

Terror, Tolerance, and Trump

A Comparison of the Influence of Fear in the 2016 Election

POLS 270 – Research Methods

Though they are typically known for their passionate defense of free speech, gun ownership, and low taxes, there is also a common perception of conservative voters as being more intolerant than their liberal counterparts. A Pew poll found that the majority of Americans see the Democratic Party as open and tolerant and find the GOP to be lacking in both tolerance and empathy (Pew Research Center 2015). Both parties demonstrate politically reactive behavior to the influence of fear but the common belief is that conservatives take a more nationalistic and isolationist stance in their responses. The 2016 presidential campaign of conservative candidate Donald Trump was laden with promises of reduced immigration and strong military response in the wake of terror attacks overseas and subsequently drew a strong conservative voter turnout (Walsh 2016). Through analyzing the different responses of conservative and liberal voters to fear and terror, this research will answer the question, “Do Trump supporters experience higher levels of fear?”

The importance of the levels of tolerance in a society cannot be understated. When tolerance decreases too severely in a country, nationalistic attitudes can take over. The danger in this is demonstrated historically and a prime example of this is the events in Germany following World War I. The country experienced growing levels of fear for its future due to its decimated economy that resulted from reparations they were ordered to pay (Kaiser 1996). This led to the rise of a leader who promised to restore the pride and financial security of the German people by prioritizing their success above all else. The pervasive culture of extreme intolerance that followed was fostered by fear and it led to the systematic elimination of millions of people that were deemed to be “other”. This event demonstrates the importance of comprehending how fear contributes to the rise and fall of tolerance in a nation and how it affects differing political

opinions. By studying this phenomenon it becomes possible to better address intolerance in the future and hopefully limit its influence.

Overarching Influence of Fear on Political Opinion

Scholars have studied the psychological influence of fear on the opinions of people from many different backgrounds. A number of studies have demonstrated a phenomenon called “affective intelligence” meaning that, regardless of party affiliation, an increase in someone’s anxiety leads to a decrease in tolerance of ideas and people that are unlike themselves (Marcus et al. 2005). Marcus and his fellow researchers studied of the effect of changing the amount of extrinsic anxiety that a person was experiencing by exposing them to opinions other than their own. They discovered that when they increased the anxiety of the subjects by putting them in a situation where they were in conflict with another political perspective, they tended to look inward and revert to what they intuitively thought was correct. The researchers extrapolated that this was because the subjects felt that they were in an intellectually unsafe environment where their ideas were being threatened. However, they discovered that when subjects felt safe and were surrounded only by things that reflected their own general opinion, those people were more open to considering outside logic and information to reach a decision about the subject because they were not automatically on the defensive.

Though the theory of affective intelligence has been confirmed across many studies, it is not without critics. The research of Ingrid Haas and William Cunningham indicates that a more nuanced explanation of the origins of intolerance is appropriate (2014). The study that they performed demonstrated that it is not the exposure to outside ideas themselves that incites intolerance. Only when the outside force is actually perceived to be a threat does it cause the subjects to become intolerant and inwardly focused in their thought. When the scientists put

subjects in an intellectually uncertain situation, it merely resulted in discomfort as opposed to the outright aversion caused by the more threatening situation that they tested. The requirement of an actual perception of threat is explained by terror management theory that dictates that a person's mortality salience or awareness that their death is inevitable causes existential anxiety that, when invoked, is often buffered by defaulting to one's own worldview.

A noteworthy real-world example of the phenomenon is the public reaction following the events of September 11th, 2001. Prior to that point, the concept of international terrorism had been a distant issue and most Americans were expressing dissatisfaction toward their government, giving it only a 30% approval rating (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). When the attack happened it was the largest terror strike that had ever occurred in the United States and the majority of it was televised. It became a visceral embodiment of the surrounding threat that most Americans previously did not know existed. Hetherington and Nelson's comparative study of polls from the Washington Post found that the percentage of people who trusted the national government to do what is right following the attack more than doubled. This is a wide scale example of how, regardless of party affiliation, people's feelings of fear lead to an increased preference for their own worldview in order to stave off the overwhelming mortality salience caused by this event.

