



Modus Vivendi



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About this Journal

Although its literal translation from the Latin is "way of life," in international relations parlance, *Modus Vivendi* signifies "a state of affairs where two opposing parties agree to differ." In a similar spirit of fostering intelligent discussion, *Modus Vivendi* attempts to provide a forum for diverse viewpoints on a variety of issues pertinent to the field of international studies. One of the few undergraduate journals of international relations, *Modus Vivendi* is published by the International Studies Department at Rhodes College, in conjunction with the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho.

This issue of *Modus Vivendi* benefits from three articles, all of which are timely and relevant to current issues within the international arena. Lisa Doody's discussion of corruption in Africa attempts to expand on existing research to elucidate the determinants that account for the wide variance in levels of corruption on the continent. In the second submission, Jay Wilson explores the effects of IMF loans on political stability in LDCs. The final article, written by a team of authors (Nix, Palma, and Wilson), tests the theory of priming by examining the role that the media play in shaping Rhodes students' opinions on the highly-debated topic of U.S. immigration policy post-September 11.

Modus Vivendi is the product of enormous efforts on the behalf of many people. The editors would like to extend their gratitude to the faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department. Without their outstanding talents, teaching abilities, and tutelage, this journal would not exist. Additionally, special thanks must be given to Brenda Somes and the faculty adviser to Sigma Iota Rho, Professor Lawrence Hamlet.

The Editors of *Modus Vivendi*

Table of Contents

The Variance of Governmental Corruption 6
in Africa: a Comprehensive Analysis

Lisa Doody

The Paradox of IMF Aid:
An Analysis of Political Protests in
Reponse to IMF Aid 36

Jay Wilson

The Effects of Priming on Rhodes
Students' Opinions on Immigration 78

Lisa Nix, Jeremy Palma, Jay Wilson

The Variance of Governmental Corruption in Africa: A Comprehensive Analysis.

Lisa Doody

Governmental corruption has infested every corner of the earth such that no nation is completely free from its grasp. While it affects every nation, corruption exists in differing degrees of severity around the world. Though one might expect that the levels of governmental corruption would be similar within a given region or continent, when examining the levels of perceived governmental corruption in African countries, there is an astonishing level of variance among nations. On the one hand there exists Botswana, a country with relatively low levels of governmental corruption and a population intolerant of corrupt behavior; and on the other hand, there is Nigeria which is perceived to be the second most corrupt country in the world with corruption-related values that are "endemic" to its society. How can these disparities exist between nations of the same colonial legacy on the same continent? In order to solve this puzzle, I will examine the question of "What causes the varying level of governmental corruption among nations in the African region?"

A. Literature Theory

There exists an overwhelming amount of literature regarding various aspects of governmental corruption. While a significant amount of the available literature focuses on effects of governmental corruption on a nation's development and economy, a large portion also deals with the causes of governmental corruption and the best strategies for eradicating this problem from nations around the world. There are several schools of thought surrounding the question of what causes corruption among governments- the Public Choice Theory and the Interest Group Sub-theory, the "Colonialism Theory", the "Modernization/development Theory", the "Political Theory", the "Economic Theory", and the "Combination Theory".

The Public Choice Theory and Interest Group Sub-theory by John

Modus Vivendi

Mukum Mbaku propose that the inability of law enforcement agencies to regulate corruption, along with the problem of "constitutional maintenance" cause corruption.¹ Constitutional maintenance implies that political leaders tinker with and mold the constitution and political system of a state in order to receive the most personal benefits possible. The "Interest Group" sub-theory compares actors in the public arena with those in the private market. Mbaku asserts that governmental actors and participants will behave in a self-interested manner, which usually leads to their accrual of personal benefits at the expense of the public, or corruption.

While Mbaku examines the economic factors tempting government actors to engage in corrupt behavior, he does not take into account, as the "Combination Theories" do, the cultural factors that influence the level of corruption. Although there is some analysis of political factors in the examination of constitutional maintenance, this factor, in reality, is not a cause of corruption, but rather an effect of corruption. Because of his lack of attention to the possibility of cultural causes, I have decided to give more weight to the other corruption theories rather than adopt a theory similar to the Public Choice Theory.

The "Colonialism Theory," supported by Victor LeVine, takes a slightly different approach than Mbaku's, placing the most importance on the colonial legacy when attempting to explain the causes of corruption.² Levine asserts that colonialism did not provide a sound structural basis for the newly independent African states. These countries had European political structures that were tailored for European values and cultures, and, thus, were oftentimes in conflict with the cultural values indigenous to the African peoples. Because the newly elected African leaders could not adapt to these systems, they began operating outside of the system for personal gain. Unfortunately, this tendency was not only illegal, but also it occurred at the nation's economic expense.

While Levine does make a valuable contribution, it does not sufficiently address the economic factors that possibly contribute to corruption like those

stated above in the "Public Choice Theory" and below in the "Economic Theory". I also reject relying solely on this theory because I have chosen case studies that are all former British colonies. Because this factor is held constant within my case studies and the corruption levels still vary, one cannot attribute colonialism as a cause of the of variance.

The "Modernization/Development Theory," supported by Robin Theobald and O.P. Dwivedi,³ asserts that the effects of modernization and development account for the corruption levels among developing countries.⁴ According to this theory, the development and modernization of a country throw the entire economic system out of balance temporarily, which induces greater inequalities of wealth and political instability. Essentially, modernization and development are indirect independent variables and their effects directly account for the presence of governmental corruption. Whereas its explanations of modernization and development as causes of inequalities of wealth and political instability are convincing, the theory does not account for cultural influences on corruption, as does the "Colonialism Theory" above.

The proponents of the "Political Theory" are John Kpundeh,⁵ Bamidele Olowu,⁶ Herbert H. Werlin,⁷ and William N. Brownsberger.⁸ These theorists focus on the role of political structures and stability in explaining the causes of corruption within African governments, arguing that the inefficient political and bureaucratic mechanisms produce corruption in African countries. While these theories take into account other factors as possibly contributing to corruption, they mainly emphasize political factors as the causes of corruption levels. While political factors contribute to levels of corruption, this theory does not give enough consideration to the influence of cultural and economic factors as do the "Colonialism Theory" and the "Economic Theory" discussed below.

The "Economic Theory" emphasizes the economic factors contributing to corruption within the African region. Susan Rose Ackerman utilizes this theory as the dominant explanation for corruption in Africa.⁹ While the majority of the authors supporting this theory does examine the economic causes of

Modus Vivendi

corruption, it usually places more emphasis on the economic implications of corruption within societies. Though this theory does provide valuable insight into the economic factors contributing to corruption levels, its focus is primarily related to the economic effects of corruption. Also, this theory fails to explore the importance of cultural and political factors, whereas the "Political" and "Colonialism" theories do.

The "Combination Theory" is supported by many authors including: Varda Eker,¹⁰ Ernest Harsch,¹¹ Kempe Ronald Hope,¹² Osei-Hwedie,¹³ and Joseph R. A. Ayee.¹⁴ These authors do not propose a single theory, but they are similar in their approaches to explaining the causes of governmental corruption. Because of their similarities and their tendency to rely on a variety of political, cultural, and economic factors, I have named them as proponents of the "Combination Theory". This theory seems to present the most comprehensive argument because it examines several causes of corruption from a variety of fields. Examining the other theories that argue mainly one approach, it seems as if they are one-dimensional and do not consider other possible causes of differing corruption levels among African governments. It is vital for a corruption theory to encompass not only economic, but also political and cultural aspects, while still remaining parsimonious.

While I have adopted the Combination Theory, my theory is unique in its perspective. First of all, I examine what causes the varying levels of governmental corruption, while the majority of the authors only study the causes or the effects of corruption. My theory has been influenced by all of the theories examined in this paper, no matter how one-dimensional or insignificant they may seem. From my research, it seems as if the varying levels of governmental corruption cannot be explained by solely one factor. It is vital that a theory such as mine include cultural, political, and economic aspects so as to address the entire realm of corruption, while at the same time remaining parsimonious and logical. My comprehensive theory is "The ineffectiveness of anti-corruption institutions, the existence of economic incentives that tempt

officials to engage in corrupt behavior, and the cultural hindrances to the development of anti-corruption values combine to account for the varying levels of governmental corruption in Africa”.

B. Overview of Research Design/Methods

In examining the causes of the dependent variable, levels of governmental corruption, I decided on using three independent variables to examine the question. I have found that the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption institutions, the existence of economic incentives that tempt governmental officials to engage in corrupt behavior, and the presence of cultural hindrances to the development of anti-corruption values all contribute to the variance of governmental corruption in Africa.

Dependent Variable: Governmental Corruption

In this study, the term corruption refers to “the abuse of public office for private gain,” and the term governmental is defined as “both political and bureaucratic officers in the central government of a nation”. The definition of corruption, which is widely accepted among corruption scholars, is adopted from the World Bank. I have narrowed its focus to political and bureaucratic officers in the central government for two reasons. First, while it is difficult to find an abundance of reliable information regarding the central government, it is virtually impossible to find such information on the local governments in Africa. Secondly, evidence relating to parastatals and other areas such as the military and police force is difficult to find. The information regarding the corruption of bureaucratic and political officials, however, is abundant.

As for the operationalization of the dependent variable, one must understand what is classified as corruption. A situation can be perceived as corrupt if an individual exploits his governmental position to obtain economic benefits outside the realm of those benefits legally granted to such an official. Thus, if there exists a high perception of governmental corruption within a given country, a significant number of officials are illegally exploiting their

Modus Vivendi

positions for substantial personal economic gain. Low corruption occurs when few officials are illegally exploiting their positions in the government for personal benefit. Low perceived corruption occurs when officials are exploiting their governmental positions for meager or moderate amounts of money, regardless of the number of individuals engaging in such practices. The level of perceived corruption within a society is deemed medium or moderate when an average amount (neither high nor low) of officials illegally exploits governmental offices held for personal benefit.

In order to collect data on and measure levels of corruption, I have used the 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International.¹⁵ This index measures the perceived corruption in a given country based on surveys from businessmen, academics, and country analysts. The index ranges from 0, the highest level of corruption, 10, the lowest level of corruption. The scores are measured to the tenth of a point. The index provides the numbers of surveys used, as well as the standard deviation, and the range of the scores. While this index measures perceived corruption rather than corruption within a given nation, the perceptions and the people behind them are quite reliable. However, one must consider a possible time lapse between actual corruption levels and the perception of these levels. Regardless, this index is the best instrument available for measuring my dependent variable.

I will also measure the level of corruption based on the CPI. This index has already provided me specific numbers ranges from 0 to 10 to measure my dependent variable. The interval measurement provides the most specific information possible and greatly enhances the effectiveness of my study.

Independent Variables:

With respect to the adoption of the combination theory, I have opted to choose an independent variable to represent each of the three areas of importance. Economic incentives represent economic causes, effectiveness of

Modus Vivendi

anti-corruption institutions represents political causes, and cultural hindrances represent cultural causes. Because each African country, or any country for that matter, has governmental corruption, I will examine the *varying levels* of corruption within the region. Because of this specification, the independent variables must and do demonstrate the ability to vary.

Ineffective Anti-Corruption Institutions

An anti-corruption institution is operationalized as a governmental body that punishes existing corrupt behavior and deters the future occurrences of such. An anti-corruption institution has mechanisms in place to examine existent corrupt behavior of governmental officials and also engages in practices such as public education to prevent the further corruption of government and society. These institutions are only fully effective when economic incentives and cultural hindrances do not exist to further tempt an official to engage in corrupt behavior. The complete effectiveness of such an institution is diminished if cultural hindrances and/or economic incentives exist.

The instrument utilized in the examination of anti-corruption institutions is a scale created based on ten characteristics necessary for an anti-corruption institution to be effective. The characteristics include powers of investigation, prosecution and financial asset monitoring, clear definitions of corrupt offenses, accountability of all higher governmental officials, accountability of the agency officials, adequate funding of the agency, comprehensive officer training, explicit protection of informers, and public education/corruption prevention. While the powers explicitly granted to an institution are important, so are other characteristics such as accountability and adequate funding. An anti-corruption institution loses credibility and is not completely effective when certain governmental officials are deemed immune from its jurisdiction. Also, if adequate funding does not exist, the institution cannot administer its duties to its fullest potential, which also decreases

Modus Vivendi

effectiveness. If the identity of informers is not protected, then it is likely that not all of the relevant cases are reported for fear of being threatened. If institution officers are not adequately trained, then the effectiveness decreases because the institution cannot operate at its fullest potential and can experience setbacks based upon inadequate training. Public education/corruption prevention is also a very important function of an effective anti-corruption institution. Without this prevention, the public will not realize what exactly corruption is, nor will they understand the mechanisms of the institution, so they cannot report incidents.

In terms of measurement, each anti-corruption institution is analyzed by examining the legislation that created the institution, expert feedback regarding the effectiveness, as well as documents generated by the agency itself such as press releases and annual reports. Once each institution is fully examined, it is scored according to the ten criteria mentioned above. For each criterion that an institution meets, it receives one point. If the institution does not meet a certain criterion, or if there is not enough available information regarding a certain criterion, the institution receives zero points. The criteria are not weighted because it is impossible to establish the relative importance of one criterion with respect to another criteria in determining the effectiveness of an anti-corruption institution. Thus, each characteristic is given equal weight and the points received by an institution are then tallied. Possible scores range from zero (completely ineffective) to ten (completely effective). If an institution receives between zero and five points, it is placed in the ineffective category. If it receives six to ten points, it is deemed effective. The more points an institution has, the more effective it is.

The weakness of the independent variable and its measures is a lack of information regarding Ghana's Act 456 of 1993 which established the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and a lack of information regarding funding of the CPC of Nigeria. This lack of information inhibits a comprehensively accurate analysis of Ghana and Nigeria

that encompasses all criteria. Another weakness is the use of dichotomous categories. Additionally, evaluations of effectiveness are only based on governmental reports and documents.

Economic Incentives:

With respect to this study, "economic incentives" are defined as "economic benefits that tempt and cause an individual to engage in corrupt practices. Economic incentives are operationalized as existent when there is a significant difference between the emoluments of governmental and private sector employees. When a governmental official receives a low salary on which he can barely survive and he notices that a private sector employee receives more, there will exist an economic incentive to tempt an individual to engage in corrupt behavior. When there are economic incentives, a higher level of governmental corruption will exist in a country than in a country that has no economic incentives.

To measure economic incentives, I will examine the wages of both private sector employees and public sector employees, as reported in the IMF country reports for each of my countries. When a difference exists between the public sector and the private sector employees in favor of the private sector, an economic incentive exists. When no statistical data exists to demonstrate a numerical data, I examine the country reports to the best of my ability to demonstrate the existence (or non-existence) of an economic incentive and its relation to corruption. This independent variable displays some weakness due to its use of dichotomous categories as well as the lack of information regarding salaries in Nigeria.

Cultural Incentives:

Cultural hindrances are difficult to analyze and operationalize across different countries. Thus, in this design, "cultural hindrances" are "the practices or beliefs inherent to a society or group that have developed over time and are

Modus Vivendi

in conflict with the development of anti-corruption values." Cultural hindrances are operationalized as customs and beliefs inherent to an ethnic group that conflict with political accountability, transparency, and other anti-corruption values. An example of a cultural hindrance would be the practice of patronage among a tribe or ethnic group. A cultural hindrance exists when a practice or belief inherent to an ethnic group could influence an individual to engage in corrupt practices because such practices are culturally acceptable.

In order to measure cultural hindrances, I analyze information regarding the customs, beliefs, and practices of the dominant ethnic group(s) in each country. Because there exists such a wide variety of ethnic groups in certain African countries, I have examined the dominant ethnic groups of each country. If cultural hindrances are present, then a country is deemed to have "existent" cultural hindrances. If no cultural hindrances are present, then the cultural hindrances are "non-existent."

Case Study Countries:

While corruption exists across the world, I have chosen to only examine African countries. My reasons for this research restriction are twofold. First, I have noticed that certain factors, especially cultural, seem to have a more significant effect on corruption levels in Africa than they do in the rest of the world. Secondly, there is such a high level of variance among the countries of this continent. On the same continent resides the second most corrupt country in the world, while there also exists a relatively non-corrupt country as one of its neighbors. I have opted to examine three African countries: one with a high level of governmental corruption, one with a medium level of governmental corruption, and one with a low level of governmental corruption according to the Corruption Perceptions Index. I also select countries that were from different regions in Africa to provide a study that was characteristic of the continent, rather than just the western region. It is also necessary to select countries that have the widest amount of relevant information available.

Another important aspect of selection was to choose three countries that are all former British colonies, thus holding constant the colonial origin of a country and eliminating the possibility that the variance could be attributed to colonial legacy.

With these criteria in mind, the study focuses on the countries of Botswana, Ghana, and Nigeria. Botswana is the African country with the lowest level of perceived corruption, registering as a 6.0 on the scale with a range of (5.6-6.6). Nigeria is the second most corrupt country in the world according to this index, ahead of only Bangladesh, and scores as a 1.0 on the scale with a range of (-0.1-2.0). Ghana registers in the middle with a 3.4 and a range of (2.7-3.9). Thus, these countries are excellent cases for this particular study, as each fits the criteria outlined above.

C. Presentation of Data/Analysis

While acquiring effective and reliable data relevant to my independent and dependent variables has proven challenging, most of the data obtained supports my theory and hypotheses. The data is presented, along with analysis relevant to my theory, in the following section and arranged in subcategories according to independent variables. Within each section, the data and analysis is subdivided into the three case studies.

Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions

In order to deter corrupt behavior among governmental officials, there must exist effective anti-corruption institutions to eradicate already existent corruption and to prevent the occurrence of future corrupt behavior. For each country, the primary anti-corruption institution is analyzed and categorized on a basis of adherence to ten characteristics important in assuring the success and effectiveness of such an institution. The hypothesis regarding this independent variable is the more the effective anti-corruption institution, the lower the levels of perceived corruption within a country. Please refer to the following table throughout the analysis of the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions of

Modus Vivendi

each case study. Each "yes" answer is coded as one, while "no" answers are coded as zero. If there is no available information for a characteristic, it is noted in the table as "n/a."

Table 1: Examination of the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions

	<u>Botswana:</u>	<u>Ghana:</u>	<u>Nigeria:</u>
Investigative Powers?	Yes: +1	Yes: +1	Yes: +1
Prosecution Powers?	Yes: +1	Yes: +1	Yes: +1
Financial/Asset Monitoring Powers?	Yes: +1	Yes: +1	No: 0
Clear Definitions of Offences?	Yes: +1	No: 0	Yes: +1
Accountability of all Governmental Officials?	No: 0	No: 0	Yes: +1
Officer Accountability?	No: 0	Yes: +1	No: 0
Adequate Funding?	No: 0	No: 0	N/A: --
Comprehensive Officer Training?	Yes: +1	N/A: --	Yes: +1
Explicit Protection of Informers?	Yes: +1	No: 0	Yes: +1
Public Education & Corruption Prevention?	Yes: +1	Yes: +1	N/A: --
Total Points	7 points	5 points	6 points

Botswana: The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (6.0 CPI)

The Botswana government established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) through the Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994. Although Botswana exhibited relatively low levels of governmental corruption, the nation was plagued by a series of scandals in the 1990s.¹⁶ According to the evaluations by several international observers, the Directorate has enjoyed many instances of combating and preventing corrupt actions among governmental officials. With respect to this particular study, the DCEC received a score of 7 points. In order to fully understand the reasoning behind this score, it is necessary to examine Botswana's "score" with regards to the individual characteristics of an effective anti-corruption institution.

