

MODUS VIVENDI

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**The Electoral Success of the Extreme
Right in Great Britain and France**

Allison Dalton



The Growth of the U.S. Militia Movement

Amber Johnson



**Taiwan and South Korea: A Comparative
Study of Economic Development, 1950-
1980**

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A Diamond War Lasts Forever

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About This Journal

Modus Vivendi is Latin for "way of life," but in international studies parlance, it signifies "a state of affairs in which two opposing parties agree to disagree." Therefore, we feel that *Modus Vivendi* is an appropriate name for a journal acting as an open forum for an intelligent discussion of global issues.

Modus Vivendi is edited by members of the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho, the national honor society for international relations. Its editors select articles which are submitted anonymously by students of Rhodes College. The evaluation process is extensive and each paper is graded according to the highest standards of research and scholarship. In this way, *Modus Vivendi* serves as a vehicle for recognizing outstanding papers pertaining to international affairs. Further, it is one of only a few journals which recognize undergraduate scholarship in this field.

This year's journal includes four papers tackling current issues in the international arena. The first examines the emergence of the extreme right in Great Britain and France. The second paper studies the growth of the United States militia movement during the 1990's and its causes. The third paper discusses South Korea's and Taiwan's paths to economic development, examining the differences in each country that led to their ultimate economic successes. The fourth and final paper compares the success of two African insurgencies in the post-Cold War period, looking at the availability of diamonds as a means to prolong the insurgent movements.

We would like to thank Brenda Somes and the faculty of the International Studies department for all of their assistance in this year's publication.

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The Electoral Success of the Extreme Right in Great Britain and France

Allison Dalton

INTRODUCTION

At various times throughout history, parties of the right in Western Europe have been a significant political force. Following World War II and the defeat of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, however, the extreme right in Western Europe more or less fell out of vogue for many years. The 1980s marked the beginning of a comeback for the extreme right. A rise in the number of extreme right parties as well as a rise in their electoral support was soon noticed. As Lauri Karvonen states in her article "The New Extreme Right-Wingers in Western Europe,"¹

During the last 10-15 years, neo-fascism and right-wing extremism have definitely left their positions as political *curiosa* to occupy a part of the centre stage in European politics. Although comparatively few commentators still view movements of this kind as an immediate threat to the stability of democracy itself in Western Europe, it has become increasingly difficult to dismiss them as insignificant and isolated groups.²

Though many people associate modern times with an increase in international cooperation and democracy, the rise of the extreme right clearly contrasts with this.

With the end of the Cold War, the resurgence of the right has become an even more important political force as a result of several factors. One important factor is that the technological advances of the 1980s have led people to feel trapped by their lack of skills in the 1990s.³ In addition to feeling displaced in the economy, many people have been unable to deal with societal changes, such as the rise of post-materialism and the breakdown of traditional society.⁴ According to Piero

Ignazi, "the extreme right-wing parties that have developed in recent years offer an answer to those demands and needs created by post-industrialism and not satisfied by traditional parties."⁵ When people feel alienated from the mainstream parties of their states, extremist parties become a more attractive option.

Countries throughout Europe now must cope with the consequences of having active parties of the extreme right as a force on the political scene. In addition to a general increase in attitudes associated with parties of the extreme right since the early 1980s, parties of the extreme right have begun to experience electoral success in several countries.⁶ However, there has not been a uniform pattern of increase in these attitudes and the parties of the extreme right have clearly had more success in some countries than they have had in others.⁷ By understanding the factors that contribute to or detract from these attitudes and from the electoral success of an extreme right political party in Western Europe, one can gain a better understanding of their ultimate significance.

The cases of the National Front in France and the British National Party in Great Britain provide a clear example of the variation that exists in the level of success experienced by extreme right parties in Western Europe. Both France and Great Britain are advanced industrialized democracies, and both states have widely known extreme right political parties. However, the National Front has had a much greater degree of electoral success than the British National Party. In fact, the National Front won 12.7% of the first round vote in the 1993 election and 15.1% of the first round vote in the 1997 election.⁸ The British National Party, on the other hand, has remained almost electorally insignificant, usually in the range of 1-2%.⁹

Although there are a variety of far-right groups in Great Britain, the British National Party has the largest membership.¹⁰ Extreme right political organizations have had a presence in Great Britain since the beginning of the 20th century. The British National Party can trace its roots back to an organization known as the National Front, which was established in Great Britain in the 1960s. This organization was a separate and distinct organization from the French extremist group known by the same name. The National Front in Great Britain, led by John Tyndall, was a coalition of several extreme right parties and was established in 1966.¹¹ The National Front

began to gain popularity in the late 1970s as a way for people to express their opposition to certain immigration policies. When ethnic Asians were expelled from Uganda following Uganda's independence from Great Britain, the British government decided to honor the British passports of the expelled Asians and allow them into the country.¹² The National Front's

“Until recently, the National Front had managed to overcome the fragmentation that has plagued many other far right groups.”

base of support began to disintegrate around the 1979 British election when opposition to this policy was integrated into the more mainstream Tory party platform following a statement made by Margaret Thatcher that

British citizens were “afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture.”¹³ Due to this breakdown in its constituency, the party experienced a major split after 1979.

The British National Party is the most prominent of the factions that existed after 1979 and was established by the former leader of the National Front, John Tyndall.¹⁴ In general, the far right in Great Britain has not been very electorally successful. In 1993, however, the British National Party made its first electoral breakthrough when it managed to elect a councilor in the East End of London. This victory represented the first time that a far-right candidate had been elected in Great Britain since 1976. The British National Party's success in this election was likely due to a significant protest vote resulting from housing policy.¹⁵

The National Front in France has had a much longer and more successful history than the British National Party. Jean-Marie LePen, a former member of the National Assembly established the National Front, in 1972. The National Front set itself apart from other far-right movements in France in two distinct ways. First, until recently, the National Front had managed to overcome the fragmentation that has plagued many other far-right groups, including the British National Front.¹⁶ Second, the National Front chose to pursue a different strategy from the beginning than many other far-right

groups at the time. David Matas states that, "At the time when the extreme right was getting less than 1 percent of the vote, as in 1981 and previously, it was not immediately obvious that an electoral strategy was the most fruitful. Other extreme-right elements were involved in violence, propagandizing, or in attempts to infiltrate the traditional parties."¹⁷ Ultimately, the pursuit of this "electoral" strategy began to pay off in 1983.

It was in 1983 that a National Front candidate was elected to the municipal council in Dreux, marking the National Front's first major electoral victory.¹⁸ Following this initial victory in Dreux, the National Front began to benefit from a slight shift to the right in the French electoral vote. Beginning in 1986, the National Front was also a noticeable force in elections for the National Assembly. 1986 was an important year for the National Front because the temporary change in French electoral rules from the two-round system to proportional representation allowed the National Front to elect 35 people to the National Assembly.¹⁹ In each of the last four elections, the National Front has won over 9% of the first round vote. However, despite the fact that the switch back to the two-round voting system has not allowed them to gain enough seats to be a major force in the National Assembly, they have clearly been more successful than the British National Party.²⁰

This paper will examine the question of why the National Front had greater electoral success than the British National Party did in the 1990s. This decade was chosen for several reasons. First, while the British National Party has been around since 1979, it did not manage to get anyone elected

until 1993. By the time the British National Party became electorally significant, the National Front was also experiencing success in France. Thus, it seems appropriate to pick a time period in which

"In each of the last four elections, the National Front has won over 9% of the first round vote."

both parties were experiencing some degree of success. Second, the majority of the data relevant to this topic deals with the 1990s. In answering this question, hypotheses will be generated based on an examination of economic data and public opinion about the future of the economy, trends in public opin-

ion data related to immigration, the ability of each party's platform to adapt to the changing needs of its constituency, variations in electoral rules, and differences in political culture. In order to test each hypothesis, evidence will be provided. Analysis will be performed to determine the significance of each of these factors. Finally, this paper will attempt to reach a conclusion as to why the National Front has experienced greater electoral success than the British National Party.

HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis A: Economic Conditions

One possible explanation for the National Front's greater success is that the economic conditions were worse in France than they were in Great Britain in the 1990s. Public support for government depends on many variables, including the performance of the economy.²¹ Many people believe that the government is responsible for producing positive economic outcomes.²² Poor economic conditions, especially in the form of rising unemployment, can often lead to a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction among voters. If the economic situation gets bad enough, a "crisis phenomena"²³ can occur where support for mainstream parties and governments becomes seriously damaged. If voters feel that the mainstream political parties are unable or unwilling to remedy the economic situation, they become more likely to turn to an extremist group. Therefore, if the economic situation is worse in France than it is in Great Britain, it follows that French voters would be more likely to turn to the National Front than the British voters would be to turn to the British National Party.

This analysis will be conducted by examining various economic indices, such as unemployment rates and the per capita GDP growth rate during the 1990s. Furthermore, public opinion data about economic expectations will also be examined. This hypothesis will be eliminated if it is found that the economic situation has been the same in these two states, or if it is found that the difference in the economic situations is not significant enough to explain the discrepancy in electoral success.

Hypothesis B: Immigration

Another possible explanation of why the National Front has experienced greater electoral success is that immigration is perceived to be a more significant problem in France than in Great Britain. Both countries have experienced immigration from a variety of regions in the last decade. Immigration often results in an increase in racism and immigrants are often blamed for a wide variety of societal problems of which they may or may not be the root cause, such as unemployment. The issue of immigration is clearly a salient one in Great Britain. Kathleen Paul describes the lack of clarity that immigrants must face over whether or not they are really "British" when she writes, "This potential for flexibility and shifting boundaries exists because there is a perception, based on decades of reconstructive language and a succession of immigration and nationality laws, that black-skinned people are generally immigrants and that immigrants are less than British."²⁴ Hostility towards immigrants also exists in France, where "...it is not surprising that the MRAP [Mouvement Contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitie entre les Peuples] in 1980 identifies the worst threat to immigrants as a 'state racism' which systematically singled them out as those who should pay the price for economic ills."²⁵ Because anti-immigration sentiments are important in both the platform of the National Front and of the British National Party, the more sensitive the citizens are to the presence of immigrants, the more likely it is that voters will turn to an extreme right party that is against immigration. In order to determine the impact of immigration on Great Britain and France, an examination of immigration data will be undertaken. In addition, public opinion data regarding the perceived effects of immigrants will also be examined. This hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that immigration has been a more significant problem in Great Britain or if it is found that citizens do not have negative attitudes about immigration in either state.

Hypothesis C: Flexible Strategy

It is also possible that the National Front has experienced greater electoral success than the British National Party due to the nature of its party platform. More specifically, it is possible that the National Front has had greater success due to the adoption of a more vague, amorphous party platform. A

flexible strategy and a broad ideology allow a party to adapt itself continually in order to attract voters who are disenchanted with mainstream parties. A more rigid party platform or the concentration on a single issue may fail to maximize a party's ability to attract constituents. Furthermore, the more extreme a party platform is, the more difficulty it may have attracting voters. A successful extremist party platform is one that is different enough from mainstream parties to be able to attract disenchanted voters, but not so different that it is perceived as being outrageous.

In order to test this hypothesis, each party's manifesto will be examined for several key criteria. First, the party platforms will be examined to see how specific they are about their policy ideas. Second, the platforms will be examined to see which one is more extreme, and thus less likely to be able to attract voters. Third, the platforms will be examined for change over time in order to see whether the platforms have been adapted to appeal to the greatest number of potential constituents. This hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that the British National Party has utilized a flexible strategy or if it is found that the National Front's party platform is less vague or more extreme than the platform of the British National Party.

Hypothesis D: Nature of the Electoral System

The greater success of the National Front may also be explained by the differences between the electoral rules in France and Great Britain. The electoral rules of a state determine how the elections are run and can often make the difference in whether or not a party survives. Great Britain has a "first past the post" system that seems to lend itself to a two party system.²⁶ France, on the other hand, has a much more flexible two-ballot system that allows significant protest voting in the first round that not only supports a multi-party system, but has also allowed the survival of smaller, fringe parties in the past.²⁷

In order to test this hypothesis, the electoral returns must be examined for evidence of protest voting in France. The percentage of the vote received by the National Front in the first round will be compared with the percentage of vote received by the National Front in the second round. Furthermore, the general success of fringe parties in both states must

be examined to discover if the National Front and the British National Party are part of a broader electoral pattern for fringe parties in their respective states. In order to test this part of the hypothesis, electoral returns from both Great Britain and France will be examined to determine what percentage of the vote in each state goes to major parties and what percentage goes to smaller, fringe parties. This hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that the National Front has not been subject to first round protest voting or if it is found that extremist parties other than the British National Party in Great Britain have been able to survive in the British electoral system.

“People who are not satisfied with democracy and do not trust their institutions are more likely to turn to an extremist party.”

Hypothesis E: Political Culture

The final hypothesis that will be discussed is the possibility that the political culture in France lends itself more to the support of fringe parties than the political culture in Great Britain. Political culture plays a significant role in many aspects of society, specifically in how people handle their dissatisfaction with the government. A nation that has a long history of political conflict is less likely to have faith in its institutions and more likely to support the existence of an extreme party than a nation that has a history of stable democracy. In order to test this hypothesis, the number and salience of cleavages in the political culture in Great Britain and France will be compared to see which society seems more likely to support the existence of an extremist party. Furthermore, public opinion data will be examined to determine if there are any differences in the levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions in Great Britain and France. People who are not satisfied with democracy and do not trust their institutions are more likely to turn to an extremist party. This hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that Great Britain has more significant cleavages in its political culture. This hypothesis will also be rejected if it is found that the citizens of Great Britain have less trust in institutions and less satisfaction with democ-

racy than the citizens of France.

EVIDENCE

Hypothesis A: Economic Conditions

Hypothesis A suggests that the National Front has been more electorally successful than the British National Party because of differences in their economic situations. Specifically, this hypothesis speculates that the economic conditions were worse in France in the 1990s than they were in Great Britain. By comparing certain economic indices, it can be determined if there is any significant difference between the economic conditions in the two states. The two economic indices that will be used to determine if there is a significant difference between the two economies are the unemployment rate and the growth rate of the GDP per capita. It is also important to examine how the citizens of these two states feel about their respective economic situations because it is not only how the economy is actually doing, but also people's perceptions about how it is doing, that may color their political leanings.

The unemployment rate is one part of the economy that has the potential to have a significant effect on all voters in a society. Because of its very tangible effects on many of the voters, the unemployment rate tends to be an important issue

Unemployment Rates 1990-2000

Year	% Unemployed	
	France	Great Britain
1990	9.1	6.9
1991	9.6	8.8
1992	10.4	10.1
1993	11.8	10.5
1994	12.3	9.7
1995	11.8	8.7
1996	12.5	8.2
1997	12.4	7.0
1998	11.8	6.3
1999	11.1	6.1
2000	10.0	5.8

source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

to the many people. In Great Britain, “[i]n every general election between 1979 and 1992, the issue of unemployment was at or near the top of a list of voters’ concerns...”²⁸ If the unemployment situation becomes bad enough, voters tend to turn away from the mainstream parties as they lose faith in the current government’s ability to solve the problem. According to Michael Minkenberg, “A sense of crisis is equally prevalent in France as growing fears of unemployment, especially in the private sector, increase discontent with the shape of French society – in 1993, 45 per cent of the French considered it necessary to change society completely – as low levels of trust in the government indicate.”²⁹ Thus, it seems logical that France would have a higher rate of unemployment than Great Britain, given that the National Front has experienced more public support than the British National Party.

The empirical evidence for the first part of Hypothesis A supports the hypothesis because France experienced a higher rate of unemployment than Great Britain in every year of the period in question. Thus, the higher unemployment rate in France has contributed to the success of the National Front.

Another important economic indicator for this hypothesis is the gross domestic product per capita. Comparing the growth rates for the per capita GDPs of France and Great Britain will shed additional light on the economic situations of the two countries beyond the unemployment rate. A higher rate of growth in the GDP per capita will indicate a stronger overall economy. Thus, according to Hypothesis A, one would expect that the average

growth rate of the GDP per capita would be higher in Great Britain than it is in France. According to the 1998 CIA Handbook of International Economic Statistics, the average annual growth rate for France between 1991 to 1997

“The unemployment rate is one part of the economy that has the potential to have a significant effect on all voters in a society.”

was .87%, while Great Britain experienced an average annual growth rate of 1.41% in the same period.³⁰ During the period in question, Great Britain experienced an average annual

growth rate that was more than one and half times the average annual growth rate experienced by France. Thus, the empirical evidence here further supports Hypothesis A because Great Britain experienced a significantly stronger average annual growth rate in its per capita GDP during the period in question.

However, hard economic data is not the only important consideration when examining how the economy affects people. It is also important to look at how people expect the economy to perform in the future. People who have an expectation that their economic situations are going to get worse are more likely to be dissatisfied with the status quo than people who expect their economic situations to improve. The Eurobarometer, which interviews Europeans on wide range of issues, helps to shed some light on these expectations. When asked in October and November of 1999 about their expectations regarding their country's economic situation in the year 2000, 25 % of the French sample expected the situation to get worse while only 21 % of the British samples had the same expectation. However, there were more people who expected the situation to get better in France than there were in Great Britain (22% vs. 20%).³¹ Thus, in 1999, there were slightly more people on both extremes in France.

However, when the Eurobarometer asked people in October and November of the previous year (1998) about their expectations regarding their country's economic situation in 1999, 29% of interviewed French people expected the situation to get worse while 41% of Britons had the same expectation. In that same study, 23% of French expected the situation to get better while only 13% of Britons expected improvement.³² At first, this study seems to take away from the explanatory value of Hypothesis A. It is possible, though, that this particular study does not indicate a larger pattern of economic pessimism in Great Britain. The Eurobarometer survey points out that the British pessimism in 1998 was most likely due to people's concern over not participating in the euro.