Specific Effects of Fear on Conservative Attitudes

Though the effects of fear transcend party affiliations, they have a unique effect on conservatives specifically. A study was done in which subjects were divided by political association of liberal or conservative and they were then asked to predict what their response would be to a negative stimulus. The participants then experienced one of the negative stimuli that they talked about, a bad test grade, and were interviewed afterward (Joel et al. 2014). The

researchers found that there was a substantial difference between both the predictions and stimulus responses of the two groups. Members of the conservative group anticipated that they would have stronger reactions to the potential negative stimuli and then when the stimulus was administered, they reported a more negative reaction than the liberal group did. The results of this study indicate that conservative voters are more sensitive to negative events and therefore they are more motivated to take action, such as going out to vote, to avoid a negative outcome.

Specific Effects of Fear on Liberal Attitudes

While they do have a particularly strong reaction to it, conservatives are not alone in their response to negative stimuli. In fact, a study by a group of psychologists found that when subjected to threats, liberals often react by shifting to more conservative viewpoints. What the scientists found was that conservatives are in a chronic state of vulnerability and anxiety caused by epistemic instability and therefore skew toward conservative attitudes that preserve that stability. When they used the experiment to manipulate the circumstances around their liberal subjects, however, and exposed them to the same threat and instability that conservatives regularly feel, the liberal subjects took on the same preservationist attitudes that the conservatives maintained (Nail et al. 2009). This result speaks to the likelihood that if there were people who viewed themselves as liberals but they experienced a sensation of instability during the 2016 election, those people may have voted for the candidate whose platform included policies that would give them the stability they lacked.

Fear Fosters Conservatism

The inherent pivot toward conservatism is explained by analyzing the foundations of the idea it presents. While its proponents often espouse its focus on freedom, conservatism is also inherently backwards thinking in its application. Edward Jones and H.B. Gerard write, “There is

an undeniable tendency toward conservatism reflected in the economizing principle of applying past solutions to present problems” (p. 227). The heart of conservatism is preserving American society as the founding fathers intended it and they try to apply past solutions like The Constitution to present day problems. This mode of thinking is simply a long-term embodiment of terror management theory. From the moment that America outlined and implemented its founding document forward, conservatives have turned inward in the face of threat. They look back on that document in the face of threats to be comforted and to reinforce the stability that was instituted upon its initial creation. Though not an American himself Edmund Burke reflected this sentiment in his attack on the French Revolution. He tore down the supposed logical roots of the revolution and predicted that it would probably end in disaster. He went on to point out the merits of a more traditionalist approach that involved gradual amendment of a government through proper constitutional channels rather than engaging in the complete unknown risks of deposing the system its entirety.

The Particular Fear of the 2016 Election

A study of the changing racial demographics leading up to the 2016 election in combination with the rhetoric used by President Trump demonstrated the particular relevance of fear and “othering” in this election cycle (Major et al. 2016). The study showed that the increased threat of soon losing the status as a racial majority in the United States caused a sense of fear among white voters. The president further exacerbated that fear by focusing his campaign upon anti-immigration policy and emphasizing the threats from overseas that could affect the country. This rhetoric induced a sense of panic for many Americans and the focus soon became ethnic identification and preserving the country in its current state, stoking the power of conservative ideology. This fear caused a strong reaction in voters who already leaned

Republican and it inspired them to go out and ensure that the negative change that they anticipated did not happen. Furthermore it created uncertainty for some liberal voters as well, causing them to stray from their typical voting habits in favor of more nationalistic thinking. My research dictates that the common denominator amongst Trump voters is their fear because that is what drove them to the voting booth.

Data Collection Background

The data relied upon in this research comes from the American National Election Studies' (ANES) 2016 Time Series Study. This information was collected by having participants across the United States complete two questionnaires, one before and one after the presidential election in 2016. The researchers used both internet surveys and face-to-face interviews and received 3,649 useable responses. Of those responses, 27% are from the face-to-face interviews while 73% are from the online questionnaire. The unit of analysis in this survey is the individual and it should be noted that all participants were required to be the legal voting age of eighteen or older.