Modus Vivendi

Like the other anti-corruption institutions examined in this study, the DCEC possesses clear investigative powers. Under the Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994, the Directorate has the powers to "investigate any alleged or suspected offences under this Act, or any other offence disclosed during such an investigation."¹⁸ It is further empowered "to receive and investigate any complaints alleging corruption in any public body."¹⁹ The DCEC also boasts explicit powers of prosecution. If a public official commits an offense, the Directorate may prosecute this individual with the written consent of the Attorney-General.²⁰ The Directorate also possesses the ability to monitor financial assets of governmental officials if corrupt behavior is suspected.²¹ While the possession of the powers mentioned above is very important in determining the effectiveness of an anti-corruption institution, they are not the only powers and characteristics that require examination.

It is also crucial that an anti-corruption institution has clear definitions of offenses. In Part IV of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, the offenses are explicitly stated. These corruption offenses range from bribe acceptance to the "possession of unexplained property."²² While the written definitions of offenses are important, the accountability of all upper-level governmental officials and anti-corruption agency officers is vital. Not all upper-level governmental officials are held directly accountable for their corrupt behavior in Botswana. For example, no criminal or civil proceedings may be instituted against the president during his term.²³ This immunity only extends through the duration of his term of office, however. The officers of the DCEC are also not held accountable for their actions with respect to corrupt behavior. According to the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, "no action shall be brought against the Director or any other officer of the Directorate... in respect of any act or thing done or omitted to be done in good faith in the exercise of his duties under this Act."²⁴ Essentially, various governmental officials, including the Directorate officers, receive immunity with respect to the punishment of corrupt behavior. Because of this immunity, Botswana receives zero points in

Modus Vivendi

the accountability category.

Aspects of the internal operations of the anti-corruption agencies also determine the effectiveness of the agency. In terms of Directorate funding, the DCEC claims that its lack of funding has hampered its effectiveness as an anti-corruption institution.²⁵ Although the lack of funding has impeded its ability, the DCEC exhibits noteworthy officer training. According to the Directorate's 2001 Annual Report, eighty-two percent of its officers were able to undergo some form of training, whether it be of limited or international scope.²⁶ Also, countless amounts of public education and corruption prevention initiatives have been undertaken. For example, the Directorate collaborated with the Infinity company on an anti-corruption advertising campaign.²⁷ Many discussions and educational talks surrounding the issue of corruption have also been handled by the DCEC.²⁸ Thus, despite a lack of funding, the DCEC has been able to implement many anti-corruption measures and officer training programs.

The last characteristic of the DCEC that is anti-corruption in nature is its explicit protection of corruption informers. In the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, Part VII, Section 45 guarantees the protection of informers. This section states: "In any trial in respect of an offence under Part IV, a witness shall not be obliged to disclose the name or address of any informer, or state any matter which might lead to his discovery."²⁹ As mentioned above, this protection of informers is of substantial importance to the public attitude towards the Directorate as well as the tendency of Botswana to report actions of corruption and economic crime.

While the DCEC exhibits many positive attributes that promote the deterrence of corrupt behavior, it still possesses qualities that impede its complete effectiveness. For each negative characteristic, one point was subtracted from the DCEC's score. These impediments include the lack of adequate funding and the lack of accountability of both upper-level governmental officials and officers of the Directorate. Because of these

shortcomings, the DCEC received a score of 7 out of a possible 10 points.

Ghana: Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (3.4 CPI)

Ghana's Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) receives the lowest score with 5 out of 10 points. The CHRAJ was created under the 1992 Constitution, but was formally established until 1993.³⁰ As apparent from its name, the CHRAJ is not only an anti-corruption body, but also a watchdog for human rights violations in Ghana. This division of time and resources between anti-corruption and anti-human rights campaigns could possibly account for the CHRAJ's low ranking.

In terms of powers granted to the body, the CHRAJ scores well. The institution does possess many specific powers of investigation, including: "all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public moneys by officials."³¹ The CHRAJ also possesses powers of prosecution, which allow for: "bringing proceedings in a competent Court for remedy to secure the termination of the offending action or conduct."³² The CHRAJ also maintains the powers of financial asset monitoring. A CHRAJ investigator may obtain the declaration of financial assets from the Auditor-General.³³ As noted above, the CHRAJ fares well in the realm of appointed powers according to the ten-point scale used for this study.

With respect to definitions of powers and offenses, however, the CHRAJ does not receive a point. Although the powers of the body are explicitly enumerated in Chapter XVIII of the Constitution, the definitions of offenses are not outlined. Another setback for this anti-corruption institution is the lack of accountability of governmental officials. Under the constitution, the president is immune from any type of civil or criminal proceedings brought against him during his time in office.³⁴ While the president is not held accountable for his actions during his term, other public officers are subject to investigation and prosecution by the CHRAJ. The officers of the CHRAJ are also held accountable for their actions, with regard to corrupt behavior. Under

Modus Vivendi

the Code of Conduct for Public Officers, the Commissioner and other members of the CHRAJ are considered to be members of the public service, which falls under the jurisdiction of the CHRAJ.³⁵ While the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners are considered to "enjoy the terms and conditions of service" that are the same as Justices of the Courts of Appeals and the High Courts, these justices may be removed on the grounds of "misbehavior."³⁶ As noted above, the CHRAJ only fares well with respect to the category of officer accountability.

An analysis of internal aspects of the CHRAJ is also important in determining its effectiveness as an anti-corruption institution. Like Botswana's DCEC, the potential effectiveness of the CHRAJ has been hampered by a lack of funding. For example, the Human Rights Watch attributes the loss of valuable personnel to the CHRAJ's lack of funding.³⁷ Dr. S. K. Asibuo also notes this same problem in his analysis of the institution.³⁸ While it is implied by the Human Rights Watch's analysis of the CHRAJ, there is no available evidence concerning the comprehensive training of commission officers.³⁹ Also, within Chapter XVIII of the constitution, there exists no explicit protection of informers, which inhibits the effectiveness of the institution and the potential number of cases reported. However, in support of anti-corruption measures, the CHRAJ does possess the powers of public education and corruption prevention. In Chapter XVIII, the commission is given the explicit power "to educate the public as to human rights and freedoms by such means as the Commissioner may decide, including publications, lectures, and symposia."⁴⁰ One such instance of this public education and corruption prevention is the organization of the National Workshop on Governance in 1997.⁴¹ The CHRAJ has also focused its efforts on the education of rural areas so as to inform and enlighten this population to its functions and the issues of good governance.⁴² While the CHRAJ does seem to take notable steps in corruption prevention and public education, its lack of funding provides a setback to its effectiveness as an anticorruption institution, thus accounting for a less-than-perfect score.

Modus Vivendi

In all, the CHRAJ does possess some notable qualities as an anti-corruption agency, such as powers of prosecution and investigation, along with public education and officer accountability, yet the lack of funding and absence of clear definitions of offenses has limited its effectiveness. It thus receives a score of 5 points.

Nigeria: Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (1.0 CPI)

The Corruption Practices Commission (CPC) was established as a result of the "Anti-Corruption Act" of 2002. The purpose of the bill is "to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices."⁴³ According to the scale in place for this study, the Nigerian CPC received 6 points, only one point less than Botswana's DCEC.

In terms of powers granted to the commission, it can investigate and prosecute practices, but it cannot monitor financial assets. In the "Anti-Corruption Act" the powers of investigation and prosecution are explicitly stated: "It shall be the duty of the Commission...to receive and investigate any report of the conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or the commission of such an offence and, in appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders."⁴⁴ The CPC does not possess explicit powers of financial asset monitoring. Although the commission is able to request any document, it is not able in all cases to order someone to produce a banker's book.⁴⁵ While financial asset monitoring does occur in Nigeria, it occurs under the jurisdiction of the Code of Conduct Bureau rather than the CPC.

The "Anti-Corruption Act" is extremely detailed in its description of powers, possible offenses, and penalties. While the commission succeeds in this respect, it fails in terms of the accountability of all CPC officers. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the CPC is over all higher officials, regardless of their role as an executive in such a public body.⁴⁶ There do not exist any explicit immunities of the President of Nigeria with regards to civil and criminal proceedings.⁴⁷ The officers of the commission, nevertheless, are immune from

Modus Vivendi

such proceedings: "No legal proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any officer of the Commission."⁴⁸

With respect to adequate funding of the commission, there is no available information regarding whether there is a surplus or lack of funding. In terms of explicit protection of informers, there is a specific clause relating to this protection: "the information referred to in the complaint and the identity of the person from whom such information is received shall be secret."⁴⁹ Explicit powers of the CPC do exist for public education and corruption prevention, as noted in the following passage: "It shall be the duty of the Commission...to educate the public on and against bribery, corruption, and related offences; and to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption."⁵⁰ One such example of these measures is the enactment of a workshop organized by the CPC that aims at promoting good governance. There is no available information regarding the implementation of comprehensive officer training.

Although Nigeria ranks second by the scale used in this study, there was a lack of information regarding two criteria; as well, both Botswana and Ghana lacked information for one criterion. Thus, this study is not fully capable of determining the true effectiveness of the anti-corruption institution for each country.

Existence of Economic Incentives to Tempt a Governmental Official to Engage in Corrupt Behavior.

Another independent variable affecting the variance in the levels of governmental corruption is the existence of economic incentives that tempt a governmental official to engage in corrupt behavior. The presence of economic incentives can have quite a significant effect on the level of governmental corruption within a country, especially if the anti-corruption institution is deemed ineffective. As mentioned above, the primary indication that an economic incentive exists is a difference in public sector and private sector salaries. If the private sector salaries are significantly higher than the public

Modus Vivendi

sector salaries, an economic incentive exists. Below, I will give a brief overview of the economic situation of each of the case studies and then follow with the presentation of differences in salary as they relate to the existence of an economic incentive. My hypothesis regarding economic incentives is that the higher the economic incentives in a country for an individual to engage in corrupt behavior, the higher the level of governmental corruption will be within any given nation.

Botswana:

With most of the African continent struggling through the woes that accompany development, Botswana is one of the few economic development success cases in the region. While it has experienced its share of economic woes, Botswana has boasted "one of the world's highest growth rates since independence in 1966."⁵¹ The economic growth of the country has averaged above nine percent per year between 1966-1999.⁵² While it was considered one of the lowest income countries in the world immediately following its independence, it is now considered a middle-income country, a feat that can largely be attributed to the very profitable diamond mining industry.⁵³ Please refer to the following table for statistical evidence regarding the existence of an economic incentive in Botswana.

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Avg. Monthly Cash Earnings (pula) (Total)	862	923	969	1,251	1,428	1,546
Private/Parastatal	678	815	871	1,067	1,243	1,327
Central Gov't	1,068	1,134	1,170	1,566	1,733	1,900
Annual % Change in Avg. Monthly Cash Earnings (pula) (Total)	9.9%	7.1%	5.0%	29.1%	14.1%	8.3%
Private/Parastatal	-2.4%	20.2%	6.9%	22.5%	16.5%	6.8%
Central Gov't	5.0%	6.2%	3.2%	33.8%	10.7%	9.6%

Source:
IMF
Country
Report
2002⁵⁴

Modus Vivendi

Botswana exhibits a substantial difference in the average monthly earnings of governmental employees and that of those employed in other sectors of the economy. While the average monthly earnings of an employee of the central government are 1,900 pula, the average monthly earnings of the private/parastatal sector are only 1,327 pula per month. As mentioned above, an economic incentive exists if a central government employee's wage or salary is significantly less than a person employed in the private sector. While a difference exists between these two sectors, the difference is in the favor of the central government employee; thus, an economic does not exist in Botswana for an official to engage in corrupt behavior. Thus, the stated theory on economic incentives holds true, at least in the case of Botswana governmental employees.

Ghana:

The Ghanaian economy has experienced more economic triumphs than its poorer, surrounding neighbors in West Africa. With respect to these western nations, Ghana boasts a doubled per capita output.⁵⁵ Most of the economy is employed in the agricultural sector which accounts for thirty-six percent of Ghana's GDP.⁵⁶ It has a diversified and developed industrial base in comparison to several other African countries.⁵⁷

Year	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Avg. Monthly Employee Earnings (cedis)	7,433	10,524	13,805	24,257	30,056	35,212
Total						
Private Sector	7,956	15,310	18,660	35,356	39,566	37,174
Public Sector	7,333	9,324	12,738	21,869	28,037	34,826

Source: IMF Country Report 2000 ⁵⁸

Modus Vivendi

As one can infer from the Table 3, there is a significant difference between the average monthly earnings of public and private sector employees. For each year, the average monthly earnings by employee are significantly lower in the public sector than the private sector. Another factor strengthening the economic incentive for corrupt behavior exists because of the substantial difference affecting the public sector employees. Because the average monthly earnings are significantly lower for public sector employees, it is rational to believe that Ghana's public sector employees will look for other means to supplement their pocketbooks. With so many financial resources at their fingertips, it is not absurd to assume that this supplementation will come from an abuse of public office and public funding. This assumption is strengthened even more when there is not an effective anti-corruption institution in place. This economic incentive combined with ineffective anti-corruption institutions accounts for the corruption level among governmental officials in Ghana.

Nigeria:

Like most economies, the Nigerian economy is particularly sensitive to political instability and economic mismanagement- two factors that have plagued the nation for quite some time. The effects of corruption have also plagued this oil-exporting economy for years.⁵⁹ Agricultural production is still at a very low level, although it makes up forty-one percent of GDP and sixty-six percent of the national employment.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, there is no available data regarding the differences in wages between private sector and governmental sector employees. Because of this impediment, I have utilized content analysis rather than quantitative analysis. For the purposes of this study, Nigeria has economic incentives for governmental officials to engage in corrupt behavior.

From my analysis of the IMF Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies of the Federal Government for 2000, an economic incentive exists for governmental officials to engage in corrupt behavior. The real wages of public sector employees have declined over the last ten years. Because of this decline,

Modus Vivendi

the government brought about a new wage bill in 1999 that restructured salaries of public sector employees. This new wage structure included a wage increase for governmental officials of one hundred percent. Unfortunately, the wage bill of 1999 has been a significant impediment to efficient public expenditure because a significant portion of the money was going to "ghost workers."⁶¹ Because of this problem of ghost workers, the salary structure was supposed to be re-evaluated by September of 2000. The government is hoping that the doubling of civil service wages will counteract the problem of real wage decline and also "lay the foundation for the development of a professional, results-oriented civil service that would be less susceptible to corruption."⁶² Apparently, the relatively low salaries of governmental officials have lead many to engage in corrupt practices, suggesting that an economic incentive to engage in corrupt behavior does exist in Nigeria.

All of the available information points to the relationship between economic incentives and corruption levels within a country. On account of this evidence, I have accepted my hypothesis regarding economic incentives. As demonstrated above, if an economic incentive exists, there will also exist a higher level of corruption than a country that contains no economic incentives, all things remaining the same. In Botswana, an economic incentive to engage in corrupt practices does not exist according to the differences between public and private sector employees. On the other hand, countries with higher corruption levels such as Ghana and Nigeria do exhibit such economic incentives. When these economic incentives interact with cultural hindrances to the development of national anti-corruption values, they can prove to be a deadly combination affecting corruption levels.

Cultural Hindrances to the Development of National Anti-Corruption Values

Thus, I now analyze the final factor affecting the varying levels of governmental corruption in Africa: the existence of cultural hindrances to the development of anti-corruption values in African societies. Since obtaining

Modus Vivendi

their freedom from European colonial rule, many African nations have struggled with the task of combining many different ethnic groups under the umbrella of one nation-state. Several countries have faced the challenging task of developing a civil society that is a combination of hundreds of ethnic groups, each with their own languages, beliefs, and customs. Some ethnic groups lend themselves to the acceptance of political accountability and transparency along with other values that denounce corrupt behavior. Other ethnic groups have customs and beliefs such as patronage that conflict with the nurturing of anti-corruption values. Cultural acceptance and tendency towards anti-corruption values are extremely important and significant in their effect on the level of governmental corruption in African states. My hypothesis is that the existence of such cultural hindrances will lead to higher level of corruption than if they did not exist in a country, all things remaining the same. As mentioned above in the methodology section, each country will be placed in one category with respect to cultural hindrances: existence or non-existence. Below, one will find a description of the cultural hindrances (if any) that exist in each country and learn how these hindrances account for the varying levels of governmental corruption among the case studies.

Botswana:

Botswana, for the purposes of this study, is characterized as having a low level of cultural hindrances that lead to the development of anti-corruption values. In fact, the *International Anti-Corruption Newsletter* explains that "corruption has never been publicly acceptable in Botswana and when scandals did erupt they were met with general condemnation."⁶³ According to the Botswana Official Government Website, approximately sixty percent of the country is of Tswana origin.⁶⁴ Although it is rare among the chosen case studies for a country to have an ethnic group comprising such a large percentage of its population, the government's estimates are nevertheless somewhat conservative. Other reports have shown the Tswana group comprising almost eighty percent of the population. Fortunately for the Botswana (citizens of

Modus Vivendi

Botswana), the Tswana ethnic group has several customs and beliefs that contribute to its acceptance of government transparency and accountability. This low occurrence of hindrances to the development of anti-corruption values has influenced the level of corruption within the government of Botswana.

As previously mentioned, the Tswana have several customs that contribute to the development of anti-corruption values and a few practices that can prove to be a hindrance to the development of these important values. The first practice that can be viewed as a hindrance to the development of anti-corruption values is the traditional generosity of the chief, or the *kgosi*, towards his subjects in order to gain popularity. According to Shapera, the generosity of the chief towards his subject was very important: "his [the chief's] personal popularity often rested on his reputation for popularity."⁶⁵ His subjects also paid tribute to him with land and other gifts.⁶⁶ While these customs seem harmless, they can be a significant roadblock to the development of anti-corruption values if not kept in check by effective legislation and institutions. Fortunately, Botswana has substantial and effective institutions in place to discourage corrupt behavior.