This possibility is further supported by data regarding expectations for 1997. When asked about their economic expectations for 1997, 56% of people from France expected their economic situation to get worse, while only 25% of Britons had the same feelings.³³ Thus, it seems that the larger pattern at work here indicates that French citizens have generally been

more pessimistic about their economic situation than British citizens have been.³⁴

The three types of evidence examined for Hypothesis A all support the hypothesis. Overall, Great Britain seems to have experienced a stronger economy than France has during the period in question. This was shown through the fact that unemployment rates have been higher in France than in Great Britain and that Great Britain has experienced higher average per capita GDP growth rates. In addition to this hard economic data, it was shown that French citizens seem to be more pessimistic about the economy. Thus, Hypothesis A is accepted and the economic situation is clearly a factor in the greater success of the National Front.

Hypothesis B: Immigration

Hypothesis B suggests that the National Front has derived its electoral success from a greater concern over immigration in France than in Great Britain. For many years, immigration has been an issue in both of these states. While both the National Front and the British National Party address immigration issues in their party platforms, it is necessary to determine in which society immigration is the more salient issue. In order to determine in which society immigration is the more salient, various types of public opinion data will be examined.

The World Values Survey provides a good starting point for examining how French and British citizens feel about immigration. The World Values Survey interviewed 1,344 people in Great Britain and 792 people in France on a wide variety of topics. One variable in the World Values Survey asks people to rate themselves politically on a scale of one to ten, one being extremely left and ten being extremely right (see Graph 1). Not surprisingly, the greatest percentage of people in both Great Britain and France placed themselves in the middle (five).

Another variable asked people to pick out groups of individuals who they would not like to have as neighbors. Among the possible groups that the interviewees could pick was foreigners. In France, 12.8% of the people interviewed mentioned foreigners among the groups that they would not like to have as neighbors. In Great Britain, only 10.8% of people

GRAPH 1- LEFT/RIGHT SELF PLACEMENT					
FRANCE					
		Freq.	%	Valid %	Cumul.
					%
Valid	1 left	40	4.0	5.1	5.1
	2	32	3.2	4.0	9.1
	3	136	13.6	17.2	26.3
	4	123	12.3	15.5	41.8
	5	222	22.2	28.0	69.8
	6	79	7.9	10.0	79.8
	7	68	6.8	8.6	88.4
	8	65	6.5	8.2	96.6
	9	13	1.3	1.6	98.2
	10 right	14	1.4	1.8	100.0
	Total	792	79.0	100.0	
Missing	0 na	95	9.5		
	99 dk	115	11.5		
	Total	210	21.0		
Total		1002	100.0		

GREAT BRITAIN					
		Freq.	%	Valid %	Cumul.
					%
Valid	1 left	42	2.8	3.1	3.1
	2	38	2.6	2.8	6.0
	3	113	7.6	8.4	14.4
	4	143	9.6	10.6	25.0
	5	491	33.1	36.5	61.5
	6	184	12.4	13.7	75.2
	7	153	10.3	11.4	86.6
	8	109	7.3	8.1	94.7
	9	26	1.8	1.9	96.7
	10 right	45	3.0	3.3	100.0
	Total	1344	90.6	100.0	
Missing	0 na	33	2.2		
	99 dk	107	7.2		
	Total	140	9.4		
Total		1484	100.0		

mentioned foreigners (see Graph 2). While the percentage in France is clearly higher than the percentage in Great Britain, even more light can be shed on the subject when the correlation between these two variables is examined.

In order to test the correlation between placement on the left-right scale and feelings about foreigners, the left-right scale was consolidated into three larger categories (see Graph 3). People who gave themselves a one, two, or three were considered "left." People who gave themselves a four through seven were "moderate" and eight through ten were considered "right." The data was then cross-tabulated with the num-

GRAPH 2- NEIGHBORS:FOREIGNERS
FRANCE

		Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumul ative %
Valid	1 mention	128	12.8	12.8	12.8
	2 no	874	87.2	87.2	100.0
	Total	1002	100.0	100.0	
GREAT BRITAIN					
		Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumul ative %
Valid	1 mention	160	10.8	10.8	10.8
	2 no	1324	89.2	89.2	100.0
	Total	1484	100.0	100.0	

bers of people who did and did not mention foreigners. This cross-tabulation revealed two interesting things. First, of all the people who considered themselves to be on the right, 35.87% of French people and only 16.67% of Britons mentioned foreigners among the people who they would not like to have as neighbors. This is significant because these are the people who would seem likely to vote for parties like the National Front and the British National Party. Not only are they on the political right, but they also have negative feelings towards immigrants and foreigners. The second interesting result is the flip side of the first results. When looking at all the people who mentioned foreigners in their response, 30% in France and 22.1% in Great Britain placed themselves on the right. The highest groups of people who mentioned foreigners in both states were in the middle, 51.8% in France and 62.5% in Great Britain. The reason why this number may be so high in Great Britain is the integration of anti-immigration policies into the platform of the Tories. However, all of this analysis leads to the same conclusion. The correlation between being on the right and having negative feelings about foreigners is higher in France than it is in Great Britain.

Public opinion data provided by the Eurobarometer reinforces this conclusion. In the spring of 1997, Eurobarometer asked people to give themselves a number between one and ten to indicate how racist they perceived themselves to be.

GRAPH 3- IDEOLOGY VS. NEIGHBORS:FOREIGNERS
FRANCE

		Neighbors: Foreigners		Total
		Mention	No	
	Left	20	188	208
Ideology	Moderate	57	435	492
	Right	33	59	92
	Total	110	682	792
GREAT BRITAIN				
		Neighbors: Foreigners		Total
		Mention	No	
	Left	21	172	193
Ideology	Moderate	85	886	971
	Right	30	150	180
	Total	136	1208	1344

People who gave themselves numbers between seven and ten were classified as "very racist". People who gave themselves four through six were classified as "quite racist". A two or three meant a little racist and people who gave themselves a one were considered "not racist at all". While 8% of British people considered themselves "very racist", 16% of French placed themselves in the same category. In Great Britain, 35% of people considered themselves not racist at all, while only 25% of French people said the same. For each category, Great Britain was almost identical to the European average whereas France was significantly more racist.³⁵

In the fall of 1997, the Eurobarometer also asked people about their feelings regarding the number of foreigners living in their country. France fell above the EU average with 46% of its citizens feeling that there are too many immigrants. Great Britain fell below the EU average with 42% feeling that there are too many immigrants. On the other end of the spectrum, only 7% of French people believe that there are not many immigrants while 12% of Britons have the same perception.³⁶ Furthermore, 12% of people in both countries indicated that they found the presence of people of other nationalities "disturbing." This statistic is compounded by the fact that 12% of Britons and 19% of French citizens indicated that they found the presence of people of another race "disturbing." However, in the case of accepting people of other nationalities, both Great Britain and France were actually slightly below the EU average of 13%. In the case of accepting other races, the French

were significantly above the EU average of 15%, while Great Britain was significantly below the average.³⁷

Thus, one would expect that immigration is perceived to be a bigger problem in France than it is in Great Britain. However, this is not exactly the case. When the Eurobarometer asked people whether or not they agreed with the statement "Our country has reached its limits; if there were more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems," 69% of French people and 66% of British people tended to agree with this statement. In this case, both states were above the European average of 65%.

In 1997, and again in 1998, Europeans were asked about how they identify themselves. In 1997, 57% of Britons indicated that they identify themselves by their nationality only, as opposed to identifying themselves as Europeans or as both Europeans and their nationality. France, on the other hand, only had 32% of its citizens identifying themselves by nationality only. French citizens tended to identify themselves by both their nationality and their status as a European.³⁸ These results were similar to the results found when the same survey was given again in 1998. 60% of Britons identified themselves by nationality only while 31% of French citizens did the same.³⁹ This seems to indicate that in general, Britons have a stronger sense of national identity that French citizens do.

Overall, the evidence supports Hypothesis B. As indicated by the World Values Survey, there is a stronger correlation between being on the political right and having negative feelings about foreigners in France than there is in Great Britain. French citizens are generally more racist and more French citizens feel that there are too many immigrants in their country. While both countries found the presence of other nationalities equally disturbing and Britons seem to have a stronger sense of national identity, the other evidence clearly tips the scales towards supporting Hypothesis B. Therefore, Hypothesis B will be accepted.

Hypothesis C: Flexible Strategy

Hypothesis C suggests that the party whose leadership is more successful at identifying the concerns of the electorate will be more electorally successful. Less extreme platforms will tend to attract a greater number of voters. There-

fore, it is important to compare the party platforms of both the National Front and the British National Party in order to determine which one best links its platform to the concerns of potential constituents.

The 1997 Manifesto of the British National Party, published on the website of the British National Party, advocates the development of British Nationalism, of which there are seven major tenets. (1) British Nationalism requires political sovereignty for Great Britain. The BNP completely objects to Great Britain's involvement in supra-national organizations. (2) British Nationalism requires the preservation of the British ethnic identity. While the BNP accepts that limited numbers of other Europeans could be allowed to immigrate, it does not accept the presence of non-European immigrants. (3) British Nationalism requires a return to economic nationalism. This means that imports must be controlled and that traditional British industries should be restored and protected. (4) The BNP objects to the separatist movements in Scotland and Wales. British Nationalism requires a return to national unity. (5) The "wider British family" of ethnic British throughout the world must be strengthened. (6) British Nationalism requires the protection of British culture. This can be accomplished by not allowing the cultural influence of foreign nations. (7) British Nationalism requires Great Britain to recognize its duty to put itself first. In addition to supporting British Nationalism, the BNP advocated withdrawing from the EU and establishing a "white commonwealth trading area" with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.⁴⁰

Some of the views contained in the manifesto seem more extremist than others. What is truly significant about the views stated in the manifesto, however, is the tone of the rhetoric it contains. The rhetoric in the manifesto of the British National Party can only be described as inflammatory. Therefore, it seems that many potential voters would perceive these views as extreme.

At first glance, the official website of the National Front appears to provide as many specifics about its ideas as the British National Party's website does. In the French version, sixteen different topics are addressed, ranging from immigration to agriculture to education. However, the only topics that seem to have any real degree of extremism to them are the discussions on Europe and immigration. Other than these two top-

ics, the information seems rather vague and inoffensive. One thing that is clear, however, is that the National Front advocates the preservation of nationalism. According to the National Front, nationalism can only be maintained by turning away from the increasingly global nature of the world. The National Front states that, "Nowadays, the identity of France is threatened by the cosmopolitan view held by the political establishment. The Front National sees itself as the stronghold and bastion of national identity against cosmopolitan projects aimed at mixing peoples and cultures."⁴¹ However, this does not mean

"Electoral rules can have a significant impact on the state."

that the leader of the National Front, Jean-Marie LePen admits to being racist or xenophobic. Rather, he claims to be defending the rights of French people. The National Front claims that democracy is no longer respected in France because there is not fair representation of all political groups, there is no freedom of expression, and the people are not sovereign. Thus, the National Front portrays itself almost as the "white knight" of the French state. It claims that it hunts down corruption and works in the interest of French citizens. The National Front does not claim to be a party of the right, but instead says that it has crossed political divisions and "has rallied people of all political colours and all social and professional backgrounds."⁴²

One factor that may contribute to the lack of specifics is that the platform of the National Front has been amorphous at times. According to Edward Declair, author of *Politics on the Fringe*, "the Front has proven quite capable of adapting its political agenda to the changing political climate."⁴³ Although the National Front has truly tried to concern itself with a wide variety of issues, the media tends to associate only the issue of immigration with the party. While immigration has clearly been one of the most resolute stances of the National Front, other aspects of the platform have been both present and more malleable than the issue of immigration. For example, its original economic stance of pro-market neoliberalism has become more focused on protectionism in order to attract more votes from the working class.⁴⁴

The National Front's amorphous platform has allowed it to avoid being pegged as "too extreme" by all voters. Rather,

it tends to focus on the issues that it knows are of great concern to many French voters, namely immigration, the economic situation, and European integration. It has tried to depict its platform as consistent with the desires of the majority of French citizens. Many of their ideas are not new to the realm of French politics. The British National Party, on the other hand, has not adopted this kind of strategy. They are much more specific about their ideas, and these ideas in many ways seem to be out of line with the usual themes of British politics. This specificity and extremism have hurt the British National Party, because many voters just find the party to be too extreme.

In order to disprove this hypothesis, evidence was needed to show that the British National Party has a platform that appeals to more voters. However, this is clearly not the case. The British National Party's more prominently extremist views nearly every issue has hurt, rather than helped, its chances for electoral success. The National Front has avoided extremism on many issues, except for those that they know will appeal to their most likely constituents. Given that the National Front has exercised a strategy of appealing to as many voters as possible, this hypothesis will be accepted.

Since the research for this hypothesis was originally conducted, the website for the British National Party has been completely overhauled. Instead of publishing the actual manifesto of the party, the website now displays the British Na-

"The electoral rules of Great Britain clearly bias the system against smaller parties."

website even has a link to the National Front. Although the British National Party is less specific about its ideas on many issues in its new website, the rhetoric it contains definitely still has a distinct tone of extremism. Therefore, this hypothesis still stands for the purposes of this paper. The British National Party may now be attempting to adopt a more flexible strategy similar to that of the National Front, but that does not change the fact that it has frequently voiced extremist views in

tional Party's views on specific issues. Interestingly, the new website bears a striking resemblance to the website of the National Front. In fact, the new British National Party

the past that have turned off many voters.

Hypothesis D: Electoral Rules

Hypothesis D suggests that the discrepancy in electoral success between the National Front and the British National Party can be explained by differences in their electoral systems. According to Hypothesis D, it is possible that the difference in electoral success is due to systemic differences that make it harder for any small parties to survive in the British system. Electoral rules can have a significant impact on the state. Colin Pilkington quotes Reeve and Ware in his book *Issues in British Politics*: "electoral systems are not mere details but key causal factors in determining outcomes."⁴⁵ First, the nature of these two electoral systems will be examined and then it will be shown whether or not these systems have been able to support fringe parties in the past.

The electoral system in Great Britain is a first-past-the-post system in which the candidate with the most votes wins. This system was adopted in Great Britain because it tends to satisfy the British desire for "clear results and strong government."⁴⁶ Because of the way that British voting works, a clear link between the constituency and the elected official is established.⁴⁷ Furthermore, this system tends to support only a two-party system. Currently, the two strongest parties are the Conservative and the Labour parties. According to Paul Webb and Justin Fisher in their article "The Changing British Party System," "The SMSP (Single Member Simple Plurality) electoral system is a key factor in the maintenance of the British party system because it militates against the breakthrough of a third party."⁴⁸ However, because a candidate is only required to get the most votes, not a majority of votes, it is possible that with the rise of other parties, the candidate can be elected even though he or she receives less than fifty per cent of the vote.⁴⁹ Although the idea of electoral reform has been brought up by various parties in the past, Great Britain has yet to make any changes that would facilitate the survival of smaller parties.

France, on the other hand, has a multi-party system. The French system is a combination system that utilizes two ballots. If the candidate receives a majority of the votes in the first ballot, he or she wins. If no one gets a majority, there is a second ballot and a candidate must only get a plurality to win. The fragmented political culture in France tends to produce

many parties. While this system does allow these parties, it often requires them to form electoral coalitions in order to be successful.⁵⁰ David Hanley goes on to state that, "In the late 1990's, the French party system has settled into a kind of stability or at least it seems able to manage the demands of a varied society without enormous difficulty. It provides governments that function, even if voters do not always like the results."⁵¹ Thus, there does not seem to be the same impetus for reform in the French system that there is in the British system.

Clearly, there are important differences between these two electoral systems. The question now is whether or not

"Britons were more satisfied with democracy than were the French."

those differences have had a significant impact on the success of fringe parties. Both states have had two general elections during the period in question. Great Britain had

general elections in 1992 and 1997, while France had elections in 1993 and 1997. The British election in 1992 showed the vast majority of votes going to the Conservatives (41.93%) and the Labour Party (34.39%). The Liberal Democrats were the only other significant party with 17.85% of the vote. None of the smaller regional parties won more than about 2% of the national vote. "Other" parties won only 1.43% of the vote and no seats in Parliament.⁵² The British election of 1997 paints a similar picture. The Conservatives and Labour led the pack with 31.5% and 44.4% respectively. The Liberal Democrats earned 17.2%.⁵³ Thus, while the Liberal Democrats are not an insignificant force, the national system is clearly geared towards the two main parties, the Conservatives and Labour.

French elections, on the other hand, do not show similar trends. In the 1993 election, second round ballots were distributed more evenly among three parties, the RPR (Rally for the Republic), the UDF (Union for French Democracy), and the PS (Socialist Party). These parties won 28.27%, 25.84%, and 28.25% respectively. However, there were also four other parties that won more than 2% of the second round vote, including the National Front.⁵⁴ These results are not an anomaly; rather, they are the types of results that one would expect given the electoral rules in France. Clearly, the French system is less

geared towards two parties than is the British system.

However, there is another possible reason why the French system allows for the survival of smaller parties. David Hanley describes the French system as a "core-periphery" system in which only a select number of the parties actually have a chance of forming a government. According to Hanley, "Outside this core lie the others who have become pure repositories of protest, free to argue maximalist cases precisely because they are never likely to be in a position to turn their theses into policy."⁵⁵ The two-ballot system in France allows for protest voting in the first round. Given that there are so many parties, it is highly unlikely that any one candidate will receive the majority needed to win in the first round. Therefore, French citizens have the option of expressing a protest vote in the first round, and voting differently in the second round. As David Hanley states, "Even the much maligned two-ballot system provides, at the first ballot, a chance both for voters to protest before voting for real and for parties to show their weight."⁵⁶ In order to discover if this possible protest vote has contributed to the success of the National Front, first round ballots must be compared to second round ballots. The availability of data regarding the two separate votes make the 1993 election an optimal case study for this part of Hypothesis D. From this data, it is clear that the National Front has benefited from a protest vote. In the 1993 French legislative election, the National Front won 12.41% of the vote in the first round, but only 5.66% in the second round.⁵⁷ These numbers support the hypothesis that not only is there protest voting in France, but that this protest voting has contributed to the success of the National Front.

