About this Journal

Although its literal translation from the Latin is "way of life," in international relations parlance, *Modus Vivendi* signifies "a state of affairs where two opposing parties agree to differ." In a similar spirit of fostering intelligent discussion, *Modus Vivendi* attempts to provide a forum for diverse viewpoints on a variety of issues pertinent to the field of international studies. One of the few undergraduate journals of international relations, *Modus Vivendi* is published by the International Studies Department at Rhodes College, in conjunction with the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho.

This issue of *Modus Vivendi* includes three articles, each of which investigates issues of great importance to the international scene although each issue is quite different in focus. Marie Brandewiede, in her study which precedes the majority of the Iraqi reconstruction efforts, examines violence in post-war Iraq as it relates to the reconstruction process. This study is particularly timely as the reconstruction effort continues and the deadline for leadership turnover, 30 June, approaches. On another level of politics, Kyle Russ compares public policy outcomes relating to capital punishment in the Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This comparative analysis yields useful insight into the determinants of public policy formulation, as he examines why policies differ among countries with similar cultures, governments, and histories. Finally, Megan Pollock, shifting the focus of this journal to yet another region, contributes a study which seeks to explain the stark difference in the levels of violence in the genocides of Rwanda and Burundi. Her analysis generates several implications regarding the importance of leadership and history in the presence of ethnic conflict.

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A Comparison of Violence in post-World War II Germany and Post-war Iraq
By Marie Brandewiede

Introduction

The United States entered Iraq in March of 2003 and within two months toppled the existing Ba'ath government with the stated purpose of disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and providing humanitarian relief to Iraqi citizens of Saddam Hussein's regime. The relative ease and speed by which the United States military was able to accomplish this mission contrasts greatly with the next task at hand for the United States and its small multinational contingency: rebuilding the country of Iraq. This current reconstruction effort seeks to design a new Iraqi government, spark the growth of the economy, aid in rebuilding the country's social infrastructure, and provide security during the process. Since the initial stages of the reconstruction effort in early May of 2003, the United States has suffered high military personnel losses due to small guerrilla attacks that occur several times a week, if not daily. As of October 15, 2003, the United States has suffered nearly 400 combat deaths in Iraq.[1] This violence far exceeds the violence that Allied soldiers experienced during the post-World War II reconstruction of Germany, where not a single U.S. soldier lost his life in a combat-related death. Why have U.S. troops encountered a high frequency of violent attacks during the reconstruction of Iraq when few attacks occurred during the post-World War II reconstruction of Germany?

The comparison between the reconstruction of Iraq and that of Germany after World War II has been made by both politicians and journalists. For example, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice compared the postwar violence of these two cases, claiming that "SS officers called werewolves engaged in sabotage and attacked both

coalition forces and those locals cooperating with them, much like to-day's Ba'athist and Fedayeen remnants.'[2] Unfortunately, this comparison lacks validity, because the werewolves only carried out a single mission (an assassination of a local mayor) and disbanded before the end of the war. Despite the fact that these two events may seem to appear similar at first glance, the high incidence of violence in Iraq and the relative lack of violence in Germany demonstrate a significant difference between the two situations. Furthermore, the geopolitical environment of Germany in mid-20th century Europe differs considerably with that of Iraq in the 21st century. Also, each country is built on very different values based on cultural, religious, and ethnic lines. The answer to why the large discrepancy exists between the levels of violence in both cases is significant for multiple short term and long term reasons. In the short run, understanding the cause for the large number of violent attacks against U.S. troops may prove vital to the development of new reconstruction policies in the near future that aim to eliminate the factors that produce this type of violence. These improved policies could result in fewer American military casualties, as well as fewer Iraqi civilian casualties. Increased safety and security would provide a more productive environment for both coalition forces and Iraqis working in the reconstruction effort. Better policies that reduce violence could also produce more cooperation between the Iraqi people and the agencies supporting the reconstruction effort. In the long run, the reduction of violence may produce increased political, economic, and social stability within the country. The United States also has a several long-term foreign policy incentives for reducing the violence. Greater stability within Iraq could improve the possibility for the success of a U.S.-led development of a democratic government for the country. Increased stability could strengthen economic ties between the two nations, which remains very important to the United States as long as Iraq's large oil reserves exist. A successful reconstruction project with little violence could also provide the United States with significant political leverage in the Middle East.

To examine the discrepancy between the rates of violence in post-

war Iraq and in post-World War II Germany, I plan to first explain why politicians and journalists have used this comparison when describing reconstruction in Iraq. Next, I plan to focus on the structure of the post-war reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and Germany. This focus includes the rebuilding of political, economic, and social institutions within each country and the methods by which this reconstruction was achieved or will be attempted. I want to study the similarities and differences between these aspects of reconstruction in Iraq and in Germany and indicate whether or not ethnic, religious, and cultural differences were accommodated for in each case. Finally, I hope to discover which people or groups of people participate in violent acts during reconstruction efforts. The reasoning behind these violent actions and the level of success produced by each attack may also serve to explain why the rebuilding efforts in Iraq remain plagued with violence while post-World War II reconstruction in Germany was relatively free of violence. In this project on reconstruction, I plan to examine theories that could explain the violence discrepancy between the cases of Iraq and Germany, then analyze the data of each case study, and conclude with a discussion of which hypothesis, or hypotheses, best explains the problem presented by this study.

Theory and Tests

Several theories exist that provide possible explanations for the discrepancy in the levels of violence in the two case studies of Iraq and Germany. The first of these theories involves the strength of the existing political institutions of each state. I hypothesize that political leaders that have lost power in their country will attempt to remain active in protesting foreign intervention and reconstruction efforts through violent attacks. It is the aim of the fallen leader to disrupt or sabotage the efforts of the intervening force as a possible means by which the leader can reassert power in the future. Without solid confirmation of the

death of Saddam Hussein, military intelligence lacks the capability to ensure that he cannot continue to issue orders to those loyal to him. The attacks by the United States against his country and his reputation for issuing anti-American rhetoric indicate that he is likely to support politically and aid financially violence against American troops in the event that he remains alive. In post-World War II Germany, the confirmation of Adolf Hitler's suicide assured Allied forces that the most important figure of the Nazi party could no longer directly hinder their efforts to rebuild Germany. Even if the supreme leader of the country is dead, unable or unwilling to support attacks, other former political leaders may fill this power vacuum. For instance, the Ba'ath political party may continue to have access to weapons and funding for operations against foreign occupiers in Iraq in cooperation with Saddam Hussein, or in place of the former Iraqi president. Those citizens that remain loyal to Saddam Hussein and/or the Ba'ath party may protect the perpetrators of the attacks against American troops. These citizens may never actively participate in the violence, but they may feel compelled to aid or protect those individuals that do commit acts of violence. In Germany the Nazi party may have been so weakened and demoralized by the invasion of Allied forces or lacked public support to the extent that the former political leaders were unable or unwilling to take the risk of initiating violent attacks against Allied troops during reconstruction. The main focus of this theory, however, lies in the strength of the leadership of the former political parties within each country and how this measure of strength affects violent resistance to reconstruction.

In order to test the validity of this first hypothesis, I plan to measure the ability and willingness of Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath political party, and the Nazi party to disrupt reconstruction efforts within their countries using several types of information. Public opinion for both leaders and their parties represents an indicator for the likelihood that these groups have or will receive aid or protection from the indigenous populations of their respective countries. The types of attacks carried out also reveal a level of funding, social network connections, and organiza-

tion of the people who conduct the attacks.

The second hypothesis addresses social and cultural issues. I argue that religious and cultural differences between an occupying force and the residents of a country may produce violence between the two groups. This hypothesis would explain why the Islamic society of Iraq and the predominantly Christian U.S. and coalition forces have clashed. The confrontation of Islamic religious values and Christianity appears to produce violence in Iraq, unlike the Christian versus Christian context of post-World War II Germany. In the religious realm, certain parts of the Quran or the teachings of religious leaders of the community may incite violence against non-Muslims. The issuing of a fatwa by Islamic religious scholars that either allows or encourages attacks on foreign troops, or specifically Americans, could lead to the violent attacks that have become common in Iraq. Some Muslims have also interpreted the Quran to state that the 'infidels' must be removed from the Middle East, even through violent means if necessary. Islamic fundamentalists also represent a danger to coalition troops because they thrive in unstable countries and easily gain membership among people who have limited options for the future. The ethnic, religious and cultural differences between the Allied reconstruction force and the German population in post-World War II Germany were much less stark than those currently found in Iraq. The circumstances concerning religion in Germany following World War II were very different. Germans who may have contemplated resistance against American occupation forces lacked religious approval for these plans. Also, many Germans shared a common religion with many Allied troops, making it unlikely that they would wish to kill Allied troops for religious reasons. A second aspect to this hypothesis recognizes that other general cultural differences also contribute to violence between occupying forces and the occupied country's citizens. As a result of major cultural differences between occupying troops and Iraqi citizens, the United States may face the problem of dispassionate forces because they find little in common with Iraqi society and culture. Apathy or lack of dedication toward the Iraqi people and the reconstruction effort may

cause U.S. troops to become more susceptible to violent attacks due to careless mistakes. During the reconstruction period following World War II, U.S. soldiers may have felt a stronger connection with German citizens because of a common ancestry. Language also played a role in that some Americans knew German and vice versa. The issue of language proves far more difficult in the case of Iraq where few troops and citizens know the others' language and a shortage of translators persists.

Testing the influence of religion and culture involves the collection of several types of data. The support or condemnation of attacks by religious institutions or religious leaders and the response of citizens represent important information sources for gauging the effect of religion on the occurrence of violent attacks. I will examine the influential religious groups of each country and their impact by employing measures of public opinion, attendance at religious services, and statements from religious leaders or official statements from the religious institutions themselves. I will also examine the type of attacks conducted, especially when the attacks may represent an act of martyrdom. To test the more general cultural aspects of this hypothesis, I will use public opinion data concerning the relationship between citizens and reconstruction forces. I plan to examine this relationship further by using data regarding, in addition to language skills, the ethnic and religious composition of both groups. Finally, opinions and accounts from both soldiers and citizens will provide information on the relationship of the two groups in the testing of this hypothesis.

A third major hypothesis proposes that the struggle for resources among religious and ethnic groups already living within a country may result in violent attacks directed at the occupying forces, especially by those groups who fear they have the most to lose in the reconstruction process. The country of Iraq represents the home of three major religious/ethnic groups including Sunni Muslims, Shi'ite Muslims, and Kurds. The tensions between these groups, as a result of strong religious differences, past oppression, and nationalist aspirations, could produce violence against the reconstruction force if a particular group feels they

will be receiving fewer resources or less power than they deserve. Post-World War II Germany lacked large ethnic variations in its population, especially after the genocide or emigration of the majority of its Jewish residents.

Evidence for this theory can be found by examining the ethnic and religious composition of the countries and how these groups are geographically distributed in relation to the country's resources. The historical relationships between these groups are also important. Public opinion polls will prove useful in determining how groups view one another. The reconstruction efforts to equally distribute resources among the various ethnic groups as well as the distribution of power represent significant factors in whether these groups will incite violence against one another or those involved with the reconstruction of the country. A final test of this hypothesis includes the relationship of the perpetrators of violent attacks to their victims.

A fourth hypothesis contends that the negative perceptions of the public over the reconstruction process of its country produce violence directed at the forces involved in the rebuilding. These negative perceptions originate from several sources and advocate an independent reconstruction effort. One source includes the fear of imperialism. Some Iraqi citizens may see the rebuilding force as an imperialist or colonizing effort by the Americans. They may also fear that the only desire of the United States is to have access to their oil supplies, the primary source of wealth for Iraq. Without the ability to easily voice opinions, Iraqis today may feel that violence represents their only recourse to show disapproval of the U.S. presence in their country and the U.S. reconstruction plan. Mistrust toward the United States may also provide Iraqis with the sense of a continuing war against an invading force, not a rebuilding force. All of the scenarios mentioned in this section represent potential instigators for conflict between Iraqis and American troops. The lack of violence in Germany during reconstruction might suggest a general approval among Germans concerning the U.S.-led rebuilding effort after World War II. Another explanation behind this hypothesis includes the fact that the Ger-

mans either trusted the U.S. forces or were too weak to provoke attacks against the Allied occupiers. A second source of negative perceptions of the occupying force includes an ideology of self-sufficiency. The Iraqi people may feel that they are more knowledgeable about rebuilding their own country and do not require the assistance of outside forces. Feelings of subordination or the inability to care for oneself and one's family may produce intense emotions that could lead to violence if the threat of the outside force appears great enough. Furthermore, citizens of an occupied country may be more willing to accept outside help as long as the effort is a multinational one. Also, some citizens may support U.S. assistance within their country but simply disapprove of the present plan for reconstruction.

Testing this theory will also focus on measures of public opinion. I will analyze polls concerning opinions toward the occupying force or the United States in general, the plan for reconstruction, and the idea of implementing a more multinational reconstruction effort. I also plan to review the strategies for the reconstruction efforts, noting gains and losses, frequency of changes in U.S. strategy, and re-allocation of U.S. government funds for the project. In regards to the plan for reconstruction I hope to find evidence proving or disproving the idea that the United States may be attempting to monopolize the rebuilding process for its own imperialist political and economic gains. Finally, I will look at data on how much economic and political control and responsibility for the reconstruction was given to both German and Iraqi-based companies and leaders.

In a fifth hypothesis, I propose that the level of organization exemplified by the occupying force correlates with the levels of violence that the occupying force will encounter within a particular country. The United States may lack the same level of organization in the Iraqi reconstruction effort as it did in the case of post-World War II Germany. If the United States lacks strong leaders and good planning for reconstruction in Iraq, the potential for violence rises greatly. Disorganization can produce confusion, opportunism, and crime, leading to an environment of

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violence. Also, the more frequently U.S. intelligence fails to block attacks, the more likely attacks will continue as the confidence of those masterminding and executing the attacks grows. If the United States lacks solid intelligence on Iraq, especially concerning Iraqi citizens that may choose to engage in violence against American troops, troops will remain highly susceptible to attacks.

Measuring the level of organization shown by the occupying force requires the inspection of plans for reconstruction and whether goals were or are currently being accomplished. The timeline goals for these projects are also important. In reference to attacks on U.S. soldiers, I will examine evidence of prevented attacks, how the occupying force have responded to attacks, and plans for the prevention of future attacks, especially in the case of Iraq.

A sixth and final hypothesis states that foreign insurgents have entered Iraq and cause the continuance of high levels of violence. The theory which explains this hypothesis shows that foreigners choose to enter Iraq to participate in violence against reconstruction forces either because they are members of terrorist organizations, hired by Ba'ath Party loyalists, or because they are drawn to Iraq by a religious calling. Post-World War II Germany never experienced an influx of foreign fighters, which may have contributed to the violence-free reconstruction effort. Terrorist organizations may actively recruit members worldwide and then support their infiltration of the country of Iraq for attack operations against the American "infidels" and their collaborators. These terrorist organizations either did not exist or were inactive during the U.S. occupation of Germany. Also, former political party loyalists may recruit foreigners to aid in their efforts to sabotage the reconstruction of Iraq. The goal of these loyalists is not to destroy the country of Iraq but to encourage the United States to abandon its plan for occupation and reconstruction. The Nazi party following World War II may have suffered division and weakness and lacked the same international networks created by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party. Finally, foreign insurgents may enter Iraq to fulfill a perceived religious duty. In Germany, religion played a much smaller

role because the majority of both the occupying force and the occupied country shared the same religion, Christianity. Given these various explanations for why a foreign fighter may choose to participate in violence in another country, this hypothesis focuses attention on the fact that foreign insurgents may produce higher levels of violence in certain post-war countries.

In order to test the hypothesis on foreign fighters, I plan to study the nationalities of people who are captured for planning, attempting, or succeeding in carrying out violent attacks against occupation and reconstruction forces in Iraq. I will look at the types of attacks that have occurred in Iraq and gauge the permeability of the borders of both Germany and Iraq. The conditions within neighboring states also may provide details concerning the ease with which a person could leave one country and enter either case country, the stability of the periphery states for both Iraq and Germany, and whether the citizens of surrounding states sympathize with the citizens of either Iraq or Germany.