The Tswana culture also has effective structures in effect for the development of anti-corruption values. For example, if the chief engages in questionable behavior during his time as leader, he may be punished or reprimanded by his advisors. If he has significantly neglected his duties or used his office in a questionable manner, he may be thrown out of power or even assassinated.⁶⁷ Also, the institution of the *kgotla* provides the tribe with a manner of adjudicating matters of custom and behavior.⁶⁸ In this court, the entire tribe gives its opinion regarding the matter at hand, and the chief decides after hearing this consensus. According to the government of Botswana, "The *kgotla* is largely seen as the foundation of Botswana's strong democratic tradition."⁶⁹ These traditions of accountability and transparency have largely aided Botswana in the development of anti-corruption values mentioned above.

Modus Vivendi

Ghana:

Ethnicity is a very important aspect of everyday life in Ghana. Ethnicity is so important and influential that it "continues to be one of the most potent factors affecting political behavior in Ghana. For this reason, ethnically based constitutional parties are unconstitutional under the present Fourth Republic."⁷⁰ Ghana is divided into many small ethnic groups, the largest group being the Akan, which is subdivided into the Ashantis and Fantis. According to available literature, the Akan ethnic group, although subdivided, is relatively homogeneous by African standards.⁷¹ All of the subgroups of the Akan comprise forty-four percent of the Ghanaian population.⁷²

Most of the information available on the Akan ethnic group does not indicate barriers to the development of anti-corruption values. Although the Akan do not comprise a majority of the population (which could be a cultural hindrance), the group has some measures in place to encourage political transparency and accountability, which can eventually lead to the development of anti-corruption values. The Ashanti chief, or the *odikro*, preserves customs as well as settles disputes within the tribe.⁷³ While the chief is the powerful political head of the tribe, he is still held accountable for his actions. If he were found acting in an inappropriate manner that went against the will of the people, then he could be removed from office.⁷⁴ It is quite difficult to encounter any significant cultural hindrances to the development of anti-corruption values. Thus, Ghana is characterized as not possessing cultural hindrances.

Nigeria:

Nigeria is comprised of more than 250 ethnic groups, none of which holds a majority in the country. The most populous is the Hausa-Fulani group, which comprises twenty-nine percent of the people.⁷⁵ The Hausa-Fulani is a fusion of two groups, the majority being Muslim.⁷⁶ Nigeria registers in the existent category of cultural hindrances for the purposes of this study due to the identification of a few cultural hindrances. There are also no positive anti-corruption values demonstrated.

Modus Vivendi

As mentioned above, the Hausa-Fulani demonstrate certain customs and beliefs that pose a cultural hindrance to the development of anti-corruption values. For example, a very prominent aspect of the Fulani political system is the practice of clientelism, in which political official accepts a tribute in exchange for his protection of an individual.⁷⁷ While clientelism and the payment of tribute are not explicitly corrupt practices, they can be easily twisted into the justification for corrupt behavior.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can see that the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions, the existence of economic incentives, and the existence of cultural hindrances explain the varying levels of governmental corruption on the African continent. In this study, Botswana is determined to have an effective anti-corruption institution, no economic incentives, and few cultural hindrances. On the other hand, Ghana has an ineffective anti-corruption institution, economic incentives, and no cultural hindrances. Surprisingly, Nigeria has an effective anti-corruption institution, economic incentives, and several cultural hindrances.

With respect to these independent variables, the economic incentives seem to provide the greatest explanation for the variance. This variance is shown by the fact that Botswana and Nigeria both have effective anti-corruption institutions and the existence of cultural hindrances. The scores regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions did not prove the hypothesis related to the level of perceived corruption. Both Botswana and Nigeria have effective anti-corruption institutions but startling differences in perceived corruption. The cultural hindrances also did not prove to be an obvious determinant of the varying levels of governmental corruption. Although Ghana has no cultural hindrances, it has a higher level of corruption than Botswana, which scored as having these hindrances. While each country does have these two similarities, they differ in relation to the independent variable of the existence of economic incentives. With regards to the variables

Modus Vivendi

examined in this study, only the difference in the existence of economic incentives can adequately explain this level of variance.

In order to decrease the levels of governmental corruption, it seems that the most effective way would be to eradicate the existence of economic incentives for governmental officials to engage in corrupt practices. Longer-term goals for corruption-infested countries should include increasing the effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions and, if possible, eradicating the cultural hindrances to the development of anti-corruption values. If the African countries endeavor to make notable steps in this effort, their citizens and country will greatly benefit and continue reaping the rewards into the future.

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The Paradox of IMF Aid: An Analysis of Political Protests in Response to IMF Aid

Jay Wilson

Originally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created in order to monitor the stability of international exchange rates under the fixed exchange rate system established at the Bretton Woods conference. With the elimination of the fixed exchange rate system in the 1970s, many scholars predicted the end of the IMF as its primary function of maintaining international exchange rates was no longer necessary. Yet, the IMF found a new role in the international system during the debt crisis of the 1980s as it developed into a lender of last resort agency specialized in assisting developing countries and abating economic crises. Furthermore, this debt crisis in the 1980s made relying on the IMF necessary, as it became tougher for developing countries in economic crises to obtain aid necessary for economic growth, because they needed IMF approval to renegotiate and receive loans from commercial banks. This dependence on the IMF allowed the IMF to strengthen its policy of conditionality: it extends assistance, but only in support of a negotiated adjustment program that contains specific policy commitments and performance criteria.¹

IMF conditions aim to ensure that the recipient country attempts to make economic reforms necessary long-term economic growth. The economic reforms most often prescribed within these IMF conditions are structural adjustment reforms that consist of reduced government expenditures, elimination of subsidies, tight monetary supplies, and currency devaluations.² Many scholars have noted that these IMF prescriptions often require 'politically controversial policy adjustments' that can often result in political protests against the domestic government.³ However, successful economic management usually requires that the central government authorities be shielded from these

Modus Vivendi

types of popular political pressures.⁴ Thus, a paradox exists in that the successful implementation of IMF aid programs often depends on the political sustainability of these programs, while, simultaneously, these programs elicit growing political protests in response to their prescribed reforms.

Despite this paradox, the IMF's role in the international economy has been increasing. The IMF has grown in membership from its initial membership of forty-five members in 1945 to 184 members currently.⁵ Furthermore, the IMF is lending increasingly large sums of money. As of 30 June 2002, the IMF had 88 billion dollars in outstanding loans and credits to eighty-eight developing countries.⁶ Yet, the IMF has been making tougher the requirements to receive this funding by increasing the amount of conditions attached with these loans.

With such an increase in the role of the IMF in developing countries, an analysis of the relationship of IMF aid and levels of political protests is important to understanding what may determine the ability of the government to successfully manage the economy and even remain in power. Yet, several scholars have acknowledged a lack of scholarly analysis with regard to the factors determining the variance in levels of political protests in response to IMF loans.⁷ Thus, an important research question that should be analyzed in order to fill this gap in existing research and explain the effects of IMF loans on differing levels of political protests is: why do IMF loans vary in their effect on political stability in LDCs?

In every society there exist certain social segments that are more likely to react strongly in the form of political protests. In developing societies, higher levels of inequality imply that different sectors will have different abilities to organize and invoke a political protest.⁸ Consequently, IMF aid will vary in its effects on levels of political protests according to the different distributional impact of the reforms across these sectors of the society. These varying effects on the public will result in differing levels of political protests. Further, these effects are shaped by the interaction of four important variables: the historical

norm of political protests in the country, the amount of political freedom within the country, the economic growth of the country, and the public opinion within the country.

The remainder of this paper will explain how these four variables provide an answer to the research question. First, an analysis of the existing literature related to this question is examined and reviewed in order to generate these four variables and testable hypotheses regarding them. Then, an explanation of the methods used to test these hypotheses and a presentation of the evidence from specific cases is presented in order to form a conclusion.

Literature Review

The predominant theories regarding this research question focus on an analysis of the effects of IMF loans on the level of political protests. These theories correspond to the four predominant approaches to answering this research question: the political approach, the economic approach, the historical approach, and the political economist approach. Within these four approaches, there exist various debates and sub-groups. The following sections will provide a general introduction to each approach followed by a critical assessment of the different debates within the sub-groups.

The Political-Economist Approach

The political-economist approach takes into account equally both the political and economic effects of IMF aid on levels of political protest. Four scholars included within this approach are Edward Epstein, John Walton, Charles Ragin, and Stephen Haggard. The most important contribution of this group of scholars to this study is that they test both economic and political variables equally in order to determine which plays a more important role in determining types of political protests.

Edward Epstein tests both economic and political hypotheses in order to describe the relationship between economic austerity measures characteristic of IMF conditionality and the number of strikes and strikers. His economic hypothesis asserts that the frequency of strikes and the number of strikers are a

Modus Vivendi

direct response to what is occurring in the economy.⁹ Whereas he concludes that no relationship exists between the number of strikes and the level of real wages, he finds that there is a correlation between unemployment levels and the number of strikes. His political hypothesis asserts that the key determinant of the number and severity of strikes is the perceived response of the state to such actions. After testing his political hypothesis, he finds that the type of regime and the level to which it attempts to restrict union behavior alter the level of strikes. This finding is important because it validates analyzing how the amount of political freedom might affect levels of political protest.

Ragin and Walton also conduct studies similar to Epstein in that they also test both economic and political hypotheses to explain the relationship between economic reforms and the level of protest. Two of the hypotheses that they test are economic, one is political, and the other is a combination. Importantly, they find that their two economic hypotheses are most supported. They further suggest that economic hardships resulting from debt and austerity play an important role in raising levels of protests in the presence of high levels of urbanization and unionization, because more people are directly affected by the austerity measures and the likelihood of protests thus increases.¹⁰ This finding is important to this study, because it provides further evidence of the need to test economic variables, and provides a basis for how to go about conducting multiple hypotheses tests regarding political protests.

Stephen Haggard also conducts a similar analysis of both political and economic variables. Specifically, he analyzes the interaction between social groups, the domestic government, and the international financial organization. He finds that in implementing structural adjustment programs the two main risks leading to a potential withdrawal of the reform are strikes and protests.¹¹ Further, he concludes that the propensity to strike or protest is related to how the economic reforms affect certain groups of society that are more likely to revolt. Haggard provides a scholarly analysis that shows the paradox of IMF aid in which strikes and protests in response to reforms recommended by the

IMF often cause the abandonment of the economic programs.

The Political Approach

The political approach to an analysis of IMF loans and their impact on political stability involves analyzing IMF lending as a political process. Thus, each political theorist focuses on the relationship between political forces and political institutions during the implementation of IMF-prescribed reforms. This does not mean that this group of theorists does not account for economic factors within their theories, but rather it suggests that they place a greater emphasis on the political variables. Consequently, all the political theorists agree that the variation in levels of political protests is due to the political aspects of the IMF aid and its reforms rather than the economic factors. Yet, the differences among this group of scholars exist and tend to be the result of utilizing differing levels of analysis of this politicized lending process. Specifically, three main levels of analysis exist among the political theorists: international, national, and individual.

International Level of Analysis

Barbara Stallings and Miles Kohler assert that international influence is the most important factor in explaining major economic policy changes in the third world.¹² Stallings determines that international influence varies according to the stage of the policy-making process and finds that international influence is least effective during the implementation stage. Kohler also agrees with Stallings that international influence is least effective during the implementation stage of policy-making process. The only line of disagreement between Stallings and Kohler is that Kohler limits international influence to just the World Bank and IMF, while Stallings thinks this influence can come in other forms such as market shocks, international forces, and domestic actors.

The points most important to this study is their general agreement that political opposition forces can eliminate programs and that the IMF is least able to affect the outcome of stabilization programs during the policy implementation stage of the process. Further, they acknowledge that domestic

Modus Vivendi

governments are most vulnerable to political opposition at the implementation point. Thus, this analysis of differing levels of political protests in response to IMF aid is important because it appears that IMF prescriptions can be undermined by domestic opposition at this vulnerable point in the lending process.

National Level of Analysis

The national level of analysis involves an examination of the effects of IMF lending on the domestic politics of the recipient country. Scholars using such analysis argue that IMF-led development programs are subject to certain domestic political variables that are unique to each recipient country. Thus, they agree that influence can come from domestic actors. Yet, they contend that these domestic actors play the most important role in determining the success or failure of IMF policies.

One important scholar within this group is Louis Paldam, who examines political factors at the national level, arguing that the effects of IMF aid are largely dependent on the political variables found within the country. His study analyzes nine Latin American countries and tests several hypotheses that provide insight into the focus of this study. Specifically, he analyzes strikes and protests before and after the announcement of adjustment measures in these countries from 1980 to 1991. One factor he examines is the type of government, and he finds that 'the nature of the regime' significantly affects the form and intensity of the protests."¹³ This finding is important to this study, as it implies that an important variable to analyze is the political freedom within the country. This analysis will show how the amount of governmental repression affects the public anticipation of response and, thus, the propensity of the public to protest.

The Individual Level of Analysis

Another group of scholars attempts to explain the effect of IMF loans on levels of political protests from a psychological perspective. Generally, this group of scholars argues that the effect of IMF loans on the individual is the

Modus Vivendi

most important variable in determining the public's propensity to protest. Thus, they would agree with the other scholars in that economic and political variables are important in explaining the levels of political protests, but they would argue that these factors all cause a certain political mindset which will be either likely to protest or not. This group of scholars consists of Joan Nelson, Henry Bienen, and Mark Gersovitz.

Bienen and Gersovitz examine the political effects of IMF loans on political stability. In one article, they study the relationship between IMF conditions and political stability. They conclude that IMF aid may result in popular protests, but that it is seldom so important that it dominates all other factors of political stability. Yet, Bienen and Gersovitz do theorize that IMF programs shift benefits from one group to another within the domestic society, and that some countries will be especially vulnerable to protests from the group who has lost benefits during the implementation stage of IMF programs.¹⁴ In a second article, they attempt to explain the same dependent variable, political stability, but this article focuses solely on the effects of consumer subsidy cuts and violence as independent variables of causation, rather than IMF conditions. In this article, they theorize that subsidy cuts will often result in violence, and they conclude that protests against austerity measures do occur, but rarely result in the overthrow of the existing regime or substantial political instability.¹⁵ Also, it provides evidence of the way that political protests will most likely affect the regime, as well as specific evidence that IMF reforms may result in violent riots.

Joan Nelson agrees with Bienen and Gersovitz that the main cause of political protests in response to IMF loans is the varying distributional effects of IMF loans on the public. In her analysis, she conducts a similar study to the one conducted here and analyzes why adjustment programs sometimes result in broad opposition and other times only small opposition. In her conclusion, she finds that popular responses to structural adjustment reforms are determined by two public perceptions: confidence in the government's ability to manage

Modus Vivendi

the economy, and the belief that they will share in future benefits.¹⁶ This finding suggests a need for analyzing public opinion in order to better gauge the formation of these perceptions, as well as the effects of public opinion on the levels of political protest.

The Economic Approach

The economic approach places less importance on the aforementioned political variables, focusing instead on the economic impact of IMF loans as the most important determinant of the levels of political protests. Within this economic approach exist two groups, the optimists and the pessimists, that differ in their perceptions of the potential economic impact of IMF loans. The optimists argue that the IMF conditions are politically sustainable and necessary for adjustment reforms, but the pessimists argue that IMF adjustment conditions are not politically feasible and should be reformed.

Pessimists

James Malloy, Manuel Guitian and Judith Teichman, argue that the IMF conditions attached to the loans cause economic problems, although such conditions requiring certain economic reforms are becoming an increasingly important part of IMF loans. Malloy quickly points out that these conditions on IMF loans are often a "bitter medicine" that can lead to political instability as the economic effects are absorbed by the domestic constituency and lead to political protests against the government.¹⁷ Teichman reaches the same conclusion as Malloy in her study of economic reforms forced upon Mexico from 1983-1988. She argues that these liberal economic reforms led to the political instability in Mexico.¹⁸ Guitian's critique of IMF conditionality is slightly different from the other two, in that he does not argue against conditionality completely. Instead, he concludes that the conditions of IMF conditionality are too harsh, but rather than be eliminated, they should be adapted according to the domestic situation of each country.

One other notable pessimistic scholar is John Loxley. He argues that the

Modus Vivendi

urban working class is usually the worst affected by: layoffs resulting from government fiscal austerity, decreasing real incomes in the face of inflationary pressure resulting from currency devaluations, subsidy cuts, and increased fees or prices for public sector services. These cases have given rise to 'IMF riots' which are an urban phenomenon.¹⁹ This is relevant to the argument because it asserts that the IMF riots are a result of the negative economic effects on only the urban class. Thus, this study will attempt to account for this variable by examining whether there is a significant correlation between the types of protestors among these IMF protests.

Optimists

Optimistic economists such as Stanley Fischer and John Williamson differ from the pessimists in that they argue for stricter IMF conditionality. Specifically, they use a *moral hazard* argument which asserts that stricter forms of IMF conditionality will increase the probability of getting the necessary structural economic reforms. Thus, they argue that with tougher conditions, there is a greater probability of the success of the loan in its promotion of sustained economic growth.²⁰ From this argument, one concludes that IMF's obtaining greater authority and ability to monitor recipients will prevent recipient countries from receiving the aid and not implementing the necessary reforms. Finally, they would agree with the pessimists that the IMF has caused political and economic instability in the past, but they argue that the solution to this problem is to enhance power rather than complete elimination of the programs.²¹

Another optimistic scholar, Anne Krueger, examines the role of the IMF and the World Bank in LDCs during the past 50 years. She theorizes that the IMF and the World Bank contributed to development in LDCs by encouraging policy changes during times of economic crises. She further asserts that the aid provided by the IMF was able to soften the effect of the strict short-term adjustment crises.²² This is important to this study because it shows a counter historical argument that the IMF increases the prospects for a country in an

Modus Vivendi

economic crisis. Yet, this difference could be accounted for by her placing an emphasis on the economic aspects of policies rather than considering the political protest aspect that will be examined in this study.

This ongoing debate between the optimists and the pessimists is important to this study, because it provides a basis for the need to examine the way the economic effects of these reforms can vary either positively or negatively. These different economic effects could imply differing levels of political protests in response to either the positive or negative economic effect. Thus, an economic variable is important to analyzing whether or not the positive or negative economic effects of IMF conditionality result in larger or smaller amounts of political protests.

The Historical Approach

The historical approach offers a sociological argument that political protests are a natural effect of the historical norms found in the societies. Thus, the most important variable in determining the presence or absence of protests is the historical level of political protests in a country. This argument compels me to include a historical variable to account for the previous history of political protests within a country.

Maya, Lander, and Ungar examine the history of political protests in Venezuela from 1985-1999. They argue that there has been a steady increase in the frequency, size, and severity of political protests throughout this period. Specifically, they argue that the 1989 *caracazo*, one of Argentina's largest and most violent protests against economic reforms, was the result of increasing levels of social protests in Venezuela in response to the IMF-prescribed government austerity measures.²³ Consequently, they acknowledge that the increasing use of protests in Venezuela during this time period established a social norm of protests against government austerity measures. This article is important to this study, because it seems to support a hypothesis that the greater the level of political protests historically the greater the level of political protests to IMF loans during the period covered by this study.