Thus, differing electoral rules have clearly contributed to the success of the National Front. The electoral rules of Great Britain clearly bias the system against smaller parties. Not only is the French system less geared towards having just two parties, but it also allows a first round protest vote that enables smaller parties like the National Front to survive. Therefore, this hypothesis will be accepted.

Hypothesis E: Political Culture

Hypothesis E suggests that the National Front has had greater electoral success than the British National Party because French political culture is more inclined to support fringe

parties than is British political culture. Because political culture can be an amorphous concept, the best way to test this hypothesis is through public opinion. Thus, public opinion data will be examined in order to gain a better understanding about satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions in Great Britain and France.

In October/November of 1999, the Eurobarometer asked people how satisfied they were with the way democracy worked in their countries. 62% of British people described themselves as very satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy while only 57% of French people put themselves in the same category. 28% of British people described themselves as not very satisfied or not at all satisfied, while 41% of French people put themselves in the same category. In this case, Great Britain was above the European average for satisfaction with democracy and France was almost exactly average.⁵⁸ The combination of all of these figures leads to the firm conclusion that Britons were more satisfied with democracy than were the French.

These figures are consistent with levels from the previous Eurobarometer survey conducted in March/April of 1999. At that time, 64% of Britons and 59% of French citizens described themselves as satisfied with their national democracy. Furthermore, Great Britain was above average in satisfaction while France was slightly below the European average.⁵⁹ Thus, the public opinion data regarding satisfaction with democracy clearly supports this hypothesis.

In the Standard Eurobarometer 45, a study was published that surveyed opinions in the spring of 1995 and the spring of 1996 about citizens' feeling towards their national parliaments. France's trust in its national parliament slightly increased while Great Britain experienced an eight-point drop in its trust level. In addition, the level of satisfaction with the national parliament was higher in France than it was in Great Britain in both years. Furthermore, France was either at or above the EU average for those two years, while Great Britain was below the EU average for both years.⁶⁰

This data contrasts with the levels of public opinion previously provided by the 1999 study on democracy. It also contrasts with a similar study done for the Standard Eurobarometer 51. In the Standard Eurobarometer 51, the average level of trust in four institutions was measured. The

four institutions were the civil service, the national Parliament, the national government, and political parties. 34% of Britons trusted these institutions while only 32% of French citizens felt the same. Both states were below the EU average in this study.⁶¹ It does not seem that a 2% difference, given that both states below the EU average, is significant enough to come to any meaningful conclusion regarding overall satisfaction with institutions. Thus, this variable washes out for the purposes of this hypothesis.

In order to disprove this hypothesis, evidence was needed that would show that the Britons are less satisfied with democracy than French citizens are and that Britons have less trust in their institutions. As the data shows, a meaningful conclusion could not be reached in regard to trust in institutions. While the evidence regarding trust in institutions is not significant either way, it is clear from the evidence presented that Britons tended to be more satisfied with their national democracy. Therefore, this hypothesis will be accepted.

CONCLUSION

This research paper sought to explain why the National Front has had greater electoral success than the British National Party in the 1990s. Five hypotheses have been presented and tested. While the evidence presented showed that some hypotheses were stronger than others, the ultimate answer to this question seems to stem from a combination of all five hypotheses.

Hypothesis A stated that economic conditions have been worse in France than in Great Britain, resulting in French citizens being more likely to turn to an extremist party. Hypothesis A was then tested by examining the unemployment rate and the growth rate of the per capita GDP in both states. Furthermore, public opinion in these two states about whether or not people expected the economy to improve was also examined. It was found that France experienced both a higher unemployment rate and a lower per capita GDP growth rate during the period in question. In addition, French attitudes tended to be more negative than British attitudes about the future of the economy. Therefore, this hypothesis was accepted for the purposes of this paper.

Hypothesis B suggested that greater concern over immigration in France than in Great Britain could explain why the National Front has experienced greater electoral success than the British National Party. Hypothesis B was tested by examining public opinion data in order to investigate people's attitudes about immigrants. First, data from the World Values Survey was examined to determine if a correlation exists between being on the political right in Great Britain and France and having a negative attitude towards foreigners. Several Eurobarometer polls were used that asked questions about different aspects of people's attitudes including how racist people perceived themselves to be, how they felt about the number of foreigners living in their country, whether or not they found the presence of foreigners "disturbing", and whether or not they perceived the number of minorities to be a problem. Overall, the evidence pointed towards a great concern for immigration in France and thus this hypothesis was accepted.

Hypothesis C stated that the ability of the party leadership to accurately identify the concerns of the electorate could explain why the National Front has had greater electoral success than the British National Party. In order to test this hypothesis, the platforms of both parties were examined to see to what degree extremist ideals are blatantly stated in the platform. The evidence presented showed that the platform of the British National Party is much more specific and more clearly extremist. The National Front, on the other hand, has attempted to maintain its ability to appeal to a wide variety of voters by utilizing a more vague and amorphous party platform. Therefore, this hypothesis was accepted.

Hypothesis D suggested that the variation in electoral success between the National Front and the British National Party could be explained by the electoral rules of Great Britain and France. This hypothesis was then tested by examining the electoral rules of Great Britain and France, as well as the statistics for the past few elections. The evidence for this hypothesis not only showed that the British system is more geared towards a two-party system, but also that the French electoral rules allow for a first round protest vote. This ability to protest vote in the first round and cast a different vote in the second round is what allows parties like the National Front to survive. The electoral rules of Great Britain do not allow for

this type of protest voting and thus it has been much harder for smaller parties to survive. Therefore, this hypothesis was accepted.

Hypothesis E stated that differences in political culture explain the greater success of the National Front. Hypothesis E was then tested by examining satisfaction with democracy and trust in national institutions to see which citizens were more likely to support fringe parties. While Britons tended to be more satisfied with their national democracy, the evidence regarding trust in institutions washed out. The evidence washed out because in one year Britons had more trust in institutions than the French and in another year the Britons had less trust in institutions than the French. Thus, whether or not this hypothesis was to be rejected or accepted rested on the evidence dealing with satisfaction in democracy. Therefore, because the evidence failed to clearly show that British political culture is more inclined to support fringe parties, this hypothesis was accepted for the purposes of this paper.

While all five of my hypotheses were accepted, it is clear that some of these hypotheses deserve more weight than others. The most empirically and theoretically strong hypothesis is Hypothesis B concerning immigration. There is a clear logical link between the citizens' concern over immigration and their decision to vote for a party that has a definite anti-immigration stance. Thus, this hypothesis should be given the greatest amount of weight.

However, my first hypothesis cannot stand alone. The second hypothesis about economics is also a strong hypothesis and contributes a great deal to our understanding of the National Front's electoral success. The dissatisfaction with mainstream parties that can occur when people become seriously frustrated with their economic situations has the significant possibility of leading people to vote for extremist parties.

Furthermore, while Hypotheses C and D both contribute to our understanding of the National Front's electoral success, neither one is strong enough to be sufficient on its own. Hypothesis C shows that the nature of the party platform can make a difference in the party's success. Hypothesis D explains the technical reason why the National Front has been able to survive, but is not strong enough on its own to explain why people vote for the National Front. Rather, it only explains why they can vote for the National Front. While the

theory behind Hypothesis E is solid, the empirical evidence is not as convincing as it is for some of the other hypotheses. However, political culture cannot be completely discounted as a factor of the National Front's success.

The main problem with researching these hypotheses was the imbalance of information available about the British National Party and the National Front. While there was more than enough information available about the National Front, the information about the British National Party was much more difficult to find. Also, it would have been useful for my first hypothesis to be able to examine data about how unemployed people in Great Britain and France vote. I attempted to find this data in the World Values Survey, but the unemployed portion of the sample was too small to be able to make solid conclusions. Furthermore, access to specific demographic information about people who vote for the British National Party and the National Front would have contributed to gaining an understanding of the topic.

Ultimately, this paper has shown that the National Front has experienced greater success than the British National Party for a combination of reasons. Clearly, both the economic situation and the citizens' feelings toward immigrants are at the core of the explanation. However, other factors still need to be examined before a complete understanding of the situation can be gained. For example, the parliament in Great Britain is stronger than the parliament in France. An examination of whether or not this relative strength affects the way people vote would present another facet to the question.

More questions can be asked to explain why the British National Party has not been as successful as the National Front. While this paper examined various aspects of each state's situation, it would be interesting to spend time comparing the British National Party and the National Front with other political parties in their own states. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare the National Front with an extreme right party that has had even greater success than the National Front. Given France's history of Bonapartism, it would also be interesting to study how the personality and appeal of the leaders of these groups have contributed to each group's success. Finally, it would be useful to examine the existence and causes each party's success outside of pure electoral success. While the National Front has been a factor in shifting French

politics in general to the right, the British National Party has been unable to secure a similar effect.

NOTES

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³ Peter H. Merkl Why are they so strong now? Comparative Reflections on the Revival of the Radical Right in Europe in *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, ed. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), 26.

⁴ Piero Ignazi, The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, ed. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), 53.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁶ Karvonen, The New Extreme Right-Wingers, 91.

⁷ Karvonen, The New Extreme Right-Wingers, 107.

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⁹ David Matas, The Extreme Right in the United Kingdom and France in *The Extreme Right: Freedom and Security at Risk*, ed. Aurel Braun and Stephen Scheinberg (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 90-91.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 86.

¹² *Ibid.*, 86.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 92.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 91.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 100.

²⁰ Le Monde/Supplement aux dossier du Monde 1993; Le Monde May 27 and June 3, 1997

²¹ Harold D. Clarke, The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies, *The Journal of Politics* 55, no. 4 (1993): 999.

²² *Ibid.*, 1000.

²³ Michael Minkenberg, The New Right in France and Germany,

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²⁴ Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Great Britain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 189.

²⁵ Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys, *The Politics of Racism in France* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 41.

²⁶ Paul Webb and Justin Fisher, The Changing British Party System, in *Changing Party Systems in Western Europe*, ed. David Broughton and Mark Donovan (New York: Pinter, 1999), 12-13.

²⁷ David Hanley, France: Living with Instability, in *Changing Party Systems*, ed. David Broughton and Mark Donovan (London: Pinter, 1999), 59.

²⁸ Colin Pilkington, *Issues in British Politics*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 43.

²⁹ Michael Minkenberg, The New Right in France and Germany, . 70.

³⁰ www.odci.gov/cia/di/products/hies/index.html

³¹ Standard Eurobarometer 52 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³² Standard Eurobarometer 50 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³³ Standard Eurobarometer 46 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³⁴ <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html>

³⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 47 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 48 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³⁷ Standard Eurobarometer 48 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 47 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

³⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 49 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

⁴⁰ www.bnp.net

⁴¹ www.front-nat.fr/

⁴² www.front-nat.fr/

⁴³ Edward Declair, *Politics on the Fringe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 115.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 137.

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⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 162.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

- ⁴⁸ Webb and Fisher, *The Changing British Party System*, 13.
- ⁴⁹ Pilkington, *Issues in British Politics*, 163.
- ⁵⁰ David Hanley, *France: Living with Instability*, in *Changing Party Systems*, ed. David Broughton and Mark Donovan (London: Pinter, 1999), 59.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 70.
- ⁵² Keesing s Record of World Events, News Digest for April 1992
- ⁵³ Keesing s Record of World Events, New Digest for May 1997
- ⁵⁴ Keesing s Record of World Events, New Digest for March 1993
- ⁵⁵ Hanley *France: Living with Instability*, 65.
- ⁵⁶ Hanley *France: Living with Instability*, 68.
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- ⁵⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 52 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)
- ⁵⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 51 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)
- ⁶⁰ Standard Eurobarometer 45 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)
- ⁶¹ Standard Eurobarometer 51 (europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)

The Growth of the U.S. Militia Movement

Amber Johnson

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of April 19, 1995, hundreds of federal government employees were just beginning a normal working day inside the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City. A little before nine, a yellow Ryder truck parked on the street in front of the building. Moments later, a 4,800 pound fertilizer bomb inside the truck exploded, leveling the Murrah building and killing 168 people, including 17 children, and injuring five hundred more.¹ Without question, the Oklahoma City bombing was the largest domestic terrorist attack in United States history.

Within hours of the explosion, the American public and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were convinced, due to the modus operandi and the circumstantial evidence, that the bombing was the work of middle-eastern terrorists. Many drew parallels between the Oklahoma City bombing and the 1994 World Trade Center bombing in New York, which a radical Islamic group committed. Therefore, the country was shocked when the FBI arrested their main suspect, U.S. citizen and army veteran, Timothy McVeigh. While he was not a member of an organized militia, McVeigh was an adamant supporter of the central belief of the militia movement: United States citizens must arm themselves to protect their rights and property from an increasingly tyrannical federal government. The date of the bombing—April 19, 1995—holds special significance for militias, because it was the second anniversary of the fire that destroyed the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. Militia groups see this event as the prime example of the federal government's abuse of power.

The Oklahoma City bombing was a violent wake-up call to Americans that thousands of people across the country were joining militias to voice their strong anti-government beliefs and these groups had the potential to act on their convictions with deadly results. Most predictions stated that the

aftermath of Oklahoma City would end the U.S. militia movement, due to the horrific death and destruction of the bombing, yet militia participation continued to increase after 1995. By 1996, militias had grown from a vague idea into a movement with more than 15,000 members organized into groups across the United States.² This rapid growth makes it essential to ask: Why has militia participation in the United States increased during the last decade?

It is essential to U.S. national security to understand the growth of militia participation because of the violent threat these groups present. As the Oklahoma City bombing demonstrated, there are an infinite number of targets vulnerable to terrorism within the United States. Considering the increasing sophistication of bombs—as well as chemical and biological weapons—available to terrorists, future attacks could easily surpass the death and destruction seen in Oklahoma City. Therefore it is necessary to understand the factors that caused militia participation to increase. The federal government could use an empirical understanding of these factors to reform its policies and prevent actions that fuel militia participation. Over time, these changes could alter the perception militia groups have of the federal government.

It is also important to understand the cause of the fierce anti-government sentiment held by militia members for the sake of democracy in the United States. In a time of almost unparalleled economic prosperity and unchallenged U.S. world power, thousands of militia members believe there are grave, fundamental problems within the federal government. They believe that these problems are so serious that United States citizens must take up arms against the state. This view in society suggests a complete breakdown of the democratic process, because militia members do not believe that the federal government represents nor serves their interests.

The anti-government message of these groups might indicate a larger problem within society. Militias may be an outlet for marginalized Americans: those people who have not seen the benefits of the new economy and do not agree with the dynamic social changes brought on by modernization. The rapid growth of the militia movement may reflect a growing divide within society, a split that could seriously damage the functioning of democracy in this country.

Compared to other advanced industrial democracies,

the United States has not had a significant domestic terrorism problem. Yet it is now clear that the United States is no longer immune to these types of attacks. The domestic terrorist threat presented by some militia groups gives Americans a unique opportunity to understand the rationale and belief systems of terrorist groups. We are in a better position to understand why some citizens would take up arms against the government, because many Americans share common experiences, ideals, and beliefs. A better understanding of our own terrorists will lead to insights into the actions of foreign terrorists who attack the United States and terrorism in other countries around the world.

In the next section, I will introduce three hypotheses that may serve as an answer to the question of why United States militia participation increased during the 1990's. In the following section, I will present evidence to prove or disprove each of these theories. The significance of the results will be discussed directly after the presentation of the evidence for each hypothesis. The last section, the conclusion, will identify the strongest hypothesis—if one exists that was not disproved by the evidence—and elaborate on the final results of the investigation.

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY

Hypothesis 1: Growth of the Federal Bureaucracy

When militia members, or "patriots", are asked why they joined a militia, the most common answer is to protest the increasing influence of the federal government in their daily lives. Most people accept the growth of the federal bureaucracy as the natural result of an increasingly large and complex society. However, patriots see the endless chain of government laws, licenses, tests, and regulations as a violation of the rights granted to them by the United States Constitution.

Many have even gone so far as to declare themselves exempt from the laws of the federal government. This declaration is based on the idea of dual citizenship: one can either have natural citizenship due to birth in the United States or citizenship based upon the 14th Amendment that granted freedom to all former slaves. Natural citizens can destroy all "contracts" with the federal government—such as driver's licenses, social security cards, and other legal documents—and become

“sovereign” citizens of a specific state. Patriots believe that this action revokes their United States citizenship and they are no longer subject to the laws of the federal government. While this assertion has not been upheld in a court of law, many patriots still contest it is a legitimate legal action.

Other militia members believe that many federal laws are unconstitutional because they are not explicitly written in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. The most explosive example of this disagreement is over gun control. In 1993, Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which was one of the first steps taken by the federal government to control guns. This bill created a mandatory five-day waiting period in the sale of all handguns and required background checks on all potential handgun buyers. The act was intensified by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, which banned the sale of some semi-automatic weapons.³

Militia groups view these laws as a direct attack on their right to bear arms, which they believe is clearly stated in the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. They argue that background checks will lead to gun registration, and gun registration will only be used by the federal government to disarm the citizenry. Many groups contest that guns are the final defense between patriots and the tyrannical power of the federal government. Once there are no guns in society, the government is free to establish totalitarian control over the people.

The standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco further inflamed emotion within militias regarding gun control. Both confrontations began when the involved parties sold or bought illegal weapons. The Ruby Ridge standoff started when Randy Weaver attempted to sell an illegal shotgun to an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF). The BATF became interested in the Branch Davidians at Waco when it was evident that they were stockpiling illegal weapons. Many militia members believe that gun control was used, in these cases, as an excuse by the federal government to legitimize the use of force against innocent citizens.

Yet gun control is only one example of how the role of the federal government has increased during the last decade. Other federal laws have also drawn criticism and violence from

militias, for example: higher income taxes, new farming regulations, additional environmental protection acts, stricter national education standards, and increasing social welfare programs. To many patriots, it appears that the government's control over their daily lives increases dramatically each year. Therefore, my first hypothesis is that growing federal government regulation caused the increase in militia participation during the last decade.

