MAN

In the Light

of

History and Religion

A SYLLABUS

VOLUME TWO

SOUTHWESTERN AT MEMPHIS

M A N

I N

T H E L I G H T O F H I S T O R Y A N D R E L I G I O N

Syllabus, Vol. II
READINGS

Tenth Edition
1970

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SOUTHWESTERN AT MEMPHIS

Memphis, Tennessee

PREFACE

In the preface to Volume I of this edition of the "Man" Syllabus we indicated that one big reason for the vitality of the "Man" Course has been its openness to change. Each addition to the personnel of the teaching staff, new interpretations of the past arising from current scholarship, new emphases and concerns arising from problems of contemporary man, serve to freshen and revitalize the content of the course--indeed, making mandatory a completely new edition of our syllabus every three to five years. We have in fact had ten editions in twenty-six years.

Equally characteristic of the "Man" Course, however, has been its retention of those features of the course which have continuing validity. Of chief importance among these features has been the alternation between the lecture method and discussion method of teaching, allowing for the rapid communication of information and interpretation by lecture, and the penetration in detail into the thought of significant leaders in the periods we study by discussion. From the beginning we have believed it better to enter into conversation with some of the "great thinkers" of the world via their own words rather than to talk at second-hand about what other persons have thought about them. We have always had an adamant determination to lead our students to the primary sources.

Multiple copies of many different books containing assigned readings have from the beginning been in our library "Man" reserve shelves (e.g. The Gilgamesh Epic). Others books have been assigned for student purchase from the bookstore (e.g. The Forest People). Other readings have been assigned from Heritage of Western Civilization by John Beatty and Oliver Johnson (Prentice-Hall, 1958 and 1966).

We discovered, however, in the course of teaching that discussion was enhanced if the students owned their own copies of the readings and could bring them to the colloquia for reference. We experimented by requiring the purchase of the Heritage of Western Civilization when the second edition was published in 1966. We also experimented in a limited way with the publication of some of our own selections of readings--first with a mimeographed appendix to the syllabus in the ninth edition and then with a separate volume of readings. The tenth edition continues this practice and extends the number of readings. This book of readings reproduces the selected passages by off-set press leaving space on each page for any notations the students may wish to make. It is furnished at less than cost to those students who register for the course.

To keep costs low we have looked for adequate editions of standard works which are in the public domain. In those cases where modern editions were necessary we have gained permission from the copyright holders to reproduce the respective selections generally at no cost at all or at nominal cost. Grateful acknowledgement of these permissions is made on a separate page in this volume.

The selection of source material has been a joint enterprise of the teaching staff, even sometimes the subject of lively debate. The choice of readings varies from edition to edition--a painful process by which "old-favorites" are replaced by new selections which seem to be more pertinent to the current purposes and directions of the course. Sometimes the "old-favorites" return to the syllabus.

There is no satisfactory way in which one can justify the inclusion of some authors rather than others in an anthology, or the particular excerpts that were made from their writings. Everyone can think of something that would have been better! All we can say is that both authors and works cited have been generally recognized as significant, and the selections we made have proved useful and productive in the conduct of our course.

Once again we wish to thank Mrs. W. E. Edwards of our Duplication Office at Southwestern for her skill and artistry in the printing of this volume. We are also grateful more than we can say to Mr. Charles Benjamin Ethridge, Mr. James David Anderson, Mrs. Mae Turner White and Miss Linda Faye Brown, who have put in many hours of labor to make this production possible.

Fred W. Neal and the
Man Course Staff

NOTATION TO STUDENTS

The page numbers have been designed to make possible the addition or removal of pages without the necessity of renumbering all the pages in the book. The Roman numeral refers to the Unit in the Syllabus to which the reading is related. The middle numeral refers to the particular lecture or colloquium in the unit to which the reading is pertinent. The third numerals consecutively indicate the pages in the specific selection (e.g. X-3-5 means Unit X, Lecture or Colloquium 3 and page five of the particular selection). You are urged also to read the suggestions for study which have been printed in the beginning of Volume I.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to the following for permission to include excerpts from their publications:

Association Press, for selections from What Is Man? by R. L. Calhoun.

Bestor, Arthur, for reprinting of his article, "The Humaneness of History" from The Western Humanities Review, Winter, 1962.

Columbia University Press, for selections from History of the Franks by Gregory, Bishop of Tours.

Doubleday and Company, Inc., for selections from St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, (Summa Contra Gentiles).

Fortress Press, for selections from The Works of Martin Luther, (A. J. Holman edition).

Oxford University Press, Inc., for selections from The Idea of History by R. G. Collingwood.

Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, (U.S.A.), for selections from Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion.

Random House, Inc., for selections from The Philosophy of Kant, (Carl J. Friedrich Tr.); and for selections from The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, (W. J. Oates, Ed.).

Henry Regnery, for selections from A Modern Philosophy of Religion by S. M. Thompson.

University of Chicago Press, for selections from Philosophers Speak for Themselves (T. V. Smith, Ed.).

Westminister Press, for selections from China: Yellow Peril? Red Hope? by C. R. Hensman.

Williams, Colin, for selections from Chapter II of his book, Faith in a Secular Age.

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THE IDEA OF HISTORY

BY

R. G. COLLINGWOOD

History's nature, object, method, and value

What history is, what it is about, how it proceeds, and what it is for, are questions which to some extent different people would answer in different ways. But in spite of differences there is a large measure of agreement between the answers. And this agreement becomes closer if the answers are subjected to scrutiny with a view to discarding those which proceed from unqualified witnesses. History, like theology or natural science, is a special form of thought. If that is so, questions about the nature, object, method, and value of this form of thought must be answered by persons having two qualifications.

First, they must have experience of that form of thought. They must be historians. In a sense we are all historians nowadays. All educated persons have gone through a process of education which has included a certain amount of historical thinking. But this does not qualify them to give an opinion about the nature, object, method, and value of historical thinking. For in the first place, the experience of historical thinking which they have thus acquired is probably very superficial; and the opinions based on it are therefore no better grounded than a man's opinion of the French people based on a single week-end visit to Paris. In the second place, experience of anything whatever gained through the ordinary educational channels, as well as being superficial, is invariably out of date. Experience of historical thinking, so gained, is modelled on text-books, and text-books always describe not what is now being thought by real live historians, but what was thought by real live historians at some time in the past when the raw material was being created out of which the text-book has been put together. And it is not only the results of historical thought which are out of date by the time they get into the text-book. It is also the principles of historical thought: that is, the ideas as to the nature, object, method, and value of historical thinking. In the third place, and connected with this, there is a peculiar illusion incidental to all knowledge acquired in the way of education: the illusion of finality. When a student is *in statu pupillari* with respect to any subject whatever, he has to believe that things are settled because the text-books and his teachers regard them as settled. When he emerges from that state and goes on studying the subject for himself he finds that nothing is settled. The dogmatism which is an invariable mark of immaturity drops away from him. He looks at so-called facts with a new eye. He says to himself: 'My teacher and text-books told me that such and such was true; but is it true? What reasons had they for thinking it true, and were these reasons adequate?' On the other hand, if he emerges from the status of pupil without continuing to pursue the subject he never rids himself of this dogmatic attitude. And this makes him a person peculiarly unfitted

to answer the questions I have mentioned. No one, for example, is likely to answer them worse than an Oxford philosopher who, having read Greats in his youth, was once a student of history and thinks that this youthful experience of historical thinking entitles him to say what history is, what it is about, how it proceeds, and what it is for.

The second qualification for answering these questions is that a man should not only have experience of historical thinking but should also have reflected upon that experience. He must be not only an historian but a philosopher; and in particular his philosophical thought must have included special attention to the problems of historical thought. Now it is possible to be a quite good historian (though not an historian of the highest order) without thus reflecting upon one's own historical thinking. It is even easier to be a quite good teacher of history (though not the very best kind of teacher) without such reflection. At the same time, it is important to remember that experience comes first, and reflection on that experience second. Even the least reflective historian has the first qualification. He possesses the experience on which to reflect; and when he is asked to reflect on it his reflections have a good chance of being to the point. An historian who has never worked much at philosophy will probably answer our four questions in a more intelligent and valuable way than a philosopher who has never worked much at history.

I shall therefore propound answers to my four questions such as I think any present-day historian would accept. Here they will be rough and ready answers, but they will serve for a provisional definition of our subject-matter and they will be defended and elaborated as the argument proceeds.

(*a*) *The definition of history.* Every historian would agree, I think, that history is a kind of research or inquiry. What kind of inquiry it is I do not yet ask. The point is that generically it belongs to what we call the sciences: that is, the forms of thought whereby we ask questions and try to answer them. Science in general, it is important to realize, does not consist in collecting what we already know and arranging it in this or that kind of pattern. It consists in fastening upon something we do not know, and trying to discover it. Playing patience with things we already know may be a useful means towards this end, but it is not the end itself. It is at best only the means. It is scientifically valuable only in so far as the new arrangement gives us the answer to a question we have already decided to ask. That is why all science begins from the knowledge of our own ignorance: not our ignorance of everything, but our ignorance of some definite thing—the origin of parliament, the cause of cancer, the chemical composition of the sun, the way to make a pump work without muscular exertion on the part of a man or a horse or some other docile animal. Science is finding things out: and in that sense history is a science.

(*b*) *The object of history.* One science differs from another in that it finds out things of a different kind. What kind of things does history find out? I answer, *res gestae*: actions of human beings that have been done in the past. Although this answer raises all kinds of further questions many of which are controversial, still, however they may be answered, the answers do not discredit the proposition that history is the science of *res gestae*, the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past.

(*c*) ***How does history proceed?*** History proceeds by the interpretation of evidence: where evidence is a collective name for things which singly are called documents, and a document is a thing existing here and now, of such a kind that the historian, by thinking about it, can get answers to the questions he asks about past events. Here again there are plenty of difficult questions to ask as to what the characteristics of evidence are and how it is interpreted. But there is no need for us to raise them at this stage. However they are answered, historians will agree that historical procedure, or method, consists essentially of interpreting evidence.

(*d*) Lastly, *what is history for?* This is perhaps a harder question than the others; a man who answers it will have to reflect rather more widely than a man who answers the three we have answered already. He must reflect not only on historical thinking but on other things as well, because to say that something is 'for' something implies a distinction between A and B, where A is good for something and B is that for which something is good. But I will suggest an answer, and express the opinion that no historian would reject it, although the further questions to which it gives rise are numerous and difficult.

My answer is that history is 'for' human self-knowledge. It is generally thought to be of importance to man that he should know himself: where knowing himself means knowing not his merely personal peculiarities, the things that distinguish him from other men, but his nature as man. Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to be a man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; and thirdly, knowing what it is to be the man *you* are and nobody else is. Knowing yourself means knowing what you can do; and since nobody knows what he can do until he tries, the only clue to what man can do is what man has done. The value of history, then, is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.

GROUNDS FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

By CHARLES A. BEARD

IF A DESIRE to advance learning or increase precision of knowledge requires any justification, practical as well as theoretical grounds may be put forward to warrant a plea for a reconsideration of historiography —the business of studying, thinking about, and writing about history. Practical persons—academic and lay—concerned primarily with public or private affairs and absorbed in "the instant need of things," are, to be sure, likely to question at once the truth or relevance of this contention. By such "practitioners" history is often, if not commonly, regarded as a kind of old almanac or as an ancient, if sometimes amusing, chronicle, without utility or pertinence in framing and executing policies for the conduct of affairs, public or private.

When leaders in politics, business, labor, agriculture, or other activities deemed "practical," set about forming programs for action they seldom, if ever, think of devoting long weeks and months to the study of history as possibly germane to their procedure. On the contrary, when in the presence of a problem to be handled, they are inclined to employ their impressions derived from current experiences in such affairs; and, if supplements are regarded as desirable, to make use of treatises on law, economics, government, and foreign affairs, or other special works presumably directed to practical ends. To practitioners in general the idea of having recourse to history in a search for firm guidance to effective action would therefore seem to be a waste of time if not absurd.

Yet in the speeches and declarations made by articulate persons among practitioners—economists, reformers, politicians, business men, labor leaders, for instance—and in the newspapers and journals published for their information and satisfaction appeals to "history" occur with striking frequency. The word flows with ease from the pens of publicists, editors, columnists, and other writers for the general public; it crops up in the periods of orators, radio commentators, and special pleaders engaged in advancing practical interests, or for that matter advocating impractical, even dangerous, delusions. History is indeed often treated as the court of last resort by such instructors of the public when they are impressed by the need of "proving" the validity of their propositions, dogmas, and assertions. Men and women who could not demonstrate the simplest proposition in mathematics, chemistry, or physics, or pass a high school examination in history feel perfectly competent to demonstrate the soundness of any public or private policy they espouse by making reference to history, or at least feel competent enough to use history in efforts to support that soundness.

Among the phrases which appear in the speeches and writings of or for practitioners, the following are so common as to be clichés:

All history proves.
The lesson of history is plain.
History demonstrates.
History shows.
History teaches.
History affirms.
History confirms.
History repeats itself.
History makes it clear.
An understanding of history settles the question.
All that belongs to ancient history.
If history is taken as our guide.
The verdict of history has been pronounced in our favor.
His place in history is secure.

The verdict of history is against any such folly.
The truth of history corroborates.
History admits no such contention.
Let us turn to history and see.
The history of that matter is definitely closed.
All history up to the present has been the history of class struggles.
American history must be taught in the schools.

The appeals of publicists to history in short form are frequently supplemented by efforts on their part to "historicize" long arguments for one cause or another; that is, to make what purports to be more or less elaborate statements of historical facts, real or alleged, in a resolve to sustain in this fashion the invincibility of their assertions and contentions.

Although there is no way of measuring the influence of historicizations on public opinion, the immense circulation they attain seems to indicate that laborious students of history probably have less influence in national life than men of science had, let us say, in the New England of Cotton Mather. Great applause is given to works which purport to be authenticated by references to history but in fact bear about the same relation to historical knowledge that astrology bears to astronomy.

Thus recent and current experiences present to workers in historiography a dilemma pertaining to the nature and uses of their work. History is treated as having little or no relation to the conduct of practical affairs and yet is constantly employed in efforts to validate the gravest policies, proposals, contentions, and dogmas advanced for adoption in respect of domestic and foreign affairs. Either historians have failed in giving precision, limitations, and social significance to their work or, by their writings, have lent countenance to the idea that almost any pressing public question can be indefeasibly answered by citations or illustrations selected from historical writings. History can scarcely be at the same time a useless old almanac and the ultimate source of knowledge and "laws" for demonstrating the invincible validity of policies proposed or already in practice....

CONTROLLING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS

By JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.
and
GEORGE HAINES, IV

Thus the history the historian will write, and the principle of selection he will employ, will be undergoing continual change. For the meaning and the significance of the past is continually changing with the occurrence of fresh events. Of course, what *did* happen, as brute events, does not change with further events. But, as we have seen, the historian is not and cannot be concerned with all that did happen. He is and must be concerned with those particular events that did happen which turn out to be "basic" for his history. He is not concerned with the entire past, with all its infinitesimal detail; he is concerned only with the "basic" or significant past. And it is precisely this "basic" past, this meaning and significance of the past, that is continually changing, that is cumulative and progressive. Writing the history of the United States, the historian uses what is basic and significant in that history-that-happened for 1927, or for 1944, as the principle that will control his selection of material. What is significant in American history he will understand in one way in 1927, and in a somewhat different way in 1944. For the historian's understanding of the significant past, like that past itself, is progressive and cumulative.

There is really nothing mysterious about this obvious fact that men's understanding of what is significant in their history changes with the lapse of time. For all understanding is in terms of causes and consequences. Now, our understanding of causes naturally changes and deepens as we find out more about the operation of causes; and equally naturally, our understanding of consequences changes with the working out of further consequences in the history-that-happens itself.

In the first place, the understanding of causes changes as we manage to extend and build up our sciences of man's social behavior. . . .

Secondly, the understanding of consequences, and hence of the "significance" of past events, changes with further history-that-happens—with what comes to pass in the world of events as a result of the possibilities inherent in what has happened. . . .

New consequences flowing from past events change the significance of the past, of what has happened. Events which before had been overlooked, because they did not seem "basic" for anything that followed, now come to be selected as highly significant; other events that used to seem "basic" recede into the limbo of mere details. In this sense, a history-that-happens is not and in the nature of the case cannot be fully understood by the actors in it. They can not realize the "significance" or consequences of what they are doing, since they cannot foresee the future. We understand that history only when it has become a part of our own past; and if it continues to have consequences, our children will understand it still differently. In this sense, the historian, as Hegel proclaimed, is like the owl of Minerva, who takes his flight only when the shades of night are gathering, and the returns are all in. The significance of any history-that-happens is not completely grasped until all its consequences have been discerned. The "meaning" of any historical fact is what it does, how it continues to behave and operate, what consequences follow from it.

For example, at a historic moment Winston Churchill said: "With the fall of Singapore we are beginning to realize the meaning of Pearl Harbor." Note the word "beginning." For the "meaning," that is, the cumulative consequences of that specific event, were not completed when

Churchill was speaking. They have not been completed yet. They depend on how things will turn out in the future.

In this sense, we understand any history-that-has-happened in terms of the future: our principle for selecting what is basic in that history involves a reference to its predicted outcome. Our "emphasis" will be determined by what we find going on in the present. But what we find there is not yet fully worked out. Rather, the present suggests what will eventuate in times to come. Thus we understand what is basic in a history in terms of what we call some "dynamic element" in the present, some "present tendency" directed toward the future. The present is full of such tendencies: it suggests many different possible futures, according as different tendencies now at work prove controlling. The historian selects one of these possible futures as "just around the corner," and uses it as a principle by which to select what is basic among the multitude of facts at his disposal.

For example, our papers are today full of attempts to understand what has been happening, the recent history of the different phases of the war. Most of this discussion inevitably turns out to be a prediction of what is going to happen: we cannot understand what has happened without reference to a projected future. Thus we cannot understand the Administration's foreign policy—toward the French, toward the Italians, toward Spain, toward Poland—we cannot understand what is "basic" in its history, without trying to predict how it is going to turn out. As we say, we are now beginning to see its significance, as we find out what it has already led to.

The historian must thus choose among the various possibilities of the present that tendency, that predicted future, which he judges to be dynamic or controlling. He chooses as his principle of selection the "real pattern of events," what is "being realized," what is "working itself out." Now, since the future is not foreseeable in detail—though many elements in it can be predicted, and all human action is based on such predictions of what will happen if other things occur—the historian's choice of a principle of selection necessarily involves a certain choice of allegiance, an act of faith in one kind of future rather than another. Thus, to take the growth of science as the basic factor in the intellectual history of modern times, means that we judge it to be of most significance today. "The future lies with it," we say, meaning we are for it. No devout Catholic, for instance, would choose that factor as basic. For him, the future will be different, and consequently he will have a different understanding of the past. In the same way, to take the growth of group control of technology as the principle for selecting what is basic in our economic past, is to express an allegiance. It is to make the problem of establishing such control central in the present. In terms of that principle of selection, the dominance of laissez faire during the nineteenth century will be understood as a "stage" in the reconstruction of the earlier medieval group controls. No "rugged individualist" would choose that focus: in his history he would select a different past.

But to say that a principle of selection is "chosen" does not mean that such choices are arbitrary. Men do not arbitrarily "choose" their allegiances and faiths, even when they are converts. Their faiths are rather forced upon them. Grace, we are told, is prevenient, and it is God who sends faith. The history-that-happens itself generates the faiths and allegiances that furnish the principles for selecting what is important in understanding it. Men do not "choose" arbitrarily to be Catholics—or rugged individualists—any more than they "choose" not to be. Some men indeed have their faiths and allegiances forced upon them by "facts," by knowledge; though presumably for none is this wholly the case. For such men, facts do force the selection of the controlling tendencies, the implicit ends, in the present, in terms of which they can understand the past. For such men, knowledge does declare what has to be done: the furtherance of science, the socialized control of industry, the achievement of international organization....

Indeed, there are so many facts and so many patterns of relation discernible in the history of anything, and it is so impossible to include them all, that any selection will remain "arbitrary" and "subjective" unless it is dictated by some necessary choice or problem generated in that history itself. Only by realizing that these are the fundamental problems and choices today, or that they were fundamental in some past period, can we hope to understand or write the history of anything "objectively." Only thus we can understand objectively, for example, the history of the Romantic era. It is notoriously difficult to find any common traits or common pattern in that movement. But we can find the common *problems* in terms of which we can understand its history. As Jacques Barzun writes, "Clearly, the one thing that unifies men in a given age is not their individual philosophies, but the dominant problem that these philosophies are designed to solve. In the romantic period this problem was to create a new world on the ruins of the old"[3]—to criticize the inadequate synthesis of the eighteenth century, and to reconstruct a more adequate one.

The historian must make a selection. From the infinite variety of relatednesses that past events disclose, he must select what is basic for his particular history. If that selection is not to be merely what is important *for him,* if it is not to be "subjective" and "arbitrary," it must have an "objective" emphasis or focus in something to be done, something he sees forced on men. The history of what is basic *for that problem*—of the conditions that generated it, the resources men had to draw upon, how they dealt with it—will then be perfectly "objective," in a sense in which no mere recording of arbitrarily selected "facts" could ever be. This is the "objective relativism" that is characteristic of all types of knowledge. Knowledge can be "objective" only *for* some determinate context; it is always a knowledge of the relations essential for that context. In historical knowledge, the context is always that of a problem faced by men, of the causes of that problem, the means for its solution, and the course actually adopted. In that context, the relation of cause and consequence, of means and end, will thus be quite "objective."

[3] Jacques Barzun, *Romanticism and the Modern Ego* (Boston, 1943), 21, 22.

by ARTHUR BESTOR

The Humaneness of History

NO MEMBER OF THE HUMAN RACE — living, dead, or unborn — has ever been or ever will be quite like me. You know this about yourself as certainly as I know it about myself. Whence this incredible self-assurance? I shall never meet more than an infinitesimal fraction of the human race. I take it for granted that there are millions of men exactly like me in height, weight, and physical characteristics. Multitudes, I know, stand with me at the same midpoint on the scale between affluence and poverty, bravery and cowardice, brilliance and stupidity. It is true that an expert on fingerprints will tell me that no one else has exactly the same whorls on the tips of his fingers as I. Nevertheless, my sense of my own identity certainly does not arise from this trivial assurance; I don't even understand the technique he uses to tell one fingerprint from another.

To prove that I am necessarily different from anyone born in a past century is simple enough. I have travelled on a jet plane and none of them ever did. And I am different from anyone who may be born hereafter because I have had some experience of a world in which there were no jet planes. If any person is exactly like me, he must be found among my contemporaries. But he must have other qualifications as well. He must have grown up in the same surroundings that somehow shaped me. He must have undergone the same experiences, done the same things, read the same books, and met the same persons. If, as Tennyson's Ulysses said, "I am a part of all that I have met," then the converse is necessarily true: All that I have met is part of me. And I am sure that no one has shadowed me through life so closely as to have reproduced in his experience the pattern of mine.

The distinctiveness I claim for myself is the product of one thing: history. I am different from others because of what I have done or thought, or what has happened to me, at various times in the past. My sense of my own identity is grounded neither in anatomy nor physiology but in historical experience. Deprive me of my consciousness of that — let my memory be eclipsed by amnesia — and, in the most literal sense, I do not know who I am.

There is another side to the coin. I am not totally unlike my fellowmen. Wherever I have lived there have been multitudes living in the same community with me. We are somewhat alike because we have seen and been impressed by many of the same things. I practice a profession that thousands of others are practicing, many of them unknown to me. Dispersed as we are, we are all somewhat alike, for we have been trained in much the same way, have read many of the same things, have worked under similar conditions, have considered the same kinds of problems. Divergent though our solutions to these problems may be, no one can miss the common element in all our answers.

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Thus I belong to many groups. And what makes me a member of each group is some fragment of history, some experience in my past that coincides with some experience in theirs. Without history I would have no companions. Not only would I cease to be myself, I would also cease to be, in any real sense, a human being.

No one knows how clearly a dog or a cat remembers and how cogently he reflects upon his past experience. From outside we can see that he has become what he now is by things that have been done for or to him. To the extent that we imagine him conscious of the pattern of his own past, to that extent we endow him (rightly or wrongly) with attributes that belong, as at least we know, to men and women. The fact that human beings have been shaped by the past does not distinguish them from the rest of the animal creation. What is probably unique is human awareness of having been so shaped. And one measure of the humaneness of human beings is the extent to which they try to make sense of this past, groping thereby toward some sort of self-understanding and some degree of foresight.

Societies are even more purely the products of history than are the human beings who compose them. Biological factors, independent of history, condition the latter but not the former. A society exists because of some linkage, in the dimension of time, among the men and women who make it up. There can be nothing but a momentary and evanescent society unless these linkages stretch deep into the past. No society is capable of acting as a society unless these historical linkages are sufficiently strong and respected for men to trust them as a footing for the steps they wish to take. Finally, no society can move forward in a rational way until the members composing it have attempted to comprehend the historical forces that brought their society into being. Only by understanding the forces of history can men hope to deflect and guide them and perhaps harness them to the task of making society itself more expressive of humane ideals and aspirations.

This is a changing world. And change is the source of both our deepest anxieties and our highest hopes. Now it is history alone that reveals this as a changing world. And it is history alone that investigates — in all its length and all its human bearings — the universal fact of change. There is no substitute for the study of history in the education of men who seek freedom through the understanding of themselves and the world they live in. *A fortiori* there is no substitute for the study of history in the education of free men who aspire to direct the course of change instead of submitting themselves, in resignation, to it.

Children who are taught to live only in the present are thereby condemned as adults to live forever in the past. The present they thought they knew vanishes before their eyes, to be replaced by a new and unrecognizable present, the product of historical forces they have never learned to understand. They find themselves lost in the dimension of time, a dimension of whose existence they were hardly aware. When the citizens of a nation do not know the sequence of events that brought them to where they are, they are powerless to decide the further path they ought to take. Panic may destroy them, when wisdom, born of knowledge and perspective, might have enabled them to surmount their actual perils. Ignorant of history, they have become the prisoners — and even the victims — of history.

How can any collection of pieces of information about past events — any assortment of names and dates — perform so high and humane a function? The answer, of course, is that they cannot. History is not a collection of facts,

it is a way of thinking. It is not even a way of thinking about facts, it is a way of thinking about evidence. Though history may be described as the memory of the human race, its method is not the method of memory, it is the method of logic. The historian does not *recall* what has happened in the past, he *discovers* by a process of reasoning what has happened. And he makes his discoveries in the only way they can possibly be made — by drawing inferences about the past from things that actually exist in the present. Like every other science, history is a structure of inference, built up from things that are immediately observable, and built up by the exercise of reason.

The inescapable characteristic of a past event — whether it be of public or only of personal importance — is that it can no longer be observed or experienced directly. Logically it is not even conceivable that one might learn about the past by reproducing it, because it would be impossible to know that the reproduction resembled the original event unless one possessed antecedent knowledge, independently arrived at, about the original event itself. A re-enactment of history — assuming it could be managed — would add no tittle of information about the past to that which we already knew, for the simple reason that any hitherto unrecorded event occurring in the re-enactment could not be shown to have happened before. If history repeats itself, only historical investigation can reveal that it is doing so.

In strict logic, everything that has just been said must also be said about any experiment or observation in the natural sciences. One can verify a scientific experiment or observation by repeating it only if one possesses a full and accurate record of the original experiment or observation — that is to say, only if there is some *historical* record. In other words, historical inference is actually an element in every scientific investigation. Because, however, scientific observations and experiments are recorded with such deliberate attention to exact detail, no notice is usually taken of the preliminary train of reasoning involved — reasoning that proceeds from the evidence in hand (*i.e.*, the written record of a previous observation) to an inference about what actually happened on the occasion recorded.

II

The process of inference that is so simple for the scientist that he can afford to overlook it, becomes infinitely complex when the haphazard records of human activity in general come into view. The drawing of inferences from such records becomes an enterprise in itself. It is, in fact, the historical enterprise. And it is precisely the same enterprise in which any private person is engaged when he seeks to ascertain, for his own purposes, exactly what he did, or obliged himself to do, on some past occasion. It is this identity of method that Carl Becker pointed to when he employed the apt phrase "Everyman His Own Historian."

History — whether public or private — can be known only when and only because something that exists in the present bears some mark that was impressed upon it by a past event. Certain of these marks are impressed on the living cells of the human brain, but they share the vicissitudes of the cells themselves — changing and fading and ultimately perishing. Much more durable marks of the past are impressed upon objects or artifacts — pots and weapons and coins, charred bones, and the tiles from ruined walls. These belong to the present, but they are vestiges of the past. They are evidence that something happened. By intricate chains of reasoning one can infer what did happen — one can reconstruct the events that will account for the place and

the condition and the form in which these objects now lying before us were found.

Not essentially different are the written words of which the historian makes use. They too are survivals. They bear marks impressed upon them in the past — marks of chisel or pen or type. They are evidence of specific events that occurred in the past. At the very least they are evidence of the acts of chiseling or writing or printing that produced them. But they are obviously evidence of very much besides. The marks were deliberately made, and for a purpose. The purpose was unlikely to have been that of informing the future historian — indeed the purpose may have been to mislead him. But inferences are immediately possible — inferences about time and place and person and motive. Most of these inferences can be validated by inferences of the same kind drawn from other written records. As more and more sources come under examination, most of these inferences achieve the cumulative support that builds up toward certainty. Gradually a picture emerges of the event or series of events that impelled so many men to set down in writing what they did. Gradually the discrepancies among their accounts of what happened begin to be resolved. Eventually the historian can construct a narrative or an analysis, each item of which is the end-point of a chain of reasoning that goes back not to some received "fact" but to some piece of evidence. Indeed the items of his narrative are what are usually referred to as the "hard facts" of history. Facts they may properly be called, but not with the connotations that sometimes attach to the word. They are not the raw materials of history, they are the end-products of the first stage of historical reasoning.

Historical investigation does not stop here. Each stage of historical reasoning — that is, of historical inference and historical generalization — is the foundation of a higher stage. Among the disparate pieces of information (the "hard facts") ascertained by the process of inference just described, there appear to be certain clear and significant relationships. The next task of the historian is to examine these relationships. The result is a series of generalizations belonging to what we may consider the second level of historical reasoning. Instead of saying what Smith and Jones and Carter were doing, we can say something about what the workingmen of Manchester were doing. We can begin to talk of groups and parties and nations. Generalizations of this kind can be true only in the way that statements about the crime-rate can be true; they describe what was going on, by and large, within a defined group of men and women, not what was happening to each or every member of the group. We are modulating into a statistical conception of human affairs. And we are obliged to do so if we are to think about what men collectively have done.

An identical process of generalization goes on in all the social sciences as well as in history. At this second level of reasoning, the logical processes employed by history are substantially the same as those of the social sciences. Only at this stage, however, is there much kinship between the various fields. As the historian mounts to a third level of generalization he enters a realm which the other social sciences are not equipped to explore. The relationships that now interest him are the relationships between past and present, or between a remote past and one less remote. The unique concern of history becomes at last fully evident. This is its concern with change — not change within a narrow segment of time, but change as it has gone on through an endless procession of centuries; not change affecting one particularized area of human activity, but change as it has pervaded the whole of human affairs,

creating historical eras that are distinguished from one another in all their multifarious yet interrelated aspects.

Even here, however, the concern of history is still with the particular. Its conclusions have to do with the causes of *this* revolution in *this* country, or the results of *this* war between *these* nations at *this* period of time. The story of mankind as a whole is told by linking together, end to end, these specific explanations. The explanations are specific, but they are by no means simple. They are products of an intricate chain of reasoning, carried on at the three levels I have described. Despite their apparent specificity, historical conclusions about cause and effect in a particular situation are actually generalizations of a very high order. And the ability to make them is the ability to think historically.

Beyond this level of generalization, historians venture with trepidation and reserve. The ladder of inference is already perilously extended. Many historians believe that their discipline has achieved all it is capable of achieving when it has provided the intricate explanations that knit together the great sequences of particular events. Nevertheless it is apparent that between one revolution in one country and another revolution in another country there are certain resemblances, as there are between one war in one century and another in another. To speculate upon these resemblances, and thus to venture upon a fourth level of historical generalization, is tempting. Some few historians, goaded perhaps by the social scientists, boldly enter this realm, hoping ultimately to discover some completely general laws of history, comparable to the laws of physics. A smaller few — among them Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee — believe they can already see in universal history certain recurrent patterns that explain (or even determine) the vast movements of the whole. Most historians are skeptical of such pretensions. They are content to reflect upon the coincidences of pattern that they occasionally perceive, without assuming that these reflect some undiscovered law of the universe or some ultimate design at the very heart of things.

This very tentativeness occasions scorn in many beholders. What kind of knowledge is it, they demand, which professes in the end to furnish no laws, no predictions, no universal conclusions? The only appropriate answer, I think, is that the kind of knowledge history offers is human knowledge – knowledge about beings infinitely various, unpredictably brave and unpredictably cowardly, successful in their designs at one time, unsuccessful at another. Time is the dimension in which the historian works. Over a short period, statistical methods may enable one to predict, within fair limits of accuracy, what a fixed proportion of a particular group will probably do. Prolong the time and the exceptions begin to count. Prolong it indefinitely, as history prolongs it, and uniformities are destroyed by the cumulative effect of the variability inherent in human nature, just as in the biological world the minute variations that occur in the otherwise uniform processes of heredity are magnified by time into the evolution of new species.

History is the history of human beings. Its very tentativeness, its unwillingness to predict, furnish, perhaps, the surest warranty of its truthfulness, for these qualities accord with human experience. An individual man, reflecting upon his own career, can discover some of its springs of action. But if, in some ultimate way, he is under the control of universal laws that determine his every thought and deed, he himself cannot discover or imagine what these laws may be. The historian cannot project into the past a greater determinism than he (and his fellowmen) can discover in their own present lives.

The analogy with personal experience holds good for the values as well as the limitations of historical reflection. Men, if they are wise, reach their personal decisions by pondering their own previous experience. They do not expect automatic answers. They do not expect the gift of prophecy. What they expect — and what they receive — is data from which they can calculate their expectations, and alternatives from among which they can choose their course of action. In the gamble of life, the odds are on foresight. This is about all one can say, but it is a great deal when one considers how high are the stakes. History, properly understood, can give man the advantage of these odds. Sir Walter Ralegh put the matter well: "In a word, we may gather out of History a policy no less wise than eternal; by the comparison and application of other mens fore-passed miseries with our own like errours and ill-deservings."

Intelligence is the ability to take thought; wisdom the ability to take thought about human affairs. There are, of course, many valid ways of thinking about human affairs. Among them — high among them — is history. This is not because the facts it presents are of transcendent importance. Taken one by one they are not. It is not because the conclusions history reaches are of impressive certitude. They cannot be. History deserves a central position in every sound program of liberal education because of the means it provides for disentangling and comprehending the problems of human existence. The judgments that history makes upon public affairs are one in method and spirit with the judgments that men must make upon private affairs. The habits engendered by thinking about one, reinforce and discipline the habits of thought applied to the other.

In the final analysis, however, history deserves its high place because it goes to the very core of human experience. Its unique characteristic is that it presents human affairs under the aspect not of eternity but of time. So long as mankind swims in the current of time — that is, till the world ends — so long must men look behind them to judge what is likely to lie ahead. History is their lifelong companion. It is fallible as every man is fallible. But it is likewise trustworthy, as a man is trustworthy who has looked into himself and come to know how blended are dust and fire in the innermost recesses of the human heart.

WHAT IS MAN?

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INTRODUCTION

MANY MEN, MANY ANSWERS

There is something slightly abnormal about asking the question, What is man? At any rate, most people never put it to themselves in words, nor consciously try to puzzle out an answer. The normal thing is to go ahead *being* a man or a woman, doing whatever comes to hand, and not giving much thought to what one is, nor why. There is, indeed, a highly sophisticated sense in which just to be a human person at all is to be a living question mark, somewhat as a discord in music is a perpetual demand for harmony. We shall look at this view later. It is worth careful study. But it is not the view of common sense. In fact, ordinary common sense does not bother much about having a consistent "view" of man at all, and most people get on most of the time without wanting one. Everybody, no doubt, thinks of himself off and on, in one fashion or another: as a sound fellow, a good father, a loyal American (or Frenchman, or fascist), a worth-while friend. But this glimpsing oneself now in one rôle, now in another, is a quite different thing from grappling with the general problem: What is *man*—any man? and what, therefore, am I? This question is most likely to come up, if at all, when things are going badly, and customary behavior is, for unknown reasons, failing to bring satisfaction. The present is such a time for an uncommonly large number of people, and at the moment it is almost normal to ask what it means to be a human being, and what practical consequences follow.

But though there is widespread agreement in asking the question, there is fantastic disagreement in answering it. This is partly because so many of those who answer have personal or political axes to grind, and are mainly interested in putting themselves in a good light and their opponents in a bad one. But partly it is because the question can be examined from any one of a great number of quite legitimate viewpoints, and an answer that is appropriate from one may be hardly recognizable from another. A carpenter, a chemist, a philosopher, and a parson may all have ideas about human nature that are sound enough, as far as they go, but so different that they might not be referring to the same thing at all. This diversity is a fruitful source of confusion with respect to human relationships just now, and one chief purpose of this small book is to offer some hints about straightening it out.

We may distinguish, for convenience, four main lines of approach to the understanding of man: the ways of everyday common sense, the sciences, the philosophies, and the religions. The first is the way that underlies all the others.

It comprises the first-hand, concrete, unsystematic acquaintance with himself and his neighbors that every person gets in the course of his work and play and daily struggle. This direct acquaintance has the full-blooded vitality, color, and fluid movement of life itself. It is often what goes by the name of "experience," as contrasted with abstract thought.

The second way is related to the first somewhat as a book of road maps is related to the automobile travel through a given region. Road maps pick out certain features of touring, and ignore others; they bring to bear information from special inquiries that the ordinary tourist cannot or does not bother to make; and they translate all this into sign language, and organize it into systematic diagrams, drawn consistently to scale, which apply not merely to some particular tour, but to any or all tours through the region charted. In like manner, the sciences seek a view of man more diagrammatic, more accurately informed, more coherent, and more general than the vivid but miscellaneous insights of practical common sense, or "experience." Just as the road maps have to leave out colors and smells of the countryside, and pleasures and discomforts of the tourists, so the scientific diagrams of human nature and behavior leave out most of its color and smell, and all of its individuality.

The philosophies try to retain as much as possible of both. They include a good many details that the sciences quite properly ignore, and they try in various ways to catch in their formulae the essence of individuality, also: that which makes each human being uniquely himself, and not any one else. Yet, paradoxically, the terms in which they try to recapture these concrete aspects of human life are even more generalized than those of the sciences. What turns up in philosophic formulae is not the actual individual, but the universal character of individuality, the definition of what it means to be an individual. The actual living individual, the man himself, necessarily eludes all formulae. His natural habitat is the realm not of definitions but of *action*. Practical, common-sense experience is acquainted with him there, since it is itself part and parcel of his active living. But the more strictly theoretic disciplines, the sciences and philosophies, are by their very nature less embedded in practical activity. Theirs is typically the rôle of observer more than that of participant, and they furnish diagrams or portraits rather than living specimens.

The religions, like common sense, move primarily within the practical realm, and their view of man is very concrete and dynamic. Their central concern is with the motives and obligations that are effective in his behavior, and those that ought to be so. They seek to appeal directly to him as a person—individual, social, and responsible; requiring his active commitment to the service of values, or powers, or both, which are superior to himself. A religious attitude may be highly intellectual or anti-intellectual, loving or despising reason. It cannot be neutral, dispassionate onlooking, and be religion.

Plainly the materials are here for all sorts of conflicts, misunderstandings, and confusions of thought about man. Scientists and theologians at a given time may be at one another's throats, the plain man crying plague o' both their

houses, and the politician exploiting them all, in their failure to understand one another and move along together. That has been happening for a long time, and is happening now with disastrous results. Analysis of points of view is, naturally, no guaranty against such conflicts, which in large part arise from sources not easily amenable to logic. But analysis can help one caught in the cross-currents to see a little more clearly what they mean, where they are tending, and how he may at least avoid being destroyed in them blindly. Whatever else may be true about man, it is more in keeping with his manhood to see where he is going, whether it be to more abundant life or to destruction, than for lack of thought to be driven like beef to the pasture or the slaughter pens.

CHAPTER I

COMMON SENSE SAYS, "JUST A PERSON"

The proper starting point for any inquiry about the nature of man is everyday experience, and the outlook usually known as common sense. This is the layman's outlook, assumed here to be at once uncomplicated by the technical habits of specialists, and unwarped by excessive emotional or other aberrations. Inasmuch as ordinary people, in most of their routine activities, behave more or less nearly like that useful fiction, "the average man," their routine way of seeing themselves and others may serve as a rough definition of what is meant here by common sense.

For this everyday view, a man is just a human person: a perfectly familiar figure, who can best be known by what he does. If you want to know what man is, says common sense, just watch him in action for awhile, and see how he behaves.

1. Man as a person differs in his behavior from the things around him. Especially his tools, languages, and cultures set him off from the rest.

There need be no trouble about finding ways in which man acts diffefently from the earth and houses and machines, and the plants and animals, that form a part of his environment. He uses them. They do not use him. Or, if that seems too sweeping, in view of the fact that some plants and animals—mostly microscopic ones, plus a few beasts of prey and scavengers—do use him for food, say rather: man uses them deliberately and conciously, according to plans of his own, and there is no clear evidence that any of them use him in that way. Moreover, he makes things for himself on a quite different level from the nests and webs and tunneled mounds that other animals build. They can make a few stereotyped finished products for immediate use as shelters, and the like; or at most, as is true of highly intelligent apes, they can fit sticks or boxes together into simple tools, for getting food that is within sight or smell but out of reach. In contrast, man makes in endless variety tools which themselves by semi-automatic processes turn out endlessly varied products in quantities unapproachable by hand labor. He makes also tools with which to make other tools, and parts to go with other parts, working toward remote goals according to plan. All this is on a different plane, in terms of foresight and technical mastery, from what even the most intelligent apes have learned to do. It involves literally man's building of an artificial physical environment for himself in the midst of raw nature: commodious, man-made "caves" to

dwell in, highways to travel, controlled heat, light, and air, and so on. No other creature on earth has done the like.

Watch man, further, in active relations with others of his own kind. With them he engages in talk, and all manner of elaborate communication, both near by and across wide gulfs in space and time. His numerous languages, or symbol-systems, through which he transacts extremely complicated business, deals with factors that elude sense perception, and puts himself into all sorts of imagined rôles, are again on a different level from the best that other animals can do. Their signal-cries are outstripped by his intricate word-systems in much the same way that their woven nests and bent sticks are outstripped by his machine tools and power houses. Man behaves, in social communication, as none of his animal neighbors seem able to do.

His skill with tools and with words, finally, has helped him develop for himself the extraordinary physical and spiritual environments we call cultures. In them he lives and moves, and carries on his affairs from birth till death. Unlike factories and highways, the traditions, habit-patterns, and beliefs that enter into one of his cultures are invisible and intangible. Yet they surround him and condition his living even more inescapably than any of his buildings or machinery. Each man is likely, indeed, to be unaware of his own cultural atmosphere, as of the air in his lungs, until it is interfered with. But when he comes into contact with men of another culture, their "folkways" are easy enough for him to discern, and perhaps to resent, with some new awareness of his own heritage arising in contrast. Still more, if his familiar way of life is threatened with destruction by a hostile force, its hold on him and his devotion to it are likely to become very plain.

Man is, then, collectively, a maker of tools, a user of languages, and a dweller in living cultures that hold in one common life generations of the past and the present. With these facts in mind, whether explicitly or implicitly, it is not hard for common sense to think of man as different from his non-human neighbors.

2. *Man as a person is an individual, social, responsible self, in intimate contact with a larger world.*

Perhaps, however, we have been going somewhat beyond the ordinary layman's explicit ideas. He would readily recognize everything thus far mentioned, once it was pointed out to him, but he might not pick it out for himself as of especial importance. Perhaps he would be more likely to formulate his own relatively unsystematic thought about man along more immediately personal lines. He would think of a man first, very likely, as an *individual* person, since that is what he ordinarily feels himself to be.

(a) *As individual, a man is largely a bundle of persistent wants and satisfactions (or frustrations), and of habitual ways of acting, thinking, and feeling; but for all that, he is more or less unpredictable, even to himself. On the other hand, there is a well-recognized difference between the unpredictability of a healthy, rational person and the unpredictability of a drug-fiend or a madman. An essential mark of everyday human behavior is reasonable consistency, or coherence,*

among the desires, thoughts, and actions of the individual, and relevance to the public situations with which he has to deal.

Each man's individuality (which, of course, is a fluid and not a static thing) shows itself primarily in a certain bundle of *wants* that crave satisfaction. These wants are his own, not somebody else's: *his* hunger and thirst, *his* craving for companionship, a mate, and children, *his* need for security, freedom, and self-respect. In fact, these personal wants, and the frustrations or satisfactions in which they issue, are not merely his property. To an important degree they are himself. In large part, he *is* what he wants and arrives at, for better or for worse.

Some of these wants or interests are obviously located in his body, and all of them are associated with it in some manner. The same is true of the thwartings or satisfactions to which they lead. An individual human body is by no means the whole person, but it is an ever-present part of him, as common sense does not doubt.

A person shows himself, similarly, in his habits, or accustomed ways of acting, thinking, and feeling. These include his skills of all sorts, the ways he has worked up to get the things he wants. Chiefly in them lies his competence to hold a job, to engage in work and play for either payment or fun, and to acquire new skills by planned learning. The things he knows, also, will mostly come under this same head. They too are a part of his equipment for skilled living; some of them important to success in his job, some to less formal kinds of satisfaction—enjoyment of conversation, travel, reading, music, and so on. What he thinks, how he goes about solving problems that call for thinking, how he feels about all sorts of things, and hence his personal standards of conduct, depend in large measure on what habits he has formed. Everybody knows that, and tends to judge himself and his neighbors accordingly. Such and such a one can be depended on to feel, think, or act thus and so. That is how he is accustomed to behave. That is his character, which is, in important measure, himself.

But common sense sees, too, that this is not the whole story. An individual can act "out of character," and set at nought the most confident expectations, both of others and of himself. As a matter of fact, this element of unpredictability in human behavior is one of the aspects that common sense most readily takes for granted. Specialists may argue about whether a man is "free." Practical common sense never doubts it, unless in some mood of emotional dejection. Normally, men act on the assumption that what they are about to do is not completely fixed by what they have done already; and they assume this about others as well as about themselves. Within fairly wide limits, common sense has no prejudice against uncertainty in human behavior.

There are limits, however, to the leeway that most people would regard as natural. Nobody, whatever his own habits may be, likes really erratic behavior in some one else, especially among grown-ups. One expects more unreliability in children, less of it in adults. Growing up is, indeed, very largely a process of developing the definiteness and stability of character that makes one's behavior in important respects more dependable—and in the large more predictable. This does not mean that one's freedom is simply lost as one matures, though with more and more commitments already made, some loss is bound to be an incidental part of the story.

It does mean that native spontaneity is progressively brought under the control of the maturing person himself, so that instead of being merely spontaneous and incalculable, his conduct becomes increasingly self-directed and controlled.

Without putting it into technical language, common sense recognizes that this is or should be so. Nearly every one would draw a distinction between the normal unpredictability of a healthy, rational adult and the erratic behavior of a drunkard, a drug addict, or a psychopath. The distinction is notoriously hard to draw with any great accuracy. We are all a little abnormal. But we all assume its importance in practice; even to the point of holding that hospital or jail, not home or street-corner, is the place for those whose conduct is too unreliable. And though the ground of the distinction may not be put into words, most laymen would agree readily with the gist of the specialists' account of it. "Normal" conduct, with all its spontaneity or freedom, is marked by two features that are lacking in very "abnormal" conduct. One is reasonable consistency, or unity, or integration within the individual's own make-up and activities, so that he is not too flagrantly in conflict with himself. The other is a reasonable relevance of what he does and thinks and feels to the actual conditions which, along with other people, he has to face.

The drunkard or the insane person lives, while under the spell of his liquor or his dementia, in a private world of fantasy which has too little relevance to the public world of everyday fact. He sees things out of focus, cannot drive a car straight, nor hold a job, nor get on with other people. Moreover, the wants and habits in him that lead to these episodes are in conflict with his more sober tendencies, and his life in consequence is more or less profoundly split up and out of control. His unpredictability is that of a complex mechanism gone wrong and coming apart, whereas the freedom of a healthy person's behavior is that of a darting airplane in the hands of a skilled pilot. The one makes sense, the other does not; and laymen are well aware how important is the difference. It means in the most literal way that no man can live to himself alone, without failing to be a normal person. Man is not merely individual, but an individual-social being.

(b) *A man as social being is a member of many groups, each with its special rôles for him to perform. These, like his individual desires and habits, need to be held together in some stable unity.*

Every grown person is, in a sense, a whole company of persons. He combines in himself many rôles that are flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone. Without them he would not be the person he is. Common sense knows all this well enough. When you ask who a certain man is, the layman will reply by telling you his name and family connections, where he lives, his business, the organizations he belongs to, and where he fits into the life of his community. That is the most usable answer to the question: "Who is he?" or "What is he?" He is the person who fills such and such a place in each of these particular groups.

First his family, and the circle of his close friends: what Hocking (interpreting Hegel) has called "the private order," in which a man can live at least part of the time with his more ceremonious masks off. His place in this circle depends more on sensitive feeling and imagination, friendli-

ness and laughter, generosity and tolerance, than upon any competitive prowess. Sterner qualities are, of course, indispensable here also: tenacity, fairness, courage, loyalty. But they are not enough. One may be a model of business integrity or political courage, and be an egoist or bully at home. What especially is called for in "the private order" more than elsewhere is a readiness to give one's confidence, and to meet others' confidences more than halfway. Needless to say, the life and friendships of actual people, outside cream-puff literature, are by no means all sweetness and light. The clash of personalities cannot be avoided in such close quarters, and at times may rise to fierce heights. If the conflict becomes civil war, then the home-pattern is broken. If the basic pattern of friendship is maintained, a substantial amount of stress may be all to the good. Human growth cannot go on normally in a stagnant pool, even a pool of sunshine. One can learn more from a liked and trusted antagonist than from the most amiable yes-man, provided that mutual confidence grows greater, not less, and that each deals with the other as a person, not a thing. Of this more in a moment.

Where men work and fight for a living, competition is normally more cold-blooded, and requirements more specialized. At home it is the whole man that counts. On the job it may be little more than his skilled fingers or clever tongue. On the job, much of what makes him human is irrelevant, if not positively detrimental to his getting on. Too quick an imagination, too lively sympathy, too nice a sense of fairness toward competitors, too outspoken generosity in protesting against oppression of weaker associates may prove to be quite out of place in the business world.

On the other hand, the very impersonality of the public order contributes to the making of grown men and women. Private personal relationships are likely to become trivial without the bracing demands of a larger world. Friendly domesticity is no adequate school for adulthood. Even person-to-person competition is no substitute for impersonal struggles with refractory raw materials and work-schedules. One can outwit, cajole, or argue down a human opponent, but not a spirit-level nor a time-clock. Either the job gets done, or it does not. Either the joint fits, the wall is plumb, the engine runs, or it does not. And meeting this sort of test is indispensable to personal maturity. To be a grown person means not only to be a good companion. It means also to be a disciplined worker, trained to cope with impersonal requirements and freed thereby from the pettiness of a sentimental individualism or the familiar idolizing of good fellowship.

A similar impersonality marks all the larger patterns of community life that widen out in intersecting circles around a man and his job. Their settled behavior patterns are social institutions. Each man is a member of various organized groups: trades unions or chambers of commerce; towns, states, and nations, with their political parties and their numerous organs; fraternal orders, schools, churches; and many more. These groups tend to fall into cell-like patterns, with small local groups included within larger groups—statewide, national, international. These groups form the massive structure of organized society, and as such they display far less pliability and quickness of response than persons do.

The economic order of wealth production and consumption; the political order of law and government; the inclusive culture that embraces both of these, along with a network of custom, tradition, literature and art, science, and religion, in their institutional forms: all these are areas in which men come together under conditions more refractory than any private personal relationship. Cutting across both organized groups and institutions, finally, are patterns of still another sort, based on racial differences of the more obvious kinds—color, physique, facial structure. These differences are being vehemently exploited of late, as alleged signs of profound intellectual, emotional, and moral differences; and as such, they are being made the basis for increasingly dangerous social divisions.

We shall have more to say about all these a bit later. For the moment, the chief point to notice is that, in all these groupings, the human person finds himself enmeshed in segments of a social order that, though less impersonal than the physical order of matter, space, and time that he tackles in doing a job of work, has something of the same massive factual character. This is, of course, not uniform. A neighborhood club is much less impersonal than a factory or a state police force or a national credit system. Moreover, no part of a social order is wholly impersonal. Even the proverbial majesty of the law is elastic in fact; and in times of transition the fate of peoples can be tilted by the moods of one man. None the less, in all the contacts that membership in organized society entails, the accepted ways of doing things and their complex grounds are *there,* and have to be taken into consideration as fully as physical laws. No doubt social patterns can be, and are, changed much more rapidly than physical laws. But social change itself always requires deep mass movements, beyond individual control. The public order, in short, calls throughout for a more objective kind of behavior than that which is normally most suitable at home; and therein lies its social significance for the maturing of its individual members.

One final point. Each of these parts that the individual is called on to play, as member of a family, friend, worker, employer, unionist, citizen, is vitalized by its own set of wants, emotions, and loyalties. Among these the occasions for conflict are many, and the more intelligent and emotionally grown-up one becomes, the more acutely aware of them he must be. Aware, too, of the danger that if he tries to be all things to all men, on all sides of every conflict, he will fritter away his personal life and wind up in futility.

In principle, two major alternatives to such disintegration are open to him. One is to cut to the bone the number and variety of his social commitments, with their competing claims. This deliberate simplification may take a monastic form, religious or secular, and when practised by a resolute man or woman—a Thoreau or a Saint Theresa—to increase the effectiveness of his impacts upon reality by concentrating them, it has been a way of great power. But it is a way better suited to pre-industrial civilizations, and to rare individuals, than to the rank and file in a closely knit world. The preferred form of simplification now, as with most peoples in the past, is one-track partisanship, which externalizes one's conflicts and purges away inner doubts and questions. By shutting one's mind to the claims of all but one's fellow partisans, and plunging into action in support of these last alone, it is possible to attain a high degree of inner unity while the particular party or cause holds together.

When this goes to pieces, or becomes irrelevant to the larger course of events, personal unity or integrity that depends on it must suffer. Hence the familiar plight of demobilized fighting men, and revolutionists when the revolution is over. The other major alternative is to keep one's mind open to the conflicts involved in everyday living, seeking to understand and evaluate them, and to grow in range and stability of character through cumulative rational decisions, instead of taking refuge in stereotyped action.

Powerful personalities (not necessarily the persons who wield the most external power) are those who, like Eduard Benes and the Czech people, threatened and then overrun by Nazi might, can maintain a high degree of integrity under stresses that would disrupt less sturdy folk.. Simplification of their living as dictated by limits of physical energy and mental grasp is no more avoidable by them than by others. But they do not carry it to the point of monastic seclusion nor single-track partisanship.

Common sense is quite able to recognize and value well-unified persons. In their stability, it sees the basis for that moral responsibleness that is essential in all mature people. Here we come face to face with the crux of human personality.

(c) *Responsible selfhood combines individual integrity and social participation with an acknowledgment of obligations that transcend both. This is, in the last analysis, what differentiates a human person from every impersonal being, alive or dead.*

When I confront an inanimate thing, I recognize it as something to use, to admire, to fear, or what not; but never as something that in turn recognizes me. When I confront an animal, especially a familiar one such as a household pet, I expect also to be recognized in some fashion; but not to be understood, still less to be dealt with in the light of mutually acknowledged rules, norms, or standards of conduct. When I confront a man, this last is exactly what I do expect, both of him and of myself. He and I are presumed to be morally responsible beings, capable of mutual response in a personal way. Each of us expects the other to respond not simply on impulse, nor under the pressure of immediate craving or compulsion, but with some regard also to the desires of the one who confronts him, and to some common scale of values that is not the exclusive property of either, nor of both. Things are moved by physical impacts. Animals are moved partly by desires. Men seem to be moved also by obligations which impose themselves not through force nor through simple bodily craving but by way of imagination, feeling, and rational insight. Such are the familiar demands that we seek truth, play fair, be considerate, and so on. These depend for their effectiveness on human desires, no doubt; but the hunger on which they depend primarily is a complex hunger and thirst after righteousness, beauty, and truth, security, or self-respect; not meat and drink or other simple goals. And the hunger for social justice or some such intangible good can overrule, in human conduct, the narrower cravings that we share with the animals. We act then as though aware of another side to our environment besides the physical and social orders already noticed: namely, a moral order of standards and mandates, not separated from the former, but supplementing them as another aspect of the reality that surrounds us.

The moral order is neither visible nor tangible, and it exerts no physical force in any direct way. It is more like the standards of excellence in one of the fine arts, than like heat or pressure. Yet curiously enough men act as though it were very real. They experience satisfaction when they feel themselves in accord with it, and discomfort when they consciously fail to measure up; discomfort sometimes to the point of chronic indecision, sleeplessness, nervous strain, even physical or mental break-down. These consequences, at least, are very real, and sophistication seems to afford no effectual escape from them. Whatever its theoretical status (about which trained thinkers are still debating after some thousands of years) the moral order seems to be an aspect of reality with which men have to come to terms in everyday practice. Their efforts to do so—to discover little by little what is required of them, and to live up to it in the maze of actual living—often go by the name of aspiration. Without this one is not a moral self, not a human person, at all. The saddest feature of long-drawn-out disease that wrecks body and mind is the loosening of that moral tautness that makes a living body and mind a person.

Recognizing all this, though seldom putting words to it, common sense takes for granted that persons are responsible selves, and treats them accordingly. At least, it demands that they behave responsibly, and punishes them or tries to cure them when they do not. One further application of this insight, however, may be much less easy for the layman to make. If every human person who deserves the name may rightly be expected to act responsibly, it follows that every such person deserves to be treated always as a person, a fellow man, and never as a thing to be used nor as a non-human opponent to be stamped on. For both parties to every human relationship, moral responsibility transcends in principle all individual desires, group loyalties, and one-track partisanships. Irresponsible partisans and all who neglect or abdicate from their duty of moral judgment are by so much the less really persons. But genuine "reverence for personality" remains hard to achieve in practice. It is hard to abate our own claims in favor of another man's, especially when emotions are running high, or when uncorrected fancies blind us to facts. None the less, one proves himself human most fully not so much when he insists that others act as responsible persons, but when under extreme provocation he steadily behaves as one himself.

(d) *Man in contact with his physical surroundings and his neighbors, and sensitive to the demands of a moral order, is sometimes vividly aware of being intimately a member of a great, complex world.*

Even matter-of-fact, prosaic people are moved, at certain seasons—Christmas, harvest time, return of spring—or at crises of danger or joy, to feel themselves a part of ongoing life far greater than they. In more sensitive, poetic or mystical folk, this sense of participation, or oneness with a larger reality, may come to dominate their whole life-patterns, either as an experience consciously prized and sought for its own sake, or as a ground-swell that ebbs and flows beneath all their varied activities. In either instance, it is a chief source of personal religion: an all but universal aspect, in some form, of human living.

COMMON SENSE SAYS, "JUST A PERSON"

Here, in the tangled flux of everyday experience, is the concrete starting point for every view of man that can be taken seriously. The judgments of common sense are not enough. We need to know ourselves far better than ordinary experience enables us to do. But judgments about man that go too far astray from those of everyday living we may confidently regard as at best negligible, at worst disastrous.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIONS SAY, "A SERVANT OF SUPERIOR VALUES AND POWERS"

The special genius of religion makes its view of man concrete, personal, and practical, rather than abstract or theoretic. The sciences and philosophies seek to look at man from the outside, and to pass generalized, objective judgments about him. The religions have their place among the inner springs of his action, and seek to redirect his life as a person, with reference to realities superior to himself.