Critical Evaluation of Survey Techniques

Considering the fact that the ANES used two methods of data collection, it is important to consider the strengths and weaknesses that are inherent to each technique. One of the benefits of using an internet survey to collect the majority of the data is that gathering information with this method is relatively inexpensive in comparison to other techniques. Additionally, because this survey method costs less to administer, the researchers could reach a wider audience with the limited amount of funds that they had. A further asset of online surveys is that they prevent an interviewer from unintentionally biasing the participants' answers with their presence. Though there are advantages to using internet polling for data collection, there are significant detriments

of the practice that must be acknowledged as well. The first potential issue with an online questionnaire is that the results innately exclude people who do not have access to the internet or a computer to complete the survey. Additionally, in having the poll administered online instead of face-to-face, the researchers prevent respondents from asking for clarification on any questions that they find to be unclear. This can prompt responses based on misunderstanding of a question that belie the respondent's genuine opinion. Lastly, internet surveys have naturally low response rates and therefore a large portion of the people that the researchers contacted may have simply ignored or failed to complete the questionnaire.

The second method that the ANES used to administer their surveys was face-to-face interviewing. Like internet polling, there are both benefits and detriments to this technique. One of the assets of face-to-face interviews is that they allow the respondents to immediately seek clarification on ambiguous parts of the survey from the interviewer before giving their answers. In addition, this method of polling typically garners a much higher response rate than other types of surveying. However, in this case researchers found a 44% response rate for their internet survey and only a 50% response rate for the face-to-face interviews. The unusually low response rate for the interviews that were conducted in person could suggest that this 204 question survey caused a phenomenon known as subject fatigue. This occurs when a survey is extraordinarily long and participants elect not to complete it. Furthermore, the interviewer's presence itself also could have biased the subjects and caused them to give disingenuous answers because of the social pressures of having another person in the room.

Critical Evaluation of the Survey

In addition analyzing the data collection techniques of this survey, it is also necessary to think critically about the questionnaire itself. One of the best things about this survey is that its

results were collected using leading questions that mostly generated ordinal and nominal level data. This means that almost every question required the respondent to sort themselves into a predetermined set of categories (such as who they voted for) or to choose from a scaled list of opinions (such as how much they favor or oppose a border wall with Mexico). The reason that the data being measured on an ordinal/nominal level is helpful is that the questions necessitate clear responses, making the process of coding the results simple and quick. Furthermore, these simple levels of measurement make the answers easy to compare due to the limited nature of the respondents' options.

While the simplicity of these results does make them easy to code, the ambiguous nature of some of the questions in this study leaves them widely open to interpretation, which is inherently problematic. One such example is the question, "Do you agree or disagree that what our country needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path?" Because the definition of the terms "evil" and "true path" are relative, two people who appear to be in agreement in the survey may be talking about entirely different things based on how they interpreted the prompt. The questions and parameters of each of these prompts can be found in *Figure 1*. A further cause for concern is the large amounts of data that are for many of these important questions. These missing responses are most likely the result of the invasive and arguably controversial nature of the survey questions and their absence indicates a flaw in the reliability of the data. The last noteworthy weakness of this data is one that plagues all surveys and that is the possibility that the respondents were untruthful in their answers. One such indicator of dishonesty in this poll can be found in the responses to the survey question, "Did you vote in the November general election?" Roughly 80% of respondents indicated that they had voted in that election even though the national average turnout for presidential elections is

usually only a little over half the population. This discrepancy either indicates that this survey reached a group of unusually civically-minded people or it shows that some of the participants were less than truthful.

The Methods of Measuring Variables

The intention of this study is to analyze the correlation of fear related factors on people who supported Trump in the 2016 election and therefore the dependent variable is people who indicated that they voted for Trump in the “Presidential Vote” category. To isolate this voter group, I converted the “Presidential Vote” category into a dichotomous variable with respondents who voted for other political candidates as zeros and the people who voted for Trump as ones. Additionally, for this and all other variables, I removed any missing data so as to not skew my results. This accounts for why the overall number of observations in *Figure 3*, as well as some of the frequency totals in *Figure 2* are lower than the overall number of cases in the original dataset.