To test this hypothesis, I will examine statements made by patriots regarding why they joined a militia. Statements that cite an increase in government regulation as their main reason for joining a group will prove this hypothesis. It will be disproved if a majority of the statements cite another factor other than increasing federal government regulation as their primary reason for becoming a member of a militia.

Hypothesis 2: Ruby Ridge & Waco

Most militia members believed that their greatest fear—the transformation of the United States into a totalitarian state—had become reality after the violent standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco. They saw the outcomes of these confrontations as the work of an increasingly tyrannical federal government that no longer had any respect for the rights, property, and lives of its citizens. To this day, many patriots contest that the federal government attacked the *innocent* people involved in these standoffs only to exert its immense power over the citizenry, and their families and homes could easily be next.

Ruby Ridge

In October of 1989, Randy Weaver, a patriot living in rural Idaho, was arrested for selling a sawed-off shotgun to an undercover BATF agent. After failing to appear in court in 1992, Federal Marshals began to conduct surveillance of his property in order to find the best way to extract him from his isolated mountaintop home. They knew his arrest would be difficult, because Weaver had vowed that he would not go peacefully. This situation was further complicated because he lived with his wife, a son, and two daughters, and every member of his family was heavily armed at all times. On August 21, the Weaver family dog discovered three of the agents in some brush near the cabin. In the shoot-out that ensued, both Federal Marshal William Degan and Weaver's son Sam were

killed. The following day, as Weaver was exiting the cabin, his wife Vicki was shot through the head while she held their infant daughter in her arms. After a ten-day standoff, Weaver and his family finally surrendered to the authorities.⁴

Waco

The Branch Davidians, an offshoot of the Seventh-Day Adventists, were a doomsday religious group that lived in a compound in Waco, Texas. After some initial government surveillance, federal agents became interested in the group in May of 1992 when a package being shipped to the Davidians fell apart in transit, revealing inert hand grenades. Further investigation found that the Davidians had received over \$40,000 of "guns, gun parts, gun kits, grenade hulls, black powder, chemicals, fuses, and ammunition" through UPS shipments during the previous four years.⁵

By February 28, 1993, BATF agents had obtained a search warrant and were ready to stage a surprise raid on the Davidians. That morning, as seventy federal agents stormed the compound, the resulting gunfire killed four BATF agents and several Davidians. For the next 51 days, a standoff ensued until the morning of April 19, 1993. During the final FBI assault, a fire began that quickly spread throughout the compound and burned it to the ground. It is still debated whether the fire was a result of the FBI assault or if it was started by the Davidians, but regardless of the cause over 80 Davidians, 17 of whom were children, lost their lives in the blaze.⁶ Most Americans were horrified at the outcome of the standoff—especially Americans who had become increasingly wary of the growing power of the federal government.

Militias state that their purpose is to counter the power of the federal government, and Ruby Ridge and Waco are always cited as the most significant abuses of the government's power. It is possible that these confrontations served to consolidate public opinion that the federal government had grown too powerful, and this common belief led some Americans to join militias. Therefore, my second hypothesis is that federal government's actions during the confrontations at Ruby Ridge and Waco increased militia participation during the last decade.

I will test this hypothesis by examining the available estimates of militia participation, published by Anti-Defama-

tion League and the Southern Poverty Law Center, during the 1990s. This data will be examined to determine when the largest increase in militia participation occurred. If the largest expansion of militia groups did not take place during the years following Ruby Ridge and Waco, then these conflicts could not have caused the rise in militia participation and my hypothesis will be disproved. To support or refute my findings, I will also use the statements made by patriots explaining why they joined a militia.

Hypothesis 3: Socioeconomic Change in Rural Areas

The Southern Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Reports show that militia groups are generally located in rural areas. The 1999 Intelligence Report found sixty-eight active militia groups operating in the United States and fifty-four of them were located in small towns. According to this study, an overwhelming 79 percent of the militias were based in rural areas. Therefore, it is safe to assume that a majority of militia members are directly or indirectly employed in the agricultural sector. They are either farmers, or work in businesses, schools, or other organizations that provide goods and/or services to farms.

Beginning in the 1980s, the agricultural sector has undergone radical changes in technology that have allowed greater production to occur on smaller portions of farmland, with fewer farms and workers. This trend has continued throughout the 1990s, and the number of farming jobs in the United States has decreased by almost half.

Fewer jobs and decreasing farm income have meant that, for many people, farming is no longer is a viable occupation. By 1997, 50 percent of all U.S. farm operators reported a principal occupation other than farming.⁷ Yet farm-

"The Southern Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Reports show that Militia groups are generally located in rural areas."

ers are not the only group that has experienced this economic dislocation. Businesses that supply goods and services to farmers have also suffered economically because of a declining cus-

tomers base. Many small towns throughout America have seen this process occur and have watched helplessly as their way of life has disappeared.

It is likely that after watching their standard of living drop since the 1980s, many rural Americans turned to militia ideology to explain their economic misfortunes.⁸ As illustrated by scholar William Laqueur, many patriots join militias because they consider themselves to be forgotten and neglected politically, economically, socially, and culturally.⁹ They blame the federal government for their misfortune, and they cite NAFTA, GATT, and complicated foreign-aid packages as evidence that the government's highest priorities concern other countries, not American citizens. As elaborated by author Chip Berlet, "They bought into the American Dream, fought in the war, sent their kids to college so they'd have a better life... Now they realize that their children will have a lower economic status than they do, they see their pensions eroding into a meaningless amount of money, and a lot of them have been downsized."¹⁰ Therefore, my third hypothesis is that socioeconomic change in rural America has increased militia participation during the last decade.

I will test this hypothesis by comparing the number of agricultural jobs in all fifty states during the last ten years. If socioeconomic change in rural areas caused the increase in militia participation, the states with the highest militia participation (California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, and Texas) should have also experienced a large decrease in farm employment. This hypothesis will be disproved if states with low militia participation experienced the largest agricultural unemployment.

In the next section, Evidence & Discussion, I will present evidence to prove or disprove each of my three hypotheses. Directly after the presentation of evidence for each hypothesis, I will discuss the significance of the findings.

EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1: Growth of the Federal Bureaucracy

This hypothesis stated that militia participation increased during the last decade because of growing federal government regulation. To test this hypothesis, I examined statements made by patriots regarding why they joined a militia.

It would be disproved if a majority of the statements cited another factor other than increasing federal government regulation as their primary reason for joining a group.

In all of the statements I received, every patriot referred to the potential or real power of the federal government as one of the reasons why they joined a militia. Ronald Gaydosh of the Michigan Militia Corps believes that the federal government has seriously encroached upon the rights the U.S. Constitution delegated to American citizens. He states, "I guess that I decided to join the militia when I read the 2nd Amendment to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights...[it] made me see what rights we really have and also understand why the government has to at-

tack these rights and pull out our liberty teeth, so to speak".¹¹ Jim Wade, who started the First Militia of Owen Country in Texas, believes that the real threat to the lives of Americans comes from the government. "Most people already know that

Every patriot referred to the potential or real power of the federal government as one of the reasons why they joined a militia

America's true enemies have always been domestic. Anyone or any power, be through legislation or unconstitutional laws, who reduces even in the slightest degree your right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is an enemy of liberty".¹²

However, only four of the responses referred to actual increases in federal government regulation as their primary reason for joining a militia. Patriot Robert Higgs response clearly fit this criteria: "America is becoming a police state. Each year more and more actions become either officially forbidden or officially required. The scope of individuals to decide how to live their own lives grows steadily narrower. The list of crimes grows longer and longer, and any deviance may subject the citizen to the wrath of the police, the courts, and the prisons."¹³

Kay Sheil, a member of the Missouri 51st Militia, stated "I joined because I didn't and don't like what is happening in this country. The erosion of the 2nd and 4th amendments in particular. I wanted to be a part of a traditional American or-

ganization that stands for the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution."¹⁴ Ken Bell, a member of the same militia, listed numerous actions of the federal government as the reasons why he joined the group: in regard to social security, "[the government] told me that they do not trust me to prepare for my own future"; in regards to taxes, "[the government] told me my hard-earned money is not mine, but that they can take away as much of my money as they want and give it to those who don't deserve it"; and in regards to gun control, "[the government] told me my 2nd amendment rights are not natural nor God-given, and that they can take them away from me at any time".¹⁵ Finally, Rick Earnest of the Indiana Civilian Volunteer Militia wrote that he joined the group after the passage of the Semi-Automatic Weapons Ban. He believes that the law is illegal, because in his opinion it contradicts the second amendment.¹⁶

Discussion

Every patriot stated that the growing power of the federal government was the primary reason why they joined a militia. However, the central ideology of the militia movement is that armed citizen militias are essential to counter the immense power of the federal government. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between patriots who joined a group because they believed the federal government was too strong and patriots who joined because of increasing federal government regulation. Only four of the responses I received explicitly referred to growing federal government regulation as the primary reason why they joined a militia. By explicit, I was looking for a response that more or less stated, "I joined a militia because of increasing federal government regulation in area X".

It is obvious from these responses that growing federal government regulation is an important aspect to consider when examining the recent increase in militia participation. Both the Brady Bill and Assault Weapons Ban served to galvanize public opinion within the far right that the federal government was infringing upon the right of Americans to bear arms. These laws have been successful tools to increase public support and membership for militias. However, a majority of the patriot's responses did not cite increasing federal government regulation as their primary reason for joining a mili-

tia, therefore this hypothesis is rejected.

Another problem arises when attempting to use this hypothesis to explain the rise and fall of militia participation during the last decade. The number of militia groups in the United States increased rapidly from 1994—a year after Congress approved the Brady Bill—and peaked in 1996. After that year the number of groups in the United States rapidly decreased until the present. Yet this trend cannot be explained by changes in federal government regulation alone. Since the passage of the Assault Weapons Ban, the threat of future gun control has increased with the rising number of school shootings and violent crimes. There is a growing consensus within the American public that gun control is necessary to stop the numerous gun-related deaths each year.

In 1999, Congress came very close to passing a new criminal justice bill that would require mandatory background checks before the purchase of all guns, a 72-hour waiting period at gun shows, and mandatory trigger locks. In his 1999 state of the union address, former President Bill Clinton called for all states to register handgun owners, require them to have a background check, a photo ID, and proof that they had met the safety requirements necessary to own a gun. Congress has also been under increasing pressure from public action groups to pass the stalled legislation on gun shows that failed the year before.¹⁷ Since 1996, the threat of future gun control has only increased. There has not been a decrease in the federal government's regulation of guns or anything else for that matter. Therefore, increasing federal government regulation cannot explain the change in militia participation during the last decade, because it cannot account for the decreasing number of groups since 1996.

Notwithstanding the failure of this hypothesis, it should not be completely discounted because it adds to the empirical understanding of the growth of the movement. While growing federal government regulation was not the primary cause of the increase in militia participation, it did influence the decision of some patriots that the time had come to join a militia.

Hypothesis 2: Ruby Ridge & Waco

This hypothesis stated that the federal government's actions during the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco increased

militia participation. I theorized that many Americans saw these events as the actions of an increasingly lawless federal government and believed that it was necessary to join an organized militia to protect their rights, property, and lives. I tested this hypothesis by examining militia participation during the last decade. If people joined or started militia groups because of their reaction to the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco, the number of groups should have increased significantly after the standoffs in 1992 and 1993.

Before Ruby Ridge modern militia groups did not exist. The first known reference to militias came from Bo Grizt during his 1992 presidential campaign as the candidate of the Populist Party. Grizt was a family friend of the Weavers and

“Before Ruby Ridge, modern militia groups did not exist.”

had assisted with the negotiations that led to Weaver’s surrender. On the campaign trail, he spoke often of the standoff at Ruby

Ridge and stated, “The lesson for America is that this could happen to anybody. We’ve got to change the bureaucracy.”¹⁸ He suggested that his supporters form militias to protect themselves from becoming “victims” like Randy Weaver and his family.

A year later in 1993, the standoff at Waco ended in the blaze that killed 80 Branch Davidians, and many Americans were incensed by the federal government’s use of force. In January of the following year, John Trochmann formed the Militia of Montana, which was soon followed by the Michigan Militia. Both of these groups would rapidly become the largest militias in the country. According to the seminal study done by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), by the end of 1994 militia groups existed in 13 states.¹⁹

The Oklahoma City bombing on April, 19 1995 alerted the nation to the possible violent threat presented by militia groups. Two months after the bombing, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) found 224 militia groups active in 39 different states across the country.²⁰ The SPLC compiled their list of militia groups from field reports, militia publications, the Internet, law enforcement sources, and news reports. Since then, the SPLC has been the only private organization to publish year-to-year estimates on the number of active militias in

the United States.

In 1996, according to the annual SPLC Intelligence Report, the number of militias had increased to 370 groups operating in almost all 50 states.²¹ However, despite the rapid increase in the number of groups, 1996 marks the peak of militia participation. By 1997, the number of groups had decreased to 221 active militias.²² In 1998, the number declined again to 171 groups.²³ Finally, in 1999, the number of active militia groups had fallen to only 68.²⁴

Table 1: Number of Active Militia Groups in the United States

	Number of Militia Groups
1994	13 states
1995	224
1996	370
1997	221
1998	171
1999	68

Discussion

The evidence for this section yielded a surprising find in that major militias did not form until 1994. This was surprising because the majority of the literature on militias suggests that groups have existed in the United States for a long time—not just the past six years. This perception is encouraged by the fact that most research on militias was completed in the years directly following the Oklahoma City bombing. The bombing alerted the public that the growth of the militia movement could pose a serious threat to United States national security and militias received much media attention. From 1995 to 1996, the number of groups increased from 224 to 370—a 40 percent increase in a single year. To many Americans, the rapid growth of militia participation was a frightening prospect. The central ideology of the militia movement had been responsible for the worst domestic terrorist attack in American history and the number of groups had nearly doubled in the space of one year.

However, after 1996 the number of militias in the country steadily decreased each year. Yet this trend received very

little attention in scholarly research and the national media, mainly because the majority of the work on the subject was done before the downward trend was apparent. In addition, after the Oklahoma City bombing there has not been any serious terrorist attack successfully committed by militias. In general, the public no longer views militias as a serious threat to United States national security and they have consequently fallen out of the national spotlight.

The rapid growth of the number of militia groups from 1994 to 1996 and the downward trend after that year present powerful evidence for my second hypothesis: the federal government's actions at Ruby Ridge and Waco caused of the increase in militia participation. Major militia groups did not exist before Ruby Ridge (1992) and Waco (1993). The death and destruction of these standoffs incensed many Americans and caused them to organize into militias to defend themselves against the federal government's "lawless" use of force.

Many of the statements made by militia members regarding why they joined a militia support this hypothesis. Charlie Puckett, of the Kentucky State Militia, powerfully explained his reason for joining a militia by referring to the death of Vicki Weaver at Ruby Ridge, stating "In 1992 a government employee completely removed the whole side of a young ladies face with a .308 cal Sniper Rifle while she was holding a young child. This kind of activity cannot be tolerated from government employees or anyone for that matter."²⁵ Phill Crousore, a member of the Tippecanoe ICVM Militia, wrote "For me, the realization of the extent of erosion of Constitutional protections came with the BATF raid and FBI siege at Waco. The raid seemed an excessive use of force; the siege was more an attempt to avenge rather than to diffuse. ...I began to mistrust the government's account of the events."²⁶ Jim Wade stated that he formed the 1st Militia of Owen County in 1994 "just after the government murdered 80 people at Waco, Texas."²⁷

These responses and others confirm that the primary reason why many patriots felt compelled to join a group was their perception that the federal government abused its power during the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco. Even former federal prosecutor Bill Johnson, who played a key role in the Waco trial, stated "This is exactly the sort of government behavior that leads people to dislike the government to take ac-

tion. ...Combine those things and you get a response like Timothy McVeigh".²⁸

Militias gained membership over the next two years because of the anger and fear felt by some Americans towards the federal government. The strong anti-government ideology of militias appealed to those who believed that the citizenry must take a stand to stop standoffs like Ruby Ridge or Waco from ever occurring again. However, by 1996 these events had lost much of their propaganda value because the federal government had admitted that serious mistakes were made during both standoffs.

After Ruby Ridge, Randy Weaver was charged with the murder of a Federal Marshall, conspiracy, and firearms violations. However, during his trial he was acquitted of all these charges and only convicted of failing to appear in court for his initial trial. After serving a year in jail, he moved to Iowa to live with his daughters. Weaver later received a \$3.1 million dollars in a civil settlement arising from the wrongful deaths of his wife Vicki and son Sam.

The federal government, on the other hand, received harsh criticism for its actions during the standoff and the trial. In the investigation following Weaver's surrender, it was discovered that the FBI had tampered with evidence at the crime scene, and several senior FBI agents were suspended for destroying documents to cover up their conduct during the standoff. Serious thought was given to prosecuting some federal agents for the murder of Vicki Weaver because the FBI modified its rules of engagement after the death of Federal Marshal William Degan. Normally agents can only open fire when their life or someone else's is in immediate danger, however these rules were changed during the Ruby Ridge standoff and this indirectly caused Vicki Weaver's death.

During the trial, Judge Edward Lodge stated that the actions of the FBI "served to obstruct the administration of justice" and "the actions of the Government, acting through the FBI, evidence a callous disregard for the rights of the defendants and the interests of justice." Along with this rebuke, he also fined the U.S. Attorney's office \$1,920 for their delay in delivering information requested by the defense.²⁹

Like the aftermath of Ruby Ridge, the federal government received substantial negative attention from the American public regarding their actions during the Waco standoff.

Several government organizations and many independent experts conducted long and arduous investigations to finally conclude who was responsible for the fire that destroyed the Branch Davidian's compound. While the BATF and the FBI were eventually found not to be responsible for the fire, they were forced to reexamine their conduct and take steps to correct the many tactical errors that occurred during the initial raid and the final siege of the compound, in order to ensure that these mistakes would not be repeated in the future.³⁰ Today, standoffs between the federal government and anti-government groups are handled very differently.