From its dim beginnings until now, religion has recognized two sorts of reality toward which man's life must be oriented: *power* and *right*. In primitive religion the former is by far the more prominent. Man feels himself surrounded by mysterious *forces* with which he must come to terms. Some of them are hostile, and must be shunned, warded off, or pacified. But some are friendly, being akin to him and his fellows, and with these friendly powers he can come into union so intimate that their strength enters his body and nerves him to more vigorous life. At the same time, it is necessary that such communion be sought in accordance with time-honored customs, which define what conduct toward the unseen allies is *right*. This last feature, the demand for right behavior toward the god, is connected from the beginning with right behavior toward the human group; and as religion becomes more advanced, the stress laid upon right conduct and the distinctively moral character of the demand for it steadily grow. The gods of advanced religion are not merely strong but good, not merely mysterious but just and merciful. So far, indeed, has this tendency to emphasize value progressed that, in some modern religions, values have displaced divine powers and have become the only objects of religious devotion, other than humanity itself.

Without spending time on other religions than those which today exercise a major influence in the West, we shall examine in turn types of religion in which higher values, higher powers, and a God at once mighty in power and perfect in goodness, are believed in and worshiped.

These last terms need brief notice. Worship as here understood is an experience in which man finds himself confronted by Reality so great or so good, or both, that he stands in awe of it; yet Reality with which, through some mediation, he feels himself reconciled, or brought into communion, and to which he commits his life without misgiving. From the first stage of such experience to the last, faith is involved: belief in the real presence of the Other, trust in its power and goodness, and self-devotion to its service. The normal issue of such devotion is in active work, guided by the insight that worship brings. Worship and work then together make up religious living.

Through such experience, man comes to find himself in a perspective different from any that can be attained in other

ways. Its determining factor is supreme self-devotion or loyalty to something taken as overwhelmingly superior to oneself.

1. *Humanism as religion calls for devotion to humanity and to values that have abiding worth, but not to any divine being that has power. It views each man as himself of high worth, and capable of perfecting his life through intelligence and kindness.*

Here is one sort of highly advanced religion. In principle it is not new, for early Buddhism and Confucianism held convictions not unlike these, and in the West also humanism in various forms has appeared and re-appeared. In detail, its present form is determined largely by the present state of scientific thought. Thus, with respect to man it holds the now familiar evolutionary view, lighted up by a confident optimism. Man who has come so far in wisdom and decency may be expected to go much further, as the habit of intelligent self-discipline grows upon him, and his methods of attaining and applying knowledge are improved. This conviction was put into a phrase current in humanist circles some years ago: "the sufficiency and perfectibility of man."

For humanism there is no God. Man's belief in gods, like his other physical and mental features, has a history, and one who understands the history of this particular belief will see that all its positive values are grounded in man. Religion is first and last an expression of fellowship and aspiration by a human group. The values which it seeks to realize—oneness with kindred beings, liberation from fear and guilt, devotion to the common welfare, and so on—depend not on a superhuman deity, but on human growth in social living. Moreover, they can be realized more fully when the confusing personification of them into a supposed God outside of man is outgrown. Mankind is its own god—the only god there is. Religion is devotion to those ideal goals that have arisen in the midst of human struggle, not come by miraculous revelation from heaven. The way to human betterment is education; the goal a glorified humanity and a beautified earth. Individual intelligence and kindness will assure social progress to this goal.

The virtues of this mode of thought are too obvious to need listing. Such ethical religion is humane, and its vision a noble one. In a world which gives so much ground for disparagement of man and his ideals, it is good to have a continual reaffirmation of faith in both, among men and women of high intelligence and vigorous idealism. It is among such men and women that humanism has always had its rebirths, and without them humanity would be worse off than it is.

But the shortcomings of humanism as a religion are likewise familiar. It tends strongly toward sentimentality about man. The particular sort of optimism that evolutionary doctrine once seemed to warrant, before the World War and the new age of savagery, has been discredited by the brutal logic of events. Instead of assured progress in wisdom and decency, man faces the ever-present possibility of swift relapse not merely to animalism but into such calculated cruelty as no other animal can practise. Men freed from belief in God, it appears, are likely under severe pressure to behave less like supermen than like subhuman devils. For such devilry, humanism is naturally not to be held responsible. Every humanist, like every civilized person in his right

mind, is revolted by it and seeks to help put an end to it. The point is that his way of trying to end it relies on something which there is all too good reason to doubt: man's ability to rise by his own efforts alone.

When man worships ideals without power, he takes on himself the sole responsibility for realizing them. But he has always found that rôle discouragingly difficult, chiefly because of—himself. Each man is an aspiring animal, as we have urged; but an animal he is, compelled to struggle for his existence, and not strong enough, secure enough, nor good enough to establish justice and mercy even in his own personal behavior, to say nothing of the world at large. He needs to have his own stumbling efforts powerfully upheld by forces greater than his own. Ideals are not enough.

This need for reinforcement has found in our time, as often in the past, a ready answer in collectivisms that revive many features of primitive religion.

2. *Cults of nation, race, or class demand supreme loyalty to a particular human group, personified in a leader who is exalted to the godlike status of a folk-hero. Each individual follower finds his significance solely as a devoted member of the group, and may be sacrificed at any time by the leader's decree.*

Today the outstanding cases of such relapse into tribal behavior patterns are fascism, especially in its German form, and Russian communism. There is no intention here of slighting their differences, which have been noticed in an earlier chapter. There is no intention, further, of denying the measure of economic and political skill displayed in the methods of each, though grave doubts of the soundness of these methods are in place. The primary point here is that in the appeal which both fascism and militant communism make to blind group loyalties and "the leader principle," they are reviving and crudely exploiting the archaic herd-emotions in which primitive religion largely consists, and which more advanced religions have sought to purge and redirect.

The strength of these emotions is one of the most portentous facts about man. He craves with a fierce hunger to be upheld and reassured by the companionship of power not his own. This power he may find naïvely within the circle of his tribe and its more-than-man-sized heroes, totems, or other domestic gods. Or he may learn, through painful experience, that such power must be sought beyond the bounds of tribe, nation, and all that is human, in some Being that pervades and transcends the whole world of which he is aware.

The tendency thus to look for a God of the universe is discernible even in early religion, among the more visionary members of primitive societies. It becomes a dominant tendency only in more advanced cultures, when primitive group solidarity has given place to a complex social diversity, and contact with alien cultures has helped widen the primitive horizon of thought. But what religion thus gains in scope and clarity, it may lose in intensity. A God of the universe may easily seem less near at hand than the living Spirit of one's own tribe. Moreover, as critical thinking about the universe advances, first the practical effectiveness and then the very existence of this more remote God may be questioned. When this happens, man finds himself alone with his ideals, in a universe from which friendly Power has

faded out. Some men, like our modern humanists, will accept that outcome and stand by their ideals. But most men will not—at least not yet. Most men, when subjected to the punishing stress of extreme hardship, will revert to the comforting power-cult of tribal solidarity. Like strong drink, the old emotions well through men's veins once more, and they are warmed against the chill of critical thought and bloodless ideals. The upsurge of such tribal solidarity, flowing now in the channels of nation, race, or class, is sweeping in a tide through our disillusioned world.

Its strength and persuasiveness no one with his eyes open will question. It has temporarily revitalized tired millions who had lost the sense of belonging in a powerful, friendly current of life. It has brought new self-respect and hope, for the moment, to beaten victims of oppression: to the propertyless workers of Russia, to the vanquished, ruined middle class of Germany. For many it has become a devouring flood of loyalty that neither sees nor wants any other god than the proletariat or the German folk.

But in this very strength are forces that make for its own destruction. As other religions have learned by long, costly experience, the fanatic mind closed hard against every one outside its own group is certain to provoke outsiders, even moderate people, to retaliation, which in the modern world can be very formidable. More than that, fanatic minds sooner or later turn against one another inside the deified group itself. Inquisitions and blood purges find their victims not only among outsiders but among fellow-enthusiasts, when inevitable differences assert themselves. Roehm and Zinoviev have gone the way of Robespierre and Danton; Goebbels and Goering, Stalin and Trotsky eye one another angrily; and the end is not yet. Most inexorably of all, fanatic minds collide with a deep-seated order of reality—natural, social, moral—which spells bankruptcy and failure for those too headstrong to acknowledge its demands. The economic realities of food-supply and labor power obey no dictator's wishes, and human nature itself rises up in revolt against irresponsible force too long unrelieved. The day for naked power-worship has gone by, if indeed it ever dawned.

3. *In Judaism and Christianity, human craving is directed toward one supreme God, in whom sovereign power and perfect goodness are united. Man, in their view, is a creature and in some sense a child of God, to whom he owes ultimate devotion and whom he can trust without reserve.*

It was a Hebrew psalmist who posed for us in its religious form the question, "What is man?" The eighth Psalm begins and ends with acknowledgment of the supremacy of God, whose glory is above the heavens and whose name is over all the earth. What then is man, that such a God should care for him, and show him favor above all other earthly creatures?

The answer of Hebrew and Jewish religion is the outcome of a long, hard growth from the crude polytheism of desert nomads to a monotheism as clear and high as men have ever known. The answer is that God has made man "in his own image," alone among earthly creatures in ability to hear and obey God's commands voluntarily. Other creatures obey of necessity. The seasons come and go, the winds rise and die away, the ocean roars but keeps its appointed place, the

plants and animals thrive each after its kind. Man alone obeys freely, and can disobey if he will. His relation with God is a personal-covenant relationship, which depends upon mutual trust. God never fails to keep his part of the covenant. But man fails again and again, even though the law has been made plain to him through inspired law-givers and prophetic interpreters. Hence, man brings on himself again and again punishment at the hands of a just and mighty God, who is supreme Ruler of the universe.

But God is not merely just. He is also merciful. "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him. For he knoweth our frame; he remembereth that we are dust." The mercy of God is not an easy-going indulgence, and man his child is not a pampered darling. God's mercy is never divorced from his justice. His mercy is extended first to the down-trodden among men. Their oppressors—"the proud," "the mighty"—confront first his inexorable justice, which uses the forces of nature and the armies of foreign nations to bring down the mighty from their seats. Yet even for the poor, more than outward poverty is needed to insure the favor of God. Inward repentance and whole-hearted love are what he requires of poor and rich alike. And if the wicked should forsake his way of oppression, and turn to the Lord with "a broken and a contrite heart," he too will find mercy and pardon.

This need not mean prosperity. All too often, this world being what it is, the wicked flourish here and the righteous suffer. Indeed, one of the choicest minds among the Hebrew prophets, the unknown author of Isaiah 40-66, declared that the chosen Servant of the Lord—perhaps the faithful remnant of Israel in exile?—must suffer for the sins of other men, and in that very suffering performs his task as Servant of God, through whom others are made righteous. In any event, the hope of the faithful is in God, not man, and that hope brings an inward peace that is proof against any earthly misfortune. Such hope, moreover, will some day be justified even on earth. For God reigns, and in his own good time he will crush his people's enemies, and establish a new age of justice on the earth.

The characteristic emphasis in Hebrew and Jewish faith is less on the individual than on the people as a social body. Both sin and righteousness, suffering and prosperity, are thought of as affecting the group, not merely this or that person in it. For better, for worse, human life is corporate life. Men suffer for one another's wrongdoing, and profit by one another's kindness and endurance. Men are destroyed or saved together, not one by one. The Jewish people, moreover, has lived this faith through twenty-six hundred years of fiery trial. No other human family has been subjected in the same degree and for so long to persecution *as a people,* nor displayed such indestructible solidarity in the face of it. Individual Jews may be raised up or destroyed. The Jewish people's faith in God and his righteousness has outlived disaster at the hands of pagans and professed Christians alike.

Such tenacity depends in part on the kind of deep-rooted folk psychology that all collectivism exploits. But in Judaism the perspective is radically different from that of all secularism, ancient or modern. Such collectivism exalts the human group itself, as we have seen, into the supreme place, and uses every means to inflame its members to aggression, physical and mental. Judaism worships a God high above all things human, whose law is love toward God and man. Neither Babylon, Greece, nor Rome could induce the Jews to bow down before man-made gods, and there is no sign as yet that modern paganism will be more successful. It is significant that the Jewish people have learned to find their chief satisfactions not in political domination over other peoples, but in the sort of enterprise—commercial, intellectual, artistic—from which all peoples may profit. The tough moral fiber which marked the Jews in the old Roman Empire has outlasted many empires. It was and is one expression of faith in the God before whom "the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are accounted as the small dust of the balance."

In this strong, moral, deeply rooted faith, Christianity was born. As it grew, all the main currents of life in the Mediterranean world contributed to it—Hellenistic thought, Oriental mystery cults, Roman discipline. But its backbone was Hebrew monotheism and morale, come to a vital new embodiment in Jesus of Nazareth. In him plain men and women were convinced that they had seen the chosen Servant and Son of God, and this belief swiftly grew into the conviction that in him men had in truth seen God face to face.

We are not concerned here with the whole fabric of Christianity, but simply with its understanding of man. As at other points, so here it sets out from the Jewish view. Man is a creature, made "according to the image of God," who has misused his high privilege and plunged wilfully into sin against his Maker. From this point, the Christian understanding of man goes beyond that of Judaism on two paradoxically opposite lines, one more deeply pessimistic than any that another religion in the West has tried, the other breath-taking in its optimism for man. Sometimes these opposing strains have been separated, in the history of Christendom, and world-hatred or complacency has been for a time the result. But in the main stream of Christianity, in which one-sided sects or passing fashions have again and again had to find correction, the two strains go together in a powerful counterpoint of desperation and hope. Man's plight, says the Christian analysis, is far worse than most men dare let themselves realize; yet, says Christian faith, the power and love of the God they have slighted will save men from living death into a new plane of life.

Consider first the Christian analysis of man's plight. It is not a cool, detached onlooker's summary, but the distillation of insights gained at first hand, during nineteen centuries and more, by men and women immersed in the struggle to find and be themselves. Such men and women have found the struggle very often a long succession of defeats. The trouble sometimes is that they have set their hearts on achieving particular goals, and then cannot reach them, because some natural or social hindrance is in the way. Sometimes they reach the goals, and then find that these were not worth the cost. Sometimes they cannot even get their desires focused clearly on any goal, but live in continual inner tur-

moil and self-defeat. Cleverness does not help much, when the situation is really serious. In fact, it often makes a bad matter worse, by promoting shallow self-confidence and a taste for quack remedies. Good intentions are not enough, nor hard work, nor "will power," nor even intelligence and moral devotion of a high order. Schopenhauer's devastating analysis of the futility of education and all cultural refinement as a safeguard against inner frustration is in principle as true now as when he wrote it. Current history is driving home his theory with the hammer blows of fact. Current psychology is helping us to see why intellectual and moral education does not get to the root of the trouble, and how profoundly man needs to be made over. But all these insights are new variations on a very old theme, which St. Paul set out clearly in the seventh chapter of his letter to the Romans, and which has been central in Christianity ever since.

The trouble with man is centered in his feelings and desires, far down beyond the range of conscious thought and will. A man is as he *loves*. He identifies himself, as we say, with what he loves most. "Where a man's treasure is, there is his heart also." If, then, he loves the wrong things most, or loves the right things in the wrong way, or loves nothing very much, frustration is inevitable. But a man cannot decide for himself what he shall love, and how much. He may see clearly that a particular craving cannot be indulged without grave damage to himself, or to others for whom he cares, and yet be unable to rid himself of the conflict which this divided loyalty forces on him, until it has poisoned his life for him. "Oh, wretched man that I am!" wrote St. Paul, "who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

Man, says the Christian thought which has grown out of such experience, is the victim of his own spoiled nature, which has become self-corrupted into a mass of misdirected cravings. Once risen above the level of animal innocence, man as a morally responsible person has taken his fate into his own hands, and has proved himself unfit for the privilege of freedom. Instead of rising steadily from the animal nature from which he set out, he has mired himself in a "second nature" of individual habits and social customs that hobbles him at every step. And that impediment is not, like a physical obstacle, something outside him, but because he is through and through a social being, it is within him as well as outside. This pervasive "second nature" of acquired depravity corrupts the springs of his personal conduct, until it is impossible to say that any part of him is free from its influence. Though still free to think, plan, and choose as other animals are not, he cannot of himself choose as he ought. For him the law is: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and strength and thy neighbor as thyself." Only on these terms—by emerging from the eddies of self-centered effort into the main stream of a communal reality—can one find that fullness of life which every sane person wants. But the fact is that man cannot, by willing it, fulfil this law. For all that he can do, he is condemned to the living death of perennial failure.

The pessimism of historic Christianity at this point stands in the sharpest contrast to the buoyancy of humanism, and even to that serene Jewish piety whose "delight is in the law of the Lord" and which is confident that man can live by it if he will. Indeed, some Christian thinkers have painted man so black that not only modern liberals but

medieval monks have revolted from their exaggerated gloom. There is no need to exaggerate. Nor is there any need to leave the firm ground of experience and the familiar atmosphere of modern thought to see what the Christian analysis of man's plight has in view. It has its eyes on man the animal as we know him in business, in politics, and in war; in the hypocrisies of home and school and church, and all polite society; in the secret lusts and hates of his most private imaginings, and in the waking nightmares of his madness when these lusts and hates come out frankly, inside hospital cells or in lynchings and pogroms. Who indeed shall deliver man, ourselves and our fellow-animals, from the body of this death?

Not high ideals and moral discourses. Not common sense, nor science, nor philosophy. They can all help, but not enough. And above all, not the cults of race or class that sanctify hatred and lust, seeking to free man from conscience and the claims of *right* by handing him over to the whirlwinds of raw *power*. Man is an animal, predatory, deceitful, cruel. But he is no less incurably a social, responsible, aspiring animal, who can no more rid himself of conscience than of his memory or his powers of speech, without ceasing to be a man. If he could, his life would be far simpler.

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain'd,
I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God. . . .

No, horses and cattle do not. And Whitman was not the first man nor the last to wish he could be "so placid and self-contain'd." But in his very wishing and self-judging he was in a different order of existence from the beasts. Cattle do not wish to be, nor judge that they ought to be, otherwise than as they are. Men do, and no way except drugging has been found to stop them. Moreover, drugs wear off. Human nerves can stand just so much marching and shouting and regimented cruelty. Then comes nausea, and the cold, drab light in which men temporarily gone animal have to face once more the fact that they are still men, with the problem of being human still unsolved.

It is in this sense that Christian thinkers today are saying: Man is himself the question, "What is man?" It is not primarily a theoretical question at all, but a fearfully urgent, practical one: *What must I be and do, to be human?*

The answer is not: Go on as you are. That would be merely repeating the question over and over, as though a jangling discord were sounded again and again, without being resolved into a harmony. The answer is not in man by himself, at all, but only in man saved by the power and goodness of God.

Here Christian faith brings its positive hope to bear on the otherwise disheartening fact of human self-contradiction and failure. If man cannot love God and his neighbor as he ought, and if his full realization of himself as human person depends upon such love to widen and deepen his being to its full dimensions, then plainly his only hope is that God in some sense loves *him* powerfully enough to quicken and guide his love in return.

Just this is the affirmation of Christian faith. "God so

loved the world that he gave his only Son. . . ." "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself." The language is necessarily symbolic, the language of myth. Nobody knows what it can mean literally for God, the Creator and Lord of a universe measured in light-years, to have an "only Son" on the earth, in whom God has himself come in human form to save men from themselves. But though the language has to be that of myth, it gives expression to a faith that has thrived on suffering and has rallied men time after time through dark centuries of struggle. Somehow it is the fact that, with the coming of Jesus, whom his followers called Messiah or Christ, a new regenerative energy was liberated among men that has made headway against seemingly overwhelming obstacles, bettered millions of individual lives, and dredged deep channels through the course of human history. This energy has found its vehicles in all sorts of institutions, of which the organized Church in all its branches is one—historically the most distinctive one. But no institution has been able to contain, nor to repress, this power—call it the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, or any other name—which works upon and within men to make whole-hearted love toward God and their neighbors dominant in their living. It is this dynamic factor, and not merely ideals or values as such, that has made strong, wilful men, often in spite of themselves, find their own fullest self-realization as Paul did, or Bernard, or Luther, in surrender to the demand for such impossible self-devotion. This is not to say that men were not saved before Jesus emerged in human history. It is to say—and history itself bears witness—that never before was the impact of this saving or regenerative power made manifest with such effect as it has had since that turning-point in human life was reached.

Trust in this power as the power of God, centrally revealed in and through Jesus Christ, is Christian faith. And this is the ground of Christian hope, which transcends the most drastic pessimism concerning man. The Christian has unquenchable hope for man because he believes in God, as Creator, Father, and Savior.

Faith and hope are not knowledge of any sort that can be proved by argument. They are practical attitudes or ways of living, active commitments that can be tested only in life. The Christian understanding of man as creature, sinner, and still cherished child of God, can be neither proved true nor proved false as a theorem is proved or disproved. It can only be tried or not tried, by men and women engaged in the life-and-death effort to be fully human persons. It can and ought, needless to say, be subjected to criticism of all sorts, from all sides, without ceasing. Blind faith, irresponsible hope, are offenses against the spirit of truth. But when all is said, there remains in religious affirmation a basic venture, a risk, that cannot be escaped.

With its eyes wide open, and with Jesus Christ in mind, Christian faith makes a staggering affirmation about man: "Beloved, now are we sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. But we know that when he is made manifest, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." Certain of the ideas which these words conveyed to the generation that wrote them are surely wrong, and the language as a whole must be reinterpreted in every new age. But one thing is sure. The Christian understanding of man, with its relentless pessimism and its exultant faith, is no ordinary

utopian dream, for it sees man not merely rehoused and re-educated, but remade. It does not crudely glorify man, but it sees him, even in the depths of his sin, as never for a moment alone but always with God, in whose unseen presence he lives and moves, and has his being. If there be any ground of hope for man the animal, it must be because something like this is true.

CHAPTER V

TOWARD SELF-KNOWLEDGE

One final word and we are through. We have glanced along four main roads by which men seek an answer to the question, "What is man?" Two of them are theoretic roads, by way of the sciences and the philosophies. Two are practical roads, through common sense and through religion. Life begins and ends in practice, not in theory. But theory provides the clearest light by which practice can become aware of its ends, and find its way. Each needs the other.

What is more, each mode of theory and each mode of practice here examined makes its distinctive contribution toward our self-knowledge. None of the four can be left out without impoverishing all the rest. And none need be left out. One form of philosophy may contradict another, one religion may conflict with another; but philosophy as such does not conflict with religion as such, nor religion with philosophy. Again some forms of religion, but not all, are incompatible with the temper and findings of some of the sciences, or with some types of philosophy. One who cares to keep his intellectual house in order will not try to mix those types which are mutually contradictory. But there is room in every man's life and thought about himself for all four major ways of approach to self-knowledge, in some significant combination.

Common-sense experience is the everyday earth on which we must walk, and the everyday air we must breathe. No scientific or philosophic subtlety, no religious devotion, can take its place; and any of these cut off from common sense will speedily lose its significance for actual human living.

The sciences provide the specialized information we need if our self-knowledge is ever to go beyond the stage of rough impressions. There is little danger that their importance will be slighted by any one who has once recognized it clearly, but in our day there is real danger for the sciences from two quarters. One is the studied effort of political dictators to suppress those findings about man that do not fit their racial or class dogmas, and to turn scientists from dispassionate inquiry to partisan propaganda. The other is the impatience of hard-pressed men of affairs, and embattled men of religious faith, over the tantalizing detachment of the genuine sciences and the present inconclusiveness of many of their findings. This is understandable, but gravely mistaken. Against every effort to coerce or to belittle the scientific study of mankind, all who really want to know what man is and what he can be must stand everlastingly on guard.

Yet the insufficiency of scientific knowledge by itself must be affirmed, and wise scientists are the first to affirm it. The sciences deal with classes or types, not with what makes an individual unique. Their view is necessarily objective, or external, whereas each living man has an essential inner side to his life which differs from the outer, observable one.

Their province is the region of fact, especially measurable fact, whereas human life finds its meaning largely in terms of values that none of the sciences can handle in a distinctively scientific way. We need, and shall always need, their contribution, but we can never live by science alone.

Philosophy cannot take the place of the sciences, and, excepting the more dogmatic totalitarian theories, it no longer tries to do so. Its task, as we have seen, is different: to help man piece together in larger patterns the findings of the sciences, of common sense, and of religious experience; and to evaluate all these in critical and systematic ways. If any one be tempted to suppose he can get on without philosophy, it is worth while for him to remember—as has often been remarked—that what he will get thus is simply bad philosophy, or pseudo-philosophic dogma. The clear-headed person will prefer to do his philosophizing with his eyes open, in order that he may both make the most of its special contribution toward his understanding of himself, and recognize clearly its limits. Philosophy is theory, not practice; and if he is wise, he will not expect it to become his life.

Religion, finally, *is* a man's life in so far as it is defined by his supreme loyalty or devotion. This is, like common-sense experience and unlike the sciences and philosophies, a way in which one can actually live. It is not difficult, indeed, to define religion so inclusively as to take in all the other three modes of life and thought. Perhaps that is the way it should be defined: the whole life of man, critically and consciously oriented toward his god. However that be, the distinctive mode of life we have been calling religious should not be divorced from common sense, the sciences, or philosophy. In isolation from these it becomes fanaticism or rapt dreaming. In association with them all, it can be a wellspring of power for good.

No man will ever know himself fully, so far as we can judge now. He knows himself best who has explored most fully all these roads. But with every major advance on one of them, the meanings of all the others are set in a new light, and no end is as yet even imaginable. If we are persuaded, with most of those who know something of the evidence, that the present scientific understanding of man is on the right track, we shall accept without misgiving our status as evolving animals. If we share the Christian faith, we shall see ourselves and all men also as groping sons of God. In either case, it remains necessary to add: "and it doth not yet appear what we shall be."

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A Modern Philosophy of Religion

What Is Religion?

Religion is one of the more flexible words of our language. Different people use it with different meanings and for different purposes, and the same person often uses it differently on different occasions. Its popular meaning is so loose that few would think of using the word in a serious discussion without trying to specify the meaning intended. So at the beginning of our discussion of religion and the philosophy of religion we shall have to look carefully into the question of what *religion* means.

It may be well first to try to clear up a common misunderstanding. People who seek precision and clarity in their thinking are likely to distrust such words as *religion*. They prefer, so far as possible, to use clearly defined technical terms. The ideal, some of them think, is a separate word for each distinguishable meaning. This, however, has a serious drawback. It ignores the fact that although different meanings may be distinguishable they need not be separate. We may say of a man, for example, that "business is his religion." This use of *religion* is so different from its usual or primary meaning that we recognize the word here to be a metaphor. Yet for the metaphor to be effective there must be some relation between the meaning of the term in this statement and its primary meaning. If we think about what we mean when we say of a man that "business is his religion" we may have some new light on the meaning of *religion*.

The fact is that any word which takes us close to real things and events is almost sure to acquire variations in its meanings. For the things it takes us to are not experienced in isolation; they are experienced in relation to other things, and each different relation may add something new to the sense of the word. A word acquires fixity of meaning only as it becomes a technical or abstract term, only as we learn to think its meaning in isolation from other things. Abstraction is necessary and useful for certain purposes; but abstractions are products of thinking and inquiry, not the material with which thinking begins.

In our attempt to come to some understanding of what we mean by *religion* it may be well to look first at what seems to be common to all its various meanings. In other words, what do we mean by *religion* in its most general sense? If we reflect for a moment we shall see that in its broadest sense *to be religious is to be seri-*

ous. This does not mean *serious* in any negative way, such as *unhappy*. It means rather that we have a concern about something, we are not fooling, we are not flippant, we are not jesting. It means, further, a concern with something we consider important; we attend to it because of its importance and we give to it the degree of consideration its importance deserves.

It is difficult to imagine a person who is serious about nothing. We should suspect one who took the trouble to proclaim such an attitude to be serious at least about not being serious. Just as ordinary waking attention requires that we concentrate our awareness on some things to the exclusion of others so, in order to live and act, we have to be selective. If we live and act with any awareness of what we are doing we judge that some things are more important than others, and we willingly sacrifice the less important to the more important.

Either a man has a serious purpose or he does not act. His purposes may change, and they may be inconsistent with each other; but when he acts he has some purpose at that time. Without purpose a man does not act; he is only acted upon. He does not act; he only reacts. Professor Ralph Barton Perry's discussion of this as it applies to morals is pertinent also to religion. In his discussion of the puritan as "the moral athlete," Professor Perry examines the contention that the puritan overemphasizes moral discipline, that he "takes his game of morality too seriously," so that "he 'exaggerates' morality, as some colleges are said to exaggerate football." Critics of the puritan "who cannot compete with him, because they have only their odd hours to devote to morality, feel that the pace should be slackened. They are advocates of 'morality for all,' 'intramural' morality, morality of a more sportive and spontaneous sort."[3]

> But [says Professor Perry] the force of this plea for the amateur spirit in morality is somewhat weakened by the fact that most of those who utter it believe in being professional *somewhere*. They may be professionals in athletics, and although they think that the puritan's perpetual examination of the state of his soul is in bad taste, they have no hesitation in keeping a similar diary of the state of their muscles. Or they may be men of affairs, and want morality tempered to the tired businessman, who, however, is tired because he is so exceedingly businesslike about his business. These critics also think it morbid to balance one's spiritual account, but feel an irresistible urge to balance their bank accounts. And so with the artist, who is perhaps the most contemptuous critic of the puritan. He objects strongly to moral discipline, but devotes himself with infinite patience to the mastery of his own technique.[4]

It is not a question of whether we shall be serious about something, but a question of what we shall be serious about. In Professor Perry's words, "it is not so much a question of *whether* one shall be strict, as *where* one shall be strict. One will be strict, presumably, about the more important and central things: the athlete about high hurdles, the businessman about profits, the artist about music, painting, or poetry. The difference is over the question of what is important and central."[5]

Every religious statement expresses an evaluation, and every sincere commitment to value is a religious expression. The two go together; we cannot assume a religious attitude toward something we consider inferior or worthless. But recognition of value is not enough, for there must be devotion to it. When we find religious sentiment in its maturity, Professor Allport says, we find a "disposition, built up through experience, to respond favorably, and in certain habitual ways, to conceptual objects and principles that the individual regards as of ultimate importance in his own life, and as having to do with what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things."[6]

In its broadest sense to be religious is to take toward something we regard important the attitude which is appropriate to the nature of the thing itself. In this sense are included all the meanings of *religious* from the narrowest literal meaning to all the effective metaphorical uses of the term. To be more specific than this we shall have to narrow the meaning by a more definite specification of the objects of religion's interest.

In the more specific sense, to be religious is to have the appropriate attitude toward not just anything of importance but, as Professor Allport suggests, toward something we consider to be of primary importance. A religious person, in the more specific meaning of the term, is one who has an attitude of acceptance and commitment to whatever he takes to be of ultimate value in existence. In so far as this which he takes to be of ultimate value *is* of ultimate value, and his attitude toward it is appropriate to it, then to that extent his religion is true. In so far as he is mistaken in his idea of what is of final worth his religion is false. It is still a religious attitude, else it could not be a false one. But if it is a religious attitude toward what does not merit such an attitude, then the religion it expresses is a false religion.

Many men, for example, have worshipped the state. They have given to the state a devotion which could be merited only by something of ultimate and final worth. In so far as this is not true of the state we must regard the religion of these men as a false religion.

Although religion concerns man's relation to man, as well as man's relation to God or to whatever it is which he considers as of ultimate importance, yet religion is an intensely personal thing. Its social expression is the expression of the individual's own internal attitudes or else, as religion, it is nothing. The individual's religion is not the internalizing of a social fact; this inverts the true relation between the individual and society in religion; or, in those cases in which this seems to be the case, it is not the individual's own religion he expresses but something he has merely borrowed. The social fabric in which religion expresses itself is woven from the attitudes and evaluations of individual persons.

On this point Professor Allport says that "the place of religion in the personal life is basically different from its place in society. The social scientist argues that the function of religion is to produce social stability. Yet no individual, I venture to assert, is religious for any such reason. Indeed, most people would discard

their religion if they thought it was merely a device to keep them out of the hands of the police and out of their neighbor's hair."[7] "Machiavelli saw in the Church an instrument for maintaining civil peace, while his contemporary, St. Catherine of Genoa, found in it the motive and meaning for a life of exceptional charity and devotion. There is a world of difference between the ruler's view and the participant's view."[8]

The same distinction is clearly drawn by Whitehead. "Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things." He goes on to say, "This doctrine is the direct negation of the theory that religion is primarily a social fact. Social facts are of great importance to religion, because there is no such thing as absolutely independent existence. . . . But all collective emotions leave untouched the awful ultimate fact, which is the human being, consciously alone with itself, for its own sake."[9] It is in the light of this that we should understand Whitehead's oft-quoted statement: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness."[10]

Religion is more than merely an attitude, if we think of an attitude simply as a state of mind. Properly understood, of course, an attitude is never a mere state of mind in complete separation from action. Attitudes are incomplete except as they are expressed in thought and action. This shows the close connection of attitude and value, for an attitude may be described as an evaluation in action. The evaluations we act out are the ones we really mean.

Religion is policy; a person's religion is that person's high policy. To the extent that he lives his religion, and does not merely talk about it, he lives in a definitely recognizable way. He deals with things in ways that fit his conception of their importance. He deals with matters of immediate moment not only as they happen to concern him at the moment but with a recognition of their final importance. If they have no such importance he treats them with the triviality they deserve, no matter how seriously others may regard them. But if they do have a bearing on things of final importance he sees this in them and does not permit himself to ignore it. To be religious is to see in the proximate a reflection of the ultimate.

Religion cannot be dismissed as a mere escape, as has so often been attempted. It is true that a religion directs attention to what it considers the basic and final factors in life and existence, but this need not mean that attention is wholly removed from our immediate concerns. Rather it leads us to view the immediate in the light of the ultimate. The fact is that irreligion is more likely than religion to be an escape, an escape from the ultimate to the immediate.

Even less than as an escape from life can religion be dismissed as mere wishful thinking. There is wishful thinking in the name of religion, to be sure, but there is wishful thinking in every activity in which man has a stake. The concerns of religion, Professor Allport points out, are far removed from those of fantasy. "What is demanded by the great religions is self-abnegation, dis-

cipline, surrender. To find one's life one must lose it. Such a transposition of values is too extensive to be covered by the formula of autism that is applied appropriately only to daydreams and to the rationalizations of daily life that are transparent in their self-centeredness. Only occasionally, I think, do we find individuals in whom religion runs its course on the level of wish-fulfilling fantasy. When this occurs we are dealing with a merely abortive religious sentiment in the individual."[11] Professor Allport insists that "it is unsound to trace the origin of the religious quest to the desire for escape from reality. It is true that religion tends to define reality as congenial to the powers and aspirations of the individual, but so too does any working principle that sustains human endeavor. Those who find the religious principle of life illusory would do well not to scrutinize their own working principles too closely."[12]

Religion, in the sense we have given to it, is the way in which a life comes to a focus. It reminds us, as we practice it, where we stand with all our interests and personal concerns. We see these matters in their context, in the widest and most nearly final context available to our awareness. Whatever else it may be, religious experience is at least the illumination which is given to the immediate situation by our discovery of its place in the whole range of being. This of course affects our attitude toward the immediate situation and enables us to deal with it as it truly is rather than merely as it appears at the moment—it enables us to do this, that is, in so far as our religion is true.

For example, a religious person who believes in the intrinsic value of human beings cannot treat a man or a woman or a child as a mere means to an end. However casual his dealings with them may be—the clerk at the cigar counter, the waitress in the restaurant, the boy who delivers his paper—he will show to each of them the respect due a person. He will not try to dominate or to hurt or to demonstrate any fancied superiority. In his attitude and in all his dealings with them he will show his recognition of the dignity of their existence as persons.

For those who profess belief in God there is only one true final object of religious devotion because they believe that only in God can ultimate value be found. For those who profess belief in God, religion is the service of God. Since belief in God involves the belief that the source of all existence far exceeds in value anything we can know or imagine, for those who profess such a belief the highest service to God of which they are capable is to serve the best they can imagine. "A man's religion is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and to the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs."[13]

Can an Atheist Be Religious?

We ended our discussion of the meaning of *religion* with a reference to God. Many would take the connection for granted; indeed they would see no meaning in religion apart from God. Yet

we must recognize that there are those who deny the existence of God, who profess atheism, and yet who actually have attitudes which correspond in other respects to what we have called *religion.*

To ask whether an atheist can be religious may seem like asking whether a person can be religiously non-religious. Paradoxical as it may appear this is precisely the impression some people give. An expression of hostility to religion such as we find in the "anti-God crusade" of Soviet Russia shows all the intensity and devotedness of a religious movement. In fact any serious and sincere attack upon religion is likely itself to be a religious expression. In our general conception of the meaning of *religion* we found it to consist primarily of a commitment to values. A crusading atheist certainly behaves as if he considered it worth his while to promote atheism. His case, as he presents it, is that it is better to be an atheist than to believe in God. Unless he thought this, and unless his argument tacitly assumed it, the only appropriate attitude for him to take would be one of indifference.

It may be remarked in passing that even if he is wrong, and the existence of God is a fact, the crusading atheist may still be closer to the truth than the merely indifferent. For he who fights against the truth does, at least, make contact with it; and there is always the chance that in his contact he will come to see the truth for what it is. Clive Bell goes so far as to say: "All uncompromising belief is religious. A man who so cares for truth that he will go to prison, or death, rather than acknowledge a God in whose existence he does not believe, is as religious, and as much a martyr in the cause of religion, as Socrates or Jesus. He has set his criterion of values outside the physical universe."[14]

Students of primitive societies recognize various forms of nature worship as varieties of religion. In some of these there are no "gods" in the usual sense of the term. To consider another and very different example, the Humanism of Auguste Comte was intended to be a religion as well as a philosophy. For the saints of the church it substituted the great men of literature and philosophy and science, and for God it substituted Humanity, the "Great Being" to which it gave adoration and devotion in its forms of worship.

A more recent version of humanism is expressed in the words of a contemporary biologist, Joseph Needham. "Many . . . see that the essence of religion is the sense of the holy (Julian Huxley, J. M. Murry, Canon J. M. Wilson and others). Religion thus becomes no more and no less than the reaction of the human spirit to the facts of human destiny and the forces by which it is influenced; and natural piety, or a divination of sacredness in heroic goodness, becomes the primary religious activity."[15]

One of the most powerful political and cultural forces in the world today is a religion without God. Marxist Communism has its sacred writings and its inspired leaders who can do no wrong; it has rituals corresponding to confirmation, confession, repentance, and absolution. It has its paradise and its hell, its saved and its damned. It demands of its devotees the utmost loyalty and

limitless sacrifice. It appeals not to reason and science for its conception of existence—although it does adopt these words for its own use; it demands instead trust in dogma and subjection to authority. Inconsistently it denies all values except economic values and at the same time assumes, without acknowledging the assumption, that it is good to be a Marxist. And it is explicitly and vociferously atheistic.[16]

From these examples it would appear that some exceedingly religious persons are also atheists; and, indeed, that atheism may itself be a form of religion. It is quite possible, however, that many who call themselves *atheists* are not atheists after all; or it may be that *atheism* is yet another ambiguous word which carries different meanings for different people and in different contexts.

We must recognize also that *atheist* is often used more for the purpose of arousing an attitude than for the purpose of clarifying meanings and conveying truth. Where it carries an imputation of evil, where the avowal of atheism is in disrepute, the word is often used as a club to clout an enemy. Many use it, as they use *radical* or *communist* or *red* or *fascist* or *reactionary*, with no concern for its meaning; they are concerned only with the emotional attitudes they can guide, by its use, toward the targets of their animosity.

Atheist may have a merely relative meaning in some of its uses. Those who hold to a certain conception of God may believe that any other supposed idea of God is not an idea of God at all. He who is confident that his idea of God is the only correct and adequate one, and that any idea which differs from his is false, may easily believe that he who uses *God* with a different meaning is not referring to God at all. Relative atheism is the denial of this or that conception of God. It is in this sense that the ancient Romans called the early Christians "atheists," for the Christians did not believe in the existence of the gods recognized and worshipped in the state religion of Rome.

Absolute atheism denies that there is anything real to which the term *God* may appropriately be applied. This of course raises the question of just what usages of *God* are appropriate, and if we wish to see clearly what absolute atheism involves we must keep in mind the widest and most general meaning we can give this word. We need to consider what we must *at least* admit in our conception of God if we are to use the term so that our meaning is in any way consistent with ordinary usage. More than this we shall not attempt at this point.

Any conception of God, whatever else it may include, must regard God as really existing. A non-existing God is a contradiction in terms. A conception of God must consider God to be the primary or ultimate existent; that is to say we cannot apply the word *God* to anything which depends on something else for its existence. Finally, we mean by *God* the source of good and the final reality of value.

If God is at least this, and if by *absolute atheism* we mean the denial of this, then the absolute atheist must hold that there is no final and ultimate reality which depends solely upon itself for its own being and which is also the source of good and the reality of

value. Yet, oddly enough, if the absolute atheist considers it worth while to be an atheist he admits value; and at the same time, as an atheist, he seems to deny to value any place in the final structure of being and so in effect he seems to deny the reality of value. The only way he can avoid this inconsistency is to point out some other basis upon which the genuineness of value can be asserted. Otherwise he is advocating nihilism, and in the act of advocating it assumes that what he is doing is worth doing. He fails to see that if no basis for value remains then there is no point even in saying so. If nothing is good it cannot be good to know that nothing is good. If nothing makes any difference then it can make no difference to know that nothing makes any difference.

The atheist may object that there is no connection whatever between the admission of value and the existence of God. There are few problems in the history of thought more fundamental than this, and there have been widely different views concerning it. Nevertheless it seems that an atheist who asserts that values are real (and to regard anything as worth asserting is to assume this) is dangerously close to inconsistency. The problem which faces him is to tell us how values are real, to point out to us the position they occupy in the final structure of existence; he has to explain how they can have any place at all in the kind of real world he is willing to admit. The theist has his answer to this question, and the atheist must not be permitted to evade it.

1. *Endymion*, in *The Novels and Tales of Benjamin Disraeli* (The Bradenham Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., n. d.), Volume XII, p. 371.
2. "Strictly Personal" by Sydney J. Harris in the *Chicago Daily News*, July 31, 1952.
3. From *Puritanism and Democracy*, Copyright 1945 by Ralph Barton Perry. Published by The Vanguard Press, Inc., pp. 257–258.
4. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
5. Perry, *loc. cit.*
6. *The Individual and His Religion* by Gordon W. Allport (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 56.
7. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
8. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
9. *Religion in the Making* by Alfred North Whitehead (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 16.
10. Whitehead, *loc. cit.*
11. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
12. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
13. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
14. *Art* by Clive Bell (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, Fifth Edition, n. d.; London: Chatto and Windus, Ltd.), pp. 91–92.
15. *Time: The Refreshing River* by Joseph Needham (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948; New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 57.
16. Professor Allport denies that such movements as Humanism, Communism, and Nazism are religions capable of satisfying the mature mind. *Op. cit.*, pp. 68–69. They still may be classed among the religions, however inadequate they may be as such, provided we use the word "religion" in the inclusive sense suggested in our present discussion.
17. "Crusades," by Ernest Barker, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1948), Volume VI, p. 772.
18. *Feuer und Blut* by Ernst Jünger, quoted from *European Witness* by Stephen Spender (Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.), p. 206.

ELEVEN SAMPLE DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

Matthew Arnold: Religion is "morality tinged with emotion."

V.F. Calverton: "Magic and religion evolved as (a) means whereby (man) believed he was able to acquire...power (over his environment) and make the universe bend to his wishes." The Passing of the Gods. New York, 1934. p. 51.

John Dewey: "Whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious." A Common Faith. New Haven, 1936. p. 24.
"The religious attitude (is) a sense of the possibilities of existence and...devotion to the cause of these possibilities." The Quest for Certainty. New York, 1929. p. 303.

Ludwig Feuerbach: "Man is the beginning of religion, man is the center of religion, man is the end of religion." Tr. from Das Wesen des Christentums. Leipzig, 1904. Kap. 19.

W.E. Hocking: "Religion...is the present attainment in a single experience of those objects which in the course of nature are reached only at the end of infinite progression. Religion is anticipated attainment." The Meaning of God in Human Experience. New Haven, 1912. p. 31. "Religion...is the habitual reference of life to divine powers." Types of Philosophy. New York, 1929. p. 26.

Harold Hoffding: "That which expresses the innermost tendency of all religions is the axiom of the conservation of values." The Philosophy of Religion. London, 1906. p.515.

William James: "Religion (means)...the feelings, acts, and experience of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York, 1902. p. 31. (Cf. A.N. Whitehead: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness." Religion in the Making. New York, 1926. p. 16.

Immanuel Kant: "Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as divine commands." Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Chicago, 1934. p. 142.

Salomon Reinach: "I propose to define religion as: A sum of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties." Orpheus, A History of Religions. New York, 1932. p. 3.

Friedrich Schleiermacher: "To take everything individual as a part of the whole, everything limited as a representation of the infinite, --that is religion." Tr. from Uber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern. Berlin, 1799. p. 56.

"The common element in all expressions of religion (Frommigkeit), no matter how different, whereby they are distinguised from all other feelings, the permanently identical essence of religion, is that we are consious of ourselves as absolutely dependent or, to say the same thing in other words, we are conscious of being in relation with God." Tr. from Der Chistliche Glaube. Berlin, 1861. I, 15, sec. 4.

H.N. Weiman: Religion is man's attempt to realize the highest good, through coming into harmonious relations with some reality greater than himself, which commands his reverence and loyal service.

JOB

I. Introductory considerations

A. Date--post-exilic; 400 B.C. or later
B. Various views about the book

1. Literal history
2. Poetic epic
3. Story literal (chs. 1, 2, 42); remainder poetic

C. Textual problems

1. Is Zophar's third speech missing?
2. Are Elihu's speeches a later addition to the book?
3. Is the author's viewpoint that of Job or that of the friends?

II. Prologue and epilogue (chs. 1, 2, 42:7--end)

A. The question raised: Is there disinterested love of God?
B. The answer: Yes. (Job does not curse God)
C. Goodness is rewarded two-fold. (42:10)
D. Satan as emissary of God

III. Dramatis personae in chs. 3-42

A. Job--genuinely righteous (else the whole book loses its point)
B. The friends: Eliphaz - calm authority, an "elder" appeals to experience
Bildad - orthodox "wisdom" theology, dogmatic, appeals to what other men have said
Zophar - private religious man, violent if anyone disputes his convictions
C. Elihu--hesitant yet fervent youth, a member of the younger generation who restates yet defends orthodoxy

IV. Analysis of the poem

A. The curse (ch. 3)
B. The debate (in three cycles)

1. The first cycle 4:1--14:22
Eliphaz (chs. 4, 5) - Politely suggests, Have not all sinned?
Job (6, 7) - Your theology doesn't speak to my real experience
Bildad (8) - Appeal to bygone ages...the moral law
Job (9, 10) - God is too great for man, (climax in 9:19-20)
Zophar (11) - The most vindictive of the friends
Job (12-14) - Sincere effort to convince friends, though with irony

2. The Second Cycle 15:1--21:34
   Eliphaz (15) - Job's blasphemy is self-condemning
   Job (16, 17) - No human comforters; no hope in God (yet)
   Bildad (18) - Orthodox picture of the lot of the wicked
   Job (19) - The really wicked are the unsympathizing friends; Job's personal problem solved (19:25-26); the remainder of the book turns to the more general problem of God's righteousnes
   Zophar (20) - The wicked man's portion; sin its own retribution
   Job (21) - But the wicked do prosper!
3. The Third Cycle 22:1--27:23
   Eliphaz (22) - Repent. (Thus, Eliphaz ends where he began)
   Job (23, 24) - But is not God indifferent to wickedness?
   Bildad (25) - Man is a worm. (Has part of this speech been lost?)
   Job (26:1-4) - How do you know?
   Bildad - ? (26:5-14) God is great. (This section seems to continue Bilda speech; otherwise, 27:1 would be superfluous.)
   Job (26:1-4) - How do you know?
   Zophar (27:7-28) - (If these chapters are by Job, it must be irony or else Job is convinced by the friends. What seems more likely is that the Zophar heading has been lost. Note that 29:1 supports this view.)
   Job (29, 30) - Summary of past happiness and present misery

C. The oath of clearing (31) (Job rising and lifting his hands)
D. Interposition of Elihu
   Prologue: His intent to speak (32)
   1st Speech, to Job: Judgment is redemptive in purpose (33)
   2nd Speech, to the friends: Job is indeed sinful (34)
   3rd Speech, to the sky: God, who is provident, is just (35)
   4th Speech, as a storm begins to arise: God is great (36, 37)
E. The divine intervention
   Voice out of the whirlwind (38--40:2) - Man does not have the knowledge or the basis to argue with God
   Job (40:3-5) - Job is quieted
   Voice out of the whirlwind (40:6--ch. 41)
   Job (42:1-2): The Voice (42:3a): Job (42:3b-4a)
   The Voice (42:4b)
   Job (42:5-6)

V. The theology of the book of Job

A. Answers suggested to the mystery of suffering

1. Suffering a test of saintship (the prologue)
2. Suffering is judgment upon sin (the friends)
3. Suffering is redemptive rather than punitive (Elihu)
4. Suffering is mysterious, but so is the Good and the Great (the Voice from the whirlwind)
5. In any case, Job's quest for God in the midst of suffering is a more acceptable attitude than the servile adoration of the friends. (Epilogue)

B. Revelation as the "real" problem of the book

1. Job's personal problem, How can I have fellowship with God?
2. The more general problem, Is God righteous?

THUCYDIDES

BOOK I

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another. He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or other of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large....

Greatness of the war.

20 Such are the results of my enquiries, though the early history of Hellas is of a kind which forbids implicit reliance on every particular of the evidence. Men do not discriminate, and are too ready to receive ancient traditions about their own as well as about other countries. For example, most Athenians think that Hipparchus was actually tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton; they are not aware that Hippias was the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, and succeeded him, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were only his brothers. At the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton suddenly suspected that Hippias had been forewarned by some of their accomplices. They therefore abstained from attacking him, but, wishing to do something before they were seized, and not to risk their lives in vain, they slew Hipparchus, with whom they fell in near the temple called Leocorium as he was marshalling the Panathenaic procession. There are many other matters, not obscured by time, but contemporary, about which the other Hellenes are equally mistaken. For example, they imagine that the kings of Lacedaemon in their council have not one but two votes each, and that in the army of the Lacedaemonians there is a division called the Pitanate division; whereas they never had anything of the sort. So little trouble do men take in the search after truth; so readily do they accept whatever comes first to hand.

Vulgar errors.

21 Yet any one who upon the grounds which I have given arrives at some such conclusion as my own about those ancient times, would not be far wrong. He must not be misled by the exaggerated fancies of the poets, or by the tales of chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather than to speak the truth. Their accounts cannot be tested by him; and most of the facts in the lapse of ages have passed into the region of romance. At such a distance of time he must make up his mind to be satisfied with conclusions resting upon the clearest evidence which can be had. And, though men will always judge any war in which they are actually fighting to be the greatest at the time, but, after it is over, revert to their

Uncertainty of early history. If estimated by facts the Peloponnesian greater than any preceding war.

admiration of some other which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, if estimated by the actual facts, will certainly prove to have been the greatest ever known.

22 As to the speeches which were made either before or during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the exact words. I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time I endeavoured, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport of what was actually said. Of the events of the war I have not ventured to speak from any chance information, nor according to any notion of my own; I have described nothing but what I either saw myself, or learned from others of whom I made the most careful and particular enquiry. The task was a laborious one, because eye-witnesses of the same occurrences gave different accounts of them, as they remembered or were interested in the actions of one side or the other. And very likely the strictly historical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten.

The speeches could not be exactly reported. Great pains taken to ascertain the truth about events.

. . . . .

BOOK II

. . . . .

34 During the same winter, in accordance with an old national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. The ceremony is as follows: Three days before the celebration they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he pleases. At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies are missing, and cannot be recovered after the battle. The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses, whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment and make lamentation. The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner of interment; and the ceremony was repeated from time to time throughout the war. Over those who were the first buried Pericles

The Athenians celebrate the funeral of their citizens who had died in the war.

was chosen to speak. At the fitting moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty stage, which had been erected in order that he might be heard as far as possible by the multitude, and spoke as follows:—

(FUNERAL SPEECH.)

35 'Most of those who have spoken here before me have commended the lawgiver who added this oration to our other funeral customs; it seemed to them a worthy thing that such an honour should be given at their burial to the dead who have fallen on the field of battle. But I should have preferred that, when men's deeds have been brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and with such an honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing. Then the reputation of many would not have been imperilled on the eloquence or want of eloquence of one, and their virtues believed or not as he spoke well or ill. For it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and even moderation is apt not to give the impression of truthfulness. The friend of the dead who knows the facts is likely to think that the words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when he hears of anything which surpasses his own powers, will be envious and will suspect exaggeration. Mankind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well himself, but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy is aroused and he begins to be incredulous. However, since our ancestors have set the seal of their approval upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of all who hear me.

The law which enjoins this oration has been often praised. But I should prefer to praise the brave by deeds only, not to imperil their reputation on the skill of an orator. Still, our ancestors approved the practice, and I must obey.

'I will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and 36 seemly that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valour they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigour of life, have carried the work of improvement further, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and

I will first commemorate our predecessors, who gave us freedom and empire. And before praising the dead, I will describe how Athens has won her greatness.

strangers may profitably listen to them.

'Our form of government does not enter into rivalry 37
with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment.

Our government is a democracy, but we honour men of merit, whether rich or poor. Our public life is free from exclusiveness, our private from suspicion; yet we revere alike the injunctions of law and custom.

38 'And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; our homes are beautiful and elegant; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own.

We find relaxation in our amusements, and in our homes; and the whole world contributes to our enjoyment.

39 'Then, again, our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face. And here is the proof. The Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with their whole confederacy following; we go alone into a neighbour's country; and although our opponents are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil, we have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength; the care of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend to have been vanquished by us all.

In war we singly are a match for the Peloponnesians united; though we have no secrets and undergo no laborious training.

'If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? Since we do not anticipate the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too our city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favours. Now he who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation; but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows that in requiting another's generosity he will not be winning gratitude but only paying a debt. We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit. To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the assertion is verified by the position to which these qualities have raised the state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every

We are not enervated by culture, or vulgarised by wealth. We are all interested in public affairs, believing that nothing is lost by free discussion. Our goodness to others springs not from interest, but from the generous confidence of freedom.

40

41

In fine, Athens is the school of Hellas. She alone in the hour of trial rises above her reputation. Her citizens need no poet to sing their praises: for every land bears witness to their valour.

sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf.

42 'I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their fame! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man's worth; it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valour with which they have fought for their country; they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the state more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life; none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be honourably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battle-field their feet stood fast, and [a] in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory.

The praise of the city is the praise of these men, for they made her great. Good and bad, rich and poor alike, preferred death to dishonour.

43 'Such was the end of these men; they were worthy of Athens, and the living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. Any one can discourse to you for ever about the advantages of a brave defence, which you know already. But instead of listening to him I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow

Contemplate and love Athens, and you will know how to value them. They were united in their deaths, but their glory is separate and single. Their sepulchre is the remembrance of them in the hearts of men. Follow their example without fear: it is the prosperous, not the unfortunate, who should be reckless.

their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres—I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope.

44 'Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here; I would rather comfort them. You know that your life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have been so ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. And sorrow is felt at the want of those blessings, not which a man never knew, but which were a part of his life before they were taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: "Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless."

The parents of the dead are to be comforted rather than pitied. Some of them may yet have children who will lighten their sorrow and serve the state; while others should remember how large their share of happiness has been, and be consoled by the glory of those who are gone.

45 'To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed, I see that the struggle to emulate them will be an arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, however pre-

Sons and brothers will find their example hard to imitate, for men

are jealous of the living, but envy follows not the dead. Let the widows restrain their natural weakness, and avoid both praise and blame.

eminent your virtue may be, hardly will you be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach them. The living have their rivals and detractors, but when a man is out of the way, the honour and good-will which he receives is unalloyed. And, if I am to speak of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth be widows, let me sum them up in one short admonition: To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for evil among men.

46 'I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead have been honourably interred, and it remains only that their children should be maintained at the public charge until they are grown up: this is the solid prize with which, as with a garland, Athens crowns her sons living and dead, after a struggle like theirs. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest citizens are enlisted in the service of the state. And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may depart.'

So have I paid a due tribute of words to the dead. The city will pay them in deeds, as by this funeral, so too by the maintenance of their children.

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BOOK III

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For not long afterwards nearly the whole Hellenic world 82
was in commotion; in every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace, men would have had no excuse for introducing either, and no desire to do so; but, when they were at war, the introduction of a foreign alliance on one side or the other to the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of themselves was easily effected by the dissatisfied party. And revolution brought upon the cities of Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have been and always will be while human nature remains the same, but which are more or less aggravated and differ in character with every new combination of circumstances. In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities; but war, which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a hard master and tends to assimilate men's characters to their conditions.

The conflict of democracy and oligarchy, encouraged as it is by the hope of Athenian or Lacedaemonian help, ruins states and disorganises society.

When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed carried the revolutionary spirit further and further, and determined to outdo the report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges. The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was

Changes in men's moral principles and in their use of language.

held to be loyal courage ; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward ; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness ; to know everything was to do nothing. Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. A conspirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in disguise. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was he who detected one. On the other hand, he who plotted from the first to have nothing to do with plots was a breaker up of parties and a poltroon who was afraid of the enemy. In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. (For party associations are not based upon any established law, nor do they seek the public good ; they are formed in defiance of the laws and from self-interest.) The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. If an enemy when he was in the ascendant offered fair words, the opposite party received them not in a generous spirit, but by a jealous watchfulness of his actions . Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless. But he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage, and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater pleasure in a perfidious than he would have had in an open act of revenge ; he congratulated himself that he had taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his enemy and gained the prize of superior ability. In general the dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness than the simple for goodness ; men take a pride in the one, but are ashamed of the other.

Causes and effects of the revolutionary spirit. Disregard of all laws, human and divine.

The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked in a contest. For the leaders on either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy, while they made the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in reality their prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most monstrous crimes ; yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the very utmost , neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. Either by the help of an unrighteous sentence, or grasping power with the strong hand, they were eager to satiate the impatience of party-spirit. Neither faction cared for religion ; but any fair pretence which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was greatly lauded. And the citizens who were of neither party fell a prey to both ; either they were disliked because they held aloof, or men were jealous of their surviving.

83 Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness

Universal distrust. Force of character, not intellect, prevailed.

in Hellas. The simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn and disappeared. An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed; for there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough to reconcile enemies. Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure; he must look to his own safety, and could not afford to trust others. Inferior intellects generally succeeded best. For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once. But the cleverer sort, presuming in their arrogance that they would be aware in time, and disdaining to act when they could think, were taken off their guard and easily destroyed.

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BOOK V

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In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos 84
with twenty ships, and seized any of the Argives who were still suspected to be of the Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and the Athenians deposited them in the subject islands near at hand. The Athenians next made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and three hundred archers besides twenty mounted archers of their own, and about fifteen hundred hoplites furnished by their allies in the islands. The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit to Athens like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities[a]. The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island. But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the people, the Melians desired them to explain their errand to the magistrates and to the dominant class. They spoke as follows:—

Alcibiades seizes the suspected Argives. The Athenians, enraged at the independence of the island of Melos, send thither an expedition. But first they try negotiation.

85 'Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a multitude should be deceived by seductive and unanswerable arguments which they would hear set forth in a single uninterrupted oration (for we are perfectly aware that this is what you mean in bringing us before a select few), you who are sitting here may as well make assurance yet surer. Let us have no set speeches at all, but do you reply to each several statement of which you disapprove, and criticise it at once. Say first of all how you like this mode of proceeding.'