Evidence

Political Actors

Public opinion can serve as a measure of the strength of former political leaders and their parties because the masses not only represent sources of cooperation but also possess the ability to drain power from these groups by exposing them or depriving them of resources. Polls for both German citizens and Iraqi citizens reveal a general dislike for their former political leaders and institutions. In a poll conducted from 1951-1972 in Germany by the U.S. High Commission for Germany, citizens indicated little support for a hypothetical future resurgence of the National Socialist Party, or Nazi Party. Although the majority initially showed indifference to this possibility in 1951, a large minority claimed they would prevent or oppose a new Nazi Party seeking power. This minority grew until it gained the majority of public opinion in 1962.[3] Similarly in Iraq, a Gallup poll that surveyed Iraqis between August 28 and

September 4th, 2003, found that 62% of the sample population thought that ". . . ousting Saddam was worth the hardships they have endured since the invasion."[4] These polls indicate a sizeable proportion of each country's population during the postwar periods that expresses negative views toward former political parties or leaders.

A second set of polling data reveals public opinion concerning the trial and punishment of former political leaders. Data from the Frederick W. Williams survey research collection of the Occupation Military Government of the United State marginals shows that a large majority (approximately 65%) of Germans felt that all Nuremberg defendants were guilty and that the Allied nations were justified in their indictment of German Nazi Organizations (56%).[5] These surveys, conducted between the years of 1945-1946, demonstrate the desire of German citizens to disassociate individual Nazis and Nazi organizations with themselves and German society in general. The results of a Zogby International Survey of Iraq in August 2003 reveal an even higher percentage of the population (74%) that wishes for the punishment of Ba'ath Party leaders who have committed crimes against the Iraqi people.[6] Many Iraqis have taken this desire for justice into their own hands in the form of revenge killings. As one journalist reported, "While there is no official tally of vigilante actions, accounts from the police and monitoring groups suggest that perhaps several hundred former Ba'ath Party officials have been killed since the fall of President Hussein's government."[7] The similar desire to punish former political leaders in Germany and Iraq fails to explain the discrepancy in the levels of violence toward occupying troops in the postwar environments. If former political leaders are involved in attacks against American troops, these populations' majorities do not indicate support for these groups.

However, there is evidence that supports the theory of political actors being involved in the attacks in Iraq, which includes the fact that many of the attacks are thought to be the work of ". . . Sunni Muslims, who form the base of support for Saddam Hussein's regime."[8] Because many of the attacks are believed to be the work of one particular ethnic

group, specifically the ethnic group that supported the former political leader, this evidence could strongly indicate the involvement of former political party leaders in the attacks.

Cultural Gap

Evidence for my religious and cultural differences theory can be divided into separate subgroups. First, I will address religion as a specific cultural aspect. Religion sometimes represents the foundation for conflict between groups of people, and these tensions can last hundreds or even thousands of years, as is evident in the continuing violence in Palestine. In the case of postwar Germany, little violence occurred against Allied troops, probably in part because religious differences between the occupied and the occupiers did not exist on a large scale. The British, French, Soviet, and American troops consisted of Christians for the most part, as did the German population. The single religious groups that could have initiated violence as a result of severe persecution, the Jews, no longer existed in large numbers in the country. This exodus of the Jewish population occurred because of the persecution by the Germans, especially the Nazis, and the population shrank further as a result of the systematic murder of millions of Jews.

The story of Iraq sharply contrasts with this generally homogeneous religious composition of the German situation. Iraq contains several large groups of Muslims from different sects that have a history of conflict and persecution between them. To increase the volatility of this situation, the vast majority of American occupation troops are Christians, and many fundamental Islamic groups preach about the necessity of keeping the "infidels" (Christians) off Muslim holy land (which consists of nearly all of the Arabian Peninsula). In October 2003 a mullah from a mosque in Syrian preached about the evils of the Western powers, especially the United States, and "attacked the 'atheist dogs' waging war in the region."[9] Furthermore, other fundamentalists have endorsed suicide attacks against Jews and Christians as a method to ensure one's place in Heaven with Allah, as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These influen-

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tial groups have no comparable counterpart in the case of Germany. Osama bin Laden represents one infamous Islamic fundamentalist leader who has organized several attacks against non-Muslims, including the September 11th World Trade Center attacks in New York City, and he is suspected to have connections with some of the recent attacks in Iraq. Although most Iraqis polled in a survey in August see Osama bin Laden as unfavorable (46.7%), a large group believes that his leadership has proven favorable for Muslims (35.8%).[10] These percentages indicate that a significant portion of the Iraqi population finds some value in the actions of Osama bin Laden, which include attacks against thousands of people. Several of the attacks on American troops or reconstruction forces have been in the form of suicide attacks, meaning that religion most likely played a role in these specific attacks. Martyrdom has become increasingly popularized by various groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, as a method of ensuring financial security for the individual's family and a guaranteed path to Heaven for the individual. However, suicide attacks consist of only a small minority of the attacks against coalition forces, indicating that other factors are also at work in the continuing attacks in Iraq.

A second aspect of the cultural gap that may cause problems between occupation troops and the citizens of the occupied country includes race. In Germany, almost the complete majority of citizens were white. Likewise, the majority of American and other Allied troops were white. Both American and French military forces deployed some black soldiers during the occupation of Germany, and these deployments caused controversy. Some Germans viewed the French deployment of black troops into their country as a "calculated insult" and entitled the action, the "black outrage."[11] The U.S. deployment of black troops to occupied Germany following the French resulted in a German response of "anxiety, and a strain of racism."[12] Public opinion polls about this issue found that some Germans thought that black soldiers were friendlier than their white counterparts, while other groups thought that the treatment they received from black soldiers was worse.[13] The racial bias of

many Germans remained evident to a degree throughout the occupation, and it may have produced more problems between the two groups had the black contingency of the American and Allied troops been larger. The small numbers of minority races present in the occupation forces lessened the role of racism as a reason behind the attacks against occupation troops. In Iraq, the vast majority of Iraqi citizens are Arabs, and the vast majority of American troops are white. This dramatic contrast certainly causes some friction in a society where religion and ethnicity already play significant roles.

Language also plays a role in the relationship between occupying troops and civilians. In Germany, following World War II, some American troops knew the German language, and some Germans were familiar with English. This meant that fewer translators were necessary and closer relationships could develop more easily between troops and civilians. In the reconstruction of Iraq, the language barrier represents a much more significant obstacle, as U.S. troops and Iraqi citizens have two very different languages. Few American soldiers know Arabic, and few Iraqis know English. This situation forces both groups to rely heavily on translators of which there remains a great shortage. The confusion and misunderstandings that result because of this language barrier likely contribute to anger and frustration, which produce violence.

Cultural differences also exist in what people perceive as their preferred form of government and society. On the European continent, Germany experienced exposure to democratic institutions in a limited form in its own government but also in its encounters with the democratic institutions of other countries. This exposure to democracy and Western thought led to a fairly smooth democratic transition following World War II. In Iraq, however, few Iraqis possess a solid understanding of the meaning of democracy and many have only learned of the inefficiencies and moral drawbacks of this system of government.[14] Democratic principles appear very foreign to people who have never been exposed to this level of participation in government activities. Consensus decision making plays a small role in Middle Eastern culture where patri-

archy and patrimonial rule represent the mainstream modes of governance. Lacking an understanding of democracy and Western culture creates anxiety among Iraqis who hesitate to replace their traditional cultural values with a completely new form of government.

Ethnic Struggle

Fighting for the control of power and resources may be a contributor to violence during post-war reconstruction, especially between religious and ethnic groups that either have much to gain or lose. Again, although Germany had a large minority Jewish population prior to World War II, this population decreased dramatically as a result of the Holocaust and the exodus of most of the remaining survivors after the war. These events created a fairly homogeneous population in Germany where little violence was recorded during post-war reconstruction. The possibility of violence as a result of religious and ethnic conflict remains much more likely in Iraq where "Shiites, Kurds, Assyrians, and Chaldeans, [are] persecuted religious and ethnic groups that make up more than 80 percent of the population of Iraq."[15] Germans continued to exhibit a certain degree of racism against Jews following World War II as "...18 percent of the population of the American Zone could be categorized as anti-Semites, 55 percent not anti-Semitic, and the remaining 27 percent somewhere in between," but because Jews no longer remained a substantial threat to control over power or resources, this racism was contained without violence.[16] In post-war Iraq, groups continue to struggle among one another over power positions. Saddam Hussein's former Iraqi government had employed mostly Sunnis, a large minority of the Iraqi population. The Sunnis who have been allowed to hold positions in the current Iraqi infrastructure or on the Governing Council typically fail to represent the actual sentiments of the Sunni population because they were selected by American occupying forces.[17] Shi'ites, who represent 60% of the total population of the country, demonstrate an eagerness to seize power after having little or none under the former regime.[18] Kurds also represent a significant minority in Iraq and continue to espouse national-

ist aspirations in the hope of creating their own independent country.

Imperialism

Evidence for the desire for an independent reconstruction effort includes substantial information relating to the perceived threat of foreign imperialism. People develop strong emotional reactions to the possible threat of imperialism whether the threat is justified or not. The emotional state of the citizens and their perceptions about their own state contribute to their determination of whether an outside force is attempting to colonize or simply providing aid for reconstruction. In Germany, people exhibited insecurities about the German role in two World Wars, and this led to an acceptance of occupation and even to a degree of acceptance of second-class treatment by the Allied forces. The U.S. government endorsed this behavior on the part of the occupation forces, encouraging ". . . occupation government staff to remind Germans of their defeat and second-class status."[19] One example of these "reminders" included a sign outside the Grand Hotel in Nuremberg that ". . . announced that the building was for the exclusive use of U.S. military personnel and that entry was forbidden to 'Germans, dogs, and displaced persons.' 'Anyone violating the above,' it was written, 'will be booked by the Military Police for proper disciplinary action."[20] Many Germans responded to this behavior by accusing the U.S. forces of ". . . exhibiting the same 'master race' attitudes that the United States was there to eliminate from the German consciousness."[21] Many people argued, however, that the Germans had little to complain about because they committed the same acts against the less powerful in their society prior to the Allied invasion and occupation. It also appears that the treatment by the United States may have fallen upon or even caused such a demoralized society that few Germans chose to resist, and no American soldiers lost their lives in attacks during the reconstruction as a result. Despite the previous examples of negative behavior by the U.S. occupation forces, the relationship between Germans and their American occupiers appeared very good based on opinions of German and their participation in cultural exchange activi-

ties. Other activities that demonstrated the good will between the two groups included simply inviting troops into homes, high participation in youth programs, and also cultural exchange programs to the United States.

Contrastingly, many Iraqis dislike and fear the U.S. presence and perceive many U.S. actions as imperialistic. One of the greatest threats against Middle Eastern culture includes the expansion of international capitalist enterprises. Western companies have gained stronger footholds in the Middle East and have plans to expand further. This economic threat serves as a major roadblock for many communities to support greater cultural exchange with the Western countries. Many people feel that they did not ask or welcome these Western companies into their communities and that these corporations represent imperialist tools of Western countries. Although not all Muslims feel this way about capitalism or corporate expansion, a large enough group holds these views to affect their communities' perceptions. In a Gallup poll Iraqis expressed dislike of the U.S. occupation and their fear of Western values invading their society by accepting violence as a means by which people must act against those participating in the American occupation: "Almost 1 in 5, 19% said attacks could be justified, and an additional 17% said they could be [justified] in some situations."[22] These figures indicate two important ideas: a large proportion of the population views the U.S. reconstruction effort unfavorably, and many people share the idea of a general acceptance of violence as a means of political expression.

In the post-war reconstruction effort of any country many citizens may fear the possibility that their occupier intends to stay indefinitely and exploit their labor and resources. This thought existed in Germany, but the element of fear was somewhat muted by the dire state of the German population and the geopolitical conditions of Europe during this time period. Americans considered the reconstruction a humanitarian effort that would cure the German people of their desire for war and teach them about peace:

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Yet what Americans wanted might be called modified coloniza-
tion. At the extremes, maximalists wanted German society fun-
damentally restructured, while minimalists were content to pun-
ish obvious war criminals but otherwise let Germans get on with
their own lives. Between these extremists stood the bulk of
Americans, seeking to reform German society modestly or
transform only a few of its main dimensions. Just as nineteenth-
century church groups sent missionaries into the colonies to
convert the heathen masses, some twentieth-century Americans
advocated a mission to democratize Germans. Just as the ideal
colonial administrators exercised benevolent despotism, so mili-
tary governors were expected to treat their German charges
firmly but fairly. The notion of social change as a policy was
aimed at rectifying a society's faults, whether paganism, or Na-
zism, while bathing the benighted in a brighter light of civiliza-
tion.[23]

Thus, although the U.S. occupation exhibited many of the conditions of a
colonizing country, the German people viewed the situation differently.
First, Germans wanted democracy for their country. In August of 1947,
56% of a sample survey indicated a preference for democracy over a
monarchy, dictatorship, socialist, communist, or other form of govern-
ment.[24] Because the majority of Germans agreed with the choice of gov-
ernment selected by the occupying force, they were less likely to fear the
imposition of an alternative form of government. A second important
reason why the Germans accepted a long-term U.S. occupation is the fact
that General Lucius Clay, the U.S. viceroy in post-war Germany, allowed
Germans to hold important positions during the reconstruction process:

[Clay] appointed three local Germans as regional administrators
in the US sector before British, French, or Soviet commands
thought to do so. The appointed Germans were "clean," never
having been in the Nazi Party or accused of other criminal activ-

ity. Clay asked these administrative advisers to assist him in drafting a variety of policy documents for his review and to help him fashion cadres of untainted lower-level German functionaries to counsel their US military supervisors.[25]

By allowing Germans to have substantial participatory roles in the re-building of their country, Clay prevented the Germans from developing a negative imperialist perception of the United States.

Iraqi citizens view their situation differently. One major reason that Iraqis feel that the United States is attempting to colonize is the U.S. imposition of it choice of government for the country. The United States seems persistent in its desire to build a democratic form of government for Iraq, yet Iraqi citizens show mixed feelings about the idea of democracy. In one survey, half of those polled agreed with the statement, "Democracy is a Western way of doing things and it will not work here." Only 38.6% thought that democracy would work well in Iraq.[26] In a separate question in the same survey, however, Iraqis identified the United States as having the best model of government for Iraq to use in creating its own new government (23.3%). The next best model of government as perceived by the sample of Iraqis, though, contrasts sharply with the democracy of the United States. The government of Saudi Arabia represented the second most popular choice for the government of Iraq with 17.4% of those surveyed choosing this response.[27] These conflicting results demonstrate how Iraqis remain unsure about democracy and the U.S. imposition of this form of government in Iraq. The results also show the sharp differences of opinion among Iraqis and how divided the society remains.

Unlike General Clay's attempt to include Germans in infrastructural positions, Iraqis feel their role in the rebuilding of their own country remains minimal. One political example includes the Iraqi Governing Council, which holds no real power. The main function of the Governing Council rests in its role as an advisory body for Paul Bremer III and the U.S. reconstruction force. The frustrations of the Council have increased

as its members have begun to see themselves as targets for violence because of their role as "collaborators" with the Americans and as have occurred repeated instances when the Council's recommendations have been ignored by American leaders. For example, the issue of allowing Turkey to send troops into Iraq as border guards brought sharp criticism from the Council, but its disapproval was overridden by American leaders. Bremer has responded to this criticism from the Council and other incidents by "scold[ing] council members at a meeting for having taken independent decisions. Four times, [Council] members said, Mr. Bremer reminded them that he held supreme authority.'[28] Keeping the Iraqi Governing Council members on such a short leash has instilled in the minds of Iraqis that the United States intends to remain supreme in their country. An example of withholding economic power from groups other than those tied to the Untied States includes a recent U.S. attempt to prevent certain countries from receiving contracts to aid with the reconstruction: "The Pentagon has barred French, German and Russian companies from competing for $18.6 billion in contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq, saying it was acting to protect 'the essential security interests of the United States.'"[29] This attempt to exclude both Iraqi and foreign companies from contributing significantly to the reconstruction may be perceived as an aspect of U.S. imperialism.