The accusation from militia groups that the federal government no longer respects the rights of its citizens has lost credibility because the government has acknowledged that it made serious mistakes during both standoffs. Admitting error makes the federal government appear to be less of a tyrant. In addition, groups have lost support because there has not been another standoff similar to Waco, and militias could not retain their members without concrete evidence of federal government misconduct. After asking a militia member what atrocities the federal government has committed since Waco, he replied that there have been "so many", but was only able to illustrate his point with hypothetical examples.³¹ Without new "Wacos" to fuel the movement, many moderate militia members have become tired of the rhetoric and conspiracy theories and returned to their jobs and families.

The ability of this hypothesis to explain the rapid rise and fall of militia participation is powerful evidence for the theory that the federal government's actions at Ruby Ridge and Waco led to the increase in militia participation. Major militias groups did not exist prior to 1994—a year after the end of the Waco standoff. Militia membership increased in the two years following the confrontations at Ruby Ridge and Waco, because some Americans believed the time had come to arm themselves against the power of the federal government. The number of groups peaked in 1996 and then rapidly decreased until the present. After the federal government admitted that mistakes had been made during both standoffs and another Waco did not occur, militias could not maintain their membership without solid evidence of federal government misconduct. Therefore, this hypothesis was proven by the evidence.

Hypothesis 3: Socioeconomic Change in Rural Areas

This hypothesis stated that militia participation has increased during the last decade because of socioeconomic change in rural areas of the United States. Most militias are based in rural areas, therefore most militia members are farmers or are employed in occupations that provide goods or services to farms. However for the past two decades, most farms in the United States have experienced decreasing farm income to such a high degree that farming is no longer a viable occupation. This situation is defined as economic suffering. People who are suffering economically develop a negative public opinion of the federal government and its policies. They blame it for their economic misfortune, which makes them more likely to join anti-government groups like militias.

The test for this hypothesis was to compare the number of agricultural jobs in all 50 states during the last decade. If socioeconomic change in rural areas caused the increase in militia participation, the states with the most militia groups (California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, and Texas) should have experienced the largest decrease in farm employment. This hypothesis would be disproved if states with low militia participation experienced the largest decrease in agricultural jobs.

The data for this section is from the book *State Profiles: The Population and Economy of Each U.S. State*, which is edited by Courtenay Slater and Martha Davis. This book is compilation of data from the U.S. Department of Labor that is organized by state in the same format to facilitate comparisons between states.³²

Table 2: Percentage Decrease in the Number of Agricultural Jobs, 1989-1997

State	Percentage Decrease
Alabama	-1.5
Alaska	-2.3
Arizona	0.1
Arkansas	-1.6
California	0.0
Colorado	1.3

Connecticut	-1.5
Delaware	-2.5
<i>Florida</i>	-0.8
Georgia	-2.3
Hawaii	-3.2
<i>Idaho</i>	-0.9
Illinois	-2.0
Indiana	-2.1
Iowa	-1.8
Kansas	-1.1
Kentucky	-1.4
Louisiana	-2.7
Maine	-1.1
Maryland	-2.2
Massachusetts	-2.0
<i>Michigan</i>	-1.1
Minnesota	-1.2
Mississippi	0.0
<i>Missouri</i>	-1.4
<i>Montana</i>	-1.8
Nebraska	-1.1
Nevada	-1.5
New Hampshire	-3.0
New Jersey	0.5
New Mexico	0.4
New York	-1.6
North Carolina	-1.0
North Dakota	-1.4
<i>Ohio</i>	-2.2
Oklahoma	-0.2
Oregon	-0.4
Pennsylvania	-1.1
Rhode Island	-2.6
South Carolina	-2.7
South Dakota	-1.4

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Tennessee	-1.9
<i>Texas</i>	0.8
Utah	0.1
Vermont	-2.2
Virginia	-0.1
Washington	0.3
West Virginia	-1.1
Wisconsin	-1.1
Wyoming	-0.8

Source: Courtenay M. Slater, Martha G. Davis, State Profiles: The Population and Economy of Each U.S. State

As illustrated in Table 2, there was no correlation between a decrease in the number of jobs in the agricultural sector and an increase in militia participation. The states with the largest drop in the number of agricultural jobs (shown in **bold** on the table) were: Alaska (-2.3 percent), Delaware (-2.5 percent), Georgia (-2.3 percent), Hawaii (-3.2 percent), Louisiana (-2.7 percent), New Hampshire (-3.0 percent), Rhode Island (-2.6 percent), and South Carolina (-2.7 percent). The only states in this list with any significant militia groups were Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina, and even then overall militia participation in these states was small.

None of the states with the largest number of militia groups (shown on the table in *italics*) experienced a large decrease in the number of jobs in the agricultural sector during the past decade. Only two of the states with high militia participation experienced a meaningful decrease in agricultural employment: Montana (-1.8 percent) and Ohio (-2.2 percent). The rest of the states had relatively small decreases in employment or the number of jobs in agriculture actually increased: California (0.0 percent), Florida (-0.8 percent), Idaho (-0.9 percent), Michigan (-1.1 percent), Montana (-1.8 percent), and Texas (0.8 percent).

Discussion

The hypothesis that socioeconomic change in rural areas caused the increase in militia participation has been disproved due to the lack of a correlation between decreasing

number of jobs in the agricultural sector and increasing militia participation. Therefore, this hypothesis has been discarded as the principal explanation for the growth of the militia movement during the last decade.

Apart from the lack of a correlation between decreasing agricultural jobs and increased militia participation, this socioeconomic theory is unable to explain the rapid rise and fall of militia participation during the 1990s. The number of agricultural jobs began to decrease in the early 1980s, falling by 16 percent from 1980 to 1989; it fell another 8 percent from 1989 to 1994; then remained relatively unchanged from 1994 to 1997. In 1980, farm employment accounted for 3.3 percent of total employment, which decreased to 1.9 percent by 1997—nearly a 50 percent decrease. This downward trend began in the early 1980s and progressed through the 1990s.³³

Yet significant militia groups did not form until 1994. If problems in the farming industry have been present since 1980, why would militia groups wait to form until 1994—fourteen years after the beginning of the farm crisis? After a rapid increase in the number of groups, militia participation has steadily decreased since 1996. Yet there was no corresponding increase in the number of farm jobs in 1996. The prospects of economic survival for the traditional family farm in the United States are still as bleak as they were a decade ago. Why would participation in militia groups decrease after 1996 if there had not been an improvement in economic situation of American farms?

Despite these problems, this hypothesis still retains some explanatory value and should not be discounted entirely. The number of farming jobs has decreased in Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, and Ohio during the last decade. In these states alone, 46,000 jobs in the farm sector have disappeared due to diminishing farm income. In California, the number of employees in the farming sector has remained stable, while farm employment in Texas has increased by 0.8 percent. Perhaps decreasing farm employment made some sections of society more receptive to the anti-government ideology of the militia movement. After watching their way of life disappear, it would be easy to blame the federal government for their economic misfortune. It is much easier to blame government mismanagement and corruption, rather than the complicated processes of globalization and modernization, as the

reasons for collapsing farm prices. While socioeconomic change in rural areas is not the primary reason for the increase in militia participation during the last decade, it can help explain why some people would be more apt to join a militia.

CONCLUSION

Summary

The best hypothesis to explain why militia participation increased during the last decade is the federal government's actions during the confrontations at Ruby Ridge and Waco. It is the most robust because it can explain the initial growth and subsequent decrease of the number of militia groups in the United States. Militia initially formed in response to the American public's outrage at the federal government's actions during these two standoffs. Participation in these groups grew in the aftermath of Waco, because many citizens thought it was necessary to join a militia to protect their rights and property from an increasingly tyrannical federal government.

However, by 1996, the government admitted that it made serious mistakes during the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco and another incident similar to these had not occurred. Without new Wacos and solid evidence of government misconduct to fuel participation, most militia groups were unable to maintain their membership. By 1997, many of the moderate supporters started to leave groups because they were no longer convinced that it was necessary to counter the power of the federal government through armed citizen militias.

The implications of this finding are most important for the U.S. federal government. This theory asserts that Americans joined militias because they felt it was necessary to organize into groups to protect themselves from the growing power of the federal government. They believed that government organizations, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), killed innocent Americans at Ruby Ridge and Waco simply to demonstrate the government's power over the citizenry. These standoffs gave extreme right-wing groups powerful evidence to convince some Americans that the time had come for the public to organize in armed militias to prepare for battle, and possibly even war, against the federal government.

However, after the government began to admit that serious mistakes had been made during both standoffs, it began to appear to be less of a tyrant. Learning from these mistakes, the FBI and the BATF have changed the way that they conduct standoffs with anti-government groups to prevent situations from escalating into a Ruby Ridge or Waco. Due to these changes in policy, militias lost future incidents between the government and anti-system groups to use a propaganda to attract new supporters. Without new Wacos to fuel support, it has been necessary for militias to resort to ridiculous conspiracy theories to justify their existence.

Timothy McVeigh felt so strongly that the federal government needed to be punished for its actions at Waco that he blew up the Murray building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. Thousands of minor incidents perpetuated by militias have led to much destruction of property and additional loss of life. Other serious terrorist attacks planned by militia groups were narrowly averted by the diligent work of local police forces and the FBI. Perhaps all of this could have been prevented if the outcomes of Ruby Ridge and Waco had been different. While it is not realistic to believe that the federal government can be reformed to such a degree that all Americans view its actions as completely legitimate and transparent, it is possible make sure that confrontations between the federal government and anti-system groups do not end in the same outcome as Waco.

Since the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco, the federal government has learned from its mistakes and now conducts itself differently during confrontations with anti-system groups. A perfect example of these changes was the 1996 standoff between the FBI and the Montana Freeman. In March of 1996, the FBI arrested Montana Freeman LeRoy Schweitzer on the outskirts of the Freeman's ranch on charges of threatening to kill a federal judge and check fraud. This action started an 81-day standoff with the remaining Freeman, however the FBI handled the situation differently in several important respects. Unlike Waco, the FBI set up its stations far from the ranch. The FBI also made it clear to the Freeman that they did not establish an armed perimeter and the confrontation was not a "standoff", which served to decrease the confrontational character of the situation. Negotiations took place using people the Freeman trusted and the Critical Incident Response Group,

a special unit within the FBI created after Waco to deal with this specific type of confrontation.³⁴

The positive results of these reforms were large: the incident ended peacefully, the remaining Freeman were taken into custody, and there was no loss of life and destruction of property.³⁵ Hopefully, in the future the federal government will continue to use this approach to peacefully resolve confrontations with anti-government groups. If the current downward trend of militia participation continues, it is likely that in several years organized militia groups will cease to exist and therefore will no longer be a threat to United States national security.

Implications for Theory

Two of the theories presented in this paper were not proven by the resulting evidence. The first hypothesis that an increase in federal government regulation caused the growth of militia participation was not proven because a majority of the evidence supported another hypothesis. This hypothesis is not completely wrong and has some explanatory value, but it is not the primary cause of the increase in militia participation. It was also rejected because it cannot explain the rise and fall of militia participation during the last decade.

The third hypothesis that socioeconomic change in rural areas caused the increase in militia participation was also rejected. It was disproved because there is no obvious correlation between farm unemployment and militia participation and it could not explain the rise and fall of militia participation during the last decade. However, this hypothesis was disproved not because the theory was incorrect but because its test failed. It is necessary to do more research on the socioeconomic composition of militia groups to accurately design a test for this hypothesis. Without data on the occupations of militia members, it was necessary to design a test based upon the fact that militias are primarily located in rural areas. From that fact, I assumed that most militia members were employed in the agricultural sector. It is likely that this assumption was wrong, which would lead to an incorrect test for this hypothesis. Therefore, it is still possible that this theory could explain the increase in militia participation if it could be more accurately tested. Perhaps this will be possible in the future when more accurate data on the occupations of militia mem-

bers becomes available.

Problems with research & What more needs to be done

The largest problem I found researching this topic was the lack of empirical research available on militias. There are numerous books, newspaper and magazine articles, and web sites that discuss many aspects of United States militias. However, the quantity of information available on militias should not be mistaken for quality research. Almost all of the available information is superficial and very little of it is based upon actual scientific investigation.

Only one private organization in the United States, the Southern Poverty Law Center, completes an annual study on militia activity and conducts field research to determine the number of active groups in each state. This is the most fundamental type of research that needs to be done on militias, yet only one private organization in the country conducts this research and makes the results available to the public. The head militia researcher at the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a very well respected organization that studies extremist groups in the United States, explained that maintaining an annual estimate on militia participation was simply too inconclusive and therefore not worth the effort. Therefore, several independent organizations need to maintain annual estimates on militia participation, in both the number of members and the number of groups operating in the United States.

Data also needs to be collected on the socioeconomic background of the militia members. The common assumption in the literature is that militia members are middle-aged white males from rural areas who are employed in blue-collar professions. However, no empirical research has been done to support this assertion. Even research that appears to be scientifically based on sound data is very superficial. For example, the academic article "Fueling the Fire: Social and Political Correlates of Citizen Militia Activity," done by researchers from the University of Wisconsin and the University of Kansas, sought to explain militia participation on the basis of political, social, and demographic factors.³⁶ Yet this paper relied upon an article written for the magazine *Psychology Today* to establish the demographic background of militia members. This article was not based on any social science investigation and was primarily an opinion piece.³⁷ More research needs to be

completed on the demographics of militia members, with empirical data on their age, profession, family status, and military background.

There are several other areas where more research on militias needs to be done. More militia members need to be interviewed to establish why and when a majority of them joined militias instead of making the general assertion that they joined because of Waco and the Brady Bill, as much of the literature does. It would also be interesting to study militia participation in each individual state. It is important to be able to isolate the factors that led to high militia participation in one state and low participation in another, especially when states share similar social and economic conditions.

Further research questions

The most obvious question that has emerged from this paper is: Why has militia participation decreased at such a rapid rate since 1996? I have tried to partially explain this downward trend by citing the lack of a new Waco and the acknowledgment by the federal government that serious mistakes occurred during both standoffs. However this explanation is not sufficient. A colleague, Lauren Davis, suggested that the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing caused the decrease in the number of militia groups. This is a probable theory, however it does explain why militia participation would continue to rise throughout the rest of 1996, instead of declining directly after the bombing in April.

No published scholarly research has been done on this topic. I was able to find only one article, published by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which addressed this trend. However it explained only the most superficial reasons for the decline and did not support its claims with any scientific research.³⁸ This paper explained why militia participation increased during the 1990s, however it is important to understand the other half of the story and explain why militia participation has decreased. It would also be interesting to study how this decrease in participation has effected militias. How has the militia movement adjusted to this decrease in participation?

It would also be insightful to compare and contrast American militias to other militia groups around the world. What other countries have active militias? What factors con-

ditioned the formation of these groups, and how has their membership changed over the last decade? Are the goals of American militias unique to the United States, or are these goals shared in countries with different political backgrounds? Placing U.S. militias in an international context will further our understanding of these groups.

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Taiwan and South Korea: A Comparative Study of Economic Development, 1950-1980

Chris Higgins

INTRODUCTION

Throughout much of the twentieth century, less developed countries attempted to find the policies that would facilitate economic growth and modernization. History shows that effectively implementing these policies in order to foster sustained and continual growth is quite difficult. Nevertheless, some previously poor countries achieved prolonged economic growth and higher standards of living during the twentieth century. East Asia is frequently regarded as a region with a disproportionately large amount of newly industrializing countries, e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. Hong Kong and Singapore distinguished themselves as city-states that relied almost completely on international markets in order to foster industrialization. Taiwan and South Korea, however, both achieved rapid and sustained economic development despite similarities with other less developed countries (LDCs).

At first glance Taiwan and South Korea appear similar in many respects. Both countries are roughly the same size, have large populations relative to their size, have access to numerous ocean ports, and lack an abundance of natural resources. China and Japan have both influenced South Korea's culture; likewise, Taiwan's history includes a profound amount of involvement with both of these nations. During the Cold War era, South Korea and Taiwan both allied themselves with the United States against communist threats in the region and received aid from the United States.

The rapid economic growth experienced by South Korea and Taiwan persisted over several decades, making the two countries centers of economic dynamism. Both recorded average-real GDP growth rates of over six percent from the period of 1960 to 1985 fostering industrialization in less than thirty years and thus achieving a feat that took European coun-

tries over a hundred years to accomplish. Successful land reform and education programs helped to foster this industrialization. A shift to an export-oriented trade regime drove much of this rapid economic modernization in both nations, and South Korea, along with Taiwan, pursued policies to encourage the growth of firms oriented towards international markets. As these nations' economies grew, foreign investment became an important factor in the economic development of both. Accompanying this foreign investment were large amounts of domestic investment procured through relatively high private savings rates. All these parallels beckon the question: what dissimilar factors played a role in making these two Asian countries miracle economies?

Industrial policy in South Korea and Taiwan differed due mainly to discrepancies between each country's economic bureaucracy, number and size of firms, and relationship between the governing regime and the private sector. These factors caused the South Korean government to alter specific incentives and intervene in the economy at a micro-level, while Taiwan's government relied on a more general manipulation of market signals. Furthermore, the 1970s marked a larger shift in South Korea's economic policies towards more government involvement, while Taiwan took a relatively less interventionist approach to development during the same period. Thus, we can observe South Korea and Taiwan taking similar paths toward economic development in many respects but dissimilar paths vis-à-vis government involvement in markets.

In the first section of this paper I will discuss the general policies pursued by Taiwan and South Korea that contributed to economic growth. I plan to also examine the reforms undertaken by South Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s, including the establishment of export-oriented trade regimes. These trade regimes in conjunction with the industrial policies of each nation will be concentrated on as a major factors leading to economic development. Such close analysis will lead me to contend that South Korea's development relied more heavily on government involvement relative to Taiwan and conclude that this greater degree of state intervention caused less desirable economic outcomes.

STABLE MACROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

As the 1950s began, the economies of Taiwan and South Korea were in disarray. South Korea, in the midst of a protracted conflict with its northern counterpart, faced unstable political and economic conditions. Taiwan's economy was not performing as poorly, but was confronted by hostile communist China across a narrow strait. Yet, during the 1950s these nations managed to establish a stable foundation for later economic growth. The two main policies that South Korea and Taiwan embarked upon to foster industrialization were education programs and land reform.