Since we are to be closeted with you, let us converse and not make speeches.

86 The Melian representatives answered:—'The quiet

We do not object. But discussion between you and us is a mockery, and can only end in our ruin.

interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, seem to belie your words. We see that, although you may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you, slavery.'

87 *Ath.* 'Nay, but if you are only going to argue from fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of looking your circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is your intention we will proceed.'

In any case you must face the facts.

88 *Mel.* 'It is an excusable and natural thing that men in our position should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we admit that this conference has met to consider the question of our preservation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you propose.'

It must be as you, and not as we, please.

89 *Ath.* 'Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in their expeditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.'

No use in talking about right; expediency is the word.

Mel. 'Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a principle which is for the common good; that to every man when in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and that any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind.'

90

For your own sakes, then, it is expedient that you should not be too strict.

Ath. 'The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is not an event to which we look forward with dismay; for ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to their vanquished enemies. With the Lacedaemonians, however, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters. But this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavour to show that we

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For ourselves we have no fears. It is you who have to learn the lesson of what is expedient both for us and you.

have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed.'

92 *Mel.* 'It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?'

For you, yes. But how for us?

93 *Ath.* 'To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.'

You will suffer less and we shall gain more.

94 *Mel.* 'But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?'

May we not be neutral?

95 *Ath.* 'No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.'

Our subjects would not understand that.

96 *Mel.* 'But are your subjects really unable to distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you?'

But we are not a colony of yours.

97 *Ath.* 'Why, they do not doubt that both of them have a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think that states like yours are left free because they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not attack them because we dare not. So that your subjection will give us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too, must not be allowed to escape us.'

You are talking about justice again. We say that we cannot allow freedom to insignificant islanders.

98 *Mel.* 'But do you not recognise another danger? For, once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice and press upon us your doctrine of expediency, we must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be for yours also, may hope to convince you:—Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all?'

But will not your policy convert all neutrals into enemies?

99 *Ath.* 'We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all who may be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire—these are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee.'

The neutral peoples of the mainland have nothing to fear from us, and therefore we have nothing to fear from them. Our subjects and the free islanders are our danger.

100 *Mel.* 'Surely then, if you and your subjects will brave all this risk, you to preserve your

empire and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be your slaves.'

If you fight for empire and your subjects for freedom, shall we be slaves?

101 *Ath.* 'Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not one of honour but of prudence.'

There is no cowardice in yielding to superior force.

102 *Mel.* 'But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand upright.'

But we hope that fortune may befriend us.

103 *Ath.* 'Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, and when men have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then. While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails . You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them.'

Hope is a great deceiver; and is only detected when men are already ruined.

104 *Mel.* 'We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against your power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favour of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose.'

Heaven will protect the right and the Lacedaemonians will succour us.

105 *Ath.* 'As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favour as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men's desires about human things. For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the Gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. And then as to the Lacedaemonians—when you imagine that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire the innocence of your idea,

That the stronger should rule over the weaker is a principle common to Gods and men. Therefore the Gods are as likely to favour us as you. And the Lacedaemonians look only to their interest.

but we do not envy you the folly of it. The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and according to their national standard of morality . But, in respect of their dealings with others, although many things might be said, they can be described in few words—of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what is expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent is such a character with your present blind hope of deliverance!'

Mel. 'That is the very reason why we trust them; 106
they will look to their interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas and play into the hands of their enemies.'

But their interest will induce them to assist us.

107 *Ath.* 'But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lacedaemonians seldom care to face?'

Not when there is any danger.

108 *Mel.* 'On the other hand, we think that whatever perils there may be, they will be ready to face them for our sakes, and will consider danger less dangerous where we are concerned. For if they need our aid we are close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen.'

But they may need our aid, and they are our kinsmen.

109 *Ath.* 'Yes, but what encourages men who are invited to join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those who summon them to their side, but a decided superiority in real power. To this no men look more keenly than the Lacedaemonians; so little confidence have they in their own resources, that they only attack their neighbours when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an island, when we are masters of the sea.'

The aid which you can give is not sufficient to make them run into danger for your sakes. They will not come alone to an island.

110 *Mel.* 'But they may send their allies: the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory.'

Their ships may find their way to us; and they may themselves invade Attica and draw away your allies.

Ath. 'Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as it 111
has come to others, and should you ever have actual experience of it, then you will know that never once have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your city would be your first care, but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is

Wait and you will see. Nothing which you say is to the point. You are deluded by a false sense of honour. Think again.

not to be compared with that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying to that false sense of honour which has been the ruin of so many when danger and dishonour were staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open to the consequences have found the word "honour" too much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and irretrievable calamities; through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonour than fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you will not run this risk; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will certainly gain no honour if, having to choose between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a single decision.'

112 *The Melians refuse to yield.*

The Athenians left the conference: the Melians, after consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in their refusal, and made answer as follows:—'Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to the good fortune which, by the favour of the Gods, has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and endeavour to save ourselves. We are ready however to be your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of both parties.'

113 *Last words of the Athenians.*

Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as they quitted the conference, spoke as follows:—'Well, we must say, judging from the decision at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as already realised in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be your ruin.'

114 *The Athenians blockade Melos.*

The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the generals, when they found that the Melians would not yield, immediately commenced hostilities. They surrounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own and of their allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their army; the remainder carried on the blockade...

The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the Melians

were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonised the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own.

LUCRETIUS

On the Nature of Things

BOOK I

Mother of the Aeneadae, darling of men and gods, increase-giving Venus, who beneath the gliding signs of heaven fillest with thy presence the ship-carrying sea, the corn-bearing lands, since through thee every kind of living things is conceived, rises up and beholds the light of the sun. Before thee, goddess, flee the winds, the clouds of heaven; before thee and thy advent; for thee earth manifold in works puts forth sweet-smelling flowers; for thee the levels of the sea do laugh and heaven propitiated shines with outspread light. For soon as the vernal aspect of day is disclosed, and the birth-favouring breeze of Favonius unbarred is blowing fresh, first the fowls of the air, O lady, show signs of thee and thy entering in, throughly smitten in heart by thy power. Next the wild herds bound over the glad pastures and swim the rapid rivers: in such wise each made prisoner by thy charms follows thee with desire, whither thou goest to lead it on. Yes, throughout seas and mountains and sweeping rivers and leafy homes of birds and grassy plains, striking fond love into the breasts of all thou constrainest them each after its kind to continue their races with desire. Since thou then art sole mistress of the nature of things and without thee nothing rises up into the divine borders of light, nothing grows to be glad or lovely, fain would I have thee for a helpmate in writing the verses which I essay to pen on the nature of things for our own son of the Memmii, whom thou, goddess, hast willed to have no peer, rich as he ever is in every grace. Wherefore all the more, O lady, lend my lays an everliving charm. Cause meanwhile the savage works of war to be lulled to rest throughout all seas and lands; for thou alone canst bless mankind with calm peace, seeing that Mavors lord of battle controls the savage works of war, Mavors who often flings himself into thy lap quite vanquished by the never-healing wound of love; and then with upturned face and shapely neck thrown back feeds with love his greedy sight gazing, goddess, open-mouthed on thee; and as backward he reclines, his breath stays hanging on thy lips. While then, lady, he is reposing on thy holy body, shed thyself about him and above, and pour from thy lips sweet discourse, asking, glorious dame, gentle peace for the Romans. For neither can we in our country's day of trouble with untroubled mind think only of our work, nor can the illustrious offset of Memmius in times like these be wanting to the general weal. . . . for what remains to tell, apply to true reason unbusied ears and a keen mind withdrawn from cares, lest my gifts set out for you with steadfast zeal you abandon with disdain, before they are understood. For I will essay to discourse to you of the most high system of heaven and the gods and will open up the first beginnings of things, out of which nature gives birth to all things and increase and nourishment, and into which nature likewise dissolves them back after their destruction. These we are accustomed in explaining their reason to call matter and begetting bodies of things and to name seeds of things and also to term first bodies, because from them as first elements all things are.

When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth crushed down under the weight of religion, who showed her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece[1] ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story of gods nor thunderbolts nor heaven with threatening roar could quell: they only chafed the more the eager courage of his soul, filling him with desire to be the first to burst the fast bars of nature's portals. Therefore the living force of his soul gained the day: on he passed far beyond the flaming walls of the world and traversed throughout in mind and spirit the immeasurable

universe; whence he returns a conqueror to tell us what can, what cannot come into being; in short on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deepset boundary mark. Therefore religion is put under foot and trampled upon in turn; us his victory brings level with heaven.

This is what I fear herein, lest haply you should fancy that you are entering on unholy grounds of reason and treading the path of sin; whereas on the contrary often and often that very religion has given birth to sinful and unholy deeds. Thus in Aulis the chosen chieftains of the Danai, foremost of men, foully polluted with Iphianassa's blood the altar of the Trivian maid.[2] Soon as the fillet encircling her maiden tresses shed itself in equal lengths adown each cheek, and soon as she saw her father standing sorrowful before the altars and beside him the ministering priests hiding the knife and her countrymen at sight of her shedding tears, speechless in terror she dropped down on her knees and sank to the ground. Nor aught in such a moment could it avail the luckless girl that she had first bestowed the name of father on the king. For lifted up in the hands of the men she was carried shivering to the altars, not after due performance of the customary rites to be escorted by the clear-ringing bridal song, but in the very season of marriage, stainless maid mid the stain of blood, to fall a sad victim by the sacrificing stroke of a father, that thus a happy and prosperous departure might be granted to the fleet. So great the evils to which religion could prompt!

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This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, but by the aspect and the law of nature;[3] the warp of whose design we shall begin with this first principle, nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine power. Fear in sooth holds so in check all mortals, because they see many operations go on in earth and heaven, the causes of which they can in no way understand, believing them therefore to be done by power divine. For these reasons when we shall have seen that nothing can be produced from nothing, we shall then more correctly ascertain that which we are seeking, both the elements out of which every thing can be produced and the manner in which all things are done without the hand of the gods.

If things came from nothing, any kind might be born of any thing, nothing would require seed. Men for instance might rise out of the sea, the scaly race out of the earth, and birds might burst out of the sky; horned and other herds, every kind of wild beasts would haunt with changing brood tilth and wilderness alike. Nor would the same fruits keep constant to trees, but would change; any tree might bear any fruit. For if there were not begetting bodies for each, how could things have a fixed unvarying mother? But in fact because things are all produced from fixed seeds, each thing is born and goes forth into the borders of light out of that in which resides its matter and first bodies; and for this reason all things cannot be gotten out of all things, because in particular things resides a distinct power. Again why do we see the rose put forth in spring, corn in the season of heat, vines yielding at the call of autumn, if not because, when the fixed seeds of things have streamed together at the proper time, whatever is born discloses itself, while the due seasons are there and the quickened earth brings its weakly products in safety forth into the borders of light? But if they came from nothing, they would rise up suddenly at uncertain periods and unsuitable times of year, inasmuch as there would be no first-beginnings to be kept from a begetting union by the unpropitious season. No nor would time be required for the growth of things after the meeting of the seed, if they could increase out of nothing. Little babies would at once grow into men and trees in a moment would rise and spring out of the ground. But none of these events it is plain ever comes to pass, since all things grow step by step at a fixed time, as is natural, since they all grow from a fixed seed and in growing preserve their kind; so that you may be sure that all things increase in size and are fed out of their own matter. Furthermore without fixed seasons of rain the earth is unable to put forth its gladdening produce, nor again if kept from food could the nature of living things continue its kind and sustain life; so that you may hold with

greater truth that many bodies are common to many things, as we see letters common to different words, than that any thing could come into being without first-beginnings. Again why could not nature have produced men of such a size and strength as to be able to wade on foot across the sea and rend great mountains with their hands and outlive many generations of living men, if not because an unchanging matter has been assigned for begetting things and what can arise out of this matter is fixed? We must admit therefore that nothing can come from nothing, since things require seed before they can severally be born and be brought out into the buxom fields of air. Lastly since we see that tilled grounds surpass untilled and yield a better produce by the labour of hands, we may infer that there are in the earth first-beginnings of things which by turning up the fruitful clods with the share and labouring the soil of the earth we stimulate to rise. But if there were not such, you would see all things without any labour of ours spontaneously come forth in much greater perfection.

Moreover nature dissolves every thing back into its first bodies and does not annihilate things. For if aught were mortal in all its parts alike, the thing in a moment would be snatched away to destruction from before our eyes; since no force would be needed to produce disruption among its parts and undo their fastenings. Whereas in fact, as all things consist of an imperishable seed, nature suffers the destruction of nothing to be seen, until a force has encountered it sufficient to dash things to pieces by a blow or to pierce through the void places within them and break them up. Again if time, whenever it makes away with things through age, utterly destroys them eating up all their matter, out of what does Venus bring back into the light of life the race of living things each after its kind, or, when they are brought back, out of what does earth manifold in works give them nourishment and increase, furnishing them with food each after its kind? Out of what do its own native fountains and extraneous rivers from far and wide keep full the sea? Out of what does ether feed the stars? For infinite time gone by and lapse of days must have eaten up all things which are of mortal body. Now if in that period of time gone by those things have existed, of which this sum of things is composed and recruited, they are possessed no doubt of an imperishable body, and cannot therefore any of them return to nothing. Again the same force and cause would destroy all things without distinction, unless everlasting matter held them together, matter more or less closely linked in mutual entanglement: a touch in sooth would be sufficient cause of death, inasmuch as any amount of force must of course undo the texture of things in which no parts at all were of an everlasting body. But in fact, because the fastenings of first-beginnings one with the other are unlike and matter is everlasting, things continue with body uninjured, until a force is found to encounter them strong enough to overpower the texture of each. A thing therefore never returns to nothing, but all things after disruption go back into the first bodies of matter. Lastly rains die, when father ether has tumbled them into the lap of mother earth; but then goodly crops spring up and boughs are green with leaves upon the trees, trees themselves grow and are laden with fruit; by them in turn our race and the race of wild beasts are fed, by them we see glad towns teem with children and the leafy forests ring on all sides with the song of new birds; through them cattle wearied with their load of fat lay their bodies down about the glad pastures and the white milky stream pours from the distended udders; through them a new brood with weakly limbs frisks and gambols over the soft grass, rapt in their young hearts with the pure new milk. None of the things therefore which seem to be lost is utterly lost, since nature replenishes one thing out of another and does not suffer any thing to be begotten, before she has been recruited by the death of some other. . .

BOOK II

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Now mark and I will explain by what motion the begetting bodies of matter do beget different things and after they are begotten again break them up, and by what force they are compelled so to do and what velocity is given to them for travelling through the great void: do you

mind to give heed to my words. For verily matter does not cohere inseparably massed together, since we see that everything wanes and perceive that all things ebb as it were by length of time and that age withdraws them from our sight, though yet the sum is seen to remain unimpaired by reason that the bodies which quit each thing, lessen the things from which they go, gift with increase those to which they have come, compel the former to grow old, the latter to come to their prime, and yet abide not with these. Thus the sum of things is ever renewed and mortals live by a reciprocal dependency. Some nations wax, others wane, and in a brief space the races of living things are changed and like runners hand over the lamp of life.

If you think that first-beginnings of things can lag and by lagging give birth to new motions of things, you wander far astray from the path of true reason: since they travel about through void, the first-beginnings of things must all move on either by their own weight or haply by the stroke of another. For when during motion they have, as often happens, met and clashed, the result is a sudden rebounding in an opposite direction; and no wonder, since they are most hard and of weight proportioned to their solidity and nothing behind gets in their way. And that you may more clearly see that all bodies of matter are in restless movement, remember that there is no lowest point in the sum of the universe, and that first bodies have not where to take their stand, since space is without end and limit and extends immeasurably in all directions round, as I have shown in many words and as has been proved by sure reason. Since this then is a certain truth, sure enough no rest is given to first bodies throughout the unfathomable void, but driven on rather in ceaseless and varied motion they partly, after they have pressed together, rebound leaving great spaces between, while in part they are so dashed away after the stroke as to leave but small spaces between. And all that form a denser aggregation when brought together and rebound leaving trifling spaces between, held fast by their own close-tangled shapes, these form enduring bases of stone and unyielding bodies of iron and the rest of their class, few in number, which travel onward along the great void. All the others spring far off and rebound far leaving great spaces between: these furnish us with thin air and bright sunlight. And many more travel along the great void, which have been thrown off from the unions of things or though admitted have yet in no case been able likewise to assimilate their motions. Of this truth, which I am telling, we have a representation and picture always going on before our eyes and present to us: observe whenever the rays are let in and pour the sunlight through the dark chambers of houses: you will see many minute bodies in many ways through the apparent void mingle in the midst of the light of the rays, and as in never-ending conflict skirmish and give battle combating in troops and never halting, driven about in frequent meetings and partings; so that you may guess from this, what it is for first-beginnings of things to be ever tossing about in the great void. So far as it goes, a small thing may give an illustration of great things and put you on the track of knowledge. And for this reason too it is meet that you should give greater heed to these bodies which are seen to tumble about in the sun's rays, because such tumblings imply that motions also of matter latent and unseen are at the bottom. For you will observe many things were impelled by unseen blows to change their course and driven back to return the way they came now this way now that way in all directions round. All you are to know derive this restlessness from the first-beginnings. For the first-beginnings of things move first of themselves; next those bodies which form a small aggregate and come nearest so to say to the powers of the first-beginnings, are impelled and set in movement by the unseen strokes of those first bodies, and they next in turn stir up bodies which are a little larger. Thus motion mounts up from the first-beginnings and step by step issues forth to our senses, so that those bodies also move, which we can discern in the sunlight, though it is not clearly seen by what blows they so act....

BOOK III

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And now since I have shown what-like the beginnings of all things are and how diverse with varied shapes as they fly spontaneously driven on in everlasting motion, and how all things can be severally produced out of these, next after these questions the nature of the mind and soul should methinks be cleared up by my verses and that dread of Acheron be driven headlong forth, troubling as it does the life of man from its inmost depths and overspreading all things with the blackness of death, allowing no pleasure to be pure and unalloyed. . . .

This same principle teaches that the nature of the mind and soul is bodily; for when it is seen to push the limbs, rouse the body from sleep, and alter the countenance and guide and turn about the whole man, and when we see that none of these effects can take place without touch nor touch without body, must we not admit that the mind and the soul are of a bodily nature? Again you perceive that our mind in our body suffers together with the body and feels in unison with it. When a weapon with a shudder-causing force has been driven in and has laid bare bones and sinews within the body, if it does not take life, yet there ensues a faintness and a lazy sinking to the ground and on the ground the turmoil of mind which arises, and sometimes a kind of undecided inclination to get up. Therefore the nature of the mind must be bodily, since it suffers from bodily weapons and blows.

I will now go on to explain in my verses of what kind of body the mind consists and out of what it is formed. First of all I say that it is extremely fine and formed of exceedingly minute bodies. That this is so you may, if you please to attend, clearly perceive from what follows: nothing that is seen takes place with a velocity equal to that of the mind when it starts some suggestion and actually sets it agoing; the mind therefore is stirred with greater rapidity than any of the things whose nature stands out visible to sight. But that which is so passing nimble, must consist of seeds exceedingly round and exceedingly minute, in order to be stirred and set in motion by a small moving power. Thus water is moved and heaves by ever so small a force, formed as it is of small particles apt to roll. But on the other hand the nature of honey is more sticky, its liquid more sluggish and its movement more dilatory; for the whole mass of matter coheres more closely, because sure enough it is made of bodies not so smooth, fine, and round. A breeze however gentle and light can force, as you may see, a high heap of poppy seed to be blown away from the top downwards; but on the other hand Eurus itself cannot move a heap of stones. Therefore bodies possess a power of moving in proportion to their smallness and smoothness; and on the other hand the greater weight and roughness bodies prove to have, the more stable they are. Since then the nature of the mind has been found to be eminently easy to move, it must consist of bodies exceedingly small, smooth, and round. The knowledge of which fact, my good friend, will on many accounts prove useful and be serviceable to you. The following fact too likewise demonstrates how fine the texture is of which its nature is composed, and how small the room is in which it can be contained, could it only be collected into one mass: soon as the untroubled sleep of death has gotten hold of a man and the nature of the mind and soul has withdrawn, you can perceive then no diminution of the entire body either in appearance or weight: death makes all good save the vital sense and heat. Therefore the whole soul must consist of very small seeds and be inwoven through veins and flesh and sinews; inasmuch as, after it has all withdrawn from the whole body, the exterior contour of the limbs preserves itself entire and not a tittle of the weight is lost. Just in the same way when the flavour of wine is gone or when the delicious aroma of a perfume has been dispersed into the air or when the savour has left some body, yet the thing itself does not therefore look smaller to the eye, nor does aught seem to have been taken from the weight, because sure enough many minute seeds make

up the savours and the odour in the whole body of the several things. Therefore, again and again I say, you are to know that the nature of the mind and the soul has been formed of exceedingly minute seeds, since at its departure it takes away none of the weight....

Again the quickened powers of body and mind by their joint partnership enjoy health and life; for the nature of the mind cannot by itself alone without the body give forth vital motions nor can the body again bereft of the soul continue to exist and make use of its senses: just, you are to know, as the eye itself torn away from its roots cannot see anything when apart from the whole body, thus the soul and mind cannot it is plain do anything by themselves. Sure enough, because mixed up through veins and flesh, sinews and bones, their first-beginnings are confined by all the body and are not free to bound away leaving great spaces between, therefore thus shut in they make those sense-giving motions which they cannot make after death when forced out of the body into the air by reason that they are not then confined in a like manner; for the air will be a body and a living thing, if the soul shall be able to keep itself together and to enclose in it those motions which it used before to perform in the sinews and within the body. Moreover even while it yet moves within the confines of life, often the soul shaken from some cause or other is seen to wish to pass out and be loosed from the whole body, the features are seen to droop as at the last hour and all the limbs to sink flaccid over the bloodless trunk: just as happens, when the phrase is used, the mind is in a bad way, or the soul is quite gone; when all is hurry and every one is anxious to keep from parting the last tie of life; for then the mind and the power of the soul are shaken throughout and both are quite loosened together with the body; so that a cause somewhat more powerful can quite break them up. Why doubt I would ask that the soul when driven forth out of the body, when in the open air, feeble as it is, stript of its covering, not only cannot continue through eternity, but is unable to hold together the smallest fraction of time? Therefore, again and again I say, when the enveloping body has been all broken up and the vital airs have been forced out, you must admit that the senses of the mind and the soul are dissolved, since the cause of destruction is one and inseparable for both body and soul....

Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot, since the nature of the mind is proved to be mortal; and as in time gone by we felt no distress, when the Poeni from all sides came together to do battle, and all things shaken by war's troublous uproar shuddered and quaked beneath high heaven, and mortal men were in doubt which of the two peoples it should be to whose empire all must fall by sea and land alike, thus when we shall be no more, when there shall have been a separation of body and soul, out of both of which we are each formed into a single being, to us, you may be sure, who then shall be no more, nothing whatever can happen to excite sensation, not if earth shall be mingled with sea and sea with heaven. And even supposing the nature of the mind and power of the soul do feel, after they have been severed from our body, yet that is nothing to us who by the binding tie of marriage between body and soul are formed each into one single being. And if time should gather up our matter after our death and put it once more into the position in which it now is, and the light of life be given to us again, this result even would concern us not at all, when the chain of our self-consciousness has once been snapped asunder. So now we give ourselves no concern about any self which we have been before, nor do we feel any distress on the score of that self. For when you look back on the whole past course of immeasurable time and think how manifold are the shapes which the motions of matter take, you may easily credit this too, that these very same seeds of which we now are formed, have often before been placed in the same order in which they now are; and yet we cannot recover this in memory: a break in our existence has been interposed, and all the motions have wandered to and fro far astray from the sensations they produced. For he whom evil is to befall, must in his own person exist at the very time it comes, if the mis-

ery and suffering are haply to have any place at all; but since death precludes this, and forbids him to be, upon whom the ills can be brought, you may be sure that we have nothing to fear after death, and that he who exists not, cannot become miserable, and that it matters not a whit whether he has been born into life at any other time, when immortal death has taken away his mortal life.

Therefore when you see a man bemoaning his hard case, that after death he shall either rot with his body laid in the grave or be devoured by flames or the jaws of wild beasts, you may be sure that his ring betrays a flaw and that there lurks in his heart a secret goad, though he himself declare that he does not believe that any sense will remain to him after death. He does not methinks really grant the conclusion which he professes to grant nor the principle on which he so professes, nor does he take and force himself root and branch out of life, but all unconsciously imagines something of self to survive. For when any one in life suggests to himself that birds and beasts will rend his body after death, he makes moan for himself: he does not separate himself from that self, nor withdraw himself fully from the body so thrown out, and fancies himself that other self and stands by and impregnates it with his own sense. Hence he makes much moan that he has been born mortal, and sees not that after real death there will be no other self to remain in life and lament to self that his own self has met death, and there to stand and grieve that his own self there lying is mangled or burnt. For if it is an evil after death to be pulled about by the devouring jaws of wild beasts, I cannot see why it should not be a cruel pain to be laid on fires and burn in hot flames, or to be placed in honey and stifled, or to stiffen with cold, stretched on the smooth surface of an icy slab of stone, or to be pressed down and crushed by a load of earth above.

'Now no more shall thy house admit thee with glad welcome, nor a most virtuous wife and sweet children run to be the first to snatch kisses and touch thy heart with a silent joy. No more mayst thou be prosperous in thy doings, a safeguard to thine own. One disastrous day has taken from thee luckless man in luckless wise all the many prizes of life.' This do men say; but add not thereto 'and now no longer does any craving for these things beset thee withal.' For if they could rightly perceive this in thought and follow up the thought in words, they would release themselves from great distress and apprehension of mind. 'Thou, even as now thou art, sunk in the sleep of death, shalt continue so to be all time to come, freed from all distressful pains; but we with a sorrow that would not be sated wept for thee, when close by thou didst turn to an ashen hue on thy appalling funeral pile, and no length of days shall pluck from our hearts our ever-during grief.' This question therefore should be asked of this speaker, what there is in it so passing bitter, if it come in the end to sleep and rest, that any one should pine in never-ending sorrow.

This too men often, when they have reclined at table cup in hand and shade their brows with crowns, love to say from the heart, 'short is this enjoyment for poor weak men; presently it will have been and never after may it be called back'. As if after their death it is to be one of their chiefest afflictions that thirst and parching drought is to burn them up hapless wretches, or a craving for any thing else is to beset them. What folly! no one feels the want of himself and life at the time when mind and body are together sunk in sleep; for all we care this sleep might be everlasting, no craving whatever for ourselves then moves us. And yet by no means do those first-beginnings throughout our frame wander at that time far away from their sense-producing motions, at the moment when a man starts up from sleep and collects himself. Death therefore must be thought to concern us much less, if less there can be than what we see to be nothing; for a greater dispersion of the mass of matter follows after death, and no one wakes up, upon whom the chill cessation of life has once come.

Once more, if the nature of things could suddenly utter a voice and in person could rally any of us in such words as these, 'what hast thou,

O mortal, so much at heart, that thou goest such lengths in sickly sorrows? Why bemoan and bewail death? For say thy life past and gone has been welcome to thee and thy blessings have not all, as if they were poured into a perforated vessel, run through and been lost without avail: why not then take thy departure like a guest filled with life, and with resignation, thou fool, enter upon untroubled rest? But if all that thou hast enjoyed, has been squandered and lost, and life is a grievance, why seek to make any addition, to be wasted perversely in its turn and lost utterly without avail? Why not rather make an end of life and travail? For there is nothing more which I can contrive and discover for thee to give pleasure: all things are ever the same. Though thy body is not yet decayed with years nor thy frame worn out and exhausted, yet all things remain the same, ay though in length of life thou shouldst outlast all races of things now living, nay even more if thou shouldst never die,' what answer have we to make save this, that nature sets up against us a well-founded claim and puts forth in her pleading a true indictment? If however one of greater age and more advanced in years should complain and lament poor wretch his death more than is right, would she not with greater cause raise her voice and rally him in sharp accents, 'Away from this time forth with thy tears, rascal; a truce to thy complainings: thou decayest after full enjoyment of all the prizes of life. But because thou ever yearnest for what is not present, and despisest what is, life has slipped from thy grasp unfinished and unsatisfying, and or ever thou thoughtest, death has taken his stand at thy pillow, before thou canst take thy departure sated and filled with good things. Now however resign all things unsuited to thy age, and with a good grace up and greatly go: thou must.' With good reason methinks she would bring her charge, with reason rally and reproach; for old things give way and are supplanted by new without fail, and one thing must ever be replenished out of other things; and no one is delivered over to the pit and black Tartarus: matter is needed for after generations to grow; all of which though will follow thee when they have finished their term of life; and thus it is that all these no less than thou have before this come to an end and hereafter will come to an end. Thus one thing will never cease to rise out of another, and life is granted to none in fee-simple, to all in usufruct. Think too how the bygone antiquity of everlasting time before our birth was nothing to us. Nature therefore holds this up to us as a mirror of the time yet to come after our death. Is there aught in this that looks appalling, aught that wears an aspect of gloom? Is it not more untroubled than any sleep?...

Once more what evil lust of life is this which constrains us with such force to be so mightily troubled in doubts and dangers? A sure term of life is fixed for mortals, and death cannot be shunned, but meet it we must. Moreover we are ever engaged, ever involved in the same pursuits, and no new pleasure is struck out by living on; but whilst what we crave is wanting, it seems to transcend all the rest; then, when it has been gotten, we crave something else, and ever does the same thirst of life possess us, as we gape for it open-mouthed. Quite doubtful it is what fortune the future will carry with it or what chance will bring us or what end is at hand. Nor by prolonging life do we take one tittle from the time past in death nor can we fret anything away, whereby we may haply be a less long time in the condition of the dead. Therefore you may complete as many generations as you please during your life; none the less however will that everlasting death await you; and for no less long a time will he be no more in being, who beginning with to-day has ended his life, than the man who has died many months and years ago.

THE *ENCHEIRIDION*

1. Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you.

With such high aims, therefore, remember that you must bestir yourself with no slight effort to lay hold of them, but you will have to give up some things entirely, and defer others for the time being. But if you wish for these things also, and at the same time for both office and wealth, it may be that you will not get even these latter, because you aim also at the former, and certainly you will fail to get the former, which alone bring freedom and happiness.

Make it, therefore, your study at the very outset to say to every harsh external impression, "You are an external impression and not at all what you appear to be." After that examine it and test it by these rules which you have, the first and most important of which is this: Whether the impression has to do with the things which are under our control, or with those which are not under our control; and, if it has to do with some one of the things not under our control, have ready to hand the answer, "It is nothing to me."

3. With everything which entertains you, is useful, or of which you are fond, remember to say to yourself, beginning with the very least things, "What is its nature?" If you are fond of a jug, say, "I am fond of a jug"; for when it is broken you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed.

4. When you are on the point of putting your hand to some undertaking, remind yourself what the nature of that undertaking is. If you are going out of the house to bathe, put before your mind what happens at a public bath—those who splash you with water, those who jostle against you, those who vilify you and rob you. And thus you will set about your undertaking more securely if at the outset you say to yourself, "I want to take a bath, and, at the same time, to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature." And so do in

every undertaking. For thus, if anything happens to hinder you in your bathing, you will be ready to say, "Oh, well, this was not the only thing that I wanted, but I wanted also to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature; and I shall not so keep it if I am vexed at what is going on."

5. It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things. For example, death is nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is dreadful, *this* is the dreadful thing. When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves, that means, our own judgements. It is the part of an uneducated person to blame others where he himself fares ill; to blame himself is the part of one whose education has begun; to blame neither another nor his own self is the part of one whose education is already complete.

8. Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.

10. In the case of everything that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and see what faculty you have to deal with it. If you see a handsome lad or woman, you will find continence the faculty to employ here; if hard labour is laid upon you, you will find endurance; if reviling, you will find patience to bear evil. And if you habituate yourself in this fashion, your external impressions will not run away with you.

14. If you make it your will that your children and your wife and your friends should live for ever, you are silly; for you are making it your will that things not under your control should be under your control, and that what is not your own should be your own. In the same way, too, if you make it your will that your slave-boy be free from faults, you are a fool; for you are making it your will that vice be not vice, but something else. If, however, it is your will not to fail in what you desire, this is in your power. Wherefore, exercise yourself in that which is in your power. Each man's master is the person who has the authority over what the man wishes or does not wish, so as to secure it, or take it away. Whoever, therefore, wants to be free, let him neither wish for anything, nor avoid anything, that is under the control of others; or else he is necessarily a slave.

15. Remember that you ought to behave in life as you would at a banquet. As something is being passed around it comes to you; stretch out your hand and take a portion of it politely. It passes on; do not detain it. Or it has not come to you yet; do not project your desire to meet it, but wait until it comes in front of you. So act toward children, so toward a wife, so toward office, so toward wealth; and then some day you will be worthy of the banquets of the gods. But if you do not take these things even when they are set before you, but despise them, then you will not only share the banquet of the gods, but share also their rule. For it was by so doing that Diogenes and Heracleitus, and men like them, were deservedly divine and deservedly so called.

19. You can be invincible if you never enter a contest in which victory is not under your control. Beware lest, when you see some person preferred to you in honour, or possessing great power, or otherwise enjoying high repute, you are ever carried away

by the external impression, and deem him happy. For if the true nature of the good is one of the things that are under our control, there is no place for either envy or jealousy; and you yourself will not wish to be a praetor, or a senator, or a consul, but a free man. Now there is but one way that leads to this, and that is to despise the things that are not under our control.

26. What the will of nature is may be learned from a consideration of the points in which we do not differ from one another. For example, when some other person's slave-boy breaks his drinking-cup, you are instantly ready to say, "That's one of the things which happen." Rest assured, then, that when your own drinking-cup gets broken, you ought to behave in the same way that you do when the other man's cup is broken. Apply now the same principle to the matters of greater importance. Some other person's child or wife has died; no one but would say, "Such is the fate of man." Yet when a man's own child dies, immediately the cry is, "Alas! Woe is me!" But we ought to remember how we feel when we hear of the same misfortune befalling others.

27. Just as a mark is not set up in order to be missed, so neither does the nature of evil arise in the universe.[1]

31. In piety towards the gods, I would have you know, the chief element in this, to have right opinions about them—as existing and as administering the universe well and justly—and to have set yourself to obey them and to submit to everything that happens, and to follow it voluntarily, in the belief that it is being fulfilled by the highest intelligence. For if you act in this way, you will never blame the gods, nor find fault with them for neglecting you. But this result cannot be secured in any other way than by withdrawing your idea of the good and the evil from the things which are not under our control, and placing it in those which are under our control, and in those alone. Because, if you think any of those former things to be good or evil, then, when you fail to get what you want and fall into what you do not want, it is altogether inevitable that you will blame and hate those who are responsible for these results. For this is the nature of every living creature, to flee from and to turn aside from the things that appear harmful, and all that produces them, and to pursue after and to admire the things that are helpful, and all that produces them. Therefore, it is impossible for a man who thinks that he is being hurt to take pleasure in that which he thinks is hurting him, just as it is also impossible for him to take pleasure in the hurt itself. Hence it follows that even a father is reviled by a son when he does not give his child some share in the things that seem to be good; and this it was which made Polyneices and Eteocles enemies of one another, the thought that the royal power was a good thing. That is why the farmer reviles the gods, and so also the sailor, and the merchant, and those who have lost their wives and their children. For where a man's interest lies, there is also his piety. Wherefore, whoever is careful to exercise desire and aversion as he should, is at the same time careful also about piety. But it is always appropriate to make libations, and sacrifices, and to give of the firstfruits after the manner of our fathers, and to do all this with purity, and not in a slovenly or careless fashion, nor, indeed, in a niggardly way, nor yet beyond our means.

53. Upon every occasion we ought to have the following thoughts at our command :

Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny,
To that goal long ago to me assigned.
I'll follow and not falter; if my will
Prove weak and craven, still I'll follow on.[1]

" Whoso has rightly with necessity complied,
We count him wise, and skilled in things divine." [2]

" Well, O Crito, if so it is pleasing to the gods, so let it be." [3]

" Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me." [4]

THE MEDITATIONS
OF
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

BOOK II

BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not only of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in the same intelligence and the same portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away.

3. All that is from the gods is full of Providence. That which is from fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and involution with the things which are ordered by Providence. From thence all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee, let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to the gods.

5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more from him who observes these things.

8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says, like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through desire are more blameable than those which are committed through anger. For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed with pleasure is more blameable than that which is com-

mitted with pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something by desire.

14. Though thou shouldst be going to live three thousand years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere moment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of like forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the only thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it not.

15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.

16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and polity.

17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgement. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

This in Carnuntum.

BOOK IV

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3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at last.—But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to thee out of the universe.—Recall to thy recollection this alternative; either there is providence or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things; or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of political community, and be quiet at last.—But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon thee.—Consider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and pleasure, and be quiet at last.—But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment thee.—See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of the present, and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want of judgement in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space within which it is circumscribed, and be quiet at last. For the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.

This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these things, which thou seest, change immediately and will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.

4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.

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"We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good. Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed, while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.

"When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the en-

joyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them...

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ROMAN STOICISM

CICERO

On Law, Justice, and Reason[1]

VI. . . . . The most learned men have determined to begin with Law [in seeking Justice], and it would seem that they are right, if, according to their definition, Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is Law. And so they believe that Law is intelligence, whose natural function it is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing. They think that this quality has derived its name in Greek from the idea of granting to every man his own, and in our language I believe it has been named from the idea of choosing. For as they have attributed the idea of fairness to the word law, so we have given it that of selection, though both ideas properly belong to Law. Now if this is correct, as I think it to be in general, then the origin of justice is to be found in Law, for law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and injustice are measured. . . . .

VII. . . . . That animal which we call man, endowed with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen, possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme God who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings, who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived of it. But what is more divine, I will not say in man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth. If indeed they obey the same authorities and powers, this is true in a far greater degree; but as a matter of fact they do obey this celestial system, the divine mind, and the God of transcendent power. Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members. . . . .

[1] *Laws*. Keyes's translation ("Loeb Classical Library" series). These selections are a small part of the first of the three books of the *Laws*. Marcus is speaking, but I have dropped the dialogue form for the sake of brevity and continuity.—T. V. S.

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X. . . . . The points which are now being briefly touched upon are certainly important; but out of all the material of the philosophers' discussions, surely there comes nothing more valuable than the full realization that we are born for Justice, and that right is based, not upon men's opinions, but upon Nature. This fact will immediately be plain if you once get a clear conception of man's fellowship and union with his fellow-men. For no single thing is so like another, so exactly its counterpart, as all of us are to one another. Nay, if bad habits and false beliefs did not twist the weaker minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined, no one would be so like his own self as all men would be like all others. And so, however we may define man, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind between man and man; for if there were, one definition could not be applicable to all men; and indeed reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts and enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss and solve problems, and to come to conclusions, is certainly common to us all, and, though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is invariable. For the same things are invariably perceived by the senses, and those things which stimulate the senses, stimulate them in the same way in all men; and those rudimentary beginnings of intelligence to which I have referred, which are imprinted on our minds, are imprinted on all minds alike; and speech, the mind's interpreter, though differing in the choice of words, agrees in the sentiments expressed. In fact, there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue.

In Final Praise of the Immutable Law[9]

XXII. . . . . True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and rule, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment. . . . .

[9] This final and lofty panegyric is taken from *The Republic*, Book iii, being the only fragment that remains of chap. xxii.—T. V. S.

THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE

THE EIGHTH BOOK

Augustine's thirty-second year. He consults Simplicianus: from him hears the history of the conversion of Victorinus, and longs to devote himself entirely to God, but is mastered by his old habits; is still further roused by the history of St. Antony, and the conversion of two courtiers; during a severe struggle hears a voice from heaven, opens Scripture, and is converted, with his friend Alypius. His mother's vision fulfilled.

O MY God, let me, with thanksgiving, remember, and confess unto Thee Thy mercies on me. *Let my bones* be bedewed with Thy love, and let them *say unto Thee, Who is like unto Thee, O Lord? Thou hast broken my bonds in sunder, I will offer unto Thee the sacrifice of thanksgiving.* And how Thou hast broken them, I will declare; and all who worship Thee, when they hear this, shall say, "Blessed be the Lord in heaven and in earth, great and wonderful is His name." Thy words had stuck fast in my heart, and *I was hedged round about on all sides by Thee.* Of Thy eternal life I was now certain, though I saw it in a figure and as *through a glass.* Yet I had ceased to doubt that there was an incorruptible substance, whence was all other substance; nor did I now desire to be more certain of Thee, but more steadfast in Thee. But for my temporal life, all was wavering, and *my heart had to be purged from the old leaven. The Way,* the Saviour Himself, well pleased me, but as yet I shrunk from going through its straitness.

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For, I saw the church full; and one went this way, and another that way. But I was displeased that I led a secular life; yea now that my desires no longer inflamed me, as of old, with hopes of honour and profit, a very grievous burden it was to undergo so heavy a bondage. For, in comparison of Thy sweetness, *and the beauty of Thy house which I loved,* those things delighted me no longer. But still I was enthralled with the love of woman; nor did the Apostle forbid me to marry, although he advised me to something better, chiefly wishing *that all men were as himself was.*

• • • • •

My will the enemy held, and thence had made a chain for me, and bound me. For of a froward will, was a lust made; and a lust served, became custom; and custom not resisted, became necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together (whence I called it a chain) a hard bondage held me enthralled. But that new will which had begun to be in me, freely to serve Thee, and to wish to enjoy Thee, O God, the only assured pleasantness, was not yet able to overcome my former wilfulness, strengthened by age. Thus did my two wills, one new, and the other old, one carnal, the other spiritual, struggle within me; and by their discord, undid my soul.

Thus I understood, by my own experience, what I had read, how *the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.* Myself verily either way; yet more myself, in that which I approved in myself, than in that which in myself I disapproved. For in this last, it was now for the more part not myself, because in much I

rather endured against my will, than acted willingly. And yet it was through me, that custom had obtained this power of warring against me, because I had come willingly, whither I willed not. And who has any right to speak against it, if just punishment follow the sinner? Nor had I now any longer my former plea, that I therefore as yet hesitated to be above the world and serve Thee, for that the truth was not altogether ascertained to me; for now it too was. But I, still under service to the earth, refused to fight under Thy banner, and feared as much to be freed of all encumbrances, as we should fear to be encumbered with it. Thus with the baggage of this present world was I held down pleasantly, as in sleep; and the thoughts wherein I meditated on Thee were like the efforts of such as would awake, who yet overcome with a heavy drowsiness, are again drenched therein. And as no one would sleep for ever, and in all men's sober judgment waking is better, yet a man for the most part, feeling a heavy lethargy in all his limbs, defers to shake off sleep, and, though half displeased, yet even, after it is time to rise, with pleasure yields to it, so was I assured that much better were it for me to give myself up to Thy charity, than to give myself over to mine own cupidity; but though the former course satisfied me and gained the mastery, the latter pleased me and held me mastered. Nor had I any thing to answer Thee calling to me, *Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light.* And when Thou didst on all sides show me that what Thou saidst was true, I, convicted by the truth, had nothing at all to answer, but only those dull and drowsy words, "Anon, anon," "presently," "leave me but a little." But "presently, presently," had no present, and my "little while" went on for a long while; in vain *I delighted in Thy law according to the inner man, when another law in my members rebelled against the law of my mind, and led me captive under the law of sin which was in my members.* For the law of sin is the violence of custom, whereby the mind is drawn and holden, even against its will; but deservedly, for that it willingly fell into it. *Who then should deliver me thus wretched from the body of this death, but Thy grace only, through Jesus Christ our Lord?...*

Then in this great contention of my inward dwelling, which I had strongly raised against my soul, in *the chamber* of my heart, troubled in mind and countenance, I turned upon Alypius. "What ails us?" I exclaim: "what is it? what heardest thou? The unlearned start up and *take heaven by force,* and we with our learning, and without heart, lo, where we wallow in flesh and blood! Are we ashamed to follow, because others are gone before, and not ashamed not even to follow?" Some such words I uttered, and my fever of mind tore me away from him, while he, gazing on me in astonishment, kept silence. For it was not my wonted tone; and my forehead, cheeks, eyes, colour, tone of voice, spake my mind more than the words I uttered. A little garden there was to our lodging, which we had the use of, as of the whole house; for the master of the house, our host, was not living there. Thither had the tumult of my breast hurried me, where no man might hinder the hot contention wherein I had engaged with myself, until it should end as Thou knewest, I knew not. Only I was healthfully distracted and dying, to live; knowing what evil thing I was, and not knowing what good thing I was shortly to become. I retired then into the garden, and Alypius, on my steps. For his presence did not lessen my privacy; or how could he forsake me so disturbed? We sate down as far removed as might be from the house. I was troubled in spirit, most vehemently indig-

into myself. What said I not against myself? with what scourges of condemnation lashed I not my soul, that it might follow me, striving to go after Thee! Yet it drew back; refused, but excused not itself. All arguments were spent and confuted; there remained a mute shrinking; and she feared, as she would death, to be restrained from the flux of that custom, whereby she was wasting to death.

Lastly, in the very fever of my irresoluteness, I made with my body many such motions as men sometimes would, but cannot, if either they have not the limbs, or these be bound with bands, weakened with infirmity, or any other way hindered. Thus, if I tore my hair, beat my forehead, if locking my fingers I clasped my knees; I willed, I did it. But I might have willed, and not done it; if the power of motion in my limbs had not obeyed. So many things then I did, when "to will" was not in itself "to be able"; and I did not what both I longed incomparably more to do, and which soon after, when I should will, I should be able to do; because soon after, when I should will, I should will thoroughly. For in these things the ability was one with the will, and to will was to do; and yet was it not done: and more easily did my body obey the weakest willing of my soul, in moving its limbs at its nod, than the soul obeyed itself to accomplish in the will alone this its momentous will.

Whence is this monstrousness? and to what end? Let Thy mercy gleam that I may ask, if so be the secret penalties of men, and those darkest pangs of the sons of Adam, may perhaps answer me. Whence is this monstrousness? and to what end? The mind commands the body, and it obeys instantly; the mind commands itself, and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved; and such readiness is there, that command is scarce distinct from obedience. Yet the mind is mind, the hand is body. The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will and yet it doth not. Whence this monstrousness? and to what end? It commands itself, I say, to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely: therefore doth it not command entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth; and, so far forth is the thing commanded, not done, as it willeth not. For the will commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself. But it doth not command entirely, therefore what it commandeth, is not. For were the will entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will, partly to nill, but a disease of the mind, that it doth not wholly rise, by truth up-borne, borne down by custom. And therefore are there two wills, for that one of them is not entire: and what the one lacketh, the other hath...

Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing myself much more severely than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain, till that were wholly broken, whereby I now was but just, but still was, held. And Thou, O Lord, pressedst upon me in my inward parts by a severe mercy, redoubling the lashes of fear and shame, lest I should again give way, and not bursting that same slight remaining tie, it should recover strength, and bind me the faster. For I said within myself, "Be it done now, be it done now," and as I spake, I all but enacted it: I all but did it, and did it not: yet sunk not back to my former state, but kept my stand hard by, and took breath. And I essayed again, and wanted somewhat less of it, and somewhat less, and all but touched, and laid hold of it; and yet came not at it, nor touched nor laid hold of it; hesitating to die to death and to live to life: and the worse whereto I was inured, prevailed more with me than the better whereto I was unused: and the very moment

wherein I was to become other than I was, the nearer it approached me, the greater horror did it strike into me; yet did it not strike me back, nor turned me away, but held me in suspense.

The very toys of toys, and vanities of vanities, my ancient mistresses, still held me; they plucked my fleshly garment, and whispered softly, "Dost thou cast us off? and from that moment shall we no more be with thee for ever? and from that moment shall not this or that be lawful for thee for ever?" And what was it which they suggested in that I said, "this or that," what did they suggest, O my God? Let Thy mercy turn it away from the soul of Thy servant. What defilements did they suggest! what shame! And now I much less than half heard them, and not openly showing themselves and contradicting me, but muttering as it were behind my back, and privily plucking me, as I was departing, but to look back on them. Yet they did retard me, so that I hesitated to burst and shake myself free from them, and to spring over whither I was called; a violent habit saying to me, "Thinkest thou, thou canst live without them?"

But now it spake very faintly. For on that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there appeared unto me the chaste dignity of Continency, serene, yet not relaxedly, gay, honestly alluring me to come and doubt not; and stretching forth to receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples: there were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave widows and aged virgins; and Continence herself in all, not barren, but a *fruitful mother of children* of joys, by Thee her Husband, O Lord. And she smiled on me with a persuasive mockery, as would she say, "Canst not thou what these youths, what these maidens can? or can they either in themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God? The Lord their God gave me unto them. Why standest thou in thyself, and so standest not? cast thyself upon Him, fear not He will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldest fall; cast thyself fearlessly upon Him, He will receive, and will heal thee." And I blushed exceedingly, for that I yet heard the muttering of those toys, and hung in suspense. And she again seemed to say, "Stop thine ears against *those* thy unclean *members on the earth,* that they may be *mortified. They tell thee of delights, but not as doth the law of the Lord thy God.*" This controversy in my heart was self against self only. But Alypius sitting close by my side, in silence waited the issue of my unwonted emotion.

But when a deep consideration had from the secret bottom of my soul drawn together and heaped up all my misery in the sight of my heart; there arose a mighty storm, bringing a mighty shower of tears. Which that I might pour forth wholly, in its natural expressions, I rose from Alypius: solitude was suggested to me as fitter for the business of weeping; so I retired so far that even his presence could not be a burden to me. Thus was it then with me, and he perceived something of it; for something I suppose I had spoken, wherein the tones of my voice appeared choked with weeping, and so had risen up. He then remained where we were sitting, most extremely astonished. I cast myself down I know not how, under a certain fig-tree, giving full vent to my tears; and the floods of mine eyes gushed out an *acceptable sacrifice to Thee.* And, not indeed in these words, yet to this purpose, spake I much unto Thee: *and Thou, O Lord, how long? how long, Lord, wilt Thou be angry, for ever? Remember not our former iniquities,*[53] for I felt that I was held by them. I sent up these sorrowful words: How long, how long, "to-morrow, and to-morrow?" Why not now? why not is there this hour an end to my uncleanness?

So was I speaking and weeping in the most bitter contrition of my heart, when, lo! I heard from a neighbouring house a voice, as of boy or girl, I know not, chanting, and oft repeating, "Take up and read; Take up and read." Instantly, my countenance altered, I began to think most intently whether children were wont in any kind of play to sing such words: nor could I remember ever to have heard the like. So checking the torrent of my tears, I arose; interpreting it to be no other than a command from God to open the book, and read the first chapter I should find. For I had heard of Antony, that coming in during the reading of the Gospel, he received the admonition, as if what was being read was spoken to him: *Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come and follow me:* and by such oracle he was forthwith converted unto Thee. Eagerly then I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting; for there had I laid the volume of the Apostle when I arose thence. I seized, opened, and in silence read that section on which my eyes first fell: *Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence.* No further would I read; nor needed I: for instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the darkness of doubt vanished away.

Then putting my finger between, or some other mark, I shut the volume, and with a calmed countenance made it known to Alypius. And what was wrought in him, which I knew not, he thus showed me. He asked to see what I had read: I showed him; and he looked even further than I had read, and I knew not what followed. This followed, *him that is weak in the faith, receive;* which he applied to himself, and disclosed to me. And by this admonition was he strengthened; and by a good resolution and purpose, and most corresponding to his character, wherein he did always very far differ from me, for the better, without any turbulent delay he joined me. Thence we go in to my mother; we tell her; she rejoiceth: we relate in order how it took place; she leaps for joy, and triumpheth, and blessed Thee, *Who art able to do above that which we ask or think;* for she perceived that Thou hadst given her more for me, than she was wont to beg by her pitiful and most sorrowful groanings. For thou convertedst me unto Thyself, so that I sought neither wife, nor any hope of this world, standing in that rule of faith, where Thou hadst showed me unto her in a vision, so many years before. And Thou didst *convert her mourning into joy* much more plentiful than she had desired, and in a much more precious and purer way than she erst required, by having grandchildren of my body.

THE CITY OF GOD.

BOOK FOURTEENTH.

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Of the nature of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly.

Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, "Thou art my glory, and the lifter up of mine head." In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers; the other says to its God, "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength." And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man, have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God "glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise,"—that is, glorying in their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride,—"they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." For they were either leaders or followers of the people in adoring images, "and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever." But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, "that God may be all in all."

BOOK NINETEENTH.

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What produces peace, and what discord, between the heavenly and earthly cities.

But the families which do not live by faith seek their peace in the earthly advantages of this life; while the families which live by faith look for those eternal blessings which are promised, and use as pilgrims such advantages of time and of earth as do not fascinate and divert them from God, but rather aid them to endure with greater ease, and to keep down the number of those burdens of the corruptible body which weigh upon the soul. Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both kinds of men and families

alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely different aim in using them. The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it. But, as the earthly city has had some philosophers whose doctrine is condemned by the divine teaching, and who, being deceived either by their own conjectures or by demons, supposed that many gods must be invited to take an interest in human affairs, and assigned to each a separate function and a separate department,—to one the body, to another the soul; and in the body itself, to one the head, to another the neck, and each of the other members to one of the gods; and in like manner, in the soul, to one god the natural capacity was assigned, to another education, to another anger, to another lust; and so the various affairs of life were assigned,—cattle to one, corn to another, wine to another, oil to another, the woods to another, money to another, navigation to another, wars and victories to another, marriages to another, births and fecundity to another, and other things to other gods: and as the celestial city, on the other hand, knew that one God only was to be worshipped, and that to Him alone was due that service which the Greeks call λατρεία, and which can be given only to a god, it has come to pass that the two cities could not have common laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been compelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious to those who think differently, and to stand the brunt of their anger and hatred and persecutions, except in so far as the minds of their enemies have been alarmed by the multitude of the Christians and quelled by the manifest protection of God accorded to them. This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognising that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can be truly

called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want, and in all its members subjected to the will. In its pilgrim state the heavenly city possesses this peace by faith; and by this faith it lives righteously when it refers to the attainment of that peace every good action towards God and man; for the life of the city is a social life.

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BOOK TWENTIETH.

What the reign of the saints with Christ for a thousand years is, and how it differs from the eternal kingdom.

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But while the devil is bound, the saints reign with Christ during the same thousand years, understood in the same way, that is, of the time of His first coming. For, leaving out of account that kingdom concerning which He shall say in the end, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, take possession of the kingdom prepared for you," the Church could not now be called His kingdom or the kingdom of heaven unless His saints were even now reigning with Him, though in another and far different way; for to His saints He says, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.' Certainly it is in this present time that the scribe well instructed in the kingdom of God, and of whom we have already spoken, brings forth from his treasure things new and old. And from the Church those reapers shall gather out the tares which He suffered to grow with the wheat till the harvest, as He explains in the words, "The harvest is the end of the world; and the reapers are the angels. As therefore the tares are gathered together and burned with fire, so shall it be in the end of the world. The Son of man shall send His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all offences." Can He mean out of that kingdom in which are no offences? Then it must be out of His present kingdom, the Church, that they are gathered. So He says, "He that breaketh one of the least of these commandments, and teacheth men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven: but he that doeth and teacheth thus shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." He speaks of both as being in the kingdom of heaven, both the man who does not perform the commandments which He teaches,—for "to break" means not to keep, not to perform,—and the man who does and teaches as He did; but the one He calls least, the other great. And He immediately adds, "For I say unto you, that except your righteousness exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees,"—that is, the righteousness of those who break what they teach; for of the scribes and Pharisees He elsewhere says, "For they say and do not;" —unless, therefore, your righteousness exceed theirs, that is, so that you do not break but rather do what you teach, "ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven." We must understand in one sense the kingdom of heaven in which exist together both he who breaks what he teaches and he who does it, the one being least, the other great, and in another sense the kingdom of heaven into which only he who does what he teaches shall enter. Con-

sequently, where both classes exist, it is the Church as it now is, but where only the one shall exist, it is the Church as it is destined to be when no wicked person shall be in her. Therefore the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign hereafter; and yet, though the tares grow in the Church along with the wheat, they do not reign with Him. For they reign with Him who do what the apostle says, "If ye be risen with Christ, mind the things which are above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God. Seek those things which are above, not the things which are on the earth." Of such persons he also says that their conversation is in heaven. In fine, they reign with Him who are so in His kingdom that they themselves are His kingdom. But in what sense are those the kingdom of Christ who, to say no more, though they are in it until all offences are gathered out of it at the end of the world, yet seek their own things in it, and not the things that are Christ's?

It is then of this kingdom militant, in which conflict with the enemy is still maintained, and war carried on with warring lusts, or government laid upon them as they yield, until we come to that most peaceful kingdom in which we shall reign without an enemy, and it is of this first resurrection in the present life, that the Apocalypse speaks in the words just quoted. For, after saying that the devil is bound a thousand years and is afterwards loosed for a short season, it goes on to give a sketch of what the Church does or of what is done in the Church in those days, in the words, "And I saw seats and them that sat upon them, and judgment was given." It is not to be supposed that this refers to the last judgment, but to the seats of the rulers and to the rulers themselves by whom the Church is now governed. And no better interpretation of judgment being given can be produced than that which we have in the words, "What ye bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and what ye loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." Whence the apostle says, "What have I to do with judging them that are without? do not ye judge them that are within?" "And the souls," says John, "of those who were slain for the testimony of Jesus and for the word of God,"—understanding what he afterwards says, "reigned with Christ a thousand years," —that is, the souls of the martyrs not yet restored to their bodies. For the souls of the pious dead are not separated from the Church, which even now is the kingdom of Christ; otherwise there would be no remembrance made of them at the altar of God in the partaking of the body of Christ, nor would it do any good in danger to run to His baptism, that we might not pass from this life without it; nor to reconciliation, if by penitence or a bad conscience any one may be severed from His body. For why are these things practised, if not because the faithful, even though dead, are His members? Therefore, while these thousand years run on, their souls reign with Him, though not as yet in conjunction with their bodies. And therefore in another part of this same book we read, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord from henceforth: and now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; for their works do follow them."

The Church, then, begins its reign with Christ now in the living and in the dead. For, as the apostle says, "Christ died that He might be Lord both of the living and of the dead." But he mentioned the souls of the martyrs only, because they who have contended even to death for the truth, themselves principally reign after death; but, taking the part for the whole, we understand the words of all others who belong to the Church, which is the kingdom of Christ.

As to the words following, "And if any have not worshipped the beast nor his image, nor have received his inscription on their forehead, or on their hand," we must take them of both the living and the dead. And what this beast is, though it requires a more careful investigation, yet it is not inconsistent with the true faith to understand it of the ungodly city itself, and the community of unbelievers set in opposition to the faithful people and the city of God. "His image" seems to me to mean his simulation, to wit, in those men who profess to believe, but live as unbelievers. For they pretend to be what they are not, and are called Christians, not from a true likeness, but from a deceitful image. For to this beast belong not only the avowed enemies of the name of Christ and His most glorious city, but also the tares which are to be gathered out of His kingdom, the Church, in the end of the world. And who are they who do not worship the beast and his image, if not those who do what the apostle says, "Be not yoked with unbelievers?" For such do not worship, *i.e.* do not consent, are not subjected; neither do they receive the inscription, the brand of crime, on their forehead by their profession, on their hand by their practice. They, then, who are free from these pollutions, whether they still live in this mortal flesh, or are dead, reign with Christ even now, through this whole interval which is indicated by the thousand years, in a fashion suited to this time.