Another major difference between Germany and Iraq concerning the fear of colonization includes polling data regarding the length of stay for the occupying force of Americans. A U.S. Occupation Military Government survey in June of 1946 revealed that 69% of Germans surveyed agreed and 23% disagreed with the statement, "Germany should be occupied for many years, until the German people are able to form a democratic government.'[30] Iraqi citizens indicate that they prefer a much more rapid exit by U.S. forces. Of those surveyed 65.6% would like to see the American and British forces stay less than one year.[31] This data reveals very different attitudes toward occupation forces and could indicate a reason for higher violence against the "colonizing" U.S. troops in Iraq as opposed to the more welcomed U.S. occupation force in Germany.

Modus Vivendi

Another concern relating to the fear of imperialism includes the desire of citizens to rebuild their own country and create their own new institutions. This combination of a fear of an imperialist nation and the desire of citizens to rebuild their own state could produce violence if these citizens feel they are deprived of this right by another sovereign state. In the case of post-World War II Germany, German citizens generally welcomed the Allies into their country to help rebuild it, but the situation in their country was incredibly different from that in Iraq. The Nazis had fought to the end of their capacity, draining the country of resources and forcing the Allies to fight their way through the country, leaving a severely war-torn nation. Desperate circumstances led the majority of Germans to welcome the security and stability provided by the U.S. occupation:

> Germans acquiesced in part because few alternatives were available. A return to the Nazi dictatorship was out of the question, not only because the Allies would not have permitted it but also because Germans had little interest in restoring that discredited past. Nor did temporary regimes established under other occupying powers hold much promise. Few West Germans had any interest in coming under Soviet domination, and those Germans who were already were soon began pouring out of the Soviet zone and the subsequent German Democratic Republic to fill the refugee camps of the West. Nowhere was the antipathy toward Soviet domination greater than in West Berlin. Its population had experienced life under the Red Army, and, during the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949, it took only a hint that the U.S. might withdraw to send most West Berliners into despair (OMG-132).[32]

Germans perhaps realized that a prolonged occupation was vital for rebuilding the political, economic, and social infrastructure of the state to ensure the future welfare of Germany.

Iraqis, however, feel very differently about a prolonged U.S. occupation, partly for reasons of regional and international politics and the current situation of the country. Iraq possesses large amounts of the incredibly valuable resource, oil, which gives Iraqis confidence that they can be strong economically as long as they successfully rebuild the infrastructure of their oil industry. Various religious and ethnic groups feel that if they gain political power over Iraq they could easily obtain funds to rebuild the oil industry through other Muslim governments allied with their cause or beliefs or through investments made by Middle Eastern oil companies. Also, historically Iraq was colonized by the British during the early 20th century, and Iraq strongly refuses to endure a colonial legacy again under the United States. Concerning security, Iraq does not face the same Communist threat that existed for postwar Germany. Although Iraq shares a long common border with its enemy, Iran, 60.7% of Iraqi citizens feel that Saudi Arabia will help them over the next five years.[33] This confidence in regional allies allows Iraq to believe that it has both the security and ability to fund and control the reconstruction of its own country.

Public opinion polls taken in post-war, occupied Germany show high approval for the U.S. occupation in general, but also in regard to the U.S. policies and plans for reconstruction. In response to the question of how long the United States should occupy Germany, the median answer was ten years and "76 percent added that it should last that long. Most of those offering reasons cited the need to 'combat communism,' 'keep peace and order or watch political developments,' or 'prevent war and ensure peace'; a few mentioned the need to teach Germans democracy or reeducate German youth."[34] When asked, "In your opinion is the occupation by the foreign powers a national humiliation for Germany?" the majority (approximately 60%) answered "no."[35] Thus, most Germans viewed the occupation as necessary and were not embarrassed by their "occupied" status. Indeed, over half of the Germans polled thought that the United States should remain in their country for an extended length of time in order to ensure that Germany would not "fall prey to commu-

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nism."[86] A question that proposed a withdrawal of the occupation forces within one year resulted in similar enthusiasm for a prolonged occupation by the United States when a majority of Germans stated that they would not like to see the occupation end within a year.[37] Germans also supported U.S. policies during the reconstruction process, including de-Nazification and the general living conditions provided in the U.S. occupation zone.

Iraqis show much less support for the U.S. occupation of their country and especially for the possibility of a prolonged occupation. They feel they should be given the right to choose their own type of government and manage the reconstruction process themselves. In a Zogby International Survey performed in August, 2003, Iraqis were asked, "Should America and Britain help make sure a fair government is set up in Iraq, or should they just let Iraqis work this out themselves?" Nearly 60% of those polled said they want Iraqis to set up their own government while only 32.3% wanted Iraq to receive help from the U.S. and Great Britain.[38] These results contrast greatly with the German situation where the majority of Germans supported U.S. occupation and hoped for an extended occupation to ensure the security and stability of the country. Another indicator of Iraqi frustrations toward the American occupying force is the fact that violence has been directed at both American troops and their Iraqi "collaborators."[39] These "collaborators" represent those Iraqis who work in the new Iraqi police force set up by the Americans, the Iraqi Governing Council, and any organization perceived to be under the control of the American reconstruction forces. Iraqi citizens view those that aid the Americans as people who support the unpopular occupation, which they feel seeks to undermine the power of Iraq. These frustrations and divisions in society represent a likely source of violent outbursts against the perceived "oppressors." Iraqis feel they are much more capable of creating institutions that fit their needs than is a foreign nation.

U.S. Organization

The reconstruction efforts of the United States in Germany and

now in Iraq directly affect the lives of millions of people in these countries. These people see first-hand the effects of the rebuilding efforts in their daily lives and observe their living conditions as they improve or deteriorate as a result of the reconstruction process. The level of success or failure by the occupying force to rebuild the country as well as the level of sophistication of the organization of the reconstruction process seem very obvious to those that depend on it simply for survival. In Germany several public opinion polls attempted to address this question of success or failure on the part of the U.S. occupation. An Occupation Military Government survey from 1945-1950 found that throughout this time period, the majority of Germans felt like the U.S. occupation furthered the reconstruction of Germany.[40] Iraqi citizens feel very differently about the methods and organization of U.S. troops and their ability to reconstruct Iraq. The majority (50.2%) of the Iraqis surveyed thought that the United States would hurt Iraq while only 35.5% felt that the United States could help Iraq.[41] A Gallup poll found that despite this unfavorable view toward the U.S. occupation, half of the Iraqis surveyed felt that the United States and Great Britain were doing a better job in August than they had been doing in June or earlier.[42] If violent attacks represented a response to the perceived level of success or organization of the occupying forces, these attacks should have significantly decreased between June and August. This decrease has not occurred based on the continued high number of coalition deaths, which in October remained at about 35 per month.

Foreign Fighters

An influx of foreign fighters with little or no interest in the rebuilding of a country, especially by a foreign occupier, may contribute to high levels of violence in the post-war environment. In Iraq, evidence indicates the presence of foreign fighters, but in Germany, most foreigners in the country were soon repatriated to their home countries. In addition to post-war repatriation, many people of other nationalities left Germany to avoid repression under the Nazi government. One country in

this study, Iraq, faces an influx of foreigners into the country, while the other case , Germany, experienced an exodus of its foreign population both during and following World War II. U.S. and coalition forces on the Iraqi borders face difficulty in effectively monitoring the entire perimeter of Iraq, and at the same time they experience greater pressure from their governments to make the border impenetrable. The New York Times reported "The intelligence officials say that since late summer they have detected a growing stream of itinerant Muslim militants headed for Iraq. They estimate that hundreds of young men from an array of countries have now arrived in Iraq by crossing the Syrian or Iranian borders."[43] The report also points out that several European countries have observed the movement of Muslim men from their countries, traveling to Iraq: "France's top investigative judge on terrorism said dozens of poor and middle-class Muslim men had left France for Iraq since the summer."[44] Germany, Spain, and Saudi Arabia have issued similar accounts. The majority of the foreign guerrillas captured in Iraq come from Middle Eastern countries such as ". . . Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen – or North Africa."[45] As a result of the inadequate numbers of U.S. and coalition border patrol troops, crossing into Iraq ". . . is usually not difficult to do because most areas of Iraq's borders remain unguarded."[46] Unlike Iraq, Germany in post-war Europe found itself surrounded by member states of the Allied Forces and occupied in sections by additional forces from other Allied states. The presence of Allied forces surrounding Germany, the effective dispersal and capture of Nazi forces and party members, and the defeat of every Axis power, left Germany and the entire European continent unlikely candidates for a rise of foreign-initiated guerrilla warfare. The total defeat of Germany and its Nazi leaders also made Germany an unfavorable location for foreign insurgents to plan and carry out attacks because the internal support structures no longer existed.

Iraq, however, has different geopolitical conditions in that it borders several enemy states, each of which contain groups that sympathize with Iraqi societies for reasons of ethnicity, religion, or shared persecution. Additional evidence of the foreign fighters hypothesis' power to explain

violence in Iraq includes the motivations for the foreign guerrillas. The fighters may represent terrorist organizations, people to fight on behalf of Ba'ath party loyalists, or they may find themselves drawn to Iraq by religious calling. In the case of Germany, these motivating factors failed to exist. International terrorist organizations left no impact on post-war Germany. Additionally, the only example of a guerrilla movement organized by the Nazi Party hired Germans, not foreigners, to conduct the missions, and the entire operation disintegrated just prior to the end of the war. Finally, religion played no role in post-war reconstruction operations because occupying countries and Germany were both composed of people of Christian-based religions. In Iraq, the role of terrorist organizations has been disputed as American leadership seeks to find connections between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. Although a connection may never be found or may not exist directly to actual attacks, evidence from some attacks indicates that foreign terrorist groups are at least involved in funding and some planning. The director of intelligence from the Interior Ministry in Baghdad, Ibrahim Jannabi, claims that the bombing of the United Nations building in August could represent a connection between the terrorist groups and former political leaders. As the New York Times reported, "Mr. Jannabi said that his investigators believed that the suicide bombing at the United Nations headquarters here in August was planned either by Al Qaeda or by former Iraqi intelligence agents with links to the terrorist group."[47] The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader, Jalal Talabani, claims that a more recent attacks is the work of "...Ansar al-Islam, a militant Islamic group that has been linked to Al Qaeda."[48] Whether or not these international terrorist organizations send direct manpower to plan and complete attacks, their tactical and financial support allows guerrillas to act in place of these foreign actors.

Foreign fighters may be influenced to go to Iraq by Ba'ath Party loyalists who must employ manpower to complete attacks against Americans and American collaborators. In some cases the foreign guerrillas receive payment for their help or other benefits for their loyalty. Ameri-

can investigations have found that many attacks "...might be the work of Islamic militants or 'jihadists' hired by loyalists to Mr. Hussein, [and they also] suspect that Mr. Hussein's agents may be recruiting non-Iraqis to drive explosive-filled cars."[49] Through audiotapes sent to Arab television stations, Saddam Hussein encourages the influx of foreign religious fundamentalist fighters by inciting "calls for holy war and curses on American and other foreign occupation troops in Iraq."[50] Some foreign fighters travel to Iraq to fulfill a believed religious duty, often "inspired by the exhortations of Al Qaeda leaders, even if they were not trained by Al Qaeda."[51] The conditions that lure foreign fighters into Iraq vary, but the outcome remains the same: the high numbers of foreign insurgents produce continued violence in Iraq.

Conclusions

In many ways, warfare seemed to contain many of the same brutal and destructive elements in both of these countries. These conditions might suggest that the aftermath of war, including military occupation during reconstruction, would also exhibit broad similarities. This presumption is challenged by the current U.S. occupation of Iraq with the post-World War II occupation of Germany, leading me to ask why high levels of violence remain in Iraq months after the declared end of the war when little violence against Allied forces occurred in Germany. Through my research, I found insightful public opinion data and press accounts that allowed me to reach several conclusions concerning this question.

For my political-actors-hypothesis, public opinion polls revealed that a majority of Germans were indifferent or opposed to a second rise of Nazis to power while a majority of Iraqis viewed the removal of Saddam from power in a positive light. Evidence for both cases emphasized negative public opinion toward former party leaders, including significant majorities approving the punishment of Nazi Party members and the Nuremberg trials or hoping to see members of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party punished for their crimes. Lacking strong majority support from the public

suggests that underground political movements may face great difficulties in receiving and/or distributing information and supplies. It must be noted, however, that when Saddam's Ba'ath Party controlled Iraq, it represented a minority group, the Sunnis, and successfully maintained control for this minority for several decades. This fact indicates that Saddam and/or the Ba'ath Party may only require a few well-connected supporters to organize resistance against the U.S. occupying forces.

My second hypothesis suggests that the cultural gap between citizens of an occupied country and the occupation forces leads to violence. A major aspect of culture that I focus on includes religion. In the case of post-war Germany, Christians represented groups on both sides of the occupation, but present-day Iraq, however, consists of a primarily Muslim population. As Islamic fundamentalist groups and leaders continue to gain and wield their power worldwide, the tension between Muslims and other religious groups, especially Jews, Christians, and atheists, will persist. My research has revealed that despite the fact that some attacks in Iraq appear to be religiously motivated suicide attacks, the majority of the attacks indicate no obvious religious influence. Additional evidence concerning the impact of culture on levels of violence is more convincing. During the occupation of post-war Germany, cultural variations between troops and civilians were small in that both groups lived in Western societies, shared similar religious, and often spoke each other's language. Iraqis live in a society that holds very different values, and U.S. occupation forces often fail to take these variations into account when policies are proposed and enacted. Iraqis also fear that they may lose their traditions if their country remains subject to a Western power, and therefore, many feel compelled to fight against this threat.

Ethnic conflict is the center of my third hypothesis used to explain attacks on U.S. occupation forces. Germany experienced little post-war ethnic strife as a result of having a generally homogeneous society. Iraq, however, contains sharp ethnic divisions, and each group harbors a separate agenda to further its power or protect the power it already possesses. The possibility of losing power and status may cause these

groups to initiate violent acts against other groups, including violent attacks on U.S. occupation forces. Conflicting interests during reconstruction and frustrations over poor representative leadership in the Iraqi Governing Council are both indicative of grievances of several ethnic groups in Iraq. Despite this logic, the fact that attacks continue to be directed at people (both American and Iraqi) participating in the reconstruction process indicates a greater problem than solely that of ethnic strife.

The fourth hypothesis, concerning the fear of imperialism and the complimentary desire for self-sufficiency, successfully explains the large discrepancy between levels of postwar violence in Germany and in Iraq. Although Americans wanted to convert the German population into a democratized society modeled after their own society, Germans welcomed these efforts, supporting both the idea of democracy as a viable form of government and the lengthy occupation by the United States. Iraqis express the opposite views, claiming that democracy will not work in their country and supporting only a short U.S. occupation. Subject to the influence of the imperial power of Great Britain in the earlier part of the 20th century, the collective memory of this negative experience fosters feelings of mistrust toward claims of Western powers that they will help Iraq. Another important difference between the two cases is the willingness of the United States to allow Germans to participate in government while Iraqis have only advisory roles with little or no real power. Withholding power from the Iraqis strengthens their fear that the United States desires imperial control over the country and strengthens their belief that Iraqis must actively discourage this invasion through their only remaining effective form of expression: violence. Another aspect of this theory includes the idea that Iraqis wish to regain control over the rebuilding effort and commence with an independent or at least Middle East-based reconstruction of Iraq. Polls indicate that Germans favored a U.S. occupation while Iraqis think that the U.S. presence will prove detrimental to their country. Not only did Iraqis respond positively to polls in regards to rebuilding their own country, but also violent attacks have been directed at both U.S. personnel and Iraqis involved in the US-led recon-

struction. These facts suggest that the desire for self-sufficiency, in association with the fear of Western imperialism, plays a highly significant role in the levels of violence in postwar Iraq.

