

Volume V

Issue I

Spring 1999

## About This Journal

"Modus Vivendi" is Latin for "way of life," but in international studies parlance, it signifies "a state of affairs where two opposing parties agree to differ." Therefore, we feel that *Modus Vivendi* is an appropriate name for a journal dedicated to an intelligent discussion of global issues, and this journal is designed to be an open forum for any views concerning international affairs.

*Modus Vivendi* is published under the auspices of the Theta Chapter of Sigma Iota Rho, the International Studies Honor Society. The staff of the journal selects articles which are submitted anonymously by students of Rhodes College. The evaluation process is extensive and each paper is graded by the editors according to the highest standards of research and scholarship. In this way, *Modus Vivendi* serves as a vehicle for recognizing outstanding papers pertaining to international affairs. Further, it is one of only a few journals which recognizes undergraduate scholarship in this field.

This year's journal contains articles covering vastly different cultures and issues. This is the essence of international studies - to analyze and learn from other societies. We are often struck at how international affairs pervades the daily life of the intellectual. The international environment affects the way in which students of all disciplines view themselves and others. The international political arena provides countless discussion topics, among all people, not just I.S. majors. To arrive at some level of understanding in this arena, we must have open discussion of these issues. Further, an intellectual eclecticism is necessary for adequate study of international phenomena. Thus, we encourage students of all disciplines to submit to this journal.

Special thanks must be given to the entire editorial staff of *Modus Vivendi* for their enormous effort and to the Rhodes College Publication Center for allowing us to use their computers. We would also like to thank the Sigma Iota Rho faculty advisor Dr. Frank Mora and Dr., Andrew Michta for making the journal accessible on the World Wide Web. Of course, thanks goes out to the entire International Studies Department and the Rhodes College Student Government for their encouragement and support.

Although it has taken many long hours of reading, re-reading, editing, re-editing, and printing, the process itself has been worthwhile and rewarding. We hope that you enjoy the result. Also, please visit us via the International Studies Web Page at "<http://www.is.rhodes.edu>".

The Editors of *Modus Vivendi*

indelible impression on the Abkhaz which has given them to this day a far greater fear of Georgia than of Russia, and their subsequent demands for autonomy would, throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, be directed at the Georgians rather than the Russians. By the late 1970s, increasing tensions existed between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, and the great 1989 Georgian independence demonstrations a decade later were in fact originally a response to anti-Georgian violence in Abkhazia.<sup>16</sup>

The fall of the Soviet Union, which left Georgia independent under the ultra-nationalistic Gamsakhurdia and Abkhazia unhappily subordinate, was a recipe for civil war. Gamsakhurdia immediately took the worst possible course of action: he suspended the parliament of Abkhazia without having the power necessary to enforce his decree. The Abkhaz responded by declaring themselves to be completely autonomous of Georgia in all but a very few areas (such as foreign policy). Gamsakhurdia unwillingly accepted this fait accompli, and the question languished for two years. Then, in August 1992, Georgian troops pursuing the forces of the now-deposed Gamsakhurdia entered Abkhazia and occupied Sukhumi, beginning the war in Abkhazia. Soon after this, the covert aid to the Abkhaz by Russian troops still based in Abkhazia (the terms for whose withdrawal were still being negotiated between the Russian and Georgian governments) began.<sup>17</sup>

### **Political Posturing in Moscow**

A number of different domestic actors in Russia had a opportunity to make the decision to covertly aid the Abkhaz or to help with the implementation of that decision. The most obvious of these were the two branches of the civilian government. Both of these branches, moreover, had possible motives for supporting such aid. The same period of time which saw most of the fighting in the Abkhazian war take place also saw the great power struggle between Yeltsin and the antireform Russian parliament (left over from Soviet days), which would culminate in a two week-long siege of the Parliament building by Yeltsin's forces and finally an armed assault on it. As they would later do during the Chechyan war,

had been disobeyed<sup>28</sup>.