Significance of Control Variables

Once I had selected my dependent variable, I chose independent and control variables that my research showed were likely to be related. Because some of these variables were nominal, I went through and converted them into dichotomous variables by turning the group within the variable most likely to vote for Trump into ones and making everyone else into zeros. My general hypothesis for my independent variables is that people who experienced higher levels of the variables related to fear were more likely to vote for Trump. A breakdown for how each of these independent and control variables are measured and their levels of measurement can be found in *Figure 1*. In regard to my control variables, I included factors that research shows commonly influence voting practices such as Party Identification, Ideology, Gender,

Race, Social Class, and Region of Residence. My hypothesis for the variables of Party Identification and Ideology are that people who classify themselves as more conservative or strongly Republican will be more likely to have voted for Trump because he was the Republican Party's presidential candidate. The next few variables that I controlled for were race and gender. Over the course of his campaign, Trump made several highly-publicized disparaging comments against women and minorities which led to a negative perception of him by those groups (Bump 2016). Additionally, women (Chaturvedi 2016) and African Americans (Brown, Khalilah, et al. 2015) have historically been more inclined to vote for democrats. For that reason I anticipate that men will show higher support for Trump in the Gender variable and white people will be more inclined to have supported Trump in the Race category. *Figure 1* reflects the fact that I changed these two variables from nominal to dichotomous to check if this hypothesis was supported by the data.

Another control variable that I looked at was social class. This variable required respondents to sort themselves into either working class or middle class and I hypothesize that the working class will show a higher tendency toward Trump. The reason that I think there will be a positive relationship between the working class and Trump is that he addressed many of his campaign speeches to the working class and continually emphasized his goal of bringing back factory jobs in a way that his opponent did not (Cohen 2016). Because of this, I coded the working class as ones and categorized the middle class as zeros. My final control variable was Region of Residence and I anticipated that people from the South would be the most strongly inclined to vote for Trump because the South historically holds more conservative views and has routinely voted for the Republican presidential candidate. Thus, I recoded this variable to make it

dichotomous by classifying people from the South as ones and making everyone who was not from the South into zeros.

Significance of Independent Variables

Regarding my independent, experimental variables, they can be split into measures of fear and measures of protection. The first measure of fear that I looked at was whether or not Clinton made respondents feel afraid. This is a very valid indicator of the concept of whether or not Trump supporters experience higher levels of fear and I anticipate that people who felt afraid of Clinton were more likely to come out and vote for her opponent, Trump, to avoid the negative consequences that they anticipated. Some additional independent variables that measure this concept of fear are how voters gauged their Concern Over Terrorism and their feelings about if China is a Military Threat. This too is a strong indicator of my overall concept and I hypothesize that people who feel threatened by these international forces are more likely to have leaned conservative and voted for Trump. The last independent variables centered around fear directly are those focused on immigration. This includes where voters fall on the Tolerance Toward Immigrants Index, their opinions on the Desirable Immigration Level, and whether they agree that the U.S. should allow Syrian Refugees. I anticipate that Trump voters will exhibit higher levels of negative feelings toward immigrants, due to the negative rhetoric that he used about them during his campaign. These variables are not extremely valid indicators of the overall concept of fear amongst Trump voters because, while Trump did use language that demonized immigrants and made them seem dangerous, intolerant responses could also be attributed to other factors like racism.

While many of my independent variables measure fear itself, there are others that address the symptoms of that fear such as feelings of desire for protection. The first two independent

variables that focus on protection which I analyzed were whether respondents felt that Trump is a Strong Leader and if they thought that the Country Needs a Strong Leader. These measures are strong indicators of whether Trump voters experience more fear because they indicate the natural reaction to fear of seeking escape and protection. I anticipate that Trump voters will give positive indications to both of these questions. In addition, there are several independent variables centered around protection and taking countermeasures to ensure that protection. This includes the variables Build a Wall with Mexico, Increase Defense Spending Scale, Send Troops to Fight ISIS, and Gun Ownership. These variables are all strong indicators of the general research question because they show how important voters feel it is to protect themselves from outside attacks. I hypothesize that Trump voters will indicate favor for all of these measures because they feel an ongoing sense of anxiety at being attacked.