My fifth hypothesis concerning the organization of the U.S. occupation in both case studies fails to adequately explain the high levels of violence currently found in Iraq. In post-World War II Germany, many Germans felt that the U.S. occupation encouraged the development of a successful country, while Iraqis feel that the U.S. involvement in their country will hinder its rebuilding efforts. The formation of new plans and new committees by the U.S. government to discuss the Iraqi situation also indicates a level of disorganization and a lack of preparation in the war and reconstruction plans for Iraq.

The final hypothesis which claims that foreigners are responsible for attacks in Iraq is greatly supported. Iraq has experienced an influx of poor and middle-class Muslim men from the Middle East and Europe while Germany never experienced this type of population movement. Strong evidence connects many of the attacks to foreign terrorist groups or foreigners hired by Ba'ath party loyalists. These groups have access to the weaponry, skills, organization, and social network connections to complete the attacks, which range from simple shootings to complex bombings. Foreign fighters also often have religious motivations, encouraged by religious leaders, leaders of terrorist groups, and certain Middle Eastern political leaders. Although not every attack results from a foreign fighter, many of them are conducted by these "jihadists" who have entered Iraq with the specific purpose of aiding those that oppose the U.S. occupation.

Based on the evidence of public opinion polls, data concerning the individual attacks, press reports, and historical accounts, the difference in violence levels during reconstruction in Germany and Iraq is a result of a combination of the hypotheses presented in this research paper. The most useful hypotheses are those regarding the Iraqi desire for a generally self-sufficient reconstruction and the fear

of U.S. imperialism. The availability of weapons from unguarded stock-piles left by Saddam's army, the varying level of organization of the attacks, and the targets of these attacks point to the fact that Iraqis generally disapprove of U.S. involvement and forced acceptance of democratic and Western ideals that do not necessarily coincide with Iraqi Muslim values. The cultural hypothesis also explains some of the violence directed at Americans. The lack of cultural understanding between U.S. occupation forces and Iraqis remains evident by the U.S. imposition of democratic institutions and Western society in Iraq. The remaining hypotheses in this study all exhibit some truth in that certain attacks do seem to able to be modeled upon their logic. As a result of some wide variations in data, I believe that every theory presented has some merit and explains at least a few of the attacks in Iraq. Each theory also presents an argument for why the same level of violence did not occur in post-World War II Germany. As mentioned earlier, the explanatory capabilities of each hypothesis vary in degree, with the fear of imperialism and desire for self-sufficiency hypothesis providing the best answers to my research question.

Though all of the theories proposed in this research provided some benefit to this project, as evidence of each theory's applicability existed, the actual structure for some of the theories may need some additional work. For example, I think the first theory on political actors may be separated between former political parties and actual leaders, such as Saddam Hussein. People may support these two types of political actors for different reasons, and these groups may use violence in different ways to achieve various goals. At this point in time, every theory has some evidence to support it with a few theories having more than others. To gain a better sense of why the violence occurs in Iraq and did not occur in Germany, time will help as it will certainly yield more evidence. Unfortunately, this time is likely to result in continued violence as U.S. leaders struggle to combat the attacks against their troops and those involved in the Iraqi reconstruction.

One challenge for this project included data collection. Because

of the recent nature of the Iraqi case, some data was either incomplete or not available. In Iraq, public opinion polls represented only a single time period while the German polls that I looked at covered many years. Another problem with this type of data is the fact that some questions directed at Germans following the war fell outside the six month period within which I had hoped to concentrate my data collection. Furthermore, the questions presented in each survey varied in wording even when they targeted the same issues. This disparity may lead to psychological effects that cause people to answer questions in certain ways. For instance, the word "Westernized" was used in a question asked to Iraqis that involved democracy. I feel that the charged nature of this word in the Middle East may have influenced the way Iraqis responded to this question. Instead of providing their opinion on democracy as a form of government, they may have focused their response on their opinion of the "West." The groups sponsoring the surveys may also have influenced the responses of participants. In Iraq, private companies provided the polling data, whereas in Germany a government commission conducted the surveys. Citizens under U.S. occupation may have felt compelled to answer questions in certain ways because they felt pressure from the occupation government.

The important worldwide impact of events in the Middle East makes the questions about violence and reconstruction in Iraq a great responsibility that needs further research. The invasion and reconstruction have only taken place recently and still face huge obstacles. Social scientists must continue to build upon existing theories and develop their own new theories if the United States can hope to implement better policies in the future in Iraq or elsewhere. Perhaps some other psychological condition causes the violence in Iraq. Could groups performing the attacks want to conceal their identities and motives? How could this aid their cause or make them perceive that anonymity aids their cause? The complexity of the U.S. reconstruction in Iraq and its large impact on Middle Eastern politics worldwide raise many other important questions. With patience and diligence social scientists must continue to tackle these questions and

share their findings with those in power so that leaders may put this knowledge to use. From a humanitarian standpoint, these issues are paramount in preventing future loss of military and civilian lives of both Americans and Iraqis.

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Capital Punishment Divergences among Similar Countries: A Case Study of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States

By C. Kyle Russ

Introduction

The similarities between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States are many, as these three countries share similar language, economies, histories, foreign policies and even cultures. Each of these countries is predominantly English-speaking and noted for its Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage. Britons, Americans, and Canadians share similar tastes in music, fashion, food, and art and larger contexts such as religion, foreign policies and commitments to democracy. However, despite the numerous and strong cultural similarities among these three countries and the fact that Americans view Canadians and Britons as their closest allies, there exists a significant difference in each country's public stances and laws on traditional morality issues.1 Traditional morality issues such as abortion, gay rights, and capital punishment are viewed in notably different fashions in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Given numerous similarities, why do the United Kingdom and Canada have more liberal views on morality politics than does the United States?

One such morality issue, capital punishment, exhibits noteworthy policy differences in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States is the only industrial democracy, with the exception of Japan, which still sanctions capital punishment by law. The European Union (of which the United Kingdom is a member) and Canada have permanent moratoriums on the death penalty. Thus, the important question arises: why given their extremely similar cultures, government structures and commitment to democracy, have the

United Kingdom and Canada abolished the death penalty while the United States has not?

In this paper, I seek to examine the aforementioned question of differing policies towards capital punishment in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I begin with a brief history of capital punishment in these countries, followed by a justification of the case selection. Given that the topic, capital punishment, is widely considered a morality issue, the following section contains a literature review of the dominant theories which attempt to infer upon the nature of morality issues. I then state the theories used to generate hypotheses and how each hypothesis will be tested. The penultimate section includes support for each hypothesis, and the final section pertains to the conclusions, difficulties in the study, further research questions, and implications.

History and Case Selection

In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Unites States, the capital punishment debate has evolved differently. Between Canada and the United Kingdom, there are several similarities in how and when the practice was abolished. However, the United States has yet to nationally abolish capital punishment despite attempts made by interests groups and twelve state governments.

Abolition in the United Kingdom first gained momentum in 1832 when the death penalty was outlawed for shoplifting and other petty crimes. In 1938 hanging, the method by which capital punishment in the United Kingdom was practiced, was abolished in times of peace, although it was reinstated shortly after due to World War II. The Homicide Act of 1957 made a clear distinction between capital and non-capital cases, which further limited the types of crimes that were punishable by death. By 1969, the complete abolition of capital punishment was passed by law. Since 1969 there have been 13 attempts to reinstate the practice, all of which have failed to gain any significant support.

Similar to the British, Canadians have also gradually outlawed the

death penalty, although complete abolition occurred in a later decade. In 1961, Canada changed murder from a capital offense to a non-capital offense, and in 1962 the last state execution took place. By 1966, capital punishment was only permissible for murder of an on-duty police officer or prison guard. Ten years later, in 1976, capital punishment was completely abolished when it was removed from the Canadian Criminal Code.

Unlike in the British and Canadian cases, the United States has not abolished the death penalty. The closest attempt to end the death penalty came from the Supreme Court in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia ruling, which effectively put a temporary halt to all state executions. However, in 1976 in the Gregg v. Georgia case, the Court effectively reversed its earlier decision, and the ban on capital punishment was lifted. Since then 12 states have outlawed the practice.

Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States are prime case selections for this study of capital punishment for several reasons. First, since the argument is trying to analyze capital punishment divergences, these countries are ideal due to their most similar (yet also different) Anglo-Saxon heritages. This Anglo-Saxon heritage is characterized by similar cultures, connected histories, and comparable governmental structures. However, within this seemingly similar Anglo-Saxon model are observed cultural distinctions, independent historical events, and some distinct differences in governmental structures.

In addition to the characters of the countries, the cases were also selected because a fair amount of scholarly work has committed itself to morality policy divergences among industrialized democracies. However, little has been done on the differing capital punishment policies in the industrialized democracies. The issue is a salient topic in the United States and among prominent international critics of capital punishment such as Amnesty International. Therefore, an understanding of why the United States is fundamentally at odds (and has been for some time now) with most of the industrialized world on this issue is not only interesting but also contributive to the study of comparative morality politics.

Lastly, this study will analyze divergent policy outcomes among established industrial democracies. While it is believed that laws will represent public sentiment in a democracy, this is not always accurate. In this endeavor, the study attempts to determine why public opinion in some countries is in accordance with current policy and why public opinion conflicts with policy in other countries.

Literature Review

Included in this literature review is a brief description of the major theoretical arguments which scholars use to examine morality issues such as capital punishment. This section will examine the cultural school, the institutional approach, and the path dependency explanation. I will then evaluate each the usefulness of each approach in explaining the nature of morality policy divergences, and the section culminates with the generation of a hypothesis and a methodology for testing the explanatory variable.

Cultural School

This approach posits that culture matters, and given different cultures, different policies are achieved. The cultural theory holds that some societies are more skeptical about government than others. The degree of skepticism often determines the role and level of involvement the government assumes in public policy (Adolino and Blake, 2001). Three major ways to study the cultural influences on policy outcomes, the Family of Nations approach, the public opinion approach, and a religiosity examination, will be defined here.

Families of Nations - When viewing policy outputs and outcomes, it may be useful to view outputs and outcomes in terms of groups of countries. While there may be variation between countries, countries with similar cultural and historical traditions commonly have similar policy outcomes and outputs. Francis Castles (1993) identified four distinct cultural families in the postwar industrialized world.
1. Anglo American Family – Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand,

the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries tend to emphasize the role of the individual, and consequently policies that impede government expansion are common. These countries tend to favor small governments that do not interfere with the citizens' individualistic nature.
2. Scandinavian Family – Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Very much the opposite of the Anglo-American group, these countries tend to be seen as favoring the collective ideal of the societal good rather than the individual, and their public polices are commonly reflections of this philosophy. Therefore, these countries exhibit large governments that seek to establish and protect public goods.
3. German Family - Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. These countries are federalist in structure, with regional governments providing a check on the national government. They are also more prone to a corporatist approach, which emphasizes compromise, rather than to a pluralist approach, which promotes competition. The German family can be described as being between the Scandinavian and Anglo-American approaches, balancing the individual and collective approaches.
4. Latin Family – France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These societies tend to have large central governments which many scholars postulate to be a result of their desire to catch up economically and militarily with the northern European states and the United States. However, these big-government states have been counterbalanced by a public mistrust of the state. Amoral famialism, which refers to a strong reliance of individuals on their immediate families and community as opposed to a reliance on the state, also exists in these countries.

Since Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all members of the Anglo-American family, one would expect, given the family of nations theory, that each country would have a similar approach to capital punishment. However, this is not the case. Therefore, one could argue that family culture may matter, but family culture does not necessarily dominate policy. Therefore, within the culture-based explanation, other forces need to be examined. Specifically, public opinion and the role of religion in the given country can have a significant impact

on policy outcomes.

Public Opinion Approach – As more sophisticated and accurate polling techniques started to emerge in the 1970s and throughout the rest of the twentieth century, some scholars started to look at contemporary and specific attitudes about current policy debates rather than exclusively using the Families of Nations approach (Adolino and Blake, 2001). By viewing public opinion data, direct cultural implications can be drawn which may be more insightful than would be looking across countries for cultural similarities. The public opinion data is then used to determine whether a state's policies reflect the general public sentiment. Public opinion polls can be more efficient than using the families approach, as a direct inference can be made to a specific issue in specific countries.

Religiosity - The religious nature of a country's citizenship is also an important aspect of the culture, as religion can notably influence one's opinion. Morality issues are particularly subject to the religious nature of a person, as the 'right and wrong' debate is most poignant in issues where material gains are negligible (Smith and Tatolovich, 2003). Although one would expect similar levels of religiosity within the "family," religiosity can vary significantly among countries of the same "family."

Using these theories, I now generate several hypotheses related to cultural matters.

Hypothesis I (Public Opinion)– The more public support there is for capital punishment, the more likely a state is to sponsor capital punishment. This hypothesis is based on the work of numerous scholars who contend that public opinion does have an effect on policy outcomes. Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that public opinion does constitute a significant variable that policy makers consider when formulating and implementing policy (1991). He continues in accordance with McConnell (1953) that policy outcomes differ across countries according to both variances in public opinion and variances in the structure of the domestic institutions. Furthermore, public opinion acts as a gauge of which policies are acceptable and which are not acceptable (Stinchcombe et al, 1980). Within this context, I will observe public opinion concerning the

death penalty in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I posit that if a country exhibits high levels of support for the death penalty, then the state is likely to endorse it.

Hypothesis II (Religiosity)- The more religiosity a country's population exhibits, the more likely the state is to sanction capital punishment. It is argued that the more religious a society is, the more likely the state is to characterize capital punishment in terms of a religious debate. This hypothesis will be tested through observations of religiosity in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Specifically, it will be measured by the World Values survey's religiosity index, which encompasses religious aspects such as a population's general belief in "God," church attendance rates, and participation in organized religion. This will be further supported through the use of various public opinion polls.

Institutional School

Another theory which attempts to explain the nature of public policy is the institutional approach. This argument states that the rules and norms governments establish, as well as the informal norms governments create, determine the degree of public policy involvement (Adolino and Blake, 2001). Therefore, societies whose institutions are receptive to public opinion, or those whose governmental structures have outlets for public opinion, are more likely to have policy outcomes that reflect public sentiment than those whose governmental structure is closed to public opinion (Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1991).

One institutional approach focuses on government institutions and the terms of how the government structure deals with national and sub-national governments. Hence, scholars make distinctions concerning federal and centralized states. These arguments state that federal governments have a more difficult time achieving national policy changes than unitary systems, as the multi-tiered decision making process has inevitable collective action problems. Centralized governments tend to have more power in changing policy unless it is delegate to a national territory.

An alternative institutional approach focuses on the interaction be-

tween the executive and the legislature; thus, a distinction is made between presidential and parliamentary systems (Adolino and Blake, 2001). Executive-legislative relations also influence the government's ability to engage in policy outcomes. Presidential systems are similar to federal systems in that both generate additional decision points which allow more public pressure and tend to slow potential changes in government activity. In contrast, a parliamentary system has rules that require the executive branch to retain the support of a majority of legislators (Adolino and Blake, 2001). When the executive and legislature work together, they can expand or contract growth relatively quickly, as opposed to when the executive and legislature oppose each other, as efficiency abates due to divergent opinions on policy.

The judicial system is also a key institution in understanding the structural argument. Different countries have different judicial systems which can play an influential role in politics as some judiciaries can effectively establish public policy. In some countries, the courts have the ability to authorize and prohibit legislation through the power of judicial review. Thus, the process by which the judiciary acts is important. It is therefore necessary to examine how a judge gains a post, to whom he/she is accountable, and the tenure of the post.

Using institutional theories, I generate another hypothesis for my study.