"The rest of them," he says, "did not live." For now is the hour when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live; and the rest of them shall not live. The words added, "until the thousand years are finished," mean that they did not live in the time in which they ought to have lived by passing from death to life. And therefore, when the day of the bodily resurrection arrives, they shall come out of their graves, not to life, but to judgment, namely, to damnation, which is called the second death. For whosoever has not lived until the thousand years be finished, *i.e.* during this whole time in which the first resurrection is going on,—whosoever has not heard the voice of the Son of God, and passed from death to life,—that man shall certainly in the second resurrection, the resurrection of the flesh, pass with his flesh into the second death. For he goes on to say, "This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection," or who experiences it. Now he experiences it who not only revives from the death of sin, but continues in this renewed life. "In these the second death hath no power." Therefore it has power in the rest, of whom he said above, "The rest of them did not live until the thousand years were finished;" for in this whole intervening

time, called a thousand years, however lustily they lived in the body, they were not quickened to life out of that death in which their wickedness held them, so that by this revived life they should become partakers of the first resurrection, and so the second death should have no power over them.

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HISTORY OF THE FRANKS

By GREGORY BISHOP OF TOURS

HERE BEGINS GREGORY'S FIRST PREFACE

With liberal culture on the wane, or rather perishing in the Gallic cities, there were many deeds being done both good and evil: the heathen were raging fiercely; kings were growing more cruel; the church, attacked by heretics, was defended by Catholics; while the Christian faith was in general devoutly cherished, among some it was growing cold; the churches also were enriched by the faithful or plundered by traitors — and no grammarian skilled in the dialectic art could be found to describe these matters either in prose or verse; and many were lamenting and saying: "Woe to our day, since the pursuit of letters has perished from among us and no one can be found among the people who can set forth the deeds of the present on the written page." Hearing continually these complaints and others like them I [have undertaken] to commemorate the past, in order that it may come to the knowledge of the future; and although my speech is rude, I have been unable to be silent as to the struggles between the wicked and the upright; and I have been especially encouraged because, to my surprise, it has often been said by men of our day, that few understand the learned words of the rhetorician but many the rude language of the common people. I have decided also that for the reckoning of the years the first book shall begin with the very beginning of the world, and I have given its chapters below.

THE SECOND BOOK

27. After these events Childeric died and Clovis his son reigned in his stead. In the fifth year of his reign Siagrius, king of the Romans, son of Egidius, had his seat in the city of Soissons which Egidius, who has been mentioned before, once held. And Clovis came against him with Ragnachar, his kinsman, because he used to possess the kingdom, and demanded that they make ready a battle-field. And Siagrius did not delay nor was he afraid to resist. And so they fought against each other and Siagrius, seeing his army crushed, turned his back and fled swiftly to king Alaric at Toulouse. And Clovis sent to Alaric to send him back, otherwise he was to know that Clovis would make war on him for his refusal. And Alaric was afraid that he would incur the anger of the Franks on account of Siagrius, seeing it is the fashion of the Goths to be terrified, and he surrendered him in chains to Clovis' envoys. And Clovis took him and gave orders to put him under guard, and when he had got his kingdom he directed that he be executed secretly. At that time many churches were despoiled by Clovis' army, since he was as yet involved in heathen error. Now the army had taken from a certain church a vase of wonderful size and beauty, along with the remainder of the utensils for the service of the church. And the bishop of the church sent messengers to the king asking that the vase at least be returned, if he could not get back any more of the sacred dishes. On hearing this

the king said to the messenger: "Follow us as far as Soissons, because all that has been taken is to be divided there and when the lot assigns me that dish I will do what the father [1] asks." Then when he came to Soissons and all the booty was set in their midst, the king said: "I ask of you, brave warriors, not to refuse to grant me in addition to my share, yonder dish," that is, he was speaking of the vase just mentioned. In answer to the speech of the king those of more sense replied: "Glorious king, all that we see is yours, and we ourselves are subject to your rule. Now do what seems well-pleasing to you; for no one is able to resist your power." When they said this a foolish, envious and excitable fellow lifted his battle-ax and struck the vase, and cried in a loud voice: "You shall get nothing here except what the lot fairly bestows on you." At this all were stupefied, but the king endured the insult with the gentleness of patience, and taking the vase he handed it over to the messenger of the church, nursing the wound deep in his heart. And at the end of the year he ordered the whole army to come with their equipment of armor, to show the brightness of their arms on the field of March. And when he was reviewing them all carefully, he came to the man who struck the vase, and said to him: "No one has brought armor so carelessly kept as you; for neither your spear nor sword nor ax is in serviceable condition." And seizing his ax he cast it to the earth, and when the other had bent over somewhat to pick it up, the king raised his hands and drove his own ax into the man's head. "This," said he, "is what you did at Soissons to the vase." Upon the death of this man, he ordered the rest to depart, raising great dread of himself by this action. He made many wars and gained many victories. In the tenth year of his reign he made war on the Thuringi and brought them under his dominion.

28. Now the king of the Burgundians was Gundevech, of the family of king Athanaric the persecutor, whom we have mentioned before. He had four sons; Gundobad, Godegisel, Chilperic and Godomar. Gundobad killed his brother Chilperic with the sword, and sank his wife in water with a stone tied to her neck. His two daughters he condemned to exile; the older of these, who became a nun, was called Chrona, and the younger Clotilda. And as Clovis often sent embassies to Burgundy, the maiden Clotilda was found by his envoys. And when they saw that she was of good bearing and wise, and learned that she was of the family of the king, they reported this to King Clovis, and he sent an embassy to Gundobad without delay asking her in marriage. And Gundobad was afraid to refuse, and surrendered her to the men, and they took the girl and brought her swiftly to the king. The king was very glad when he saw her, and married her, having already by a concubine a son named Theodoric.

29. He had a first-born son by queen Clotilda, and as his wife wished to consecrate him in baptism, she tried unceasingly to persuade her husband, saying: "The gods you worship are nothing, and they will be unable to help themselves or any one else. For they are graven out of stone or wood or some metal. And the names you have given them are names of men and not of gods, as Saturn, who is declared to have fled in fear of being banished from

[1] *papa*. The word was used in the early Middle Ages in unrestricted, informal sense, and applied widely to bishops. Cf. Du Cange, *Glossarium*.

his kingdom by his son; as Jove himself, the foul perpetrator of all shameful crimes, committing incest with men, mocking at his kinswomen, not able to refrain from intercourse with his own sister as she herself says: *Jovisque et soror et conjunx.* What could Mars or Mercury do? They are endowed rather with the magic arts than with the power of the divine name. But he ought rather to be worshipped who created by his word heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is out of a state of nothingness, who made the sun shine, and adorned the heavens with stars, who filled the waters with creeping things, the earth with living things and the air with creatures that fly, at whose nod the earth is decked with growing crops, the trees with fruit, the vines with grapes, by whose hand mankind was created, by whose generosity all that creation serves and helps man whom he created as his own." But though the queen said this the spirit of the king was by no means moved to belief, and he said: "It was at the command of our gods that all things were created and came forth, and it is plain that your God has no power and, what is more, he is proven not to belong to the family of the gods." Meantime the faithful queen made her son ready for baptism; she gave command to adorn the church with hangings and curtains, in order that he who could not be moved by persuasion might be urged to belief by this mystery. The boy, whom they named Ingomer, died after being baptized, still wearing the white garments in which he became regenerate. At this the king was violently angry, and reproached the queen harshly, saying: "If the boy had been dedicated in the name of my gods he would certainly have lived; but as it is, since he was baptized in the name of your God, he could not live at all." To this the queen said: "I give thanks to the omnipotent God, creator of all, who has judged me not wholly unworthy, that he should deign to take to his kingdom one born from my womb. My soul is not stricken with grief for his sake, because I know that, summoned from this world as he was in his baptismal garments, he will be fed by the vision of God."

After this she bore another son, whom she named Chlodomer at baptism; and when he fell sick, the king said: "It is impossible that anything else should happen to him than happened to his brother, namely, that being baptized in the name of your Christ, he should die at once." But through the prayers of his mother, and the Lord's command, he became well.

30. The queen did not cease to urge him to recognize the true God and cease worshiping idols. But he could not be influenced in any way to this belief, until at last a war arose with the Alamanni, in which he was driven by necessity to confess what before he had of his free will denied. It came about that as the two armies were fighting fiercely, there was much slaughter, and Clovis's army began to be in danger of destruction. He saw it and raised his eyes to heaven, and with remorse in his heart he burst into tears and cried: "Jesus Christ, whom Clotilda asserts to be the son of the living God, who art said to give aid to those in distress, and to bestow victory on those who hope in thee, I beseech the glory of thy aid, with the vow that if thou wilt grant me victory over these enemies, and I shall know that power which she says that people dedicated in thy name have had from thee, I will believe in thee and be baptized in thy name. For I have invoked my own gods,

but, as I find, they have withdrawn from aiding me; and therefore I believe that they possess no power, since they do not help those who obey them. I now call upon thee, I desire to believe thee, only let me be rescued from my adversaries." And when he said this, the Alamanni turned their backs, and began to disperse in flight. And when they saw that their king was killed, they submitted to the dominion of Clovis, saying: "Let not the people perish further, we pray; we are yours now." And he stopped the fighting, and after encouraging his men, retired in peace and told the queen how he had had merit to win the victory by calling on the name of Christ. This happened in the fifteenth year of his reign.

31. Then the queen asked saint Remi, bishop of Rheims, to summon Clovis secretly, urging him to introduce the king to the word of salvation. And the bishop sent for him secretly and began to urge him to believe in the true God, maker of heaven and earth, and to cease worshiping idols, which could help neither themselves nor any one else. But the king said: "I gladly hear you, most holy father; but there remains one thing: the people who follow me cannot endure to abandon their gods; but I shall go and speak to them according to your words." He met with his followers, but before he could speak the power of God anticipated him, and all the people cried out together: "O pious king, we reject our mortal gods, and we are ready to follow the immortal God whom Remi preaches." This was reported to the bishop, who was greatly rejoiced, and bade them get ready the baptismal font. The squares were shaded with tapestried canopies, the churches adorned with white curtains, the baptistery set in order, the aroma of incense spread, candles of fragrant odor burned brightly, and the whole shrine of the baptistery was filled with a divine fragrance: and the Lord gave such grace to those who stood by that they thought they were placed amid the odors of paradise. And the king was the first to ask to be baptized by the bishop. Another Constantine advanced to the baptismal font, to terminate the disease of ancient leprosy and wash away with fresh water the foul spots that had long been borne. And when he entered to be baptized, the saint of God began with ready speech: "Gently bend your neck, Sigamber; worship what you burned; burn what you worshipped." The holy bishop Remi was a man of excellent wisdom and especially trained in rhetorical studies, and of such surpassing holiness that he equalled the miracles of Silvester. For there is extant a book of his life which tells that he raised a dead man. And so the king confessed all-powerful God in the Trinity, and was baptized in the name of the Father, Son and holy Spirit, and was anointed with the holy ointment with the sign of the cross of Christ. And of his army more than 3000 were baptized. His sister also, Albofled, was baptized, who not long after passed to the Lord. And when the king was in mourning for her, the holy Remi sent a letter of consolation which began in this way: "The reason of your mourning pains me, and pains me greatly, that Albofled your sister, of good memory, has passed away. But I can give you this comfort, that her departure from the world was such that she ought to be envied rather than mourned." Another sister also was converted, Lanthechild by name, who had fallen into the heresy of the Arians, and she con-

fessed that the Son and the holy Spirit were equal to the Father, and was anointed.

32. At that time the brothers Gundobad and Godegisel were kings of the country about the Rhone and the Saône together with the province of Marseilles. And they, as well as their people, belonged to the Arian sect. And since they were fighting with each other, Godegisel, hearing of the victories of King Clovis, sent an embassy to him secretly, saying: "If you will give me aid in attacking my brother, so that I may be able to kill him in battle or drive him from the country, I will pay you every year whatever tribute you yourself wish to impose." Clovis accepted this offer gladly, and promised aid whenever need should ask. And at a time agreed upon he marched his army against Gundobad. On hearing of this, Gundobad, who did not know of his brother's treachery, sent to him, saying: "Come to my assistance, since the Franks are in motion against us and are coming to our country to take it. Therefore let us be united against a nation hostile to us, lest because of division we suffer in turn what other peoples have suffered." And the other said: "I will come with my army, and will give you aid." And these three, namely, Clovis against Gundobad and Godegisel, were marching their armies to the same point, and they came with all their warlike equipment to the stronghold named Dijon. And they fought on the river Ouche, and Godegisel joined Clovis, and both armies crushed the people of Gundobad. And he perceived the treachery of his brother, whom he had not suspected, and turned his back and began to flee, hastening along the banks of the Rhone, and he came to the city of Avignon. And Godegisel having won the victory, promised to Clovis a part of his kingdom, and departed quietly and entered Vienne in triumph, as if he now held the whole kingdom. King Clovis increased his army further, and set off after Gundobad to drag him from his city and slay him. He heard it, and was terrified, and feared that sudden death would come to him. However he had with him Aridius, a man famed for energy and wisdom, and he sent for him and said: "Difficulties wall me in on every side, and I do not know what to do, because these barbarians have come upon us to slay us and destroy the whole country." To this Aridius answered: "You must soften the fierceness of this man in order not to perish. Now if it is pleasing in your eyes, I will pretend to flee from you and to pass over to his side, and when I come to him, I shall prevent his harming either you or this country. Only be willing to do what he demands of you by my advice, until the Lord in his goodness deigns to make your cause successful." And Gundobad said: "I will do whatever you direct." When he said this, Aridius bade him good-by and departed, and going to King Clovis he said: "Behold I am your humble servant, most pious king, I come to your protection, leaving the wretched Gundobad. And if your goodness condescends to receive me, both you and your children shall have in me a true and faithful servant." Clovis received him very readily, and kept him by him, for he was entertaining in story-telling, ready in counsel, just in judgment, and faithful in what was put in his charge. Then when Clovis with all his army sat around the walls of the city, Aridius said: "O King, if the glory of your loftiness should kindly consent to hear the few words of my lowliness, though you do not need counsel, yet I

would utter them with entire faithfulness, and they will be advantageous to you and to the cities through which you purpose to go. Why," said he, "do you keep your army here, when your enemy sits in a very strong place? If you ravage the fields, lay waste the meadows, cut down the vineyards, lay low the olive-yards, and destroy all the produce of the country, you do not, however, succeed in doing him any harm. Send an embassy rather and impose tribute to be paid you every year, so that the country may be safe and you may rule forever over a tributary. And if he refuses, then do whatever pleases you." The king took this advice, and commanded his army to return home. Then he sent an embassy to Gundobad, and ordered him to pay him every year a tribute. And he paid it at once and promised that he would pay it for the future.

33. Later he regained his power, and now contemptuously refused to pay the promised tribute to king Clovis, and set his army in motion against his brother Godegisel, and shut him up in the city of Vienne and besieged him. And when food began to be lacking for the common people, Godegisel was afraid that the famine would extend to himself, and gave orders that the common people be expelled from the city. When this was done, there was driven out, among the rest, the artisan who had charge of the aqueduct. And he was indignant that he had been cast out from the city with the rest, and went to Gundobad in a rage to inform him how to burst into the city and take vengeance on his brother. Under his guidance an army was led through the aqueduct, and many with iron crowbars went in front, for there was a vent in the aqueduct closed with a great stone, and when this had been pushed away with crowbars, by direction of the artisan, they entered the city, and surprised from the rear the defenders who were shooting arrows from the wall. The trumpet was sounded in the midst of the city, and the besiegers seized the gates, and opened them and entered at the same time, and when the people between these two battle lines were being slain by each army, Godegisel sought refuge in the church of the heretics, and was slain there along with the Arian bishop. Finally the Franks who were with Godegisel gathered in a tower. But Gundobad ordered that no harm should be done to a single one of them, but seized them and sent them in exile to king Alaric at Toulouse, and he slew the Burgundian senators who had conspired with Godegisel. He restored to his own dominion all the region which is now called Burgundy. He established milder laws for the Burgundians lest they should oppress the Romans.

[34. King Gundobad is converted to the doctrine of the Trinity but will not confess it in public. The writings of bishop Avitus are described.]

35. Now when Alaric, king of the Goths, saw Clovis conquering nations steadily, he sent envoys to him saying: "If my brother consents, it is the desire of my heart that with God's favor we have a meeting." Clovis did not spurn this proposal but went to meet him. They met in an island of the Loire which is near the village of Amboise in the territory of Tours, and they talked and ate and drank together, and plighted friendship and departed in peace. Even at that time many in the Gauls desired greatly to have the Franks as masters.

43. After all this he died at Paris, and was buried in the church of the holy apostles, which he himself had built together with his queen Clotilda. He passed away in the fifth year after the battle of Vouillé, and all the days of his reign were thirty years, and his age was forty-five. From the death of St. Martin to the death of king Clovis, which happened in the eleventh year of the episcopate of Licinius, bishop of Tours, one hundred and twelve years are reckoned. Queen Clotilda came to Tours after the death of her husband and served there in the church of St. Martin, and dwelt in the place with the greatest chastity and kindness all the days of her life, rarely visiting Paris.

EINHARD

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES

HAVING made up my mind to write an account of the life and conversation, and to a large extent of the actions of my lord and patron King Charles, of great and deservedly glorious memory, I have compressed my task within the narrowest possible limits. My aim has been on the one hand to insert everything of which I have been able to find an account; and on the other to avoid offending the fastidious by telling each new incident at wearisome length. Above all, I have tried to avoid offending in this new book those who look down upon even the monuments of antiquity written by learned and eloquent men.

There are, I do not doubt, many men of learning and leisure who feel that the life of the present day must not be utterly neglected, and that the doings of our own time should not be devoted to silence and forgetfulness as wholly unworthy of record; who, therefore, have such love of fame that they would rather chronicle the great deeds of others in writings, however poor, than, by abstaining from writing, allow their name and reputation to perish from the memory of mankind. But, even so, I have felt that I ought not to hold my hand from the composition of this book, for I knew that no one could write of these events more truthfully than I could, since I was myself an actor in them, and, being present, knew them from the testimony of my own eyes; while I could not certainly know whether anyone else would write them or no. I thought it better, therefore, to join with others in committing this story to writing for the benefit of posterity rather than to allow the shades of oblivion to blot out the life of this King, the noblest and greatest of his age, and his famous deeds, which the men of later times will scarcely be able to imitate.

Another reason, and not, I think, a foolish one, occurred to me, which even by itself would have been strong enough to persuade me to write—the care, I mean, that was taken with my upbringing, and the unbroken friendship which I enjoyed with the King himself and his children from the time when first I began to live at his Court. For in this way he has so bound me to himself, and has made me his debtor both in life and death, that I should most justly be considered and condemned as ungrateful if I were to forget all the benefits that he conferred upon me and were to pass over in silence the great and glorious deeds of a man who was so kind to me; if I were to allow his life to remain as unchronicled and unpraised, as if he had never lived, when that life deserves not merely the efforts of my poor talents, which are insignificant, small and almost non-existent, but all the eloquence of a Cicero.

So here you have a book containing the life of that great and glorious man. There is nothing for you to wonder at or admire except his deeds; unless, indeed, it be that I, a barbarian, and little versed in the Roman tongue, have imagined that I could write Latin inoffensively and usefully, and have become so swollen with impudence as to despise Cicero's words when, speaking about Latin writers in the first book of the Tusculans, he says: "If a man commits his thoughts to paper when he can neither arrange them well nor write them agreeably, nor furnish pleasure of any kind to the reader, he is recklessly misusing both his leisure and his paper." The great orator's opinion would, perhaps, have deterred me from writing if I had not fortified myself with the reflection that I ought to risk the condemnation of men, and bring my poor talents into peril by writing, rather than spare my reputation and neglect this great man's memory.

The Preface ends: the Book begins

THE race of the Merovings from which the Franks were accustomed to choose their kings is reckoned as lasting to King Hilderich, who, by the order of Stephen, the Roman Pontiff, was deposed, tonsured, and sent into a monastery. But this race, though it may be regarded as finishing with him, had long since lost all power, and no longer possessed anything of importance except the empty royal title. For the wealth and power of the kingdom was in the hands of the Præfects of the Court, who were called Mayors of the Palace, and exercised entire sovereignty. The King, contented with the mere royal title, with long hair and flowing beard, used to sit upon the throne and act the part of a ruler, listening to ambassadors, whencesoever they came, and giving them at their departure, as though of his own power, answers which he had been instructed or commanded to give. But this was the only function that he performed, for besides the empty royal title and the

precarious life income which the Præfect of the Court allowed him at his pleasure he had nothing of his own except one estate with a very small revenue, on which he had his house, and from which he drew the few servants who performed such services as were necessary and made him a show of deference. Whereever he had to go he travelled in a waggon, drawn in rustic style by a pair of oxen, and driven by a cowherd. In this fashion he used to go to the palace and to the general meetings of the people, which were held yearly for the affairs of the kingdom ; in this fashion he returned home. But the Præfect of the Court looked after the administration of the kingdom and all that had to be done or arranged at home or abroad.

2. When Hilderich was deposed Pippin, the father of King Charles, was performing the duties of Mayor of the Palace as if by hereditary right. For his father Charles, who put down the tyrants who were claiming dominion for themselves through all Frankland, and so crushed the Saracens, when they were attempting to conquer Gaul, in two great battles (the one in Aquitania, near the city of Poitiers, the other near Narbonne, on the river Birra), that he forced them to return into Spain—his father Charles had nobly administered the same office, and had inherited it from his father Pippin. For the people did not usually give this honour except to such as were distinguished for the renown of their family and the extent of their wealth.

This office, then, was handed down from his father and his grandfather to Pippin, the father of King Charles, and to his brother Carloman. He exercised it for some years conjointly with his brother Carloman on terms of the greatest harmony, still in nominal subordination to the above-mentioned King Hilderich. But then his brother Carloman, for some unknown cause, but probably fired with love of the contemplative life, abandoned the toilsome administration of a temporal kingdom and retired to Rome in search of peace. There he changed his dress, and, becoming a monk in the monastery upon Mount Soracte, built near the church of the blessed Silvester, enjoyed for some years the quiet that he desired, with many brethren, who joined themselves to him for the same purpose. But as many of the nobles of Frankland came on pilgrimage to Rome to perform their vows, and, unwilling to pass by one who had once been their lord, interrupted the peace that he most desired by frequent visits, he was compelled to change his abode. For, seeing that the number of his visitors interfered with his purpose, he left Mount Soracte and retired to the monastery of Saint Benedict, situated in the camp of Mount Cassino, in the province of Samnium. There he occupied what remained to him of this temporal life in religious exercises.

3. But Pippin, after he was made King instead of Mayor of the Palace by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, exercised sole rule over the Franks for fifteen years, or rather more. Then, after finishing the Aquitanian war, which he had undertaken against Waifar, Duke of Aquitania, and had carried on for

nine consecutive years, he died at Paris of the dropsy, and left behind him two sons, Charles and Carloman, to whom by divine will the succession of the kingdom came. For the Franks called a solemn public assembly, and elected both of them to be kings, on the understanding that they should equally divide the whole kingdom, but that Charles should receive for his special administration that part which his father Pippin had held, while Carloman received the territories ruled by their uncle Carloman. The conditions were accepted, and each received the share of the kingdom that was allotted to him. Harmony was maintained between the two brothers, though not without difficulty; for many partisans of Carloman tried to break their alliance, and some even hoped to engage them in war. But the course of events proved that the danger to Charles was imaginary rather than real. For, upon the death of Carloman, his wife with her sons and some of the leading nobles fled to Italy, and, for no obvious reason, passed over her husband's brother, and placed herself and her children under the protection of Desiderius, King of the Lombards. Carloman, after ruling the kingdom for two years conjointly with Charles, died of disease, and Charles, upon the death of Carloman, was made sole king with the consent of all the Franks.

4. It would be foolish of me to say anything about his birth and infancy, or even about his boyhood, for I can find nothing about these matters in writing, nor does anyone survive who claims to have personal knowledge of them. I have decided, therefore, to pass on to describe and illustrate his acts and his habits and the other divisions of his life without lingering over the unknown. I shall describe first his exploits both at home and abroad, then his habits and interests, and lastly the administration of the kingdom and the end of his reign, omitting nothing that demands or deserves to be recorded.

5. Of all the wars that he waged that in Aquitania, begun, but not finished, by his father, was the first that he undertook, because it seemed easy of accomplishment. His brother was still alive, and was called upon for assistance, and, though he failed to provide the help that he promised, Charles prosecuted the enterprise that he had undertaken with the utmost energy, and would not desist or slacken in his task before, by perseverance and continuous effort, he had completely reached the end after which he strove. For he forced Hunold, who after the death of Waifar had attempted to occupy Aquitania and renew the almost finished war, to abandon Aquitania and retire into Gascony. Even there he did not allow him to remain, but crossed the Garonne, and sent ambassadors to Lupus, Duke of the Gascons, ordering him to surrender the fugitive, and threatening him with war unless he did so at once. Lupus, more wisely, not only surrendered Hunold but also submitted himself and the province over which he presided to the power of Charles.

6. When the Aquitanian trouble was settled and the war finished, when, too, his partner in the kingdom had withdrawn from the world's affairs, he undertook a war against the Lombards, being

moved thereto by the entreaties and the prayers of Hadrian, Bishop of the City of Rome. Now, this war, too, had been undertaken by his father at the supplication of Pope Stephen, under circumstances of great difficulty, inasmuch as certain of the chiefs of the Franks, whose advice he was accustomed to ask, so strongly resisted his wishes that they openly declared that they would leave their King to return home. But now Charles undertook the war against King Haistulf, and most swiftly brought it to an end. For, though his reasons for undertaking the war were similar to, and, indeed, the same as those of his father, he plainly fought it out with a very different energy, and brought it to a different end. For Pippin, after a siege of a few days at Pavia, forced King Haistulf to give hostages, and restore to the Romans the towns and fortresses that he had taken from them, and to give a solemn promise that he would not attempt to regain what he had surrendered. But King Charles, when once he had begun the war, did not stop until he had received the surrender of King Desiderius, whom he had worn down after a long siege; until he had forced his son Adalgis, in whom the hopes of his people seemed to be centred, to fly not only from his kingdom but from Italy; until he had restored to the Romans all that had been taken from them; until he had crushed Hruodgausus, Præfect of the Duchy of Friuli, who was attempting a revolution; until, in fine, he had brought all Italy under his rule, and placed his son Pippin as king over the conquered country. I should describe here the difficulties of the passage of the Alps and the vast toil with which the Franks found their way through the pathless mountain ridges, the rocks that soared to heaven, and the sharply-pointed cliffs, if it were not that my purpose in the present work is rather to describe Charles's manner of life than to chronicle the events of the wars that he waged. The sum of this war was the conquest of Italy, the transportation and perpetual exile of King Desiderius, the expulsion of his son Adalgis from Italy, power taken from the kings of the Lombards and restored to Hadrian, the Ruler of the Roman Church.

7. When this war was ended the Saxon war, which seemed dropped for a time, was taken up again. Never was there a war more prolonged nor more cruel than this, nor one that required greater efforts on the part of the Frankish peoples. For the Saxons, like most of the races that inhabit Germany, are by nature fierce, devoted to the worship of demons and hostile to our religion, and they think it no dishonour to confound and transgress the laws of God and man. There were reasons, too, which might at any time cause a disturbance of the peace. For our boundaries and theirs touch almost everywhere on the open plain, except where in a few places large forests or ranges of mountains are interposed to separate the territories of the two nations by a

robbery, and arson were of constant occurrence. The Franks were so irritated by these things that they thought it was time no longer to be satisfied with retaliation but to declare open war against them.

So war was declared, and was fought for thirty years continuously with the greatest fierceness on both sides, but with heavier loss to the Saxons than the Franks. The end might have been reached sooner had it not been for the perfidy of the Saxons. It is hard to say how often they admitted themselves beaten and surrendered as suppliants to King Charles; how often they promised to obey his orders, gave without delay the required hostages, and received the ambassadors that were sent to them. Sometimes they were so cowed and broken that they promised to abandon the worship of devils and willingly to submit themselves to the Christian religion. But though sometimes ready to bow to his commands they were always eager to break their promise, so that it is impossible to say which course seemed to come more natural to them, for from the beginning of the war there was scarcely a year in which they did not both promise and fail to perform.

But the high courage of the King and the constancy of his mind, which remained unshaken by prosperity and adversity, could not be conquered by their changes nor forced by weariness to desist from his undertakings. He never allowed those who offended in this way to go unpunished, but either led an army himself, or sent one under the command of his counts, to chastise their perfidy and inflict a suitable penalty. So that at last, when all who had resisted had been defeated and brought under his power, he took ten thousand of the inhabitants of both banks of the Elbe, with their wives and children, and planted them in many groups in various parts of Germany and Gaul. And at last the war, protracted through so many years, was finished on conditions proposed by the King and accepted by them; they were to abandon the worship of devils, to turn from their national ceremonies, to receive the sacraments of the Christian faith and religion, and then, joined to the Franks, to make one people with them.

8. In this war, despite its prolongation through so many years, he did not himself meet the enemy in battle more than twice—once near the mountain called Osning, in the district of Detmold, and again at the river Hasa—and both these battles were fought in one month, with an interval of only a few days. In these two battles the enemy were so beaten and cowed that they never again ventured to challenge the King nor to resist his attack unless they were protected by some advantage of ground.

In this war many men of noble birth and high office fell on the side both of the Franks and Saxons. But at last it came to an end in the thirty-third year, though in the meanwhile so many and such serious wars broke out against the Franks in all parts of the

world, and were carried on with such skill by the King, that an observer may reasonably doubt whether his endurance of toil or his good fortune deserves the greater admiration. For the war in Italy began two years before the Saxon war, and though it was prosecuted without intermission no enterprise in any part of the world was dropped, nor was there anywhere a truce in any struggle, however difficult. For this King, the wisest and most high-minded of all who in that age ruled over the nations of the world, never refused to undertake or prosecute any enterprise because of the labour involved, nor withdrew from it through fear of its danger. He understood the true character of each task that he undertook or carried through, and thus was neither broken by adversity nor misled by the false flatteries of good fortune.

9. Whilst the war with the Saxons was being prosecuted constantly and almost continuously he placed garrisons at suitable places on the frontier, and attacked Spain with the largest military expedition that he could collect. He crossed the Pyrenees, received the surrender of all the towns and fortresses that he attacked, and returned with his army safe and sound, except for a reverse which he experienced through the treason of the Gascons on his return through the passes of the Pyrenees. For while his army was marching in a long line, suiting their formation to the character of the ground and the defiles, the Gascons placed an ambuscade on the top of the mountain—where the density and extent of the woods in the neighbourhood rendered it highly suitable for such a purpose—and then rushing down into the valley beneath threw into disorder the last part of the baggage train and also the rearguard which acted as a protection to those in advance. In the battle which followed the Gascons slew their opponents to the last man. Then they seized upon the baggage, and under cover of the night, which was already falling, they scattered with the utmost rapidity in different directions. The Gascons were assisted in this feat by the lightness of their armour and the character of the ground where the affair took place. In this battle Eggihard, the surveyor of the royal table; Anselm, the Count of the Palace; and Roland, Præfect of the Breton frontier, were killed along with very many others. Nor could this assault be punished at once, for when the deed had been done the enemy so completely disappeared that they left behind them not so much as a rumour of their whereabouts.

22. His body was large and strong; his stature tall but not ungainly, for the measure of his height was seven times the length of his own feet. The top of his head was round; his eyes were very large and piercing. His nose was rather larger than is usual; he had beautiful white hair; and his expression was brisk and cheerful; so that, whether sitting or standing, his appearance was dignified and impressive. Although his neck was rather thick and short and he was somewhat corpulent this was not noticed owing

to the good proportions of the rest of his body. His step was firm and the whole carriage of his body manly ; his voice was clear, but hardly so strong as you would have expected. He had good health, but for four years before his death was frequently attacked by fevers, and at last was lame of one foot. Even then he followed his own opinion rather than the advice of his doctors, whom he almost hated, because they advised him to give up the roast meat to which he was accustomed, and eat boiled instead. He constantly took exercise both by riding and hunting. This was a national habit ; for there is hardly any race on the earth that can be placed on equality with the Franks in this respect. He took delight in the vapour of naturally hot waters, and constantly practised swimming, in which he was so proficient that no one could be fairly regarded as his superior. Partly for this reason he built his palace at Aix, and lived there continuously during the last years of his life up to the time of his death. He used to invite not only his sons to the bath but also his nobles and friends, and at times even a great number of his followers and bodyguards.

23. He wore the national—that is to say, the Frankish dress. His shirts and drawers were of linen, then came a tunic with a silken fringe, and hose. His legs were cross-gartered and his feet enclosed in shoes. In winter-time he defended his shoulders and chest with a jerkin made of the skins of otters and ermine. He was clad in a blue cloak, and always wore a sword, with the hilt and belt of either gold or silver. Occasionally, too, he used a jewelled sword, but this was only on the great festivals or when he received ambassadors from foreign nations. He disliked foreign garments, however beautiful, and would never consent to wear them, except once at Rome on the request of Pope Hadrian, and once again upon the entreaty of his successor, Pope Leo, when he wore a long tunic and cloak, and put on shoes made after the Roman fashion. On festal days he walked in procession in a garment of gold cloth, with jewelled boots and a golden girdle to his cloak, and distinguished further by a diadem of gold and precious stones. But on other days his dress differed little from that of the common people.

24. He was temperate in eating and drinking, but especially so in drinking ; for he had a fierce hatred of drunkenness in any man, and especially in himself or in his friends. He could not abstain so easily from food, and used often to complain that fasting was injurious to his health. He rarely gave large banquets, and only on the high festivals, but then he invited a large number of guests. His daily meal was served in four courses only, exclusive of the roast, which the hunters used to bring in on spits, and which he ate with more pleasure than any other food. During the meal there was either singing or a reader for him to listen to. Histories and the great deeds of men of old were read to him. He took delight also in the books of Saint Augustine, and especially in those which are entitled the City of God. He was so temperate in the use of wine and drink of any kind that he rarely drank oftener than thrice during dinner.

In summer, after his midday meal, he took some fruit and a single draught, and then, taking off his clothes and boots, just as he was accustomed to do at night, he would rest for two or three hours. At night he slept so lightly that he would wake, and even rise, four or five times during the night.

When he was putting on his boots and clothes he not only admitted his friends, but if the Count of the Palace told him there was any dispute which could not be settled without his decision he would have the litigants at once brought in, and hear the case, and pronounce on it just as if he were sitting on the tribunal. He would, moreover, at the same time transact any business that had to be done that day or give any orders to his servants.

25. In speech he was fluent and ready, and could express with the greatest clearness whatever he wished. He was not merely content with his native tongue but took the trouble to learn foreign languages. He learnt Latin so well that he could speak it as well as his native tongue ; but he could understand Greek better than he could speak it. His fluency of speech was so great that he even seemed sometimes a little garrulous.

He paid the greatest attention to the liberal arts, and showed the greatest respect and bestowed high honours upon those who taught them. For his lessons in grammar he listened to the instruction of Deacon Peter of Pisa, an old man ; but for all other subjects Albinus, called Alcuin, also a deacon, was his teacher—a man from Britain, of the Saxon race, and the most learned man of his time. Charles spent much time and labour in learning rhetoric and dialectic, and especially astronomy, from Alcuin. He learnt, too, the art of reckoning, and with close application scrutinised most carefully the course of the stars. He tried also to learn to write, and for this purpose used to carry with him and keep under the pillow of his couch tablets and writing-sheets that he might in his spare moments accustom himself to the formation of letters. But he made little advance in this strange task, which was begun too late in life.

26. He paid the most devout and pious regard to the Christian religion, in which he had been brought up from infancy. And, therefore, he built the great and most beautiful church at Aix, and decorated it with gold and silver and candelabras and with wicket-gates and doors of solid brass. And, since he could not procure marble columns elsewhere for the building of it, he had them brought from Rome and Ravenna. As long as his health permitted it he used diligently to attend the church both in the morning and evening, and during the night, and at the time of the Sacrifice. He took the greatest care to have all the services of the church performed with the utmost dignity, and constantly warned the keepers of the building not to allow anything improper or dirty either to be brought into or to remain in the building. He provided so great a quantity of gold and silver vessels, and so large a supply of priestly vestments, that at the religious services not even the door-keepers, who form the lowest ecclesiastical order, had

to officiate in their ordinary dress. He carefully reformed the manner of reading and singing; for he was thoroughly instructed in both, though he never read publicly himself, nor sang except in a low voice, and with the rest of the congregation.

27. He was most devout in relieving the poor and in those free gifts which the Greeks call alms. For he gave it his attention not only in his own country and in his own kingdom, but he also used to send money across the sea to Syria, to Egypt, to Africa—to Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Carthage—in compassion for the poverty of any Christians whose miserable condition in those countries came to his ears. It was for this reason chiefly that he cultivated the friendship of kings beyond the sea, hoping thereby to win for the Christians living beneath their sway some succour and relief.

Beyond all other sacred and venerable places he loved the church of the holy Apostle Peter at Rome, and he poured into its treasury great wealth in silver and gold and precious stones. He sent innumerable gifts to the Pope; and during the whole course of his reign he strove with all his might (and, indeed, nó object was nearer to his heart than this) to restore to the city of Rome her ancient authority, and not merely to defend the church of Saint Peter but to decorate and enrich it out of his resources above all other churches. But although he valued Rome so much, still, during all the forty-seven years that he reigned, he only went there four times to pay his vows and offer up his prayers.

28. But such were not the only objects of his last visit; for the Romans had grievously outraged Pope Leo, had torn out his eyes and cut off his tongue, and thus forced him to throw himself upon the protection of the King. He, therefore came to Rome to restore the condition of the church, which was terribly disturbed, and spent the whole of the winter there. It was then that he received the title of Emperor and Augustus, which he so disliked at first that he affirmed that he would not have entered the church on that day—though it was the chief festival of the church—if he could have foreseen the design of the Pope. But when he had taken the title he bore very quietly the hostility that it caused and the indignation of the Roman emperors. He conquered their ill-feeling by his magnanimity, in which, doubtless, he far excelled them, and sent frequent embassies to them, and called them his brothers.

29. When he had taken the imperial title he noticed many defects in the legal systems of his people; for the Franks have two legal systems, differing in many points very widely from one another, and he, therefore, determined to add what was lacking, to reconcile the differences, and to amend anything that was wrong or wrongly expressed. He completed nothing of all his designs beyond adding a few capitularies, and those unfinished. But he gave orders that the laws and rules of all nations comprised within his dominions which were not already written out should be collected and committed to writing.

He also wrote out the barbarous and ancient songs,

in which the acts of the kings and their wars were sung, and committed them to memory. He also began a grammar of his native language.

He gave the months names in his own tongue, for before his time they were called by the Franks partly by Latin and partly by barbarous names. He also gave names to the twelve winds, whereas before not more than four, and perhaps not so many, had names of their own. Of the months, he called January Winter-month, February Mud-month, March Spring-month, April Easter-month, May Joy-month, June Plough-month, July Hay-month, August Harvest-month, September Wind-month, October Vintage-month, November Autumn-month, December Holy-month. The following are the names which he gave to the winds:—The Subsolanus (east) he called East Wind; the Eurus (east by south) East-South Wind; the Euroauster (south by east) South-East Wind; the Auster (south) South Wind; the Austro-Afric (south by west) South-West Wind; the Afric (west by south) West-South Wind; the Zephyr (west) West Wind; the Corus (west by north) West-North Wind; the Circius (north by west) North-West Wind; the Septentrion (north) North Wind; the Aquilon (north by east) North-East Wind; the Vulturnus (east by north) East-North Wind.

30. At the very end of his life, when already he was feeling the pressure of old age and sickness, he summoned his own son Lewis, King of Aquitania, the only surviving son of Hildigard, and then solemnly called together the Frankish nobles of his whole kingdom; and then, with the consent of all, made Lewis partner in the whole kingdom and heir to the imperial title. After that, putting the diadem on his head, he ordered them to salute him "Imperator" and Augustus. This decision of his was received by all present with the greatest favour, for it seemed to them a divine inspiration for the welfare of the realm. It added to his dignity at home and increased the terror of his name abroad.

He then sent his son back to Aquitania, and himself, though broken with old age, proceeded to hunt, as his custom was, not far from the palace of Aix, and after spending the rest of the autumn in this pursuit he came back to Aix about the beginning of November. Whilst he was spending the winter there he was attacked by a sharp fever, and took to his bed. Then, following his usual habit, he determined to abstain from food, thinking that by such self-discipline he would be able either to cure or alleviate the disease. But the fever was complicated by a pain in the side which the Greeks call pleurisy; and, as Charles still persisted in fasting, and only very rarely drank something to sustain his strength, seven days after he had taken to his bed he received holy communion, and died, in the seventy-second year of his life and in the forty-seventh year of his reign, on the fifth day before the Kalends of February, at the third hour of the day.

Gregory VII's Conception of the Pope's Prerogatives

The *Dictatus* of Gregory VII (1075).

Among the letters and decrees of Gregory VII a list of propositions is found which briefly summarizes the claims of the papacy. The purpose of this so-called *Dictatus* is unknown; it was probably drawn up shortly after Gregory's accession and no doubt gives an official statement of the powers which he believed that he rightly possessed. The more important of the twenty-seven propositions contained in the *Dictatus* are given below.

The Roman church was founded by God alone.

The Roman bishop alone is properly called universal.

He alone may depose bishops and reinstate them.

His legate, though of inferior grade, takes precedence, in a council, of all bishops and may render a decision of deposition against them.

He alone may use the insignia of empire.[1]

The pope is the only person whose feet are kissed by all princes.

His title is unique in the world.[2]

He may depose emperors.

No council may be regarded as a general one without his consent.

No book or chapter may be regarded as canonical without his authority.

A decree of his may be annulled by no one; he alone may annul the decrees of all.

He may be judged by no one.

No one shall dare to condemn one who appeals to the papal see.

The Roman church has never erred, nor ever, by the witness of Scripture, shall err to all eternity.

He may not be considered Catholic who does not agree with the Roman church.

The pope may absolve the subjects of the unjust from their allegiance.

Origin of the Troubles between Gregory VII and Henry IV

In 1075 a synod held at Rome under Gregory VII denounced the marriage of the clergy, prohibited lay investiture, and then excommunicated five of Henry IV's councilors on the ground that they had gained the church offices which they held, by simony. While the text of this decree, which in a way began the trouble between Gregory and Henry, is lost, it was probably similar to the following decrees issued respectively three and five years later.

[1] The Donation of Constantine describes the emperor Constantine as leaving his imperial scepter, cloak, etc., to Pope Sylvester. The word "use" (Latin *uti*) here employed may perhaps be used in the sense of "dispose of," referring to the pope's asserted claim to control the election of the emperor.

[2] This is the first distinct assertion of the exclusive right of the bishop of Rome to the title of pope, once applied to all bishops.

Decree of November 19, 1078, forbidding lay investitures.

Inasmuch as we have learned that, contrary to the ordinances of the holy fathers, the investiture with churches is, in many places, performed by lay persons, and that from this cause many disturbances arise in the Church by which the Christian religion is degraded, we decree that no one of the clergy shall receive the investiture with a bishopric, or abbey, or church, from the hand of an emperor, or king, or of any lay person, male or female. If he shall presume to do so, let him know that such investiture is void by apostolic authority, and that he himself shall lie under excommunication until fitting satisfaction shall have been made.

Decree of March 7, 1080, forbidding the same.

Following the ordinances of the holy fathers, as we decreed in our former councils held by the mercy of God concerning the regulation of ecclesiastical offices, so also now by apostolic authority we decree and confirm: that, if any one shall henceforth receive a bishopric or abbey from the hands of any lay person, he shall by no means be reckoned among the bishops and abbots; nor shall any hearing be granted him as bishop or abbot. Moreover we further deny him the favor of St. Peter and entrance to the Church, until, coming to his senses, he shall surrender the position that he has appropriated through criminal ambition and disobedience — which is the sin of idolatry. We decree, moreover, that the same rule be observed in the case of inferior ecclesiastical positions.

Likewise if any emperor, king, duke, margrave, count, or any secular dignitary or person shall presume to bestow the investiture with bishoprics, or with any ecclesiastical office, let him know that he is bound by the bonds of the same condemnation. And, furthermore, unless he come to his senses and relinquish her prerogatives to the Church, let him feel, in this present life, the divine wrath both in body and estate, in order that at the Lord's coming his soul may be saved.

The two letters which follow serve to show the attitude of mind of the pope and of the emperor on the eve of open hostilities.

Bishop Gregory, servant of the servants of God, to King Henry, greeting and apostolic benediction: — that is, if he be obedient to the apostolic chair as beseems a Christian king:

Gregory's letter of December, 1075, upbraiding Henry for his neglect of the papal decrees.

For we cannot but hesitate to send thee our benediction when we seriously consider the strictness of the Judge to whom we shall have to render account for the ministry intrusted to us by St. Peter, chief of the apostles. For thou art said knowingly to associate with men excommunicated by a judgment of the apostolic chair and by sentence of a synod. If this be true, thou thyself dost know that thou mayst not receive the favor of the divine, nor of the apostolic benediction, unless those who have been excommunicated be separated from thee and compelled to do penance, and thou, with condign repentance and satisfaction, obtain absolution and pardon for thy misdeeds. Therefore we counsel thy Highness that, if thou dost feel thyself guilty in this matter, thou shouldst seek the advice of some devout bishop, with prompt confession. He, with our permission, enjoining on thee a proper penance for this fault, shall absolve thee, and shall take care to inform us by letter, with thy consent, of the exact measure of thy penance.

In the next place, it seems strange to us that although thou dost so often send us such devoted letters; and although thy Highness dost show such humility in the messages of thy legates, — calling thyself the son of holy mother Church and of ourselves, subject in the faith, foremost in love and devotion; — although, in short, thou dost commend thyself with all the sweetness of devotion and reverence, yet in conduct and action thou dost show thyself most stubborn, and in opposition to the canonical and apostolic decrees in those matters which the religion of the Church deems of chief importance. For, not to mention other things, in the affair of Milan[1] the actual outcome shows with what intent thou didst make, and how thou didst carry out, the promises made through thy mother and through our brothers the bishops whom we sent to thee. And now, indeed, inflicting wound upon wound, thou hast, contrary to the rules of the apostolic chair, given the churches of Fermo and Spoleto — if indeed a church can be given or granted by a mere man — to certain persons not even known to us, on whom, unless they are previously well known and proven, it is not lawful regularly to perform the laying on of hands.

It would have beseemed thy royal dignity, since thou dost confess thyself a son of the Church, to have treated more respectfully the master of the Church, — that is, St. Peter, the chief of the apostles. For to him, if thou art of the Lord's sheep, thou wast given over by the Lord's voice and authority to be fed; Christ himself saying, "Peter, feed my sheep." And again: "To thee are given over the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

Inasmuch as in his seat and apostolic ministration we, however sinful and unworthy, do, by the providence of God, act as the representative of his power, surely he himself is receiving whatever, in writing or by word of mouth, thou hast sent to us. And at the very time when we are either perusing thy letters or listening to the voices of those who speak for thee, he himself is observing, with discerning eye, in what spirit the instructions were issued. Wherefore thy Highness should have seen to it that no lack of good will should appear toward the apostolic chair in thy words and messages. . . .

A reference to the decree of 1075 forbidding investitures by laymen.

In this year a synod was assembled about the apostolic chair, over which the heavenly dispensation willed that we should preside, and at which some of thy faithful subjects were present. Seeing that the good order of the Christian religion has now for some time been disturbed, and that the chief and proper methods of winning souls have, at the instigation of the devil, long been neglected and suppressed, we, struck by the danger and impending ruin of the Lord's flock, reverted to the decrees and teachings of the holy fathers, — decreeing nothing new, nothing of our own invention.[1] . . .

The pope willing to moderate his decree.

Lest these things should seem unduly burdensome or unjust to thee, we did admonish thee, through thy faithful servants, that the changing of an evil custom should not alarm thee; that thou shouldst send to us wise and religious men from thy land, to demonstrate or prove, if they could, by any reasoning, in what respects, saving the honor of the

[1] There had been trouble even before Gregory's accession over the question of filling the bishopric of Milan.

Eternal King and without danger to our soul, we might moderate the decree as passed by the holy fathers, and we would yield to their counsels. Even without our friendly admonitions it would have been but right that, before thou didst violate apostolic decrees, thou shouldst reasonably have appealed to us in cases where we oppressed thee or infringed thy prerogatives. But how little thou didst esteem our commands or the dictates of justice is shown by those things which thou afterwards didst.

But since the long-suffering patience of God still invites thee to amend thy ways, we have hopes that thy understanding may be awakened, and thy heart and mind be bent to obey the mandates of God: we exhort thee with paternal love to recognize the dominion of Christ over thee and to reflect how dangerous it is to prefer thine own honor to his.

Henry, irritated not so much by the tone of the above letter as by the reproaches of Gregory's legates, sent the following violent reply, January 24, 1076.

Henry IV's violent reply to Gregory.

Henry, King not by usurpation but by holy ordination of God, to Hildebrand, now no Pope but false monk:

Such greeting as this hast thou merited through thy disturbances, for there is no rank in the Church but thou hast brought upon it, not honor but disgrace, not a blessing but a curse. To mention a few notable cases out of the many, thou hast not only dared to assail the rulers of the holy Church, the anointed of the Lord, — archbishops, bishops, and priests, — but thou hast trodden them under foot like slaves ignorant of what their master is doing. By so crushing them thou hast won the favor of the common herd; thou hast regarded them all as knowing nothing, — thyself alone as knowing all things. Yet this knowledge thou hast exerted, not for their advantage but for their destruction; so that with reason we believe St. Gregory, whose name thou hast usurped, prophesied of thee when he said, "The pride of the magistrate commonly waxes great if the number of those subject to him be great, and he thinks that he can do more than they all."

We, forsooth, have endured all this in our anxiety to save the honor of the apostolic see, but thou hast mistaken our humility for fear, and hast, accordingly, ventured to attack the royal power conferred upon us by God, and threatened to divest us of it. As if we had received our kingdom from thee! As if the kingdom and the empire were in thy hands, not in God's! For our Lord Jesus Christ did call us to the kingdom, although he has not called thee to the priesthood: that thou hast attained by the following steps.

By craft abhorrent to the profession of monk, thou hast acquired wealth; by wealth, influence; by influence, arms; by arms, a throne of peace. And from the throne of peace thou hast destroyed peace; thou hast turned subjects against their governors, for thou, who wert not called of God, hast taught that our bishops, truly so called, should be despised. Thou hast put laymen above their priests, allowing them to depose or condemn those whom they themselves had received as teachers from the hand of God through the laying on of bishops' hands.

Thou hast further assailed me also, who, although unworthy of anointing, have nevertheless been anointed to the kingdom, and who, according to the traditions of the holy fathers, am subject to the judgment of God alone, to be deposed

upon no charge save that of deviation from the faith, — which God avert! For the holy fathers by their wisdom committed the judgment and deposition of even Julian the Apostate not to themselves but to God alone. Likewise the true pope, Peter, himself exclaims: "Fear God. Honor the king." But thou, who dost not fear God, art dishonoring me, his appointed one. Wherefore, St. Paul, since he spared not an angel of heaven if he should preach other than the gospel, has not excepted thee, who dost teach other doctrine upon earth. For he says, "If any one, whether I, or an angel from heaven, shall preach the gospel other than that which has been preached to you, he shall be damned."

Thou, therefore, damned by this curse and by the judgment of all our bishops and ourselves, come down and relinquish the apostolic chair which thou hast usurped. Let another assume the seat of St. Peter, who will not practice violence under the cloak of religion, but will teach St. Peter's wholesome doctrine. I, Henry, king by the grace of God, together with all our bishops, say unto thee: "Come down, come down, to be damned throughout all eternity!"

Gregory's Deposition of Henry IV. Henry's Penance at Canossa

First deposition and excommunication of Henry IV (February 22, 1076).

O St. Peter, chief of the apostles, incline to us, I beg, thy holy ear, and listen to thy servant, whom from infancy thou hast nurtured, and whom, until this day, thou hast shielded from the hand of the wicked that hated me, and do hate me, for my faithfulness to thee. Thou and my Lady, the Mother of God, and thy brother, St. Paul, are witnesses for me among all the saints that thy holy Roman church placed me in control against my will; that I had no thought of violence in ascending to thy chair, and that I should rather have ended my life as a pilgrim than by worldly means to have gained thy throne for the sake of earthly glory.

Therefore, through thy grace and through my own merit, I believe that it has been and is thy will that the Christian people especially committed to thee should obey me. To me, in particular, as thy representative and the recipient of thy favor, has God granted the power of binding and loosing in heaven and earth. In this confidence, therefore, for the honor and security of thy Church, in the name of Almighty God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, by thy power and authority, I withdraw from Henry the king, son of Henry the emperor, a rebel of incredible insolence against thy Church, his right to rule over the whole kingdom of the Germans and over Italy. And I absolve all Christians from the bonds of the oath which they have taken to him or which they shall in future take; and I forbid any one to serve him as king.

For it is fitting that he who strives to lessen the honor of thy Church should himself lose the honor which seems to belong to him. And since he has scorned to obey as a Christian, and has not returned to God whom he has deserted, but has had intercourse with the excommunicated; practiced manifold iniquities; spurned the counsels which, as thou art witness, I sent to him for his own salvation; separated himself from thy Church and endeavored to rend it asunder; I bind him, in thy stead, with the chain of the anathema. Relying upon thee, I bind him, that the people may know and prove that thou art Peter, and upon thy rock the Son of the living God hath built his Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

Gregory's account of Henry's penance at Canossa (1077).

Bishop Gregory, servant of the servants of God, to all the Archbishops, Bishops, Dukes, Counts, and other princes of the realm of the Germans, defenders of the Christian faith, greeting and apostolic benediction:

Inasmuch as for the love of justice ye have assumed common cause and danger with us in the stress of this Christian warfare, we have bethought us to relate to you, beloved, in sincere affection, how the king, humbled to penance, has obtained the pardon of absolution, and how the whole matter has progressed since his entry into Italy up to the present day.

As had been arranged with the legates whom you dispatched to us, we came into Lombardy about twenty days before the date on which one of the nobles was to meet us at the pass, and awaited his coming before we crossed over to the other side of the Alps.

When the time fixed upon had quite passed, we were told, as we could well believe, that at that season, on account of the numerous obstacles, an escort could not be sent to meet us. We were then involved in no little anxiety as to what we would best do, since we had no means of crossing over to you.

Meanwhile, however, we learned positively that the king was approaching. Indeed, before he entered Italy he had sent us suppliant messages, offering to render satisfaction, in all respects, to God, St. Peter, and ourselves. He also renewed his promise that he would be perfectly obedient in the matter of amending his life if only he might win from us the favor of absolution and of the apostolic benediction.

When, after many delays and after much consultation, we had, through all the envoys who passed between us, severely reprimanded him for his offenses, he at length came of his own accord, accompanied by a few followers, with no hostility or arrogance in his bearing, to the town of Canossa, where we were tarrying. And there, laying aside all the trappings of royalty, he stood in wretchedness, barefooted and clad in woolen, for three days before the gate of the castle, and implored with profuse weeping the aid and consolation of the apostolic mercy, until he had moved all who saw or heard of it to such pity and depth of compassion that they interceded for him with many prayers and tears and wondered at the unaccustomed hardness of our heart; some even protested that we were displaying not the seriousness of the apostolic displeasure but the cruelty of tyrannical ferocity.

At last, overcome by his persistent remorse and by the earnest entreaties of those with us, we loosed the chain of anathema and received him into the favor of our fellowship and into the lap of the holy mother Church, accepting the pledges given below.[1] We also obtained a confirmation of the transaction from the abbot of Cluny, from our daughters Matilda[2] and the countess Adelaide, and from such princes, ecclesiastical and lay, as seemed to us proper.

[1] Henry took an oath that he would carry out the wishes of the pope; this may be found in Henderson, *Select Documents*, pp. 387–388.

[2] The countess of Tuscany, to whom the castle of Canossa belonged.

The Pope fully explains the Natural Supremacy of the Spiritual over the Civil Power

Letter of Gregory VII to the bishop of Metz (March, 1081).

The following is one of the fullest and most instructive general justifications of the papal supremacy that has come down to us.

Bishop Gregory, servant of the servants of God, to his beloved brother in Christ, Hermann, Bishop of Metz, greeting and the apostolic benediction:

It is doubtless through God's grace that thou art ready, as we hear, to endure trials and dangers in the defense of the truth. . . . However, thy request to be supported and fortified by a letter from us directed against those persons who are constantly asserting, with perverse tongues, that the holy and apostolic see had no authority to excommunicate Henry — the scorner of Christian law, the destroyer of churches and of the empire, the patron and companion of heretics — nor to absolve any one from the oath of fidelity to him, hardly seems necessary to us when so many and such absolutely decisive warrants are to be found in the pages of Holy Scriptures. . . .

Diabolical origin of civil rule.

Shall not an office instituted by laymen — by those even who did not know God — be subject to that office which the providence of God Almighty has instituted for his own honor, and in compassion given to the world? For his Son, even as he is unquestioningly believed to be God and man, so is he considered the chief of priests, sitting on the right hand of the Father and always interceding for us. Yet he despised a secular kingdom, over which the men of this world swell with pride, and came of his own will to the priesthood of the cross. Whereas all know that kings and princes are descendants of men who were ignorant of God, and who, by arrogance, robbery, perfidy, murder, — in a word by almost every crime, — at the prompting of the prince of this world, the devil, strove with blind avarice and intolerable presumption to gain the mastery over their equals, that is, over mankind.

To whom, indeed, can we better compare them, when they seek to make the priests of God bend to their feet, than to him who is chief of all the sons of pride and who tempted the highest Pontiff himself, the chief of priests, the Son of the Most High, and promised to him all the kingdoms of the world, saying, "All these will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me"?

Who doubts that the priests of Christ should be regarded as the fathers and masters of kings and princes, and of all the faithful? Is it not evidently hopeless folly for a son to attempt to domineer over his father, a pupil over his master, or for any one, by iniquitous exactions, to claim power over him by whom he himself, as he acknowledges, can be bound and loosed both on earth and in heaven? Constantine, the great lord of all kings and princes throughout nearly the whole world, plainly understood this, as the blessed Gregory observes in a letter to the emperor Mauritius, for Constantine took his seat after all the bishops in the holy Council of Nicæa; he presumed to issue no decisions superior to theirs, but addressed them as gods, and declared that they should not be subject to his judgment, but that he was dependent upon their will. . . .

Cases of churchmen excommunicating kings.

Armed accordingly with such decrees and authority, many bishops have excommunicated, in some cases kings, in others emperors. If the names of such princes are asked for, it

may be said that the blessed pope Innocent excommunicated the emperor Arcadius for consenting to the expulsion of St. John Chrysostom from his see. Likewise another Roman pontiff, Zacharias, deposed a king of the Franks, not so much for his iniquities, as for the reason that he was not fitted to exercise his great power. And he substituted Pippin, father of the emperor Charles the Great, in his place, — releasing all the Franks from the oath of fealty which they had sworn to him, — as, indeed, the holy Church frequently does, by its abundant authority, when it absolves servitors from the fetters of an oath sworn to such bishops as are deposed by apostolic sentence from their pontifical rank.

The blessed Ambrose — who, although a saint, was yet not bishop over the whole Church — excommunicated and excluded from the Church the emperor Theodosius the Great for a fault which was not looked upon as very grave by other priests. He shows, too, in his writings that gold does not so far excel lead in value as the priestly dignity transcends the royal power. He speaks in this fashion near the beginning of his pastoral letter: "The honor and sublimity of bishops, brethren, is beyond all comparison. To compare them to resplendent kings and diademed princes would be far more unworthy than to compare the base metal lead to gleaming gold. For one may see how kings and princes bow their necks before the knees of priests, and kiss their right hands so as to believe themselves protected by their prayers." . . .

Furthermore every Christian king, when he comes to die, seeks as a poor suppliant the aid of a priest, that he may escape hell's prison, may pass from the darkness into the light, and at the judgment of God may appear absolved from the bondage of his sins. Who, in his last hour, whether layman or priest, has ever implored the aid of an earthly king for the salvation of his soul? And what king or emperor is able, by reason of the office he holds, to rescue a Christian from the power of the devil through holy baptism, to number him among the sons of God, and to fortify him with the divine unction? Who of them can by his own words make the body and blood of our Lord, — the greatest act in the Christian religion? Or who of them possesses the power of binding and loosing in heaven and on earth? From all of these considerations it is clear how greatly the priestly office excels in power.