Summary Statistics Explained

One of the first points to note is that many of these summary statistics in *Figure 2* have a lower frequency total than they do in the raw data, this is because I removed missing data. There was a large amount of missing data for a number of these variables, a particular one of note being the 861 variables missing from the New Presidential Vote category. This means that in later regressions, the number of observations may be significantly lower than it is in the raw data. With the New Presidential Vote, the missing cases were due to many people indicating that they had not voted in the election at all. Additionally, the relatively even distribution of party identifications in the NewPartyID shows that the study was not oversaturated with one particular political perspective. In the tabulation of NewIdeology, it is also clear that the political opinions of the group were more measured, with less than five percent on either side labeling themselves as an “extreme”. Furthermore, while I realized that immigration was largely a negative topic

during the election, I was surprised to see that only five percent of respondents were in favor of increasing it. Across several of the tables I noticed that the middle value was the highest which leads me to believe that a substantial amount of respondents were unsure or uneducated on a subject and gave an answer of neutrality rather than foregoing the question altogether. I was shocked to see that in the NewChinaMilitaryThreat ninety percent of Americans viewed China as a mid-level or high level military threat. Furthermore, it is worth noting that roughly a third of respondents oppose allowing Syrian refugees completely, reflecting the emphasis placed on Syrians as potential terrorists in the election. The widespread intolerance of Syrian refugees indicates that the variable of fear played a role that extended even outside of the Trump voters in the 2016 election. Lastly, I was surprised to see that the percentage of people who owned one or two guns was the same as the number who owned three or more guns.

Interpreting Regression Results

In order to interpret this logistic regression in *Figure 3*, we must first note some overarching statistics about our variables. The total number of observations is 2,244 which is substantially lower than the 3,649 cases in the raw data. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the cumulative removal of missing data from every response, and in particular the recoding of 861 cases in my “Voted For Trump” variable as missing data because those people did not vote. Because the probability of obtaining my chi squared statistic if the null hypothesis were true is .00 and therefore less than .05, I can reject my null hypothesis that none of my independent variables will have an effect on my dependent variable. Additionally, my pseudo r squared is .73, meaning that 73% of the total variation in my dependent variable is explained by the independent variable. This tells us that this model does a very strong job of explaining the variation in my dependent variable using my independent variable.

Regarding the influence of perceiving Trump as strong leader on whether or not people voted for Trump, the coefficient in Figure 3B shows that there is a positive relationship between the two. Specifically, the odds ratio in Figure 3A shows that as people who perceive Trump as a strong leader were twice as likely to vote for Trump. This result also has a low P value and a high z score, meaning that there is a low chance of the coefficient occurring by random chance. This idea of needing a powerful leader is further perpetuated in the result for NewCountryStrongLeader. That variable demonstrated a positive relationship and tells us that people who feel that the country needs a strong leader were one and a half times more likely to vote for Trump. Additionally, there was a positive relationship between feeling afraid because of Clinton and voting for Trump. The odds ratio shows that when people felt afraid because of Clinton, they were one and a half times more likely to vote for Trump. Like with the Strong Leader variable, this result also has a low P value and a high z score, meaning that there is a low chance of the coefficient occurring by random chance.

I was unsurprised to see a negative correlation between Immigrant Tolerance and voting for Trump, specifically people are a quarter less likely to vote for him when they report high Immigrant Tolerance. There was a positive correlation coefficient between people who are in favor of building the wall with Mexico, the odds ratio tells us that wanting to build the wall makes people one and a half times more likely to vote for Trump. This result also has a low P value and a high z score, meaning that there is a low chance of the coefficient occurring by random chance. That being said, I did find it to be unexpected that the odds ratio showed that being in favor of higher immigration levels made you more likely to vote for Trump but then the coefficient shows a negative relationship. The logistic regression also definitively reveals that I was wrong in my assumption that the working class would favor Trump. There is also a negative

relationship between being in the working class and voting for Trump, though that variable does have a fairly high P score and a low z score which calls into question whether this result occurred by random chance.