Modus Vivendi

Another scholar that would agree with their assertion that the past forms of protest affect the current level of protests is John Walton and David Seddon. They make an argument comparing European transitions to modernity with recent transitions of third world countries. Specifically, they argue that the third world countries moved from paternalist modernization to neo-liberalism due to policies imposed by international financial agencies such as the IMF. Thus, during the modern paternalist phase, the popular sectors in the Third World developed a moral economy like that of England's in during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This term refers to a moral code in which the poor expect to be tied in with the government, the wealthy, and the economy. Thus, past forms of protest relate to popular forms of protests when authorities are seen to break their moral agreement with the poor by switching from paternalism to modernism.²⁴ This evidence further supports a historical hypothesis and shows that it could be especially relevant to an analysis of the third world countries.

Cloward and Piven's argument for the historical perspective stems from the idea that varying levels of political protests are attributed to other various institutional, political, and historical factors. Specifically, disruption of everyday life is the only method that the poor have historically had to pressure authorities. Thus, a large history of protests develops as a reaction of the poor to the hardships that they endured, and the degree of the varying level of protests is the result of the history of protests and the weakness of government institutions.²⁵

From this review of the existing literature, four hypotheses seem most prevalent among the abovementioned theories. The first hypothesis is based on the idea from the historical approach that a country's history of protests may cause a country to develop a historical norm to protest against the government. The *historical hypothesis* is the greater the amount of political protests historically, the greater the level of political protests in response to IMF loans. Second, the *public opinion hypothesis* is based on the assertion of the individual-level political theorists that the levels of

Modus Vivendi

political protests are a direct result of the public's opinion towards the economy. Thus, one could infer that the higher the percentage of public opinion is regarding a worsening economic future, the greater the level of political protests that ensue. The *economic hypothesis* borrows from the economic theorists and asserts that the level of political protests in response to IMF reforms is a direct result of the growth of the economy. With this hypothesis, the expectation is that the greater the level of economic growth, the lower the level of political protests that results in response to the reforms. The fourth hypothesis borrows from the ideas of the national-level political theorists and asserts that the levels of political freedom are an important variable. This *political hypothesis* is that the greater the levels of political freedom, the higher the levels of political protests that result.

Methodology

In order to test these four hypotheses, a better explanation of the differences in levels of political protests is necessary. Generally, scholars that are examining political protests in response to IMF loans refer to a specific type of protest often called an IMF riot because it is a response to austerity measures introduced by the IMF as stabilizing conditions necessary for new or rescheduled loans.²⁶ IMF riots are often defined more generally to include other types of IMF-prescribed reforms, as well. In this study, political protests are defined more generally as 'collective actions that oppose state economic reform policies aimed at reducing foreign debts and qualifying debtor nations for new or rescheduled loans.'²⁷

Despite this general agreement in defining political protests in response to IMF aid, significant variation in the operationalization of these political protests does exist. This division largely centers on whether strikes and popular protests should be examined individually or collectively. Joan Nelson examines the effects of structural adjustments on popular political actions on elections, strikes, and urban protests. Thus, she analyzed the affects of the economic reforms by separating popular protests from strikes and examining them individually.²⁸ Other scholars have examined the effects of the structural

Modus Vivendi

adjustments associated with IMF loans on strikes alone.²⁹ Furthermore, others have examined these effects on only popular protests.³⁰ Yet, there are at least two studies that examined the effect of IMF loans on both popular protests and strikes collectively.³¹ They make a convincing argument that strikes and protests should be combined because they are essentially constitute a substitutable variable whose total varies less than each one separately, and thus are of greater significance.³² Further, it has been noted that 'strikes and protests are often more complementary than different.'³³ Thus, in this study, strikes and protests are combined in this study into one group called political protests.

In the absence of a predominant method of measuring the level of political protests individually, a unique scale is created in order to measure this dependent variable. This interval scale is based on variations of three indicators of level of political protests: 1) an interval measure of the size of each protest ranging from a couple to millions 2) an interval measure of the duration of each protest ranging from one hour to a few weeks 3) a dichotomous variable of the presence or absence of violence.

Since each of the first two factors could have a wide range of values, they were each divided into ordinal variables consisting of three different ranges. The three ranges for size are: *small* (consisting of 1-100 people); *medium* (range is from 101-1000) and *large* (range is from 1000 and up). The three ranges for duration are: *short*, ranging from 0 to 24 hours; *moderate*, ranging from 24-48 hours; *long*, ranging from 48 hours and up. These two factors are weighted equally on the scale because the assumption is made that a large protest with a few people would have the same destabilizing effect as a small protest that lasts a longer period.

The third factor, violent nature, is a dichotomous variable measured nominally by assigning two names to characterize each variable as either violent or non-violent. *Violent* protests are those protests that are characterized by one or more injuries or deaths. *Non-violent* protests are those protests that are characterized by no injuries or deaths. This factor is taken into account on

Modus Vivendi

the scale by ranking violent protests one point higher than non-violent protests, because their violent nature means that the protest is potentially more destabilizing to the government.

Admittedly, there are limits to this type of measurement of violence in that this variable does not account for differing levels of violence. For the purposes of this study though, it is assumed that the level of violence is already accounted for in the other two variables because violent protests that are larger and longer typically result in larger numbers of injuries and deaths than those that are shorter and smaller. Further, this is generally confirmed in the protests examined in this study. Thus, the use of measuring different levels of violence through an ordinal method and multiplying each protest by this factor in this study would not have effected the variation among the dependent variable, but would have only made their total scores larger and widened the gaps between the groups.

Consequently, a 10-point interval scale is created to measure the level of political protests in this study. As discussed previously, this scale measures each individual protest according to three criteria: size, duration, and violent/non-violent nature. Size and duration are weighted equally, and violence is accounted for by placing violent protests at one level above those of a non-violent nature.

- 1- small, short, non-violent
- 2- small, short, violent
- 3- small, moderate, non-violent = medium, short, non-violent
- 4- small, moderate, violent = medium, short, non-violent
- 5- small, long, n-v = large, short, n-v = medium, moderate, n-v
- 6- small, long, v = large, short, v = medium, moderate, v
- 7- medium, long, non-violent = large, moderate, non-violent
- 8- medium, long, violent = large, moderate, violent
- 9- large, long, non-violent
- 10- large, long, violent

Modus Vivendi

Using this measure, each individual protest was scored accordingly at a point on the interval scale. Then, the frequency of protests in each country was taken into account by totaling the sum of the values of each individual protest to get a yearly total value for each country. These values were totaled and placed according to their level of protests ranging from: *low*-total score less than 25; *medium*-total score between 25 and 50; and *high*- total score above 50.

In order to obtain the necessary information regarding the most recent IMF protests, data was collected using the *States of Unrest I* and *States of Unrest II* reports published by the World Development Movement. The first report documents protests against the IMF in thirteen countries from December 1999 through September 2000. The second report is more recent and includes documentation of political protests in response to IMF and World Bank policies in twenty-three countries.

At first glance, the use of these reports may seem suspicious since the source of the data is a lobbying group that consistently lobbies against the IMF and the World Bank. Yet, this potential for biasness is recognized and accounted for by several cross-validating methods. In order to test the merits of this report, a sample of the sources cited at the end of each report was obtained and analyzed to ensure that the information used in the study was not taken out of context. Second, each individual protest documented was further explored through the use of other newspapers and journals in order to make sure the riots documented were direct responses to the IMF and to obtain information specifically relevant to this study that was not found in their sources. Third, there was an exhaustive search of archived newspapers from 1999-2001 in order to check for potential IMF policies and prescribed reforms that may have occurred but were not documented due to their inability to lead to political protests and to determine if any significant protests were left out during the three month gap. These protests are mentioned in the paper, but they are not included in the total score. This cross-referencing was performed

Modus Vivendi

to ensure that significant protests that might have affected the levels of variation were accounted for during this period.

Historical Hypothesis

The *historical hypothesis* argues that the general amount of strikes and protests historically will determine the level of political protests in response to the IMF. In order to test this historical hypothesis, historical data regarding the history of political protests are collected from the James S. Banks Cross-National Time Series Dataset. This dataset includes documentation of strikes and riots from 1960 to 1998. In this dataset, strikes are defined as 'the number of any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.' A riot is defined as 'the number of any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.'³⁴ From this dataset, the cumulative totals of both strikes and riots are obtained and analyzed both individually and collectively to determine whether a relationship exists between them.

Public Opinion Hypothesis

The *public opinion hypothesis* identifies the public opinion in the domestic country as the most important variable in determining the resulting level of political protests. Public opinion is most often referred to as the general views of the population regarding a specific issue or institution. In the case of IMF loans, the most important aspect of people's public opinions that affects their likelihood of protesting is their attitudes toward their economic future.

A test of this hypothesis requires the use of survey data regarding the public opinion in the case studies from 2000-2001. This is analyzed to estimate the general public opinion data on public perceptions of their economic futures. These measurements come from survey data collected from the International Gallup Polls end of year polls for 2000 and 2001. Within the two surveys, the analyzed question asks respondents whether they felt that economic prosperity will increase, decrease, or remain the same in the upcoming year. The data

Modus Vivendi

collected will be analyzed in order to see if a relationship exists between public opinion and levels of political protests.

Economic Hypothesis

The *economic hypothesis* attempts to analyze the potential effects of the amount of economic growth on the differing levels of political protests. This hypothesis is based on the observation that people are generally less likely to protest during times of economic growth as this success of the economy will spread benefits across society. In order to test this hypothesis, two important measures of economic growth are analyzed: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. GDP is the total value of a nation's goods and services during a year.³⁵ GNI is a country's domestic product plus its interest payments or dividends received from abroad and minus similar payments made to others.³⁶ Both measures take into account the factor of the size of differing populations, but GDP per capita does not account for income coming from abroad so GNI was also used in order to account for some of the potential positive effects of IMF aid.

The data for both of these economic growth indicators are obtained from the *World Development Indicators* dataset on the World Bank website. GDP is analyzed by collecting end of year GDP growth percentages for both 2000 and 2001. GNI is analyzed by collecting GNI per capita statistics from 1997 through 2001 and calculating the total percentage change over that period in order to account for the difference in GNI levels due to the different valuations of currencies among the cases.

The Political Freedom Hypothesis

The *political freedom hypothesis* identifies the amount of political freedom within a country as the determinant of the level of political protests in a country. This hypothesis is based on the general observation that societies with larger amounts of political freedom are more able to communicate, mobilize, and protest against unpopular government actions such as economic reforms associated with IMF aid. Consequently, the expectation associated with this

Modus Vivendi

hypothesis is that greater amounts of political freedom will correlate with greater amounts of political protests against IMF aid.

In order to test this hypothesis, the political freedom scores from the annual Freedom House ratings are utilized. The Freedom House assigns these ratings by averaging each country's scores in two categories, political rights and civil liberties. A country's scores in either of the two categories are assigned from 1 (*Free*) to 7 (*Not Free*). Then, both scores are averaged, and the country is placed into an ordinal category of: *Free*, scored between 1 and 3; *Partly Free*, scoring between 3 and 5.5; and *Not Free*, scoring between 5.5 and 7.

The cases selected to test these hypotheses are Argentina, Ecuador, Kenya, Mexico, and Nigeria. They were selected for several reasons. First, they all were approved to receive IMF aid during the time period examined in the study. Second, they exhibit the most variation in my dependent and independent variables. Third, the use of three Latin American countries and two African countries provides geographical diversity and differing levels of protests, which will help to alleviate the potential to ascribe these riots to one specific cultural phenomenon. Fourth, all of the countries except Mexico are contained in both reports. Though Mexico is the only case not included in the first report, it is extensively reviewed in a collection of newspapers during the time period of both reports to ensure that the absence of political protests during 2000.

Case Studies

After cross-analyzing the data collected in the two *States of Unrest* reports with a variety of sources, each individual protest is assigned one of the values and the sum total is established to determine the level of political protests in the two years. For some of the protests within the study, there is no mention of the exact size or length of the protest. This was generally due to the fact that these protests were small and not mentioned in depth in the report or newspapers. In these cases, the protests are assigned a rating of "moderate" or "medium," though this assignation probably resulted in slightly higher scores

Modus Vivendi

than possible as these protests were generally of a smaller nature. In order to account for potential variation due to these estimates, a range score is also calculated where each country's range includes the lowest and highest possible scores using the ratings of all high and all low for these protests. Yet, these ranges did not affect the variation between groups since each country's range still fell in the same interval and there is clearly variation as none of the ranges overlap. Thus, the total scores proved to be the most accurate measure, and each of the five countries in my study is placed in one of three levels of political protests over the two year period according to their total scores.

Admittedly, there were potentially other protests that were not

Table 1

	<u>Total Scores</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Level of Political Protests</u>
<u>Argentina</u>	113	70 to 139	High
<u>Ecuador</u>	80	64 to 96	High
<u>Nigeria</u>	38	27 to 47	Medium
<u>Kenya</u>	22	16 to 24	Low
<u>Mexico</u>	5	5	Low

included within these reports and there was evidence of some protests that occurred during the three month gap from October to December of 2000. Yet, the inclusion of these protests would only have resulted in increasing overall scores of each group. In addition, including non-reported protests would have only served to increase the overall scores of each country and would not likely have decreased the gaps between each country. Further, a direct link of these protests as responses to IMF loans is not clearly evident among these protests compared to the ones included in the reports. Thus, the reports and the protests accounted for in this numerical measure provide a record of both the largest protests in response to the IMF in the case countries and the protests that are most clearly linked to IMF-prescribed policies.

Modus Vivendi

Furthermore, there exist several large differences captured by these scores that are clearly demonstrated in the following brief report regarding the each country. The largest difference appears between Argentina and Ecuador, countries with the highest levels of political protests, and other countries that scored "moderate" or "low" during the same period. First, Argentina and Ecuador are the only countries within the group that experienced political protests in response to IMF aid that resulted in the overthrow of the regime. Second, these countries are the only countries within this group that experienced multiple, widespread protests throughout many towns and involved millions of people. Third, Ecuador and Argentina had multiple protests that were markedly more violent and resulted in the largest numbers of deaths and injuries in their protests. Only one of the countries in the lower levels, Nigeria, had a protest resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. The following documentation of the most significant protests in each country during the period from 2000 to 2001 provides a more detailed documentation and further evidence of the variation between the groups.

Argentina- High Level of Political Protests

In March of 2000, Argentina was approved to receive a three-year stand-by credit worth 7.2 billion US dollars. Argentina had a total of nineteen political protests in response to IMF loans, seven of the protests occurred in 2000, while twelve occurred in 2001. Also, there was a wide variety in the type of protests, and the majority of the protests were in response to IMF-imposed austerity measures. Specifically, government austerity resulted in a number of economic reforms such as labor reforms, decreases in wages, and increases in taxes. These types of reforms are very similar to the austerity measures implemented in the other cases, but the main difference is the extremely high level of reaction in the form of protests.

Argentina's largest and most widespread protests occurred over a two-day period beginning on 19 December 2001 and resulted in the overthrow of the government. These protests transpired throughout the Argentine provinces,

Modus Vivendi

consisted of thousands of people, lasted for over two days, and were of an extremely violent nature. On the first day of protests sixteen people died, while the total for both days left more than twenty-four people dead.³⁷ The largest demonstrations occurred in the capital city of Buenos Aires, where citizens, predominantly from the middle class, protested in front of the presidential palace. The police were dispersed to break up the crowd using tear gas and bullets. Consequently, the high level of these protests had a large destabilizing effect on the Argentine government. On 20 December 2001, President de la Rúa declared a state of siege, but protestors remained on the streets. After failing to secure a political coalition, the President resigned the next day.

These massive protests occurred throughout Argentina in response to the government's stringent economic policies. Argentines were angry over pay cuts and austerity measures implemented by the government under pressure from foreign interests including the IMF. There is clear evidence in this case that the IMF played a role in pressuring for the reforms and had even increased pressure earlier in the month to press for more austerity as a condition for new loans. This caused one source close to the government to assert that this pressure 'put us in an untenable position, and was a key factor to de la Rúa's collapse.'³⁸

Ecuador- High Level of Political Protests

On 19 April 2000, the IMF approved a twelve month stand-by credit loan for Ecuador equivalent to \$304 million. The agreement document explicitly stated necessary reforms in the labor market, oil sector, privatization, and dollarization.³⁹ The IMF leaders praised dollarization as a means of calming financial markets, restoring confidence in the economy, and reducing inflation.⁴⁰ Also, they suggested the need to impose tighter fiscal policies in the future to help reduce fiscal deficit from its seven percent level in 1999.⁴¹ The IMF did, however, acknowledge that the proposed reforms would be tough politically and would require firm support from the government and public at large.

Modus Vivendi

Ecuador also had a high level of protests for the period studied with a total of fourteen protests throughout the period including nine in 2000 and five in 2001. Additionally, Ecuador is the only country that had two documented protests that scored a 10 on the scale, one in June 2000 and one in February 2000. Ecuador also had a slightly higher number of violent protests than Argentina with five occurring during the period. Of the documented protests, the majority of these protests came in response to IMF-prescribed reforms, as three protests ensued against the potential dollarization reform and four protests commenced against government austerity measures.

Ecuador could not have foreseen the amount of political protests that resulted in response to these IMF-prescribed policies. The first significant protests that occurred during the time period were in January 2000 and resulted in the overthrow of the president. In January 2000, President Jamil Mahaud declared a state of emergency in response to growing protests in regards to the proposed dollarization. On 15 January 2000, the Confederation of the Indigenous peoples planned a week of protests calling for the President's resignation and an end to IMF reforms. On 22 January, three thousand protestors occupied Ecuador's congress building and ten thousand more people protested outside. This led to the involvement of the military guards and to the eventual fleeing of Muhaud from the Presidential Palace. The next day Gustavo Naboia, his vice president, assumed presidential powers.

Ecuador's first protest that scored a 10 on the scale occurred from 1 February 2001 to 7 February 2001. On the first day of the protests, protestors occupied the offices of the IMF in Quito, providing clear evidence of the link between this large protest and the IMF. Other protests arose in similar fashion throughout other cities and the government declared a state of emergency on 2 February 2001. Despite the state of emergency, these protests continued to escalate and spread to other cities and regions around the country. Furthermore, these widespread protests turned violent as the government tried to gain control over the protestors. This led to over forty injuries, four deaths

Modus Vivendi

including a fourteen year old boy, and twenty-five people shot and wounded.⁴² The national protests ended on the 7 February 2001 when the government agreed to lower prices and entered into a dialogue with the leaders of the protests.