Hypothesis III (Government Structure) – Federal countries are more likely to have state-sponsored capital punishment than are unitary countries. Logic posits that federal states are more prone to public opinion as there are more policy outlets for the public and interest groups to voice their views. In a federal state, individuals and groups can approach local, state, as well as national policy makers. Thus, the chance of getting a view recognized by policy makers is significant. In contrast, unitary states are less susceptible to public demands as policy decisions are most often made from the upper levels of the government that are difficult to access (O'Neill, 2000). Therefore, individuals and interest groups have greater difficulty influencing policy makers in unitary states. This hypothesis will be tested by observing the governmental structures in Can-

ada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I posit that if there are more policy outlets, or institutional fragmentation, then there is a greater likelihood of a state sponsoring capital punishment. I assume that since the majorities of the populations in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States support the death penalty, it is more likely that the pro-death penalty supporter will influence policy-makers.

Path Dependence

Another body of theory concerning the nature of public policy says policy outcomes can be explained through examinations of historical events. Paul Pierson outlines some of the basic assumptions of increasing returns and path dependency arguments (2000). Path dependency argues that events in history have significant influence on future policies. He defines succinctly the increasing returns and path dependence argument throughout the paper and contends that,

> Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life (251).

Simply put, history matters, and path dependency can help explain why historical events have lasting consequences. Pierson highlights that the events do not have to be "big" events but that even little events at the appropriate time can have significant consequences. This argument contends that current conditions are the result of a previous process of events, so it is not a singular past event explicitly, but rather the previous unfolding of a chain of events that is theoretically central (Pierson, 2000). The theory also concludes that once a particular action has been taken, it is increasingly difficult to reverse those effects or "deviate from the

path," as the cost of changing paths is politically and socially unattractive. An example of the argument can be illustrated by the QWERTY keyboard. While it is certainly the less efficient means of typing, it persists because the opportunity costs of abandoning the system are viewed as too great to switch to a more efficient configuration as everyone familiar with the QWERTY keyboard would have to learn a new method. While learning a more efficient keyboard may be desirable in the long-run, it would be extremely costly as the QWERTY keyboard is a necessary tool in practically every job. The United States' use of the English measurement system rather than the universal metric system also exhibits path dependence logic. While U.S. utilization of the metric system would synthesize measurements around the world and thus be more efficient, it would be very difficult to switch as most Americans are only familiar with the English system.

Path dependency theory yields an additional hypothesis for this study.

Hypothesis IV (Path Dependence) - The post- World War II decisions a country made concerning the legality of capital punishment determine a country's current authorization of capital punishment. By using the last fifty- five years of history as a reference point, reasonable inferences can be made given the sufficient amount of time to observe major historical issues dealing with the death penalty. Within the nature of this context, major decisions have been made concerning the legality of capital punishment in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I will observe these historical events and predict the costs in changing policies now. If the costs are politically and socially substantial, I will argue that changing the capital punishment policies is not likely to occur and thus current policies will persist.

Evidence

This section contains support (or lack thereof) for the above stated hypotheses. Ultimately I find that the most support exists for the religiosity hypothesis and the path dependence hypothesis. I failed to find

support for public opinion and the federal/institutional hypothesis.

Hypothesis I: Pubic Opinion

I begin my analysis with testing the public opinion hypothesis, Hypothesis I, which claimed that a state is more likely to sponsor capital punishment if there is a higher level of public support for capital punishment. I first consider the case of Canada in my search of support for this theory. High levels of public support in Canada for capital punishment have been the norm, and it has been only recently that opposition to the ultimate sanction has substantially increased. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the debate over capital punishment reached its climax, there was stable endorsement of the death penalty among respondents to a poll (between 50% and 58%) and relatively low disapproval (only between 33% and 40%) (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003).2   Two years after the death penalty was abolished for ordinary crimes in 1967, polls showed 68% of Canadians supported capital punishment (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003). Furthermore, analysis of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) surveys in 1965, 1975, and 1982 influenced a scholarly conclusion that "opinion was one-sidedly pro-capital punishment in each year" (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003).

However, the 1990s surveys have indicated increased levels of disapproval for capital punishment. The Canada Press reported in 2001 that 53% of respondents supported capital punishment while 43% opposed it (Death Penalty Info). Canada Press believed this to be significant as a similar poll conducted in 1995 found 69% supported reinstating the death penalty in Canada (Death Penalty Info). These figures are additionally supported by Ipsos-Reid and the Toronto Globe and Mail polls in 1995 and 2001 (Death Penalty Info). These statistics could lead to the assumption that policy is driving public opinion.

The British case is similar to that of Canada, but the abolition occurred a decade earlier (1965) amidst high levels of public support for the death penalty. Furthermore, the British case, akin to the Canadian case, shows high levels of support for capital punishment historically with lev-

els of support only decreasing slightly since the 1990s.

In 1947, the British Gallup found that 65% of those polled favored the death penalty (King, 2001). The trends over the middle half of the twentieth century demonstrate that "[a]t no time were the abolitionists able to claim a majority for their position" (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003). Since the 1970s, support for the reinstatement of capital punishment has been publicly stable. Gallup polls taken in the 1970s indicate support levels around 70% for capital punishment. Since then, pro-capital punishment has maintained this 70% average and, according to some accounts, has increased. MORI found that 76% of British respondents supported the death penalty in 1995 (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003). Gallup found similarly high sentiments supporting capital punishment in 1999, as 68% of those polled were against abolition of the death penalty (King, 2001).

Similar to those of Canada and the United Kingdom, the U.S. population has also shown high public support for capital punishment. Furthermore, Americans have displayed higher levels of support for the death penalty since World War II, whereas such support has abated in Canada since the war. Whereas twelve U.S. states have placed moratoriums on the death penalty, the majority of states still sanction capital punishment. The 1950s and 1960s exhibit the lowest levels of support for the death penalty. Gallup polls found the average level of support in the 1950s to be about 51% and in the 1960s, 47% (Flanagan and Longmire, 1996). Since the 1970s, there has been an increased level of approval for capital punishment. The 1970s shows on average 57% of respondents in support of the death penalty; in the 1980s, this figure jumps to 72% in favor; and a slightly higher level arises in the 1990s, with an average of 76% supporting capital punishment (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003).

The theory positing that public opinion has an influence on policy displays significant limitations. The theory predicted that Canada and the United Kingdom would sanction capital punishment due to high levels of public support for the death penalty. Despite the theory that policy will reflect public opinion, both the Canadian and British governments have abolished capital punishment. Public opinion in the United States does

seem to influence policy, however, as the United States has continued to rule in favor of the death penalty, albeit the limitations placed on the death penalty.

Hypothesis II: Religiosity

The religiosity hypothesis posits that a higher level of religiosity in a country's population should result in an increased likelihood of the state sponsoring capital punishment. The Canadian population is relatively religious, although it seems as if religion is decreasing in importance in the everyday lives of Canadians. Many scholars and public opinion polls have exhibited this trend in three primary ways. The Pew Research Center conducts a series of studies called "The Pew Global Attitudes Project." In this series released in 2002, 38,000 people across forty-four countries were asked, "Do you consider religion personally important?" The highest religiosity ranking was held by Senegal, with 97% answering affirmatively, and the Czech Republic ranked lowest with 11 % (Religious Tolerance). Canada was also on the lower side with only 30% of those polled feeling religion was personally important (Religious Tolerance).

In addition to the low percentage Canadians who feel that religion is personally important, church attendance rates in Canada are also low. Canada's General Social Survey reports that "attendance at religious services has fallen dramatically across the country over the past 15 years" (Religious Tolerance). As evidence of this statement, only 28% of respondents said they attended religious services weekly in 1986. In 2001, this percentage declined to 20% (Religious Tolerance). This data is further supported by a respected Canadian public polling group, Angus Reid, who attempts to measure church attendance rates through actual service observations -that is, by counting the number of people at church rather than other methods which include polls where people self-select. Angus Reid showed that 21% of Canadian adults currently attend a religious meeting place weekly (Religious Tolerance). Again, this is in accordance with the findings of Canada's General Social Survey which re-

ported that 20% attended religious services weekly (Religious Tolerance).

Ronald Inglehart's World Value Survey also measures religiosity in an attempt to gauge the religious nature of a country. Key areas analyzed in the attempt are religious affiliations, attendance, behavior, communities, doctrine, experience, and practice. This survey is widely known as it covers an extensive time period and sixty countries. The 1990-1991 survey data shows Canada with a result of thirty-eight. This result is about the median score, but still relatively low as the highest possible score is 100 and the lowest is 0. See Figure 1.

With respect to the case of the United Kingdom, it is widely assumed that Britons are not a very religious people. Many surveys and public opinion polls have confirmed this belief. The MORI Social Research Institute found that in 2003, three in five Britons (60 %) said they believe in "God." This is a drop from 1998 where 64 % said they believed in "God" (MORI, 2003). This 64% of Britons who believe in God may seem to constitute a high percentage, although the rate is dropping but only about one in about five British people (18%) say they are practicing members of an organized religion while 25% say they are non-practicing members of an organized religion (MORI, 2003). When asked whether or not they were "spiritually inclined but do not really belong to an organized religion," 24% responded affirmatively while about 14% of Britons reported themselves to be agnostic and 12% indicated an atheistic belief (MORI, 2003). Further evidence which indicates that the United Kingdom is marked by low levels of religiosity is that only 17% say that their own life experience has the most influence on their lives and outlook on life. In sum, Inglehart's World Value Survey additionally describes the United Kingdom as not significantly religious. On his religiosity index, the United Kingdom has a score of only 27. See Figure 1.

In contrast to neighboring Canada, and its closest ally the United Kingdom, the population of the United States is very religious. This claim is well supported. Public opinion polls display evidence that Americans are among the world's most religious people, especially when

compared to other industrialized democracies. An August 2000 poll found that 94% of Americans believe in "God" (Harris Interactive, 2000). See Figure 2. This percentage is higher for Christians, who are the dominant religious group in the United States. See Figure 3. It is also estimated that 44% of Americans attend church once a week, not including funerals, Christening or baptisms (Harris Interactive, 2000). As stated, this is significantly higher than in the United Kingdom, where about only 20% attended once a week. Furthermore, Americans generally believe that religion is very important in their daily lives (Harris Interactive, 2000). Lastly, the World Values Survey displays a high religiosity score for the United States, which indicates a generally high religious nature of Americans that numerous other findings support. See Figure 1.

Thus, it is clear that the United States has a more religiously-natured population than do Canada and the United Kingdom. This is shown simply by Ingelhart's respected World Values Survey religiosity scores, but the claim is further supported by observations of respected public opinion polls such as Angus Reid in Canada, MORI in the United Kingdom, and Harris in the United States. I have predicted that a high level of religiosity in the United States would lead to state endorsement of capital punishment, whereas low levels of religiosity in the United Kingdom and Canada would lead to a lesser probability of state endorsement of capital punishment. The prediction is accurate as the United States sanctions capital punishment, and Canada and the United Kingdom have abolished the death penalty while all the available information indicates that the United States has higher levels of religiously natured citizens than do Canada and the United Kingdom. Coincidentally, it is also interesting to observe that the country with the lowest religiosity level, the United Kingdom, was the earliest in abolishing capital punishment.

Hypothesis III: Government Structure

Modus Vivendi

My third hypothesis predicts that federal countries are more likely to have state sponsored capital punishment than are unitary countries. Canada's government is unique in many ways, although it was once a former British colony. Since independence in 1867, Canada has evolved into a confederation with parliamentary democracy. Canada's government is federalist in nature with ten provinces and three territories, each with its own sub-national government. The governing capital, Ottawa, is home to the three major branches of the national government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

The executive branch has three major power outlets. The monarchy is hereditary and has little authoritative power and few responsibilities. The monarch (currently Queen Elizabeth II of England) appoints the Governor General (currently Adrienne Clarkson) with the advice of the Prime Minister who serves a five-year term. The Governor General, following legislative elections, appoints the leader of the majority party, or the leader of the majority coalition, in the House of Commons as the Prime Minister (currently Prime Minister Paul Martin). The Prime Minister then appoints a Federal Ministry among the members of his/her own party in Parliament.

The bicameral legislative branch, or *Parlement*, consists of the Senate, or *Sénat*, and a House of Commons. The senators are appointed by the governor general with the advice of the Prime Minister and serve until reaching seventy-five years of age; its normal limit in size is 105 Senators. The House of Commons, or *Chambre des Communes*, is the lower house of Parliament, but it is more influential and consists of 301 seats. The members are elected by direct, popular vote and serve up to five-year terms.

The judicial branch is similar to that of the United States with its highest court being the Supreme Court of Canada. The nine judges are appointed by the Prime Minister through the governor general. This is the final court of appeal in constitutional (and other) cases, and it provides advice on constitutional debates. Since 1975 the Supreme Court has gained substantial power and has moved into the major Canadian po-

litical scene. Supreme Court decisions are binding on all lower courts in Canada. The second highest court is the Federal Court of Canada, followed by the Federal Court of Appeal and Provincial Courts.

The second system of study is that of the United Kingdom, which is considered a constitutional monarchy and is characterized as a centralized state. Albeit devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland is increasing, the power resides at the national capital in London. In the United Kingdom, the legislative branch has the overwhelming majority of power and responsibility, due to the fact that the monarch plays only a ceremonial (but important) role and the courts lack any substantial constraining power over the national government. The United Kingdom has a bicameral Parliament comprised of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The House of Lords is the upper house of Parliament and consists of approximately 500 life peers, ninety-two hereditary peers, and twenty-six clergy. This body is largely seen as ceremonial; it does, however, play an important role in British politics, as it serves as an important discussion arena as well as the highest court of appeal in the United Kingdom. The lower house, the House of Commons, is made up of 659 seats to which members are elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms (unless the House is dissolved earlier). This body is responsible for the grand majority of policy creation in the United Kingdom. The majority party in the House of Commons appoints a Prime Minister, who serves as the head of government and appoints the cabinet. Unlike that of Canada, the House of Commons is not subject to provinces that curtail its power. Furthermore, the court system in the United Kingdom cannot override any parliamentary decision; only Parliament can change its own decisions.

Similar to the Canadian structure, but unlike the British, the American government is federalist in structure. Each of the fifty states has its own legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, and the national government in Washington, D.C., also has three major branches. At the national level, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches provide checks on each other. The executive branch's authority resides with the

President, who is popularly elected (through the Electoral College) every four years and may serve two terms. The President is extremely powerful as the chief of state and head of government. He also appoints a cabinet.

The legislature, Congress, is made up of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is the upper house, consisting of 100 seats, one-third of which are renewed every two years; two members are elected from each state by popular vote to serve six-year terms. The House of Representatives has 435 seats, and its members are directly elected by popular vote to serve two-year terms.

The judicial branch's highest court is the Supreme Court, of which there are nine justices who are appointed for life by the President with confirmation by the Senate. The Supreme Court does have the power of judicial review which can override Congressional decisions, and thus the court is a major source of power in the United States. Under the Supreme Courts are the U.S. Courts of Appeal, U.S. District Courts, State Courts and County Courts.

Having characterized the major governmental institutions in the three countries of study, the theory does exhibit explanatory power in the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States, where the prediction was accurate. Again, the theory predicted that federalist states, due to fragmentation and increased policy access for public opinion which supports the death penalty in all three cases, would be more likely to support capital punishment than centralized states. However, as centralized states are characterized by this theory as relatively less receptive to public opinion, this theory would not have predicted that Canada, a federalist state, would have abolished capital punishment as it did 1976.

Hypothesis IV: Path Dependency

My next hypothesis predicts that the post-World War II decisions a country made concerning the legality of capital punishment determine a country's current authorization of capital punishment. In the case of Canada, the course of events leading to the abolition of capital punish-

ment began in the 1960s and culminated in 1976 when capital punishment was removed from the Canadian Criminal Code. Susan Monroe provides a brief history as follows:

> 1865 - Crimes of murder, treason and rape carried the death penalty in Upper and Lower Canada.
>
> 1961 - Murder was classified into capital and non-capital offense. Capital murder offenses in Canada were premeditated murder and murder of a police officer, guard or warden in the course of duty. A capital offence had a mandatory sentence of hanging.
>
> 1962 - The last executions took place in Canada. Arthur Lucas, convicted of the premeditated murder of an informer and witness in racket discipline, and Robert Turpin, convicted of the unpremeditated murder of a policeman to avoid arrest, were hanged at the Don Jail in Toronto, Ontario.
>
> 1966 - Capital punishment in Canada was limited to the killing of on-duty police officers and prison guards.
>
> 1976 - Capital punishment was removed from the Canadian Criminal Code. It was replaced with a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for 25 years for all first-degree murders. The bill was passed by a vote in the House of Commons. Capital punishment still remained in the Canadian National Defense Act for the most serious military offences, including treason and mutiny.
>
> 1987 - A motion to reintroduce capital punishment was debated in the Canadian House of Commons and defeated (Monroe 2003).