One of the strongest predictors in this model is the race of a voter. Having a P value of zero, this coefficient tells us that there is a positive relationship between being white and voting for Trump and the odds ratio confirms that, revealing that being white makes you three times more likely to vote for Trump. There were a few variables such as NewDefenseSpendingHike, NewAllowSyrian, NewRegionResidence, NewSocialClass, and NewGender that have P values so high that we cannot rule out that their results occurred by random chance (more so NewChinaMilitaryThreat and NewGender). Generally, I was surprised by the fact that my control variables like Gender and Region of Residence are the ones that ended up with the highest z scores and the greatest possibility at having occurred by random chance. What these results tell me overall is that people who voted for Trump did in fact experience high levels of fear of their opponent and they did feel that Trump was the strength that the vulnerable country was missing. Trump voters were in favor of countermeasures against their perceived opponent such as Building the Wall with Mexico. And, although it was only a control, I learned that race is one of the top determining factors in whether or not people voted for Trump.

As much as this logistical regression tells us, there are still limitations to it that must be acknowledged. The missing data in this analysis is, of course, problematic. Furthermore, my dependent variable is not measured at an interval level which limits how much information can be garnered through this analysis. And lastly, I think that the inclusion of an extra variable regarding negative anticipation would be helpful. A question of on a scale from one to five, one being absolute disaster and five being a good job, how do you think the opposing candidate to

your own would do if elected? My research shows that oftentimes conservatives anticipate an outcome to be more severely negative than their liberal counterparts so I think that the question would add value to the study.

Conclusion

In light of my research question of if Trump supporters experience higher levels of fear, this study has shown that there is definitely a relationship between the two. My analysis suggests a correlation between my dependent variable of support for Trump and perceptions that the country needs a strong leader, the belief that Trump is that strong leader, fear about his opponent, and countermeasures like building a wall with Mexico. The more fear based a person's response was to these variables, the more likely they were to vote for Trump. That being said, many of the odds ratios showed that these factors only made voters slightly more likely to vote for Trump.

I feel comfortable rejecting the notion that fear and fear related factors have no effect on whether people voted for Trump because I have statistically significant results for each of these variables that state otherwise. However, I think that this dataset could do more to delve into why people thought that Trump was a strong leader and what made them fear his opponent? And I think it would be helpful to know how severe people perceive the stakes to be if the other person wins? If I were able to conduct my own data collection, these are the kinds of questions that I think would best aid in my research and our understanding of whether Trump voters truly experienced higher levels of fear overall.

Appendix

Figure 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Measurement	Source
Presidential Vote (NewPresVote)	Dichotomous Variable. <i>"For whom did you vote for President in 2016?"</i> (0-1, 0 being did not support Trump and 1 being supported Trump)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Party Identification (NewPartyID)	Ordinal Variable. <i>"Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? If Democrat or Republican, would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican or a not very strong Democrat/Republican? If independent, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?"</i> (1-7, 1 being Strong Democrat, 2 being Weak Democrat, 3 being Independent Democrat, 4 being Independent, 5 being Independent Republican, 6 being Weak Republican, 7 for Strong Republican)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Trump: Strong Leader (NewTrumpStrong)	Ordinal Level. <i>"How well does the phrase 'he would provide strong leadership' describe Trump?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Not Well at All and 5 being Extremely Well)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Clinton: Feel Afraid (NewClintonAfraid)	Ordinal Level. <i>"How often would you say you've felt afraid because of the kind of person Hillary Clinton is or because of something she has done?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Never and 5 being Always)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Ideology (NewIdeology)	Ordinal Level. <i>"Where would you place yourself on this seven point liberal/conservative scale?"</i> (1-7, 1 being Very Liberal and 7 being Very Conservative)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election