Nigeria-Moderate Level of Political Protest

On 4 August 2000, the IMF approved a stand-by credit worth over one billion dollars for Nigeria's economic program for 2000 and 2001. Nigeria decided to treat this aid as precautionary and has not withdrawn any of the funding yet, but signing the agreement still requires Nigeria be bound to the IMF conditions proposed in the agreement. Further, there is clear evidence of the Nigerian government's attempts to follow the IMF prescribed policy prescriptions. In the press release statement about the aid, the IMF commended Nigeria for its current progress in economic reforms such as reducing the government budget deficit. It then goes on to encourage 'an acceleration of structural reforms' in the areas of the 'provision of power, telecommunications, and the petroleum sector.'⁴³ The IMF also encouraged Nigerian authorities to 'avoid a repetition of excessive and wasteful expansion of spending.' There is evidence of implementation of all these reforms in Nigeria from 2000 to 2001 as reforms have increased fuel prices, decreased government programs, and privatized several government industries.

As the Nigerian government undertook the program recommended by the IMF and underwent the necessary reforms, these reforms led to political protests in Nigeria in both 2000 and 2001. Nigeria had a total of six protests for the entire period, consisting of two in 2000 and four in 2001. Of Nigeria's protests, there were four strikes including one that scored a 10 on the scale. Of the six protests, three of them were against the increase in fuel prices, one against a privatization, and two against non-payment of back salaries due to IMF austerity.

Nigeria does have one political protest that scored a 10 on the 10-point scale and accounts for almost a third of Nigeria's raw score. This June 2000

Modus Vivendi

protest occurred in response to the increase in fuel-prices that was encouraged by the IMF. The protest consisted of widespread violence across multiple cities in Nigeria and resulted in several deaths. Yet, this one large and widespread protest never resulted in the overthrow of the government, as did similar protests in Ecuador or Argentina. Further, this protest appears to be an oddity during the time period as the other documented protests in response to the IMF were not as widespread or violent.

Kenya- Low Level of Political Protests

On 28 July 2000, the IMF approved a \$198 million US credit to Kenya to support an economic and structural reform program. According to Stanley Fischer, Managing Director of the IMF at the time, the structural reforms attached as conditions to this loan were "the removal of distortions in the various markets, especially agriculture, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and improvements in the efficiency and governance of public enterprises."⁴⁴ Thus, the main reforms recommended by the IMF were a decrease in the role of the government in the economy and a reduction in public expenditures through implementing programs such as privatization. The potential for these harsh reforms to stifle living conditions were evident in a comment from the President Daniel Arap Moi that 'these conditions are the toughest ever imposed on Kenya.'⁴⁵ These harsh conditions imposed by the IMF did result in some political protests during 2000 and 2001, but overall Kenya never encountered the large-scale violent reactions found in the other countries. Thus, Kenya's total score reflects this "low" level of political protests.

Kenya had a total of five protests for the 2000 and 2001 period, consisting of two in 2000 and three in 2001. Although 2001 saw three strikes, none of them was larger than one thousand people. Kenya had only one violent protest, but this was a small, short protest that did not result in a large-scale incidence with multiple deaths or injuries like the countries placed in the "high" and "moderate" levels. There were three other protests against government austerity measures such as non-payment of salaries. Yet, Kenya

never encountered the widespread violent protests seen in the other cases, and its score reflects a "low" level of political protests.

Mexico-Low Level of Political Protests

Mexico had a very low level of political protests in response to IMF-prescribed policies from 2000 through 2001. On 17 March 2000, the IMF completed its review of Mexico's standing in the fund and approved a \$1.2 billion credit. During the two-year period that followed, there was only one documented political protest against IMF-prescribed reforms. This protest was a demonstration by thousands of people in Mexico City against plans to impose taxes against food and medicines, who argued that the taxes would have an unfair impact on the poor.⁴⁶ This type of a tax reform was recommended by the IMF as necessary for the current administrations policies to be 'fully effective.'⁴⁷ The protest was large, short, and non-violent. Thus, it scores a total of 5 for Mexico during the two-year period, placing it in the group of countries with a "low" level of political protests. There is evidence of other protests in Mexico during the period, but none of them could be clearly linked as a direct response to IMF-prescribed economic reforms.

Historical Hypothesis

The *historical hypothesis* is based on the assumption that a historical norm develops within a society in response to economic reforms similar to those adjustment policies prescribed by the IMF. Historically high levels of political protests tend to result from the inability of certain sectors of society to be incorporated into the formalized political process. Consequently, these groups attempt to persuade policy-making through the use of political protests. Thus, the analysis of historical norms should indicate that the greater the history of political protests in the country, the greater the probability of political protests in response to IMF prescribed policies.

In order to test this historical hypothesis, I analyze the data on strikes and riots historically from 1960 through 1998. This data only went to 1993 for the cases selected for this study, but it accounts for over a thirty-year period in

Modus Vivendi

all of the case countries except for Kenya, which was missing data until 1967. An analysis of this data consists of examining the cumulative totals of strikes, riots, and combined scores for this historical time period.

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Ecuador</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Kenya</u>	<u>Mexico</u>
Strikes	50	16	7	0	3
Riots	41	16	32	14	35
Totals	91	32	39	14	38

Source: Arthur S. Banks Cross-National Time Series Data


From Table 2, the least amount of consistency appears to be between countries' riot history totals and the levels of political protests. Three of the countries that did seem to support the historical hypothesis are Argentina with the highest number of riots with forty-one for the time period, Kenya with the lowest total of riots with only fourteen, and Nigeria with the third highest number of riots with thirty-two. The two cases that do not support this hypothesis are Mexico and Ecuador. Mexico had the lowest level of political protests against IMF reforms for 2000-2001, but it had the second highest number of riots historically with thirty-five. Ecuador had the second highest total of political protests for 2000-2001, but it had the second lowest number of riots during the historical period with sixteen.

These inconsistencies within the riot totals for the historical period appear to also skew the results from the combined totals historically. This hypothesis is supported again by Argentina, which had the highest combined totals, and Kenya, which had the lowest combined totals historically. The hypothesis seems mixed among the other countries' combined totals with thirty-two for Ecuador, thirty-nine for Nigeria, and thirty-eight for Mexico. Thus, there was wide variation among these countries in their level of political protests in the study, but there was little or no variation in their riot totals.

Modus Vivendi

The most conclusive evidence supporting the *historical hypothesis* is in the cumulative strike totals. In the graph below, it is evident that all of the countries appear to be separated according to their levels of political protests. Argentina and Ecuador have the first and second highest totals historically with fifty and sixteen respectively. Further, the two countries with low levels of political protests during the 2000-2001 time period are countries with historically low totals. There were no documented strikes for Kenya during the period and three documented strikes for Mexico. Nigeria, the one country at a "moderate" level of protests, falls in the middle with seven strikes during the historical period. The graph below further illustrates this.

Graph 1 Source: Arthur S. Banks Cross-National Time Series Data Archive



The graph above illustrates that the number of strikes was increasing the fastest among the "high" level countries. Argentina had the biggest jump in

Modus Vivendi

cumulative totals from 1968 to 1970, and there is also evidence of a steady increase in strikes until the end of the thirty-year time period. Ecuador also shows a marked increase later in the historical period as it is below the other countries and had no strikes until 1981. Then, it begins a steady increase until it reaches sixteen at the end of the dataset. This helps to explain why Ecuador had a higher level of political protests in the period than Nigeria, but they only differed historically by a margin of seven strikes.

The data implies that the *historical hypothesis* is most clearly supported for large strikes in certain sectors such as industrial and service sectors. This conclusion is further confirmed by several other different historical reports that review shorter time periods and consist of only some of the cases proposed in this study. The one piece contradictory historical evidence against this result is the strike statistics published by the International Labour Organization, which have some of the lower level countries like Mexico with many protests and Ecuador with only a few. These statistics have more mixed results and the hypothesis does not hold for each case study.

This contradiction is important, because an insight into the differences in the two statistics could provide further insight into the determinant of this variation of political protests. The apparent difference in results appears to be due to the differing definitions of strikes and their inclusion of smaller strikes within their dataset. Thus, the *historical hypothesis* is most clearly supported when using data that contains documentation of only large strikes that involve over one thousand people and occur in the industrial and service sector. This result implies that countries with historically high levels of large strikes will have higher levels of protests in response to the economic reforms required with IMF aid.

The Economic Hypothesis

The *economic hypothesis* attempts to capture how the success of the IMF aid to promote economic growth affects the level of political protests in

Modus Vivendi

response to the reforms implemented. This hypothesis stems from the idea that IMF aid is intended to promote economic growth within these developing countries, and political protests will result when this economic aid is unsuccessful in bringing economic growth. Thus, it hypothesizes that higher levels of economic growth will result in lower levels of political protests.

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Ecuador</u>	<u>Nigeria</u>	<u>Kenya</u>	<u>Mexico</u>
2000	-1	2	4	0	7
2001	-4	5	4	1	0

Source: World Development Indicators

The GDP growth figures for the period indicate mixed support for the economic growth hypothesis. The economic growth hypothesis is most supported by Argentina, which had the lowest amounts of GDP growth during the period with negative amounts of GDP growth for both 2000 and 2001. Yet, the data is more varied among the other four countries. The other "high" level country, Ecuador, provides a drastically different result with positive GDP growth for both 2000 and 2001. Further, Nigeria, the "moderate" case, has the highest average GDP growth for the period. Among the "low" level countries the hypothesis is only supported in Mexico in the year 2000, when it experience seven percent GDP growth.

Despite this evidence, there does appear to be some correlation between increasing or decreasing GDP growth figures for 2001 and the levels of political protests for each year. Argentina's GDP growth decreased from negative one percent in 2000 to negative four percent in 2001, at the same time as an increase in political protests from 2000 to 2001. Ecuador however had an increase in GDP growth from two percent to five percent and it had a decrease in the amount of IMF protests in 2001. Further, Mexico had a decrease in GDP

Modus Vivendi

growth from seven percent to zero growth and it had an increase of protests from 2000 to 2001. The other two countries did not have significant changes in GDP growth over the period and thus they had similar levels of protests during both periods. Consequently, the data is mixed in supporting the economic growth hypothesis.

In examining the GNI per capita data, there also appears to be mixed results among the countries. A total percentage change in GNI per capita from 1997 to 2001 was obtained in order to account for the different currency values for each country and to show whether individual income was increasing or decreasing over the period. The results for Argentina and Ecuador support the *economic hypothesis*, as both countries experienced large decreases in income per capita from fifteen percent in Argentina to over twenty-two percent in Ecuador. Also, the hypothesis appears to hold for Mexico as it experienced a drastic increase in income per capita for the period of forty-two percent. Thus these data support the idea that as people's income increases they are less likely to protest IMF-prescribed economic reforms. Finally, the hypothesis holds for Nigeria as it experienced only a moderate increase in GNI per capita with only an eight percent increase from 1997 to 2001. The one case that does not appear to support the *economic hypothesis* is Kenya, which experienced negative GNI growth of three percent and a "low" level of political protests for the period. Thus, although the GNI per capita measure does provide a better indicator of variation among the levels of protest, it still does not account for all the variation.

One reason for the lack of strong support for the *economic hypothesis* with either measure is due to the unique nature of political protests. The economic growth data analyzed in this study shows the relative success of the overall economy, but it does not capture the potential impact of economic reforms on specific groups. Specifically, the benefits of an expanding and growing economy are dispersed across the entire society, but the effects of certain IMF-prescribed reforms have different distributional effects that may

only affect certain groups. Thus, the economic reforms result in direct costs to specific groups, while the benefits of this economic growth are dispersed across the entire society.

Public Opinion Hypothesis

The *public opinion hypothesis* attempts to explain the relationship between people's attitudes toward their economic future and their propensity to protest government reforms. It asserts that the levels of political protests are a direct result of the public's perceptions about their economic future. It is based on the observation that people who feel that their economic prospects are not promising are more likely to protest against the government, because they are already pessimistic about the ability of the government to bring them economic benefits at the individual level. Thus, they will be more likely to protest the implementation of future reforms, as well. Consequently, one expects to find that the greater the public opinion regarding economic prosperity in the future, the lower the level of political protests that will ensue.

In the 2000 survey, there are mixed results in the questions regarding economic prosperity. These mixed results are largely due to one outlier, Nigeria. The *public opinion hypothesis* appears to hold in the Latin American cases as approximately forty percent of the populations in Argentina and Ecuador believe there will be economic difficulties in 2001, compared with only nineteen percent who foresee economic difficulties in Mexico. Mexico's high optimism for their economic future is probably largely due to the smaller impact of the Brazilian crises in 1998 on the Mexican economy. Nigerians also show an overwhelming optimism towards their economic future, with sixty-eight percent of the population feeling that it will achieve economic prosperity and only six percent responding that they feel economic difficulty will arise. Kenya was not included in the 2000 end of year survey, but it was included in the 2001 survey. Thus, Kenya is only analyzed for the year 2001.

In the 2001 survey, the results are more mixed and there appears to be less support for this hypothesis. In Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, and Kenya,

Modus Vivendi

over forty percent of the population felt that their economy would face economic difficulty and that strikes would increase in 2002. The most striking change among the countries from 2000 to 2001 is in Mexico, where there is a marked decrease in optimism regarding its economic future. Specifically, only sixteen percent of Mexicans felt that the next year would be economically prosperous in 2001 compared to forty-one percent in the 2000 survey. This could be a reflection of the decrease in GDP growth from seven percent in 2000 to zero growth in 2001. Nigeria again is the only country where the majority of the public feels that the economy will be prosperous in 2002. Thus, the data once again is mixed for the 2001 survey, with every country showing signs of economic pessimism except for Nigeria.

A potential explanation for the variance in support of the *public opinion hypothesis* is that these measures only identify the opinions of the entire population. The data analyzed here do not show the distribution of these opinions across different sectors of society. This is an especially important factor within less developed countries due to the large amounts of inequality between different sectors of society. Further, attitudes are subject to change depending upon the immediate effects of economic reforms, which cannot be captured by an end of year survey.

Political Freedom Hypothesis

The *political freedom hypothesis* attempts to test the observation that countries with less political freedom will face harsher penalties from their government, and are thus less likely to form and develop political protests. With the *political freedom hypothesis*, the expectation is that higher levels of political freedom will be associated with higher amounts of political protests, within our case studies, against the IMF-prescribed economic reforms. Thus, Argentina and Ecuador should have higher amounts of political freedom than the "medium" and "low" level cases of Nigeria, Mexico, and Kenya.



After analyzing the data, the political freedom ratings of the case studies appear to be mixed. In the high level cases, Ecuador received a rating of

Modus Vivendi

Partly Free in both 2000 and 2001, and Argentina received a rating of *Free* in 2000 and *Partly Free* in 2001. Thus, there was a moderate amount of political freedom present, and their overall scores do indicate that they had more political freedom than two of the three other cases. Nigeria and Kenya both receive higher scores on the protest scale, but Nigeria was rated *Partly Free* for both years and Kenya was rated *Not Free* for both years. The Kenyan case probably provides the most support for this hypothesis, because Kenya had low amounts of political freedom in both civil and political liberties and it also had a low level of political protests for the same period.

The one case that does not appear to follow this pattern and is contradictory to this hypothesis is Mexico. Mexico had the largest amount of political freedom for both 2000 and 2001, receiving a *Free* rating for both 2000 and 2001, but it had the lowest level of protests against the IMF for the same time period. Thus, it proves contradictory to the other cases and does not support this hypothesis. This rating may be a little misleading, though, since these years represented the only two times that Mexico was rated free in the thirty-year history of the Freedom House scores. Thus, the following graph attempts to take this into account and provide the basis for a potential historical explanation regarding the political freedom hypothesis.

Graph 2 Historical Political Freedom Graph 1972-2000 (Source: Freedom House)



Modus Vivendi

The differences among the Mexican case and the other cases appear to be explained more clearly by comparing each country's historical levels of political freedom. Mexico received a *partly free* rating for every year from 1972 through the 1999-2000 ratings. Its only years of being rated *Free* came in 2000 and 2001. Yet, Ecuador and Argentina have significantly higher historical ratings than any of the other countries. Ecuador had a total of nineteen years with a *Free* rating, eight years of *Partly Free*, and three years of being rated *Not Free*. Further, Ecuador had a rating of *Free* for every year but two years from 1979 to 2000. Argentina also had a greater history of political freedom with eighteen years of a *Free* rating and six years each of *Partly Free* and *Not Free* ratings. Of the eighteen years in which it was rated *Free*, Argentina had seventeen consecutive years of being rated *Free* from 1984 until 2001. Further, Nigeria only had five years of being rated *Free* and Kenya has no years of being rated *Free*. Consequently, there is evidence that countries with a greater history of political freedom have higher levels of political protests in response to IMF aid.

This historical support for the *political freedom hypothesis* is important, because it establishes a clearer link of interaction between the historical and the political freedom variables. The countries with the most extensive levels of political freedom also had historically high levels of strikes. Specifically, they had historically high levels of strikes in highly unionized sectors such as industry and service. These findings imply that countries with historically high amounts of political freedom foster an environment in which the development of large unions and interest groups are able to mobilize against government policies in the form of strikes.

Important to explaining the effect of political freedom on the levels of political protests against IMF reforms, the result implies that the current level of political freedom found within these countries from 2000 to 2001 is of secondary importance to the historical amounts of political freedom developed within

Modus Vivendi

each of the countries. Further, it implies that these well-developed and organized interest groups and unions that were developed historically are those groups that are most likely to protest the government in response to the direct effects of IMF prescribed policies.

Conclusion

After analyzing all the results of the hypotheses tests, the data provides the strongest support for the *historical hypothesis* in that higher levels of political protests throughout history seem to cause a historical norm to develop and imply similar high levels of protests in the future. In testing the *political freedom hypothesis*, the evidence presented indicates that the level of political freedom in the present is of secondary importance to its historical levels. Thus, the historical type of analysis is further strengthened and supported by the historical levels of a countries political freedom. Both of the other hypotheses, the *economic hypothesis* and the *public opinion hypothesis*, provide only mixed results in attempting to explain the variation in popular protests. This is largely a result of their inability to capture the immediate effects of IMF aid across certain sectors of society rather than the entire population.

Consequently, countries with historically free societies and large strikes will foster the development of better organized labor and interest groups that lead to higher levels of political protests in response to IMF aid. These groups establish a historical norm of protesting the government in the form of large strikes and this leads to higher levels of political protests in response to IMF aid. This indicates that historically high levels of political freedom and large strikes are variables that are necessary conditions for high levels of political protests in response to IMF aid. The historical norm of strikes is necessary to establish a precedent of how to protest unpopular government measures, and the history of political freedom is necessary to foster the development of new interest and labor groups. They are not sufficient conditions, however, because they require the implementation of the economic reforms in order to trigger a response from these affected interest and labor groups.

Modus Vivendi

In all of the cases examined, the evidence supports the idea that certain types of these economic reforms are more likely to lead to higher levels of political protests, because different types of economic reforms affect different sectors of society. When these reforms affect certain sectors of society that are more likely to revolt, protests occur. In response to IMF-prescribed reforms, the groups that are most likely to protest are the most negatively affected groups. This was evident in all of the cases studies, because the public's propensity to protest an economic reform is the result of the negative effects of the reforms on a specific group rather than the dispersed economic benefits of IMF aid across society.