Thus, it can be seen that limitations on the implementation of capital punishment increased almost linearly in Canada until its abolition in 1976 and the introduction of movements supporting the reinstatement of capital punishment in the late twentieth century.

Among the countries in this study, abolitionist policies were enacted first in the United Kingdom. In 1832, Parliament abolished the death penalty for shoplifting goods worth five shillings or less, returning from transportation, letter-stealing and sacrilege.
By 1861, capital crimes were considered murder, treason, arson in royal dockyards and piracy with violence. The House of Commons in 1938 called for legislation to abolish hanging in peacetime for a five-year experiment, and the Homicide Act of 1957 made a distinction between capital and non-capital murder. Many attributed these policies to growing public discontent over the hangings of Timothy Evans in 1950, Derek Bentley in 1953 and Ruth Ellis, who was the last woman executed, in 1955. The Homicide Act, in practice, created an unintended precedent that murder in the course of theft was punishable by death, while murder in the course of rape was not. This fuelled further public uneasiness over capital punishment, as the law seemed to place a higher value on property than on humans. Parliament voted to abolish the death penalty for murder for a five-year experiment in 1965, and another vote in 1969 finally made abolition of the death penalty for murder "permanent" in Great Britain. A further vote in 1973 abolished it permanently in Northern Ireland. Since 1969 there have been at least thirteen attempts to bring back hanging for various categories of murder. Each of the attempts has failed to gain the necessary backing to become law. Furthermore, each attempt has displayed greater majorities in Parliament for capital punishment abolition.

In the United States, capital punishment has been maintained since World War II, although twelve states have passed prohibition of capital punishment. The Supreme Court is the most influential body

witnessed in the debate concerning state sanctioning of capital punish-
ment. The Court has passed two major rulings that have governed the
death penalty: Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976).
In the ruling of Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that capital
punishment raised serious constitutional issues because of the "relatively
rare and arbitrary manner" in which capital punishment was imposed
(Smith and Tatalovich, 2003). The Court found that the circumstances
by which previous executions had been carried out were highly suspi-
cious due primarily to racial and socioeconomic conditions. That is, the
poor and blacks were (and still are) not proportionately sentenced to
death. This ruling effectively served as a moratorium for the death pen-
alty and set aside the sentences of about 1,000 people on death row.
Shortly after Furman v. Georgia, however, the Supreme Court reconsid-
ered the capital punishment issue in 1976. The Supreme Court's ruling
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) ended the four year moratorium on the death
penalty and states were again able to practice the death penalty. New
statutes were meant to establish "guided discretion" for imposing a death
sentence (Amnesty International). The Court then felt that the "relatively
rare and arbitrary manner" had been partially solved and thus capital pun-
ishment could continue. Since 1976 there have been some significant
rulings concerning the cases in which capital punishment is permitted.
However, none of the rulings has established a moratorium on the prac-
tice, nor has there been a universal acceptance of capital punishment by
all fifty states. Given the strong public support existing for and the laws
sanctioning capital punishment, a decision to place a greater moratorium
on the death penalty in the United States would be both socially and po-
litically expensive.

 Overall, the path dependence theory does have significant ex-
planatory power. In the case of Canada one can see that considerable
amounts of public support exist for the death penalty. However, the deci-
sion of 1976 has not been overturned by the Supreme Court nor by Par-
liament. The same is true in the United Kingdom: Parliament, given thir-
teen votes calling for the reinstatement of capital punishment, has kept in

place the abolition it established in 1965. In these cases it would be exceedingly difficult for politicians to change laws established over thirty years ago. Furthermore, in both Canada and the United Kingdom, small, yet organized groups such as Amnesty International have influential power in both the government and public. Thus, in Canada and the United Kingdom there have been gradual steps that limited the circumstances under which capital punishment could be enforced, ultimately resulting in complete abolition. I therefore conclude that since the laws have been in place for over thirty years, coupled with the fact the no one has been executed in Canada or the United Kingdom, it would be both politically and socially costly to reverse the policy. In the case of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court, though it placed a temporary moratorium on the death penalty in 1972, reaffirmed the legality of capital punishment in 1976. This decision, despite several challenges, has not been overturned. This can likely be attributed to Congress's and the Supreme Court's lack of desire to oppose such a large majority of public opinion, not to mention the political storm that would be created given a universal moratorium on capital punishment, given that the practice has been legal for so long. Furthermore, there is no major precedent which could potentially serve as a catalyst to abolition. Lastly, policymakers in the United States, unlike those in the other states in this study, have not classified this debate in moral terms, which may have an effect on public opinion.

Conclusions

This examination has shown how similar cultures with similar governmental institutions and similar ideological foundations can establish completely dissimilar policies on salient issues. Once again, while Canada and the United Kingdom have abolished the death penalty in all cases, the United States has not. It is puzzling that the United States is the only industrialized democracy besides Japan to sanction capital punishment.

Explanations for the differing policies look towards public opinion, religiosity, governmental structure, and historical events. The religiosity theory displayed significant explanatory power as it predicted that states with higher levels of religiosity were more likely to sanction capital punishment than were those where religiosity indicators were low. The United States had a high religiosity score, measured by several indicators, while the Canadian and British scores were low. Therefore, the prediction was that the United States would sanction capital punishment while Canada and the United Kingdom would not. This prediction was accurate. I thus conclude that theories which use religiosity scores to predict policy are insightful.

The public opinion explanation failed to explain capital punishment policies in all the countries examined. The prediction posited that countries with high levels of public support for the death penalty would have policies sanctioning such actions. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, public opinion in the majority has supported the death penalty. However, the Canadian and British governments have abolished the practice despite the lack of public support for such an action, while public opinion in the United States does seem to influence the state's acceptance of capital punishment. Therefore, I conclude that theories of public opinion are not sufficient to explain policy outcomes.

The third explanation, that the federally structured countries would be more prone to endorsement of capital punishment given the increased policy access of the pro-death penalty advocates, also failed to fully explain the divergence in capital punishment policies across Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The theory predicted that the centralized state of the United Kingdom would be less susceptible to public opinion and, thus, more prone to abolition. In this case, the theory was correct: the United Kingdom was the first country of the three to abolish capital punishment. However, the theory also predicted that Canada and the United States, given their federal structures, would allow the death penalty. Yet only the United States does while Canada does not. Consequently, I conclude that other factors besides governmental

structure must be taken into account when viewing policy divergence.

The last explanation, the path dependence argument, did offer significant insight into why each state maintained a certain policy concerning the death penalty. The theory predicted that policies established (before and) after the World War II era would bear influence on the policies maintained today. In Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, this theory held. Thus, I contend that the path dependence argument does provide an important and useful understanding of policy outcomes and policy divergence.

While literature on this subject has been extremely helpful, the examination could have benefited from more extensive research into elite decision making processes. Even as several authors contend that morality policies such as capital punishment are made by the elites without regard for public opinion, they do not examine why elites act the way they do. For example, why does it seem that elites in Europe tend to be more liberal and less receptive to public opinion, while elites in the United States are less liberal and policies tend to reflect public opinion? Additionally, this study also would have benefited from scholarly work which concerned itself with Anglo-American court systems and their role in shaping morality politics. The dearth of such research marginally constrained this paper. Lastly, further work could be done to review the role that interest groups have in the issue. It is observed that the Roman Catholic Church and Amnesty International have launched campaigns against the death penalty; however, their influence has not been sufficiently analyzed to date.

This examination bears importance for each of the countries studied. In Canada and the United Kingdom, the question must be asked, how democratic a government is if it disregards public opinion on such a salient issue? On the other hand, in the United States, while policies towards the death penalty reflect public support, the question must be asked, how can the United States act as a moral authority in the world, when it is the only industrialized democracy (besides Japan) to sanction capital punishment? Additionally, numerous scholars attack the U.S. use

of capital punishment as it is unlikely to deter crime and is thus contradictory to a primary motive for the implementation of capital punishment (Amnesty International). Furthermore, several respected findings claim that the racially biased nature of the death penalty is unconstitutional. Finally, in order for capital punishment to continue in the United States, policymakers must examine the higher costs of the death penalty as compared to "life without parole," especially considering the potential of executing an innocent person. Given respected research that claims a significant probability of past and future erroneous executions, further examination on the United States' state sanctioning of capital punishment is indeed necessary in order to avoid potential future injustices.

Endnotes

1. I use the term traditional morality issues, as many scholars label capital punishment a morality issue. However, many in the US see the death penalty as a law enforcement/crime issue. This is a significant difference as the Canadian and British governments categorize capital punishment as a human rights issue. This paper will consider the issue a morality issue in accordance with the majority of scholars in the field.
2. Smith and Tatalovich publish the Gallup polls concerning capital punishment.

Appendix

Figure 1. Religiosity Scores (1-100)
1 = low; 100 = high

Country	Score
Nigeria	89
Ireland	84
Philippines	68
U.S.A.	44
Turkey	43
Peru	43
India	42
Canada	38*
Britain	27*
Spain	25
Slovenia	22
Hungary	21*
France	21*
Switzerland	16
Australia	16

**Source: Based on the latest data from the
1990-1991 or the 1995-1997 World Values sur-
veys.**

**Results with an asterisk are from the 1990-1991
survey.
All others are from the 1995-1997 survey.**

Figure 2.

When asked, "I will read you a list of things some people believe in.
Please say for each one if you believe in it or not."

Year	1994	1998	2000
God	95%	94%	94%
Heaven	90%	89%	89%

Source: Harris Interactive.
This Harris Poll was conducted among a nationwide cross section of 1,010 adults

Figure 3.

Beliefs - Chris-
   tians v. non-

	All adults	Christians	Non-Christians
Believe in:			
God	94%	99%	72%
Heaven	89%	95%	59%

Source: Harris Interactive.
This Harris Poll was conducted among a nationwide cross section of 1,010 adults

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Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi: Determinants Of Differing Levels of Violence
By Megan Pollock

Introduction

Rwanda and Burundi are similar states in nearly every sense of the word; bordering one another in Central Africa they are nearly equal in size, population, resources and economy.[1] They share the same tribal divisions of Hutu (80%), Tutsi (18%), and Twa (2%). Under German and Belgian rule they even comprised one colony called Rwanda-Urundi. The two states also share a bloody history of intermittent Hutu and Tutsi conflict, beginning in the 1950s and continuing on presently in Burundi. The most recent genocides, in 1993 in Burundi and 1994 in Rwanda, were also both set off by the assassinations of the countries' presidents. Despite these similarities, the two conflicts had quite different levels of violence. Burundi's genocide resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people, while Rwanda's genocide left approximately 800,000 dead.[2] These facts press the question of why the extent of violence was so different in these similar states and conflicts.

In tackling this question of levels of violence in genocide, it is important to understand the significance of such a study. Although genocide is not a modern phenomenon, it is one that has occurred repeatedly in the second half of the 20th Century. According to Rudolf Rummel, "democide – that is, genocide and mass murder – is the most serious threat to humankind in our century."[3] Thus, any attempt to study such a threat is profitable. Ethnic violence in Africa is often brushed off as simply a fact of life. as there is the idea that Hutu and Tutsi will forever be locked in an ethnic blood feud. This paper addresses the issue of the level of ethnic violence not only to describe

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certain events, but to attempt to find reasons for some groups killing more than others. If we are ever to end violence on a mass scale, studying and evaluating previous conflicts is a step we must take. The specific question of why two similar states had dissimilar levels of violence is significant because the conclusions may give the international system answers as to what leads to massive violence and in turn what may dissuade such outbreaks. We must go deeper than simply blaming ethnic differences for genocide by looking at the institutions that affect levels of violence.

Finding an answer to the question posed involves understanding the history of Rwanda and Burundi with special attention to the conflict in the early 1990s. The Hutu and Tutsi populations of Rwanda and Burundi used to coexist in peace, albeit in a feudal system of Tutsi cattle owners having power over Hutu cultivators. Counter to popular belief, "being a Hutu, Tutsi and Twa did not involve an ethnic connotation; rather, it reflected an occupational identity."[4] Indeed, "…ethnic thinking in political life is a product of modern conflicts over power and resources, and not an ancient impediment to political modernity."[5] When Belgium took colonial control of Rwanda-Urundi after World War I, the government conducted a census to distinguish between the tribes and to give everyone an "'ethnic identity' that determined his or her place within the colony."[6] When choosing which indigenous people the Belgians would partner with in administering the colony, the Tutsi were chosen due to their 'European' features (tall, thin stature, straight hair, and light skin). They were given special privileges in schooling, employment, and general society that the Hutu were denied. This 'divide and rule' system was used by most colonial powers as a means to keep the indigenous people from banding together and opposing the colonists. The system proved successful as resentment brewed among the Hutu against the Tutsi for their unfair treatment. Thus, present conflict is fueled at the core by colonial discrimination, which "created what had not existed before: a sense of collective Hutu identity, a Hutu cause."[7] The Hutu-Tutsi conflict began as an economic power struggle, but as time passed and new generations

were taught to hate the other tribe, the enmity between the two groups turned into an ethnic battle.

The conflicts of the mid-1990s were linked to previous massacres; for Burundi, it was the genocide of 1972, and for Rwanda it was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion of 1990. The 1972 genocide in Burundi was committed against Hutu civilians by a Tutsi army, and it was "the cataclysmic event behind the reconstruction of group identities, i.e. the dehumanization of Tutsi by Hutu and the denial of Hutu identity by Tutsi."[8] When a Hutu was elected president in 1993, the backdrop of the 1972 genocide helped explain why "many Tutsi simply refused to contemplate a transfer of power to Hutu claimants, and why, ultimately, so few shrank from the use of violence to reverse the verdict of the polls."[9] On October 21, 1993, just three months after Melchior Ndadaye became Burundi's first elected president, he was assassinated by a military coup. The coup wanted to stop the integrated government Ndadaye had started when he included several Tutsi officials in his government and had left the army under Tutsi control. The assassination of the Hutu president had disastrous effects far beyond the coup's plans; Hutus all over the countryside took up arms and attacked Tutsis "in an uncontrolled outburst of rage; for many Hutu on the hills, the death of Ndadaye was the harbinger of a replay of 1972."[10] This violence was reciprocated by the all-Tutsi army, and some 300,000 Hutu fled to Rwanda – an important development for the future Tutsi genocide in Rwanda that would begin just six months later. The coup collapsed on October 28, a mere seven days after it had begun, but violent clashes between Hutus and Tutsis continued. Although only 200,000 people were killed in the 1993 genocide, an estimated 800,000 Hutus were forced into exile, most of which went to neighboring Rwanda.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide grew out of the aftermath of the civil war beginning on October 1, 1990, when an army of 4,000 RPF troops, composed of Tutsi refugees living in Uganda, invaded the Hutu-controlled state. Civil war continued in Rwanda until 1993, when the Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana was forced by international pres-

sure to hold peace talks with RPF leaders, which included discussion of creating an integrated government and military. In the years of the civil war, there had been "efforts by the dictator-president Habyarimana to wipe out his political opposition, Hutu as well as Tutsi,"[11] and although he participated what became known as the Arusha Accords, he was never fully devoted to peace in Rwanda. Despite where his true nature rested, Habyarimana's plane was shot down on April 6, 1994 as he returned to Kigali from signing the peace accords in Tanzania. Although the perpetrators remained unidentified, it was widely believed to be the act of radical Hutus unwilling to share their government with Tutsis. Habyarimana's assassination worked to create a Hutu cause, as only hours after the plane crashed state radio announced that all Hutus should kill their Tutsi neighbors in revenge for their president's death. The Arusha Accords seem "retrospectively as a recipe for disaster: not only were the negotiations conducted under tremendous external pressures, but, partly for this reason, the concessions made to the RPF were seen by Hutu hardliners as a sell-out imposed by outsiders."[12] In the first hours and days, the killing was solely against moderate government officials from Habyarimana's administration, but after the first few days had passed, Hutus mercilessly massacred Tutsis of all ages: men, women and children in churches, schools, homes, anywhere. The RPF joined in the fighting and finally took control of the country in July when they invaded Kigali.