Who of them can ordain a single clerk in the holy Church, much less depose him for any fault? For in the ranks of the Church a greater power is needed to depose than to ordain. Bishops may ordain other bishops, but can by no means depose them without the authority of the apostolic see. Who, therefore, of even moderate understanding, can hesitate to give priests the precedence over kings? Then, if kings are to be judged by priests for their sins, by whom should they be judged with better right than by the Roman pontiff?

In short, any good Christian whatsoever might far more properly be considered as a king than might a bad prince; for the former, seeking the glory of God, strenuously governs himself, whereas the latter, seeking the things which are his own and not the things of God, is an enemy to himself and a tyrannical oppressor of others. Faithful Christians constitute the body of the true king, Christ; evil rulers, that of the devil. The former rule themselves in the hope that they will eternally reign with the Supreme Emperor, but

the sway of the latter ends in their destruction and eternal damnation with the prince of darkness, who is king over all the sons of pride.

Bishops chosen by the emperor naturally support him

It is certainly not strange that wicked bishops are of one mind with a bad king, whom they love and fear for the honors which they have wrongfully obtained from him. Such men, simoniacally ordaining whom they please, sell God even for a paltry sum. As even the elect are indissolubly united with their Head, so also the wicked constitute a pertinacious league with him who is the head of evil, with the special purpose of resisting the good. But surely we ought not so much to inveigh against them as to mourn for them with tears and lamentations, beseeching God Almighty to snatch them from the snares of Satan in which they are held captive, and after their peril to bring them at last to a knowledge of the truth.

How kings should be kept in a humble frame of mind.

We refer to those kings and emperors who, too much elated by worldly glory, rule not for God but for themselves. Now, since it belongs to our office to admonish and encourage every one as befits the special rank or dignity which he enjoys, we endeavor, by God's grace, to implant in emperors and kings and other princes the virtue of humility, that they may be able to allay the gusts of passion and the floods of pride. For we know that mundane glory and worldly cares usually foster pride, especially in those who are in authority, and that, in consequence, they forget humility and seek ever their own glory, and dominion over their brethren. Wherefore it is well for kings and emperors, particularly when they grow haughty in spirit and delight in their own pomp, to discover a means by which they may be humbled and be brought to realize that the cause of their complacency is the very thing that they should most fear.

Kings and emperors rarely attain salvation

Let them, therefore, diligently consider how dangerous and how much to be dreaded are the royal and imperial offices. For in them very few are saved, and those who, through the mercy of God, do attain to salvation are not so glorified in the holy Church by the will of the Holy Spirit as are many of the poor. From the beginning of the world to this our own day, in the whole extent of recorded history, we do not find seven emperors or kings whose lives were as distinguished for piety and as beautified by the gift of miracles as were those of an innumerable multitude who despised the world; yet, notwithstanding this, we believe that many of them achieved salvation through the almighty God of mercy.

What emperor or king was ever honored by miracles as were St. Martin, St. Anthony, and St. Benedict, not to mention the apostles and the martyrs? What emperor or king raised the dead, cleansed lepers, or gave sight to the blind? Observe how the holy Church praises and reveres the emperor Constantine of blessed memory, Theodosius, Honorius, Charles, and Louis, lovers of justice, promoters of Christian religion, defenders of the churches; yet it does not ascribe even to them such resplendent and glorious miracles. Furthermore, how many emperors or kings have chapels or altars dedicated to them by order of the holy Church, or masses celebrated in their honor?

Terrible responsibility of the royal power.

Let kings and princes fear lest the more they exult in their sway over men in this life, the more they shall be subjected to eternal fires; for of them it is written, "The mighty shall suffer mightily in torment." They must needs

render account to God for as many as they had under their dominion, and if it be no slight task for any devout person in a private station to guard his single soul, how much labor devolves upon them who rule over many thousands of souls?

Moreover if the judgment of the holy Church severely punishes a sinner for the slaying of one man, what will become of them who, for the sake of worldly renown, send many thousands of souls to death? Such men, though after a great slaughter they may say with their lips, "We have sinned," nevertheless inwardly rejoice that they have extended their so-called fame. They would not undo what they have done, nor do they grieve that they have sent their brethren down to Tartarus. And so long as they do not repent with their whole heart, and refuse to let go what they have gained or kept through the shedding of human blood, their repentance fails in the sight of God to bring forth the true fruit of repentance.

They should, therefore, be in constant apprehension and should frequently recall to mind that, as we have already said, from the beginning of the world very few of the multitude of kings in the various realms of the earth are known to have been holy, whereas in one see alone, the Roman, — where bishops have succeeded one another in an unbroken line, — almost a hundred, since the time of St. Peter the apostle, are reckoned among the most holy. Why is this, except that kings and princes of the earth, seduced by vain glory, prefer, as has been said, the things that are their own to the things that are spiritual, whereas the bishops of the Church, despising vain glory, prefer to carnal things the things that are of God? The former punish promptly offenders against themselves and are indifferent to sinners against God. The latter pardon readily those who sin against themselves, but do not spare those who are remiss toward God. The former, too much bent on earthly achievements, think slightingly of spiritual ones; the latter, sedulously meditating upon heavenly things, despise the things of earth.

THE MEDIÆVAL CHURCH AT ITS HEIGHT

The most celebrated assertion of the supreme authority of the Church and of its head, the pope, is the bull *Unam Sanctam*, issued by Boniface VIII in 1302.

Bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII (1302).

That there is one holy Catholic and apostolic Church we are impelled by our faith to believe and to hold — this we do firmly believe and openly confess — and outside of this there is neither salvation nor remission of sins, as the bridegroom proclaims in Canticles, "My dove, my undefiled is but one; she is the only one of her mother, she is the choice one of her that bare her." The Church represents one mystic body, and of this body Christ is the head; of Christ, indeed, God is the head. In it is one Lord, and one faith, and one baptism. In the time of the flood there was one ark of Noah, prefiguring the one Church, finished in one cubit, having one Noah as steersman and commander. Outside of this all things upon the face of the earth were, as we

read, destroyed. This Church we venerate and this alone. . . . It is that seamless coat of the Lord, which was not rent but fell by lot. Therefore, in this one and only Church there is one body and one head, — not two heads as if it were a monster, — namely, Christ and Christ's vicar, Peter and Peter's successor; for the Lord said to Peter himself, "Feed my sheep." "*My* sheep," he said, using a general term and not designating these or those sheep, so that we must believe that all the sheep were committed to him. If, then, the Greeks, or others, shall say that they were not intrusted to Peter and his successors, they must perforce admit that they are not of Christ's sheep, as the Lord says in John, "there is one fold, and one shepherd."

In this Church and in its power are two swords, to wit, a spiritual and a temporal, and this we are taught by the words of the Gospel; for when the apostles said, "Behold, here are two swords" (in the Church, namely, since the apostles were speaking), the Lord did not reply that it was too many, but enough. And surely he who claims that the temporal sword is not in the power of Peter has but ill understood the word of our Lord when he said, "Put up again thy sword into his place." Both the spiritual and the material swords, therefore, are in the power of the Church, the latter indeed to be used for the Church, the former by the Church, the one by the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, but by the will and sufferance of the priest.

It is fitting, moreover, that one sword should be under the other, and the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power. For when the apostle said, "there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God," they would not be ordained unless one sword were under the other, and one, as inferior, was brought back by the other to the highest place. For, according to St. Dionysius, the law of divinity is to lead the lowest through the intermediate to the highest. Therefore, according to the law of the universe, things are not reduced to order directly and upon the same footing, but the lowest through the intermediate, and the inferior through the superior. It behooves us, therefore, the more freely to confess that the spiritual power excels in dignity and nobility any form whatsoever of earthly power, as spiritual interests exceed the temporal in importance. All this we see fairly from the giving of tithes, from the benediction and sanctification, from the recognition of this power and the control of these same things.

Hence, the truth bearing witness, it is for the spiritual power to establish the earthly power and judge it, if it be not good. Thus, in the case of the Church and the power of the Church, the prophecy of Jeremiah is fulfilled: "See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms," etc. Therefore, if the earthly power shall err, it shall be judged by the spiritual power; if the lesser spiritual power err, it shall be judged by the higher. But if the supreme power err, it can be judged by God alone and not by man, the apostles bearing witness, saying, The spiritual man judges all things, but he himself is judged by no one. Hence this power, although given to man and exercised by man, is not human, but rather a divine power, given by the divine lips to Peter, and founded on a rock for him and his successors in him (Christ) whom he confessed, the Lord saying to Peter himself, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind," etc.

Whoever, therefore, shall resist this power, ordained by God, resists the ordination of God, unless there should be

two beginnings [i.e. principles], as the Manichæan imagines. But this we judge to be false and heretical, since, by the testimony of Moses, not in the *beginnings* but in the *beginning*, God created the heaven and the earth. We, moreover, proclaim, declare, and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human being to be subject to the Roman pontiff.

Given at the Lateran the twelfth day before the Kalends of December, in our eighth year, as a perpetual memorial of this matter.

The Rule of Saint Benedict

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THE INSTRUMENTS OF GOOD WORKS

IN THE first place, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; then, one's neighbor as oneself. Then, not to kill; not to commit adultery; not to steal; not to covet; not to bear false witness; to honor all men; not to do to another what one would not have done to oneself; to deny oneself in order to follow Christ; to chastise the body; not to seek after luxuries; to love fasting; to refresh the poor; to clothe the naked; to visit the sick; to bury the dead; to help in afflictions; to console the sorrowing; to keep aloof from worldly actions; to prefer nothing to the love of Christ; not to follow the promptings of anger; not to seek an occasion of revenge; not to foster deceit in one's heart; not to make a feigned peace; not to forsake charity; not to swear, lest perchance one perjure oneself; to utter the truth with heart and lips; not to render evil for evil; to do no wrong to anyone, but to bear patiently any wrong done to oneself; to love one's enemies; not to render railing for railing, but rather blessing; to suffer persecution for justice' sake; not to be proud; not to be given to wine; not to be a glutton; not to be given to sleep; not to be slothful; not to be a murmurer; not to be a detractor; to put one's hope in God; to attribute any good that one sees in oneself to God and not to oneself, but to acknowledge evil as having been done by oneself and to repute it to oneself; to fear the day of judgment; to be in dread of hell; to desire everlasting life with all spiritual longing; to keep death daily before one's eyes; to keep guard at all times over the actions of one's life; to know for certain that God sees one in every place; to dash upon Christ one's evil thoughts the instant they come to one's heart, and to manifest them to one's spiritual senior; to keep one's mouth from speech that is wicked or full of guile; not to love much speaking; not to speak words that are vain or such as provoke laughter; not to love much or noisy laughter; to listen willingly to holy reading; to apply oneself frequently to prayer; daily to confess in prayer one's past sins with tears and sighs to God, and to amend these evils for the future; not to fulfil the desires of the flesh; to hate one's own will; to obey in all things the commands of the Abbot,

even though he himself (which God forbid) should act otherwise, being mindful of that precept of the Lord: "What they say, do ye; but what they do, do ye not." Not to wish to be called holy before one is so, but first to be holy that one may be truly so called; to fulfil daily the commandments of God by one's deeds; to love chastity; to hate no man; to have no jealousy or envy; not to love strife; to fly from vainglory; to reverence one's seniors; to love one's juniors; to pray for one's enemies in the love of Christ; to make peace with those with whom one is at variance before the setting of the sun; and never to despair of the mercy of God.

Behold, these are the instruments of the spiritual art, which, if they be constantly employed by day and by night, and delivered up on the day of judgment, that reward will be made to us by the Lord which He Himself has promised: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." And the workshop in which we are to labor diligently at all these things is the enclosure of the monastery and stability in the community.

Of Obedience

THE first degree of humility is obedience without delay. This is peculiar to those who prefer nothing to Christ; who on account of the holy service to which they have obliged themselves, or on account of the fear of hell, or for the glory of eternal life, as soon as anything has been commanded by their superior, as though it were commanded by God Himself, cannot suffer a moment's delay in fulfilling this command. It is of these that the Lord said: "At the hearing of the ear they have obeyed Me." And again to teachers He says: "He that heareth you heareth Me." Therefore, such as these, immediately putting aside their private occupation and forsaking their own will, with their hands quickly disengaged and leaving unfinished what they were about, with the instant step of obedience, fulfil by their deeds the word of him who commands; and so, as it were at the same instant, the command of the master and its perfect fulfilment by the

disciple, in the swiftness of the fear of God, are together speedily fulfilled by those upon whom presses the desire of attaining eternal life. These, therefore, seize upon that narrow way of which the Lord says: "Straight is the way that leadeth to life"; inasmuch as they, not living according to their own will, neither obeying their own desires and pleasures, but walking according to the judgment and command of another, live in community and desire to have an Abbot over them. Such as these, without doubt, fulfil that saying of the Lord: "I came not to do my own will but the will of Him who sent me."

But this very obedience will then only be acceptable to God and pleasing to men if what is commanded be done without hesitancy, tardiness, lukewarmness, murmuring, or a manifestation of unwillingness; because the obedience which is given to superiors is given to God; for He Himself has said: "He that heareth you heareth Me." And this obedience ought to be given by the disciple with a ready will, because "God loveth a cheerful giver." For if the disciple obey with ill will, and murmur not only with his lips but also in his heart, even though he fulfil the command, nevertheless he will not be acceptable to God, who regards the heart of the murmurer; for such a deed he receives no reward; nay, he rather incurs the punishment of murmurers, unless he amend and make satisfaction.

Of Silence

LET us act in conformity with that saying of the Prophet: "I said I will take heed to my ways that I sin not with my tongue; I have set a guard to my mouth; I was dumb and was humbled and kept silence from good things." Here the prophet shows that if we ought at times for the sake of silence to refrain even from good words, much more ought we to abstain from evil words on account of the punishment due to sin. Therefore, on account of the importance of silence, let permission to speak be rarely given even to the perfect disciples, even though their words be good and holy and conducive to edification, because it is written: "In the multitude of words there shall not want sin." And elsewhere: "Death and life are in the power

of the tongue." For to speak and to teach are the province of the master; whereas that of the disciple is to be silent and to listen. Therefore, if anything is to be asked of the superior, let it be done with all humility and subjection of reverence, lest one seem to speak more than is expedient. Buffoonery, however, or idle words or such as move to laughter we utterly condemn in every place, and forbid the disciple to open his mouth to any such discourse.

Of Humility

THE Sacred Scripture cries out to us, brethren, saying, "Everyone that exalteth himself shall be humbled, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted." In saying this it teaches us that all exaltation is of the nature of pride, which vice the Prophet shows that he took care to avoid, saying: "Lord, my heart is not exalted nor are my eyes lofty, nor have I walked in great matters, nor in wonderful things above me." And why? "If I was not humbly minded, but exalted in my soul, as a child that is weaned is towards his mother, so reward in my soul."

Wherefore, brethren, if we wish to gain the summit of humility and speedily to attain to that heavenly exaltation to which we can ascend only by the humility of this present life, we must, by actions which constantly elevate us, erect that ladder which Jacob beheld in his dream and on which Angels appeared descending and ascending. This descent and ascent we must understand without doubt as being nothing other than that we descend by exaltation and ascend by humility. The ladder itself thus erected is our life in this world, which the Lord, having respect to our humility of heart, lifts up even to heaven. The sides of this ladder we declare to be our body and soul, in which our divine vocation has placed divers rounds of humility and discipline which we must ascend.

The first degree of humility then is, that a person, always keeping the fear of God before his eyes, should avoid all forgetfulness and be ever mindful of all that God has commanded, and of the fact that those who contemn God fall into hell for their sins; and that one should ever meditate in his heart on the everlasting life which has been prepared

for those who fear God. And keeping himself at all times from sins and vices, whether of the thoughts, the tongue, the eyes, the hands, the feet, or of his own will, let him also hasten to cut off the desires of the flesh.

Let him always consider that at all times he is being watched from heaven by God, and that his actions are everywhere seen by the eye of the Divine Majesty, and are every moment reported to Him by His Angels. Of this the Prophet informs us when he shows how God is ever present to our thoughts, saying: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." And again: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men that they are vain." And he also says: "Thou hast understood my thoughts afar off." And: "The thought of man shall confess to thee." In order, therefore, that the humble brother may be on his guard against evil thoughts, let him say ever in his heart: "Then shall I be unspotted before Him, if I shall have kept myself from my iniquity." We are indeed forbidden to do our own will by the Scripture when it says to us: "Turn away from thy own will." And so, too, we beg God in prayer, that His will may be done in us. Rightly, therefore, are we taught not to do our own will when we hearken to that which the Scripture says: "There are ways which seem to men right, but the ends thereof lead to the depths of hell." Or again, when we pay heed to what is said of the careless: "They are corrupt and have become abominable in their pleasures."

As to the desires of the flesh, let us hold as certain that God is always present to us, as the prophet says to the Lord: "Lord, before thee is all my desire." We must be on our guard, then, against evil desires, for death is close to the entrance of delight; whence the Scripture commands us, saying: "Go not after thy lusts."

Wherefore, since the eyes of the Lord behold the good and the evil, and "the Lord is ever looking down from heaven upon the children of men to see if there is one who hath understanding or who seeketh God"; and since the works of our hands are reported to Him, our Creator, day and night by the Angels appointed to watch over us, we must be always on the watch, brethren, lest, as the Prophet says in the Psalm, God should see us at any time declining to evil and become unprofitable; and lest He, though sparing us at the present time, because He is merciful

and awaits our conversion, should say to us hereafter: "These things hast thou done and I was silent."

The second degree of humility is, that a person, loving not his own will, delight not in gratifying his desires, but carry out in his deeds that saying of the Lord: "I came not to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent me." And again the Scripture says: "Self-will merits punishment, but self-constraint wins a crown."

The third degree of humility is, that a person for the love of God submit himself to his superior in all obedience, imitating thereby the Lord, of whom the Apostle says: "He was made obedient even unto death."

The fourth degree of humility is, that if, in this very obedience, hard and contrary things, nay even injuries, are done to a person, he should take hold silently on patience, and, bearing up bravely, grow not weary nor depart, according to that of the Scripture: "He that shall persevere to the end shall be saved." And again: "Let thy heart be strengthened and wait thou for the Lord." And, showing how the faithful man ought to bear all things, however contrary, for the Lord, it says in the person of those who suffer: "For thee we suffer death all the day long; we are counted as sheep for the slaughter." And, confident in the hope of divine reward, they go on with joy, saying: "But in all these things we overcome because of him who hath loved us." Similarly in another place the Scripture says: "Thou hast proved us, O God; thou hast tried us as silver is tried by fire; thou hast led us into the snare, and hast laid tribulation on our backs." And to show that we ought to be under a superior, it goes on to say: "Thou hast placed men over our heads."

Moreover, these, fulfilling the precept of the Lord by patience in adversities and injuries, when struck on one cheek offer the other; to him who takes away their coat they leave also their cloak; forced to walk a mile they go other two; with Paul the Apostle they bear with false brethren and with persecution; and bless those that curse them.

The fifth degree of humility is to hide from one's Abbot none of the evil thoughts that beset one's heart, nor the sins committed in secret, but to manifest them in humble confession. To this the Scripture exhorts us, saying: "Make known thy way unto the Lord, and hope in him." And again: "Con-

fess to the Lord, for he is good, and his mercy endureth forever." So also the prophet says: "I have made known to thee my offence, and my iniquities I have not hidden. I said, I will confess against myself my iniquities to the Lord; and thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my heart."

The sixth degree of humility is, that a monk be content with all that is mean and poor, and, in all that is enjoined him, esteem himself a sinful and unworthy laborer, saying with the prophet: "I have been brought to nothing and I knew it not; I am become as a beast before thee, and (yet) I am always with thee."

The seventh degree of humility is, that a person not only call himself with his own tongue lower and viler than all men, but also consider himself thus with inmost conviction, humbling himself and saying with the Prophet: "I am a worm and no man, the shame of men and the outcast of the people. I have been exalted and cast down and confounded." And again: "It is good for me that thou hast humbled me, that I may learn thy commandments."

The eighth degree of humility is, that a monk do nothing except what the common rule of the monastery or the example of the seniors direct.

The ninth degree of humility is, that a monk restrain his tongue from speaking and, maintaining silence, speak not until questioned, for the Scripture teaches: "In the multitude of words there shall not want sin," and: "The man full of tongue shall not be established upon the earth."

The tenth degree of humility is, that one be not easily moved or quick to laughter, because it is written: "The fool lifteth up his voice in laughter."

The eleventh degree of humility is, that, when a monk speaks, he do so gently and without laughter, humbly, gravely, and with few and reasonable words, and that he be not boisterous in his speech, as it is written: "A wise man is known by the fewness of his words."

The twelfth degree of humility is, that a monk, not only in his heart, but also in his very outward appearance, always show his humility to all who see him; that is, in his work, in the oratory, in the monastery, in the garden, when traveling, in the field, or wherever he may be, whether sitting, walking, or standing, he keep his head always bent down, his gaze fixed on the ground;

always mindful of the guilt of his sins, he consider himself already present before the fearful judgment seat of God, always repeating in his heart what the publican in the gospel said with his eyes fixed on the earth: "Lord, I a sinner am not worthy to raise my eyes to heaven." And again with the Prophet: "I am bowed down and humbled in every way."

Having, therefore, ascended all these degrees of humility, the monk will presently arrive at that love of God which, when perfect, casts out fear; in which love he shall begin to observe without labor and as it were naturally and by habit all those precepts which previously he had observed not without fear, now no longer through fear of hell, but for the love of Christ and out of holy custom and delight in virtue. This the Lord will deign to manifest by the Holy Ghost in his laborer, now cleansed from vice and sin.

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Whether the Monks are to Have Anything of Their Own

ABOVE all, let this vice be rooted out of the monastery: namely, that one presume to give or to receive anything without leave of the Abbot, or to keep anything as his own, absolutely anything at all: either a book or a writing tablet or a pen or anything whatsoever; since they are to have not even their bodies or their wills in their own keeping.

They may, however, expect to receive from the father of the monastery all that is necessary; but they may not keep what the Abbot has not given or permitted. Let all things be common to all, as it is written, but let no one call anything his own or claim it as such. Should, however, anyone be found addicted to this most wicked vice, let him be twice admonished; if he be not amended, let him be subjected to punishment.

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Of the Observance of Lent

ALTHOUGH the life of a monk ought at all times to have the aspect of Lenten observance, yet, since few have strength enough for this, we exhort all during these days of

Lent to lead lives of the greatest purity, and to atone during this holy season for all the negligences of other times. This we shall do in a worthy manner if we refrain ourselves from all sin and give ourselves to prayer with tears, to reading, to compunction of heart, and to abstinence. Moreover, during these days, let us add something to our ordinary burden of service, such as private prayers, abstinence from food and drink, so that each one may offer up to God in the joy of the Holy Ghost something over and above the measure appointed to him; let him deny his body in food, in drink, in sleep, in superfluous talking, in mirth, and withal long for the holy feast of Easter with the joy of spiritual desire.

Let each one, however, make known to his Abbot what he offers up, and let it be done with the assistance of his prayers and with his permission; because that which is done without the permission of the spiritual father will be imputed to presumption and vainglory, and will merit no reward. All things, therefore, are to be done with the permission of the Abbot.

Life and Character of St. Francis

How St. Francis came to undertake his mission. (From the first *Life of St. Francis*, by Thomas of Celano, written in 1228; condensed.)

Until his twentieth year Francis wretchedly wasted his days. He astonished every one, for he sought to exceed all others in pomp and vain display. He was full of jests, quips, and light words; he dressed in soft flowing garments, for he was very rich; yet he was not avaricious, only prodigal, and squandered instead of saving his money. He was withal a man of gentle manner, friendly and very courteous.

In the midst of the joys and sins of his youth suddenly the divine vengeance, or grace, came upon him, which began to recall him to the right way by bringing anguish to his mind and suffering to his body, according to the saying of the prophet, "Behold, I will hedge up thy way with thorns, and I will encompass it with afflictions." When he had long been afflicted by bodily sickness — as the sinful man merits, since

he will not amend his ways except by punishment — he began to turn his thoughts to other things than had been his wont.

When he had somewhat mended, he once more wandered about the house, supported by a staff, in order to hasten his recovery. One day he went out of doors and looked thoughtfully over the neighboring plain; but the beauty of the fields and their pleasantness, and all things whatsoever that are lovely to the sight, in no way delighted him. He marveled at the sudden change in himself, and those who still loved the things that he had formerly loved seemed to him most foolish.

From that day it came to pass that he seemed worthless in his own sight, and did hold in a certain contempt those things that he was used to hold in admiration and love. He would fain conform his will to the divine will, and so he withdrew himself for a season from worldly business and tumult and sought to store away Jesus Christ within his soul.

[Together with a certain man of Assisi who did love him greatly, he was used to go apart into the country.] Now there was near the city a certain grotto and thither they often went. Francis, the man of God, who now was blessed with a holy purpose, would enter into the grotto whilst his companion awaited him without. There he did pray fervently that the eternal and true God would direct his way and would teach him to do his will. His soul glowed with divine fire and he could not hide the brightness of his spirit. And he repented him because he had sinned so grievously and had offended in the eyes of the Divine Majesty.

On a certain day when he had most earnestly besought the mercy of God, it was made known to him by the Lord what he should do. Therefore he was filled with so great gladness that he could not keep from rejoicing inwardly, and yet he would not make known unto men anything concerning this joy. But so great was the love kindled within him that he could not be wholly silent, so he spoke somewhat cautiously and in parables and told his companions how that he would do noble and mighty deeds. They asked him, saying, "Wilt thou marry a wife, Francis?" Who, answering, saith, "I will marry a wife more noble and fairer than ever ye saw, and this spotless bride is the true religion of God."

Ever had he been the benefactor of the poor, but from this time he resolved more firmly in his heart to deny no poor man anything who asked of him in the name of the Lord. Thenceforth whensoever he walked abroad and a beggar asked alms of him, if he had money he gave it to him. If he had no money, then he went apart into some hidden place and took off his shirt and sent it to the beggar secretly.

After some days, as he was passing by the church of St. Damian, it was revealed to him in the spirit that he should go in and pray. When he had entered and had begun to pray fervently before a certain crucifix, lo, the Christ upon the cross spoke to him kindly and lovingly, saying, "Francis, do you not see that my house is destroyed? Go then and repair it for me." Trembling and astounded, he answered, "That will I gladly do, Lord." For he thought that our Lord did speak of the church of St. Damian, which, because of its too great age, was like to fall into decay. So Francis straightway sought out the priest and gave him a certain sum of money that he might buy oil for the lamp before the crucifix. From that hour was his heart softened and

wounded by the memory of our Lord's passion, so that even while he lived he did bear in his heart the stigmata of the Lord Jesus. . . .

[Now Francis, from this time, did long to give all things that he had to the Lord;] so this blessed servant of the Most High took some pieces of cloth that he might sell them, and went forth mounted upon his horse and arrived straightway at the city called Foligno. There did the happy merchant sell all the goods that he had, and did even part with his horse when a price was offered for him. Then he took his way toward Assisi, and he passed by the way the church of St. Damian. The new soldier of Christ straightway entered the church and sought out a certain poor priest, and with reverence did kiss his hands and then offered to him all the money that he had. . . .

[Rejoicing in the Lord, he lingered in the church of St. Damian.] His father, hearing of these things, gathered together his friends and neighbors and made all speed possible to the place where the servant of God was abiding. Then he, because he was but a new champion of Christ, when he heard the threats of vengeance, did hide himself in a certain secret cave and there did lie concealed for a month. Fasting and praying, he did entreat the mercy of the Saviour; and though he lay in a pit and in the shadow of death, yet was he filled with a certain unutterable joy, unhoped for until now. All aglow with this gladness, he left the cave and exposed himself openly to the abuses of his persecutors. . . . Armed with the shield of faith and the armor of trust, he took his way to the city. All who knew him did deride him and called him insane and a madman, and pelted him with the mud of the streets and with stones.

The father of the blessed Francis, when he learned that his son was ridiculed in the open streets, first strove by abuse to turn him from his chosen way. When he could not thus prevail over him, he desired the servant of God to renounce all his inheritance. That this might be done, he brought the blessed Francis before the bishop of Assisi. At this Francis did greatly rejoice and hastened with a willing heart to fulfill his father's demands.

When he had come before the bishop he did not delay, nor did he suffer others to hinder him. Indeed, he waited not to be told what he should do, but straightway did take off his garments and cast them away and gave them back to his father; and he stood all naked before the people. But the bishop took heed of his spirit and was filled with exceeding great wonder at his zeal and steadfastness; so he gathered him in his arms and covered him with the cloak which he wore. Behold now had he cast aside all things which are of this world.

The holy one, lover of all humility, did then betake himself to the lepers and abode with them most tenderly for the love of God. He washed away all the putrid matter from them, and even cleansed the blood and all that came forth from the ulcers, as he himself spake in his will: "When I was yet in my sins it did seem to me too bitter to look upon the lepers, but the Lord himself did lead me among them and I had compassion upon them."

Now upon a certain day, in the church of Santa Maria Portiuncula, the gospel was read — how that the Lord sent forth his disciples to preach. It was while they did celebrate the solemn mystery of the mass, and the blessed one

of God stood by and would fain understand the sacred words. So he did humbly ask the priest that the gospel might be expounded unto him. Then the priest set it forth plainly to him, and the blessed Francis heard how the disciples were to have neither gold, nor silver, nor money, nor purse, nor script, nor bread, not to carry any staff upon the road, not to have shoes nor two coats, but to preach repentance and the spirit of God, rejoicing always in the spirit of God.

Then said the blessed Francis, "This is what I long for, this is what I seek, this is what I desire to do from the bottom of my heart." And he was exceeding rich in joy, and did hasten to fulfill the blessed words that he had heard. He did not suffer any hindrance to delay him, but did earnestly begin to do that which he had heard. Forthwith he did loose the shoes from his feet, and did lay down the staff from out his hands, and was content with one tunic, and changed his girdle for a rope. Then with great fervor of spirit and joy of mind he began to preach repentance to all men. He used simple speech, yet by his noble heart did he strengthen those who heard him. His word was as a flaming fire, and found a way into the depths of all hearts.

St. Francis' sermon to the birds. (From *Thomas of Celano.*)

The most blessed Father Francis once made his way through the valley of Spoleto, and he came to a place near Bevagna where birds of divers kinds had gathered together in a great multitude, — crows, doves, and others which are called, in the vulgar tongue, bullfinches. Now Francis, most blessed servant of God, was a man full of zeal and moved to tenderness and gentleness toward all creatures, even those that be lowly and without reason. So when he had seen the birds he did run to them quickly, leaving his companions upon the way.

When he had come near to them he saw that they awaited him, and he made salutation, as he was wont to do. Wondering not a little that they did not take flight, as is the habit of birds, he begged them humbly, yet with great joy, that they would hear the word of God. And among many things which he said unto them was this which follows: "My brother birds, greatly should ye praise your Creator and always serve him, because he gave you feathers to wear, wings to fly, and whatsoever ye needed. He exalted you among his creatures and made for you a mansion in the pure air. Although ye sow not, neither reap, none the less he protects you and guides you, and ye have not any care."

At this the birdlings — so one said who was with him — began to stretch out their necks and raise their wings, to open their mouths, and to look upon him. He went and came, passing through the midst of them, and his tunic touched their heads and bodies. Then he blessed them, and made the sign of the cross, and gave them leave to fly to other places.

The will of St. Francis.

Francis left no more important memorial of himself and his ideals than his will, dictated by him shortly before his death.

God gave it to me, Brother Francis, to begin to do penance in the following manner: when I was yet in my sins it did seem to me too bitter to look upon the lepers, but the Lord himself did lead me among them, and I had compassion upon them. When I left them, that which had

seemed to me bitter had become sweet and easy.

A little while after I left the world, and God gave me such faith that I would kneel down with simplicity in any of his churches, and I would say, "We adore thee, Lord Jesus Christ, here and in all thy churches which are in the world, and we bless thee that by thy holy cross thou hast ransomed the world."

Afterward the Lord gave me, and still gives me, so great a faith in priests who live according to the form of the holy Roman Church, because of their sacerdotal character, that even if they persecuted me I would have recourse to them, and even though I had all the wisdom of Solomon, if I should find poor secular priests, I would not preach in their parishes against their will. I desire to respect them like all the others, to love them and honor them as my lords. I will not consider their sins, for in them I see the Son of God, and they are my lords. I do this because here below I see nothing, I perceive nothing corporeally of the most high Son of God, except his most holy body and blood, which the priests receive and alone distribute to others.

I desire above all things to honor and venerate all these most holy mysteries and to keep them precious. Wherever I find the sacred names of Jesus, or his words, in unsuitable places, I desire to take them away and put them in some decent place; and I pray that others may do the same. We ought to honor and revere all the theologians and those who preach the most holy word of God, as dispensing to us spirit and life.

A reference to Francis' first Rule.

When the Lord gave me the care of some brothers, no one showed me what I ought to do, but the Most High himself revealed to me that I ought to live according to the model of the holy gospel. I caused a short and simple formula to be written, and the lord pope confirmed it for me.

Those who presented themselves to follow this kind of life distributed all they might have to the poor. They contented themselves with one tunic, patched within and without, with the cord and breeches, and we desired to have nothing more. The clerics said the office like other clerics, and the laymen repeated the paternoster.

We loved to live in poor and abandoned churches, and we were ignorant, and were submissive to all. I worked with my hands and would still do so, and I firmly desire also that all the other brothers work, for this makes for goodness. Let those who know no trade learn one, but not for the purpose of receiving the price of their toil, but for their good example and to flee idleness. And when we are not given the price of our work, let us resort to the table of the Lord, begging our bread from door to door. The Lord revealed to me the salutation which we ought to give: "God give you peace!"

Let the brothers take great care not to accept churches, habitations, or any buildings erected for them, except as all is in accordance with the holy poverty which we have vowed in the Rule; and let them not live in them except as strangers and pilgrims. I absolutely interdict all the brothers, in whatsoever place they may be found, from asking any bull from the court of Rome, whether directly or indirectly, in the interest of church or convent, or under pretext of preaching, nor even for the protection of their bodies. If they are not received anywhere, let them go of themselves elsewhere, thus doing penance with the benediction of God.

I firmly desire to obey the minister general of this brotherhood, and the guardian whom he may please to give me. I desire to put myself entirely into his hands, to go nowhere and do nothing against his will, for he is my lord. Though I be simple and ill, I would, however, have always a clerk who will perform the office, as it is said in the Rule. Let all the other brothers also be careful to obey their guardians and to do the office according to the Rule.

If it come to pass that there are any who do not the office according to the Rule, and who desire to make any other change, or if they are not Catholics, let all the brothers, wherever they may be, be bound by obedience to present them to the nearest custodian. Let the custodians be bound by obedience to keep such a one well guarded, like a man who is in bonds, day and night, so that he may not escape from their hands until they personally place him in the minister's hands. And let the minister be bound by obedience to send him, by brothers who will guard him as a prisoner day and night, until they shall have placed him in the hands of the lord bishop of Ostia, who is the lord protector, and the corrector of all the brotherhood.

And let the brothers not say, "This is a new Rule"; for this is only a reminder, a warning, an exhortation; it is my last will and testament, that I, little Brother Francis, make for you, my blessed brothers, in order that we may observe in a more Catholic way the Rule which we promised the Lord to keep.

Let the ministers general, all the other ministers, and the custodians be held by obedience to add nothing to and take nothing away from these words. Let them always keep this writing near them beside the Rule; and in all the assemblies which shall be held, when the Rule is read, let these words be read also.

I interdict absolutely by obedience all the brothers, clerics and laymen, to introduce comments in the Rule, or in this will, under pretext of explaining it. But since the Lord has given me to speak and to write the Rule and these words in a clear and simple manner, so do you understand them in the same way without commentary, and put them in practice until the end.

And whoever shall have observed these things, may he be crowned in heaven with the blessings of the heavenly Father, and on earth with those of his well-beloved Son and of the Holy Spirit, the Consoler, with the assistance of all the heavenly virtues and all the saints.

And I, little Brother Francis, your servitor, confirm to you, so far as I am able, this most holy benediction. Amen.

An account of the seven sacraments, written for the Armenians by Pope Eugene IV (1438).

We have drawn up in the briefest form a statement of the truth concerning the seven sacraments, so that the Armenians, now and in future generations, may more easily be instructed therein.

There are seven sacraments under the new law: that is to say, baptism, confirmation, the mass, penance, extreme unction, ordination, and matrimony. These differ essentially from the sacraments of the old law; for the latter do not confer grace, but only typify that grace which can be given by the passion of Christ alone. But these our sacraments both contain grace and confer it upon all who receive them worthily.

The first five sacraments are intended to secure the spiritual perfection of every man individually; the two last are ordained for the governance and increase of the Church. For through baptism we are born again of the spirit; through confirmation we grow in grace and are strengthened in the faith; and when we have been born again and strengthened we are fed by the divine food of the mass; but if, through sin, we bring sickness upon our souls, we are made spiritually whole by penance; and by extreme unction we are healed, both spiritually and corporeally, according as our souls have need; by ordination the Church is governed and multiplied spiritually; by matrimony it is materially increased.

To effect these sacraments three things are necessary: the things [or symbols], that is, the "material"; the words, that is, the "form"; and the person of the "ministrant," who administers the sacrament with the intention of carrying out what the Church effects through him. If any of these things be lacking, the sacrament is not accomplished.

The indelible characters.

Three of these sacraments — baptism, confirmation, and ordination — impress indelibly upon the soul a character, a certain spiritual sign, distinct from all others; so they are not repeated for the same person. The other four do not imprint a character upon the soul, and admit of repetition.

Baptism.

Holy baptism holds the first place among all the sacraments because it is the gate of spiritual life; for by it we are made members of Christ and of the body of the Church. Since through the first man death entered into the world, unless we are born again of water, and of the spirit, we cannot, so saith Truth, enter into the kingdom of heaven. The material of this sacrament is water, real and natural — it matters nothing whether it be cold or warm. Now the form is: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." . . .

The ministrant of this sacrament is the priest, for baptism belongs to his office. But in case of necessity not only a priest or deacon may baptize, but a layman or a woman — nay, even a pagan or a heretic, provided he use the form of the Church and intend to do what the Church effects. The efficacy of this sacrament is the remission of all sin, original sin and actual, and of all penalties incurred through this guilt. Therefore no satisfaction for past sin should be imposed on those who are baptized; but if they die before they commit any sin, they shall straightway attain the kingdom of heaven and the sight of God.

Confirmation.

The second sacrament is confirmation. The material is the chrism made from oil, which signifies purity of conscience, and from balsam, which signifies the odor of fair fame; and it must be blessed by the bishop. The form is: "I sign thee with the sign of the cross and confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The proper ministrant of this

sacrament is the bishop. While a simple priest avails perform the other anointings, this one none can confer s: the bishop only; for it is written of the apostles alone that the laying on of hands they gave the Holy Ghost, and bishops hold the office of the apostles. We read in the A of the Apostles, when the apostles who were at Jerusal heard how Samaria had received the word of God, they se to them Peter and John; who, when they were come, pray that they might receive the Holy Ghost; for as yet it w fallen upon none of them, — they were only baptized in t name of the Lord Jesus. Then they laid hands upon the and they received the Holy Ghost. Now, in place of th laying on of hands, confirmation is given in the Churc Yet we read that sometimes, for reasonable and urgent caus by dispensation from the Holy See, a simple priest has bee permitted to administer confirmation with a chrism prepare by a bishop.

In this sacrament the Holy Ghost is given to strengthe us, as it was given to the apostles on the day of Pentecos that the Christian may confess boldly the name of Chris And therefore he is confirmed upon the brow, the seat o shame, that he may never blush to confess the name o Christ and especially his cross, which is a stumbling-bloc to the Jews and foolishness to the Gentiles, according to the apostle. Therefore he is signed with the sign of the cross

The holy eucharist.

The third sacrament is the eucharist. The material is wheaten bread and wine of the grape, which before consecration should be mixed very sparingly with water; because, according to the testimony of the holy fathers and doctors of the Church set forth in former times in disputation, it is believed that the Lord himself instituted this sacrament with wine mixed with water, and also because this corresponds with the accounts of our Lord's passion. For the holy Pope Alexander, fifth from the blessed Peter, says, "In the offerings of sacred things made to God during the solemnization of the mass, only bread and wine mixed with water are offered up. Neither wine alone nor water alone may be offered up in the cup of the Lord, but both mixed, since it is written that both blood and water flowed from Christ's side."

Moreover the mixing of water with the wine fitly signifies the efficacy of this sacrament, namely, the union of Christian people with Christ, for water signifies "people," according to the passage in the Apocalypse which says, "many waters, many people." And Julius, second pope after the blessed Sylvester, says: "According to the provisions of the canons the cup of the Lord should be offered filled with wine mixed with water, because a people is signified by the water and in the wine is manifested the blood of Christ. Therefore when the wine and water are mixed in the cup the people are joined to Christ, and the host of the faithful is united with him in whom they believe."

Since, therefore, the holy Roman Church, instructed by the most blessed apostles Peter and Paul, together with all the other churches of the Greeks and Latins in which glowed the light of sanctity and of doctrine, has from the beginning of the nascent Church observed this custom and still observes it, it is quite unseemly that any region whatever should depart from this universal and rational observance. We decree, therefore, that the Armenians likewise shall conform themselves with the whole Christian world, and that their priests shall mix a little water with the wine in the cup of oblation.

The form of this sacrament is furnished by the words of the Saviour when he instituted it, and the priest, speaking in the person of Christ, consummates this sacrament. By virtue of these words, the substance of the bread is turned into the body of Christ and the substance of the wine into his blood. This is accomplished in such wise that the whole Christ is altogether present under the semblance of the bread and altogether under the semblance of the wine. Moreover, after the consecrated host and the consecrated wine have been divided, the whole Christ is present in any part of them. The benefit effected by this sacrament in the souls of those who receive it worthily is the union of man with Christ. And since, through grace, man is made one body with Christ and united in his members, it follows that through this sacrament grace is increased in those who partake of it worthily. Every effect of material food and drink upon the physical life, in nourishment, growth, and pleasure, is wrought by this sacrament for the spiritual life. By it we recall the beloved memory of our Saviour; by it we are withheld from evil, and strengthened in good, and go forward to renewed growth in virtues and graces.

Transubstantiation of the bread and the wine.

The fourth sacrament is penance. The material, as we may say, consists in the acts of penitence, which are divided into three parts. The first of these is contrition of the heart, wherein the sinner must grieve for the sins he has committed, with the resolve to commit no further sins. Second comes confession with the mouth, to which it pertains that the sinner should make confession to his priest of all the sins he holds in his memory. The third is satisfaction for sins according to the judgment of the priest, and this is made chiefly by prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. The form of this sacrament consists in the words of absolution which the priest speaks when he says, "I absolve thee," etc.; and the minister of this sacrament is the priest, who has authority to absolve either regularly or by the commission of a superior. The benefit of this sacrament is absolution from sins.

Penance and its three parts.

The fifth sacrament is extreme unction, and the material is oil of the olive, blessed by a bishop. This sacrament shall not be given to any except the sick who are in fear of death. They shall be anointed in the following places: the eyes on account of the sight, the ears on account of the hearing, the nostrils on account of smell, the mouth on account of taste and speech, the hands on account of touch, the feet on account of walking, and the loins as the seat of pleasure. The form of this sacrament is as follows: "Through this holy unction and his most tender compassion, the Lord grants thee forgiveness for whatever sins thou hast committed by the sight," — and in the same way for the other members. The minister of this sacrament is a priest. The benefit is even the healing of the mind and, so far as is expedient, of the body also. Of this sacrament the blessed apostle James says: "Is any sick among you? Let him call for the elders of the church and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him."

Extreme unction.

The sixth sacrament is ordination. The material for the priesthood is the cup with the wine and the paten with the bread; for the deaconate, the books of the Gospel; for the subdeaconate, an empty cup placed upon an empty paten; and in like manner, other offices are conferred by giving to the candidates those things which pertain to their

Ordination.

secular ministrations. The form for priests is this: "Receive the power to offer sacrifice in the Church for the living and the dead, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." And so for each order the proper form shall be used, as fully stated in the Roman pontifical. The regular minister of this sacrament is a bishop; the benefit, growth in grace, to the end that whosoever is ordained may be a worthy minister.

Matrimony. The seventh sacrament is matrimony, the type of the union of Christ and the Church, according to the apostle, who saith, "This is a great mystery[1]; but I speak concerning Christ and the church." The efficient cause of marriage is regularly the mutual consent uttered aloud on the spot. These advantages are to be ascribed to marriage: first, the begetting of children and their bringing up in the worship of the Lord; secondly, the fidelity that husband and wife should each maintain toward the other; thirdly, the indissoluble character of marriage, for this typifies the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church. Although for the cause of adultery separation is permissible, for no other cause may marriage be infringed, since the bond of marriage once legitimately contracted is perpetual.

ON THE TRUTH OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH

SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

BOOK ONE: GOD

Chapter 3.

ON THE WAY IN WHICH DIVINE TRUTH IS TO BE MADE KNOWN

[1] The way of making truth known is not always the same, and, as the Philosopher has very well said, "it belongs to an educated man to seek such certitude in each thing as the nature of that thing allows." The remark is also introduced by Boethius. But, since such is the case, we must first show what way is open to us in order that we may make known the truth which is our object.

[2] There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason.

[3] That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man's ability appears with the greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to Aristotle "what a thing is" is the principle of demonstration), it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause. Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power.

[4] We may easily see the same point from the gradation of intellects. Consider the case of two persons of whom one has a more penetrating grasp of a thing by his intellect than does the other. He who has the superior intellect understands many things that the other cannot grasp at all. Such is the case with a very simple person who cannot at all grasp the subtle speculations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel surpasses the human intellect much more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses the intellect of the most uncultivated simple person; for the distance between the best philosopher and a simple person is contained within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. For the angel knows God on the basis of a more noble effect than does man; and this by as much as the substance of an angel, through which the angel in his natural knowledge is led to the knowledge of God, is nobler than sensible things and even than the soul itself, through which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. The divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect is in its capacity equal to its substance, and therefore it understands fully what it is, including all its intelligible attributes. But by his natural knowledge the angel does not know what God is, since the substance itself of the angel, through which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect that is not equal to the power of its cause. Hence, the angel is not able, by means of his natural knowledge, to grasp all the things that God understands in Himself; nor is the human reason sufficient to grasp all the things that the angel understands through his own natural power. Just as, therefore, it would be the height of folly for a simple person to assert that what a philosopher proposes is false on the ground that he himself cannot understand it, so (and even more so) it is the acme of stupidity for a man to suspect as false what is divinely revealed through the ministry of the angels simply because it cannot be investigated by reason.

[5] The same thing, moreover, appears quite clearly from the defect that we experience every day in our knowledge of things. We do not know a great many of the properties of sensible things, and in most cases we are not able to discover fully the natures of those properties that we apprehend by the sense. Much more is it the case, therefore, that the human reason is not equal to the task of investigating all the intelligible characteristics of that most excellent substance.

[6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees with this conclusion. He says that "our intellect is related to the prime beings, which are most evident in their nature, as the eye of an owl is related to the sun."

[7] Sacred Scripture also gives testimony to this truth. We read in Job: "Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly?" (11:7). And again: "Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge" (Job 36:26). And St. Paul: "We know in part" (I Cor. 13:9).

[8] We should not, therefore, immediately reject as false, following the opinion of the Manicheans and many unbelievers, everything that is said about God even though it cannot be investigated by reason.

Chapter 4.

THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD TO WHICH THE NATURAL REASON REACHES IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF

[1] Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, it is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief. This point must first be shown concerning the truth that is open to the inquiry of the reason; otherwise, it might perhaps seem to someone that, since such a truth can be known by the reason, it was uselessly given to men through a supernatural inspiration as an object of belief.

[2] Yet, if this truth were left solely as a matter of inquiry for the human reason, three awkward consequences would follow.

[3] The first is that few men would possess the knowledge of God. For there are three reasons why most men are cut off from the fruit of diligent inquiry which is the discovery of truth. Some do not have the physical disposition for such work. As a result, there are many who are naturally not fitted to pursue knowledge; and so, however much they tried, they would be unable to reach the highest level of human knowledge which consists in knowing God. Others are cut off from pursuing this truth by the necessities imposed upon them by their daily lives. For some men must devote themselves to taking care of temporal matters. Such men would not be able to give so much time to the leisure of contemplative inquiry as to reach the highest peak at which human investigation can arrive, namely, the knowledge of God. Finally, there are some who are cut off by indolence. In order to know the things that the reason can investigate concerning God, a knowledge of many things must already be possessed. For almost all of philosophy is directed towards the knowledge of God, and that is why metaphysics, which deals with divine things, is the last part of philosophy to be learned. This means that we are able to arrive at the inquiry concerning the aforementioned truth only on the basis of a great deal of labor spent in study. Now, those who wish to undergo such a labor for the mere love of knowledge are few, even though God has inserted into the minds of men a natural appetite for knowledge.

[4] The second awkward effect is that those who would come to discover the abovementioned truth would barely reach it after a great deal of time. The reasons are several. There is the profundity of this truth, which the human intellect is made capable of grasping by natural inquiry only after a long training. Then, there are many things that must be presupposed, as we have said. There is also the fact that, in youth, when the soul is swayed by the various movements of the passions, it is not in a suitable state for the knowledge of such lofty truth. On the contrary, "one becomes wise and knowing in repose," as it is said in the *Physics*. The result is this. If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely that of the reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance. For then the knowledge of God, which especially renders men perfect and good, would come to be

possessed only by a few, and these few would require a great deal of time in order to reach it.

[5] The third awkward effect is this. The investigation of the human reason for the most part has falsity present within it, and this is due partly to the weakness of our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of images. The result is that many, remaining ignorant of the power of demonstration, would hold in doubt those things that have been most truly demonstrated. This would be particularly the case since they see that, among those who are reputed to be wise men, each one teaches his own brand of doctrine. Furthermore, with the many truths that are demonstrated, there sometimes is mingled something that is false, which is not demonstrated but rather asserted on the basis of some probable or sophistical argument, which yet has the credit of being a demonstration. That is why it was necessary that the unshakeable certitude and pure truth concerning divine things should be presented to men by way of faith.

[6] Beneficially, therefore, did the divine Mercy provide that it should instruct us to hold by faith even those truths that the human reason is able to investigate. In this way, all men would easily be able to have a share in the knowledge of God, and this without uncertainty and error.

[7] Hence it is written: "Henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened" (Eph. 4:17–18). And again: "All thy children shall be taught of the Lord" (Isa. 54:13).

Chapter 5.

THAT THE TRUTHS THE HUMAN REASON IS NOT ABLE TO INVESTIGATE ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF

[1] Now, perhaps some will think that men should not be asked to believe what the reason is not adequate to investigate, since the divine Wisdom provides in the case of each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary for man to receive from God as objects of belief even those truths that are above the human reason.

[2] No one tends with desire and zeal towards something that is not already known to him. But, as we shall examine later on in this work, men are ordained by the divine Providence towards a higher good than human fragility can experience in the present life. That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be called to something higher than the human reason here and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire something and with zeal tend towards something that surpasses the whole state of the present life. This belongs especially to the Christian religion, which in a unique way promises spiritual and eternal goods. And so there are many things proposed to men in it that transcend human sense. The Old Law, on the other hand, whose promises were of a temporal character, contained very few proposals that transcended the inquiry of the human reason. Following this same direction, the philosophers themselves, in order that they might lead men from the pleasure of sensible things to virtue, were concerned to show that there were in existence other goods of a higher nature than these things of sense, and that those who gave

themselves to the active or contemplative virtues would find much sweeter enjoyment in the taste of these higher goods.

[3] It is also necessary that such truth be proposed to men for belief so that they may have a truer knowledge of God. For then only do we know God truly when we believe Him to be above everything that it is possible for man to think about Him; for, as we have shown, the divine substance surpasses the natural knowledge of which man is capable. Hence, by the fact that some things about God are proposed to man that surpass his reason, there is strengthened in man the view that God is something above what he can think.

[4] Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.

[5] A still further benefit may also be seen in what Aristotle says in the *Ethics*. There was a certain Simonides who exhorted people to put aside the knowledge of divine things and to apply their talents to human occupations. He said that "he who is a man should know human things, and he who is mortal, things that are mortal." Against Simonides Aristotle says that "man should draw himself towards what is immortal and divine as much as he can." And so he says in the *De animalibus* that, although what we know of the higher substances is very little, yet that little is loved and desired more than all the knowledge that we have about less noble substances. He also says in the *De caelo et mundo* that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be given even a modest and merely plausible solution, he who hears this experiences intense joy. From all these considerations it is clear that even the most imperfect knowledge about the most noble realities brings the greatest perfection to the soul. Therefore, although the human reason cannot grasp fully the truths that are above it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at least by faith, it acquires great perfection for itself.

[6] Therefore it is written: "For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men" (Ecclus. 3:25). Again: "So the things that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit" (I Cor. 2:11, 10).

Chapter 6.

THAT TO GIVE ASSENT TO THE TRUTHS OF FAITH IS NOT FOOLISHNESS EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON

[1] Those who place their faith in this truth, however, "for which the human reason offers no experimental evidence," do not believe foolishly, as though "following

artificial fables" (II Peter 1:16). For these "secrets of divine Wisdom" (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge, it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability of all nature. Thus, there are the wonderful cures of illnesses, there is the raising of the dead, and the wonderful immutation in the heavenly bodies; and what is more wonderful, there is the inspiration given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom and the readiest eloquence. When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of the abovementioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms or the promise of pleasures, and (what is most wonderful of all) in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that surpass every human intellect; the pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should seek only what is invisible. Now, that this has happened neither without preparation nor by chance, but as a result of the disposition of God, is clear from the fact that through many pronouncements of the ancient prophets God had foretold that He would do this. The books of these prophets are held in veneration among us Christians, since they give witness to our faith.

[2] The manner of this confirmation is touched on by St. Paul: "Which," that is, human salvation, "having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that hear Him: God also bearing them witness of signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost" (Heb. 2:3–4).

[3] This wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the clearest witness of the signs given in the past; so that it is not necessary that they should be further repeated, since they appear most clearly in their effect. For it would be truly more wonderful than all signs if the world had been led by simple and humble men to believe such lofty truths, to accomplish such difficult actions, and to have such high hopes. Yet it is also a fact that, even in our own time, God does not cease to work miracles through His saints for the confirmation of the faith.

[4] On the other hand, those who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines proceeded in a way that is opposite to this. The point is clear in the case of Mohammed. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. As for proofs of the truth of his doctrine, he brought forward only such as could be grasped by the natural ability of anyone with a very modest wisdom. Indeed, the truths that he taught he mingled with many fables and with doctrines of the greatest falsity. He did not bring forth any signs

produced in a supernatural way, which alone fittingly gives witness to divine inspiration; for a visible action that can be only divine reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of truth. On the contrary, Mohammed said that he was sent in the power of his arms—which are signs not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. What is more, no wise men, men trained in things divine and human, believed in him from the beginning. Those who believed in him were brutal men and desert wanderers, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, through whose numbers Mohammed forced others to become his followers by the violence of his arms. Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly.

Chapter 7.

THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

[1] Now, although the truth of the Christian faith which we have discussed surpasses the capacity of the reason, nevertheless that truth that the human reason is naturally endowed to know cannot be opposed to the truth of the Christian faith. For that with which the human reason is naturally endowed is clearly most true; so much so, that it is impossible for us to think of such truths as false. Nor is it permissible to believe as false that which we hold by faith, since this is confirmed in a way that is so clearly divine. Since, therefore, only the false is opposed to the true, as is clearly evident from an examination of their definitions, it is impossible that the truth of faith should be opposed to those principles that the human reason knows naturally.

[2] Furthermore, that which is introduced into the soul of the student by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher—unless his teaching is fictitious, which it is improper to say of God. Now, the knowledge of the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; for God is the Author of our nature. These principles, therefore, are also contained by the divine Wisdom. Hence, whatever is opposed to them is opposed to the divine Wisdom, and, therefore, cannot come from God. That which we hold by faith as divinely revealed, therefore, cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.

[3] Again. In the presence of contrary arguments our intellect is chained, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If, therefore, contrary knowledges were implanted in us by God, our intellect would be hindered from knowing truth by this very fact. Now, such an effect cannot come from God.

[4] And again. What is natural cannot change as long as nature does not. Now, it is impossible that contrary opinions should exist in the same knowing subject at the same time. No opinion or belief, therefore, is implanted in man

by God which is contrary to man's natural knowledge.

[5] Therefore, the Apostle says: "The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart. This is the word of faith, which we preach" (Rom. 10:8). But because it overcomes reason, there are some who think that it is opposed to it: which is impossible.

[6] The authority of St. Augustine also agrees with this. He writes as follows: "That which truth will reveal cannot in any way be opposed to the sacred books of the Old and the New Testament."

[7] From this we evidently gather the following conclusion: whatever arguments are brought forward against the doctrines of faith are conclusions incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident principles imbedded in nature. Such conclusions do not have the force of demonstration; they are arguments that are either probable or sophistical. And so, there exists the possibility to answer them.

ON THE TRUTH OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH

SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE

Chapter 1.

PROLOGUE

"The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods" (Ps. 94:3). *"For the Lord will not cast off His people"* (Ps. 93:14). *"For in His hand are all the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed dry land"* (Ps. 94:4-5).

[1] That there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of the whole of being, and that we call Him God, has been shown in the preceding Books.[1] From the abundance of His perfection, He endows all existing things with being, so that He is fully established not only as the First Being but also as the original source of all existing things. Moreover, He has granted being to other things, not by a necessity of His nature but according to the choice of His will, as has been made clear in our earlier explanations.[2] From this it follows that He is the Lord of the things that He has made, for we are masters of the things that are subject to our will. In fact, He holds perfect dominion over things produced by Himself, since to produce them He is in need neither of the assistance of an external agent nor of the underlying presence of matter, for He is the universal maker of the whole of being.

[2] Now, each of the things produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by the agent. For the proper object of the will is the good and the end. As a result, things which proceed from will must be directed to some end. Moreover, each thing achieves its ultimate end through its own action which must be directed to the end by Him Who gives things the principles through which they act.

[3] So, it must be that God, Who is in all ways perfect in Himself, and Who endows all things with being from His own power, exists as the Ruler of all beings, and is ruled by none other. Nor is there anything that escapes His rule, just as there is nothing that does not receive its being from Him. As He is perfect in being and causing, so also is He perfect in ruling.

[4] Of course, the result of this rule is manifested dif-

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Book One: God*, trans. Anton C. Pegis, Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Image Books), Garden City, N. Y., 1955; *Book Two: Creation*, trans. James Anderson, Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Image Books), Garden City, N. Y., 1956.
2. SCG, II, ch. 23.

ferently in different beings, depending on the diversity of their natures. For some beings so exist as God's products that, possessing understanding, they bear His likeness and reflect His image. Consequently, they are not only ruled but are also rulers of themselves, inasmuch as their own actions are directed to a fitting end. If these beings submit to the divine rule in their own ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule they are admitted to the achievement of their ultimate end; but, if they proceed otherwise in their own ruling, they are rejected.

[5] Still other beings, devoid of understanding, do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another being. Some of these are incorruptible and, as they can suffer no defect in their natural being, so in their own actions they never fail to follow the order to the end which is prearranged for them. They are unfailingly subject to the rule of the First Ruler. Such are the celestial bodies whose motions occur in ever the same way.

[6] Other beings, however, are corruptible. They can suffer a defect in their natural being, yet such a defect works to the advantage of another being. For, when one thing is corrupted, another comes into being. Likewise, in their proper actions they may fall short of the natural order, yet such a failure is balanced by the good which comes from it. Thus, it is evident that not even those things which appear to depart from the order of the primary rule do actually escape the power of the First Ruler. Even these corruptible bodies are perfectly subject to His power, just as they are created by God Himself.