Yet in the "high" level countries, all of the sectors of society are more likely to revolt. This is attributed to the historical establishment of these interest groups and labor unions, as well as the history of political freedom that fostered the development of new groups. These established groups provide a precedent for the development and formation of new groups and for how they should react to unpopular government reforms. Thus, new groups will mobilize and develop in response to these negative effects.

This conclusion is further supported by the variation in the types of protestors involved in the protests. The types of protestors varied widely in each country, but they varied the most among the countries with the highest levels of political protests. In both of the high level countries, the protestors did not just include the urban highly industrialized sectors of society, but they ranged widely from rural to urban and included farmers, doctors, teachers, students, indigenous, unemployed, homeless, and the middle class. This heterogeneity of protestors implies that the political protests were not the result of the effects of the reforms on one historically well-established group, but rather a result of the negative effects of the reforms on different sectors of society.

Consequently, the IMF must take into account the potential political consequences of IMF prescribed reforms to these negatively affected groups in

Modus Vivendi

countries. Specifically, it must determine how the type of reforms it requires of these governments will affect certain societal groups and how these affected groups are likely to react. Once these elements are accounted for, the IMF must then attempt to realize whether these reforms are politically feasible, because the success of their recommended economic programs depends on their ability of the government to withstand the public's reactions. In making this analysis, the IMF should utilize the finding of this study and determine whether a country has a well-established historical norm of protests and political freedoms. Hopefully, this will allow both the IMF and the recipient countries to find ways to overcome the potential political protests in these societies in order to increase the probabilities of success of IMF aid in facilitating economic growth.

Based on the conclusions reached in this paper, one important potential factor that needs to be examined by scholars in the future is the type of implementation of these reforms. Specifically, two aspects should be examined regarding the type of implementation: the level of government coordination and the speed of implementation. An examination of the level of government coordination should include an analysis of the amount of dialogue between the government and these negatively affected groups. This would attempt to determine whether a greater amount of dialogue from the government might counteract the negative effects of the reforms, resulting in fewer political protests. Thus, implementation of structural adjustment reforms in countries with the propensity to have high levels of protests might be decreased by the government's attempt to mobilize public support before or after it implements a given reform. Also, the speed of implementation of the reforms should be examined over a longer time period to determine whether rapidly or slowly implemented policies will result in varying levels of political protests.

Furthermore, the *economic hypothesis* proposed here could be strengthened by a more specific examination of the economic impact of these IMF-prescribed reforms on the most negatively affected groups. In order to

Modus Vivendi

measure the short-term economic impact of IMF-prescribed policies, it will require an examination of the type of policy and the group affected. Thus, future analysis should include how specific reforms affect different sectors of society, and whether the negative effects of the reforms can be overcome by other positive economic incentives or dialogues between the government and the affected groups.

Finally, one other interesting application of this research would be to analyze the effects of the varying levels of political protests in the IMF negotiations process. Many times these negotiations become tense as the IMF presses for tighter restrictions and implementations of more reforms before it grants aid. A potential case to examine is Argentina, which is still currently in a severe economic crisis and has been struggling to reach an agreement with the IMF to receive more aid. Thus, a potential application of this finding is to analyze the impact of these different levels of protests on these negotiations from a game-theory perspective, in which each party analyzes the potential implications of the reforms and chooses an optimal strategy.

These future analyses will hopefully build upon the research and the conclusions presented within this paper to provide an even more accurate characterization of the underlying causes of political protests in response to IMF aid. Perhaps, they will uncover new ways for the IMF and the recipient governments to counteract this tendency of public protest against these IMF reforms, allowing the IMF to provide these developing countries with what each party desires, economic prosperity and stability. Yet, these future analyses should also take into account that the reaction of a society to protest on a large, long, and violent scale is an "exceptional political response," and it will require insightful thinking in order to find a solution that completely eliminates this paradox of IMF aid.⁴⁸

Modus Vivendi

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Modus Vivendi

The Effects of Priming on Rhodes Students' Opinions of Immigration

Lisa Nix, Jeremy Palma, Jay Wilson

This experiment deals with two main topics, the United States immigration policy before and after the attacks of 11 September 2001, and how priming can affect and influence people's responses or opinions. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, U.S. immigration policy became a topic of much discussion. Immigration policy was an issue that most people probably rarely thought about prior to these recent terrorist attacks. However, news reports that surfaced about some of the terrorists legally living in the US brought more attention to the issue, and these events resulted in concerns regarding the level of efficiency with which the Immigration and Naturalization Service enforced immigration policies.

This type of media impact can often result in altering people's opinions regarding a particular issue. This is referred to as priming. Priming is defined as the prior presentation of a word or concept that could trigger a memory and make it more accessible.¹ Thus, the stories that we watch on the news and read in the paper or on the Internet are often written with a certain bias, which could subconsciously influence our view on that subject. The media also primes the public through their focus on certain issues rather than others, a concept known as story selection. This focus can make one story seem more important than another based on the length or time spent on the story, or where the story is placed in comparison to other stories. There are numerous other factors that constitute priming, but the aforementioned are sufficient for an understanding of the concept.

Consequently, this paper examines and aims to answer the question:

Modus Vivendi

does priming affect Rhodes students' opinions towards U.S. immigration policy? The data for the experiment was compiled by surveying a group of 91 Rhodes students taking International Studies 100.² We divided the respondents into three groups and obtained responses from two groups, one of which read either a pro-immigration article, while the other read an anti-immigration article. The third group was used as a control group and read no article in order to use as a basis against the other two groups. We expected that there would be a statistically significant difference in responses among the three groups as a result of the priming. We then conducted three tests in order to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in responses among the groups. Two of these tests involved comparing results between similar question before and after reading an article, and the third test compared the results of one question between the three groups.

Thus, our dependent variable is the opinions of Rhodes students about U.S. immigration policy. This dependent variable can be measured from the survey results that we collected from the IS 100 classes. Further, we can determine if there is variation in our dependent variable among the three groups. Thus, we can do a difference of means test and analyze whether there is a statistically significant difference in the means among the three classes. If there is a statistically significant difference, then we would expect to find that the Rhodes students opinion towards immigration policy is more favorable in the class with the pro-immigration article, less favorable in the class with the anti-immigration article, and in somewhere in between in the class without the article. If we find no statistical difference though, then we cannot reject our null hypothesis that priming does not affect Rhodes student's opinion of immigration policy. Yet, we would still have an important finding in that the media and priming tends to play no role in the formulation of Rhodes students opinions of U.S. immigrations policy.

We begin by reviewing past literature and studies on immigration policy and the effects of priming in the media. Next, we explain the method we

used to conduct our experiment and present the hypotheses we will test with our results. We conclude with a brief discussion of our results and evaluate how priming played a major role in the survey responses.

Brief Overview of U.S. Immigration Policy Before 9/11

Immigration policy in the United States has been implemented in various forms for more than 200 years. The policies focused on are those that have been most significant in framing the history of immigration policies in the United States. It must be noted that political forces are the major determining factor for which immigration policies are implemented. The first policy initiated was just 14 years after the newly independent nation-state was formed in 1790.³ The Naturalization rule established a requirement for those seeking U.S. citizenship to reside in the country for at least two years. This would, in effect, instigate those people seeking citizenship to be working citizens in the country.⁴ However, it was not until 1819 that data was collected in order to keep track of the specific numbers of those entering and leaving the country. Throughout the years this has remained the most important task for the immigration department to maintain.

The immigration policies of the United States have sometimes contained exclusionary acts in order to deter certain cultures and peoples. The first exclusionary act was passed in 1875 and denied access to convicts, prostitutes, and Chinese contract laborers.⁵ In time these exclusionary acts would come under much fire from various politicians who condemned them as immoral and impractical. The Immigration Act of 1882 sought to take control of immigration issues such as the exclusionary acts, but the main provision was a tax implemented on all immigrants who entered the country.⁶ In 1891, the Office of Immigration was established as part of the Treasury Department, and immediately it made considerable changes.⁷ The most significant of these changes was the opening of Ellis Island in New York as a formal facility where more than 12 million immigrants were processed in over 50 years.

Few immigration policies were implemented in the next decade, due to

Modus Vivendi

the nation's focusing on World War I. In 1921 though, the Quota Act was passed in order to limit annual immigration to the United States at 350,000 people.⁸ A section of this Quota Act restricted the entrance of immigrants based on their nationality because the government wanted the United States to become a country that combined a vast variety of cultures. There was stark evidence in the government that many immigrants were illegally entering the country through the borders shared with Mexico and Canada, and the U.S. Border Patrol was created in 1924 to monitor the situation.⁹

As with World War I, World War II had a significant impact on the immigration policy of the United States. The passage of the Displaced Persons Act allowed the admission of 400,000 people that were displaced as a result of the post-war world.¹⁰ This Act led a considerable number of immigrants to flee their homelands and venture to the United States. In 1952 the McCarran-Walter Act removed race as a basis for exclusion from America, in direct contrast with previous immigration policies.¹¹ However, the Act stated that persons could be excluded because of their political ideology. In 1965, the historic Immigration Act was amended abolishing nationality quotas and also raising the maximum to 170,000 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 from the Western Hemisphere.

In 1980 the maximum number of immigrants was reduced to 270,000 with the passage of the Refugees Act.¹² It was decided that refugees would be administered as a category separate from that of immigrants because of the persecution refugees endure in their home country. This Act still immensely affects the country today as refugees continue to flee to the United States. In a dramatic shift in 1986, the maximum number of immigrants allowed entrance in the country double from 270,000 to 540,000.¹³ Known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act, this legislation was the result of many economic factors in the United States. The act also included strict penalties for those businesses employing illegal aliens.

Throughout the 1990s, the government began to implement policies to

Modus Vivendi

raise the number of legal immigrants, and at the same time better monitor illegal migrants in the United States and around the world. The Immigration Act of 1990 raised the maximum to 700,000 immigrants per year and also amended the McCarran-Walter Act so that people will no longer be denied admittance due to their political ideology.¹⁴ Yet with the number of immigrants rising so dramatically, the government had to deal with the issue of illegal immigrants, as well. Therefore, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1996 to double the number of border patrol workers and build fences along parts of the Mexico-U.S. border to deter those illegally entering the country.¹⁵ Known as "Operation Global Reach," the program is designed to control human smuggling that began in 1997. As part of this program, the INS has provided technical assistance to a number of countries in order to increase information sharing and to help to combat document fraud.¹⁶

Post-9/11 Immigration Policy

Prior to September 11, many scholars had begun to argue for the diminution in importance of borders in order to support the development of one large global society. Yet, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2002 have revealed the "dark side of globalization."¹⁷ All of the nineteen hijackers involved with the attacks of September 11 had entered the U.S. legally on business, student, and tourist visas.¹⁸

Consequently, U.S. immigration policy changed drastically after September 11, as it became an important part in the new war against terrorism. On 17 September 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) made its first change by extending the period of time its officers have to arrest and further question detainees in order to provide them with more flexibility to deal with possible terrorists. In January 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) added the names of 6,000 men who ignored deportation or removal orders and came from countries that were believed to be harboring Al-Qaeda terrorists. This database was then used by the DOJ to track down these people and exile them

Modus Vivendi

from the country.¹⁹

After September 11, the U.S. government realized the need to tighten the borders with Canada and Mexico as many politicians and intelligence agents viewed the porous borders as places where terrorists could easily pass. Thus, the United States and Canada began talks on developing a "North American perimeter" that was to be modeled after the European Schengen Convention.²⁰ These talks focused on loosening the internal border between the United States and Canada, but strengthening their external borders in order to prevent illegal migration.

Also, the United States proposed to increase information sharing between Canadian and U.S. immigration authorities. Other new programs include the "Smart Borders" initiative, which involves controlling migration flow through the use of Information Technology. The initiative to share information is a joint venture between the United States and its neighboring countries, Canada and Mexico. A prime example of this type of service is the use of an INS linked database to allow frequent flying professionals to go past airport passport control lines very quickly, while at the same time setting up remote sensors on the border to stop the smuggling of illegal immigrants.²¹

On 22 March 2000, President Bush and Vicente Fox announced a similar "smart border" between the United States and Mexico. This agreement will increase security along their 2,000 mile shared border, and simultaneously enact measures to facilitate the flow of bilateral trade.²² Some of the proposed measures designed to facilitate trade flows include the use of smart ID cards, high tech processes to monitor trade at the border, and infrastructure projects to decrease congestion at the border. Other measures designed to increase security include an expansion of the commuter lanes at high-volume ports of entry, the exchange of advance passenger flight information, and the development of systems to share intelligence.²³

President Bush signed into law on 14 May 2002 the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. Perhaps the most significant piece of

Modus Vivendi

post-9/11 legislation, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act is designed to fill the gaps in U.S. immigration policy that terrorists have exploited in the past. Specifically, it is designed to address the weaknesses in U.S. immigration policy and visa processes that allowed the U.S. government to legally admit the September 11 terrorists. It attempts to address these problems through four primary means:²⁴

1. obtain intelligence about potential terrorists into the hands of the INS and State Department more quickly;
2. create layers of security with multiple opportunities to stop someone who will do harm;
3. eliminate opportunities for terrorists to hide behind false travel documents;
4. determine how the United States can work with Canada and Mexico to deter terrorists and to manage the common land borders.

In particular, there have been several controversial issues in immigration policy regarding the application of stricter immigration laws toward immigrants from certain areas. On 9 November 2001, the State Department slowed the process for granting visas to men ages sixteen through forty-five from certain Arab and Muslim countries.²⁵ Then, on the one year anniversary of the terrorist attacks the INS was authorized to implement the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). This authorizes the INS to keep track of the arrival and departure of visitors to the United States who were born in Iraq, Libya, Sudan, or Syria and allow these people to be photographed and fingerprinted as they enter and exit the United States.²⁶ Finally, on 6 November 2002, the INS issued a notice requiring that males from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria who are age sixteen or older and were admitted to the United States before 10 September 2002 must appear before and register with the INS for fingerprints, photos, and an interview. Failure to comply with the notice will result in their deportation.²⁷

Modus Vivendi

The backlash from September 11 has also led to further implementation of stricter immigration policies towards foreign students. On 8 April 2002, the INS began to tighten visa rules for foreign students. This tightening of policies towards foreign students was a direct response to ameliorate an apparent flaw in prior immigration policy. One of the hijackers on September 11 legally entered the United States on a student visa and apparently never showed up for class, but the U.S. officials were unaware of this and he retained legal status.²⁸ Thus, the new policy requires foreign students to obtain a visa before beginning classes and must have received the appropriate security checks before they can enter the country. Prior to this, students could begin course work while their applications were processed.²⁹ Also, Attorney General John Ashcroft proposed the implementation of a new student reporting system called SEVIS that will require reporting regarding students enrollment status. The INS is currently developing this system as part of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act.

Two other new initiatives that resulted from the terrorist attacks of September 11 are the "Snitch Visa" law and the Transportation and Safety Act. This snitch law was signed by President Bush on 1 October 2001, and gives permission to authorities to grant admission to non-immigrants and aliens who possess and will supply information regarding terrorist organizations to U.S. law enforcement officials.³⁰ Additionally, in November 2001, President Bush signed into law the Transportation Security Act, which established the Transportation Security Administration. This law gives this new administration the ability to use government agencies to identify individuals on airplanes who might be threats to national security and to prevent them from boarding the aircraft.³¹

We have attempted to outline the major immigration policies that had been implemented since the origins of the United States as well as the specific laws and policies that have been enacted since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. These are important to acknowledge because the media

Modus Vivendi

heavily influences what the general public knows about immigration policy. Since the attacks, immigration policies have garnered new interest from many citizens of the United States.

Priming and the Media

Before and after September 11, the media have played a role in shaping public opinion towards these immigration policies. For example, the way in which the media covers or reports different stories can have an affect on people's opinions based on their previous knowledge or biases towards certain events or people. Many studies have been conducted to see exactly how much influence the media has on public opinion and whether the use of different words or angles on a subject can influence public opinion. Much of the previous research on priming in the field of political psychology is based on the influence the news media can have on people's opinions of political issues such as presidential performance and elections.

According to the Priming Theory, prior presentation of a word or concept should trigger a memory.³² Thus, priming an audience with a particular word or image can increase the likelihood that thoughts with much the same meaning as the stimulus will come to mind. Priming theory would then support the idea that the use of certain types of words in the media about a particular issue would affect people's opinions regarding immigration policy. Our research design for the experiment facilitates the testing of this hypothesis by using two different articles to prime our subjects. Thus, priming theory would lead one to infer that these articles should have some impact on people's responses, and therefore, their attitudes towards immigration.

In order to create an effective research design, a review of studies on priming is necessary. In their book News That Matters, Shanto Iyengar and Daniel Kinder develop a theory of priming and then test this theory against a series of television programs on presidential performance. They state that people's judgments are based on the first thing that comes to mind, or accessible information, rather than thinking about the subject and then creating

Modus Vivendi

their judgment from knowledge stored in both long-term and short-term memory.³³ In their experiment Iyengar and Kinder find that when television coverage is focused on a particular problem in a presidential administration, people base their rating of the president's performance on that specific problem rather than the president's overall performance. They also find that the subjects felt the problem focused on in the priming was more important than they did before the experiment had been conducted. The research done by Iyengar and Kinder is related to our project because we perform a similar experiment that seeks to test people's responses to questions about immigration after they read a particular article. Rather than priming them with various problems about certain situations, we attempted to prime our subjects through articles that were either positive or negative in their slant toward immigration.

The design and part of the idea for this research project arose from Adam Simon's piece, "Elite Discourse, Programming and Public Policy." In his research Simon primes the participants in his experiment by manipulating the wording of an article that discusses abortion so as to elicit different feelings from the subjects in his experiment. Simon divides his subjects into two groups and each reads an abortion-related article. In one article, the unborn child is referred to as the "baby," while in the second the unborn child is referred to as the "fetus." In this paper Simon contends that the priming should alter respondent attitudes and he looks at differences in how the two groups answered the questions on the survey.³⁴ We wanted to create an experiment similar to this and apply this design to attitudes toward immigration policy. Immigration policy is an effective subject for this type of priming because after the events of 9/11, immigration policy became an important issue because of increased awareness of problems relating to the INS. Rather than changing one word in the articles we used to prime our subjects, we decided to use two different articles, and then to manipulate the wording so that they were similar in content.

In another article that analyzes the effects of priming, Mark Joslyn and

Modus Vivendi

Steve Ceccoli examine the news media's effect on people's evaluations of the candidates during the last two months of the campaign. Then they examined from this study whether these perceptions were also influenced by the political party with which the subjects associated themselves. Joslyn and Ceccoli find that the subject's evaluations of the presidential candidates were "consistent with the tone of the news coverage for each candidate."³⁵ In their research they look at priming, as well as how the subjects' previous biases or predispositions can affect priming. For example, if the person has a strong opinion on a certain topic, then the priming may not affect either a positive or negative change in the view with regards to that subject. Thus, if a person has a strong opinion about a subject and the priming reflects that subject in a negative light, the person would probably still have the same opinion as they did before the priming occurred. In other words, their study asserts that priming could be least effective on those people that already have a strong opinion about the issue. From this study, we glean that though we are priming our subjects, we have to bear in mind when interpreting our results that the priming could have no effect on people who had strong opinions about immigration policy before reading the article.