Asian cultural emphasis on learning helped produce education programs that led to large amounts of human capital accumulation in each nation. South Korea implemented a compulsory elementary education program in the 1950s, and later the government expanded the program to encompass middle school and high school levels.¹ Taiwan, following a similar approach, invested large amounts of money into education that by 1972 had reached levels of over seventeen percent of total government expenditure.² The willingness of the South Korean and Taiwanese governments to fund public education allowed manufacturers to draw from a relatively well-educated domestic workforce. The human capital of these laborers allowed for higher labor productivity compared to other developing nations' manufacturing sectors. As a result, per capita GDP increased at phenomenal rates. Spillover benefits from education were also apparent in lower fertility rates and improved income distribution.³ The latter mitigated the dissatisfaction that can accompany economic growth in developing countries, while the former sustained higher wages by restricting the growth of the labor pool.

Equally important as human capital formation were the successful land reform programs implemented by the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist regime in Taiwan and the authoritarian government under Syngman Rhee in South Korea. When the KMT fled Mainland China it cut off all ties to a landed class thereby making land reform politically viable.⁴ In Taiwan, land reform undertaken in 1949 and culminating in 1953 with the Land-to-the-Tiller act, produced an equitable redistribution of land to the previously landless peasant class. The land reform led to higher agricultural productivity, which in

turn increased rural per capita income and militated against the formation of a dual economy. More importantly, however, land reform fostered industrialization by forcing the gentry to cut political and economic ties to rural areas and shift their attention to economic pursuits in urban manufacturing.⁵

South Korea also engaged in land reform before the Korean War but it took the war's effects to shatter the gentry's political and economic power. To be sure, many landlords held on to their economic and political power even after the land reforms of 1950. However, the Korean War displaced large numbers of South Koreans, ending the upper class' stranglehold on land ownership.⁶ Following the war South Korean society was poor but egalitarian. Without a rigid class structure, people were able to move fluidly into different economic pursuits.⁷ The combined policies of education and land reform allowed for some economic development in South Korea and Taiwan but it would take drastic economic reforms for these East Asian countries to fully realize their potential.

ECONOMIC REFORMS

According to the conventional wisdom of the 1950s, South Korea and Taiwan both engaged in import substituting (IS) trade regimes. IS trade regimes entail a large degree of protectionism, replacing manufactured imports with domestically produced industrial goods. This protectionism resulted in high effective protection rates (EPR), distorting prices and granting monopolies to protected industrial sectors.⁸ Taiwan and South Korea experienced some initial success with IS, but soon it became apparent that the small domestic markets in both nations could not foster continued industrialization. By the 1950s, Taiwan's economy began to stagnate and South Korea was experiencing a similar saturation of domestic markets. It was becoming clear that a drastic change in both nations' trade regimes would be necessary to sustain economic development. Although the KMT regime in Taiwan and the Rhee regime in South Korea faced opposition to alterations in their respective trade regimes, both governments managed to effectively implement economic reform.

Taiwan's trade policy reforms began in 1958 and continued into the 1960s. The elimination of the complex and overvalued multiple exchange rate system and the subsequent

currency devaluations began to expand the international markets available to domestic producers, causing exports to increase rapidly.⁹ Furthermore, the KMT government also provided tax incentives, special import pricing, subsidies, and low interest loans to exporting firms. These policies and an expanding amount of trade eventually shifted the dependence of many manufacturers from domestic markets to international markets. Case in point, Taiwan's ratio of total trade to GDP (the value of exports plus imports divided by GDP) had reached .53 by 1970, just over ten years after the reforms were implemented.¹⁰ It should be noted, however, that the export-oriented regime that developed in the late fifties and early sixties was not accompanied by an immediate and substantial lowering of tariff barriers.

Strong political opposition to trade regime reforms existed in South Korea but in Taiwan the resistance to such changes was less pronounced. The main point of contention against reforming Taiwan's multiple exchange rate system was that unification and devaluation would not increase exports because Taiwan's two major exports at the time (sugar and rice) had fairly inelastic international demand. Furthermore, the devaluation would increase the price of imported goods that resource-poor Taiwan depended on, fueling an already serious problem with inflation.¹¹ Numerous government officials opposed unifying and devaluing the exchange rate for these economic reasons. In addition, the existing currency speculation opportunities for politicians were facilitated by the multiple exchange rate system, and these rent-seeking politicians also opposed any unification of the exchange rates. Nevertheless, the combination of relatively powerful and politically insulated technocrats in Taiwan's government accompanied with external political pressure from the United States caused economic policies aimed at export-oriented growth to prevail over IS policies.

Mired in political crisis, South Korea instituted trade regime reforms later than Taiwan, but these reforms proved equally effective in altering the economy's structure. Embarking on exchange rate reform in 1964, the government discontinued its overvaluation of the South Korean currency, and the *won* began to better reflect its true market value.¹² Accompanying this devaluation were industrial policies favoring export-oriented firms. South Korea's reform policies were simi-

lar to Taiwan's and did not translate into an across-the-board lowering of tariff barriers. Instead, the South Korean government selectively lowered tariffs on capital goods with the aim of inducing the manufacture of products intended for export.¹³

Strong political opposition to policies altering the existing IS trade regime emanated from officials within the government and from many of South Korea's economic actors. Indeed, the trade regime reform went smoothly in Taiwan compared to South Korea, where it required a strong military government to propel the economy in new directions. This political opposition in South Korea stemmed from the Rhee regime's close ties with the powerful monopolies during the 1950s. The rent-seeking politicians' arbitrage opportunities, existing due to the multiple exchange rate system, also helped to prevent exchange rate reform. The legitimacy of the Rhee regime, however, began to erode after the questionable elections of 1960, followed by Rhee's resignation amid allegations of outright election fraud. Subsequently, Major General Park Chunghee overthrew Chang Myon, the acting prime minister, in a coup. The new military regime, led by Park, focused its attention on the corrupt economy, arresting and parading IS businessmen through the streets wearing placards stating "I ate the people" and "I am corrupt swine."¹⁴ President Park, however, felt that improvements in the economy could lead to national pride and strength vis-à-vis North Korea; therefore, instead of continuing the persecution, Park collaborated with these businessmen. Through his previous attempts to uproot corruption Park had gained an upper hand in his negotiations with business interests and soon reached an agreement between the government and big business. These agreements halted the persecution of business, and allowed Park – under the auspices of national solidarity and loyalty – to push through economic reforms.¹⁵

Economic reform in the early 1960s also brought monetary policy reforms to both countries, which increased the previously extremely low interest rates. The increase in interest rates induced domestic private savings. Manufacturers therefore had a large supply of funds to utilize for investment in production and in research and development. This supply of loanable funds increased as the saving rates in both South Korea and Taiwan steadily rose throughout the 1960s reaching rates above twenty percent by the 1970s.¹⁶ Many scholars attribute these large domestic private saving rates to Confu-

cian values of thrift. This idea holds merit in so far that many countries, with rates of return comparable to Taiwan and South Korea achieved lower savings rates. However, domestic savings in both South Korea and Taiwan increased markedly after savers began to realize positive returns instead of negative returns on their deposits.

OPEC's price hikes in the 1970s also increased foreign investment in South Korea and Taiwan. Oil producing nations' profits found their way to Western banks in the form of petrodollars, which in turn caused an influx of foreign investment in many Asian and Latin American countries. South Korea's government attracted foreign investors by guaranteeing repayment of all foreign loans, while Taiwan mitigated foreign investors' fears of nationalization through appropriate legislation. Physical capital formation in South Korea and Taiwan rose due to the increasing domestic and foreign investment rates, which ultimately led to increased productivity and accelerated growth.

Export oriented policies, coupled with land reform, a fairly well educated workforce, and increased domestic and foreign investment provided the foundations for South Korea and Taiwan to develop at unprecedented growth rates. Manufacturers that produced exports utilized South Korea's and Taiwan's comparative advantage: a large supply of fairly well educated labor.

Available to these manufacturers was a large supply of capital from both domestic and foreign savings. Subsequently, both East Asian economies began to develop manufactur-

**“During the period
1960-1985, the South
Korean real GDP grew
at an annual rate of
6%”**

ing sectors, which produced labor-intensive goods for export. These light industrial goods would soon give way to higher value-added goods as education levels and capital formation increased. As a result, both economies developed at rapid rates. During the period 1960 to 1985 the South Korean real GDP grew at an annual rate of nearly six-percent and Taiwan saw real GDP growth rates upwards of six-percent during the same period.¹⁷ From 1965 to 1989, per capita GDP also increased at

rates above seven percent in South Korea and just below this percentage in Taiwan.¹⁸ Industry grew at rates never observed before concomitantly labor's share of employment in manufacturing grew rapidly. Surprisingly, increasing income *equality* accompanied this outstanding growth. By the 1980s both South Korea and Taiwan's income distribution closely resembled some advanced industrialized countries' income distribution. Politically, this equality in the distribution of income diminished dissatisfaction with economic development and legitimized both governments' efforts to industrialize.

ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES

Thus far it has been shown that South Korea and Taiwan implemented similar policies in order to foster development. The South Korea's government, however, intervened in markets to a greater degree and at a more micro-level than Taiwan's government. This divergence in the amount and degree of state intervention stemmed from differences in the characteristics and structure of the economic bureaucracy in each government.

In Taiwan the structure of the economic bureaucracy led to economic planning that relied on a general manipulation of existing market signals. During the 1960s and for much of the 1970s Taiwan's decentralized economic bureaucracy was characterized by stability oriented monetary and fiscal authorities, which implemented policy relatively independent from other agencies within the government.¹⁹ Poorly developed links between the private sector and economic planning agencies fostered the latter's independence from private sector pressures. The resulting situation allowed for less state involvement in Taiwan's economy.

In contrast to Taiwan, South Korea's economic bureaucracy was comprised of interventionist and less stability-minded technocrats.²⁰ These technocrats operated in a highly centralized structure of economic planning agencies that exerted control over various aspects of the economy. The reforms of the 1960s "placed all banks and investment decisions under the control of the government," rendering firms compliant to government demands.²¹ Consequently, South Korea's industrial policy was more elaborate than Taiwan's. These discrep-

ancies between the two countries' industrial policies resulted in differing methods of industrialization and growth.

Both Taiwan and South Korea controlled foreign direct investment and portfolio investment in their economies, but South Korea's government maintained tighter controls on foreign direct investment. All proposals for foreign direct investment in South Korea's economy were scrutinized by several bureaucracies and approved so long as the foreign direct investment did not compete with domestic producers.²² Thus, only if domestic factors of production failed to sufficiently produce a product would foreign direct investment be allowed to enter South Korea. Portfolio investment in domestic firms, however, was encouraged with fewer stipulations than foreign direct investment, and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in South Korea instituted a policy of guaranteed repayment on foreign loans. Conversely, Taiwan did not place such rigid rules and restrictions on foreign direct investment, allowing complete foreign ownership of many firms.²³ Accordingly, Taiwan's growth relied less on foreign loans for development and took on less foreign debt than South Korea.

Government directed credit allocation to firms also differed in Taiwan and South Korea. While both governments utilized discretionary low-credit allocation through government controlled banks, the stipulations attached in order to receive low-cost credit varied. In Taiwan, the definition of a firm that qualified for low-cost credit was generally conceived and consequently, start-up capital was not difficult to procure. On the other hand, South Korea's specialized banks, under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance, set stringent and specific guidelines as to which firms qualified for low-cost and at times negative-cost loans.²⁴ These guidelines set by the economic bureaucracy in South Korea allowed the government to precisely direct what areas of the economy grew and what areas stagnated or atrophied. This stranglehold on credit allocation proved to be a potent weapon for inducing "appropriate" firm behavior. Strong relationships between the government, banks, and firms formed due to this financial system, which resulted in the formation of South Korea's large conglomerates, known as *chaebols*.

Utilizing large firms as a path to industrialization is common in many developing countries. Unusually, however, Taiwan utilized small firms as an engine for industrial growth.

The financial structure in Taiwan with its loosely defined guidelines for distributing capital allowed more entrepreneurs to acquire start up funds resulting in large numbers of small firms. To be sure, the ten largest conglomerates in South Korea sold US\$47.1 billion goods in services in 1983, whereas Taiwan's ten largest firms generated total sales of only US\$7.4 billion that same year.²⁵ Income inequality in South Korea compared with Taiwan is still worse due to South Korea's *chaebols*, which employ greater amounts of physical capital per worker than Taiwan's smaller firms.

Although firms also received tax incentives from both governments the use of these incentives was again much more discretionary in South Korea. Tax incentives in Taiwan resembled South Korea's in so far as the utilization of five-year tax holidays "for approved investments, remission of duties on imported inputs into export production, and exemption of exports from indirect taxes."²⁶ South Korea's government differed from Taiwan's in that it granted lower tax on profits and allowed "generous depreciation and wastage allowances" to particular manufacturers.²⁷ In Taiwan, where such highly structured tax incentives did not exist growth in specified industrial sectors was encouraged through general taxation policies. Here again we note the South Korean state's dominance over numerous economic actors' decisions.

This divergence in state intervention became even more pronounced in the 1970s as the Park government in South Korea and the KMT regime in Taiwan responded differently to various economic and political crises. In the early 1970s, the labor-intensive, export-oriented industries of both countries experienced increased labor costs as full employment was realized. As a result, their comparative advantage in labor costs, which had provided the basis for much of the industrialization in Taiwan and South Korea, began to erode. In both Taiwan and South Korea, stagnation in many heavy industrial sectors compounded this problem of increased production costs. Externally, the first oil crisis of 1973 spurred global stagflation and an increased protectionism in developed countries, both of which deleteriously affected the export-driven East Asian economies. Politically, the KMT government and the Park regime experienced crises of legitimacy. In Taiwan, the islanders' animosity towards the mainlander-dominated KMT government was growing while in South Korea the

public's disapproval mounted against the increasingly authoritarian nature of Park's unconstitutional third presidential term. Taiwan and South Korea sought to address these economic and political problems by shifting the focus of industrial policy from labor-intensive manufacturing to capital-intensive production. However, the structure of the economic bureaucracy, state-societal relations, and the average firm size led to the divergent use of tools implementing industrial policies.

During the early 1970s, conservatives within the KMT government saw capital-intensive industrialization as a "panacea for all economic ills."²⁸ However, the private sector, whose power was large vis-à-vis the state, refused to cooperate with government plans to increase investment in heavy industry. In addition, Taiwan's taxation policies aimed at inducing private investment into capital-intensive industry were weak and ineffectual. Small firms also dominated Taiwan's economy and failed to supply the KMT led government with an appropriate industrial base from which to launch a drive towards heavy industrialization. These factors forced the KMT regime to utilize public enterprises for the development of a heavy industrial sector, setting up state owned firms dealing with ship-building, steel, and aluminum.²⁹ Thus, in Taiwan, the scope of the state's at-

tempts to foster capital-intensive production were minimal and lacked efficacy in shifting manufacturing to heavy industrial production.³⁰ The conservatives, who advocated this

"Politically, the KMT government and the Park regime experienced crises of legitimacy."

push towards heavy industry, saw their power wane and by the mid-1970s the influence of pragmatic technocrats' increased, leading to industrial policies that emphasized the development of a labor-intensive technology sector.³¹

Unlike Taiwan's small firms, large Korean conglomerates – already planning on investing in heavy industry – helped promote government plans to invest in the production of heavier industrial goods. Furthermore, the highly centralized structure of the Korean economic bureaucracy and Park's own political pressure allowed little room for disagreement

with the new industrial policies focused on capital-intensive industrialization. Coupled with this heavy industrial push from both the private sector and the state was society's pressure to continue economic growth into the latter half of the 1970s. As a result, in 1973 the Park regime undertook the ambitious "Heavy and Chemical Industrial" (HCI) plan. Park saw the HCI plan as a means to quell society's objections to his illegitimate third term as president by promoting economic growth. At the same time, Park and other technocrats felt that the HCI plan would address South Korea's economic problems brought on by the oil crisis and increasing labor costs. The HCI plan called for a creation of a heavy industrial sector producing steel, electronics, and chemicals. Subsequently, Korea's extensive industrial policy tools were utilized to shift manufacturing away from the labor-intensive light industrial goods that had dominated the manufacturing base of South Korea throughout the 1960s. These policy tools were used to erect high tariffs protecting the heavy industrial sectors, to dole out low cost loans to firms pursuing capital-intensive production, and to provide generous tax breaks to heavy industry.

How effective was South Korea's drive towards producing higher value added goods? The HCI policies employed by the Park regime did not significantly hinder economic growth in the short run but proved to be damaging in the long run. Most importantly, these policies failed to accomplish their long run objective of increasing labor's share of employment in higher value added goods.³² The latter resulted from the South Korean government's low-cost credit allocation to firms developing heavy industry, making physical capital cheap, compared to labor. In addition, South Korea's industrial policies, which decreased the cost of capital to heavy industry, exacerbated income inequality through the creation of a dualistic industrial base.³³ In the long run inflation increased substantially due to the expansionary fiscal spending associated with many of the HCI policies. Bad loans proved to be the largest problems arising out of HCI policies increasing many of the *chaebols* debt and threatening to bankrupt the entire South Korean financial system by 1980. At the worst, these HCI policies transferred resources into poor performing industries, such as steel and at best into high performing industries as evident in electronics and automobile manufacturing.

South Korea's campaign to increase heavy industrial

production caused economic problems not present in Taiwan's more laissez-faire economy of the late 1970s. As a result the Taiwanese economy during 1979 grew at a respectable 8.5 percent while South Korea's slowed considerably towards the end of the 1970s. In terms of price increases Taiwan's inflation rate averaged nine percent, much lower than South Korea's double-digit inflation rates of the late 1970s. While Taiwan's heavy industry did not develop as rapidly as South Korea's it managed a steady rate of growth and higher added value industry in the high-tech sector began to develop during the late 1970s.