<p>Tolerance Toward Immigrants Index (NewImmigrant-Tolerance)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"Index of tolerance for immigrants, built from how strongly one agrees/disagrees with the following statements: (1) Immigrants are generally good for America's economy (reversed); (2) America's culture is generally harmed by immigrants; and (3) Immigrants increase crime rates in the US. Those who rank high on this index are more likely to be tolerant of immigration."</i> (1-5, 1 being Low Tolerance and 5 being High Tolerance)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>Desirable Immigration Level (NewDesired-ImmigrationLevel)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same?"</i> (1-4, 1 being Decreased a Lot and 4 being Increased)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>Build a Wall with Mexico (NewMexicoWall)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"Should the US build a wall on the border with Mexico?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Greatly Oppose and 5 being Greatly Favor)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>Defense Spending Scale (NewDefense-SpendingHike)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"Where would you place yourself on this seven-point scale where 1 means 'greatly decrease defense spending' and 7 means 'greatly increase defense spending'?"</i> (1-7, 1 being Greatly Decrease and 7 being Greatly Increase)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>Concern Over Terrorism (NewTerrorism-Concern)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"How worried are you that the U.S. will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Not Worried and 5 being Extremely Worried)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>Send Troops to Fight ISIS (NewTroopsISIS)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Greatly Oppose 5 being Greatly Favor)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>China Military Threat (NewChina-MilitaryThreat)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"How big a threat is China's military to the U.S?"</i>(1-3, 1 being No Threat and 3 being Major Threat)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>
<p>Allow Syrian Refugees (NewAllowSyrian)</p>	<p>Ordinal Level. <i>"Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the U.S?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Greatly Oppose and 5 being Greatly Favor)</p>	<p>Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election</p>

Country Needs Strong Leader (<i>NewCountry-StrongLeader</i>)	Ordinal Level. <i>"Do you agree or disagree that what our country needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path?"</i> (1-5, 1 being Strongly Disagree and 5 being Strongly Agree)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Gender (<i>NewGender</i>)	Dichotomous Variable. <i>"Gender of Respondent"</i> (0-1, 0 being Not Male and 1 being Male)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Race (<i>NewRace</i>)	Dichotomous Variable. <i>"Respondent's racial self-identification"</i> (0-1, 0 being Not White and 1 being White)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Social Class (<i>NewSocialClass</i>)	Dichotomous Variable. <i>"Most people say they belong to either the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? Which one?"</i> (0-1, 0 being Middle Class and 1 being Working Class)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Gun Ownership (<i>NewGunOwnership</i>)	Ordinal Level. <i>"Do you or anyone else living here own a gun?"</i> (1-3, 1 being No Guns, 2 being 1-2 Guns, 3 being 3 or More Guns)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election
Region of Residence (<i>NewRegion-Residence</i>)	Dichotomous Variable. <i>"Region of the country in which R resides"</i> (0-1, 0 being Not South and 1 being South)	Voting Behavior: The 2016 Election

Figure 2: Frequency Tables

-> tabulation of NewPresVote			
A02	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	1,550	55.60	55.60
1	1,238	44.40	100.00
Total	2,788	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewPartyID			
A07	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	768	21.15	21.15
2	483	13.30	34.45
3	427	11.76	46.21
4	473	13.03	59.24
5	442	12.17	71.41
6	440	12.12	83.53
7	598	16.47	100.00
Total	3,631	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewTrumpStrong			
D07	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	1,348	37.10	37.10
2	501	13.79	50.89
3	672	18.50	69.39
4	649	17.86	87.26
5	463	12.74	100.00
Total	3,633	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewClintonAfraid			
D19	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	1,391	38.17	38.17
2	777	21.32	59.50
3	359	9.85	69.35
4	571	15.67	85.02
5	546	14.98	100.00
Total	3,644	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewIdeology			
G01	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	133	3.70	3.70
2	458	12.75	16.45
3	600	16.70	33.15
4	818	22.77	55.91
5	846	23.55	79.46
6	593	16.50	95.96
7	145	4.04	100.00
Total	3,593	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewImmigrantTolerance			
K09	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	598	16.59	16.59
2	849	23.56	40.15
3	799	22.17	62.32
4	696	19.31	81.63
5	662	18.37	100.00
Total	3,604	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewMexicoWall			
K14	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	1,314	36.20	36.20
2	368	10.14	46.34
3	769	21.18	67.52
4	420	11.57	79.09
5	759	20.91	100.00
Total	3,630	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewDesiredImmigrationLevel			
K11	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	906	25.01	25.01
2	688	19.00	44.01
3	1,825	50.39	94.40
4	203	5.60	100.00
Total	3,622	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewDefenseSpendingHike			
N05	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	163	5.14	5.14
2	217	6.85	11.99
3	348	10.98	22.97
4	868	27.38	50.35
5	679	21.42	71.77
6	521	16.44	88.20
7	374	11.80	100.00
Total	3,170	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewTerrorismConcern			
N08	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	244	6.70	6.70
2	682	18.74	25.44
3	1,225	33.65	59.09
4	844	23.19	82.28
5	645	17.72	100.00
Total	3,640	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewTroopsISIS

N09	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	608	16.80	16.80
2	598	16.52	33.31
3	1,064	29.39	62.71
4	786	21.71	84.42
5	564	15.58	100.00
Total	3,620	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewChinaMilitaryThreat

N11	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	389	10.85	10.85
2	1,560	43.51	54.37
3	1,636	45.63	100.00
Total	3,585	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewAllowSyrian

N10	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	1,174	32.50	32.50
2	584	16.17	48.67
3	985	27.27	75.94
4	517	14.31	90.25
5	352	9.75	100.00
Total	3,612	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewCountryStrongLeader

P04	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	573	15.76	15.76
2	459	12.63	28.39
3	699	19.23	47.62
4	978	26.91	74.53
5	926	25.47	100.00
Total	3,635	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewGender

R01	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	1,699	46.99	46.99
1	1,917	53.01	100.00
Total	3,616	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewRace

R02	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	995	27.44	27.44
1	2,631	72.56	100.00
Total	3,626	100.00	

. tabulate NewSocialClass

R10	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	2,043	56.77	56.77
1	1,556	43.23	100.00
Total	3,599	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewGunOwnership

R22	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	2,347	67.95	67.95
2	556	16.10	84.05
3	551	15.95	100.00
Total	3,454	100.00	

-> tabulation of NewRegionResidence

R24	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	2,501	68.54	68.54
1	1,148	31.46	100.00
Total	3,649	100.00	

Bibliography

- Burke, Edmund. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. J Dodiley, 1790.
- Bump, Phillip. 2016. "Most Americans think Trump is biased against women or black people." *The Washington Post*. 6 November 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/06/most-americans-think-trump-is-biased-against-women-or-black-people/?utm_term=.b527ab4eb4ee
- Brown, Khalilah, et al. 2015. "50 Years of Voting Rights Act: The State of Race in Politics" Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. .
- Chaturvedi, Richa. 2016. "A closer look at the gender gap in presidential voting". Pew Research Center. 28 November 2017.
- Cohen, Nate. 2016. "Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites". *New York Times*. 9 November 2016.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Michael Nelson. 2003. "Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism." *Journal of Political Science and Politics*. 36 (February): 37–42.
- Joel, Samantha, et al. 2014. "Conservatives Anticipate and Experience Stronger Emotional Reactions to Negative Outcomes." *Journal of Personality*. 82 (February): 32-43.
- Jones, Edward, and Gerard, H.B. *Foundations of Social Psychology*. Wiley, 1967.
- Kaiser, David. *The Reader's Companion to Military History*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 1996.

- Kirk, Ashley, and Patrick Scott. 2016. "US election: How age, race and education are deciding factors in the race for President." *The Telegraph*. 7 November 2016.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/us-election-how-age-race-and-education-are-deciding-factors-in-t/>
- Major, Brenda, et al. 2016. "The threat of increasing diversity: Why many White Americans support Trump in the 2016 presidential election." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*. Advance online publication.
- Marcus, Sullivan, et al. 2005. "The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgments." *Journal of Political Psychology*. 26 (December): 950-963.
- Nail, Paul R., et al. 2009. "Threat Causes Liberals to Think Like Conservatives." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. 45 (August): 901-907.
- Pew Research Center. *Democrats Have More Positive Image, But GOP Runs Even or Ahead on Key Issues*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015. Web. 1 October 2017.
<http://www.people-press.org/2015/02/26/democrats-have-more-positive-image-but-gop-runs-even-or-ahead-on-key-issues/>
- Walsh, Kenneth T. 2016. "The Fear Factor". *U.S. News & World Report*. U.S. News and World Report L.P., 24 June 2016. Web. 1 October 2017.