Two days after the beginning of the offensive, Russia threatened to withhold \$25 million in credits from Abkhazia and to cut off its energy supplies if Abkhaz forces did not return to the ceasefire lines immediately.<sup>29</sup> They carried out their promise several days later, cutting both phone and electricity lines from Russia<sup>30</sup>

until the Abkhazian victory was a fait accompli, at which point they reversed their position and reopened those lines.

Did the Yeltsin government support the Abkhaz in an attempt to win political capital? Eduard Shevardnadze apparently did not think so. Throughout the war, he denounced Russian involvement, but always was careful to exculpate Yeltsin and blame Parliament or unnamed hardline elements) for the Russian support.<sup>31</sup>

While this rhetoric may have been a pragmatic ploy on Shevardnadze's part, recognizing that alienating Yeltsin would do him no good, the Georgian leader went beyond rhetoric to act in ways which make it evident that he truly believed Yeltsin to be on his side, despite the fact that personal relations between the two leaders had been strained ever since Shevardnadze had failed to back Yeltsin in a dispute within the Communist Party in 1987.

His support of Yeltsin in the popular referendum of April 25, 1993, which alienated hard-line anti-Russian members of his own government, 32 was clearly prompted by the fear that if Parliament won its power struggle with Yeltsin, Georgia's situation would be far worse than it was already. Shevardnadze's constant efforts to have truces with the Abkhaz negotiated by the Russian Foreign Ministry are another example of his willingness to place the future of his country in the hands of a government which he must have had reason to believe was friendly. His final, desperate plea to Yeltsin for help, made when the defense of Sukhumi was on the brink of collapse, 33 serves as yet another indicator of his belief that there actually was a chance that Yeltsin's government would intervene on Georgia's behalf. Western diplomats in the area tended to agree with Shevardnadze that Yeltsin was not behind the covert Russian support of the Abkhaz, though the culprits to whom they allocated the blame for the support varied. 34

A final aspect of the situation makes the Yeltsin government look even less likely as the antagonist in this drama: the lack of a convincing motive. How could they have hoped to gain politically from support of the Abkhaz? If anything, the major successful Abkhazian offensives, all of which began with the violation of a Russian-negotiated ceasefire, made the Yeltsin government look weak, disorganized, and ineffective. This was especially true of the final September 1993 offensive, which disrupted the plans for the friendship treaty between Russia and Georgia, for which Georgia had already indicated a willingness to make virtually all concessions requested by Russia. 35

## **Parliament**

The hard-line elements in the Russian parliament, which during the time of the Abkhaz war were making their great challenge to Yeltsin's rule, were alleged by Shevardnadze and others to be the force behind the Russian support of the Abkhaz for the same reason as the Yeltsin government was blamed: political posturing in the ongoing struggle for power between the two branches of government. The Russian parliament, according to these observers, was trying to embarrass Yeltsin and show their nationalism by fanning up conflict in the Caucasus. The major argument in support of this view was that Russian aid to the Abkhaz would not only be more likely to embarrass Yeltsin than to help him, but would also conform to the generally more nationalist ideological leanings of the Parliament. Unlike the case of the Yeltsin government, there is no question that the inclination of the Russian parliament was to support the Abkhaz rebellion against Georgia. In a September 28, 1992 resolution later condemned by the state council of Georgia for playing a provocative role in the escalation of the Abkhazian war, 36 Parliament "denounce[d] the policy of the Georgian leadership" for using violence to

confront ethnic problems and demanded that Georgia cease all combat operations immediately. 37

Combined with the Parliament's aforementioned criticism of Yeltsin's passivity in the face of Georgian actions, it is obvious that Parliament had a strong motive to prompt the Russian support of the Abkhaz, as Shevardnadze would accuse it of doing throughout the war.