Hypotheses and Theories

With the background laid out, we may now begin answering the question of why the extent of violence was so different in these two genocides. This will be a multi-case study of similar systems using Rwanda and Burundi. Although violent conflict is a part of these states' pasts, the question deals specifically with 1993 and 1994.; therefore the study will not employ a time series analysis. Rwanda and Burundi are the best states for this comparison since they are so similar. This not only narrows the scope of the paper, since the history of each state is

much the same as the other, but leaves to stand out the differences in institutions causing the differences in conflict.

The dependent variable in this question is the level of violence measured in loss of human life. Although the exact amount of people killed in the genocides is unknown due to insufficient records, the loss of life is estimated to be 800,000 in Rwanda and 200,000 in Burundi. Three hypotheses propose different independent variables that explain why a difference exists between the levels of violence. First I will discuss differences in the preferences of the leadership. Leaders will react differently to challengers based on their power preferences; they may either negotiate or fight. The less leaders are willing to share power, the more they will fuel violent conflict. If leaders feel their political power is threatened to the extent that they need to completely annihilate their opposition, they will accomplish their goal by rallying their political, ethnic, or religious group through propaganda, direct military orders, and/or threats to kill the opposition. Leaders use genocide for one of two reasons: either for ideological belief that a certain group of people does not have the right to live in their state, or for political purposes to rid their state of opposition and thereby gain power. While the former use of genocide is rare, many case studies have cited political causes of genocide. The efforts of pro-genocide leaders thus fuel violence, and anti-genocide leaders will either have no effect on or even discourage violence. Based on this theory, I hypothesize that the different leaders and their attempts to encourage or discourage peace based on their political preferences resulted in Rwanda's genocide being more violent than Burundi's.
Secondly, I posit that the preceding civil war in Rwanda, as compared to relative peace in Burundi prior to 1993, led to greater violence in the former country. Perhaps societies involved in civil war are more likely to engage in genocide than societies at peace. In some circumstances, genocide may actually be a reaction to a civil war; those victimized in the war may want revenge against their attackers. Furthermore, civil war possibly creates a 'window of opportunity' for leaders to destroy their opposition. There is already a hatred for an enemy, thus there is little needed to

incite one group to commit violence with the "intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."[13] People may
have acquired a war mentality, so they will have less moral aversion to
killing. While an average citizen would not take up a weapon and mur-
der their neighbors in a time of peace, the backdrop of civil war poten-
tially justifies the killing. Since "contribution to the genocide may be
regarded as patriotic duty," it possibly legitimates "violations of normal
standards against killing innocent men, women, and children...since they
have been authorized by the government."[14] Also, the rule of law in soci-
ety has been broken, so people feel freer to act upon passions, unafraid of
authority.

The final hypothesis states that the presence of the perceived
threat of the Rwandan Patriotic Front led to more violence in Rwanda
than Burundi. The logic behind this hypothesis is that when a govern-
ment has an outside threat to use against its citizens, those citizens will
be more likely to engage in violence to save themselves. This may seem
counter-intuitive; one may think that if there is a threat of invasion, in
response to a group engaging in violence, this threat may deter them from
committing violent acts. But if people think they will be attacked regard-
less of what they do, it is logical to kill as many of the opposition as pos-
sible before they have the opportunity to join the threatening force.

Examining the first hypothesis - different preferences in leadership
lead to different levels of violence - there are several tests that will pro-
vide credibility to the argument. It must be shown that the leaders of
Rwanda and Burundi did in fact have different preferences. I need to
prove that conflicts encouraged by governments are more destructive
than those without government approval and also that government spon-
sored propaganda fuels violence. To provide credibility for the second
hypothesis of civil war resulting in more violent genocide, I need to show
that Rwanda was at war and Burundi was not, and I must further prove
that the engagement in war led the masses in Rwanda to act more vio-
lently than those in Burundi. To support the third hypothesis – which
states that fear of a perceived threat leads to greater levels of violence - I

need to address the status of enemy armies in Rwanda and Burundi. I must also show that the Rwandan Hutu government used the RPF as a threat, and that those threats led Rwandans to behave more violently than Burundians.

Hypothesis 1

To give credibility to my first hypothesis, I must show that Burundian and Rwandan leaders did have different preferences for power sharing, that conflicts encouraged by governments are more destructive than those without government approval, and that government-sponsored propaganda fuels violence. Asserting that genocide is the result of leadership would be an understatement, for as Bill Berkley writes, "All of Africa's present-day conflicts are orchestrated from on high. They are all products of calculated evil."[15] Prunier, Deng and Woodward "explain the onset of large-scale ethnic violence as a direct result of elite efforts to retain or grab political power."[16] I am not arguing whether or not genocide occurred because of leaders' differing preferences, but whether the extent of genocide was altered by differences in leadership. The genocides obviously occurred after the leaders were killed, but how they led affected how violent the genocides became. That is, Rwanda maybe was prepared for genocide by its leadership while Burundi was not.

President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ndadaye of Burundi were both Hutu, but their actions reveal two very different preferences for Hutu power. Rwanda under Habyarimana's regime was "a textbook case of ethnic conflict produced by tyranny, a prime example of the links between tyranny and anarchy and between ethnicity and organized crime," and it was this environment "that in 1994 made possible the slaughter of hundreds of thousands in barely three months, mostly with clubs and machetes."[17] Ndadaye, however, led Burundi relatively democratically with respect to governance in the rest of central Africa, as he "had included several Tutsi officials in his government and had left the army under Tutsi control."[18] Habyarimana, however, had been in power for over two decades as an unchallenged dictator. His government was

completely comprised of Hutus, among which there were few who looked on Tutsis with anything but disdain. In the early 1990s that unquestioned power affronted two challenges: the Rwandan Patriotic Front from Uganda and opposition political parties from within Rwanda. This was the recipe for disaster for the Habyarimana regime, because "for the first time since the Hutu revolution of 1959 the circumstances were ripe for a strategic alliance between the enemies from within and those from without."[19] To counteract the external threat, Habyarimana deployed the state army and the presidential guard, and in response to the internal challengers, Hutu powers created their own political party, "the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR)…with the sole mission of ensuring Hutu supremacy."[20] Habyarimana could not afford to allow the challenging political parties to have a voice, for he knew that "the chances of winning a fair election ranged from slim to none,"[21] and he might even have been charged with crimes against humanity for some of the atrocities that had occurred under his dictatorship. He knew something had to be done, and "the assassination of the newly-elected Hutu presidents in Burundi, on 21 October 1993, by the Tutsi-dominated military provided an additional motive for the Habyarimana regime to resist against power sharing at all costs."[22] Since negotiation was not an option based on his power preferences, pursuing genocide was the only way to preserve his position. As one genocide scholar writes, "What simpler way can there be for a modern state to galvanize its citizens, divert public attention from the regime's defects, steal the victims' wealth and status, and terrorize the survivors into submission than to perpetrate mass rape and annihilation on a defenceless minority?"[23] Habyarimana encouraged anti-Tutsi propaganda in print and on radio using government owned newspapers and Radio Television des Milles Collines. Aided by these media, genocidal ideology became a national aim, for "[r]adio is the only means of mass communication in an impoverished African nation, and the Nazis taught us long ago that to control the national radio is to control the people."[24] Hatred was broadcast with "catchy nationalistic theme tunes and its racist jingles" [25] long before the genocide occurred; by April

1994, many Rwandans had come to believe that the elimination of the Tutsi was a civic duty. Hutu Power propaganda "was designed to marginalize the Tutsis and create an atmosphere in which their mass destruction would be acceptable, almost inevitable."[26] This follows the example of "the Nazis in their campaign against the Jews prior to the outbreak of the Second World War." [27]

The end of the civil war had emerged in 1992 when "moderate Hutus gained some control over the tense situation and negotiated a cease-fire with the Rwandan Patriotic Front...at Arusha."[28] Of Habyarimana, Rene Lemarchand writes, "[He] had to be driven kicking and screaming to the negotiating table."[29] The cease-fire was a nominal way to pacify Western pressure, but it never actually went into effect. Throughout the period of the Arusha Peace Accords, 1992-1994, Hutu extremists had continued to carry out massacres against Tutsi civilians. The massacres "became so widespread that [they] caught outside attention, [and eventually led to a UN-established] independent International Commission in January 1993, to look into growing violence...[which] found the government's fingerprints everywhere."[30] The International Commission identified "a 'circle of around 20 people' in Habyarimana's entourage who 'organize massacres, clashes with the opposition, and assassinations,' and their identification implicated the President himself."[31] Among the organizers of the massacres was Agathe Habyarimana, the president's wife, who formed "the 'Zero Network' death squads, the institutional precursors of the genocide."[32] The militias, death squads, and the presidential guard were integral to the 'success' of the Rwandan genocide, as they were responsible for much of the killing, especially in the first weeks. Like all military organizations, the Interahamwe militia employed a basic training system. Its divergence, however, was the use of "mass rallies complete with alcohol and speeches, along with paramilitary drill maneuvers, to inculcate their members with the appropriate attitudes and behaviors," along with "three-week indoctrination sessions at a training camp in Mutara."[33] The militias were comprised mainly of "young unemployed Hutu males, a group highly susceptible to the

[Habyarimana] regime's messages of hatred …[and] the combination of roadblocks, alcohol, and machetes proved fearsome in the hands of these militia groups."[34]

While operating massacres back in Rwanda, President Habyarimana signed a peace agreement in Tanzania with the RPF in August 1993. The agreement gave the Tutsi refugees in Uganda "a strip of land along Rwanda's northern border.… A power-sharing government was to be set up, and the Rwanda army and Tutsi rebel forces were to be cut back and merged."[35] The negotiated forced transition to democracy in Rwanda was, according to some analysts, "a recipe for disaster: not only were the negotiations conducted under tremendous external pressures, but, partly for this reason, the concessions made to the RPF were seen by Hutu hard-liners as a sell-out imposed by outsiders."[36] Knowing that the Hutu extremists would revolt if an actual power-sharing government was formed, "President Habyarimana kept postponing the transition to the Arusha-approved government in early 1994, despite great international pressure."[37]

Postponement would not last forever, though, and Hutu Power authorities in Kigali knew that something extreme was needed to happen in order for them to keep power over the government, the military, and the economy. This desperation was important, because as some scholars believe, "when the ruling elites decide that their continuation in power transcends all other economic and social values, at that point does the possibility, if not the necessity, for genocide increase qualitatively."[38] So Hutu power concocted the plan to rid ultimately Rwanda of Tutsis and those Hutus who were not loyal to the Hutu regime. The genocide was not simply formulated to exterminate a race of people, but to completely wipe out the Hutu power's political opposition. The first death lists that went out after Habyarimana's assassination were comprised of Hutus in favor of power-sharing, and "during the genocide, in addition to the Tutsi deaths, some 10,000-30,000 Hutus (many of them intellectuals with moderate leanings) were killed by other Hutus."[39]

Habyarimana may have led this effort, but genocide cannot be the

intent of one leader only.

> [A] sufficient number of individuals within the genocidal
> regime must be willing to engage directly in, or support, the kill-
> ing and other forms of destruction of large numbers of human
> beings.... Even when top leaders, like Hitler, possess such a
> genocidal mentality, it is necessary for their regimes to create
> such attitudes among members of elites and ordinary citizens
> alike.[40]

Although it is unknown "when the oligarchs, threatened with democracy
and power-sharing, decided to use genocide as a political weapon,...what
is known is that by April 1994, when the genocide began, the militia had
grown to 30,000 and there were stockpiles of weapons and new agricul-
tural tools hidden all over the country."[41]
Ultimately, it appeared that Hutu leaders were willing to sacrifice Ha-
byarimana to prevent the power-sharing government. Perhaps they felt
betrayed by his cooperation with the RPF at the Arusha Accords, or per-
haps they knew that only the death of the president would give civilians a
reason to take up arms. Despite what other intentions may have been,
Habyarimana's plane crash operated as the signal to begin the genocide,
and "within 30 minutes, the barricades were up, and presidential guard
units were acting on the death lists."[42] Since the political opposition par-
ties had operated legally, those Hutu who had backed the Arusha process
were well known, as were their places of residence, and they were the
first to be killed.[43] Radio Milles Collines announced that Tutsis had
killed the president, which served as "a fiction used to encourage waver-
ing Hutus to commit themselves to eliminating the 'enemy within'" and
sent out the call for genocide: "'Now,' it announced, 'it is time to bring
in the harvest.'"[44] The radio was further used to broadcast who was to be
killed The central government sent out orders "that instantly organized
the infinitely hierarchical Hutu world, in which each cluster of ten houses
had a leader who was connected to all other local group leaders in the

commune, themselves under the direction of regional authorities."[45]

These facts indicate a great deal of organization that went into planning the assassination and genocide. It is important to make explicitly clear the hand that Habyarimana had in the genocide, even though it occurred after his death. Although he may not have intended the scale of death that occurred, he "encouraged the most virulent anti-Tutsi propaganda, and…given Rwanda's history, he must have been aware of the potential consequences…[A]nd when attacks on Tutsis began growing in 1989, Habyarimana did nothing to quell the violence that was being instigated by his henchmen in the militia and army."[46]

To describe Ndadaye's power preferences, one might be able to say they were the exact opposite of Habyarimana's. Burundi had experienced genocide in 1972, and Ndadaye is said to have wanted to turn a new leaf and construct a democratic, free and peaceful nation. He set up an integrated government of both Hutus and Tutsis in an attempt to bridge the divide between the two groups and create interdependence, which would hopefully prevent future war. Burundi had a multiparty system, a legacy from the previous president, a Tutsi, Pierre Buyoya. When radicals were threatening civil war in 1988, Buyoya launched a policy of liberalization to give radicals a peaceful way of letting their voices be heard. Buyoya formed an integrated government and "set up a joint committee to study the issue of national unity and draft a Charter condemning exclusion and discrimination between Hutus and Tutsis for adoption by referendum in February 1991."[47] Buyoya's transition "extending over a five-year period (1988-1993), introduced a climate of tolerance and openness totally unknown during the previous 23 years of dictatorship, culminating with an electoral campaign relatively free of ethnic references."[48] During the election, Buyoya and Ndadaye "were genuinely committed to giving democracy a chance, which meant keeping the extremists at bay and looking for the middle ground."[49] This involved some non-democratic measures, including making "every effort to prevent Hutu extremists…from participating in the several 'transplacement' conferences preceding the election."[50] After his defeat

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in the June 1993 election, Buyoya stepped down peacefully and Ndadaye continued the former president's legacy as he continued to look for a middle ground between Hutus and Tutsis. He ended the use of ethnic identity cards, which were used in the Rwandan genocide as "the final arbiters of life and death."[51]

Burundian government officials were taken by surprise at Ndadaye's assassination and worked to stop the violence. In the first few days they were paralyzed, showing in this case that the government was not prepared for Ndadaye's death. Premier Sylvie Kinigi reported "from the French embassy in Burundi, where she was taking refuge, that it...was not clear which group held power and addressed the country via state radio and urged the army to return to barracks."[52] Even the army was unprepared for the attack; they were confused, "seemingly unable to prevent the frenzied slaughter, only turning up a couple of days later to pick up survivors."[53] The Hutu extremists who led the coup were unsuccessful, for "despite this disastrous blow to the government, the rebels failed to find any real support from the army or civilians."[54]

Based on the evidence gathered, the 'power preference' hypothesis is a credible causal argument for the differing levels of violence between the two genocides. Genocide is committed "in the building and maintaining of empires,"[55] and "the more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects."[56] Rudolf Rummel succinctly puts it:

> Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely. The more power a regime has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite.... The way to virtually eliminate genocide and mass murder appears to be through restriction and checking power.[57]

Thus it is logical that the Habyarimana regime, with unlimited power in Rwanda and interest in maintaining that power, would operate a more

violent mass murder than the extremists in Burundi. Also, "social scientists have long recognized the power of the state and of the group in fostering conformity, even if the group is composed of strangers and regardless of the individual's personal feelings."[58] Lacking motivation from the state, the genocide in Burundi was short and relatively small.