[7] Contemplating this fact, the Psalmist, being filled with the Holy Spirit, first describes for us the perfection of the First Ruler, in order to point out the divine rule to us: as a perfection of nature, by the use of the term "God"; as a perfection of power, by the use of the words, "great Lord" (suggesting that He has need of no other being for His power to produce His effect); and as a perfection of authority, by the use of the phrase, "a great King above all gods" (for even if there be many rulers, they are all nonetheless subject to His rule).

[8] In the second place, he describes for us the manner of this rule. First, as regards those intellectual beings who are led by Him to their ultimate end, which is Himself, he uses this expression: "For the Lord will not cast off His people." Next, in regard to corruptible beings which are not removed from the power of the First Ruler, even if they go astray sometimes in their own actions, he says: "For in His hands are all the ends of the earth." Then, in regard to celestial bodies which exist above all the highest parts of the earth (that is, of corruptible bodies) and which always observe the right order of the divine rule, he says: "and the heights of the mountains are His."

[9] In the third place, he indicates the reason for this universal rule: the things created by God must also be ruled by Him. Thus it is that he says: "For the sea is His," and so on.

[10] Therefore, since we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature in Book One, and of the perfection of His power inasmuch as He is the Maker and Lord of all things in Book Two, there remains to be treated in this third Book His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as

He is the End and Ruler of all things. So, this will be our order of procedure: first, we shall treat of Himself, according as He is the end of all things; second, of His universal rule, according as He governs every creature; third, of His particular rule, according as He governs creatures possessed of understanding.

Chapter 37.

THAT THE ULTIMATE FELICITY OF MAN CONSISTS IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD

[1] So, if the ultimate felicity of man does not consist in external things which are called the goods of fortune, nor in the goods of the body, nor in the goods of the soul according to its sensitive part, nor as regards the intellective part according to the activity of the moral virtues, nor according to the intellectual virtues that are concerned with action, that is, art and prudence—we are left with the conclusion that the ultimate felicity of man lies in the contemplation of truth.

[2] Indeed, this is the only operation of man which is proper to him, and in it he shares nothing in common with the other animals.

[3] So, too, this is ordered to nothing else as an end, for the contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake.

[4] Also, through this operation man is united by way of likeness with beings superior to him, since this alone of human operations is found also in God and in separate substances.

[5] Indeed, in this operation he gets in touch with these higher beings by knowing them in some way.

[6] Also, for this operation man is rather sufficient unto himself, in the sense that for it he needs little help from external things.

[7] In fact, all other human operations seem to be ordered to this one, as to an end. For, there is needed for the perfection of contemplation a soundness of body, to which all the products of art that are necessary for life are directed. Also required are freedom from the disturbances of the passions—this is achieved through the moral virtues and prudence—and freedom from external disorders, to which the whole program of government in civil life is directed. And so, if they are rightly considered, all human functions may be seen to subserve the contemplation of truth.

[8] However, it is not possible for man's ultimate felicity to consist in the contemplation which depends on the understanding of principles, for that is very imperfect, being most universal, including the potential cognition of things. Also, it is the beginning, not the end, of human enquiry, coming to us from nature and not because of our search for truth. Nor, indeed, does it lie in the area of the sciences which deal with lower things, because felicity should lie in the working of the intellect in relation to the noblest objects of understanding. So, the conclusion remains that man's ultimate felicity consists in the contemplation of wisdom, based on the considering of divine matters.

3. See below, ch. 64–110.

[9] From this, that is also clear by way of induction, which was proved above by rational arguments,[1] namely, that man's ultimate felicity consists only in the contemplation of God.

BOOK FOUR: SALVATION

Chapter 54.

THAT IT WAS SUITABLE FOR GOD TO BE MADE FLESH

[1] However, if one earnestly and devoutly weighs the mysteries of the Incarnation, he will find so great a depth of wisdom that it exceeds human knowledge. In the Apostle's words: "The foolishness of God is wiser than men" (I Cor. 1:25). Hence it happens that to him who devoutly considers it, more and more wondrous aspects of this mystery are made manifest.

[2] First, then, let this be taken into consideration: The Incarnation of God was the most efficacious assistance to man in his striving for beatitude. For we have shown in Book III[1] that the perfect beatitude of man consists in the immediate vision of God. It might, of course, appear to some that man would never have the ability to achieve this state: that the human intellect be united immediately to the divine essence itself as an intellect is to its intelligible; for there is an unmeasured distance between the natures, and thus, in the search for beatitude, a man would grow cold, held back by very desperation. But the fact that God was willing to unite human nature to Himself personally points out to men with greatest clarity that man can be united to God by intellect, and see Him immediately. It was, then, most suitable for God to assume human nature to stir up man's hope for beatitude. Hence, after the Incarnation of Christ, men began the more to aspire after heavenly beatitude; as He Himself says: "I am come that they may have life and may have it more abundantly" (John 10:10).

[3] At the same time, too, some obstacles to acquiring beatitude are removed from man. For, since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the enjoyment of God alone, as shown above,[2] necessarily every man is kept from participation in the true beatitude who cleaves as to an end to these things which are less than God. But man was able to be misled into this clinging as to an end to things less than God in existence by his ignorance of the worthiness of his nature. Thus it happens with some. They look on themselves in their bodily and sentient nature—which they have in common with other animals—and in bodily things and fleshly pleasures they seek out a kind of animal beatitude. But there have been others who considered the excellence of certain creatures superior to man in some respects. And to the cult of these they bound themselves. They worshiped the universe and its parts because of the greatness of its size and its long temporal duration; or spiritual substances, angels and demons, because they found these greater than man both in immortality and in sharpness of understanding. They judged that in these, as existing above themselves, the beatitude of man should be sought. Now, although it is true, some conditions considered, that man stands inferior to some creatures, and even that in certain matters he is rendered like to the lowest creatures, nothing stands higher in the order of end than man except God alone, in whom alone man's perfect beatitude is to be found. Therefore, this dignity of man—namely, that in the immediate vision of God his beatitude is to be found—was most suitably

1. SCG, III, ch. 48–63.

2. SCG, III, ch. 48–62.

manifested by God by His own immediate assumption of human nature. And we look upon this consequence of God's Incarnation: a large part of mankind passing by the cult of angels, of demons, and all creatures whatsoever, spurning, indeed, the pleasures of the flesh and all things bodily, have dedicated themselves to the worship of God alone, and in Him only they look for the fulfillment of this beatitude; and so the Apostle exhorts: "Seek the things that are above where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth" (Col. 3:1–2).

[4] Since man's perfect beatitude, furthermore, consists in the sort of knowledge of God which exceeds the capacity of every created intellect (as was shown in Book III), there had to be a certain foretaste of this sort of knowledge in man which might direct him to that fullness of blessed knowledge; and this is done through faith, as we showed in Book III.[3] But the knowledge by which man is directed to his ultimate end has to be most certain knowledge, because it is the principle of everything ordered to the ultimate end; so, also, the principles naturally known are most certain. But there cannot be a most certain knowledge of something unless the thing be known of itself, as the first principles of demonstration are known to us; or the thing be resolved into what is known of itself, in the way in which the conclusion of a demonstration is most certain for us. Of course, what is set forth for us to hold about God by faith cannot be known of itself to man, since it exceeds the capacity of the human intellect. Therefore, this had to be made known to man by Him to whom it is known of itself. And, although to all who see the divine essence this truth is somehow known of itself, nevertheless, in order to have a most certain knowledge there had to be a reduction to the first principle of this knowledge—namely, to God. To Him this truth is naturally known of itself, and from Him it becomes known to all. And just so the certitude of a science is had only by resolution into the first indemonstrable principles. Therefore, man, to achieve perfect certitude about the truth of faith, had to be instructed by God Himself made man, that man might in the human fashion grasp the divine instruction. And this is what John (1:18) says: "No man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." And our Lord Himself says: "For this was I born and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth" (John 18:37). And for this reason we see that after Christ's Incarnation men were the more evidently and the more surely instructed in the divine knowledge; as Isaias (11:9) has it: "The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord."

[5] Again, since man's perfect beatitude consists in the enjoyment of divinity, man's love had to be disposed toward a desire for the enjoyment of divinity, as we see that there is naturally in man a desire of beatitude. But the desire to enjoy anything is caused by love of that thing. Therefore, man, tending to perfect beatitude, needed inducement to the divine love. Nothing, of course, so induces us to love one as the experience of his love for us. But God's love for men could be demonstrated to man in no way more effective than this: He willed to be united to man in person, for it is proper to love to unite the lover with the beloved so far as possible.[4] Therefore, it was necessary for man tending to perfect beatitude that God become man.

3. SCG, III, ch. 147 and 152.
4. See Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, IV (*PG*, 3, col. 713).

[6] Furthermore, since friendship consists in a certain equality, things greatly unequal seem unable to be coupled in friendship.[5] Therefore, to get greater familiarity in friendship between man and God it was helpful for man that God became man, since even by nature man is man's friend;[6] and so in this way, "while we know God visibly, we may [through Him] be borne to love of things invisible."[7]

[7] In like fashion, too, it is clear that beatitude is the reward of virtue.[8] Therefore, they who tend to beatitude must be virtuously disposed. But we are stimulated to virtue both by words and by examples. Of course, his examples and words of whose goodness we have the more solid opinion induce us the more effectively to virtue. But an infallible opinion of goodness about any pure man was never tenable; even the holiest of men, one finds, have failed in some things. Hence, it was necessary for man to be solidly grounded in virtue to receive from God made human both the teaching and the examples of virtue. For this reason our Lord Himself says: "I have given you an example that as I have done to you so you do also" (John 13:15).

[8] By virtues, again, man is disposed to beatitude, and so by sin he is blocked therefrom. Sin, of course, the contrary of virtue, constitutes an obstacle to beatitude; it not only induces a kind of disorder in the soul by seducing it from its due end, but it also offends God to whom we look for the reward of beatitude, in that God has the custody of human acts. And sin is the contrary of divine charity, as we showed more fully in Book III. What is more, man, being aware of this offense, loses by sin that confidence in approaching God which is necessary to achieve beatitude. Therefore, the human race, which abounds in sins, needed to have some remedy against sin applied to it. But this remedy can be applied only by God, who can move the will of man to good and bring it back to the order due; who can, as well, remit the offense committed against Him—for an offense is not remitted except by him against whom the offense is committed. But, if man is to be freed from awareness of past offense, he must know clearly that God has remitted his offense. But man cannot be clear on this with certainty unless God gives him certainty of it. Therefore, it was suitable and helpful to the human race for achieving beatitude that God should become man; as a result, man not only receives the remission of sins through God, but also the certitude of this remission through the man-God. Hence, our Lord Himself says: "But that you may know that the Son of Man hath power to forgive sins" (Matt. 9:6), and the rest; and the Apostle says that "the blood of Christ will cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God" (Heb. 9:14).

[9] The tradition of the Church, moreover, teaches us that the whole human race was infected by sin. But the order of divine justice—as is clear from the foregoing[9]—requires that God should not remit sin without satisfaction. But to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race was beyond the power of any pure man, because any pure man is something less than the whole human race in its entirety. Therefore, in order to free the human race from its common sin, someone had to satisfy who was both man and so proportioned to the satisfac-

5. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 5, (1157b 35–40).
6. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 1 (1155a 15–25).
7. Preface, Mass of the Nativity of our Lord and of Corpus Christi; St. Thomas has omitted *per hunc*.
8. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 9 (1099b 10–20).
9. SCG, III, ch. 158.

tion, and something above man that the merit might be enough to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race. But there is no greater than man in the order of beatitude, except God, for angels, although superior to man in the condition of nature, are not superior in the order of end, because the same end beatifies them.[10] Therefore, it was necessary for man's achievement of beatitude that God should become man to take away the sin of the human race. And this is what John the Baptist said of Christ: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world" (John 1:29). And the Apostle says: "As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification" (Rom. 5:16).

[10] These points, then, and similar ones make us able to conceive that it was not out of harmony with the divine goodness for God to become man, but extremely helpful for human salvation.

10. *SCG*, III, ch. 57.

ST. THOMAS

TREATISE ON LAW

QUESTION XCI.

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an eternal law? (2) Whether there is a natural law? (3) Whether there is a human law? (4) Whether there is a Divine law? (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several? (6) Whether there is a law of sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 6): *That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. 1 *ad* 2; AA. 3, 4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the First Part (Q. XXII., AA. 1, 2), that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. viii. 23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

Reply Obj. 1. Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rom. iv. 17: *Who calls those things that are not, as those that are.* Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

Reply Obj. 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or

in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Reply Obj. 3. The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively,—that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end,—except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* i.) that *the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly.* But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Obj. 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Obj. 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. ii. 14: *When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law,* comments as follows: *Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. 1 *ad* 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (A. 1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the

natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. iv. 6): *Offer up the sacrifice of justice,* as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: *Many say, Who showeth us good things?* in answer to which question he says: *The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us:* thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above (Q. X., A. 1): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Reply Obj. 3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 1). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (A. 2). Now through the eternal law *all things are most orderly,* as Augustine states (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.

Obj. 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 1). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in *Metaph.* x., text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

Obj. 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in *Metaph.* x., text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. ix. 14: *The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.* Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. 1, *ad* 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (*ibid.*). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (Q. XC., AA. 2, 3, 4). Wherefore Tully says in his *Rhetoric* (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii.) that *justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law.*

Reply Obj. 1. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.

Reply Obj. 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above (A. 2), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the

eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore there is no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. xv. 14) that *God left man in the hand of his own counsel.* Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. 1). Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.

Obj. 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps. cxviii. 33): *Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord.*

I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction on the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q. V., A. 5), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 5, 6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. cxviii. 8, where it is said: *The law of the Lord is unspotted, i.e.*, allowing no foulness of sin; *converting souls*, because it directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; *the testimony of the Lord is faithful*, because of the certainty of what is true and right; *giving wisdom to little ones*, by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Reply Obj. 1. By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

Reply Obj. 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.

Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails.

FRANCOIS RABELAIS

INTRODUCTION: Francois Rabelais (1494-1553) entered a Benedictine monastery as a young man but soon found the religious life vexatious. After escaping from the cloister at age 30 he studied law, Greek, and medicine, eventually becoming a prominent physician. Rabelais distinguished himself for his classical erudition and love of learning, his free thinking in matters of religion, his high opinion of human nature and rejection of the doctrine of original sin, and his general enthusiasm for the earthly existence. He and Montaigne best exemplify the spirit of the Renaissance in France. Rabelais wrote two satirical books, Gargantua and Pantagruel, which may loosely be described as novels. In desultory fashion they describe the humorous and fantastic adventures of the two giants for whom the books are named. The excerpt provided below deals with the building of a new monastery according to Rabelaisian ideals. This monastery, or Abbey of Theleme (from Greek word meaning "desire" or "will", is established by Gargantua as a reward to a certain monk for his assistance in time of war.

CHAPTER 52

It was now necessary to provide for the monk. Gargantua wanted to appoint him abbot of Seuilly, but the monk refused. He wanted to give him the abbey of Bourgueil, or of Saint-Florent, whichever might suit him better, or both if that pleased him, but the monk replied emphatically that he did not want control or responsibility over other monks. "How," he asked, "can I govern someone else when I don't even know how to govern my own life?" "If you think that I have rendered you, or may in the future render you, helpful assistance, allow me to establish an abbey according to my own design." This request pleased Gargantua, and he offered him his entire country of Theleme down to the Loire River, two leagues from the great forest of Port Huault. And the monk requested that Gargantua establish his convent or monastery just the opposite of all others. "To begin with," said Gargantua, "we must not build any walls around it, for all other abbeys are tightly contained within walls." "True," said the monk, "and not without cause where there is a wall, both in front and behind, there is necessarily grumbling, frustration and scheming." Furthermore, since it is the custom in certain monasteries of this world if any woman (I mean decent and proper woman) should enter, the place through which she passed is cleaned, it was ordered that if a monk or nun should enter by accident it would be necessary to clean carefully any place through which they might pass. And since in all religions of the world everything is contained, limited and regulated by schedules it was decided that there should be no clock or timepiece anywhere; rather all work was to be done at a convenient time. Because, said Gargantua, the biggest waste of time that he knew was that of counting hours. "What good comes from it? And the most foolish thing in the

world is to regulate one's life by the sound of a bell instead of by the dictates of good sense and intelligence."

Item: In those times the only women who took religious vows were one-eyed, lame, hunchbacked, ugly, bedraggled, nuts, silly, witches, and blemished; and the men were all runny-nosed, low-born, stupid and trouble makers. ("By the way," said the monk, "of what value is a woman if she is not good looking?" "Only good for a convent," replied Gargantua. "True," said the monk, "and to make shirts.") It was decided that in Theleme only beautiful women of good disposition would be admitted. Likewise, only handsome, urbane men be accepted.

Item: Whereas in traditional convents of nuns men could enter only on the sly, it was decreed that women could live at Theleme only if men were present also.

Item: Whereas both men and women, having entered a traditional religious community, after one year of probation, are forced and constrained to remain there for the rest of their lives, it was established that both sexes could freely depart from Theleme whenever they might choose to do so.

Item: Whereas ordinarily monks and nuns take three vows, namely: chastity, poverty, and obedience, it was agreed that there one could get married honorably, everyone would be wealthy, and liberty would prevail. With regard to the lawful age of entering, women would be received between the ages of ten and fifteen and men from twelve to eighteen.

CHAPTER 53

Gargantua made available two million seven hundred thousand eight hundred thirty-one gold coins for the construction and furnishings of the abbey, and for each year until all was completed he provided one million six hundred sixty-nine thousand gold coins. For its endowment he gave two million three hundred sixty-nine thousand five hundred fourteen "rose" coins in guaranteed annual income.

The building had the shape of a hexagon in such a way that at each corner there was a big round tower sixty feet in diameter. All towers were identical in size and shape. The Loire River ran along the northern side of the property. One of the towers, named Artique (Arctic), stood by the river. Going clockwise there was another tower named Calaer (Fine Air). The next was Anatole (Eastern), then Mesembrine (Southern), followed by Hesperie (Western) and Cryere (Icy).

Between each tower there was a distance of 312 feet. The building had six stories, counting the subterranean passages as one. The second story was vaulted in the shape of a basket handle. The rest were stuccoed in the form of lamp bottoms. The roof was covered with fine slate, with

the ridge sheathing of lead in the shape of small mannikins and animal figures, well matched and gilded. The gutters, which extended out from the walls between the windows, were painted blue and gold and ran to the ground where they emptied into large channels leading under the building to the river.

The edifice was a hundred times more magnificient than Bonivet, Chambord or Chantilly, for it had 9,332 rooms, each provided with a dressing room, study, closet, altar and an exit into the main hall. Between each tower, in the middle of the main building, there was a spiral staircase, the steps of which were made partly of porphery, partly of red marble and partly of green marble. The steps were twenty-two feet wide and three fingers thick, there being twelve steps between each landing. On each landing were two beautiful old-style arches which permitted light to enter and which opened into a room having walls and ceiling of lattice work and being of the same width as the stairway. The stairway itself went all the way to the roof and opened onto a pavillion. From the stairs one could enter on all sides into a great hall, and from the hall into smaller rooms. Between the Arctic and Icy towers there were magnificent libraries in Greek, Latin, Hebrew, French, Italian, and Spanish divided among the different floors according to the languages. In the middle was a marvelous stairway which had an entrance outside the building under an archway thirty-six feet wide. It was designed large enough for six men-at-arms with their lances at rest to ride abreast all the way to the top of the building. Between the Eastern and Southern towers were large and beautiful galleries which contained fresco paintings of ancient deeds of prowess, history and geography. In the center was a stairway and a door similar to the ones we have described on the side of the river.

[There follows a long poetic inscription which prohibits the entry of hypocrites, bigots, lawyers, misers, money lenders, syphilitics and vexatious types in general. At the same time it welcomes cultivated gentlemen, preachers of the Gospel (!) and good-looking, sophisticated women. Rabelais then devoted two chapters to further description of the abbey, including recreational facilities (horsemanship, swimming, tennis, archery, falconry and others) and a detailed account of the sartorial splendor of the occupants.]

CHAPTER 57

Their whole life was governed not by laws, statues or rules, but according to their wishes and free will. They arose from bed when they felt like it, drank, ate, worked, and slept when they so desired. Nobody woke them up, nobody forced them to drink or eat or do anything at all. That's the way Gargantua established it. Their rule was a simple one: "Do what you wish," because free, well-born, cultivated human beings who are accustomed to decent company have a natural instinct which motivates them to do good deeds and refrain from vice.

This instinct is called honor. These same people, when they are bound by regulations and restraints, use their honorable inclination to rebel against and throw off yokes of servitude. Man always seeks after forbidden things and desires that which is denied him.

As a result of this freedom they devoted themselves to the laudable emulation of doing as a group whatever they thought would please a single member. If anyone said, "Let's play," they all played. If he said, "Let's go have fun in the fields," they all went. If it was falconry or hunting, the ladies rode beautiful steeds with a hawk, lanneret or merlin on their finely gloved wrists. The men carried the other birds.

So cultivated were all of them that there was no one who could not read, write, sing, play musical instruments, speak five or six languages, writing both prose and verse in these languages. Never were knights so proud, so gallant, so skillful on foot and horseback, more vigorous or more adept at handling weapons of all sorts. Never were ladies so well-groomed, so dainty, so delightful, more skilled in doing handwork or needlework and every proper feminine activity.

For this reason, when the time came for anyone to wish to depart from the abbey, whether by request of his relatives or for other causes, he carried with him one of the ladies, the one who had taken special devotion for him, and the two of them were married. And if they had lived at Theleme in devotion and friendship, then all the better did they observe these qualities in marriage; living together until the end of their days as they had lived as newly-weds.

(Translated by Donald W. Tucker.)

A TREATISE ON CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

MARTIN LUTHER

Faith MANY have thought Christian faith to be an easy thing, and not a few have given it a place among the virtues. This they do because they have had no experience of it, and have never tasted what great virtue there is in faith. For it is impossible that any one should write well of it or well understand what is correctly written of it, unless he has at some time tasted the courage faith gives a man when trials oppress him. But he who has had even a faint taste of it can never write, speak, meditate or hear enough concerning it. For it is a living fountain springing up into life ever-
John 4:14 lasting, as Christ calls it in John iv. For my part, although I have no wealth of faith to boast of and know how scant my store is, yet I hope that, driven about by great and various temptations, I have attained to a little faith, and that I can speak of it, if not more elegantly, certainly more to the point, than those literalists and all too subtile disputants have hitherto done, who have not even understood what they have written.

Liberty and Bondage That I may make the way easier for the unlearned—for only such do I serve—I set down first these two propositions concerning the liberty and the bondage of the spirit:

A Christian man is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none.

A Christian man is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.

Although these two theses seem to contradict each other, yet, if they should be found to fit together they would serve our purpose beautifully. For they are both
1 Cor. 9:19 Rom. 13:8 Paul's own, who says, in I Cor. ix, "Whereas I was free, I made myself the servant of all," and, Rom. xiii, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Now love by its very nature is ready to serve and to be subject to him who is loved. So Christ, although Lord of all, was made of a
Gal. 4:4 Phil. 2:6 f. woman, made under the law, and hence was at the same time free and a servant, at the same time in the form of God and in the form of a servant. . . .

Here we must point out that all the Scriptures of God are divided into two parts—commands and promises. The commands indeed teach things that are good, but the things taught are not done as soon as taught; for the commands show us what we ought to do, but do not give us the power to do it; they are intended to teach a man to know himself, that through them he may recognize his inability to do good and may despair of his powers. That is why they are called and
Ex. 20:17 are the Old Testament. For example: "Thou shalt not covet" is a command which convicts us all of being sinners, since no one is able to avoid coveting, however much he may struggle against it. Therefore, in order not to covet, and to fulfil the command, a man is compelled to despair of himself, and to seek elsewhere and from some one else the help which he does not find in himself, as is said in Hosea,
Hos. 13:9 "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me." And as we fare with this one command, so we fare with all; for it is equally impossible for us to keep any one of them.

Commands reveal Weakness

But when a man through the commands has learned to know his weakness, and has become troubled as to how he may satisfy the law, since the law must be fulfilled so that not a jot or tittle shall perish, otherwise man will be condemned without hope; then, being truly humbled and reduced to nothing in his own eyes, he finds in himself no means of justification and salvation. Here the second part of the Scriptures stands ready—the promises of God, which declare the glory of God and say, "If you wish to fulfil the law, and not to covet, as the law demands, come, believe in Christ, in Whom grace, righteousness, peace, liberty and all things are promised you; if you believe you shall have all, if you believe not you shall lack all." For what is impossible for you in all the works of the law, many as they are, but all useless, you will accomplish in a short and easy way through faith. For God our Father has made all things depend on faith, so that whoever has faith, shall have all, and whoever has it not, shall have nothing. "For He has concluded all under unbelief, that He might have mercy on all," Romans xi. Thus the promises of God give what the commands of God ask, and fulfil what the law prescribes, that all things may be of God alone, both the commands and the fulfilling of the commands. He alone commands, He also alone fulfils. Therefore the promises of God belong to the New Testament, nay, they are the New Testament.

Matt. 5:18

Promises give Strength

Rom. 11:32

And since these promises of God are holy, true, righteous, free and peaceful words, full of all goodness, it comes to pass that the soul which clings to them with a firm faith, is so united with them, nay, altogether taken up into them, that it not only shares in all their power, but is saturated and made drunken with it. For if a touch of Christ healed, how much more will this most tender touch in the spirit, rather this absorbing of the Word, communicate to the soul all things that are the Word's. This, then, is how through faith alone without works the soul is justified by the Word of God, sanctified, made true and peaceful and free, filled with every blessing and made truly a child of God, as John i says, "To them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His Name."

John 1:12

Faith Justifies

From what has been said it is easily seen whence faith has such great power, and why no good work nor all good works together can equal it: no work can cling to the Word of God nor be in the soul; in the soul faith alone and the Word have sway. As the Word is, so it makes the soul, as heated iron glows like fire because of the union of fire with it. It is clear then that a Christian man has in his faith all that he needs, and needs no works to justify him. And if he has no need of works, neither does he need the law; and if he has no need of the law, surely he is free from the law, and it is true, "the law is not made for a righteous man." And this is that Christian liberty, even our faith, which does not indeed cause us to live in idleness or in wickedness, but makes the law and works unnecessary for any man's righteousness and salvation...

1 Tim. 1:9

Faith Unites with Christ

The third incomparable benefit of faith is this, that it unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom. And by this mystery, as the Apostle teaches, Christ and the soul become one flesh. And if they are one flesh and there is between them a true marriage, nay, by far

Eph. 5:31 f.

the most perfect of all marriages, since human marriages are but frail types of this one true marriage, it follows that all they have they have in common, the good as well as the evil, so that the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as if it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as His own. Let us compare these and we shall see things that cannot be estimated. Christ is full of grace, life and salvation; the soul is full of sins, death and condemnation. Now let faith come between them, and it shall come to pass that sins, death and hell are Christ's, and grace, life and salvation are the soul's. For it behooves Him, if He is a bridegroom, to take upon Himself the things which are His bride's, and to bestow upon her the things that are His. For if He gives her His body and His very self, how shall He not give her all that is His? And if He takes the body of the bride, how shall He not take all that is hers?

Lo! here we have a pleasant vision not only of communion, but of a blessed strife and victory and salvation and redemption. For Christ is God and man in one person, Who has neither sinned nor died, and is not condemned, and Who cannot sin, die or be condemned; His righteousness, life and salvation are unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent; and He by the wedding-ring of faith shares in the sins, death and pains of hell which are His bride's, nay, makes them His own, and acts as if they were His own, and as if He Himself had sinned; He suffered, died and descended into hell that He might overcome them all. Now since it was such a one who did all this, and death and hell could not swallow Him up, they were of necessity swallowed up of Him in a mighty duel. For His righteousness is greater than the sins of all men, His life stronger than death, His salvation more invincible than hell. Thus the believing soul by the pledge of its faith is free in Christ, its Bridegroom, from all sins, secure against death and against hell, and is endowed with the eternal righteousness, life and salvation of
Eph. 5:27 Christ, its Bridegroom. So He presents to Himself a glorious bride, without spot or wrinkle, cleansing her with the washing in the Word of life, that is, by faith in the Word of life, of righteousness, and of salvation. Thus He marries her to Himself in faith, in loving kindness, and
Hos. 2:19 f. in mercies, in righteousness and in judgment, as Hosea ii says...

Faith the Fulfilment of the Law

From this you see once more why so much is ascribed to faith, that it alone may fulfil the law and justify without works. You see that the First Commandment, which says, "Thou shalt worship one God," is fulfilled by faith alone. For though you were nothing but good works from the sole of your foot to the crown of your head, yet you would not be righteous, nor worship God, nor fulfil the First Commandment, since God cannot be worshiped unless you ascribe to Him the glory of truthfulness and of all goodness, which is due Him. And this cannot be done by works, but only by the faith of the heart. For not by the doing of works, but by believing, do we glorify God and acknowledge that He is truthful. Therefore, faith alone is the righteousness of a Christian man and the fulfilling of all the commandments. For he who fulfils the First, has no difficulty in fulfilling all the rest...

Let this suffice concerning the inward man, his liberty and its source, the righteousness of faith, which needs neither laws nor good works, nay, is rather injured by them, if a man trusts that he is justified by them.

The Outward Man

Now let us turn to the second part, to the outward man. Here we shall answer all those who, misled by the word "faith" and by all that has been said, now say: "If faith does all things and is alone sufficient unto righteousness, why then are good works commanded? We will take our ease and do no works, and be content with faith." I answer, Not so, ye wicked men, not so. That would indeed be proper, if we were wholly inward and perfectly spiritual men; but such we shall be only at the last day, the day of the resurrection of the dead. As long as we live in the flesh we only begin and make some progress in that which shall be perfected in the future life. For this reason the Apostle, in Romans viii, calls all that we attain in this life "the first fruits" of the spirit, because, forsooth, we shall receive the greater portion, even the fulness of the spirit, in the future. This is the place for that which was said above, that a Christian man is the servant of all and made subject to all. For in so far as he is free he does no works, but in so far as he is a servant he does all manner of works. How this is possible, we shall see.

Rom. 8:23

Needs to do Works

Although, as I have said, a man is abundantly justified by faith inwardly, in his spirit, and so has all that he ought to have, except in so far as this faith and riches must grow from day to day even unto the future life: yet he remains in this mortal life on earth, and in this life he must needs govern his own body and have dealings with men. Here the works begin; here a man cannot take his ease; here he must, indeed, take care to discipline his body by fastings, watchings, labors and other reasonable discipline, and to make it subject to the spirit so that it will obey and conform to the inward man and to faith, and not revolt against faith and hinder the inward man, as it is the body's nature to do if it be not held in check. For the inward man, who by faith is created in the likeness of God, is both joyful and happy because of Christ in Whom so many benefits are conferred upon him, and therefore it is his one occupation to serve God joyfully and for naught, in love that is not constrained...

Works do not Justify

In doing these works, however, we must not think that a man is justified before God by them: for that erroneous opinion faith, which alone is righteousness before God, cannot endure; but we must think that these works reduce the body to subjection and purify it of its evil lusts, and our whole purpose is to be directed only toward the driving out of lusts. For since by faith the soul is cleansed and made a lover of God, it desires that all things, and especially its own body, shall be as pure as itself, so that all things may join with it in loving and praising God. Hence a man cannot be idle, because the need of his body drives him and he is compelled to do many good works to reduce it to subjection. Nevertheless the works themselves do not justify him before God, but he does the works out of spontaneous love in obedience to God, and considers nothing except the approval of God, Whom he would in all things most scrupulously obey...

These two sayings, therefore, are true: "Good works do not make a good man, but a good man does good works; evil works do not make a wicked man, but a wicked man does evil works"; so that it is always necessary that the "substance" or person itself be good before there can be any good works, and that good works follow and proceed from
Matt. 7:18 the good person, as Christ also says, "A corrupt tree does not bring forth good fruit, a good tree does not bring forth evil fruit." It is clear that the fruits do not bear the tree, nor does the tree grow on the fruits, but, on the contrary, the trees bear the fruits and the fruits grow on the trees. As it is necessary, therefore, that the trees must exist before their fruits, and the fruits do not make trees either good or corrupt, but rather as the trees are so are the fruits they bear; so the person of a man must needs first be good or wicked before he does a good or a wicked work, and his works do not make him good or wicked, but he himself makes his works either good or wicked...

Works of Love

Let this suffice concerning works in general, and at the same time concerning the works which a Christian does for his own body. Lastly, we will also speak of the things which he does toward his neighbor. A man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body, so as to work for it alone, but he lives also for all men on earth, nay, rather, he lives only for others and not for himself. And to this end he brings his body into subjection, that he may the more
Rom. 14:7 f. sincerely and freely serve others, as Paul says in Romans xiv, "No one lives to himself, and no man dies to himself. For he that liveth, liveth unto the Lord, and he that dieth, dieth unto the Lord." Therefore, it is impossible that he should ever in this life be idle and without works toward his neighbors. For of necessity he will speak, deal with and
Phil. 2:7 converse with men, as Christ also, being made in the likeness
Bar. 3:38 of men, was found in form as a man, and conversed with men, as Baruch iii says.

Do not Save

But none of these things does a man need for his righteousness and salvation. Therefore, in all his works he should be guided by this thought and look to this one thing alone, that he may serve and benefit others in all that he does, having regard to nothing except the need and the advantage of his neighbor. Thus, the Apostle commands us to work with our hands that we may give to him who is in need, although he might have said that we should work to
Eph. 4:28 support ourselves; he says, however, "that he may have to give to him that needeth." And this is what makes it a Christian work to care for the body, that through its health and comfort we may be able to work, to acquire and to lay by funds with which to aid those who are in need, that in this way the strong member may serve the weaker, and we may
Gal. 6:2 be sons of God, each caring for and working for the other, bearing one another's burdens, and so fulfilling the law of
Gal. 5:6 Christ. Lo, this is a truly Christian life, here faith is truly

Grow out of Faith

effectual through love; that is, it issues in works of the freest service cheerfully and lovingly done, with which a man willingly serves another without hope of reward, and for himself is satisfied with the fulness and wealth of his faith...

Faith and Love

Lo, thus from faith flow forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a joyful, willing and free mind that serves one's neighbor willingly and takes no account of gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or blame, of gain or loss. For a man does not serve that he may put men under obligations, he does not distinguish between friends and enemies, nor does he anticipate their thankfulness or unthankfulness; but most freely and most willingly he spends himself and all that he has, whether he waste all on the thankless or whether he gain a reward. For as his Father does, distributing all things to all men richly and freely, causing

Matt. 5:45

His sun to rise upon the good and upon the evil, so also the son does all things and suffers all things with that freely bestowing joy which is his delight when through Christ he sees it in God, the dispenser of such great benefits...

Conclusion

We conclude, therefore, that a Christian man lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor. Otherwise he is not a Christian. He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbor through love; by faith he is caught up beyond himself into God, by love he sinks down beneath himself into his neighbor; yet he always remains in God and in His love...

Summary of the Christian Life. Self-Denial

BY

JOHN CALVIN

ALTHOUGH the Divine law contains a most excellent and well-arranged plan for the regulation of life, yet it has pleased the heavenly Teacher to conform men by a more accurate doctrine to the rule which he had prescribed in the law. And the principle of that doctrine is this—that it is the duty of believers to "present their bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God;" (*b*) and that in this consists the legitimate worship of him. Hence is deduced an argument for exhorting them, "Be not conformed to this world; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that will of God." This is a very important consideration, that we are consecrated and dedicated to God; that we may not hereafter think, speak, meditate, or do any thing but with a view to his glory. For that which is sacred cannot, without great injustice towards him, be applied to unholy uses. If we are not our own, but the Lord's, it is manifest both what error we must avoid, and to what end all the actions of our lives are to be directed. We are not our own; therefore neither our reason nor our will should predominate in our deliberations and actions. We are not our own; therefore let us not propose it as our end, to seek what may be expedient for us according to the flesh. We are not our own; therefore let us, as far as possible, forget ourselves and all things that are ours. On the contrary, we are God's; to him, therefore, let us live and die. We are God's; therefore let his wisdom and will preside in all our actions. We are God's; towards him, therefore, as our only legitimate end, let every part of our lives be directed. O, how great a proficiency has that man made, who, having been taught that he is not his own, has taken the sovereignty and government of himself from his own reason, to surrender it to God! For as compliance with their own inclinations leads men most effectually to ruin, so to place no dependence on our own knowledge or will, but merely to follow the guidance of the Lord, is the only way of safety. Let this, then, be the first step, to depart from ourselves, that we may apply all the vigour of our faculties to the service of the Lord. By service I mean, not that only which consists in verbal obedience, but that by which the human mind, divested of its natural carnality, resigns itself wholly to the direction of the Divine Spirit. Of this transformation, which Paul styles a renovation of the mind, (*c*) though it is the first entrance into life, all the philosophers were ignorant. For they set up Reason as the sole directress of man; they think that she is exclusively to be attended to; in short, to her alone they assign the government of the conduct. But the Christian philosophy commands her to give place and submit to the Holy Spirit; so that now the man himself lives not, but carries about Christ living and reigning with him. (*d*)

II. Hence also that other consequence, that we should seek not our own things, but those which are agreeable to the will of the Lord, and conducive to the promotion of his glory. This also argues a great proficiency, that almost forgetting ourselves, and certainly neglecting all selfish regards, we endeavour faithfully to devote our attention to God and his commandments. For when the Scripture enjoins us to discard all private and selfish considerations, it not only erases from our minds the cupidity of wealth, the lust of power, and the favour of men, but also eradicates ambition and all appetite after human glory, with other more secret plagues. Indeed, a Christian man ought to be so disposed and prepared, as to reflect that he has to do with God every moment of his life. Thus, as he will measure all his actions by his will and determination, so he will refer the whole bias of his mind religiously to him. For he who has learned to regard God in every undertaking, is also raised above every vain imagination. This is that denial of ourselves, which Christ, from the commencement of their course, so diligently enjoins on his disciples; which, when it has once obtained the government of the heart, leaves room neither for pride, haughtiness, or ostentation, nor for avarice, libidinousness, luxury, effeminacy, or any other evils which are the offspring of self-love. On the contrary, wherever it does not reign, there either the grossest vices are indulged without the least shame; or, if there exist any appearance of virtue, it is vitiated by a depraved passion for glory. Show me, if you can, a single individual, who, unless he has renounced himself according to the command of the Lord, is voluntarily disposed to practise virtue among men. For all who have not been influenced by this disposition, have followed virtue merely from the love of praise. And even those of the philosophers who have ever contended that virtue is desirable for its own sake, have been inflated with so much arrogance, that it is evident they desired virtue for no other reason than to furnish them occasion for the exercise of pride. But God is so far from being delighted, either with those who are ambitious of popular praise, or with hearts so full of pride and presumption, that he pronounces "they have their reward" in this world, and represents harlots and publicans as nearer to the kingdom of heaven than such persons. But we have not yet clearly stated the number and magnitude of the obstacles by which a man is impeded in the pursuit of that which is right, as long as he has refrained from all self-denial. For it is an ancient and true observation, that there is a world of vices concealed in the soul of men. Nor can you find any other remedy than to deny yourself and discard all selfish considerations, and to devote your whole attention to the pursuit of those things which the Lord requires of you, and which ought to be pursued for this sole reason, because they are pleasing to him.

V. How extremely difficult it is for you to discharge your duty in seeking the advantage of your neighbour! Unless you quit all selfish considerations, and, as it were, lay aside yourself, you will effect nothing in this duty. For how can you perform those which Paul inculcates as works of charity, unless you renounce yourself, and devote yourself wholly to serve others? "Charity," says he, "suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily pro-

voked," &c. (*h*) If this be all that is required, that we seek not our own, yet we must do no small violence to nature, which so strongly inclines us to the exclusive love of ourselves, that it does not so easily permit us to neglect ourselves and our own concerns in order to be vigilant for the advantage of others, and even voluntarily to recede from our right, to resign it to another. But the Scripture leads us to this, admonishes us, that whatever favours we obtain from the Lord, we are intrusted with them on this condition, that they should be applied to the common benefit of the Church; and that, therefore, the legitimate use of all his favours, is a liberal and kind communication of them to others. There cannot be imagined a more certain rule, or a more powerful exhortation to the observance of it, than when we are taught, that all the blessings we enjoy are Divine deposits, committed to our trust on this condition, that they should be dispensed for the benefit of our neighbours. But the Scripture goes still further, when it compares them to the powers with which the members of the human body are endued. For no member has its power for itself, nor applies it to its private use; but transfuses it among its fellow members, receiving no advantage from it but what proceeds from the common convenience of the whole body. So, whatever ability a pious man possesses, he ought to possess it for his brethren, consulting his own private interest in no way inconsistent with a cordial attention to the common edification of the Church. Let this, then, be our rule for benignity and beneficence, —that whatever God has conferred on us, which enables us to assist our neighbour, we are the stewards of it, and must one day render an account of our stewardship; and that the only right dispensation of what has been committed to us, is that which is regulated by the law of love. Thus we shall not only always connect the study to promote the advantage of others with a concern for our own private interests, but shall prefer the good of others to our own...

VI. Moreover, that we may not be weary of doing good, which otherwise would of necessity soon be the case, we must add also the other character mentioned by the apostle, that "charity suffereth long, and is not easily provoked." The Lord commands us to do "good unto all men," (*k*) universally, a great part of whom, estimated according to their own merits, are very undeserving; but here the Scripture assists us with an excellent rule, when it inculcates, that we must not regard the intrinsic merit of men, but must consider the image of God in them, to which we owe all possible honour and love; but that this image is most carefully to be observed in them "who are of the household of faith," (*l*) inasmuch as it is renewed and restored by the Spirit of Christ. Whoever, therefore, is presented to you that needs your kind offices, you have no reason to refuse him your assistance. Say that he is a stranger; yet the Lord has impressed on him a character which ought to be familiar to you; for which reason he forbids you to despise your own flesh. (*m*) Say that he is contemptible and worthless; but the Lord shows him to be one whom he has deigned to grace with his own image. Say that you are obliged to him for no services; but God has made him, as it were, his substitute, to whom you acknowledge yourself to be under obligations for numerous and important benefits. Say that he is unworthy of your making the smallest exertion on his account; but the image of God, by which he is recommended to

you, deserves your surrender of yourself and all that you possess. If he not only has deserved no favour, but, on the contrary, has provoked you with injuries and insults,—even this is no just reason why you should cease to embrace him with your affection, and to perform to him the offices of love. He has deserved, you will say, very different treatment from me. But what has the Lord deserved? who, when he commands you to forgive men all their offences against you, certainly intends that they should be charged to himself. This is the only way of attaining that which is not only difficult, but utterly repugnant to the nature of man—to love them who hate us, (*n*) to requite injuries with kindnesses, and to return blessings for curses. (*o*) We should remember, that we must not reflect on the wickedness of men, but contemplate the Divine image in them; which, concealing and obliterating their faults, by its beauty and dignity allures us to embrace them in the arms of our love.

The Right Use of the Present Life and Its Supports

BY

JOHN CALVIN

By such principles, the Scripture also fully instructs us in the right use of terrestrial blessings—a thing that ought not to be neglected in a plan for the regulation of life. For if we must live, we must also use the necessary supports of life; nor can we avoid even those things which appear to subserve our pleasures rather than our necessities. It behooves us, therefore, to observe moderation, that we may use them with a pure conscience, whether for necessity or for pleasure. This the Lord prescribes in his word, when he teaches us, that to his servants the present life is like a pilgrimage, in which they are travelling towards the celestial kingdom. If we are only to pass through the earth, we ought undoubtedly to make such a use of its blessings as will rather assist than retard us in our journey. It is not without reason, therefore, that Paul advises us to use this world as though we used it not, and to buy with the same disposition with which we sell. (*f*) But as this is a difficult subject, and there is danger of falling into one of two opposite errors, let us endeavour to proceed on safe ground, that we may avoid both extremes. For there have been some, in other respects good and holy men, who, seeing that intemperance and luxury, unless restrained with more than ordinary severity, would perpetually indulge the most extravagant

excesses, and desiring to correct such a pernicious evil, have adopted the only method which occurred to them, by permitting men to use corporeal blessings no further than their necessity should absolutely require. This advice was well intended, but they were far too austere. For they committed the very dangerous error of imposing on the conscience stricter rules than those which are prescribed to it by the word of the Lord. By restriction within the demands of necessity, they meant an abstinence from every thing from which it is possible to abstain; so that, according to them, it would scarcely be lawful to eat or drink any thing but bread and water. Others have discovered still greater austerity, like Crates the Theban, who is said to have thrown his wealth into the sea, from an apprehension that, unless it were destroyed, he should himself be destroyed by it. On the contrary, many in the present day, who seek a pretext to excuse intemperance in the use of external things, and at the same time desire to indulge the licentiousness of the flesh, assume as granted, what I by no means concede to them, that this liberty is not to be restricted by any limitation; but that it ought to be left to the conscience of every individual to use as much as he thinks lawful for himself. I grant, indeed, that it is neither right nor possible to bind the conscience with the fixed and precise rules of law in this case; but since the Scripture delivers general rules for the lawful use of earthly things, our practice ought certainly to be regulated by them.

II. It must be laid down as a principle, that the use of the gifts of God is not erroneous, when it is directed to the same end for which the Creator himself has created and appointed them for us; since he has created them for our benefit, not for our injury. Wherefore, no one will observe a more proper rule, than he who shall diligently regard this end. Now, if we consider for what end he has created the various kinds of aliment, we shall find that he intended to provide not only for our necessity, but likewise for our pleasure and delight. So in clothing, he has had in view not mere necessity, but propriety and decency. In herbs, trees, and fruits, beside their various uses, his design has been to gratify us by graceful forms and pleasant odours. For if this were not true, the Psalmist would not recount among the Divine blessings, "wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine;" (*g*) nor would the Scriptures universally declare, in commendation of his goodness, that he has given all these things to men. And even the natural properties of things sufficiently indicate for what end, and to what extent, it is lawful to use them. But shall the Lord have endued flowers with such beauty, to present itself to our eyes, with such sweetness of smell, to impress our sense of smelling; and shall it be unlawful for our eyes to be affected with the beautiful sight, or our olfactory nerves with the agreeable odour? What! has he not made such a distinction of colours as to render some more agreeable than others? Has he not given to gold and silver, to ivory and marble, a beauty which makes them more precious than other metals or stones? In a word, has he not made many things worthy of our estimation, independently of any necessary use?

III. Let us discard, therefore, that inhuman philosophy which, allowing no use of the creatures but what is absolutely necessary, not only malignantly deprives us of the lawful enjoyment of the Divine beneficence, but which cannot be embraced till it has

despoiled man of all his senses, and reduced him to a senseless block. But, on the other hand, we must, with equal diligence, oppose the licentiousness of the flesh; which, unless it be rigidly restrained, transgresses every bound. And, as I have observed, it has its advocates, who, under the pretext of liberty, allow it every thing. In the first place, it will be one check to it, if it be concluded, that all things are made for us, in order that we may know and acknowledge their Author, and celebrate his goodness towards us by giving him thanks. What will become of thanksgiving, if you overcharge yourself with dainties or wine, so as to be stupefied or rendered unfit for the duties of piety and the business of your station? Where is any acknowledgment of God, if your body, in consequence of excessive abundance, being inflamed with the vilest passions, infects the mind with its impurity, so that you cannot discern what is right or virtuous? Where is gratitude towards God for clothing, if, on account of our sumptuous apparel, we admire ourselves and despise others? if with the elegance and beauty of it, we prepare ourselves for unchastity? Where is our acknowledgment of God, if our minds be fixed on the splendour of our garments? For many so entirely devote all their senses to the pursuit of pleasure, that the mind is, as it were, buried in it; many are so delighted with marble, gold, and pictures, that they become like statues, are, as it were, metamorphosed into metal, and resemble painted images. The flavour of meats, or the sweetness of odours, so stupefies some, that they have no relish for any thing spiritual. The same may be observed in other cases. Wherefore it is evident, that this principle lays some restraint on the license of abusing the Divine bounties, and confirms the rule given us by Paul, that we "make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof;" (*i*) which, if they are allowed too much latitude, will transgress all the bounds of temperance and moderation.

IV. But there is no way more certain or concise, than what we derive from a contempt of the present life, and meditation on a heavenly immortality. For thence follow two rules. The first is, "that they that have wives be as though they had none; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; and they that use this world, as not abusing it;" (*k*) according to the direction of Paul: the second, that we should learn to bear penury with tranquillity and patience, as well as to enjoy abundance with moderation. He who commands us to use this world as though we used it not, prohibits not only all intemperance in eating and drinking, and excessive delicacy, ambition, pride, haughtiness, and fastidiousness in our furniture, our habitations, and our apparel, but every care and affection, which would either seduce or disturb us from thoughts of the heavenly life, and attention to the improvement of our souls. Now, it was anciently and truly observed by Cato, That there is a great concern about adorning the body, and a great carelessness about virtue; and it is an old proverb, That they who are much engaged in the care of the body, are generally negligent of the soul. Therefore, though the liberty of believers in external things cannot be reduced to certain rules, yet it is evidently subject to this law, That they should indulge themselves as little as possible; that, on the contrary, they should perpetually and resolutely exert themselves to retrench all superfluities and to restrain luxury; and that they should diligently beware lest they pervert into impediments things which were given for their assistance.

V. The other rule will be, That persons whose property is small should learn to be patient under their privations, that they may not be tormented with an immoderate desire of riches. They who observe this moderation, have attained no small proficiency in the school of the Lord, as he who has made no proficiency in this point can scarcely give any proof of his being a disciple of Christ. For besides that an inordinate desire of earthly things is accompanied by most other vices, he who is impatient under penury, in abundance generally betrays the opposite passion. By this I mean, that he who is ashamed of a mean garment, will be proud of a splendid one; he who, not content with a slender meal, is disquieted with the desire of a more sumptuous one, would also intemperately abuse those dainties, should they fall to his lot; he who bears a private and mean condition with discontent and disquietude, would not abstain from pride and arrogance, should he rise to eminence and honours. Let all, therefore, who are sincere in the practice of piety, earnestly endeavour to learn, after the apostolic example, "both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to suffer need." (*l*) The Scripture has also a third rule, by which it regulates the use of earthly things; of which something was said, when we treated of the precepts of charity. For it states, that while all these things are given to us by the Divine goodness, and appointed for our benefit, they are, as it were, deposits intrusted to our care, of which we must one day give an account. We ought, therefore, to manage them in such a manner that this alarm may be incessantly sounding in our ears, "Give an account of thy stewardship." (*m*) Let it also be remembered by whom this account is demanded; that it is by him who has so highly recommended abstinence, sobriety, frugality, and modesty; who abhors profusion, pride, ostentation, and vanity; who approves of no other management of his blessings, than such as is connected with charity; who has with his own mouth already condemned all those pleasures which seduce the heart from chastity and purity, or tend to impair the understanding.

VI. Lastly, it is to be remarked, that the Lord commands every one of us, in all the actions of life, to regard his vocation. For he knows with what great inquietude the human mind is inflamed, with what desultory levity it is hurried hither and thither, and how insatiable is its ambition to grasp different things at once. Therefore, to prevent universal confusion being produced by our folly and temerity, he has appointed to all their particular duties in different spheres of life. And that no one might rashly transgress the limits prescribed, he has styled such spheres of life *vocations*, or *callings*. Every individual's line of life, therefore, is, as it were, a post assigned him by the Lord, that he may not wander about in uncertainty all his days. And so necessary is this distinction, that in his sight all our actions are estimated according to it, and often very differently from the sentence of human reason and philosophy. There is no exploit esteemed more honourable, even among philosophers, than to deliver our country from tyranny; but the voice of the celestial Judge openly condemns the private man who lays violent hands on a tyrant. It is not my design, however, to stay to enumerate examples. It is sufficient if we know that the principle and foundation of right conduct in every case is the vocation of the Lord, and that he who disregards it will never keep the right way in the duties of

his station. He may sometimes, perhaps, achieve something apparently laudable; but however it may appear in the eyes of men, it will be rejected at the throne of God; besides which, there will be no consistency between the various parts of his life. Our life, therefore, will then be best regulated, when it is directed to this mark; since no one will be impelled by his own temerity to attempt more than is compatible with his calling, because he will know that it is unlawful to transgress the bounds assigned him. He that is in obscurity will lead a private life without discontent, so as not to desert the station in which God has placed him. It will also be no small alleviation of his cares, labours, troubles, and other burdens, when a man knows that in all these things he has God for his guide. The magistrate will execute his office with greater pleasure, the father of a family will confine himself to his duty with more satisfaction, and all, in their respective spheres of life, will bear and surmount the inconveniences, cares, disappointments, and anxieties which befall them, when they shall be persuaded that every individual has his burden laid upon him by God. Hence also will arise peculiar consolation, since there will be no employment so mean and sordid (provided we follow our vocation) as not to appear truly respectable, and be deemed highly important in the sight of God.

ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT

VIII. And for private men, who have no authority to deliberate on the regulation of any public affairs, it would surely be a vain occupation to dispute which would be the best form of government in the place where they live. Besides, this could not be simply determined, as an abstract question, without great impropriety, since the principle to guide the decision must depend on circumstances. And even if we compare the different forms together, without their circumstances, their advantages are so nearly equal, that it will not be easy to discover of which the utility preponderates. The forms of civil government are considered to be of three kinds: Monarchy, which is the dominion of one person, whether called a king, or a duke, or any other title; Aristocracy, or the dominion of the principal persons of a nation; and Democracy, or popular government, in which the power resides in the people at large. It is true that the transition is easy from monarchy to despotism; it is not much more difficult from aristocracy to oligarchy, or the faction of a few; but it is most easy of all from democracy to sedition. Indeed, if these three forms of government, which are stated by philosophers, be considered in themselves, I shall by no means deny, that either aristocracy, or a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, far excels all others; and that indeed not of itself, but because it very rarely happens that kings regulate themselves so that their will is never at variance with justice and rectitude; or, in the next place, that they are endued with such penetration and prudence, as in all cases to discover what is best. The vice or imperfection of men therefore renders it safer and more tolerable for the government to be in the hands of many, that they may afford each other mutual assistance and admonition, and that if any one arrogate to himself more than is right, the many may act as censors and masters to restrain his ambition. This has always been proved by experience, and the Lord confirmed it by his authority, when he established a government of this kind among the people of

Israel, with a view to preserve them in the most desirable condition, till he exhibited in David a type of Christ. And as I readily acknowledge that no kind of government is more happy than this, where liberty is regulated with becoming moderation, and properly established on a durable basis, so also I consider those as the most happy people, who are permitted to enjoy such a condition; and if they exert their strenuous and constant efforts for its preservation and retention, I admit that they act in perfect consistence with their duty. And to this object the magistrates likewise ought to apply their greatest diligence, that they suffer not the liberty, of which they are constituted guardians, to be in any respect diminished, much less to be violated: if they are inactive and unconcerned about this, they are perfidious to their office, and traitors to their country. But if those, to whom the will of God has assigned another form of government, transfer this to themselves so as to be tempted to desire a revolution, the very thought will be not only foolish and useless, but altogether criminal. If we limit not our views to one city, but look round and take a comprehensive survey of the whole world, or at least extend our observations to distant lands, we shall certainly find it to be a wise arrangement of Divine Providence that various countries are governed by different forms of civil polity; for they are admirably held together with a certain inequality, as the elements are combined in very unequal proportions. All these remarks, however, will be unnecessary to those who are satisfied with the will of the Lord. For if it be his pleasure to appoint kings over kingdoms, and senators or other magistrates over free cities, it is our duty to be obedient to any governors whom God has established over the places in which we reside.

XXVII. But the most remarkable and memorable passage of all is in the Prophecy of Jeremiah, which, though it is rather long, I shall readily quote, because it most clearly decides the whole question: "I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power and by my outstretched arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me. And now I have given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Babylon, my servant. And all nations shall serve him, and his son, and his son's son, until the very time of his land come. And it shall come to pass, that the nation and kingdom which will not serve the same king of Babylon, that nation will I punish with the sword, and with the famine, and with the pestilence. Therefore serve the king of Babylon and live." (*x*) We see what great obedience and honour the Lord required to be rendered to that pestilent and cruel tyrant, for no other reason than because he possessed the kingdom; and it was by the heavenly decree that he was seated on the throne of the kingdom, and exalted to that regal majesty, which it was not lawful to violate. If we have this constantly present to our eyes and impressed upon our hearts, that the most iniquitous kings are placed on their thrones by the same decree by which the authority of all kings is established, those seditious thoughts will never enter our minds, that a king is to be treated according to his merits, and that it is not reasonable for us to be subject to a king who does not on his part perform towards us those duties which his office requires.

XXX. And here is displayed his wonderful goodness, and power, and providence; for sometimes he raises up some of his servants as public avengers, and arms them with his commission to punish unrighteous domination, and to deliver from their distressing calamities a people who have been unjustly oppressed: sometimes he accomplishes this end by the fury of men who meditate and attempt something altogether different. Thus he liberated the people of Israel from the tyranny of Pharaoh by Moses; from the oppression of Chusan by Othniel; and from other yokes by other kings and judges. Thus he subdued the pride of Tyre by the Egyptians; the insolence of the Egyptians by the Assyrians; the haughtiness of the Assyrians by the Chaldeans; the confidence of Babylon by the Medes and Persians, after Cyrus had subjugated the Medes. The ingratitude of the kings of Israel and Judah, and their impious rebellion, notwithstanding his numerous favours, he repressed and punished, sometimes by the Assyrians, sometimes by the Babylonians. These were all the executioners of his vengeance, but not all in the same manner. The former, when they were called forth to the performance of such acts by a legitimate commission from God, in taking arms against kings, were not chargeable with the least violation of that majesty with which kings are invested by the ordination of God; but, being armed with authority from Heaven, they punished an inferior power by a superior one, as it is lawful for kings to punish their inferior officers. The latter, though they were guided by the hand of God in such directions as he pleased, and performed his work without being conscious of it, nevertheless contemplated in their hearts nothing but evil.

XXXI. But whatever opinion be formed of the acts of men, yet the Lord equally executed his work by them, when he broke the sanguinary sceptres of insolent kings, and overturned tyrannical governments. Let princes hear and fear. But, in the mean while, it behoves us to use the greatest caution, that we do not despise or violate that authority of magistrates, which is entitled to the greatest veneration, which God has established by the most solemn commands, even though it reside in those who are most unworthy of it, and who, as far as in them lies, pollute it by their iniquity. For though the correction of tyrannical domination is the vengeance of God, we are not, therefore, to conclude that it is committed to us, who have received no other command than to obey and suffer. This observation I always apply to private persons. For if there be, in the present day, any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings, such as were, in ancient times, the Ephori, who were a check upon the kings among the Lacedæmonians, or the popular tribunes upon the consuls among the Romans, or the Demarchi upon the senate among the Athenians; or with power such as perhaps is now possessed by the three estates in every kingdom when they are assembled; I am so far from prohibiting them, in the discharge of their duty, to oppose the violence or cruelty of kings, that I affirm, that if they connive at kings in their oppression of their people, such forbearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, of which they know that they have been appointed protectors by the ordination of God.