CONCLUSIONS

South Korea and Taiwan's political economy entered three unique stages: IS regimes (1940s-1950s), export-oriented regimes (1960s), and a push toward heavy industrialization (1970s). During the IS trade regimes that dominated the economic structure of both nations, stable foundations for growth and development were cultivated. The policies of land reform and effective education programs rationalized agriculture and released peasants for work in manufacturing, while education programs afforded the workforce a relatively high level of human capital. Export-oriented trade regimes began to dominate both nation-states in the early to mid 1960s. Growth in real GDP and exports accompanied these export-oriented trade regimes and productivity increased rapidly in South Korea and Taiwan. Foreign investment also increased, albeit more in South Korea than in Taiwan, but both countries experienced accelerated capital inflows.

The general policies implemented by both states appeared to be quite similar but as the 1960s continued South Korea's industrial policies began to entail larger amounts of state interference. This disparity grew during the 1970s as both of these export-oriented economies faced crises that threatened continued economic development and modernization. The response in each country called for investment in heavy industry. South Korea's established pattern of state intervention and its rigid economic bureaucracy helped lead to the comprehensive and ambitious HCI plan of 1973. Conversely, Taiwan's flexible economic bureaucracy and the state's limited power vis-à-vis private firms caused a weak move towards establishing capital-intensive industry.

In their entirety the policies implemented by Taiwan and South Korea proved to be quite successful in attaining an enhanced standard of living for a majority of each countries' population. Nevertheless, South Korea's increased manipulation of market signals to foster economic development actually hindered long-run economic growth causing inefficient allocation of resources, a growing problem with inflation, increased income inequality and insolvent firms. Taiwan's less ambitious plan to transfer capital into heavy industry and its continued focus on export-oriented growth in the form of high-tech manufactures caused superior economic outcomes vis-à-vis South Korea. In the larger context of the international economic system these policies are applicable to many industrializing countries. Accordingly, LDCs should consider the general and specific policies that South Korea and Taiwan implemented in light of each country's economic performance.

NOTES

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² William James, Seiji Naya, and Gerald M. Meier. *Asian Development* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 191.

³ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁴ Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," *International Organization* 38, no. 1 (Winter, 1984): 22.

⁵ Yung Wei, "Modernization Process in Taiwan: An Allocative Analysis," *Asian Survey* 26, no. 3 (March, 1976): 258.

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- ¹² Cho Soon, *The Dynamics of Korean Development* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 30.
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- ²³ Chalmers Johnson, *Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience 1950-1980*. ed. James C. Hsiung (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 194.
- ²⁴ Tibor Scitovsky, *Models of Development: A Comparative Study of Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan*, ed. Lawrence J. Lau (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1986), 153.
- ²⁵ Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, *Taiwan in the Modern World: The Role of the State in Taiwan's Development* (New York: East Gate, 1994), 10.
- ²⁶ Tibor Scitovsky, *Models of Development: A Comparative Study of Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan*, 153.
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A Diamond War Lasts Forever

Jason Knobloch

INTRODUCTION

Insurgencies, no matter the level of revolutionary fervor, have to finance their fight in some way. During the Cold War, this was a relatively easy matter. Movements that declared a Marxist ideology received support from the Soviet Union. Movements that declared themselves against communism received support from the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, however, it has become much more difficult to finance an insurgency. The Soviet Union no longer exists and in the United States it is politically unacceptable to support authoritarian governments or groups that show no desire to foster democracy and often violate human rights. This situation has led to the failure of many Cold War era insurgencies around the developing world to continue their fight, such as in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. However, many states are still experiencing armed insurgencies, even in the absence of external support, including Myanmar, Colombia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Because of the lack of foreign financial support, insurgent groups must find alternative sources of funding in order to survive. A key factor that must be examined is the relationship between the longevity of a Cold War era insurgency in the post-Cold War era and the possession of a high value commodity by the insurgency. There appears to be a positive correlation between the duration of a Cold War era insurgency and the access to high value commodities that can be used to fund the insurgency. The insurgencies that continue in Africa, for instance, are by and large funded through the sale of diamonds: such is the case in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

To illustrate the correlation between the duration of an insurgency and the availability of high value commodities, a comparison of two insurgencies with similar Cold War histories but different contemporary outcomes is useful. The

insurgencies in the two former Southern African Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, are ideal for this comparison. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) are well suited for this analysis. Both movements arose from lengthy independence struggles against the Portuguese, and both received assistance from external powers to oppose the Soviet-backed ruling parties in Angola and Mozambique. However, since the end of the Cold War and South Africa's transition from apartheid to participatory democracy, the two movements have had very different roles in their respective countries. While RENAMO has ceased its armed conflict and become a participant in the politics of Mozambique, UNITA continues its violent struggle in Angola. The demise of RENAMO's military function in Mozambique can be traced, in large part, to the simple fact that without external support, RENAMO does not have the means to finance an armed conflict. UNITA, on the other hand, has access to large quantities of diamonds, which it has used to purchase military equipment and pay its combatants.

The Rational Actor Model is helpful in understanding decisions made by UNITA and RENAMO since the end of external support. This theoretical model assumes that each unit, in this case, each insurgency, acts as a unified actor. There are then four aspects of the decision-making process. First, the actor must identify its goals and preferences. Second, the actor must choose from a number of policy options. The actor then makes a cost-benefit analysis of the various choices, and finally picks the option with the highest payoff.¹ In the cases of the selected insurgencies, one can assume that they have two fundamental options: to continue fighting or to cease fighting and negotiate. A primary factor influencing their cost-benefit analysis is their ability to continue supporting their struggle financially, either through external support or through other means. The Rational Actor Model will be used to make assertions in each of the paper's three sections.

The first section provides the necessary context of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique since 1975, the year of both countries' independence. A general overview of the various liberation movements in these countries will be given: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and

UNITA, as well as the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and RENAMO.

The second section looks at the nature of foreign support in Angola and Mozambique during the Cold War. The third section of the paper examines the insurgent movements in the post-Cold War period, as well as the nature of the diamond industry. The final section deals with the resolution or continuation of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. The various negotiations that led to the Lusaka Protocol in Angola will be discussed, as will the subsequent failure of the peace accords.

BACKGROUND

The historical context of the cases being examined is very important for understanding the duration of insurgencies in the post-Cold War era. Angola and Mozambique were both colonies of Portugal that received their independence after 1974, when a military coup occurred in Portugal. Before they were granted independence, both states experienced lengthy independence struggles. In Angola, the movements fighting for independence were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

The MPLA was formed in 1956 under the leadership of Dr. Agostinho Neto. Its main constituency came from the Kimbundu ethnic group in and around the Angola capital Luanda. The MPLA espoused socialist, non-racial ideology, and consequently received support from the USSR. The FNLA was organized in the Belgian Congo as the Union of Peoples of Northern Angola in 1957. The FNLA supported free enterprise and held an ethnic base among the Kikongo in northern Angola. Holden Roberto, the leader of the FNLA, was a protégé of Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaire. The relationship between Seko and the FNLA, as well as the group's opposition to the MPLA led the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States to support the FNLA during the 1960's. The third movement in Angola, UNITA, was created in 1964 under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi after he broke with the FNLA. Support for UNITA came primarily from southern and eastern Angola, which included the Umbundu ethnic group. Of the three in-

dependence movements in Angola, UNITA's program was the least defined, relying primarily on the charismatic appeal of Savimbi.² The goal of UNITA is simple: to take control of the Angolan government. It has come close to doing this several times: in 1993, UNITA controlled over 70% of Angolan territory.³ In order to achieve this goal, UNITA aims to hold as much territory as possible, especially regions with important resources. Lt. Gen. Jose Ribeiro Neco, the chief of staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), stated in May 1999: "The aim (of UNITA) is to widen their area of influence, that is to control a larger area of Angola, including zones rich in natural resources...areas where they can tap diamonds."⁴ UNITA also seeks to drive foreign corporations out of Angola, which would result in a complete collapse of the Angolan economy and would discredit the government.(source?)

UNITA fields both conventional and guerrilla troops to fight its battles. In 1999, UNITA was believed to have 70,000 well-disciplined, well-led troops in the field.⁵ Lt. Gen. Neco gave a breakdown of UNITA's forces: 12,000 troops on the northern military front; between 3,500 and 4,000 on the north-western military front, where the goal is to disrupt oil operations; between 7,000 and 7,500 in the Eastern Military Region, a diamond-rich area; 20,000 troops in the Central Military Region, UNITA's stronghold; 8,000 men in the area around the city of Huambo; between 1,500 and 2,000 troops on the southern military front. Equipment used by these troops included T-64 tanks, T-62 tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, and self-propelled artillery pieces.⁶ The objective of the conventional forces is to take ground and hold it. Guerrilla forces supplement the activities of the conventional troops. The guerrillas carry out such operations as ambushes, the mining of government-held roads and territory, and attacks on civilians. In 1999, UNITA carried out more than 835 operations, ranging from conventional engagements, ambushes, and shelling, to abductions, murder, and sabotage.⁷ The UNITA soldiers and guerrillas who actually fight the battles generally have one of two backgrounds, those who volunteered and those who were recruited through force. Those who volunteered generally did so in the early stages of UNITA's war against the government, from 1974 to 1976; today, these volunteers make up the bulk of UNITA's officer corps. Those recruited in the 1980s and 1990s, especially the rank-and-file soldiers, were

generally recruited forcefully, either through a draft in UNITA-held territory or through recruitment raids into government-held territory.⁸

Mozambique

In Mozambique, the only sustained and widespread anti-colonial organization was the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Motivated by the successful anti-colonial movements in the various British colonies, FRELIMO was formed in 1962, with Eduardo Mondlane as its first president. The Marxist-Leninist movement created a statewide network that it attempted to use to consolidate its power after independence was granted.⁹ Upon gaining independence in 1975, the FRELIMO movement came in to power. The FRELIMO government gave its support to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which was carrying out an armed struggle against the white minority government of Rhodesia. In retaliation, Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organization assisted in the creation of the Mozambican National Resistance, later called by its Portuguese acronym RENAMO, in order to supplement Rhodesian attacks against Mozambique. Formed in 1976, RENAMO's first commander was André Matsangaissa.¹⁰

The goals of RENAMO were never quite clear. Afonso Dhlakama, the RENAMO commander who took the place of Matsangaissa when he was killed in action, claimed "the people of Mozambique rejected Marxism, leading to the formation of RENAMO to fight for a just and democratic pluralist system."¹¹ By 1988, Dhlakama stated that the goal of RENAMO was not to win the war but to "force FRELIMO to accept negotiations for a democratically elected government."¹² The objectives of RENAMO were to undermine the government's influence in the rural areas and to force either the collapse of the government or to force the government into negotiations on favorable terms.¹³

At its height, RENAMO was a guerrilla operation numbering over 22,000 personnel.¹⁴ RENAMO primarily targeted transportation networks because Mozambique's main sources of foreign exchange, cashews, tea, and sugar, relied on the railways, as did landlocked states in the region. Between 1982-1988, RENAMO attacks caused \$898 million worth of damage, six times the worth of Mozambique's yearly exports during the same period. In addition to attacking railways,

RENAMO targeted road traffic, commercial agricultural operations, and small cities where the guerrillas killed government officials, looted, and destroyed cities. The most beneficial programs enacted by the government in the rural areas, such as education and healthcare, were also targeted.¹⁵ By 1988, 45% of rural primary schools were forced to close due to RENAMO attacks and 46% of the primary health network had been destroyed, looted, or forced to close. Given the size of the country and the limitations of the Mozambican armed forces, only certain areas at certain times could be adequately defended, allowing RENAMO to continuously move to an undefended region and continue its operations.¹⁶

Much of RENAMO's notoriety stems from its recruitment practices. Many, if not most, of the RENAMO rank-and-file soldiers were abducted and forced into service. Even in areas of relatively stable RENAMO control, forced conscription was the most common means of gaining new recruits. These recruits were controlled through the threat of execution, transfer from their home region, fear of the government, initiation and training, political mobilization, and rewards.¹⁷ This forced recruitment included children, of whom some were introduced to violence by being forced to perform violent acts against civilians.¹⁸

Foreign Assistance

Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in an interesting period of international affairs. The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in détente, which minimized tensions between them directly but led to the use of proxies and surrogates in the Third World. The Soviets and the Chinese were also engaged in a power struggle at this time. The white-minority apartheid regime in South Africa was still fully functioning, and the white-minority government in Rhodesia was fighting to retain control. All of these factors had profound effects in newly independent Angola and Mozambique.

Foreign intervention manifested itself in two ways in Angola and Mozambique. One manifestation was indirect intervention, provided by the United States and the Soviet Union. The other manifestation was direct intervention, that is, when states such as South Africa, Rhodesia, and Cuba, became physically involved in the conflicts.

United States Assistance

The leaders of the Realpolitik era of American foreign policy, such as Kissinger and Brzezinski, encouraged supporting insurgencies against communist regimes in the Third World. As early as 1961, The US, began giving financial support to the FNLA in Angola. During the initial Angolan civil war of the late 1970s that followed independence, the US gave millions of dollars to the FNLA and UNITA.¹⁹ The US also encouraged South Africa to support the anti-MPLA alliance.²⁰ In 1976, the actions of the CIA (funneling money and weapons) led to the passage of the Clark Amendment (HR4276), which required that any American support for military operations in Angola be openly acknowledged. This amendment was circumvented, however, through the use of secret Saudi accounts and other means, in much the same way the Nicaraguan Contras were funded. In 1981, through the influence of a powerful UNITA lobby in Washington, DC, the Clark amendment came close to being repealed. After the announcement of the "Reagan Doctrine" which provided American assistance for insurgent movements struggling against Marxist regimes in the Third World, the Clark Amendment was repealed in 1985.²¹ American assistance continued around the amount of \$40 million a year from 19?? until 1992, when UNITA rejected the elections it had agreed to under the Bicesse Accords in 1991.²²

In Mozambique, there was never any direct American involvement, but there is evidence that the US knew of and did nothing about South African violations of the Nkomati Accords, which prohibited South Africa and Mozambique from allowing cross-border military operations against one state to originate in the other.²³

Communist Assistance

The two major communist powers of the time, the USSR and China, also played indirect roles in the Angolan and Mozambican conflicts. Soviet support came primarily in the form of military supplies, such as light arms, artillery, tanks, and aircraft, which was supplied to both Angola's MPLA and Mozambique's FRELIMO governments. China gave symbolic and material support to Angola's FNLA, which included training the FNLA leadership in guerrilla warfare. Since the FRELIMO government did not take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it also received support such as weapons and train-

ing, from China.²⁴

Direct intervention

While the U.S., Soviet Union, and China indirectly supported the insurgencies, several other countries were directly involved in the events in Angola and Mozambique. Cuba, for instance, committed thousands of troops and material to Angola to demonstrate its internationalist foreign policy and its support for national liberation movements.²⁵ After South Africa lost its *cordon sanitaire* of white-ruled states in 1976, its defense policy became much more aggressive. In accordance with its "total strategy," (define "total strategy") South Africa engaged in cross-border raids in both Angola and Mozambique, and committed several thousand troops to southern Angola in 1975 to support the anti-MPLA alliance between the FNLA and UNITA. These conventional troops engaged in operations and then attempted to give credit to UNITA.²⁶ Beyond the cross-border raids it conducted, South Africa also provided training camps, material, and intelligence to RENAMO.²⁷

As mentioned earlier, the white minority government of Rhodesia created Mozambique's RENAMO to suit its own purposes. Rhodesia used the insurgency to harass the FRELIMO government because of the support it gave to Zimbabwe's ZANU in its war of liberation against Rhodesia. After the success of ZANU in Zimbabwe (when???), many former members of the Rhodesian Army became mercenaries in the service of RENAMO in Mozambique.²⁸ Zimbabwe, then, directly intervened on behalf of the FRELIMO government, sending as many as 20,000 troops to Mozambique to protect the corridor that connects Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port Beira.²⁹

Using RAM, is helpful in understanding why the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique lasted or more than fifteen years. As stated in the introduction, both UNITA and RENAMO had one basic decision to make whether to continue fighting or to cease fighting and negotiate. As long as the insurgency perceived its chances of defeating the seated government and taking control of the state, which in Sub-Saharan Africa is viewed as a powerful material resource, there was little reason to negotiate. Why would UNITA or RENAMO try to talk the government into giving it a slice when it could

possibly take the whole pie?

Post Cold War

Obviously, operations of the magnitude in Angola require significant financial expenditures, not only in terms of the initial equipment purchases, but also in terms of fuel, ammunition, troops' pay, mercenaries' fees, and bribes. During the Cold War, the majority of funds came from the United States. UNITA possessed an influential lobby in Washington, DC, had allies among the more conservative members of the US Congress, and was viewed sympathetically by the CIA. The fight against communism outweighed most other considerations in American foreign policy at the time, so the United States funded UNITA military operations (source???)

However, the end of the Cold War changed American priorities. The desire to defeat communism had been fulfilled and the outlook of American foreign policy changed from stopping the spread of communism to promoting peace and democracy. Support for organizations such as UNITA, whose support for democracy went little beyond rhetoric and whose tactics included the planting of land-mines in zones used predominantly by civilians and the indiscriminate shelling of cities, began to wane. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US began to use its leverage to pressure UNITA into accepting a cease-fire and participating in elections. Once UNITA proved that it would not accept the democratic process by returning to war in 1992, the US ceased supporting UNITA and began supporting UN sanctions against the group.(source??)