Finally, in their article, "Toward the Integrated Study of Political Communications, Public Opinion, and the Policy-making Process," Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro argue that "the media have accentuated the disorganized trends in contemporary politics, but they were not exogenous causes of these trends."³⁶ They recognize that the media has an effect on the public's policy concerns and issues the public think are highly important. Also, they determine the quality of the news the public receives from the media affects the quality of the public's political attitudes and information. Research on the effects of the media's influence in changing or influencing people's opinions is fairly new, and the authors point out that the exact amount of influence the media has on shaping people's opinions is unclear. This article highlights the media's use of priming, which parallels our experiment design

Modus Vivendi

because we are trying to measure the influence, if any, that the two articles have on survey responses about immigration policy.

The aforementioned articles indicate that priming is a very important concept because of the effect it can potentially have in influencing the public's views. From the research we read on priming it appears that priming can have a major impact on public opinion because the majority of the public receives their news from media sources such as television and the Internet. Specifically, it is likely to have a strong effect on those people that have not yet formulated a strong opinion regarding the topic. Yet, it may still alter the opinion of those that already feel strongly about a certain topic.

In the last decade priming has garnered much excitement in the political science field. The field of political psychology has taken off with specific focus on topics such as perceptions and cognitive processes. Even more specifically, in the year and half following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 there have been many links between priming and terrorism. Many in media outlets have come under fire due to allegations that they have promoted stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs through their reporting. Also, the government has been accused of profiling certain people according to race, which creates a priming effect of leading others to do so as well. The excitement about priming that has emerged greatly in the last decade, coupled with the possible priming effects apparent in the case of combating terrorism make studies such as ours extremely timely.

Methodology

Initially, we had to find two articles that we could use for priming the students. One of the articles selected was a pro-immigration article, while the other was an anti-immigration article. We obtained both of our articles from reputable news sources: one of our articles came from the Denver Post, the largest circulated newspaper in the state of Colorado, and the other article came from the American Immigration Lawyers Association website (www.aila.com). Second, the articles were also manipulated so that they were clearly either pro-

Modus Vivendi

immigration or anti-immigration articles. They were designed so that there did not exist any ambiguity so that the subjects reading the material would be able to clearly determine the main argument of the articles.

Additionally, the two articles were manipulated so that they appeared similar in their writing styles, use of statistics, and overall language. In order to accomplish this, we cut out certain sections of both articles so that they would appear to be symmetric. This allowed both articles to be nearly the same in length, and the articles resemble one another when placed next to each other (See Appendix 1 & 2). Our reasoning for this was that controlling for these potential factors would allow our testing to be most accurate if the articles shared consistency with one another, despite their difference in bias.

Our sample size consists of ninety-one students, all taken from one of the four International Studies 100 introductory courses. The majority of the students sampled are first-year students, and most of them have a very basic knowledge of international relations. We decided that the first class would read the pro-immigration article, and the second class read the anti-immigration article. The third class was our control group, and we did not give them any article to read. In the fourth class, we gave them a mix of anti-immigration articles, pro-immigration articles, and the survey with no article. This distribution was so that we could try to end up with an even number of the three groups. There were thirty-one students who read the pro-immigration article, thirty who read the anti-immigration article, and thirty who did not read any article.

Possibly the most important factor of our experiment that we needed to develop was the survey that the students would be answering. We developed about seventy questions and then trimmed them down to the ones we thought would be most useful. Thus, the final survey consisted of a total of forty-seven questions. We gave the students six questions to answer before reading either of the articles, and then reproduced the same questions in similar fashion for them to answer after reading the articles. From this technique, we would be

Modus Vivendi

able to see if the respondents' answers changed after reading the article. The third group, which did not read an article, is used as our control group, so that hopefully we would see no change in their answers of the first six questions in relation to the questions which followed in the main questionnaire.

(See Appendix 3)

After collecting all of the completed surveys, we coded the questions and answers and entered our data into the SPSS computer program in order to run various tests among them. For the most part, we code the answers using numbers. For example, for a question with five answers ranging from "strongly support" to "strongly oppose", we code the answer "strongly support" a value of 1. The "no opinion" answer, being the third answer, is assigned a value of 3, while the "strongly oppose" answer is given a value of 5.

Also, the questions that preceded the survey were linked to questions within the survey. These questions were given responses similar in total numbers, which made it much easier to compare data from our first six questions to the corresponding questions later in our survey using a paired sample t-test. The t-test allows us to examine the before and after responses that the students gave in relation to the articles they read. We also utilize many histograms to give a visual indication of the way in which student responses changed due to the article that was in their survey. Another test we use is the one-way ANOVA to see if there is a difference between the means of the three groups in their responses relating to the priming article they read.

We examine three hypotheses in order to test the effects of priming. The first hypothesis is that there should be an increase in the responses for a stricter border policy for those who read the anti-immigration article. The second hypothesis is that there should be an increase in the responses for looser border control policy for those students who read the pro-immigration article. The third hypothesis is that there should be no change among responses toward immigration policy for those students in the control group that read no article.

Modus Vivendi

Results:

The first two tests involve analyzing the before and after responses to two linked questions. Thus, we use a paired sample t-test to determine whether a statistically significant difference exists. The paired sample t-test allows us to examine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the mean response of each group before and after reading the article. The third statistical test involves comparing the means of responses to one question among the groups after each read the articles. Thus, our hypothesis will hold if we find a statistically significant difference among these means of responses.

Several different survey questions are analyzed to determine if there exist any potential statistically significant differences among the responses to the questions. In formulating the survey questions, several questions were asked prior to reading an article in both of our groups in order to determine whether a statistically significant difference was present. We first analyze the histograms of each of the group's responses before and after reading the article. We then give the results of the paired sample t-tests conducted on these questions, with the most significant findings presented. The first test analyzes question 4 and question 28, and the second analysis analyzes question 3 and question 34. The third test analyzes question 19 in order to determine whether a difference of means exists among the three groups, and this will be an ANOVA test.

The first test analyzes the difference in responses to questions 4 and 28. These questions were selected in order to test sentiment feeling about immigration policy, and are linked in that they ask very similar questions and are worded similarly. Further, they each have only four potential responses and allow for good comparison.


Modus Vivendi

Chart 1:

Graphs of questions 4(Before) and 28(After):

Question 4(Before): 1-Increase, 2-Stay the Same, 3-Decrease, 4-No Opinion


Question 28(After): 1-Be More Open, 2-Stay the Same, 3-Be More Closed, 4-No Opinion



This chart indicates the difference between the control group regarding their response to questions 4 and 28. In looking at the two graphs, the overall structure of each graph looks roughly the same and the only difference appears to be a slight increase in the middle column and a slight decrease regarding whether the number of immigrants should decrease. This indicates that there was a slight change in some of the responses, but the overall mean should be the same, as the only difference is that two students from each of the columns that favor increasing and decreasing immigration moved into the middle neutral "stay the same" column. Additionally, question 4 had fourteen respondents and question 28 had eighteen responses. Thus, there was a slight increase and this appears to be the result of two students' moving from the increase column and two students' moving from the decrease column into the more neutral column. Yet, the number of no opinions stayed the same.

Modus Vivendi


Chart 2:



The two histograms in Chart 2 show an interesting difference in responses before and after reading the pro-immigration article. Before reading the article, the distribution of responses is fairly split among each column. Eleven respondents were supportive of current immigration policy and felt the number of U.S. immigrants should stay the same, whereas nine felt that current immigration policy should be more restrictive and the number of immigrants should decrease. Yet, the most interesting finding in this graph is that eight of the students answered no opinion. After reading the article, the histogram clearly illustrates a decrease in this column to only three. Thus, five people switched from no opinion to having an opinion, and all five of these people appear to have taken a pro-immigration stance as the columns supporting a looser border policy increased from three to five and the column supporting that the number of immigrants should stay the same increased from eleven to fourteen. This implies that the article may have educated the people with no opinion and persuaded them to an opinion more favorable towards immigration.

Modus Vivendi

Chart 3:



In the two histograms from the group that read the anti-immigration article, there appears to be more evidence that priming occurred from reading the article. In the first two columns, there appears to be little difference before and after reading the article, as the number of people in favor of more immigrants in column 1 increased from four to five. People in favor of the same number of immigrants decreased in column 2 from thirteen to twelve and offset the previous increase. This indicates there was little evidence of change in the responses of people who generally support immigration policy after reading the anti-immigration article. Yet, there does appear to be a significant difference between the next two columns. In the histogram before reading the article, there were five respondents who had no opinion and also one student who chose not to answer the question. After reading the article though, there was a marked decrease in column 4, as only one student responded no opinion. Further, the movement of these five students appears to have all shifted into a response that the number of immigrants should decrease, favoring a stricter immigration policy. This implies that there is evidence again that the article served to educate those people with no opinion, and further, the opinion that it gave them was towards the anti-immigration stance of the article.

Modus Vivendi

After analyzing the histograms of the before and after responses to the two questions, there is significant statistical evidence that priming occurred, as there is a difference in responses from reading the article. Thus, a paired sample t-test is conducted in order to determine if there was a statistically significant change in the average responses among the pro-immigration and anti-immigration groups. Since the anti-immigration histograms indicate a shift towards the anti-immigration policy that was coded a 3, we would expect to see an increase in the average of this group. As the first two-columns represent the more pro-immigration stance of those who desired the number of immigrants to increase or the stay the same, we expect that our average should decrease after reading the article.

For the t-test, our null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant difference in the mean responses to questions 4 and 28. This test was also conducted as a one-tail test because we expect to see a difference in the mean in one direction, either an increase or decrease depending on which article they read. Thus, our alternative hypothesis is that the mean increased in the anti-immigration group and decreased in the pro-immigration group.

When conducting this paired sample t-test of this question though, the difficult aspect is to account for the shift from the no opinion columns into either the pro or anti-immigration columns depending on the article they read. Thus, the difference in the means is only evident depending on how the no opinions are coded. They cannot be coded in the middle of our scale as a 2, because this will not adequately capture the shift from having no opinion to having an opinion, and it will only serve to inflate the middle column. Further, they could not be coded as missing cases, because this will eliminate all the respondents who had no opinion in the before group. Also, it will not indicate any change in response, because the evidence of the priming appears among the changes in response in this group. Consequently, paired sample t-tests were run among all three groups with this no opinion group coded as both a 0 and a 4. Further, those who indicated no opinion to both questions before and after

Modus Vivendi

are still included in this data test in order to capture those who were not affected by reading the article.

In the control group, there was no statistically significant difference. The mean before and after reading the article was 2.4. Thus, there is no change in the mean and we fail to reject the null. This is important though, in that it acknowledges that the responses in the control group did not change, and that the potential variation in the other groups is due to some other factor than the wording of the question.

In the pro-immigration group, there was a statistically significant difference. The mean before reading the article is 2.7, whereas after reading the article it is 2.3. This difference resulted in a t-statistic of 2.55, which was well above the critical value of 1.697 at the 5% level with 30 degrees of freedom. Thus, we reject our null in favor of our alternative hypothesis. There appears to be a statistically significant difference in our mean responses before and after reading the article.

The anti-immigration group also revealed a similar statistically significant difference in responses before and after reading the article. The mean before reading the article for this group was 2.44 and after reading the article the mean was 2.27. This decrease in the mean indicates the movement of those coded as four with "no opinion" into the "disagree" column which was coded a 3. This mean difference produces a t-statistic of 1.4, which is slightly less than the t-critical value at 5% of 1.7 with 29 degrees of freedom. Yet, this value is greater than the critical value of 1.311 at the 10% level. Thus, there does exist fairly strong evidence of a statistically significant difference in responses within this group after reading the article, but the statistical evidence is not as strong as in the pro-immigration group.

One potential problem in this anti-immigration group is that we expected to find an increase in the mean responses as people shifted their opinions towards the disagree column which was coded a three. The previous finding does not indicate this clearly because the mean decreased due to the no

Modus Vivendi

opinions coded as a four. In order to see the potential increase of the mean, another paired sample t-test was conducted with this group and the no opinions were coded as 0. This was done in order to indicate the potential differences among the pro and anti immigration groups and to further test this weak result in the anti-immigration group

With the no opinions coded as 0, the second paired sample t-test reveals more clearly the statistically significant difference in responses. Before reading the article, the mean score was 1.75 and the mean score was then 2.13 after reading the article. This change determined a t-score of -1.886 whose absolute value is greater than the critical value at .05 with 29 degrees of freedom of 1.699. This indicates that we can reject our null at a lower significance level. This further indicates the statistically significant difference, and it captures the increase in respondents who went from "no opinion" to an anti-immigration stance after reading the article.

After conducting this paired sample t-test, we conduct a second paired sample t-test on two more linked questions. This test involves analyzing the difference in mean responses from Questions 3 and Question 34. These questions both ask whether the student disagrees or agrees that immigrants have influenced culture in positive ways.



Graphs of questions 3(Before) and 34(After):

Question 3(Before): 1-Strongly Agree, 2-Agree, 3-No Opinion, 4-Disagree



Question 34(After): 1-Strongly Agree, 2-Agree, 3-No Opinion, 4-Disagree

Modus Vivendi


Control Group:



Pro-Immigration:



Anti-Immigration



In analyzing the histograms comparing questions 3 and 34, there does not appear to be any significant differences among the charts. There are some slight changes among respondents' answers, but this does not appear to affect the overall distribution of the responses. There is a slight decrease among the "no opinion" and "disagree" columns as each one decreased by one. Also, the "strongly agree" column decreases by one. Yet, this does not appear to upset the overall distribution of responses as these respondents all selected agree and this column increased by four from sixteen to twenty.

The most variation among the before and after responses exists in the pro-immigration group. Within this group, the before histogram seems to indicate a similar result to the control group with the majority of responses "agreeing" with sixteen and "strongly agreeing" with eight. Yet, there are also a total of five with "no opinion" and two students who "disagree." After reading the article though, there appears to be a significant change as there are no students who disagree with this statement that immigration is positive. Further, there are fewer students with "no opinion" as this column decreased

Modus Vivendi

by two. Yet, there is a significant jump among the "agree" and "strongly agree" columns as each of these increased by two students each. Consequently this does indicate that some priming occurred as four students changed from "no opinion" and "disagree" to agreeing with the statement.

In the anti-immigration group, there exists less evidence of priming, as there is no evidence of a significant change in any of the columns. The "strongly agree" responses stayed the same before and after reading the article with seven respondents. The "disagree" column also stayed the same before and after reading the article and had two responses. There was a slight variation in the "no opinion" and "agree" columns as two people switched from the agree column to the no opinion group. Yet, overall this should not affect the mean scores much, and there does not appear to be significant evidence of priming occurring.

In order to test to see if a significant difference exists among the responses before and after reading the article a paired sample t-test is once again conducted. In this test, the "no opinion" group did not effect the mean variation much, since it was coded with a 3 and it was the middle score for our responses. Further, a one-tail test is once again conducted, because we want to see if one mean value was higher or lower and indicated a shift of attitudes to either pro- or anti- immigration rather than just a significant difference. Thus, our null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant difference between the two means. Our alternative hypothesis varies depending on which group we are testing. In the pro-immigration group our alternative hypothesis is that the mean would decrease, and in our anti-immigration group our alternative is that the mean would increase and shift more towards an anti-immigration stance.

In the control and the anti-immigration groups there was little variation among the responses and this was evident in only slight variations among the means for both question 3 and question 34. Thus, the t-statistic for each of these groups was small and not statistically significant. Consequently, we cannot

Modus Vivendi

reject the null in both of these groups, concluding there is no significant difference among the means.

In testing the pro-immigration group, there is evidence of significant variation among the responses. The mean score of the question before reading the article is 2.03, while after reading the article it is 1.77. This drop in the average score indicates an increase in the respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree" that immigrants influence American culture in positive ways. This difference is also statistically significant with a t-score of 1.85, which is higher than the critical value of 1.697 at .05 for a one-tailed test with 30 degrees of freedom. Thus, we can reject the null that there is no statistically significant difference and infer that our alternative hypothesis is supported. We conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses in this group before and after reading the article.


Finally, we analyze the responses to question 19. This question asks how people feel about current immigration policy and the responses range from "strongly support" to "strongly oppose." First, we analyze the histograms associated with these responses. We then conduct our last statistical test, which involves performing an Anova test on question 19. This Anova test attempts to show if there is a difference in mean responses after reading the article in the pro- or anti-immigration group or not reading an article in the control group. Our null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant difference among the groups.

Graphs of question 19: Question 19: How do you feel about current American immigration policy?


1-Strongly Support, 2-Support, 3-No Opinion, 4-Oppose, 5-Strongly Oppose

Modus Vivendi


Question 19: Pro-Immigration Group



Question 19: Anti-Immigration Group



Question 19: No Article



Modus Vivendi

In analyzing the histograms from Question 19, there exists a pretty large difference between each of the groups. In our control group, the majority of the class with twenty-two responses had "no opinion." In the other categories, there were six responses in support of current immigration policy and two respondents who were opposed to current U.S. immigration policy.

In the pro-immigration group, the majority of the respondents also had no opinion, but the number was a little bit lower than in the control group with only nineteen. The most significant difference appears in the amount of support for U.S. immigration policy. In the first two columns, there were two respondents who "strongly support" U.S. immigration policy and eight that "support" it. Yet, there were only two who "oppose" current immigration policy.

In the anti-immigration group, there is the largest difference in responses. There is the largest number of respondents opposed to U.S. immigration policy with fourteen that "oppose" it. Also, there is the lowest number with "no opinion" with only twelve, and the lowest number of respondents who support it with only three. This implies that this group was swayed by the article and responded in opposition to current U.S. immigration policy. Consequently, it appears that there is some evidence of priming occurring.

After analyzing the histograms, a one-way ANOVA test is conducted in order to determine if the potential differences in response were statistically significant among the groups. The use of the ANOVA test allows us to determine if there is a significant difference in the mean values of each of our three groups. The ANOVA test will review this by computing an F-statistic consisting of a ratio of the between groups mean square over the within groups mean square. Thus, our null hypothesis is that all of the mean values of each of the three groups are equal. If this null is then rejected, then we will use the Bonferroni statistics to determine if the means are different among the groups.

In conducting the one-way ANOVA test for the entire group, the

Modus Vivendi

within groups sum of squares is 35 and the between groups sum of squares is 7.832. This ratio determined an F-statistic of 9.7, which is well above the critical value and statistically significant at the lowest levels. Thus, we reject our null and determine that there is a statistically significant difference.