XXXII. But in the obedience which we have shown to be due to the authority of governors, it is always necessary to make one exception, and that is entitled to our first attention,—that it do not seduce us from obedience to him, to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty all their sceptres ought to submit. And, indeed, how preposterous it would be for us, with a view to satisfy men, to incur the displeasure of him on whose account we yield obedience to men! The Lord, therefore, is the King of kings; who, when he has opened his sacred mouth, is to be heard alone, above all, for all, and before all; in the next place, we are subject to those men who preside over us; but no otherwise than in him. If they command any thing against him, it ought not to have the least attention; nor, in this case, ought we to pay any regard to all that dignity attached to magistrates; to which no injury is done when it is subjected to the unrivalled and supreme power of God. On this principle Daniel denied that he had committed any crime against the king in disobeying his impious decree; (*i*) because the king had exceeded the limits of his office, and had not only done an injury to men, but, by raising his arm against God, had degraded his own authority. On the other hand, the Israelites are condemned for having been too submissive to the impious edict of their king. For when Jeroboam had made his golden calves, in compliance with his will, they deserted the temple of God and revolted to new superstitions. Their posterity conformed to the decrees of their idolatrous kings with the same facility. The prophet severely condemns them for having "willingly walked after the commandment:" (*k*) so far is any praise from being due to the pretext of humility, with which courtly flatterers excuse themselves and deceive the unwary, when they deny that it is lawful for them to refuse compliance with any command of their kings; as if God had resigned his right to mortal men when he made them rulers of mankind; or as if earthly power were diminished by being subordinated to its author, before whom even the principalities of heaven tremble with awe. I know what great and present danger awaits this constancy, for kings cannot bear to be disregarded without the greatest indignation; and "the wrath of a king," says Solomon, "is as messengers of death." (*l*) But since this edict has been proclaimed by that celestial herald, Peter, "We ought to obey God rather than men," (*m*)—let us console ourselves with this thought, that we truly perform the obedience which God requires of us, when we suffer any thing rather than deviate from piety. And that our hearts may not fail us, Paul stimulates us with another consideration—that Christ has redeemed us at the immense price which our redemption cost him, that we may not be submissive to the corrupt desires of men, much less be slaves to their impiety. (*n*)

THE FIVE POINTS OF DEISM[1]

Herbert of Cherbury

Herbert's religious views show as striking an originality as his purely philosophical speculations. He develops them in the concluding sections of the De Veritate as well as in two treatises--Religio Laici and De Religione Gentilium--which practically form appendices to the work on Truth. His doctrine, briefly expressed, runs thus:--Religion is common to the human race. Stripped of accidental characteristics, and reduced to its essential form, it consists of five notitae communes, or innate ideas, which spring from the natural instinct. The common notions are--(1) That there is a God. (To confirm the existence of a God, Herbert relies on the argument of design in the created world, and he anticipates Paley in illustrating his argument by the example of a watch) (2) That He ought to be worshipped. (3) That virtue and piety are essential to worship. (4) That man ought to repent of his sins. (5) That there are rewards and punishments in a future life. It is unnecessary and unreasonable to admit any articles of religion other than those. The dogmas of the Churches, reputed to embody divine revelations, are the work of priests, who have endeavoured to establish their own influence for their own advantage by shrouding these five ideas in obscurely worded creeds.

AN AMERICAN EXAMPLE OF DEISM[2]

Benjamin Franklin

I had been religiously educated as a Presbyterian; and tho' some of the dogmas of that persuasion, such as the eternal decrees of god, election, reprobation, etc., appeared to me unintelligible, others doubtful, and I early absented myself from public assemblies of the sect, Sunday being my studying day, I never was without some religious principles. I never doubted, for instance, the existence of the Deity; that he made the world, and govern'd it by his Providence; that the most acceptable service of God was the doing of good to man; that our souls are immortal; and that all crime will be punished, and virtues rewarded, either here or hereafter. These I esteem'd the essentials of every religion; and, being to be found in all the religions we had in our country, I respected them all, tho' with different degrees of respect, as I found them more or less mix'd with other articles, which, without any tendency to inspire, promote, or confirm morality, serv'd principally to divide us, and make us unfriendly to one another. This respect to all, with an opinion that the worst had some good effects, induc'd me to avoid all discourse that might tend to lessen the good opinion another might have of his own religion; and as...new places of worship were continually wanted, and generally erected by voluntary contribution, my mite for such purpose, whatever might be the sect, was never refused.

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[1]Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Autobiography, ed. by Sidney Lee, London (1906) Introduction, pp. xxvii-xxviii

[2]From his autobiography.

VOLTAIRE'S PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY

THE ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTRY

THE institution of religion exists only to keep mankind in order, and to make men merit the goodness of God by their virtue. Everything in a religion which does not tend towards this goal must be considered foreign or dangerous.

Instruction, exhortation, menaces of pains to come, promises of immortal beatitude, prayers, counsels, spiritual help are the only means ecclesiastics may use to try to make men virtuous here below, and happy for eternity.

All other means are repugnant to the liberty of the reason, to the nature of the soul, to the inalterable rights of the conscience, to the essence of religion and of the ecclesiastical ministry, to all the rights of the sovereign.

Virtue supposes liberty, as the carrying of a burden supposes active force. Under coercion no virtue, and without virtue no religion. Make a slave of me, I shall be no better for it.

The sovereign even has no right to use coercion to lead men to religion, which supposes essentially choice and liberty. My thought is subordinate to authority no more than is sickness or health.

In order to disentangle all the contradictions with which books on canon law have been filled, and to fix our ideas on the ecclesiastical ministry, let us investigate amid a thousand equivocations what the Church is.

The Church is the assembly of all the faithful summoned on certain days to pray in common, and at all times to do good actions.

The priests are persons established under the authority of the sovereign to direct these prayers and all religious worship.

A numerous Church could not exist without ecclesiastics; but these ecclesiastics are not the Church.

It is no less evident that if the ecclesiastics, who are part of civil society, had acquired rights which might trouble or destroy society, these rights ought to be suppressed.

It is still more evident that, if God has attached to the Church prerogatives or rights, neither these rights nor these prerogatives should belong exclusively either to the chief of the Church or to the ecclesiastics, because they are not the Church, just as the magistrates are not the sovereign in either a democratic state or in a monarchy.

Finally, it is quite evident that it is our souls which are under the clergy's care, solely for spiritual things.

Our soul acts internally; internal acts are thought, volition, inclinations, acquiescence in certain truths. All these acts are above all coercion, and are within the ecclesiastical minister's sphere only in so far as he must instruct and never command.

This soul acts also externally. External actions are under the civil law. Here coercion may have a place; temporal or corporal pains maintain the law by punishing those who infringe it.

Obedience to ecclesiastical order must consequently always be free and voluntary: no other should be possible. Submission, on the other hand, to civil order may be coerced and compulsory.

For the same reason, ecclesiastical punishments, always spiritual, do not reach here below any but those who are convinced inwardly of their fault. Civil pains, on the contrary, accompanied by a physical ill, have their physical effects, whether or no the guilty recognize their justice.

From this it results obviously that the authority of the clergy is and can be spiritual only; that it should not have any temporal power; that no coercive force is proper to its ministry, which would be destroyed by it.

It follows from this further that the sovereign, careful not to suffer any partition of his authority, must permit no enterprise which puts the members of society in external and civil dependence on an ecclesiastical body.

Such are the incontestable principles of real canon law, of which the rules and decisions should be judged at all times by the eternal and immutable truths which are founded on natural law and the necessary order of society.

TOLERANCE

WHAT is tolerance? it is the consequence of humanity. We are all formed of frailty and error; let us pardon reciprocally each other's folly—that is the first law of nature.

It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster. That admits of no difficulty. But the government! but the magistrates! but the princes! how do they treat those who have another worship than theirs? If they are powerful strangers, it is certain that a prince will make an alliance with them. François I., very Christian, will unite with Mussulmans against Charles V., very Catholic. François I. will give money to the Lutherans of Germany to support them in their revolt against the emperor; but, in accordance with custom, he will start by having Lutherans burned at home. For political reasons he pays them in Saxony; for political reasons he burns them in Paris. But what will happen? Persecutions make proselytes? Soon France will be full of new Protestants. At first they will let themselves be hanged, later they in their turn will hang. There will be civil wars, then will come the St. Bartholomew; and this corner of the

world will be worse than all that the ancients and moderns have ever told of hell.

Madmen, who have never been able to give worship to the God who made you! Miscreants, whom the example of the Noachides, the learned Chinese, the Parsees and all the sages, has never been able to lead! Monsters, who need superstitions as crows' gizzards need carrion! you have been told it already, and there is nothing else to tell you—if you have two religions in your countries, they will cut each other's throat; if you have thirty religions, they will dwell in peace. Look at the great Turk, he governs Guebres, Banians, Greek Christians, Nestorians, Romans. The first who tried to stir up tumult would be impaled; and everyone is tranquil.

Of all religions, the Christian is without doubt the one which should inspire tolerance most, although up to now the Christians have been the most intolerant of all men. The Christian Church was divided in its cradle, and was divided even in the persecutions which under the first emperors it sometimes endured. Often the martyr was regarded as an apostate by his brethren, and the Carpocratian Christian expired beneath the sword of the Roman executioners, excommunicated by the Ebionite Christian, the which Ebionite was anathema to the Sabellian.

This horrible discord, which has lasted for so many centuries, is a very striking lesson that we should pardon each other's errors; discord is the great ill of mankind; and tolerance is the only remedy for it.

There is nobody who is not in agreement with this truth, whether he meditates soberly in his study, or peaceably examines the truth with his friends. Why then do the same men who admit in private indulgence, kindness, justice, rise in public with so much fury against these virtues? Why? it is that their own interest is their god, and that they sacrifice everything to this monster that they worship.

I possess a dignity and a power founded on ignorance and credulity; I walk on the heads of the men who lie prostrate at my feet; if they should rise and look me in the face, I am lost; I must bind them to the ground, therefore, with iron chains.

Thus have reasoned the men whom centuries of bigotry have made powerful. They have other powerful men beneath them, and these have still others, who all enrich themselves with the spoils of the poor, grow fat on their blood, and laugh at their stupidity. They all detest tolerance, as partisans grown rich at the public expense fear to render their accounts, and as tyrants dread the word liberty. And then, to crown everything, they hire fanatics to cry at the top of their voices: "Respect my master's absurdities, tremble, pay, and keep your mouths shut."

It is thus that a great part of the world long was treated; but to-day when so many sects make a balance of power, what course to take with them? Every sect, as one knows, is a ground of error; there are no sects of geometers, algebraists, arithmeticians, because all the propositions of geometry, algebra and arithmetic are true. In every other science one may be deceived. What Thomist or Scotist theologian would dare say seriously that he is sure of his case?

If it were permitted to reason consistently in religious mat-

ters, it is clear that we all ought to become Jews, because Jesus Christ our Saviour was born a Jew, lived a Jew, died a Jew, and that he said expressly that he was accomplishing, that he was fulfilling the Jewish religion. But it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error. Shall a reed laid low in the mud by the wind say to a fellow reed fallen in the opposite direction: "Crawl as I crawl, wretch, or I shall petition that you be torn up by the roots and burned?"

PRAYERS

We do not know any religion without prayers, even the Jews had some, although there was not among them any public form, until the time when they sang canticles in their synagogues, which happened very late.

All men, in their desires and their fears, invoked the aid of a deity. Some philosophers, more respectful to the Supreme Being, and less condescending to human frailty, for all prayer desired only resignation. It is indeed what seems proper as between creature and creator. But philosophy is not made to govern the world; she rises above the common herd; she speaks a language that the crowd cannot understand. It would be suggesting to fishwives that they should study conic sections.

Even among the philosophers, I do not believe that anyone apart from Maximus of Tyre has treated of this matter; this is the substance of Maximus' ideas.

The Eternal has His intentions from all eternity. If prayer accords with His immutable wishes, it is quite useless to ask of Him what He has resolved to do. If one prays Him to do the contrary of what He has resolved, it is praying Him to be weak, frivolous, inconstant; it is believing that He is thus, it is to mock Him. Either you ask Him a just thing; in this case He must do it, and the thing will be done without your praying Him for it; entreating Him is even to distrust Him: or the thing is unjust, and then you outrage Him. You are worthy or unworthy of the grace you implore: if worthy, He knows it better than you; if unworthy, you commit a crime the more in asking for what you do not deserve.

In a word, we pray to God only because we have made Him in our own image. We treat Him like a pasha, like a sultan whom one may provoke and appease.

In short, all nations pray to God: wise men resign themselves and obey Him.

Let us pray with the people, and resign ourselves with the wise men.

THEIST

THE theist is a man firmly persuaded of the existence of a Supreme Being as good as He is powerful, who has formed all beings with extension, vegetating, sentient and reflecting; who perpetuates their species, who punishes crimes without cruelty, and rewards virtuous actions with kindness.

The theist does not know how God punishes, how he protects, how he pardons, for he is not reckless enough to flatter himself that he knows how God acts, but he knows that God acts and that He is just. Difficulties against Providence do not shake him in his faith, because they are merely great difficulties, and not proofs. He submits to this Providence, although he perceives but a few effects and a few signs of this Providence: and, judging of the things he does not see by the things he sees, he considers that this Providence reaches all places and all centuries.

Reconciled in this principle with the rest of the universe, he does not embrace any of the sects, all of which contradict each other; his religion is the most ancient and the most widespread; for the simple worship of a God has preceded all the systems of the world. He speaks a language that all peoples understand, while they do not understand one another. He has brothers from Pekin to Cayenne, and he counts all wise men as his brethren. He believes that religion does not consist either in the opinions of an unintelligible metaphysic, or in vain display, but in worship and justice. The doing of good, there is his service; being submissive to God, there is his doctrine. The Mahometan cries to him—"Have a care if you do not make the pilgrimage to Mecca!" "Woe unto you," says a Recollet, "if you do not make a journey to Notre-Dame de Lorette!" He laughs at Lorette and at Mecca; but he succours the needy and defends the oppressed.

RELIGION

I MEDITATED last night; I was absorbed in the contemplation of nature; I admired the immensity, the course, the harmony of these infinite globes which the vulgar do not know how to admire.

I admired still more the intelligence which directs these vast forces. I said to myself: "One must be blind not to be dazzled by this spectacle; one must be stupid not to recognize the author of it; one must be mad not to worship Him. What tribute of worship should I render Him? Should not this tribute be the same in the whole of space, since it is the same supreme power which reigns equally in all space? Should not a thinking being who dwells in a star in the Milky Way offer Him the same homage as the thinking being on this little globe where we are? Light is uniform

for the star Sirius and for us; moral philosophy must be uniform. If a sentient, thinking animal in Sirius is born of a tender father and mother who have been occupied with his happiness, he owes them as much love and care as we owe to our parents. If someone in the Milky Way sees a needy cripple, if he can relieve him and if he does not do it, he is guilty toward all globes. Everywhere the heart has the same duties: on the steps of the throne of God, if He has a throne; and in the depth of the abyss, if He is an abyss."

I was plunged in these ideas when one of those genii who fill the intermundane spaces came down to me. I recognized this same aerial creature who had appeared to me on another occasion to teach me how different God's judgments were from our own, and how a good action is preferable to a controversy.

He transported me into a desert all covered with piled up bones; and between these heaps of dead men there were walks of ever-green trees, and at the end of each walk a tall man of august mien, who regarded these sad remains with pity.

"Alas! my archangel," said I, "where have you brought me?"

"To desolation," he answered.

"And who are these fine patriarchs whom I see sad and motionless at the end of these green walks? they seem to be weeping over this countless crowd of dead."

"You shall know, poor human creature," answered the genius from the intermundane spaces; "but first of all you must weep."

He began with the first pile. "These," he said, "are the twenty-three thousand Jews who danced before a calf, with the twenty-four thousand who were killed while lying with Midianitish women. The number of those massacred for such errors and offences amounts to nearly three hundred thousand.

"In the other walks are the bones of the Christians slaughtered by each other for metaphysical disputes. They are divided into several heaps of four centuries each. One heap would have mounted right to the sky; they had to be divided."

"What!" I cried, "brothers have treated their brothers like this, and I have the misfortune to be of this brotherhood!"

"Here," said the spirit, "are the twelve million Americans killed in their fatherland because they had not been baptized."

"My God! why did you not leave these frightful bones to dry in the hemisphere where their bodies were born, and where they were consigned to so many different deaths? Why assemble here all these abominable monuments to barbarism and fanaticism?"

"To instruct you."

"Since you wish to instruct me," I said to the genius, "tell me if there have been peoples other than the Christians and the Jews in whom zeal and religion wretchedly transformed into fanaticism, have inspired so many horrible cruelties."

"Yes," he said. "The Mohammedans were sullied with the same inhumanities, but rarely; and when one asked

amman, pity, of them and offered them tribute, they pardoned. As for the other nations there has not been one right from the existence of the world which has ever made a purely religious war. Follow me now." I followed him.

A little beyond these piles of dead men we found other piles; they were composed of sacks of gold and silver, and each had its label: *Substance of the heretics massacred in the eighteenth century, the seventeenth and the sixteenth.* And so on in going back: *Gold and silver of Americans slaughtered,* etc., etc. And all these piles were surmounted with crosses, mitres, croziers, triple crowns studded with precious stones.

"What, my genius! it was then to have these riches that these dead were piled up?"

"Yes, my son."

I wept; and when by my grief I had merited to be led to the end of the green walks, he led me there.

"Contemplate," he said, "the heroes of humanity who were the world's benefactors, and who were all united in banishing from the world, as far as they were able, violence and rapine. Question them."

I ran to the first of the band; he had a crown on his head, and a little censer in his hand; I humbly asked him his name. "I am Numa Pompilius," he said to me. "I succeeded a brigand, and I had brigands to govern: I taught them virtue and the worship of God; after me they forgot both more than once; I forbade that in the temples there should be any image, because the Deity which animates nature cannot be represented. During my reign the Romans had neither wars nor seditions, and my religion did nothing but good. All the neighbouring peoples came to honour me at my funeral: that happened to no one but me."

I kissed his hand, and I went to the second. He was a fine old man about a hundred years old, clad in a white robe. He put his middle-finger on his mouth, and with the other hand he cast some beans behind him. I recognized Pythagoras. He assured me he had never had a golden thigh, and that he had never been a cock; but that he had governed the Crotoniates with as much justice as Numa governed the Romans, almost at the same time; and that this justice was the rarest and most necessary thing in the world. I learned that the Pythagoreans examined their consciences twice a day. The honest people! how far we are from them! But we who have been nothing but assassins for thirteen hundred years, we say that these wise men were arrogant.

In order to please Pythagoras, I did not say a word to him and I passed to Zarathustra, who was occupied in concentrating the celestial fire in the focus of a concave mirror, in the middle of a hall with a hundred doors which all led to wisdom. (Zarathustra's precepts are called *doors,* and are a hundred in number.) Over the principal door I read these words which are the précis of all moral philosophy, and which cut short all the disputes of the casuists: "When in doubt if an action is good or bad, refrain."

"Certainly," I said to my genius, "the barbarians who immolated all these victims had never read these beautiful words."

We then saw the Zaleucus, the Thales, the Aniximanders, and all the sages who had sought truth and practised virtue.

When we came to Socrates, I recognized him very quickly by his flat nose. "Well," I said to him, "here you are then among the number of the Almighty's confidants! All the inhabitants of Europe, except the Turks and the Tartars of the Crimea, who know nothing, pronounce your name with respect. It is revered, loved, this great name, to the point that people have wanted to know those of your persecutors. Melitus and Anitus are known because of you, just as Ravaillac is known because of Henry IV.; but I know only this name of Anitus. I do not know precisely who was the scoundrel who calumniated you, and who succeeded in having you condemned to take hemlock."

"Since my adventure," replied Socrates, "I have never thought about that man; but seeing that you make me remember it, I have much pity for him. He was a wicked priest who secretly conducted a business in hides, a trade reputed shameful among us. He sent his two children to my school. The other disciples taunted them with having a father who was a currier; they were obliged to leave. The irritated father had no rest until he had stirred up all the priests and all the sophists against me. They persuaded the counsel of the five hundred that I was an impious fellow who did not believe that the Moon, Mercury and Mars were gods. Indeed, I used to think, as I think now, that there is only one God, master of all nature. The judges handed me over to the poisoner of the republic; he cut short my life by a few days: I died peacefully at the age of seventy; and since that time I pass a happy life with all these great men whom you see, and of whom I am the least."

After enjoying some time in conversation with Socrates, I went forward with my guide into a grove situated above the thickets where all the sages of antiquity seemed to be tasting sweet repose.

I saw a man of gentle, simple countenance, who seemed to me to be about thirty-five years old. From afar he cast compassionate glances on these piles of whitened bones, across which I had had to pass to reach the sages' abode. I was astonished to find his feet swollen and bleeding, his hands likewise, his side pierced, and his ribs flayed with whip cuts. "Good Heavens!" I said to him, "is it possible for a just man, a sage, to be in this state? I have just seen one who was treated in a very hateful way, but there is no comparison between his torture and yours. Wicked priests and wicked judges poisoned him; is it by priests and judges that you have been so cruelly assassinated?"

He answered with much courtesy—*"Yes."*

"And who were these monsters?"

"They were hypocrites."

"Ah! that says everything; I understand by this single word that they must have condemned you to death. Had you then proved to them, as Socrates did, that the Moon was not a goddess, and that Mercury was not a god?"

"No, these planets were not in question. My compatriots did not know at all what a planet is; they were all arrant ignoramuses. Their superstitions were quite different from those of the Greeks."

"You wanted to teach them a new religion, then?"

"Not at all; I said to them simply—Love God with all your

heart and your fellow-creature as yourself, for that is man's whole duty.' Judge if this precept is not as old as the universe; judge if I brought them a new religion. I did not stop telling them that I had come not to destroy the law but to fulfil it; I had observed all their rites; circumcised as they all were, baptized as were the most zealous among them, like them I paid the Corban; I observed the Passover as they did, eating standing up a lamb cooked with lettuces. I and my friends went to pray in the temple; my friends even frequented this temple after my death; in a word, I fulfilled all their laws without a single exception."

"What! these wretches could not even reproach you with swerving from their laws?"

"No, without a doubt."

"Why then did they put you in the condition in which I now see you?"

"What do you expect me to say! they were very arrogant and selfish. They saw that I knew them; they knew that I was making the citizens acquainted with them; they were the stronger; they took away my life: and people like them will always do as much, if they can, to whoever does them too much justice."

"But did you say nothing, do nothing that could serve them as a pretext?"

"To the wicked everything serves as pretext."

"Did you not say once that you were come not to send peace, but a sword?"

"It is a copyist's error; I told them that I sent peace and not a sword. I have never written anything; what I said can have been changed without evil intention."

"You therefore contributed in no way by your speeches, badly reported, badly interpreted, to these frightful piles of bones which I saw on my road in coming to consult you?"

"It is with horror only that I have seen those who have made themselves guilty of these murders."

"And these monuments of power and wealth, of pride and avarice, these treasures, these ornaments, these signs of grandeur, which I have seen piled up on the road while I was seeking wisdom, do they come from you?"

"That is impossible; I and my people lived in poverty and meanness: my grandeur was in virtue only."

I was about to beg him to be so good as to tell me just who he was. My guide warned me to do nothing of the sort. He told me that I was not made to understand these sublime mysteries. Only did I conjure him to tell me in what true religion consisted.

"Have I not already told you? Love God and your fellow-creature as yourself."

"What! if one loves God, one can eat meat on Friday?"

"I always ate what was given me; for I was too poor to give anyone food."

"In loving God, in being just, should one not be rather cautious not to confide all the adventures of one's life to an unknown man?"

"That was always my practice."

"Can I not, by doing good, dispense with making a pilgrimage to St. James of Compostella?"

"I have never been in that country."

"Is it necessary for me to imprison myself in a retreat with

fools?"

"As for me, I always made little journeys from town to town."

"Is it necessary for me to take sides either for the Greek Church or the Latin?"

"When I was in the world I never made any difference between the Jew and the Samaritan."

"Well, if that is so, I take you for my only master." Then he made me a sign with his head which filled me with consolation. The vision disappeared, and a clear conscience stayed with me.

Of the Need of Revelation

The greatest benefit we owe to the New Testament is that it has revealed to us the immortality of the soul. It is in vain, therefore, that this fellow Warburton tried to cloud over this important truth, by continually representing in his legation of Moses that "the ancient Jews knew nothing of this necessary dogma, and that the Sadducees did not admit it in the time of our Lord Jesus."

He interprets in his own way the very words that have been put into Jesus Christ's mouth: ". . . have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (St. Matt. xxii. 31, 32). He gives to the parable of the wicked rich man a sense contrary to that of all the Churches. Sherlock, Bishop of London, and twenty other scholars refuted him. English philosophers even reproached him with the scandal of an Anglican bishop manifesting an opinion so contrary to the Anglican Church; and after that, this man takes it into his head to treat these persons as impious: like the character of *Arlequin* in the comedy of the *Dévaliseur de maisons,* who, after throwing the furniture out of the window, sees a man carrying some of it off, and cries with all his might "Stop thief!"

One should bless the revelation of the immortality of the soul, and of rewards and punishments after death, all the more that mankind's vain philosophy has always been sceptical of it. The great Cæsar did not believe in it at all, he made himself quite clear in full senate when, in order to stop Catalina being put to death, he represented that death left man without sensation, that everything died with him; and nobody refuted this view.

The Roman Empire was divided between two principal sects: that of Epicurus which asserted that deity was useless to the world, and that the soul perished with the body: and that of the Stoics who regarded the soul as part of the Deity, which after death was joined again to its origin, to the great everything from which it emanated. Thus, whether one believed the soul mortal, or whether one believed it immortal, all the sects were agreed in laughing at pains and punishments after death.

We still have a hundred monuments of this belief of the Romans. It is by virtue of this opinion graved profoundly in their hearts, that so many simple Roman citizens killed themselves without the least scruple; they did not wait for a tyrant to hand them over to the executioners.

The most virtuous men even, and those most persuaded of the existence of a God, hoped for no reward, and feared no punishment. Clement, who later was Pope and saint, began by himself doubting what the early Christians said of another life, and consulted St. Peter at Cæsarea. We are far from believing that St. Clement wrote the history that is attributed to him; but this history makes evident the need the human race had of a precise revelation. All that can surprise us is that so repressive and salutary a doctrine has left a prey to so many horrible crimes men who have so little time to live, and who see themselves squeezed between two eternities.

THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE

BY

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING

TRANSLATED BY

F. W. ROBERTSON

1

THAT which Education is to the Individual, Revelation is to the Race.

2

Education is Revelation coming to the Individual Man; and Revelation is Education which has come, and is yet coming, to the Human Race.

3

Whether it can be of any advantage to the science of instruction to contemplate Education in this point of view, I will not here inquire; but in Theology it may unquestionably be of great advantage, and may remove many difficulties, if Revelation be conceived of as the Educator of Humanity.

4

Education gives to Man nothing which he might not educe out of himself; it gives him that which he might educe out of himself, only quicker and more easily. In the same way too, Revelation gives nothing to the human species, which the human reason left to itself might not attain; only it has given, and still gives to it, the most important of these things earlier.

5

And just as in Education, it is not a matter of indifference in what order the powers of a man are developed, as it cannot impart to a man all at once; so was God also necessitated to maintain a certain order, and a certain measure in His Revelation.

6

Even if the first man were furnished at once with a conception of the One God; yet it was not possible that this conception, imparted, and not gained by thought, should subsist long in its clearness. As soon as the Human Reason, left to itself, began to elaborate it, it broke up the one Immeasurable into many Measurables, and gave a note or sign of mark to every one of these parts.

7

Hence naturally arose polytheism and idolatry. And who can say how many millions of years human reason would have been bewildered in these errors, even though in all places and times there were individual men who recognized them *as* errors, had it not pleased God to afford it a better direction by means of a new Impulse?

8

But when He neither could nor would reveal Himself any more to *each* individual man, He selected an individual People for His special education; and that exactly the most rude and the most unruly, in order to begin with it from the very commencement.

9

This was the Hebrew People, respecting whom we do not in the least know what kind of Divine Worship they had in Egypt. For so despised a race of slaves was not permitted to take part in the worship of the Egyptians; and the God of their fathers was entirely unknown to them.

10

It is possible that the Egyptians had expressly prohibited the Hebrews from having a God or Gods, perhaps they had forced upon them the belief that their despised race had no God, no Gods, that to have a God or Gods was the prerogative of the superior Egyptians only, and this may have been so held in order to have the power of tyrannising over them with a greater show of fairness. Do Christians even now do much better with their slaves?

11

To this rude people God caused Himself to be announced first, simply as "the God of their fathers," in order to make them acquainted and familiar with the idea of a God belonging to them also, and to begin with confidence in Him.

12

Through the miracles with which He led them out of Egypt, and planted them in Canaan, He testified of Himself to them as a God mightier than any other God.

13

And as He proceeded, demonstrating Himself to be the Mightiest of all, which only One can be, He gradually accustomed them thus to the idea of THE ONE.

14

But how far was this conception of The One, below the true transcendental conception of the One which Reason learnt to derive, so late with certainty, from the conception of the Infinite One?

15

Although the best of the people were already more or less approaching the true conception of the One only, the people as a whole could not for a long time elevate themselves to it. And this was the sole true reason why they so often abandoned their one God, and expected to find the One, *i. e.*, as they meant, the Mightiest, in some God or other, belonging to another people.

16

But of what kind of moral education was a people so raw, so incapable of abstract thoughts, and so entirely in their childhood capable? Of none other but such as is adapted to the age of children, an education by rewards and punishments addressed to the senses.

17

Here too Education and Revelation meet together. As yet God could give to His people no other religion, no other law than one

through obedience to which they might hope to be happy, or through disobedience to which they must fear to be unhappy. For as yet their regards went no further than this earth. They knew of no immortality of the soul; they yearned after no life to come. But now to reveal these things to one whose reason had as yet so little growth, what would it have been but the same fault in the Divine Rule as is committed by the schoolmaster, who chooses to hurry his pupil too rapidly, and boast of his progress, rather than thoroughly to ground him?

18

But, it will be asked, to what purpose was this education of so rude a people, a people with whom God had to begin so entirely from the beginning? I reply, in order that in the process of time He might employ particular members of this nation as the Teachers of other people. He was bringing up in them the future Teachers of the human race. It was the Jews who became their teachers, none but Jews; only men out of a people so brought up, could be their teachers.

23

Once more, The absence of those doctrines in the writings of the Old Testament proves nothing against their Divinity. Moses was sent from God even though the sanction of his law only extended to this life. For why should it extend further? He was surely sent only to the Israelitish people *of that time,* and his commission was perfectly adapted to the knowledge, capacities, yearnings of the ***then existing*** Israelitish people, as well as to the destination of that which belonged to the future. And this is sufficient.

26

I explain myself by that which is a picture of Revelation. A Primer for children may fairly pass over in silence this or that important piece of knowledge or art which it expounds, respecting which the Teacher judged, that it is not yet fitted for the capacities of the children for whom he was writing. But it must contain absolutely nothing which blocks up the way towards the knowledge which is held back, or misleads the children from it. Rather far, all the approaches towards it must be carefully left open; and to lead them away from even one of these approaches, or to cause them to enter it later than they need, would alone be enough to change the mere imperfection of such a Primer into an actual fault.

32

Let us also acknowledge that it is a heroic obedience to obey the laws of God simply because they are God's laws, and not because He has promised to reward the obedience to them here and there; to obey them even though there be an entire despair of future recompense, and uncertainty respecting a temporal one.

36

Revelation had guided their reason, and now, all at once, reason gave clearness to their Revelation.

51

But every Primer is only for a certain age. To delay the child, that has outgrown it, longer in it than it was intended for, is hurtful. For to be able to do this in a way in any sort profitable, you must insert into it more than there is really in it, and extract from it more than it can contain. You must look for and make too much of allusions and hints; squeeze allegories too closely; interpret examples too circumstantially; press too much upon words. This gives the child a petty, crooked, hair splitting understanding: it makes him full of mysteries, superstitions; full of contempt for all that is comprehensible and easy.

53

A Better Instructor must come and tear the exhausted Primer from the child's hands. CHRIST came!

54

That portion of the human race which God had willed to comprehend in one Educational plan, was ripe for the second step of Education. He had, however, only willed to comprehend on such a plan, one which by language, mode of action, government, and other natural and political relationships, was already united in itself.

58

And so Christ was the first certain practical Teacher of the immortality of the soul.

64

At least, it is already clear that the New Testament Scriptures, in which these doctrines after some time were found preserved, have afforded, and still afford, the second better Primer for the race of man.

69

Until these weaker fellow scholars are up with thee, rather return once more into this Primer, and examine whether that which thou takest only for duplicates of the method, for a blunder in the teaching, is not perhaps something more.

70

Thou hast seen in the childhood of the human race, respecting the doctrine of God's unity, that God makes immediate revelations of mere truths of reason, or has permitted and caused pure truths of reason to be taught, for some time, as truths of immediate revelation, in order to promulgate them the more rapidly, and ground them the more firmly.

71

Thou experiencest in the boyhood of the Race the same thing in reference to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It is *preached* in the better Primer as a Revelation, instead of *taught* as a result of human reason.

72

As we by this time can dispense with the Old Testament, in reference to the doctrine of the unity of God, and as we are by degrees beginning also to be less dependent on the New Testament, in reference to the immortality of the soul: might there not in this

Book also be other truths of the same sort prefigured, mirrored, as it were, which we are to marvel at, as revelations, exactly so long as until the time shall come when reason shall have learned to educe them, out of its other demonstrated truths and bind them up with them?

76

Let it not be objected that speculations of this description upon the mysteries of religion are forbidden. The word mystery signified, in the first ages of Christianity, something quite different from what it means now: and the cultivation of revealed truths into truths of reason, is absolutely necessary, if the human race is to be assisted by them. When they were revealed they were certainly no truths of reason, but they were revealed in order to become such. They were like the "that makes—" of the ciphering master, which he says to the boys, beforehand, in order to direct them thereby in their reckoning. If the scholars were to be satisfied with the "that makes," they would never learn to calculate, and would frustrate the intention with which their good master gave them a guiding clue in their work.

77

And why should not we too, by the means of a religion whose historical truth, if you will, looks dubious, be conducted in a familiar way to closer and better conceptions of the Divine Being, our own nature, our relation to God, truths at which the human reason would never have arrived of itself?

82

Never?—Let me not think this blasphemy, All Merciful! Education has its goal, in the Race, no less than in the Individual. That which is educated is educated for *something*.

83

The flattering prospects which are open to the people, the Honor and Well-being which are painted to him, what are they more than the means of educating him to become a man, who, when these prospects of Honor and Well-being have vanished, shall be able to do his *Duty?*

84

This is the aim of *human* education, and should not the Divine education extend as far? Is that which is successful in the way of Art with the individual, not to be successful in the way of Nature with the whole? Blasphemy! Blasphemy!!

85

No! It will come! it will assuredly come! the time of the perfecting, when man, the more convinced his understanding feels itself of an ever better Future, will nevertheless not be necessitated to borrow motives of action from this Future; for he will do the Right because it *is* right, not because arbitrary rewards are annexed thereto, which formerly were intended simply to fix and strengthen his unsteady gaze in recognising the inner, better, rewards of well-doing.

IMMANUEL KANT

The Good Will and the Categorical Imperative

Section 1

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a GOOD WILL. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other *talents* of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects. But these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of these gifts, and which therefore constitutes what is called *character,* is not good. It is the same with the *gifts of fortune.* Power, riches, honor, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called *happiness,* all inspire pride and often presumption if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this to rectify also the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being, not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition for being even worthy of happiness. . . .

A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, nor by its aptness for attaining some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself and when considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that it can bring about in pursuing any inclination, nay even in pursuing the sum total of all inclinations. It might happen that, owing to special misfortune, or to the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose. If with its greatest efforts this will should yet achieve nothing and there should remain only good will (to be sure, not a mere wish but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, good will would still shine by its own light as a thing having its whole value in itself.

We assume, as a fundamental principle, that no organ [designed] for any purpose will be found in the physical constitution of an organized being, except one which is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now if the proper object of nature for a being with reason and a will was its *preservation,* its *welfare,* in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement when it selected the reason of the creature to carry out this function. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct would be far more surely prescribed by [its own] instinct, and that end [happiness] would have been attained by instinct far more certainly than it ever can be by reason. . . . Nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty; that is, as one which is to have influence on the *will.* Therefore, if we admit that nature generally in the distribution of natural propensities has adapted the means to the end, nature's true intention must be to produce a *will,* which is not merely good as a *means* to something else but *good in itself.* Reason is absolutely necessary for this sort of will. . . .

[The analysis of the notion of a will that is good in itself reveals the notion of duty, or moral obligation, which all rational beings possess. And we clearly distinguish actions performed *in accordance with* duty (though from a prudential or utilitarian motive) from actions performed *out of respect for* duty: that is, actions performed not only *as,* but *because,* duty requires. Kant's first main proposition, then, is that only actions performed specifically for the sake of duty possess "true moral worth."]

The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined. Therefore the action does not depend on the realization of its objective, but merely on the *principle* of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. . . .

The third proposition, which is a consequence of the preceding two, I would express thus: *Duty is the necessity of an action, resulting from respect for the law.* . . .

But what sort of law can it be the conception of which must determine the will, even without our paying any attention to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have stripped the will of every impulse which could arise for it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the general conformity of the will's actions to law in general. Only this conformity to law is to serve the will as a principle; that is, I am never to act in any way other than *so I could want my maxim also to become a general law.* It is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. . . . It is a wholly different thing to be truthful from a sense of duty, than to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case, the very conceiving of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be associated with it which would affect me. For it is beyond all doubt wicked to deviate from the principle of duty; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, although it is certainly wiser to abide by it. However, the shortest way, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question of whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Would I be content if this maxim of extricating myself from difficulty by a false promise held good as a general law for others as well as for myself?" Would I care to say to myself, "Everyone may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot extricate himself otherwise"? Then I would presently become aware that while I can decide in favor of the lie, I can by no means decide that lying should be a general law. For under such a law there would be no promises at all, since I would state my intentions in vain in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe my allegation, or, if they did so too hastily, they would pay me back in my own coin. Hence, as soon as such a maxim was made a universal law, it would necessarily destroy itself. . . .

Section 2

The concept of an objective principle, in so far as it is compulsory for a will, is called a command of reason and the formulation of such a command is called an IMPERATIVE.

All imperatives are expressed by the word *ought* (*or shall*) and they indicate thereby the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which, because of its subjective constitution, is not necessarily determined by this [compulsion]. . . .

All *imperatives* command either *hypothetically* or *categorically*. . . . Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this account as necessary for a subject who can determine practically by reason, all imperatives are formulations determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will in some respects good. If the action is good only as a means *to something else*, then the imperative is *hypothetical*. If the action is conceived as good *in itself* and consequently as necessarily being the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason then it is *categorical*.

Therefore we shall have to investigate *a priori* the possibility of a *categorical* imperative, since, in this case, we do not have the advantage that the imperative's reality is given in experience, so that the elucidation of its possibility would be needed only for explaining it, not for establishing it. It can be discerned that the categorical imperative has the purport of a practical law. All the rest may certainly be called *principles* of the will but not laws, since whatever is merely necessary for attaining some casual purpose may be considered contingent in itself, and at any time we can be free from the precept if we give up the purpose. However, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite, and consequently only the will carries with it that necessity we require in a law. . . .

When I conceive of a hypothetical imperative at all, I do not know previously what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. In addition to the law, the imperative contains only the necessity that the maxim conform to this law. As the maxim contains no condition restricting the maxim, nothing remains but the general statement of the law to which the maxim of the action should conform, and it is only this conformity that the imperative properly represents as necessary.

Therefore there is only one categorical imperative, namely this: *Act only on a maxim by which you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law.*

Now, if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as easily as from their principle, then we shall be able at least to show what we understand by it and what this concept means, although it would remain undecided whether what is called duty is not just a vain notion.

Since the universality of the law constitutes what is properly called *nature* in the most general sense [as to form]; that is, the existence of things as far as determined by general laws, the general imperative of duty may be expressed thus: *Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a general law of nature.*

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of duties to ourselves and to others, and of perfect and imperfect duties.

1. A man, while reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes and feeling wearied of life, is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he enquires whether the maxim of his action could become a general law of nature. His maxim is: Out of self-love I consider it a principle to shorten my life when continuing it is likely to bring more misfortune than satisfaction. The question then simply is whether this principle of self-love could become a general law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature, whose law would be to destroy life by the very feeling designed to compel the maintenance of life, would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly be a general law of nature and consequently it would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.

2. Another man finds himself forced by dire need to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it

within a definite time. He would like to make this promise but he still has enough conscience to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and contrary to my duty to get out of a difficulty in this way? However, suppose that he does decide to do so, the maxim of his action would then be expressed thus: When I consider myself in want of money, I shall borrow money and promise to repay it although I know that I never can. Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be agreeable to my whole future well-being; but the question is now: Is it right? Here I change the suggestion of self-love into a general law and state the question thus: How would it be if my maxim were a general law? I then realize at once that it could never hold as a general law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For if it were a general law that anyone considering himself to be in difficulties would be able to promise whatever he pleases intending not to keep his promise, the promise itself and its object would become impossible since no one would believe that anything was promised him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses. . . .

Now, if a supreme practical principle ought to exist, or a categorical imperative with respect to the human will, it must be one which turns the concept of what is necessarily an end for everybody because it is *an end in itself* into an *objective* principle of the will which can serve as a general practical law. The basis of this principle is that *rational nature exists as an end in itself.* Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being this rational nature, to the extent that it is a *subjective* principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly for the same rational reason that holds true for me, so at the same time it is an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, all laws of the will must needs be deductible. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: *Act so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a means.* We shall now enquire whether this principle can be realized.

To use the previous examples:

First: In regard to the concept of necessary duty to oneself, whoever contemplates suicide will ask himself whether his action is consistent with the idea of man as *an end in itself.* If he destroys himself to escape onerous conditions, he uses a person merely as a *means* to maintain a tolerable condition until life ends. But man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used *merely* as means, but in all his actions must always be considered as an end in itself. Therefore I cannot dispose in any way of man in my own person so as to mutilate, damage or kill him. (It is a matter of morals proper to define this principle more precisely to avoid all misunderstanding. Therefore I bypass such questions as that of the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve one's life, and of exposing one's life to danger with a view to preserving it, etc.)

Second: As regards necessary or obligatory duties toward others, whoever is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man *merely as a means,* without the latter being the end in itself at the same time. The person whom I propose to use by such a promise for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my way of acting toward him. . . . This conflict with the principle of duty toward others becomes more obvious if we consider examples of attacks on the liberty and property of others. Here it is clear that whoever transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as means without considering that as rational beings they shall always be regarded as ends also; that is, as beings who could possibly be the end of the very same action. . . .

Section 3

The *will* is a kind of causality of living beings in so far as they are rational, and *freedom* should be that quality of this causality through which it can be an efficient cause independent of extraneous *determining* causes; just as *physical necessity* is the peculiar quality of the causality of all non-rational beings as impelled into activity by extraneous causes.

The above definition of freedom is *negative* and therefore unsuitable for understanding its essence; but it leads to a *positive* concept which is all the more ample and fruitful. Since the concept of causality implies that of law, according to which something called a cause produces something else called an effect, freedom, though not a quality of the will in so far as it depends on natural laws, is not for that reason without law, but must rather be a causality acting in accordance with immutable laws of a peculiar kind; otherwise free will would be an absurdity. Natural necessity is a heteronomy of efficient causes because every effect if possible only according to the law [of natural causality:] some [antecedent cause] determines the efficient cause to act causally. What else can freedom of the will be but autonomy; that is, the property of the will to be a law unto itself? But the proposition: the will is a law unto itself in every action, only expresses the principle of acting on no other maxim than that which can also aim to be a general law. This is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and of the principle of ethics, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same. . . .

[FROM the *Metaphysical Foundation of Morals* (or the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*), 1785, trans. Carl J. Friedrich in *The Philosophy of Kant*, N. Y.: Modern Library, 1949.

ON RELIGION.

FIRST SPEECH.

DEFENCE.

It may be an unexpected and even a marvellous undertaking, that any one should still venture to demand from the very class that have raised themselves above the vulgar, and are saturated with the wisdom of the centuries, attention for a subject so entirely neglected by them. And I confess that I am aware of nothing that promises any easy success, whether it be in winning for my efforts your approval, or in the more difficult and more desirable task of instilling into you my thought and inspiring you for my subject. From of old faith has not been every man's affair. At all times but few have discerned religion itself, while millions, in various ways, have been satisfied to juggle with its trappings. Now especially the life of cultivated people is far from anything that might have even a resemblance to religion. Just as little, I know, do you worship the Deity in sacred retirement, as you visit the forsaken temples. In your ornamented dwellings, the only sacred things to be met with are the sage maxims of our wise men, and the splendid compositions of our poets. Suavity and sociability, art and science have so fully taken possession of your minds, that no room remains for the eternal and holy Being that lies beyond the world. I know how well you have succeeded in making your earthly life so rich and varied, that you no longer stand in need of an eternity. Having made a universe for yourselves, you are above the need of thinking of the Universe that made you. You are agreed, I know, that nothing new, nothing convincing can any more be said on this matter, which on every side by sages and seers, and I might add by scoffers and priests, has been abundantly discussed. To priests, least of all, are you inclined to listen. They have long been outcasts for you, and are declared unworthy of your trust, because they like best to lodge in the battered ruins of their sanctuary and cannot, even there, live without disfiguring and destroying it still more. All this I know, and yet, divinely swayed by an irresistible necessity within me, I feel myself compelled to speak, and cannot take back my invitation that you and none else should listen to me.

Might I ask one question? On every subject, however small and unimportant, you would most willingly be taught by those who have devoted to it their lives and their powers. In your desire for knowledge you do not avoid the cottages of the peasant or the workshops of the humble artizans. How then does it come about that, in matters of religion alone, you hold every thing the more dubious when

it comes from those who are experts, not only according to their own profession, but by recognition from the state, and from the people? Or can you perhaps, strangely enough, show that they are not more experienced, but maintain and cry up anything rather than religion? Scarcely, my good sirs! Not setting much store on a judgment so baseless I confess, as is right, that I also am a member of this order. I venture, though I run the risk, if you do not give me an attentive hearing, of being reckoned among the great crowd from which you admit so few exceptions.

You know how the Deity, by an immutable law, has compelled Himself to divide His great work even to infinity. Each definite thing can only be made up by melting together two opposite activities. Each of His eternal thoughts can only be actualized in two hostile yet twin forms, one of which cannot exist except by means of the other. The whole corporeal world, insight into which is the highest aim of your researches, appears to the best instructed and most contemplative among you, simply a never-ending play of opposing forces. Each life is merely the uninterrupted manifestation of a perpetually renewed gain and loss, as each thing has its determinate existence by uniting and holding fast in a special way the opposing forces of Nature. Wherefore the spirit also, in so far as it manifests itself in a finite life, must be subject to the same law. The human soul, as is shown both by its passing actions and its inward characteristics, has its existence chiefly in two opposing impulses. Following the one impulse, it strives to establish itself as an individual. For increase, no less than sustenance, it draws what surrounds it to itself, weaving it into its life, and absorbing it into its own being. The other impulse, again, is the dread fear to stand alone over against the Whole, the longing to surrender oneself and be absorbed in a greater, to be taken hold of and determined. All you feel and do that bears on your separate existence, all you are accustomed to call enjoyment or possession works for the first object. The other is wrought for when you are not directed towards the individual life, but seek and retain for yourselves what is the same in all and for all the same existence, that in which, therefore, you acknowledge in your thinking and acting, law and order, necessity and connection, right and fitness. Just as no material thing can exist by only one of the forces of corporeal nature, every soul shares in the two original tendencies of spiritual nature. At the extremes one impulse may preponderate almost to the exclusion of the other, but the perfection of the living world consists in this, that between these opposite ends all combinations are actually present in humanity.

And not only so, but a common band of consciousness embraces them all, so that though the man cannot be other than he is, he knows every other person as clearly as himself, and comprehends perfectly every single manifestation of humanity. Persons, however, at the extremes of this great

series, are furthest removed from such a knowledge of the whole. The endeavour to appropriate, too little influenced by the opposite endeavour, takes the form of insatiable sensuality that is mindful only of its individual life, and endeavours only in an earthly way to incorporate into it more and more material and to keep itself active and strong. Swinging eternally between desire and enjoyment, such persons never get beyond consciousness of the individual, and being ever busy with mere self-regarding concerns, they are neither able to feel nor know the common, the whole being and nature of humanity. To persons, on the other hand, too forcibly seized by the opposite impulse, who, from defective power of grasp, are incapable of acquiring any characteristic, definite culture, the true life of the world must just as much remain hidden. It is not granted them to penetrate with plastic mind and to fashion something of their own, but their activity dissipates itself in a futile game with empty notions. They never make a living study of anything, but devote their whole zeal to abstract precepts that degrade everything to means, and leave nothing to be an end. They consume themselves in mistaken hate against everything that comes before them with prosperous force. How are these extremes to be brought together, and the long series be made into a closed ring, the symbol of eternity and completeness?

Persons in whom both tendencies are toned down to an unattractive equilibrium are not rare, but, in truth, they stand lower than either. For this frequent phenomenon which so many value highly, we are not indebted to a living union of both impulses, but both are distorted and smoothed away to a dull mediocrity in which no excess appears, because all fresh life is wanting. This is the position to which a false discretion seeks to bring the younger generation. But were the extremes avoided in no other way, all men would have departed from the right life and from contemplation of the truth, the higher spirit would have vanished from the world, and the will of the Deity been entirely frustrated. Elements so separated or so reduced to equilibrium would disclose little even to men of deep insight, and, for a common eye that has no power of insight to give life to the scattered bones, a world so peopled would be only a mock mirror that neither reflects their own forms nor allows them to see behind it.

Wherefore the Deity at all times sends some here and there, who in a fruitful manner are imbued with both impulses, either as a direct gift from above, or as the result of a severe and complete self-training. They are equipped with wonderful gifts, their way is made even by an almighty indwelling word. They are interpreters of the Deity and His works, and reconcilers of things that otherwise would be eternally divided. I mean, in particular, those who unite those opposing activities, by imprinting in their lives a characteristic form upon just that common nature of spirit, the shadow of which only appears to most in empty notions, as an image upon mist. . .

In order to make quite clear to you what is the original and characteristic possession of religion, it resigns, at once, all claims on anything that belongs either to science or morality. Whether it has been borrowed or bestowed it is now returned. What then does your science of being, your natural science, all your theoretical philosophy, in so far as it has to do with the actual world, have for its aim? To know things, I suppose, as they really are; to show the peculiar relations by which each is what it is; to determine for each its place in the Whole, and to distinguish it rightly from all else; to present the whole real world in its mutually conditioned necessity; and to exhibit the oneness of all phenomena with their eternal laws. This is truly beautiful and excellent, and I am not disposed to depreciate. Rather, if this description of mine, so slightly sketched, does not suffice, I will grant the highest and most exhaustive you are able to give.

It is true that religion is essentially contemplative. You would never call anyone pious who went about in impervious stupidity, whose sense is not open for the life of the world. But this contemplation is not turned, as your knowledge of nature is, to the existence of a finite thing, combined with and opposed to another finite thing. It has not even, like your knowledge of God—if for once I might use an old expression—to do with the nature of the first cause, in itself and in its relation to every other cause and operation. The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal. Where this is found religion is satisfied, where it hides itself there is for her unrest and anguish, extremity and death. Wherefore it is a life in the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all. Yet religion is not knowledge and science, either of the world or of God. Without being knowledge, it recognizes knowledge and science. In itself it is an affection, a revelation of the Infinite in the finite, God being seen in it and it in God...

What can man accomplish that is worth speaking of, either in life or in art, that does not arise in his own self from the influence of this sense for the Infinite? Without it, how can anyone wish to comprehend the world scientifically, or if, in some distinct talent, the knowledge is thrust upon him, how should he wish to exercise it? What is all science, if not the existence of things in you, in your reason? what is all art and culture if not your existence in the things to which you give measure,

form and order? And how can both come to life in you except in so far as there lives immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the universal existence of all finite things in the Infinite?

Wherefore, you will find every truly learned man devout and pious. Where you see science without religion, be sure it is transferred, learned up from another. It is sickly, if indeed it is not that empty appearance which serves necessity and is no knowledge at all. And what else do you take this deduction and weaving together of ideas to be, which neither live nor correspond to any living thing? Or in ethics, what else is this wretched uniformity that thinks it can grasp the highest human life in a single dead formula? The former arises because there is no fundamental feeling of that living nature which everywhere presents variety and individuality, and the latter because the sense fails to give infinity to the finite by determining its nature and boundaries only from the Infinite. Hence the dominion of the mere notion; hence the mechanical erections of your systems instead of an organic structure; hence the vain juggling with analytical formulas, in which, whether categorical or hypothetical, life will not be fettered. Science is not your calling, if you despise religion and fear to surrender yourself to reverence and aspiration for the primordial. Either science must become as low as your life, or it must be separated and stand alone, a division that precludes success. If man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the unity of consciousness which is derived, for ever apart...

The sum total of religion is to feel that, in its highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one; to feel that aught single and particular is only possible by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our being and living is a being and living in and through God. But it is not necessary that the Deity should be presented as also one distinct object. To many this view is necessary, and to all it is welcome, yet it is always hazardous and fruitful in difficulties. It is not easy to avoid the appearance of making Him susceptible of suffering like other objects. It is only one way of characterizing God, and, from the difficulties of it, common speech will probably never rid itself. But to treat this objective conception of God just as if it were a perception, as if apart from His operation upon us through the world the existence of God before the world, and outside of the world, though for the world, were either by or in religion exhibited as science is, so far as religion is concerned, vain mythology. What is only a help for presentation is treated as a reality. It is a misunderstanding very easily made, but it is quite outside the peculiar territory of religion...

The whole religious life consists of two elements, that man surrender himself to the Universe and allow himself to be influenced by the side of it that is turned towards him is one part, and that he transplant this contact which is one definite feeling, within, and take it up into the inner unity of his

life and being, is the other. The religious life is nothing else than the constant renewal of this proceeding. When, therefore, anyone is stirred, in a definite way, by the World, is it his piety that straightway sets him to such working and acting as bear the traces of commotion and disturb the pure connection of the moral life? Impossible. On the contrary, his piety invites him to enjoy what he has won, to absorb it, to combine it, to strip it of what is temporal and individual, that it may no more dwell in him as commotion but be quiet, pure and eternal. From this inner unity, action springs of its own accord, as a natural branch of life. As we agreed, activity is a reaction of feeling, but the sum of activity should only be a reaction of the sum of feeling, and single actions should depend on something quite different from momentary feeling. Only when each action is in its own connection and in its proper place, and not when, dependently and slavishly, it corresponds to one emotion, does it exhibit, in a free and characteristic way, the whole inner unity of the spirit...

If then this, that I trust I have indicated clearly enough for you all, is really the nature of religion, I have already answered the questions, Whence do those dogmas and doctrines come that many consider the essence of religion? Where do they properly belong? And how do they stand related to what is essential in religion? They are all the result of that contemplation of feeling, of that reflection and comparison, of which we have already spoken. The conceptions that underlie these propositions are, like your conceptions from experience, nothing but general expressions for definite feelings. They are not necessary for religion itself, scarcely even for communicating religion, but reflection requires and creates them. Miracle, inspiration, revelation, supernatural intimations, much piety can be had without the need of any one of these conceptions. But when feeling is made the subject of reflection and comparison they are absolutely unavoidable. In this sense all these conceptions do certainly belong to the sphere of religion, and indeed belong without condition or the smallest limit to their application.

The strife about what event is properly a miracle, and wherein its character properly consists, how much revelation there may be and how far and for what reasons man may properly believe in it, and the manifest endeavour to deny and set aside as much as can be done with decency and consideration, in the foolish notion that philosophy and reason are served thereby, is one of the childish operations of the metaphysicians and moralists in religion. They confuse all points of view and bring religion into discredit, as if it trespassed on the universal validity of scientific and physical conclusions. Pray do not be misled, to the detriment of religion, by their sophistical disputations, nor even by their hypocritical mystery about what they would only too willingly publish. Religion, however loudly it may demand back all those well abused conceptions, leaves your physics untouched, and please God, also your psychology.

What is a miracle? What we call miracle is everywhere

else called sign, indication. Our name, which means a wonder, refers purely to the mental condition of the observer. It is only in so far appropriate that a sign, especially when it is nothing besides, must be fitted to call attention to itself and to the power in it that gives it significance. Every finite thing, however, is a sign of the Infinite, and so these various expressions declare the immediate relation of a phenomenon to the Infinite and the Whole. But does that involve that every event should not have quite as immediate a relation to the finite and to nature? Miracle is simply the religious name for event. Every event, even the most natural and usual, becomes a miracle, as soon as the religious view of it can be the dominant. To me all is miracle. In your sense the inexplicable and strange alone is miracle, in mine it is no miracle. The more religious you are, the more miracle would you see everywhere. All disputing about single events, as to whether or not they are to be called miraculous, gives me a painful impression of the poverty and wretchedness of the religious sense of the combatants. One party show it by protesting everywhere against miracle, whereby they manifest their wish not to see anything of immediate relationship to the Infinite and to the Deity. The other party display the same poverty by laying stress on this and that. A phenomenon for them must be marvellous before they will regard it as a miracle, whereby they simply announce that they are bad observers.

What is revelation? Every original and new communication of the Universe to man is a revelation, as, for example, every such moment of conscious insight as I have just referred to. Every intuition and every original feeling proceeds from revelation. As revelation lies beyond consciousness, demonstration is not possible, yet we are not merely to assume it generally, but each one knows best himself what is repeated and learned elsewhere, and what is original and new. If nothing original has yet been generated in you, when it does come it will be a revelation for you also, and I counsel you to weigh it well...

You see that all these ideas, in so far as religion requires, or can adopt ideas, are the first and the most essential. They indicate in the most characteristic manner a man's consciousness of his religion, because they indicate just what necessarily and universally must be in it. The man who does not see miracles of his own from the standpoint from which he contemplates the world, the man in whose heart no revelation of his own arises, when his soul longs to draw in the beauty of the world, and to be permeated by its spirit; the man who does not, in supreme moments, feel, with the most lively assurance, that a divine spirit urges him, and that he speaks and acts from holy inspiration, has no religion. The religious man must, at least, be conscious of his feelings as the immediate product of the Universe; for less would mean nothing. He must recognize something individual in them, something that cannot be imitated, something that guarantees the purity of their origin from his own heart. To be assured of this possession is the true belief...

I have tried, as best I could, therefore, to show you what religion really is. Have you found anything therein unworthy of you, nay, of the highest human culture? Must you not rather long all the more for that universal union with the world which is only possible through feeling, the more you are separated and isolated by definite culture and individuality? Have you not often felt this holy longing, as something unknown? Become conscious of the call of your deepest nature and follow it, I conjure you. Banish the false shame of a century which should not determine you but should be made and determined by you. Return to what lies so near to you, yes, even to you, the violent separation from which cannot fail to destroy the most beautiful part of your nature...

THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

September 16, 1949

MAO TSE-TUNG

The Chinese should thank Acheson, spokesman of the U.S. bourgeoisie, not merely because he has explicitly confessed to the fact that the United States supplied the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people and because he has thus given Chinese progressives evidence with which to convince the backward elements. You see, hasn't Acheson himself confessed that the great, sanguinary war of the last few years, which cost the lives of millions of Chinese, was planned and organized by U.S. imperialism? The Chinese should thank Acheson, again not merely because he has openly declared that the United States intends to recruit the so-called "democratic individualists" in China, organize a U.S. fifth column and overthrow the People's Government led by the Communist Party of China and has thus alerted the Chinese, especially those tinged with liberalism, who are promising each other not to be taken in by the Americans and are all on guard against the underhand intrigues of U.S. imperialism. The Chinese should thank Acheson also because he has fabricated wild tales about modern Chinese history; and his conception of history is precisely that shared by a section of the Chinese intellectuals, namely, the bourgeois idealist conception of history. Hence, a refutation of Acheson may benefit many Chinese by widening their horizon. The benefit may be even greater to those whose conception is the same, or in certain respects the same, as Acheson's.

What are Acheson's wild fabrications about modern Chinese history? First of all, he tries to explain the occurrence of the Chinese revolution in terms of economic and ideological conditions in China. Here he has recounted many myths.

Acheson says:

> The population of China during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries doubled, thereby creating an unbearable pressure upon the land. The first problem which every Chinese Government has had to face is that of feeding this population. So far none has succeeded. The Kuomintang attempted to solve it by putting many land-reform laws on the statute books. Some of these laws have failed, others have been ignored. In no small measure, the predicament in which the National Government finds itself today is due to its failure to provide China with enough to eat. A large part of the Chinese Communists' propaganda consists of promises that they will solve the land problem.