Hypothesis 2

My second hypothesis states that the civil war in Rwanda from 1990 to 1993, as opposed to the relative peace in Burundi prior to its genocide, caused the Rwandan form to be more violent. The aggressive feelings left from a recent civil war likely caused people to be more violent when war was sparked again, and the civil unrest of domestic conflict gave a pro-genocidal government the perfect setting for mass murder.

Rwanda and Burundi experienced two very different social environments in the years leading up to the genocides in the mid-1990s. As was discussed previously, Burundi was going through a period of relatively peaceful leadership transition which included its first ever democratic elections. The defeated president and the incumbent were working to create an integrated government of both Hutus and Tutsis. While this is not exactly a picture of paradise, it may seem so in comparison to the situation in Rwanda. On October 1, 1990, Tutsi refugees and descendants of Tutsis who fled Rwanda in the 1950s marched across the Ugandan border into Rwanda demanding the right to live in their home country. Despite fears that they wanted to reinstate Tutsi hegemony, it is assumed that "their aim was to pressure the Hutu government of President Juvenal Habyarimana to allow Rwanda's exiled Tutsis to return."[59] Habyarimana's government did not respond well to the RPF's demands, but instead "resurrected the spectre of ethnic subversion on an unprecedented scale, causing untold casualties among innocent Tutsi civilians...[and] the movement towards ethnic polarization gained an irresistible momentum."[60] Within one year of the invasion, the Rwandan army grew in numbers from 5,000 soldiers to 24,000, "making up an ill-disciplined force that institutionalized thuggery as much as did World War II Italian

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fascist Black Shirts or German Nazi Brown Shirts."[61] The RPF also grew "from approximately 4,000 men at the time of the 1 October 1990 invasion [to] some 20,000 combatants when it seized Kigali in July 1994."[62] So when Habyariamana was assassinated in the Spring of 1994, not only was the population still recovering from the civil war of the previous three years, but the armed forces on both sides had quadrupled.

The civil war also had challenged the supremacy of Hutu power, causing many in Habyarimana's regime to seek desperate measures in order to keep power. René Lemarchand asks in his study of the genocide, "Would the genocide have occurred if the RPF invasion had not taken place, threatening both the heritage of the 1959-62 Hutu revolution, and the state born of that revolution?"[63] Whether or not the Tutsi RPF wanted complete hegemony in Rwanda or simply equality with the Hutus, there was a threat to Hutu power, which resulted in a long, bloody civil war and perhaps the murder of nearly one million Tutsis in 1994.

There is some of this civil war mentality in the 1993 genocide in Burundi that we must look at. Although the war occurred in 1972, it was "the cataclysmic event behind the reconstruction of group identities, i.e. the dehumanization of Tutsi by Hutu and the denial of Hutu identity by Tutsi,"[64] and thus still plays a major role in the lives of Burundians. It important to remember that because of the 1972 genocide, there was a "sense of martyrdom felt by the Hutu as a group. To this day, their collective self-image is that of a victimized community, against whom deliberate atrocities have repeatedly been committed."[65] When the Hutu president was assassinated, "Tutsi men, women, and children were hacked to pieces or burned alive in October and November 1993 in an uncontrolled outburst of rage."[66] Ndadaye's death seemed to be an omen for a reprisal of the 1972 violence, and, as one source reported, "in the words of one Hutu, shortly after the news of Ndadaye's death had reached his commune, 'back in 1972 they got us, but this time they won't!'"[67] The violent coup reminded Hutus of the massacres a quarter of a century earlier, and they responded violently.

The distinct difference between Burundi and Rwanda in this compari-

son is that the violence was fresher for Rwandans, taking place just one year earlier as opposed to twenty-five years prior to the genocide. If we look at the average life span of the two countries, 39.33 years in Rwanda and 43.2 years in Burundi, we see that those in their prime during the last Burundian civil war would have been dead or dying in 1993. Thus there were fewer people with direct memories of violence.

Several scholars have written about civil war's effects on genocide. Krain, who examined several different domestic and international aspects of mass violence. concluded that "civil war involvement appears to be the best predictor of genocide or politicide."[68] This conclusion was based on data concerning the environments surrounding genocide and politicide between 1948 and 1982, and Krain justifies his findings with the argument that "major structural changes such as wars, civil wars, extraconstitutional changes, or decolonization create 'windows of political opportunity' during which the elites may and must more freely act to consolidate power and eliminate the opposition."[69] Krain argues with his evidence that the relationships between "openings in the political opportunity structure," and "the onset and the degree of severity of genocides," have been more important than "more static, environmental components of opportunity, such as levels of power concentration."[70] Harff also explains how the magnitude of political upheaval affects the extent of genocide:

> The argument is that the greater the extent of violent conflict and adverse regime change, the greater the likelihood that geno-/politicide will occur. There are two rationales. First, the more intense and persisting conflict has been, the more threatened authorities are likely to be, and the more willing to take extreme measures. Second...the greater the extent of political disruption, the greater the opportunities for authorities to seek a 'final solution' to present and potential future challenges.[71]

Thus, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the civil war in Rwanda

caused the genocide to be more violent there than in Burundi, for "simmering hatred and anger were ripe for activation"[72] in the population, and there was political disruption that created a 'window of political opportunity' for Habyarimana's regime to dispose of its opponents. Genocide scholars have found that "the vast majority of genocides have emerged during periods of social stress and threat," [73] so it is logical to see that the social stress caused by the civil war in Rwanda contributed to more violence than did the peace in Burundi. Referring back to Lemarchand's question of the civil war's role in the genocide, he concludes with the following, "The war, they say, was the principal cause of the massacres. Had the RPF not invaded the country, on October 1, 1990, the massacres would not have taken place. The onus of guilt, therefore, lies entirely with the RPF."[74] The Hutu militias also blame the civil war for the 1994 violence. After his capture, Robert Kajuga, leader of the Hutu Interahamwe militia charged with genocide, declared that "absolutely nothing was organized. Everything was spontaneous; the people defended themselves while the rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front attacked them." [75] In the current genocide trials presided over by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, alleged genocidaires "paint a picture of civil war, in which their side, the 'patriotic' Hutus, engaged primarily in self-defense, though some regrettable atrocities occurred."[76]

Hypothesis 3

"The grave is only half full.
Who will help us fill it?
Kill them all. Spare none,
or their children will return to kill us."[77]

Although we often focus on hatred as the driving emotion in mass murder, fear may drive some to kill - fear not just of their leaders but also "fear of those whom they sought to exterminate."[78] The final possible answer I will discuss for this question is fear leading to violence. Fear of

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genocide victims has been used as an excuse for mass killing and forced deportment for years in many different cases of genocide. In the case of Rwanda, "incessant radio broadcasts [throughout 1993 before the genocide] portrayed the Tutsi-led RPF as bloodthirsty killers."[79] The "virulent propaganda campaign… tapped into and inflamed old Hutu fears and resentments," [80] that were left from the 1990 civil war. Through this propaganda, Hutus were taught to fear not only the RPF but also their Tutsi neighbors, who were presented as one in the same. The government did not simply want to make the Hutu population afraid of an RPF attack; they wanted action 1based on that fear, and "the Hutu government capitalized on Hutu peasant fears by scapegoating the Tutsi minority through propaganda designed to incite hatred against them."[81] Broadcasts leading up to April 1994 warned even of Tutsi plans to kill the president, so when Habyarimana's plane went down there was in the minds of Hutu citizens reason to believe that they were about to come under attack. The Rwandan chief of civil intelligence reported, "The persistent tension is due to…the psychological fatigue of the population…. If the highest authorities of this country don't do anything to stop the gears of violence this country risks falling into chaos."[82]

Several Hutu men, now held as perpetrators of the genocide, have described the threats their government broadcasted:

> 'The government always told us that the RPF was Tutsi, and if it wins the war all the Hutus will be killed,' reflects 18-year-old Emmanuel Kamuhanda. 'As of now I don't believe this is true. But at the time, because it was the government saying so, using the radio, and because I had not known the RPF before, I believed that the government was telling the truth.'… 'They were always telling people that if the RPF comes, it will return Rwanda to feudalism, that they would bring oppression.'… 'I did not believe that Tutsis were coming to kill us and take our land, but when the government radio continued to broadcast that the RPF is coming to take our land, is coming to kill the Hutu –

when this was repeated over and over, I began to feel some kind of fear.'[83]

Other genocidaires, when caught, cited fear of the Tutsis as their cause for killing and claimed that "they murdered their neighbors only out of fear that they themselves would be killed" by the militias; however, "no examples could be found of the punishment of any reluctantly homicidal Hutu.'[84] Many Hutus now held prisoner for the crime of genocide insist that they killed because they were forced to by leaders who characterized their Tutsi neighbors "as potential, if not actual supporters of the advancing RPF, which was said to be seeking retribution for the 1959 revolution.'[85] They had been persuaded that "they could survive only by killing those who were, or could become, their killers,'[86] so innocent Tutsis were massacred throughout the country. With this historical fear of a return to Tutsi hegemony, Hutu peasants held nothing back at murdering their neighbors. In their training camps "Rwandan Interahamwe militia members were taught that they had to kill the Tutsis to protect their nation, [including] women and children in order to prevent the next generation of Tutsis from seeking revenge.'[87]

In Burundi, the genocide was fueled by fear, but on a personal level as opposed to the government-incited fear in Rwanda. Although some Rwandan broadcasts made their way across the Burundian border, there was no propaganda painting Burundian Tutsis as enemies of Hutus. There was no outside army that Hutu power could portray or perceive as a potential threat. Without the fear that they would be killed, there was little stimulus for Burundian Hutus to murder their Tutsi neighbors. While Burundian Hutus did have the historical fear of Tutsi resurgence, they acted violently based only on their personal fears. Since the Burundian government was not behind the violence, there was no centralized body spreading propaganda to scare civilians into killing one another. Also, there was no perceived threat to use as an incentive for violence. Although it was a group of Tutsi extremists who killed President Ndadaye, its goal was not to incite mass violence, and it retreated to Za-

ire only a few days after the coup. Overall it seems that Burundians fought out of revenge for their fallen president and not out of fear that the Tutsis would return the country to feudalism.

Conclusions

With the backgrounds of Rwanda and Burundi being ostensibly similar, I asked why the levels of violence of their conflicts in the mid-1990s were so different. My incentive for investigating this topic was to understand the different levels of violence and hopefully to find certain variables that can be modified in order to reduce the occurrence of mass violence in the world. Three possible hypotheses have been discussed in this paper. First, I proposed that the different leaders of Rwanda and Burundi and their attempts to encourage or discourage peace based on their political preferences resulted in Rwanda's genocide being more violent than Burundi's. Second, I conjectured that the preceding civil war in Rwanda, as compared to relative peace in Burundi prior to 1993, led to greater violence in the former country. Finally, I examined whether the perceived threat of the Rwandan Patriotic Front led to more violence in Rwanda than Burundi.

Based on genocide theory and evidence of what occurred in the countries leading up to and during the genocides, all three of these hypotheses are credible. Habyarimana was a known tyrant and his Hutu government was firmly against power sharing while Ndadaye was a democratically elected president in the process of forming an integrated administration. The Rwandan president encouraged militias of radical Hutus and funded anti-Tutsi propaganda both through government radio and newspapers while the Burundian president worked to lower extremist groups' power. Given this context, Rwanda was ready for genocide even before April 6, 1994, and Burundi was taken by surprise on October 21, 1993. During the genocide, the Rwandan government encouraged, even ordered, the mass murder of Tutsis, but Burundian officials condemned the fighting and controlled the army to stop the fighting. It is evident,

therefore, that the two distinct preferences for power-sharing led to differences in the levels of violence.

The 'civil war' hypothesis is also credible based on genocide theory and evidence. Many scholars cite political unrest as a leading cause of violence, and civil war is the most extreme type of political unrest. With the civil war of 1990-1993 fresh in the minds of Rwandan Hutus, it took very little to ignite the genocide in 1994; it was almost a continuation of the civil war. In contrast, the violence of 1972 in Burundi, while still causing a change in the Hutu image, did not have as much power as to cause violence as Rwanda's more recent conflict. Burundi was in a state of relative peace in 1993, and the military coup was a shock, so there were fewer weapons available, fewer militias, and a less violent social attitude in general.

The third hypothesis of the perceived RPF threat is credible through records of how the Hutu Power authority convinced Hutu civilians to massacre their Tutsi neighbors. They believed they were fighting in self-defense against a threat of virtual enslavement or even their own death at the hands of Tutsis. The RPF, whether a credible threat or not, was an existing entity that could be used and manipulated for the purposes of the Hutu government. There was no such outside threat in Burundi, and the government did not try to persuade Hutus that the Tutsi population was going to take over power. Thus, Hutu civilians in Rwanda acted more violently than those in Burundi.

The 'leadership preference' hypothesis is the strongest of the three, in that it can stand on its own as a causal argument for more violence in Rwanda. The other two hypotheses are credible in that they did make a difference in the level of violence, but if the leadership preferences were not difference, the civil war may not have occurred in Rwanda, and the Rwandan government may not have used a perceived threat to induce mass violence. Thus, the first hypothesis is necessary and the most credible of the three. The theory of civil war and the RPF threat are so linked that they may have been formed into one hypothesis. Again, had there not been a civil war in Rwanda, the government would

not have had a credible threat to use for its purpose of eliminating the Tutsis. All three of the theories build one on top of the other, so if one is taken away, the others tumble.

As with many research projects dealing with less developed countries, the amount of research available on this topic was minimal. While Rwanda has an official government web page, it does not release government documents, and Burundi is without an official web page. The government radio stations and newspapers that spread pro-genocide propaganda have been shut down, so I was unable to locate archives of those sources. While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda does keep records on who has been arrested and convicted for genocide or crimes against humanity, transcripts of the trials are confidential documents. These primary sources would help provide solid evidence for my hypotheses.

Overall, the information was lopsided in favor of Rwanda. I found only a few sources outside of newspapers that discussed the 1993 violence in Burundi. Most genocide literature does not even cite the 200,000 murdered and 800,000 forced refugees as a genocide. I would like to see more information on the genocide that was shorter and less deadly, to see why it was so and in turn hopefully be able to prevent future violence from escalating.

I was able to find adequate theorizing on the first two hypotheses, leadership preferences and the presence of civil war. There was very little theorizing by genocide scholars on the fear hypothesis. However we may be able to take theoretical examples from game theory, e.g. 'tit for tat,' to understand how threats lead to certain actions.

The tables seem to have turned now, with Rwanda in a relatively peaceful situation after its first 'free' presidential election in August. Burundi, after the election of a Hutu president last spring, has been in a state of violence with Tutsis once again rising up against Hutus in order to regain state power. A question that arises from my research is what would allow these countries to have peaceful power transitions. I have answered the question of why one was less violent than the other, but we

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should go further to ask what would need to be in place to have no violence at all. This is not only a question to be asking of Rwanda and Burundi, or even just Central Africa, but would be pertinent to the whole world as we seek to create and maintain peace.

Endnotes
1 Rwanda: 26,000 sq. km, population 7.5 million, GDP per capita $290; Burundi: 28,000 sq. km, population 6 million, GDP per capita $231. (Pre-genocide figures) Lemarchand, p 586.
2 CIA World Factbook, Burundi, Rwanda
3 Rummel 1994, 1
4 Nantulya 2001, 2
5 Bowen 1996, 6
6 Bowen 1996, 6
7 Bowen 1996, 6
8 Lemarchand 1994, 590
9 Lemarchand 1998, 6
10 Lemarchand 1998, 6
11 Bowen 1996, 8
12 Lemarchand 1994, 591
13 From definition of genocide in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
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