Next, we conduct post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Procedure in order to find which groups had statistically significant differences. There is a statistically significant difference between the anti-immigration group and both the pro-immigration and control groups. This indicates that some priming must have occurred within this group, as the variation was statistically significant at the lowest levels. The largest difference found is between the pro and anti-immigration groups, though, and indicating that the articles played the largest role in swaying their opinions. Yet, there is not a statistically significant difference between the pro-immigration and the control group, perhaps indicating that reading the article did not provoke a significant response towards the question.

Conclusion

The following gives a brief overview of the results of our three statistical tests. In the first statistical test regarding questions 4 and 28, we find statistically significant differences between both the pro- and anti-immigration groups. This indicates that priming did occur in that people altered their responses to the corresponding question, depending on which article they read. This is further supported by the control group, which did not change and showed no statistically significant difference in responses. In the second statistical tests regarding questions 3 and 34, we find a statistically significant difference among only the pro-immigration group. There is no statistically significant difference in the control group or the anti-immigration group. This indicates that the priming occurred and had some impact on their response among this pro-immigration group, but it did not occur in the anti-immigration group. This could imply that the wording of the question had some impact on responses, and that perhaps the results would be switched if the question were

posed regarding a 'negative' effect. In the third statistical test, we find the largest statistically significant difference between the pro- and anti-immigration groups. This indicates that some priming must have occurred and caused the altered the responses of the students.

Thus, we find support for our original three hypotheses regarding our different groups. The pro-immigration groups and anti immigration groups both showed indications of having different responses before and after reading the article. Further, there is no statistical difference among the control group responses. This indicates that some outside factor contributed to the difference in responses among the pro- and anti- immigration groups. Thus, we conclude that this outside factor was the different article read by each group and the effects of priming.

Consequently, these findings indicate that the priming experiment conducted here did serve to influence student opinions towards immigration policy. Specifically, reading the articles served to influence opinions in two ways. The first way that it influenced opinion was through education. This is evident in the fact that there was a significant decrease in those people who had no opinion about the linked questions after reading the article. It is likely that these respondents did not originally have an opinion regarding a particular issue, because they were unfamiliar with the topic and did not have an opinion formed. Yet, the majority of this group did develop an opinion towards the issue after reading the article, implying that the article educated them about the issue and allowed them to form an opinion.

The second element of the priming that was determined from our tests was that the priming influenced students' opinions. Specifically, reading the pro- and anti- immigration articles did tend to sway people's opinions to the views presented in the articles. Yet, this potential influence was more likely to alter the opinions of those that did not have strongly developed opinions such as those who were somewhere in the middle or those that had no opinion regarding an issue. Conversely, the priming does not appear to affect those

Modus Vivendi

who had previously developed strong opinions regarding the particular issue. This suggests that the effects of priming vary depending on who is reading the article and how much the respondents have already developed their viewpoints prior to reading the articles.

In conclusion, we have found results that suggest some priming occurred in our small sample size. The data collected and statistical results presented here provide support for our original hypotheses that priming does affect students' opinions towards immigration. In the future, we would like to conduct this experiment with a larger sample size, as it would probably indicate more significant results in our data of priming throughout the sample. It is now clear to us that priming exists in many facets of the media. Considering the numerous media outlets including newspapers, magazines, the Internet, and television, it is safe to say that millions of people are primed each and everyday. Though we may not realize it the majority of the time, one potential goal of media outlets could be to infiltrate our minds with certain biases. Our simple experiment was quite a significant indicator that priming can influence the attitudes of the general public in regard to various issues.

Appendix 1:

America is Immigration

Over the years the United States has been called a nation of immigrants. The fact that we are a melting pot for so many different cultures, races, and religions makes us unique in the world. It is also what has helped mold our national character. For more than 300 years, various ethnic, cultural and social groups have come to our shores to reunite with their loved ones, to seek economic opportunity, and to find a haven from religious and political persecution. They bring their hopes, their dreams, and, in turn, contribute, enrich, and energize America.

With time immigrants assimilate into American society so that though Asian-American, Cuban-American, European-American, African-American, and Mexican-American immigrants all come from different backgrounds and cultures, they are all united by the fact that when the hyphen is eliminated we are all Americans. This has all been possible due to a well-established and well-functioning immigration policy

Family reunification is the cornerstone of our legal immigration policy. It is truly one of the most visible areas in government policy in which we support and strengthen family values. We acknowledge that family unification translates into strong families who build strong communities.

Second, our legal admissions system allows employers to bring in a relatively small number of skilled workers from overseas when there are no qualified Americans available to fill the job. This doesn't mean that we shirk our responsibility to educate and train those already here. It only means that we recognize the need to be able to attract talented and hardworking individuals

Modus Vivendi

from all corners of the world and to acquire often needed expertise and experience.

The concept is not new. Throughout our history we have relied on the strength, expertise, and special skills of foreign workers and immigrants to build this country. As early as 1610, Italian craftsmen were brought to the New World by the Virginia Colony to start the glass trade. In the mid-1800s American manufacturers advertised in European newspapers offering free passage to any man willing to come to the United States to work for them. Immigrant workers have altered American life and their contributions were, and still are significant to the economic growth of our nation.

Third, American immigration policy fulfills our commitment to religious and political freedom. "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breath free," is not rhetoric, it is American's pledge to ensure that those brave men and women who face the prospect of ethnic cleansing, religious oppression, torture, and even death have a haven. Because this country was founded in large part by those who fled various kinds of political and religious persecution, it has become of our historical responsibility to serve as an advocate for human rights.

And yet, today, we are witnessing television shows that vilify newcomers as scam artists, news stories that showcase the growing backlash against immigration, and politicians and reporters who make no distinction between immigrants entering the country legally or illegally. Unfortunately, much of what we are reading, hearing, and seeing is based on fiction, not fact.

There is no denying that the terrorist threat we face is grave and that methods need to be devised to protect us from harm. However, history teaches us that ill-conceived government policies during wartime, such as unfairly targeting

Modus Vivendi

certain persons because of their race, national origin, or religious beliefs, do not make us safer. Instead, they weaken our core values and alienate allies who can help us fight terrorism. Despite President Bush's soothing words urging Americans to be tolerant and to distinguish between immigrants and terrorists, Muslim, Arab, and South Asian men living in the United States have been victimized, and the Bush Administration has pursued enforcement policies founded on religious, racial and ethnic profiling.

In times of war or threats to national security, the delicate balance we strive to achieve as a nation between liberty and security inevitably tips towards security, and civil liberties tend to be compromised. Consequently, our leaders have begun exercising extraordinary powers to ensure our collective safety, sacrificing the personal liberties of some, particularly immigrants, in the process. Using invigorated surveillance and enforcement powers to promote homeland security, President Bush, Congress, and the Justice Department have selectively targeted and indefinitely detained significant numbers of Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian non-citizen males living in the United States, stripping them of the most basic and fundamental due process protections. This increased scrutiny has caused significant apprehension among other immigrants, too.

Less than a million immigrants arrive in the United States each year. Of these, 700,000 enter as lawful permanent residents and another 100,000 to 150,000 enter legally as refugees or others fleeing persecution. Today, there are an estimated 8-11 million illegal immigrants in the United States and, contrary to popular belief, most of these immigrants do not enter the country illegally by crossing our border with Canada or Mexico. Instead most immigrants here illegally, 6 out of 10, enter the U.S. legally with a student, tourist, or business visa and become illegal when they stay in the United States after their visas expire.

Modus Vivendi

Most legal immigrants, about 8 out of 11, come to join close family members. Family-sponsored immigrants enter as either immediate relatives—spouses, unmarried minor children, parents—of U.S. citizens, or through the family preference system, for relatives of permanent residents and siblings of U.S. citizens, INS data shows that only around 235,000 visas have been issued annually in this category in recent years. The family preference system is far more restrictive and limits the number of visas issued in its four categories to a total of 226,000 per year. In addition, the waiting period for a visa can be very long.

The concept of immigration is not new. Throughout our history, Americans have relied on the strength, expertise, and special skills of foreign workers and immigrants to build this country. In a sense, American is immigration. As Americans, we can credit our longstanding and well-developed immigration policy for making the United States the great country that it is.

Appendix 2:

Immigration Policy – Lax Borders Leave Us At Risk

Over the years the United States has been called a nation of immigrants. The fact that we are a melting pot for so many different cultures, races, and religions makes us unique in the world. It is also what has helped mold our national character. For more than 300 years, various ethnic, cultural and social groups have come to our shores to reunite with their loved ones, to seek economic opportunity, and to find a haven from religious and political persecution. They bring their hopes, their dreams, and, in turn, contribute, enrich, and energize America.

With time immigrants assimilate into American society so that though Asian-American, Cuban-American, European-American, African-American, and Mexican-American immigrants all come from different backgrounds and cultures, they are all united by the fact that when the hyphen is eliminated we are all Americans.

However, for much of the last three decades, U.S. immigration policy has been driven by two considerations: The desire of some sectors of the business community to gain easy access to cut-rate foreign labor, and ethnic interest politics. As a result of failures in our immigration policy, America has become dangerously vulnerable to the infiltration of foreign terrorists. In the process, we have systematically dismantled our immigration enforcement capability at home, making it easy for terrorists to enter and operate openly within our own borders.

First, rather than the interests of the American public, or even national security, immigration policy has been focused on keeping labor costs down (an objective openly advocated by Alan Greenspan) and competition between the two parties to recruit new ethnic voters. Consequently, there are glaring loopholes in our immigration policy. Unless we take decisive action to plug these holes, we are greatly increasing the odds that others will target our nation.

Modus Vivendi

Second, Congress, with President Bush's backing, added a provision to an appropriations measure that will allow illegal aliens to apply for legal residence without having to return home. Moreover, this is being done with the full knowledge that the Immigration and Naturalization Service lacks the capability to check the histories of the people they are being asked to adjust. Other immigration safeguards, such as matching entry and exit records so we at least have a record of visa overstays, have never been implemented because of special interest pressure and bureaucratic inertia. Delays in reporting requirements for educational institutions, on whose say-so foreign students are given visas, made it easy for several illegal immigrants to elude detection.

Third, state and local governments have also contributed to the conditions that make it possible for illegal immigrants to operate easily in the United States. In many locales, there are official policies on non cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Moreover, several states have enacted policies that enabled illegal aliens to obtain drivers' licenses, which are America's de facto identification documents.

These are but the most egregious immigration-related soft spots in our nation's immigration policy. We need to be more careful about who we admit in the first place, have a better sense of whether they are abiding by the terms of their visas, and eliminate all the gimmicks that allow people to skirt the law.

Less than a million immigrants arrive in the United States each year. Of these, 700,000 enter as lawful permanent residents and another 100,000 to 150,000 enter legally as refugees or others fleeing persecution. Today, there are an estimated 8-11 million illegal immigrants in the United States. Most immigrants here illegally, 6 out of 10, enter the U.S. legally with a student, tourist, or business visa and become illegal when they stay in the United States after their visas expire.

The U.S. immigration system is overloaded and it can be easily manipulated. With the presence of the 8-11 million illegal immigrants currently in the U.S.,

Modus Vivendi

these illegal immigrants can become the needle in the immigration system. Our immigration policy could be used to make a serious dent in the size of the haystack. People who want to immigrate to the United States legally, or obtain temporary residence here, are supposed to go to an embassy or consulate in their homeland (where their backgrounds can be most effectively checked) and apply for admission. Over the years, however, we have created countless opportunities for people to come here on one type of visa – or illegally – and apply to have their status changed while they're here.

Throughout our history, Americans have relied on the strength, expertise, and special skills of foreign workers and immigrants to build this country. However, our current immigration policies are failing miserably. The influence of factors such as business interests and ethnic interest groups has led to a series of failed immigration policies. Though the United States has been a nation built on immigration, the continued reliance on a failed immigration policy may seriously jeopardize this once proud history.

Modus Vivendi

Appendix 3:

Rhodes Student Survey

If you would please take the next few minutes to fill out the following survey, we would greatly appreciate it. Please place a checkmark in the appropriate box. Thanks for your cooperation!!!

1. As a Rhodes student, how would you feel traveling or studying abroad next semester?

Very Safe Safe Unsafe Very unsafe

2. As you know, one of the primary responsibilities of the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) is to identify and remove people who have no lawful immigration status in the US. In your opinion, the INS does a:

Very good job Good job No opinion Bad Job Very bad job

3. In your view, the role of immigrants in American history has been positive:

Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree Strongly disagree

4. In your opinion, the number of immigrants allowed in the US should:

Increase Stay the Same Decrease No opinion

5. Which word best describes your feeling after September 11?

Anger Fear Surprise No effect

6. Do you think the US could have prevented the 9/11 terrorists from entering the country?

Yes No

Modus Vivendi

7. What is your gender? Male Female
8. What political party do you most associate yourself with?
Republican Democrat Green Independent Other
9. Have you traveled internationally? Yes No
If yes, to what regions specifically?
Africa Australia/Pacific Central America Middle East
Asia Caribbean Europe South America
Other _____
10. What year are you at Rhodes? Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior
11. What is your major? _____
12. How would you describe yourself?
American Indian/Alaskan Native Black, non-Hispanic Multiracial
Asian or Pacific Islander White, non-Hispanic Other

13. What is your religion?
Buddhism Catholicism Hindu Judaism Islam Protestantism Other _____
14. How often do you talk about politics?
Very Often Often Rarely Never
15. What is your home city and state? _____
16. What is your primary source of news? *Mark one*
Internet News Magazines TV Newspapers Friends Other _____
17. What is your stance on abortion?
Strongly pro-choice Pro-choice No opinion Pro-life Strongly Pro-Life

Modus Vivendi

18. If the US goes to war with Iraq, you would:

Strongly Support Support No opinion Oppose Strongly Oppose

19. How do you feel about current American immigration policy?

Strongly Support Support No opinion Oppose Strongly Oppose

20. In your opinion, the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) could have prevented the terrorist attacks of 9/11:

Strongly Agree Agree No opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree

21. In your opinion, US immigration policy should be given a higher priority by US government policy makers:

Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree Strongly disagree

22. Using your best estimate, what is your family income in thousands of US dollars?

0-30 31-60 61-100 100-250 Over 250

23. Do you think that there will be another catastrophic terrorist attack on US soil similar to the September 2001 attack?

Yes No

If yes, when do you think this attack will occur?

Within the next 3 months Within the next 4-12 months After at least one year

24. In your opinion, the Rhodes student body is:

Very Diverse Somewhat diverse Not diverse No opinion

25. Do you think the US immigration policy should be applied equally towards immigrants from all regions of the world? Yes No

If no, toward what regions should a stricter immigration policy apply? *Circle all*

Modus Vivendi

Notes

1. "The Priming Theory." <http://www.jour.unr.edu/greer/J711/J711.priming.html>
2. The sample taken for our survey was from four separate sections of the IS 100 classes at Rhodes. We chose this sample because we thought the students in this class would be aware of international news stories because of the nature of the class. We think that it is important to study college students' attitudes towards immigration because they are young enough to probably not have strong concrete opinions formed. Yet, their beliefs are now independent of their parents since they are away at college.
3. *Act of March 26, 1790. U.S. Statutes at Large 103 (1790).*
4. *Steerage Act of March 2, 1819. U.S. Statutes at Large 488 (1819).*
5. *Act of March 3, 1875. U.S. Statutes at Large 477 (1875).*
6. *Immigration Act of August 3, 1882. U.S. Statutes at Large 214 (1882).*
7. *Immigration Act of March 3, 1891. U.S. Statutes at Large 1084 (1891).*
8. *Quota Law of May 19, 1921. U.S. Statutes at Large 5 (1921).*
9. *Act of May 28, 1924. U.S. Statutes at Large 240 (1924).*
10. *Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948. U.S. Statutes at Large 1009 (1948).*
11. *Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952. U.S. Statutes at Large 1009 (1962).*
12. *Refugee Act of March 17, 1980. U.S. Statutes at Large 102 (1980).*
13. *Immigration Control and Reform Act of November 6, 1986. U.S. Statutes at Large 3359 (1986).*
14. *Immigration Act of November 29, 1990. U.S. Statutes at Large 4978 (1990).*
15. *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of September 30, 1996. U.S. Statutes at Large 3009 (1996).*
16. Rey Koslowski. "Smarter Borders May Not Bar Terrorist," *Public Affairs Report* 43, no. 2, Summer 2002.
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*
19. "DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men from Al-Qaeda haven Countries," *The Washington Post*, January 8, 2002
20. Rey Koslowski. "Smarter Borders May Not Bar Terrorist," *Public Affairs Report* 43, no. 2, Summer 2002.
21. Lee Rosenberg. "Immigration Policy Must Tilt to Security," *Public Affairs Report* 43, no. 2, Summer 2002.
22. Dr. Susan Kaufman Purcell. "US Foreign Policy since September 11th and Its Impact on Latin America." http://www.pentfundacion.org/docs/PENT_2002-004.pdf.
23. Lee Rosenberg. "Immigration Policy Must Tilt to Security," *Public Affairs Report* 43, no. 2, Summer 2002.
24. "Backgrounder: Immigration and National Security: The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act." 8 April 2002. <http://www.immigrationforum.com>
25. "DOJ Orders Incentives, 'Voluntary' Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorist: Foreign Students, Visa Processing Info under State Dept. Scrutiny." *Wall Street Journal*, 14 November 2001.
26. "Rio Grande Valley Beefs Up Security for Foreigners Entering International Bridges." *The Associated Press*, 12 September 2002.

Modus Vivendi

27. "INS Issues Notices Requiring Certain Nonimmigrants to Register by December 16", 79 *Interpreter Releases* 1677, 11 November 2002.
28. Rey Koslowski. "Smarter Borders May Not Bar Terrorist,," *Public Affairs Report* 43, no. 2, Summer 2002.
29. Suzanne Gamboa. "INS Imposes New Restrictions on Foreign Students, Proposes Other Visa Changes," *The Associated Press*, 8 April 2002.
30. U.S. Public Law 1591, 1595; "Anti-Terrorism Legislation gains Momentum Compromises Coalescing," No.1-7-45 8 October 2001.
31. *Aviation and Transport Security Act*, Public Law 107-71,107th Cong., 19 November 2001.
32. "The Priming Theory." <http://www.jour.unr.edu/greer/f711/f711.priming.html>.
33. Iyengar, Shanto, and Daniel Kinder. *News That Matters*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1987.
34. Adam Simon. "Elite Discourse, Programming and Public Policy." Department of Political Science, University of Washington. August 2002.
35. Mark R. Joslyn and Steve Ceccoli. "Attentiveness to Television News and Opinion Change in the Fall 1992 Presidential Campaign," *Political Behavior* 18, no. 2, 1996.
36. Lawrence Jacobs, and Robert Shapiro. "Toward the Integrated Study of Political Communications, Public Opinion, and the Policy-Making Process," *Political Science and Politics* 29, no.1 (March 1996): 10-13.