Peacekeeping Operations: Humanitarianism or Politics as Usual?

Abstract

After the Cold War, International Organizations (IOs) have become the guardians of international peace and security, in charge of creating and maintaining peace in conflicts that are, for the most part, internal. Current research, however, focuses on why states intervene through the auspices of IOs. Research on why IOs themselves intervene in these conflicts, therefore, is largely lacking. This paper thus analyzes the factors that lead to the decision by IOs to establish peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In order to determine whether or not the decision is based on a consequential rationality or based on an IO’s identity and role in society, the research questions is framed by using the logic of expected consequences versus the logic of appropriateness debate. This paper looks in particular at the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) PKOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC in 1999 and Operation Artémis in 2003, respectively) and the EU intervention, Operation Concordia (2003), in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The findings reveal that security and economic interests play a large role in influencing an IOs decision to intervene by framing the way in which IOs deal with humanitarian crises and human rights situations in a conflict. In the end, IO’s base the decision to intervene on a cost-benefit analysis: if the costs of intervention outweigh the benefits, intervention will not take place. If, however, the costs outweigh the benefits of non-intervention, intervention is more likely to take place.