To replace this massive loss of income, UNITA turned to the diamond industry for financial support. Because of its pivotal role in the events in Angola after the Cold War, a brief overview of the diamond industry is necessary. The estimated total world production of diamonds in 1999 was worth approximately \$6.8 billion. The De Beers Corporation and its Central Selling Organization control 70% of world production. There are several categories of diamond trading, including governments selling their own production, companies selling diamonds mined by others, and unlicensed buyers buying unlicensed production. There are diamond buyers in every country diamonds are mined. Rough diamonds are collected by these buyers, then sorted by type and value and shipped to cutting centers in India, Belgium, Israel, Thailand, and the US. Experts can identify with reasonable certainty the source of a

rough diamond by its surface features, mineral inclusions, and other characteristics, but once a diamond has been cut, identification becomes almost impossible.³⁰

Diamonds are extremely valuable, in demand worldwide, and easily smuggled. Because they are so valuable, enforcing the ban on UNITA diamonds, or on so-called "conflict diamonds" in general, is extremely difficult. Arms-dealers barter directly with UNITA in weapons-for-diamonds deals.³¹ Reports allege that shipments of diamonds leave airstrips in UNITA held territory and make their way to the Ukraine, where they are traded for heavy military equipment.³² Some of this trade goes on outside of the legitimate diamond industry, but much of it is carried on within it as well. Certificates of Origin are supposed to ensure that a given shipment of diamonds originated in a certain location; however, given the ease with which diamonds can be smuggled and the willingness of some government officials to be bribed, both within Angola and in surrounding countries, UNITA diamonds still find their way onto the open market.³³ For example, countries bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo, where another civil war is also being funded through the sale of conflict diamonds, reported some unusual statistics in 1999: Zimbabwe exported 19,000 carats worth of diamonds, Rwanda exported 1,500 carats worth of diamonds, and Uganda exported 11,000 carats worth of diamonds. That is a total of 31,500 carats worth of diamonds exported from three countries that are not diamond producers.³⁴ The main countries through which UNITA smuggles diamonds are Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, although other routes are used as well.³⁵

The volume of diamond sales by UNITA is staggering. It is estimated that between 1992 and 1997, UNITA made \$3.7 billion from diamond sales.³⁶ IN 1999, the estimated income from diamond sales was approximately \$255 million.³⁷ According to the US State Department, UNITA controls approximately 5% of world diamond production.³⁸ This in spite of the fact that UNITA withdrew from some of the richest diamondiferous regions in 1997, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocols.³⁹

Given the amount of revenue generated from the sale of diamonds, UNITA has a great deal of interest in protecting its diamond operations. UNITA has large concentrations of troops in the east and central regions, where it either controls

diamond-mining operations or is attempting to stop diamond-mining operations allowed by the government. As mentioned earlier, the Eastern Military Region, which consists of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico provinces, hold between 7,000 and 7,500 UNITA troops organized into 12 battalions, two guerrilla columns, two to four commando groups, and artillery support groups.⁴⁰ UNITA's strategy is simple: make mining diamonds so costly for foreign mining corporations and frighten foreign investors to the point that they leave Angola. Once they are gone, UNITA will be able to extract the diamonds for its own purposes.⁴¹ Lt. Gen. Neco states: "The main goal of these forces is to prevent the various diamond projects from operating, thereby allowing them to engage in illegal diamond mining to raise funds to sponsor their war."⁴² UNITA has also resorted to taking diamond mines by force, such as when a communiqué issued by the Standing Committee of the UNITA Political Commission described the "liberation" of a diamonds commune in Lunda Norte province on May 11, 1999.⁴³

The uses of the income provided by diamond sales are obvious. Weapons, ammunition, fuel, mercenaries, and aircraft, all have been bought with the almost \$4 billion UNITA has made, and funds from diamond sales have formed the foundation of the UNITA movement. An UNITA representative in Brussels admits that UNITA has been trading diamonds despite the UN embargo: "Yes, we do mine diamonds we have to survive economically."⁴⁴ Robert Fowler, Canadian representative to the UN and head of the UN Angola sanctions committee, believes that "diamond revenues constitute the essential component of UNITA's capacity to wage war."⁴⁵ But no clearer statement of UNITA's reliance on the income from diamonds has been made than the statement made by Jonas Savimbi himself. On a secret video made in 1998 of Savimbi addressing UNITA troops and traditional chiefs, captured by the FAA when it took the cities Andulo and Bailundo, Savimbi says:

It does not mean that all the money earned in Lundas Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte has been spent on food. We have also bought sophisticated weapons. We have stockpiled weapons in the bush and the time has come to free ourselves...We have a great many white al-

lies. They have machinery and money and would like to come here to mine the diamonds so that we can live well.⁴⁶

In the framework of RAM, UNITA's actions since the end of the Cold War are perfectly understandable. Between 1992 and 1997, UNITA made thirteen times the amount of money given to it by the US between 1985 and 1992. One can assume that Savimbi is a risk-acceptant leader, that is, he attaches some amount of added utility to taking a gamble, and therefore is less constrained in making war decisions.⁴⁷ This assumption can be made because UNITA has chosen to continue fighting rather than negotiate, even when the military tides have turned against its favor. As long as diamond revenues continue to come in and the UNITA leadership perceives some chance of winning, there is little incentive for it to stop fighting.

Post-Cold War RENAMO

External support for RENAMO never reached the same level as it did for UNITA. The US never officially recognized RENAMO; the closest the US came to recognizing RENAMO as an insurgency worth supporting was to ignore South Africa's violations of the Nkomati Accord supporting RENAMO. Support for RENAMO was always a regional matter, beginning with its foundation by Rhodesian intelligence operatives. They trained and equipped RENAMO fighters, and then gave them orders to either support Rhodesian attacks against ZANU or the FRELIMO government or to carry out attacks on their own.⁴⁸ After the Rhodesian government lost the civil war in 1980 and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, a state ruled by the black majority, only South Africa remained to support RENAMO. South African liaison officers had been assigned to RENAMO since its foundation; after 1980, South Africa played a more direct role in RENAMO's affairs. It created training camps in its territory, provided intelligence, and shipped military supplies by sea and air.⁴⁹ These activities continued after the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984. Once the regime began to shift in South Africa from apartheid to participatory democracy, support for RENAMO began to decrease, but it was not completely halted until South Africa's focus turned inwards as the administration of F. W. de Klerk

came to power and began dismantling the system of apartheid.⁵⁰ Thus, the ANC was legalized, opening the way for the transition to democracy.⁵¹

Again, using the RAM framework, one can understand why RENAMO continued fighting rather than seeking to negotiate, albeit in a different context than UNITA. Even though the odds that RENAMO would actually topple the government and assume control were always slim at best, the continuation of the conflict meant that the issues raised by its propaganda and the desires of its leadership could not be totally dismissed. The process leading to the end of the conflict and the factors that influenced the end of hostilities will be addressed in the next section.

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS

Angola

Negotiations to resolve the civil war in Angola began with the Angola-Namibia Accords in 1988. The Accords called for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the granting of independence to and withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Superpowers' attitudes began to change, shifting the perception of global competition as a zero-sum game closer to viewing the other state as legitimate and as a potential partner in resolving regional conflicts. After such a long conflict, the international actors began to feel that an end to the war would be desirable. The Soviets had lost interest in spreading their influence in southern Africa, and the United States was becoming more adamant that South Africa should cease its occupation of Namibia. Cuba had proven its devotion to the "internationalist" cause and felt it could withdraw from Angola without loss of face, and the loss of South African military superiority to the Cuban-Angolan forces was beginning to have an effect in South Africa.⁵² The Soviet Union used its economic leverage on Cuba and the Angolan government, and the US used its active mediatory role to convince the South Africans to disengage from Namibia before Cuban troops had fully withdrawn from Angola.⁵³

The next attempt at negotiating an end to the conflict was the Gbadolite Summit in June 1989, led by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko and accompanied by other African leaders. During this summit, Angolan President Eduardo dos

Santos and Jonas Savimbi met and shook hands for the first time, giving some amount of recognition and legitimacy to UNITA. Three principles were laid out in the Gbadolite Declaration: desire for national reconciliation, proclamation of a cease-fire, and the formation of a commission to plan for national reconciliation.⁵⁴ However, none of these principles were upheld, as the dos Santos government called for Savimbi's temporary exile and the integration of UNITA organizations and military forces into those of the state. Savimbi sought to remain in Angola and maintain a separate identity for UNITA in the context of multiparty elections. Hostilities resumed in full force in late 1989.⁵⁵

Given the failure of the Gbadolite Summit, President dos Santos requested a new third-party intermediary. Portugal assumed the position. Portugal invited the US and USSR to observe the negotiations, giving the talks added legitimacy via their direct involvement, and negotiations eventually culminated in the Bicesse Accords of 1991. The Accords called for a cease-fire, for UNITA to recognize the dos Santos government until elections were held, affirmed the right of UNITA to take part in multiparty elections, and called for the integration of UNITA forces into a single Angolan military.⁵⁶

Angola was again immersed in violence after UNITA rejected the outcome of the elections held in 1992 in accordance with the Bicesse agreement. It launched an offensive and in 1993 controlled 70% of the country. However, the offensive was contained thanks to the purchase by the Angolan government of \$3.5 billion worth of arms and ammunition and a thorough retraining of the FAA (who?) by South African mercenaries. This led to military setbacks for UNITA. This motivated yet another round of negotiations in 1994, held this time in Lusaka, Zambia, and mediated by the UN.⁵⁷ The Lusaka Protocol, signed by both the MPLA and UNITA, provided a cease-fire, integration of UNITA military forces into the FAA, demilitarization, repatriation of mercenaries, and reconciliation.⁵⁸

In 1992, International observers declared the multiparty elections (called for by the Bicesse Accords) 'free and fair'. Voter turnout was 91%: President dos Santos received 49.6% of the vote and Savimbi received 40.7%.⁵⁹ Savimbi claimed electoral fraud and ordered UNITA into action. UNITA's fortunes swung back and forth, but once it started to

experience steady losses in the field, it became more receptive to and cooperative in the Lusaka negotiations, hoping to stall a further government advance.⁶⁰

It is now apparent that the UNITA used the time of diminished hostilities created by the Lusaka Protocol to recover from the government offensive that forced it to negotiate. Western intelligence reports assert that UNITA went on a buying spree of conventional weapons, using money it made from diamond sales. By 1997, UNITA was better equipped than it had been in 1992.⁶¹ Hostilities resumed again in 1997 with UNITA attacking government positions in diamond-producing areas and then spreading through the rest of the country.⁶²

In response to the return to violence, the UN Security Council has passed many resolutions, several of which placed sanctions on UNITA. These resolutions identify the income from diamonds as a primary factor in allowing the Angolan civil war to continue. Resolutions 1173 and 1176 prohibit the direct or indirect export of Angolan diamonds not accompanied by a Certificate of Origin issued by the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation of Angola.⁶³ Resolution 1295 explicitly identifies diamonds as a principal source of funding for UNITA and calls for the creation of a mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the sanctions that have been placed on UNITA.⁶⁴ There is evidence that the sanctions are having an effect: a senior UNITA official admitted that UNITA was receiving approximately half the market price for its diamonds and that it was having to pay more for weapons and fuel.⁶⁵ Diamond-importing countries and diamond corporations have also made steps toward cooperation. The two largest diamond trade groups in the world, the International Diamond Manufacturers' Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses endorsed a plan announced in July 2000. The plan calls for every package of rough diamonds to be sealed and entered into an international database, which will be monitored by a new organization, the International Diamond Council. Persons or corporations found to be dealing in conflict diamonds face expulsion from the organization and criminal prosecution.⁶⁶

The pattern of UNITA's actions is rational, according to RAM. It has the money, the manpower, the equipment, and perhaps most importantly, it still believes it has a chance to win, or if not to win, then to negotiate an outcome with much

more favorable terms than previous negotiations.

MOZAMBIQUE

The process of negotiating an end to the civil war in Mozambique rested upon the government giving legitimacy to RENAMO. Given the asymmetrical power relationship of the government to the insurgency, the government felt little need to give recognition to RENAMO, and RENAMO had little desire to end its attacks on the state until more parity was given to it in the negotiations.⁶⁷ The initial round of negotiations took place in Pretoria, South Africa, in 1984. The FRELIMO government viewed RENAMO as a group of bandits bent on destruction and therefore did not deserve recognition, even though RENAMO's tactics had brought about the conditions that made negotiating necessary, namely the almost total collapse of the government's administrative ability. Because South Africa had achieved its goal of limiting cross-border activities of the African National Congress from Mozambique, it was in a position to support negotiations aimed at ending the war. The achievement of this goal meant that South Africa's role as patron of RENAMO shifted from giving the insurgency material support to acting as its agent in the negotiations. Little substance came from the Pretoria talks because of the denial of legitimacy of RENAMO and the disinterest of South Africa.⁶⁸

Little progress was also made in the Nairobi talks of 1989. Negotiations were carried out via mediators rather than bilaterally, with representatives of the Catholic Church, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe acting as the third parties. RENAMO had rejected South Africa, given its declining interest in destabilizing neighboring states and its increasing interest in resolving regional conflicts.⁶⁹ Presidents Moi and Mugabe introduced a seven-point peace plan that was supposed to lay the foundation for direct talks between RENAMO and the FRELIMO government. This plan called for, among other things, all attacks on civilians to stop, that democracy be based on freedom of expression and association, that all Mozambican citizens be able to participate in the process of governance in Mozambique, that both sides recognize that the Mozambican people are sovereign and should be given the right to vote, and that all parties must recognize the legitimacy of the Republic of Mozambique, its constitution, its institutions and its laws.⁷⁰

Neither side had reached the point in the conflict where it felt that negotiating was the best possible avenue, therefore neither side granted the other formal recognition. The government denied that the aim of the talks was a power-sharing system of rule. RENAMO still had not consolidated politically, had no clear objectives, and was still receiving support, albeit in smaller amounts than previously, from South Africa.⁷¹

The round of negotiations that proved in the end to be successful took place in Rome from 1990 to 1992. With the Catholic Church acting as a mediator, the two parties agreed to recognize each other. This mutual recognition was critical for the success of the negotiations. The FRELIMO government agreed that it would not preempt any subjects of bilateral negotiation, illustrating its recognition of the asymmetrical political relationship. RENAMO, realizing that its external backers were beginning to withhold support and experiencing a severe drought in the countryside, both of which cut into its ability to operate effectively, found it an opportune time to attempt to reach an agreement. In October 1992, the FRELIMO government and RENAMO signed the Rome Declaration, in which both parties agreed on the political freedom and personal security of all Mozambican citizens and parties, the acceptance of international supervision of the cease-fire and elections, the formation of a new army consisting of troops from both sides, and the liberation of prisoners.⁷²

Peacekeeping troops of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), 6,200 strong, were deployed in Mozambique and supervised the cease-fire, the conversion of the two armies into one, and oversaw the return of 5 million displaced people to their homes. Multiparty elections were held in October 1994 and were judged free and fair. President Joachim Chissano and FRELIMO were reelected as the president and parliamentary majority, with RENAMO rising to the position of a strong parliamentary minority.⁷³

RENAMO, after waging a brutal war for fifteen years, chose to negotiate an end to the conflict and to participate in the political process. As a rational actor, it had the option to continue fighting, given its basis as a guerrilla organization, but diminishing amounts of external support made it more attractive to negotiate with the government while it still had some leverage.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the duration of a Cold War era insurgency is positively correlated to the availability of high value commodities that can be used to fund the insurgency. The comparison of UNITA and RENAMO, two Cold War era insurgencies in former Portuguese colonies in southern Africa, has been used to illustrate the correlation. During the Cold War, both insurgencies relied on external support from the United States, South Africa, or Rhodesia to fund their operations. Once the Cold War ended, however, the two insurgencies took two different paths. RENAMO, having no source of funding save what was provided by outside powers, chose to negotiate while it could still use some leverage on the government, namely the threat of the continuation of the war resulting in the further erosion of the state's ability to govern. UNITA, on the other hand, had another source of income once it had been abandoned by its former patrons: diamonds. Through diamond sales, UNITA has been able to afford the costs of war and carries on the conflict because it believes it still has some chance of winning. The Rational Actor Model has been used in each section of the paper to explain the motivations of each insurgency to undertake the actions it did.

As mentioned in the introduction, the relationship between the duration of Cold War era insurgencies and the availability of high value commodities has implications worldwide. The warlords of Myanmar and the communist guerrillas of Colombia, as well as others, use illicit drugs to fund their insurgencies. Some observers of the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere have labeled the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) the new Medellin cartel. In an interview with a Brazilian journalist, Commander Raul Reyes, official negotiator of FARC, admits that drug trafficking takes place in areas controlled by FARC, and that the insurgency receives funding by taxing the profits.⁷⁴

The distinction between Cold War era insurgencies and post-Cold War era insurgencies is important. While several ongoing insurgencies created after the end of the Cold War do fund themselves by selling high value commodities, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, many others, based not on ideology but on ethnic or religious

grounds, do not require much beyond rudimentary weapons and the zeal of the combatants. Rwanda was stated earlier as an example of this.

The possibility of resolution in Angola remains an open question. World demand for diamonds is not likely to diminish soon, and buyers for diamonds of questionable origin can always be found. It is possible that the Angolan civil war will not end until UNITA is defeated militarily and its leadership is either imprisoned or dead, a similar scenario to that of the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) guerrillas in Peru. The constant inflow of oil and diamond money to the two respective combatants, the government and UNITA, ensures that neither side will have to succumb to the other for lack of money, at least not for the foreseeable future.

Mozambique, on the other hand, has been serene and stable relative to the brutality of its civil war. The state is still a very weak actor, racked by economic problems and natural disasters, but it has yet to revert to the horror that it knew before. RENAMO's role as an opposition party quickly gained acceptance, especially in the central and northern provinces. 30% of the positions in the Mozambican Armed and Defense Force (FADM) were filled by RENAMO soldiers, and the countryside returned to something close to normalcy as refugees return to their homes in steady numbers.⁷⁵ However, the combination of the weakness of the state and Mozambique's history has recently created problems. In the 2000 elections, RENAMO won majorities in the northern and central provinces but came short of the percentages required to appoint their own governors, and Dhlakama lost the presidency to the incumbent, Chissano, 47.7% to 52.2%. RENAMO has alleged that the elections were tampered with and that RENAMO and its alliance of ten smaller opposition parties would return to violence if an independent count of new ballots were not carried out.⁷⁶ Like most states in Africa, Mozambique has a long road to travel before it achieves the position of a stable and strong democracy.

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