To those Chinese who do not reason clearly the above sounds plausible. Too many mouths, too little food, hence revolution. The Kuomintang has failed to solve this problem and it is unlikely that the Communist Party will be able to solve it either. "So far none has succeeded."

Do revolutions arise from over-population? There have been many revolutions, ancient and modern, in China and abroad; were they all due to over-population? Were China's many revolutions in the past few thousand years also due to over-population? Was the American Revolution against Britain 174 years ago[1] also due to over-population? Acheson's knowledge of history is nil. He has not

even read the American Declaration of Independence. Washington, Jefferson and others made the revolution against Britain because of British oppression and exploitation of the Americans, and not because of any over-population in America. Each time the Chinese people overthrew a feudal dynasty it was because of the oppression and exploitation of the people by that feudal dynasty, and not because of any over-population. The Russians made the February Revolution and the October Revolution because of oppression and exploitation by the tsar and the Russian bourgeoisie, not because of any over-population, for to this day in Russia there is a great abundance of land as compared with people. In Mongolia, where the land is so vast and the population so sparse, a revolution would be inconceivable according to Acheson's line of reasoning, yet it took place some time ago.[2]

According to Acheson, China has no way out at all. A population of 475 million constitutes an "unbearable pressure" and, revolution or no revolution, the case is hopeless. Acheson pins great hope on this; although he has not voiced this hope, it has often been revealed by a number of American journalists – through the allegation that the Communist Party of China will not be able to solve its economic problems, that China will remain in perpetual chaos and that her only way out is to live on U.S. flour, in other words, to become a U.S. colony.

Why did the Revolution of 1911 not succeed and why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because it overthrew only the Ching Dynasty but did not overthrow imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation.

Why did the Northern Expedition of 1925-27 not succeed and why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution, surrendered to imperialism and became the chieftain of the counter-revolution which oppressed and exploited the Chinese.

Is it true that "so far none has succeeded"? In the old Liberated Areas in northwestern, northern, northeastern and eastern China, where the land problem has already been solved, does the problem of "feeding this population", as Acheson puts it, still exist? The United States has kept quite a number of spies or so-called observers in China. Why have they not ferreted out even this fact? In places like Shanghai, the problem of unemployment, or of feeding the population, arose solely because of cruel, heartless oppression and exploitation by imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the reactionary Kuomintang government. Under the People's Government, it will take only a few years for this problem of unemployment, or of feeding the population, to be solved as completely as in the northern, northeastern and other parts of the country.

It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus[3] that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly refuted in theory by Marxists long ago, but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China after their revolutions. Basing itself on the truth that revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has issued orders to Party organizations and the People's Liberation Army throughout the country not to dismiss but to retain all former Kuomintang personnel, provided they can make themselves useful

and are not confirmed reactionaries or notorious scoundrels. Where things are very difficult, food and housing will be shared. Those who have been dismissed and have no means of support will be reinstated and provided with a living. According to the same principle, we shall maintain all Kuomintang soldiers who have revolted and come over to us or been captured. All reactionaries, except the major culprits, will be given a chance to earn their living, provided they show repentance.

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. We are refuters of Acheson's counter-revolutionary theory. We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly groundless.

"The impact of the West" is given by Acheson as the second reason why the Chinese revolution occurred. Acheson says:

> For more than three thousand years the Chinese developed their own high culture and civilization, largely untouched by outside influences. Even when subjected to military conquest the Chinese always managed in the end to subdue and absorb the invader. It was natural therefore that they should come to look upon themselves as the center of the world and the highest expression of civilized mankind. Then in the middle of the nineteenth century the heretofore impervious wall of Chinese isolation was breached by the West. These outsiders brought with them aggressiveness, the unparalleled development of Western technology, and a high order of culture which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China. Partly because of these qualities and partly because of the decay of Manchu rule, the Westerners, instead of being absorbed by the Chinese, introduced new ideas which played an important part in stimulating ferment and unrest.

To those Chinese who do not reason clearly, what Acheson says sounds plausible – the influx of new ideas from the West gave rise to the revolution.

Against whom was the revolution directed? Because there was "decay of Manchu rule" and because it is the weak point that is attacked, it would seem that the revolution was directed against the Ching Dynasty. But what Acheson says here is not quite right. The Revolution of 1911 was directed against imperialism. The Chinese directed the revolution against the Ching regime because it was the running dog of imperialism. The war against Britain's opium aggression, the war against the aggression of the Anglo-French allied forces, the war against the Ching regime, the running dog of imperialism, by the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,[4] the war against French aggression, the war against Japanese aggression and the war against the aggression of the allied forces of the eight powers – all ended in failure; hence the Revolution of 1911 broke out against the running dog of imperialism, the Ching Dynasty. That is modern Chinese history up to 1911. What is the "impact of the West", as Acheson calls it? It is the effort of the Western bourgeoisie, as Marx and Engels said in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* of 1848,[5] to remould the world after its own image by means of terror. In the process of this impact or remoulding, the Western bourgeoisie, which needed compradors and flunkeys familiar with Western customs, had to let countries like China open schools and send students abroad, and thus "new ideas were in-

troduced" into China. Concurrently the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat were born in countries like China. At the same time, the peasantry was bankrupted, and a huge semi-proletariat was brought into existence. Thus the Western bourgeoisie created two categories of people in the East, a small minority, the flunkeys of imperialism, and a majority which is opposed to imperialism and consists of the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals coming from these classes. Those in the majority group are all grave-diggers of imperialism, who were created by imperialism itself, and the revolution originates from them. It was not that the so-called influx of ideas from the West stirred up "ferment and unrest", but that imperialist aggression provoked resistance.

For a long time in the course of this resistance movement, that is, for over seventy years from the Opium War of 1840 to the eve of the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese had no ideological weapon with which to defend themselves against imperialism. The ideological weapons of the old die-hard feudalism were defeated, had to give way and were declared bankrupt. Having no other choice, the Chinese were compelled to arm themselves with such ideological weapons and political formulas as the theory of evolution, the theory of natural rights and of the bourgeois republic, which were all borrowed from the arsenal of the revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie in the West, the native home of imperialism. The Chinese organized political parties and made revolutions, believing that they could thus resist foreign powers and build a republic. However, all these ideological weapons, like those of feudalism, proved very feeble and in their turn had to give way and were withdrawn and declared bankrupt.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 awakened the Chinese, and they learned something new, Marxism-Leninism. In China, the Communist Party was born, an epoch-making event. Sun Yat-sen, too, advocated "learning from Russia" and "alliance with Russia and the Communist Party". In a word, from that time China changed her orientation.

Being the spokesman of an imperialist government, Acheson naturally does not want to breathe even a word about imperialism. He describes imperialist aggression thus: "These outsiders brought with them aggressiveness. . . ." "Aggressiveness" – what a beautiful name! Having learned this "aggressiveness", the Chinese did not aggress into Britain or the United States but only created "ferment and unrest" inside China, *i.e.*, carried out revolutions against imperialism and its running dogs. But unfortunately they never once succeeded; each time, they were defeated by the imperialists, the inventors of "aggressiveness". The Chinese therefore turned around to learn something else and, strangely enough, they immediately found that it worked.

The Chinese Communist Party "had been organized in the early twenties under the ideological impetus of the Russian revolution". Here Acheson is right. This ideology was none other than Marxism-Leninism. This ideology is immeasurably superior to that of the Western bourgeoisie, which Acheson calls a "high order of culture which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China". The clinching proof of the effectiveness of this ideology is that Western bourgeois culture, which the Achesons can boast of as a "high order of culture" compared with China's old feudal culture, was defeated the moment it encountered the new Marxist-Leninist culture, the scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution, which the Chinese people had acquired. In its first battle, this scientific and revolutionary new culture acquired by the Chinese people defeated the Northern warlords, the running dogs of imperialism; in the second, it defeated the attempts by another running dog of imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek,

to intercept the Chinese Red Army during its 25,000-*li* Long March;[6] in the third, it defeated Japanese imperialism and its running dog, Wang Ching-wei; and in the fourth, it finally put an end to the domination of China by the United States and all other imperialist powers as well as to the rule of their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and all the other reactionaries.

The reason why Marxism-Leninism has played such a great role in China since its introduction is that China's social conditions call for it, that it has been linked with the actual practice of the Chinese people's revolution and that the Chinese people have grasped it. Any ideology – even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself – is ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people. We are historical materialists, opposed to historical idealism.

Oddly enough, "Soviet doctrine and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, particularly in terms of economics and Party organization". What was the effect produced on Dr. Sun by the "high order of culture" of the West, of which Acheson and his like are so proud? Acheson doesn't say. Was it an accident that Dr. Sun, who devoted the greater part of his life to seeking from Western bourgeois culture the truth that would save the nation, was finally disappointed and turned to "learning from Russia"? Obviously not. Of course it was no accident that Dr. Sun and the long suffering Chinese people he represented were all infuriated by the "impact of the West" and resolved to form an "alliance with Russia and the Communist Party" in order to wage a life-and-death struggle against imperialism and its running dogs. Acheson dare not say here that the Soviet people are imperialist aggressors and that Sun Yat-sen learned from aggressors. Well, then, if Sun Yat-sen could learn from the Soviet people and the Soviet people are not imperialist aggressors, why can't his successors, the Chinese who live after him, learn from the Soviet people? Why are the Chinese, Sun Yat-sen excepted, described as "dominated by the Soviet Union" and as "the fifth column of the Comintern" and "lackeys of Red imperialism" for learning the scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution through Marxism-Leninism, linking these with China's specific characteristics, starting the Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution and founding a republic of the people's democratic dictatorship? Can there be such superior logic anywhere in the world?

Since they learned Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese people have ceased to be passive in spirit and gained the initiative. The period of modern world history in which the Chinese and Chinese culture were looked down upon should have ended from that moment. The great, victorious Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution have rejuvenated and are rejuvenating the great culture of the Chinese people. In its spiritual aspect, this culture of the Chinese people already stands higher than any in the capitalist world. Take U.S. Secretary of State Acheson and his like, for instance. The level of their understanding of modern China and of the modern world is lower than that of an ordinary soldier of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Up to this point, Acheson, like a bourgeois professor lecturing on a tedious text, has pretended to trace the causes and effects of events in China. Revolution occurred in China, first, because of over-population and, second, because of the stimulus of Western ideas. You see, he appears to be a champion of the theory of causation. But in what follows, even this bit of tedious and phoney theory of causation disappears, and one finds only a mass of inexplicable

events. Quite unaccountably, the Chinese fought among themselves for power and money, suspecting and hating each other. An inexplicable change took place in the relative moral strength of the two contending parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the morale of one party dropped sharply to below zero, while that of the other rose sharply to white heat. What was the reason? Nobody knows. Such is the logic inherent in the "high order of culture" of the United States as represented by Dean Acheson.

NOTES

[1] The bourgeois revolution of 1775-83, known as the War of Independence, in which the people of North America opposed British colonial rule.

[2] In their struggle for liberation in 1921-24 the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, drove out the Russian Whiteguard bandit troops and the armed forces of the Northern warlords of China, both of which were backed by Japanese imperialism, overthrew Mongolian feudal rule and founded the Mongolian People's Republic.

[3] T. R. Malthus (1766-1834), Anglican clergyman and reactionary economist. In his *Essay on Population* (1798), he wrote that "population unchecked . . . increases in geometrical ratio . . . [while] the means of subsistence . . . could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio". Basing himself on this arbitrary assumption, he came to the conclusion that all poverty and all evils in human society are permanent phenomena of nature. According to him, the only ways to solve the problem of poverty of the working people were to shorten their life-span, reduce the population or stop its increase. He regarded famine, pestilence and war as means to cut down population.

[4] The War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a peasant revolutionary war waged against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty in the middle of the 19th century. Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and others, the leaders of this revolution, staged an uprising in Kwangsi in January 1851 and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army proceeded northward from Kwangsi and marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 it captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse. Part of its forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin, a major city in northern China. Because the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied and also because, after establishing its capital in Nanking, the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors, it could not withstand the joint attack of the counter-revolutionary troops of the Ching government and the aggressors, Britain, the United States and France, and suffered defeat in 1864.

[5] See *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Chapter I, "Bourgeois and Proletarians". The bourgeoisie "compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, *i.e.*, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image".

[6] In October 1934 the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometres) on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

December 21, 1939

Comrade Norman Bethune,[1] a member of the Communist Party of Canada, was around fifty when he was sent by the Communist Parties of Canada and the United States to China; he made light of travelling thousands of miles to help us in our War of Resistance Against Japan. He arrived in Yenan in the spring of last year, went to work in the Wutai Mountains, and to our great sorrow died a martyr at his post. What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn. Leninism teaches that the world revolution can only succeed if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and if the proletariat of the colonies and semi-colonies supports that of the proletariat of the capitalist countries.[2] Comrade Bethune put this Leninist line into practice. We Chinese Communists must also follow this line in our practice. We must unite with the proletariat of all the capitalist countries, with the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries, for this is the only way to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism.

Comrade Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his great sense of responsibility in his work and his great warm-heartedness towards all comrades and the people. Every Communist must learn from him. There are not a few people who are irresponsible in their work, preferring the light and shirking the heavy, passing the burdensome tasks on to others and choosing the easy ones for themselves. At every turn they think of themselves before others. When they make some small contribution, they swell with pride and brag about it for fear that others will not know. They feel no warmth towards comrades and the people but are cold, indifferent and apathetic. In truth such people are not Communists, or at least cannot be counted as devoted Communists. No one who returned from the front failed to express admiration for Bethune whenever his name was mentioned, and none remained unmoved by his spirit. In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area, no soldier or civilian was unmoved who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had seen how he worked. Every Communist must learn this true communist spirit from Comrade Bethune.

Comrade Bethune was a doctor, the art of healing was his profession and he was constantly perfecting his skill, which stood very high in the Eighth Route Army's medical service. His example is an excellent lesson for those people who wish to change their work the moment they see something different and for those who despise technical work as of no consequence or as promising no future.

Comrade Bethune and I met only once. Afterwards he wrote me many letters. But I was busy, and I wrote him only one letter and do not even know if he ever received it. I am deeply grieved over his death. Now we are all commemorating him, which shows how profoundly his spirit inspires everyone. We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit everyone can be very useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people.

NOTES

[1] The distinguished surgeon Norman Bethune was a member of the Canadian Communist Party. In 1936 when the German and Italian fascist bandits invaded Spain, he went to the front and worked for the anti-fascist Spanish people. In order to help the Chinese people in their War of Resistance Against Japan, he came to China at the head of a medical team and arrived in Yenan in the spring of 1938. Soon after he went to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area. Imbued with ardent internationalism and the great communist spirit, he served the army and the people of the Liberated Areas for nearly two years. He contracted blood poisoning while operating on wounded soldiers and died in Tanghsien, Hopei, on November 12, 1939.

[2] See J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", *Problems of Leninism*, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, pp. 70-79.

China: Yellow Peril? Red Hope?

3. Creating the New Man

But the Chinese revolutionaries were not just humanitarian leaders. They strongly oppose humanitarianism. The revolution took place in a country where in the past a great deal of much-advertised philanthropy was practised by non-Chinese. It therefore set itself to eliminate the attitudes of philanthropy as part of the vicious order which bred the specific evils of the 'feudal' and 'imperialist' societies. Its precept and practice amounts to the doctrine that it is only when the proletarians – those who have had no claim on the means of life – are roused by their oppression to political consciousness and disciplined, revolutionary action to win control of their destiny, and are self-reliant and hard-working that there will be success. Feudal man, capitalist-bourgeois man, colonial or neo-colonial man, with the limitations and inhibitions he sanctifies, cannot break out of his oppression, lethargy and helplessness. He must criticize himself first, and release himself from the shackles of the old order of exploitation.

Mao had written in June 1949 in 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship'[10] why there would have been no tolerable future for China if she had taken the path shown by the imperial powers.

[In a paragraph reviewing China's past history, Mao noted that China had tried for over a century to adjust to the modern world by learning from the West. From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840, China's intellectuals studied Western knowledge. China's politicians, such as Sun Yat Sen, looked to the West for truth. China's university students came in droves to Japan, Britain, the United States, France and Germany. Mao noted that he, too, had engaged in such studies. What was studied was Western bourgeois democracy, social theories, and natural science. This was considered "the new learning," and its adherents had no doubts that it could save a moribund China. Japan was considered the great example of how to learn from the West and how to become modernized. Chinese in those days considered Russia to be backward, and few wanted to learn from her.

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But the dreams that Western democracy and science could save China were due to be shattered. Chinese traditionally give great respect to teachers. They were therefore especially shocked when the West, their teachers, committed repeated aggression against their pupil. Furthermore, the political struggles and modernizing efforts in China, even such a country-wide movement as the Revolution of 1911, all ended in failure. Conditions in the country got worse and worse, and doubts deepened.]*

The process by which China had become aware of the harsh realities as well as the possibilities of the world outside her traditional sphere of influence had been long and painful. During the nineteenth century there had been continual failures on the part of the decaying Chinese empire to withstand the impact of the rising world powers of Europe and America. The technology and social organization which had led to the penetration of European and American expansion into China had for some centuries been building up the foundation of European strength and prosperity. And China, in the things which she needed in order to enforce her own laws or command respect, had clearly fallen behind even minor European nations, though the elaborate, mediaeval pretences of the Ching courts and its mandarin bureaucracy for years sustained itself on empty gestures of superiority. The uninvited guests were more and more getting profoundly implicated in China's economic, cultural and administrative affairs, and had to be kotowed to by Chinese officials and gentry. At the same time they on their own

*The above paragraph in brackets is a paraphrase of a quotation of Mao Tse Tung quoted directly in Hensman's book from the Selected Works, (Peking, China: The Foreign Language Press, 1965), Vol. IV, pp. 412-13. We have not as yet been able to contact The Foreign Language Press for permission to quote directly.

part did not show for the law, civilization or the social order (which the Chinese had believed to be supreme and universal) any of the respect which the Chinese had traditionally expected even from those who conquered China. At first the Chinese acted outwardly with deference towards their conquerors, while among themselves they affected to despise them. Later they did admit to one another that something was wrong with China. The loss of confidence in things Chinese, and the sheer need for the survival or independence of China (which was still identified with the traditional social order) had made some scholars turn to the West. Western power had effectively humiliated one of the great Oriental civilizations. Something similar had happened in India, too.

The first series of attempts by the guardians of the social order to save China, which were carried out not by looking into China's own resources but by imitation of the 'superior' industrial and capitalist societies, were viewed with suspicion by the Manchu court. These reform proposals were essentially conservative, since the new developments were to be grafted on to the existing tree. Later, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there were some outstanding thinkers who proposed fairly far-reaching changes in China. The examination system was criticized, and Western forms of education were admired. Changes in military training, the manufacture of armaments, a ship-building programme, more study of science, more industrialization and foreign commerce were proposed. The parliamentary form of government then practised in countries like Britain and the United States were commended. Associated with the Westernization movement of the end of the century were names such as Kang Yu Wei, Huang Tsun Hsien, Liang Chi Chao, Yen Fu, Tan Ssu Tung and Wang Kang Nien. People who were later to be prominent in republican China, like Sun Yat Sen and Chen Tu Hsiu, were much affected by this Westernizing trend. But the search for salvation in Western models saved neither the Manchu Dynasty nor the dominant position of the Confucianist elite; and it did not give China a nationalism with the will, the strength, or the ideology which could withstand the increasing power of the Europeans, Americans or Japanese. The basis of Chinese society – the Chinese peasantry – had been untouched by it.

The decade following the collapse of the new Republic had been years when some, at least, of the realities of China's situation came home to her patriots, and when a rapid reappraisal of 'the West' produced two clearly noticeable trends. One was negative: Yen Fu, who once had been one of the great advocates of radical Westernization, wrote:

> The culture of Western countries since this European war has been corrupted completely . . . I feel that the three great centuries of the progress of their races have accomplished four things, that is, to be selfish, to kill others, to have no integrity, and to lose the sense of shame. When we recall the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, they are really as broad as heaven and earth and their influence is extended to the people all over the globe . . .[11]

This attitude is almost similar to the negative reactions of a much earlier period, and provided no clue to what China could *do* to survive and flourish in the changing modern world. It left the continuing westernizers unconvinced. The reappraisal of the West led also to a second result. In place of the vague notion of an idealized 'West' which lumped together the European and American peoples, their bourgeois liberalism, capitalism, philosophy, literature, religion and others, a new conception emerged. Both the 'imperialist' nations and Chinese institutions and traditions were viewed at from new angles. The reappraisal involved for people like Sun Yat Sen new convictions about the relation of westernization to China's 'subjection' by imperialist forces, about the historical role of the popular mass movements like the 'Tai Pings' and the 'Boxers' which tried to throw out the foreigners. It was understandable that the son of a peasant in the 'progressive' province of Hunan should during this period come to see the Chinese nation's greatness as the greatness of Chinese *masses* and not of the rulers. Under the impact of 'the West' and the exploiting ruling class the Chinese people had been reduced to a proletariat. But one would have to see China's powers of recuperation and rejuvenation as a great nation in the dynamism and creativity of her common people, not in outside forces.

Thus Mao and other young Chinese of his generation had, as he explained, been convinced of the correctness of their appraisal by the way the Russian masses in October 1917, led and organized by the Marxist Lenin, had overturned the autocratic, feudal order, and had been persuaded to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying the nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems.

[Mao pointed out how he and various other intellectuals were impressed by the Russian Revolution of 1917 and decided to follow its example. In 1921, the Communist Party of China was founded. Sun Yat Sen, who earlier had looked to the West but now was in despair, welcomed the example of Russia's revolution, welcomed help from the Russians for the Chinese, and welcomed the cooperation of the Chinese Communist Party.]*

[11] Quoted in Teng and Fairbank, *China's Response to the West*, p. 151.

*A paraphrase of a selection from Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 413-14.

Mao (who in 1921 had been one of the eleven people, among them Chen Tu Hsiu, who had decided on the inspiration of Lenin's example to found a Communist Party to carry out a revolution in China) then gave an account of the rise of Chiang Kai Shek, the second World War, and American backing for Chiang against 'the Chinese people'. 'Thus Western bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and the plan for a bourgeois republic have all gone bankrupt in the eyes of the Chinese people.'[14]

In saying this, Mao was expressing a conviction which other Asian nationalists were to have in the years that followed. This frontal attack on the Western belief in its own superiority and sufficiency for all men naturally provoked angry reactions. The French writer, Robert Guillain, in *The Blue Ants* wrote:

> He did not realize that this statement rebounded against the Chinese. True it accuses the West, but does it not also incriminate China, by inadvertently admitting that she had been unable to make good use of Western teaching, and that she demolished or corrupted everything that had been brought to her by the West? Is this not tantamount to saying that for the Chinese liberty was a gift which they were not yet worthy to receive, or, at any rate, not ready to use for the good of their country? When, on the other hand, the system of totalitarian dictatorship in the Marxist form arrived, the Chinese recognized at last the method which suited them.[15]

This reaction of resentment, the argument that, far from the Western models and lessons not being good enough for China's needs, the Chinese were not good enough to benefit by what the West gave, is understandable. Some of Mr Guillain's points had already been answered by Mao in September 1949 in the piece of scathing and witty polemic which he directed towards then United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson's version of Chinese history.

[Mao made the point that Marxism-Leninism had succeeded in China because its analysis fit the actual conditions in China, its practical directives had been successful in Chinese practice, and it was graphic and explicit enough to be grasped by the Chinese masses.

[13] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, pp. 413-4.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 414.
[15] Guillain, *The Blue Ants*, p. 223.

Mao observed that since learning Marxism-Leninism the Chinese people had ceased to be passive in spirit and had gained the initiative. He said that the great, victorious Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution had rejuvinated and were continuing to rejuvinate the great culture of the Chinese people. He said that in its spiritual aspect, the culture of the Chinese people was already higher than that of any capitalist country. For example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was in the dark concerning the truth in China, when compared to the ordinary soldier of the Chinese People's Liberation Army who had been illumined by Marxism-Leninism and who was actually engaged in the liberation of China.]*

If indigenous *Chinese* culture was not to be 'looked down upon' any more, then everything that had prided itself on its 'superiority' to Chinese culture, and perhaps to other Asian cultures, was brought to naught. Western institutions, the missionary 'contribution', Western education and culture and Western criteria were regarded by the Chinese as unsuitable and unnecessary for China's progress, for which the resources of a 'rejuvenated' indigenous culture and enterprise would be adequate. The Chinese soon set about proclaiming their achievement in Asia's major country of a 'new man'; whereas, they seemed to say, the Chinese who wanted to see their country's resurgence as a modern, democratic, secure and great nation had in the past repeatedly found the bourgeois West inadequate, and even an obstacle, now find their own anti-imperialist nationalism, enriched and inspired by the achievement of the Marxists-Leninists in Russia in 1917, had proved adequate. Mao had pioneered a way of 'liberation' for the vast area of the world in which the colonial and semi-colonial peoples bore the burdens of 'imperialism'. If the standard of living, the quality of life and the status of the colonial peoples was to be raised, the organization and strategy by which this was to be achieved, and the assumptions, values and ethos of the new order to be created, were of vital importance. But to plan and build on specifications offered by the 'imperialist' (or 'revisionist') powers was to invite frustration and failure. A correct reading of history would have made this as clear as it was 'to an ordinary soldier of the People's Liberation Army' when he was struggling for China's freedom.

This kind of nationalist argument was a direct challenge to the authority, prestige and interests of those who had to maintain the continued presence of Europe and North America in the rest of the world. Because it was a challenge presented boldly and aggressively by such a resolute and dynamic new force as China had shown herself under Mao's leadership to be, it became the most serious chal-

*A paraphrase of a selection from Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 458.

lenge the West and Russia had ever faced from Asia, Latin America and Africa. If it came to be widely believed that China's ability to deal with the problems of poverty, economic underdevelopment, social evils, ignorance, disease, disorganization and political liberty was not just accidental, and not due, as Acheson had suggested, to 'the impact of the West', but could only have been achieved by the Maoist reading of history, strategy, organization and aims, then, there was cause to fear that the whole of the Third World, already strongly anti-imperialist in the non-westernized (or, in Latin America, the non-Americanized) sector, would become an enormous problem.

As the years went by it became evident that the new leaders of Asia and Africa to whom power had been transferred were much less critical about 'imperialism' than the nationalist movements had been before independence had been granted. The 'rights' of the Western powers in their territories were recognized, and these new governments showed the hoped-for sense of their international responsibilities by making it part of their function to protect the economic interests of European and American concerns. 'Development', too, was undertaken in terms of Western analyses of the causes of underdevelopment and of the world-historical situation, and often with Western advice, technical assistance and capital. Except in Vietnam, and later in Cuba and to a lesser extent in Guinea and Tanzania, there was no radical restructuring of the economy or shift of political power. The transition seemed to be much more peaceful than had been feared. The Cold War also helped, by making it possible for people to see the issues and choices not as the Chinese and those who agreed with them saw them, but rather as one between loyalty to the Anglo-American leadership and loyalty to Soviet leadership. The problem for the West was that highly pro-Western regimes like those in Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia and the Ivory Coast were too much like Chiang's for comfort.

For those Europeans and Americans who have uncompromisingly claimed a universal jurisdiction for 'the West' and their 'consensus' condominium – equating progress and modernization with westernization, international order with Western authority, freedom with the free market economy, and so on – China's xenophobia has continued to be a problem. Whereas the Chinese had had their confidence in the sufficiency and universality of their civilization undermined in the nineteenth century, it is the West that has lost its self-assurance in recent years, as its moral superiority, its model of progressive man, its ideal of justice and freedom, its conception of democracy, its intellectual superiority, its omnipotence, are all

questioned and challenged. Nor has the liberalizing trend in Russia increased the appeal of the Soviet Communist variant of Euramerican society. The attractiveness of the Chinese ideal of the 'new man' is a serious threat. China has shown, the Maoists would claim, that in the Third World's break-through into a more just and progressive order imperialist influence had made no contribution. Revisionism, too, could not solve China's problems, the Maoists will explain. How, then, have there been among a people, who were recently almost at the end of their long history, the tremendous release of energy, the enlargement of human possibilities and the dynamism which are demonstrable? How have ordinary, obscure people come to perform acts of heroism? How has the laboratory synthesis of insulin or the manufacture of a cheaper hydrogen bomb been achieved in a seemingly backward and non-westernized country? How has production been increased? Was it competition? No, they would answer. Was it the individual's ambition to achieve greatness? No, they would answer. What was it then? It was 'the thought of Mao Tse Tung'; in other words, it was that devotion to the service of mankind that enabled one to scale hitherto unattainable heights. It is man everywhere, rebellious, daring, unselfish man, and not Western man or Chinese man who can overthrow oppressors and renew society, they would claim. What the Chinese have done in China other liberation movements can do in their own countries.

In the light of these claims, China as a potential model for the rest of the Third World is then doubly a menace. Firstly, she destroys the big-power consensus, ridicules the 'balance of terror', and generally ignores the polarization of the world between the United States and the Soviet Union. She puts them both together *vis-à-vis* the Third World, and points out to other options in a polycentric world. Secondly, she throws into question the assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union are in the vanguard of progress. Both Khrushchev-Kosygin and Johnson-Wilson are rejected as those who will lead mankind into a more attractive future. 'The new world,' as *Renmin Ribao* said in 1966, 'needs a new Man to create it.' The Canadian Norman Bethune (see p. 148) or the Chinese Chang Ssu-teh (see pp. 148-9) are examples.

> This kind of man is a noble man, a pure man, a man of moral integrity, a man who has left coarse tastes behind, a man of use to the people. He is a man with no selfish interests, heart and soul for the people.[17]

Large numbers of these are needed in every society, in any part of the world, before a new world without oppression and injustice can be created.

[17] These words echo Mao's own epitaph to Norman Bethune who died in 1939. This became one of the basic texts of Maoism.

Faith in a Secular Age

by

Colin Williams

The Process of Secularization

It is a strange fact that the word secular, after a period in which it was something of an enemy word in the church, now bids fair to becoming something of a hero word. To discover why, we must trace a little of its history. The word itself comes from the Latin *saeculum,* meaning 'of this age' or 'related to this world'. It is a time word, referring to the world in its temporal aspect—the world of time; whereas the other Latin word for world, *mundus,* is a space word, referring to the world in its spatial aspect—the world of space.

It has been noted by many writers that these two words point to two different ways in which we apprehend our world, and that these contrasting ways have had a profound influence upon the attitudes to life that are characteristic of different peoples. It has been suggested[1] that for the Greeks the primary apprehension of the world was as space or location and that they therefore constructed a picture of life, or a world-view, that was primarily spatial in character. Thus, for example, they pictured this life as set against the framework of a 'ladder of being', with the true or underlying reality of life being derived from this metaphysical world that lay behind the moving world of time. For this Greek view, as a result, time was a problem; and the moving world of appearance had to be seen in the light of the solid world of being that lay behind it and gave it meaning. Truth and reality are timeless.

[1] See, e.g., T. Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared With Greek,* S.C.M. Press, 1960. This is a typical treatment; but it is a stock-in-trade of theological writers, with many warnings against either-or conclusions.

On the other hand, the Hebrews' primary apprehension of reality was in terms of time. Truth was something that happened. Reality was understood in the light of the events in which they believed that God had revealed himself to them as the Lord of history. Truth and reality then, are to be found in the living God who comes to us in the events of time. Space is important, but it is seen as the arena for the temporal story and as deriving its meaning from its relation to God's purpose for man in history.

This tension between the spatial and temporal views of reality can be treated carelessly and misleadingly, as though the supporter of one is obliged to become the enemy of the other. It can be used to suggest, for example, that for those who accept the 'temporal' or 'historical' view, life can be only understood as a moment by moment 'event' in which meaning can only 'happen', it cannot 'be'; and that any attempt therefore to project meaning into any kind of continuing ('static') institutions, or laws, or doctrines, is a reversion to Greek spatial nature categories which is foreign to the dynamic historical character of the Hebrew-Christian view of life.

To develop such neat either-ors is to misuse the meaning of the tension. When theologians to-day find themselves fighting against the spatial images that have come to a dominant place in the theology and liturgy of the churches—'the God-up-there'—it is because they have seen that the dominance of these categories has obscured the dynamic historical character of the Christian faith, and that if believers are to be freed to see the living changing presence of God in the events of our time, the stranglehold of these spatial symbols must be broken. But this should not be taken to mean that Christians cannot use spatial symbols at all! What is being insisted is that space has to be understood in terms of time. God is doing something on those mountains and hills and in those streets, and our relation to the world of space must derive from our obedience to God as he works out his purpose with us within the framework of the cosmos. To state that in another way: the dynamic and static symbols are both necessary, but in the Hebrew view the dynamic gives meaning to the static, whereas in the Greek the static gave meaning to the dynamic.
. . .

The tension between the 'dynamic' apprehension of life and the 'static' apprehension of reality does not end, of course, with a victory for the former with the coming of Christ and the spread of the Christian faith. Initially in the Christian church there was a surge forward of the Hebrew view, since the Christian's primary experience of the world was as history[2] and they thought of themselves as caught up in the vital movement of God's unfolding purpose for history that had broken through in Jesus of Nazareth. But as the Christian faith spread, the Greek view gradually gained a considerable hold, especially after the church gained an important place in the world after Constantine and began to think of itself less as the pilgrim people of God and more as the giver of order to society. The static institutional side regained dominance over the dynamic temporal side.

This gradual victory of the spatial over the temporal images is reflected in the meaning that was now given to the time word 'secular'. The secular—having to do with this world of time—began to denote something inferior in contrast with the 'religious'—having to do with the contemplation of the changeless world beyond time. The secular priest became one who served those whose lives were spent in the profane order, while the religious priest was one who lived in detachment from this world of time contemplating changeless truth in the sacred order. Thus too when church-state agreements divided life into two realms, the pope and the clergy served the spiritual world, while the emperor and the laity served the temporal or secular world.

In recent centuries, however, we have witnessed a remarkable process of secularization in which more and more of life has passed from the 'spiritual' order and the control of the church to the secular order and the control of the world and its agencies. Not surprisingly, because of the medieval terminology, in which secular was an inferior word, this process has met with fierce resistance in the church—a resistance abetted of course by the fear produced by the gradual loss of the institutional control of the church over the world. But now we are seeing in writers like van Peursen, Cox and van Leeuwen, a revolt against the medieval terminology. The very secularization which has been regarded as the enemy, is now interpreted as the result of the Christian faith bringing about the defeat of the Greek spatial view of reality which had gained the upper hand in medieval Christendom. For these writers 'secular' (pointing to 'the world of time') becomes a word to be rehabilitated—not as a saviour word, for secularization as such certainly will not save the world; but as a word that points to the world of time where God is at work and where we are called to be free to join him where the action is. The word secular stresses the positive fact that for Christians the world of time is of central importance. Because God is the Lord of time, the world is experienced as history.

[2] See Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 18ff. See also Carl Michalson, *The Rationality of Faith*, Scribner and S.C.M. Press, 1963.

The significance of this process of secularization is seen more clearly when we point to two of its major characteristics:

1. *'Thinking from below' in contrast to the previous attitude of 'thinking from above'*

We have mentioned already various ways of describing the major change which has occurred in the attitude of man to the world: the change from magical, mythical, metaphysical or ontocratic ways of thinking to empirical, open, functional or technocratic ways of thinking.[8] In the older forms of man's awareness of his relation to his world, he tended to think from above. It was assumed that there is an eternal pattern to life and that our understanding of the various aspects of our daily life has to be drawn from that God-given structure of truth. So, for example, theology was regarded in the Middle Ages as the queen of the sciences with all the other sciences taking their starting-point from the revealed principles that she provided. The divine world was the world of the eternal surrounding this world. The real world is the metaphysical world beyond the substance that we can see ('meta-physics' means 'beyond substance') and the order of understanding is from the meta-physical to the physical.

[8] Harvey Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-36, has a most suggestive analysis of this process of secularization.

(a) He speaks of 'creation as the disenchantment of nature' —the overcoming of the magical view of life. The biblical view of creation with its separation of nature from God plays an essential role in this disenchantment. Nature, instead of being continuous with the divine, is seen in the biblical view as being ruled by the divine; and man, instead of being absorbed within a total cosmic unity, is now seen as the free servant of God's relation to the world. As a result nature is neither his brother nor his god; it is instead the scene of his relation to the purpose of God.

(b) He speaks of 'exodus as the desacralization of politics' —with the ancient sacral legitimation of political power being broken down by the belief of Israel that kings are subject to God and that when they flaunt his purpose they are subject to civil disobedience. In the Old Testament we see the constant danger of relapse into neosacral politics, and in Christian history too this danger often triumphs. Nevertheless the biblical awareness of God as the living Lord working out his purpose in such a way that all men and institutions are subject to it, remains as a threat to all such lapses.

(c) He speaks of 'the Sinai covenant as the deconsecration of values'—beginning with the prohibition against graven images, and with the recognition that Yahweh alone rules relativizing all human values and their representations. God is free; man must be free for God. We must have no other absolutes beside him.

On this level, the watershed of the process of secularization is the period of the Enlightenment with its critical attack upon the assumed domination of metaphysical first-principles. The slogan of Immanuel Kant, ***sapere aude*** ('dare to be wise'), was an affirmation of their belief that man must use his full ability to explore the meaning of the world from below. It was a revolt for the freedom of the secular from the sacred; a bid for freedom from the prison house of pre-established norms. It was a declaration of war against the 'religious' attitude which assumed that all of life has to be understood in terms of the religious forces that impinge upon our existence from the supernatural world outside and which demand that we submit to their absolute control. With this revolt of the secular came the rise of the sciences, expanding the understanding of life from within so that less and less does man resort to the 'religious' as the source for his understanding and the resource for his control of life.

With the expansion of the realm of science came the contraction of the world of religion. For a while 'apologetics'[4] was able to insist that at the ultimate points of life—at the source of meaning, at the place of guilt and at the frontier of death—science could not provide the answers from below. At these points of crisis we are still dependent upon answers from above, so that here we are given windows into the world of religion. But now less and less does this kind of apologetics impress. Bonhoeffer expressed one of the reasons. If God, he said, only appears at the extremities of life where man is weak, and cannot be encountered in the midst of life where man feels strong, man will soon object. He will not be impressed by a God who waits till man is cornered, but is of no normal earthly use. But there is another reason as well why this apologetic line has less and less appeal. Men have come to feel that at least enough 'meaning' is available from below to manage our daily affairs; that at least enough understanding of 'guilt' can arise from psychology to promise hope for its control; and that if 'death' cannot finally be overcome, this may be simply a fact to be accepted. In the meantime we can only seek to improve our skill in the battle to keep it at bay.[5]

[4] 'Apologetics' is the name given to attempts to defend the faith against attacks.

[5] The spread of this attitude is one of the reasons why writers speak of our time as 'post-religious'. So Philip Rieff in *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist,* Anchor and Gollancz, p. 297, writes: 'By "post-religious", I mean an attitude so far removed from ultimate concern that neither piety nor atheism can appeal to it.' It is the attitude of living 'from below'.

2. *Progressive freedom from ecclesiastical control*

If the first characteristic of secularization is 'thinking from below', a second flows inevitably from it. The revolt of the secular brings in its train a revolt against the institutional control exercised by the guardians of the sacred. Roger Bacon was a churchman; but he was able to gain freedom for his experimentation only by warding off the attempts of the church to maintain institutional and therefore metaphysical control over his life. And so from within the church itself there arose a revolt against the control of the church. As science gained its autonomy and broadened its scope to more and more facets of life, it brought with it the gradual removal of more and more institutions from the control of the church. Economic institutions (market, prices, interest rates), schools, hospitals, were gradually removed from the power of the clergy and the institutional control of the church. If man's way of thinking was more and more being conducted without benefit of metaphysical principles, his institutional life was more and more being conducted without benefit of clergy. Charles West summarizes this process of secularization as 'the withdrawal of thought and life from religious and finally also from metaphysical control, and the attempt to understand and live in those areas in the terms which they alone offer.'

As this chapter was being written, two newspaper stories appeared which illustrate this changed relation of the world to the institution of the church.

i. *The New York Times*, March 16, 1965, contained an account of a protest meeting held by students and faculty at St. John's University (a Roman Catholic University in New York) calling for greater academic freedom. Professor Joseph Gannon is reported as saying: 'The day of the omniscience of the clergy is ended. The average college graduate knows more than the average parish priest, and this applies to certain college administrators as well.' We see here that the protest was not only on behalf of freedom from institutional clerical control. Behind the claim for freedom from institutional control is a protest against the theological control the church has sought to exercise over the lives of men by claiming the right to decide how they must act in life's changing situations through the application of 'eternal truths'—'eternal truths' of which the clergy are the appointed guardians. So Professor Gannon continued: 'We've been too concerned with what Thomas Aquinas thought about 500 years ago. What did St. Thomas know about the pill?' Even more significant is the audience reaction as recorded in *The Times*. 'At this allusion to the birth-control pill, a gasp and a cheer swept through the gymnasium. "This is too good to be true," a student said exultantly.' In that reaction can be felt the growing desire to throw off the rule of theology as a metaphysic which supplies the first principles by which society must be governed and which must be applied from above to the changing circumstances. If theology is to retain its right to be heard, it must win that right in temporal

commerce with the knowledge that is constantly being discovered from below.

It is the belief that this rejection is justified and that the Christian faith does in fact encourage us to express our theology within the open framework of secular thinking, that is giving rise to the many attempts to restate the gospel in 'worldly' terms. So, for example, Gibson Winter[9] uses the concept of 'reflection' to describe the mode of theology that is appropriate to a secular age. It is a mode in which the participants think not in terms of bringing eternal truths down to a contemporary situation, but in terms of their participation in an historical situation in which their Christian judgment *now* is made by reflection on the facts of the present situation in the light of two other moments in the historical process—the *past* moment in history that came to its fulfilment in Jesus and the *future* moment or goal of history to which the event of Jesus points. This present reflection is itself an historical event and requires us to maintain true openness to the possibility that as we encounter the present in the light of all the new knowledge available to us, new dimensions of our understanding of the past 'saving event' and of the future goal will be opened to us. Here we see theology trying to remove itself from a timeless metaphysical mould and seeking to be secular, without in any way abandoning the pivotal importance of the particular historical event of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, and without closing our eyes to all the new dimensions of the future that this event began to disclose.

ii. On the same day that the story of revolt at St. John's appeared, there were also accounts of a swelling tide of public reaction to the death of a clergyman, James Reeb, as a 'martyr' in the civil rights struggle in Alabama. Others had died in that same cause—black and white—without the tide of reaction rising nearly so high. Why? Probably we see here a remnant of the religious aura surrounding 'the man of God'; and therefore a striking evidence of a survival of an element of the world of 'Christendom'. But it seems likely that there is another factor involved—a sense of relief that the church (as represented by the clergy) now is finding a relevant place in the secular struggle. If this is true, this second incident can also stand as evidence of a strong desire, often unexpressed, for the Christian faith to break free from its static categories and to be open in its response to the changing forms of need and changing ways of thought. What is longed for (and also feared) is a celebration of the faith on the living altar of the world's needs in such a way that the worship of the church is brought

[9] In his *The New Creation As Metropolis*, Macmillan, 1963.

out of the timeless world of Latin sounds and Gregorian rhythm and feudal institutions into the living world of contemporary history. In this sense James Reeb is a symbol of a minister becoming again a priest to his people; as one man pointing to a legitimate ministry of all men in and for the life of the world. The increasing presence of priests and nuns, clergy and rabbis in civil rights activities and demonstrations can be seen as a recognition of the need to move away from imprisonment in the static religious world in order to point to God's presence in contemporary events. The reaction of the laity so far to this new stance of the clerics has been confused. The sight of the 'religious' becoming 'secular' has brought forth a mingled reaction of hope and resentment. But it may well be that this movement of the clerics will provide a major impetus towards renewal, by leading the laity out of the narrowly 'religious' concern which they have come to assume as the province of the church, into the concern for God's present purpose in history.

We need to confess immediately that the death of metaphysics and religion (in the sense of a sacral world bringing to holy institutions, ideas and people an aura of timeless, supernatural authority) is far from complete; just as tribal and small town attitudes continue to survive in the city and magical and mythical remnants of thinking survive in the attitude of modern, functional, pragmatic man. Nevertheless, these survivals do not alter the fact that the dominant and the emerging attitude of modern man can now be seen as secular. For that reason it is important for us to come to a decision as to whether this attitude is to be welcomed as a fruit of the gospel or dealt with as an enemy. To help us to come to grips with that question, we now turn to three more theologians who have been at the centre of the attempt to explore what is involved: Barth, Bonhoeffer and Gerhard Ebeling; all of whom have interpreted the process of secularization in positive terms. Paul van Buren[10] speaks of their interpretation as 'kerygmatic' in the sense that they see behind this development the work of God, clearing away the 'religious' and freeing us to concentrate our attention on the work of God in the events of history.

Karl Barth. 'Barth was the first theologian,' wrote Bonhoeffer, 'and that remains his really great merit—to begin the critique of religion.'[11] And in his continuing comment he gives the clue to Barth's treatment of the problem. 'He brought the God of Jesus Christ into the field against religion, pneuma (spirit) against sarx (flesh).'

[10] Paul van Buren, *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*, Macmillan, 1963.

[11] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Prisoner For God*, Macmillan, 1957, p. 148; Eng. ed. *Letters and Papers from Prison*, Fontana, 1953, p. 35. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, Mentor, 1964, traces the rise and use of the word 'religion' and the contemporary development of critiques against it.

'Religion' is interpreted by Barth as man's reaching out towards God; as man's projection of his thoughts about God together with the cultic forms that inevitably build up around this religious upreach. This religiosity Barth sees as one of man's greatest temptations, for men are tempted to trust in this work of their own hands and to confer eternal significance upon it. The biblical faith warns us of their danger. It speaks of this religion as 'fleshly,' in the sense that it is the work of man's own hands and stands in opposition to God. Over against this religion stands 'faith' which has its origin in God's approach to us, and therefore can be described in biblical terms as 'spiritual'. This faith is spiritual in that it is free for God's approach, whereas religion is fleshly, because it interposes our thoughts and cult between ourselves and God.

We are freed from religion only when we see God as the 'wholly other' who is not at our disposal, but stands in judgment against our constant attempts to make ourselves independent of him by creating for ourselves a religion in which we can trust. It is in the light of this reality of God as the 'wholly other' that we must see the first commandment to have no other gods beside him; with the consequent prohibition of idolatry. It is in this light that we must see the constant prophetic battle against trust in religious forms: 'Your feasts, your burnt offerings, I hate, I despise.' 'O you who say, the temple, the temple, the temple of the Lord.' This prophetic word of judgment against religion has as its purpose the delivery of men from trust in the works of their own hands, into a faith relation to the living God of history which finds its fulfilment in the life of obedience: 'Let justice flow down like a mighty stream.' The prophets sought to deliver men from an idolatrous trust in their own religion with its shrines, both physical and mental, so that they could be delivered into faith with its trust in the living free God who comes to us in the moving events of history. Barth sees in Scripture (as well as in subsequent Christian history) a long battle of faith against religion. The battle comes to its climax and fulfilment in Christ, who breaks through the religious idolatries of Israel in order to expose men to a naked faith relation with the living God.[12]

Since the Sabbath was the centre of the religiosity of the Israel of Christ's day, the Sabbath became the centre of his attack on religion. In encounter after encounter he broke through the idolatrous trust in Sabbath observance to expose the fullness of God's continuing demands coming to us through the neighbour and so demanding the free response of living faith and obedience.[13] Similarly

[12] Barth has a major section in the *Church Dogmatics*, vol. I, part 2, pp. 280ff., entitled 'The Abolition of Religion'. This was a major theme too in the work which first made him famous—his commentary on Romans.

[13] See, e.g., the story in John 5 of the Sabbath encounter at the pool of Bethesda. Cultic obedience had obscured the demand faith should see in the needs of the world.

the place of the temple and the religious cult comes under the judgment of Christ, until at last the static temple as a sacred place is destroyed and in its stead Christ becomes the living temple, destroyed and raised up, with members joined to him as living stones. Faith knows that it is called into relation to the living Christ; we are to be members of the living Body of Christ involved with him in his work in the events of history. To be 'in Christ' then, is not a religious cultic matter; now the day has come when no holy mountain can be the place of true worship, for true worship is spiritual in the sense of being free to be with the living Christ, the Lord of history.

Faith then, is opposed to religion. Faith is spiritual in that it is freed for presence with the living Christ in the events of history; while religion is fleshly because it takes attention away from Christ's living demands and diverts it to sacred places and rites. We can see then that for Barth, the significance of speaking of God as wholly other is not that God is outside history. Rather it is an insistence upon God's full freedom from our attempts to imprison him in our religious practices; it is a protest against our attempts to 'place' God, or to 'domesticate' him in such a way that we are freed from the full rigour of his demands...

God's transcendence, in the theology of Barth, is the transcendence of our 'other' who meets us in the midst of life as our Lord; it is the transcendence of a Lord who resists all our attempts to control him; but it is not the transcendence of one whose home is in a separate sphere outside our world...

We can see now why Barth insists that the incarnation is an expression of the 'secularity' of the gospel. It means that we know God as the one who makes himself known to us in the everyday events of secular life. It was, in fact, this secularity of Jesus which puzzled the Scribes and Pharisees. They looked for a religious Messiah coming to them from the world of the temple and the cult; but instead he came as a lay figure in the secular world—the Man who in his care for others revealed that he came to give man a truly human existence within the full context of the world of creation.

There are, then, two aspects to Barth's attack on religion:

1. Against religion in terms of man's reaching out to God, with its production of cultic forms that crystallize around that religious practice and tempt man to trust in those forms.[14]

2. Against religion in its tendency to separate out a piece of life and to designate that as religious over against the realm of the worldly; as the sacred over against the profane. The danger in making religion a separate realm lies not only in the idolatry that results in relation to the religious; it lies also in the fact that the non-religious realm is thus withdrawn from the full scrutiny of Christ's demands. It is no accident that so many social conservatives find in the sacred-secular separation a theology that peculiarly suits their determination to exempt the social structures they have inherited from any suggestion that God may be working in them calling for radical change. The 'religious' God is indeed convenient for the privileged and a relief for those that fear radical change...

Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In a letter to Eberhard Bethge written in 1942 when he was on the way to the Vatican to receive code instructions for his part in the anti-Hitler coup, Bonhoeffer wrote: 'I feel the resistance growing in me against all religiosity, sometimes reaching the level of an instinctive horror. . . . But all the time I am forced to think of God, of Christ, of genuineness, life, freedom, charity—that matters for me. What causes uneasiness is just the religious clothing.'[15] And again on April 30, 1944 he wrote, this time from prison:

[14] This attack against religion bears many similarities to Paul's polemic against the law. Salvation 'in Christ' here is salvation from religion as the work of man's hands; just as salvation 'in Christ' is for St. Paul salvation from the law as the work of man in which he puts his trust. But just as St. Paul knew there was a right use of the law, must we not recognize too a right use of religion with its separate times and prayers, its sacraments and 'sacred' forms? Barth would agree that 'faith' makes use of such cultic practices; but I am sure he would resist the use of the analogy of the place of the law to restore 'religion' to an honoured place. Barth is even skittish about the place the church gives to 'sacraments'—particularly infant baptism. He warns us that the long period of Christendom has given rise to a dangerous development of sacred forms which offer us a too-easy assurance of God's presence. Similarly he is suspicious of any doctrine of the church in which God's continued presence is guaranteed by the continuity of order. True, there is in all this a parallel to Paul's attack on the law and it would seem that we could legitimately extend the parallel by saying that 'religion' as prayer, preaching, sacraments, is like the law, a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. But Barth would still insist that the law is a term with a definite historical meaning in the life of Israel which can be purified in the light of Christ, whereas religion is a term which is not native to Israel's faith, and because of its historical associations, best abandoned. Prayer, preaching and the rites of the fellowship are best described not as religion, but in terms of our faith relation to the living Lord of history.

[15] Eberhard Bethge, in his Alden-Tuthill Lectures on Bonhoeffer, published in vol. li, no. 2, of the Chicago Theological Seminary 'Register', February 1961, p. 29 *and Papers.*

> The Pauline question whether circumcision is a condition of justification is to-day, I consider, the question whether religion is a condition of salvation. Freedom from circumcision is at the same time freedom from religion. I often ask myself why a Christian instinct frequently draws me more to the religionless man than to the religious, by which I mean not with any intention of evangelizing them, but rather, I might almost say, in 'brotherhood'. While I often shrink with religious people from speaking of God by name—because that Name somehow seems to me here not to ring true, and I strike myself as rather dishonest (it is especially bad when others start talking in religious jargon: then I dry up completely and feel somehow oppressed and ill at ease)—with people who have no religion I am able on occasion to speak of God quite openly and as it were naturally. Religious people speak of God when human perception is (often just from laziness) at an end, or human resources fail: it is really always the *Deus ex machina* they call to their aid, either for the so-called solving of insoluble problems or as support in human failure—always, that is to say, helping out human weakness or at the borders of human existence. Of necessity, that can go on until men can, by their own strength, push those borders a little further, so that God becomes superfluous as a *Deus ex machina.*[16]

To be a Christian, Bonhoeffer is insisting, is not to be religious but to be truly human. But the real question then is: what is the measure of the truly human?...

If there is to be a truly worldly Christianity—a truly secular faith—behind it there must be a reliance upon the grace of Christ who alone can make us free from self-concern and free us for the true worldly life of concern for others. And because this freedom is a costly

[16] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Prisoner for God*, pp. 123-4; Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 92f.

freedom, there is required a 'secret discipline' from which a truly Christian style of life can arise in the midst of commitment in the world. Bonhoeffer remained acutely aware of the danger of false worldliness—of easy alliance with current attitudes. This, of course, was the great tragedy of the German church of his time; and the irony was that it was the attempt to keep the church out of the secular world of the state and inside the religious world of the church which had resulted in its acquiescence in the false worldly values of Hitlerism. And so Bonhoeffer looked for a relation to the world which was religionless; in the sense that it would cut through this sacred-secular dichotomy and would dispense with outward religiosity in order to free itself for the real world of human existence—the secular world. But he knew that this relation to the world also must be redemptive in its commitment to the true and costly transcendence of God expressed in Christ's life of complete self-giving—in the suffering life of the One who was wholly 'for others'.

For Bonhoeffer then, a non-religious life—a secular life —was the genuine life because it was the life revealed to us in Christ. In Christ we see God not as the Omnipotent one standing outside the world—that God is the God of the religious world with its separate realms—but in Christ we see God coming to us in weakness and suffering and allowing himself to be edged out of life on to the cross. And it is here that God shows himself as the one who is for us in history—Emmanuel—and as the one who desires us to know him not in a separate religious realm but as the one who comes to us by the roadside in the daily affairs of life. Secularization can be rightly interpreted as the fruit of the Incarnation, for this coming of Christ into our secular life has shown us that the only God has the world of creation as the scene of his saving work. So it is that because of the coming of Christ the deities of religion are dispersed; there is no other God than the one who has come to us in Christ, and no other 'religion' than the truly human existence of Christ.

'Just as in Christ the reality of God entered into the reality of the world,' wrote Bonhoeffer,[18] 'so too is that which is Christian to be found only in that which is of the world: the supernatural only in the natural, the holy only in the profane.' He was fully aware that the church has resisted this secularization and has kept on fighting for a religious place in the midst of life; believing that in this way it was fighting for God's living space in the religious sphere. But to Bonhoeffer this was a fatal mistake. 'The attack by Christian apologetics upon the adulthood of the world I consider to be in the first place pointless, in the second place ignoble and in the third unchristian.'[19]

1. It is pointless. As secularization captures more and more areas of life, religion is driven back to the edges of human existence; its God becomes a God of the gaps, and the parson is kept for the inner private life and death, as religion is increasingly driven out of the world. This is pointless; for it will even prove difficult to keep religion on this basis as secular science continues its invasion of the inward life and its attack on death.

2. It is also ignoble to hold on to the religion of the gaps—it turns faith into a Canute-like figure ludicrously seeking to demonstrate its divine right by holding up its hand to the advancing tide of secularization and commanding it to stop.

3. It is unchristian, for any attempt to relate God to the special realm of the interior life cannot be accepted. The God revealed in Christ is the God of our whole life in history. He is the secular God; and we must learn to give a non-religious interpretation of Christianity.

[18] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, S.C.M. Press, 1955, p. 65.

[19] *Prisoner for God*, p. 147; *Letters and Papers From Prison*, p. 108.

We must see God, then, not as a God who waits to come to us at the edges of our life in our weakness and extremity; we must see him as the Lord who comes to us in the midst of the secular life at the points of our confidence and strength as well as at the points of weakness, and bringing to us the truly human life which far transcends our ordinary life because it is a life that is wholly 'for others'. His concern in all this is summarized in some notes he put down as an outline for a projected book; one he rightly believed he would never write:

> What do we mean by 'God'? Not in the first place an abstract belief in his omnipotence etc. That is not a genuine experience of God, but a partial extension of the world. Encounter with Jesus Christ, implying a complete orientation of human being in the experience of Jesus as the one whose only concern is for others. This concern of Jesus for others the experience of transcendence. This freedom from self, maintained to the point of death, the sole ground of his omnipotence, omniscience and ubiquity. Faith is a participation in this Being of Jesus (incarnation, cross and resurrection). Our relation to God is not a religious relationship to a supreme Being, absolute in power and goodness, which is a spurious conception of transcendence, but a new life for others, through participation in the Being of God. The transcendent consists not in tasks beyond our scope and power, but in the nearest thou to hand. God in human form, not, as in other religions, in animal form —the monstrous, chaotic, remote and terrifying—nor yet in the Greek divine-human of autonomous man, but man existing for others, and hence the crucified. A life based on the transcendent.[20]

In all of this I have made no attempt to give a formal definition of what Bonhoeffer means by religion, preferring to allow the context to suggest the somewhat indistinct boundaries of Bonhoeffer's concept. Eberhard Bethge, however, attempts a formulation, and as long as it is not accepted as a final statement of what religion means in this discussion—for the concept is in fact kaleidoscopic, with moving boundaries and changing characteristics—it should help us to gain the feel of what Bonhoeffer and our other writers are talking about when they say that religion must be cleared away to make room for the non-religious interpretation of the gospel for which our secularized age calls and toward which the Christian faith itself has been leading us.

> First, religion is *individualism*. It cultivates individualistic forms of inwardness. It takes the form of asceticism or concepts of conversion which all abandon the world to itself. . . .

[20] *Prisoner for God*, p. 179; *Letters and Papers*, p. 164f.

Second, religion is *metaphysics.* Its transcendence provides the completion which is felt necessary for this world. God or the godly is the superstructure for being. Thus it secures the escape the religious desire wants to have. Religion inescapably leads into thinking in two realms: reality must be completed by the supranatural. . . .

Third, religion is admittedly a province of life, a sector of the whole. . . . Driven out from one department after the other in dreadful secularization, it is still alive in the more remote areas. Is that the Christian God, dwelling in a dark and ever smaller province?

Fourth, religion is the *deus ex machina* concept. God must be there for providing answers, solutions, and help. . . . It covers up actual godlessness with piety and religiosity. . . .

Bonhoeffer holds that the time for religion is essentially over. . . . Christians give proof every day of this analysis because they are not able to make more out of their religion than a nice little province of their real life. . . .

But who is Jesus? . . . He is the man for others against individualistic inwardness. He is the lonely and forsaken without transcendent escape. He worships not in provinciality but in the midst of real life. He, though longing for him, does not experience the *deus ex machina.* Thus the time for religion might have gone, but not the time for Jesus. . . .

Non-religious interpreting must do the opposite of what religious interpretation is doing: not making God the stopgap of our insufficiencies, not relating the world in its misfits to a *deus ex machina,* but respecting its adulthood.[21]

[21] Bethge, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-4.