Observers who agree with this assessment, however, miss one key point. Parliament did not have the power or the pull to make the Russian military support the Abkhaz. It had never established any direct authority over the military as a result of the administrative chaos surrounding the dissolution of the Soviet Union, combined with Yeltsin's reluctance to give Parliament any role in oversight of the military, and the only influence it could possibly have exercised would have had to come informally, as a result of similarity of ideology or of personal friendships. Viewed from any perspective, support by the Russian military was essential in any program to militarily aid the Abkhaz, and while there may have been some uncertainty during the course of the Abkhazian war as to whether Yeltsin or the Parliament had more influence over the

had been from theirs. In April, for instance, he finally announced his support for Georgia's territorial integrity - a position that the Yeltsin government had been continually reiterating ever since the initial Georgian incursion into Abkhazia in August 1992 but which Grachev had refused to take up to that point. 45

With the beginning of the final Abkhazian offensive in September 1993, however, Grachev would once again take a stand that differed from that of the Yeltsin government, which denounced the Abkhaz for their massive violation of the Russian-negotiated ceasefire of August 1993. Grachev instead announced that both the Abkhazians and the Georgians were equally to blame for the violation of the ceasefire and that sanctions should be imposed on both sides. 46

On that same day, he proposed a plan whereby two Russian army divisions and a brigade would enter Abkhazia and separate the two warring forces, only to withdraw the offer (due to changed military conditions) and suggest a full Georgian withdrawal from Abkhazia when the desperate Shevardnadze government actually accepted Grachev's humiliating plan. 47

This record of Grachev's actions during the Abkhazian war, while it shows him to have favored a fairly hard-line anti-Georgian policy, is hardly convicting evidence of complicity in giving arms to the Abkhaz. Even overt anti-Georgian military measures, such as the airstrike ordered by Grachev following the downing of the Mi-8, seem to be well within the realm of reasonable policy for a Defense Minister concerned for the safety of his troops. This record does, however, present a clear pattern of policymaking by the Ministry of Defense independent of the wishes of the Yeltsin government. There are other circumstances, however, which seem to indicate at very least a full knowledge of the support by the Russian troops in Abkhazia for the Abkhaz. The already-described

case of the Russian reaction to the events in early October 1992 during the initial rupture in Russo-Georgian relations - the Georgian demands for the Russians to turn over their weapons and withdraw from Abkhazia and Georgian accusations of Russian military aid to the Abkhaz - belongs in this category. While the Yeltsin government, as has already been described, floundered about for three days before making any official response to Georgian demands that Russian troops turn over their weapons to Georgia, Grachev was ready with his rejection of their demands and with counterdemands of his own the next morning. 48

Grachev's rapidity of response, while it may just be a reflection of the fact that the military places more importance on issues relating to it than does the government as a whole, indicates a greater level of preparedness on his part for the Georgian declaration. This preparedness suggests that Grachev was aware that the Russian military in Abkhazia was involved in activity that would prompt the Georgians to make the demands which they in fact made in early October 1993. Just as disturbing (and more bizarre) were Grachev's repeated equivocations when answering questions about Russian aid to the Abkhaz. Never once, when asked about possible support by the Russian military for the Abkhaz, did Grachev admit even to any low-level support by individuals disobeying orders, even though the evidence was clearly balanced against him. By the middle of the war, Grachev had been forced to make ever more unrealistic claims as explanations for the practically airtight case that Georgia was able to present against the Russian forces in Abkhazia. After the first Georgian charges that Russia had been supplying arms to the Abkhaz, to pick a particularly egregious example, Grachev made a statement denying any Russian involvement and implying that Ukraine (which was at that time courting Georgia as a potential ally) had shipped the weapons to the Abkhaz. 49

Later, when two Su-25 military airplanes with Russian markings making a bombing run over Georgian-held Sukhumi were positively identified by neutral observers, Grachev made a statement claiming that Georgia had actually painted Russian markings on their own Su-25s and had used those modified planes to bomb their own positions in order to gain international sympathy. 50

When the Georgians shot down a Russian Su-27 flying towards Sukhumi on the day after he made this assertion, Grachev claimed that the Su-27 had been sent up to fight a Georgian fighter which the base commander feared was about to attack his military base, but was, of course, supported by no other report by either side or neutral observers. 51

Again, Grachev was hardly deviating from normal military routine (especially in Russia) in attempting to cover up potentially embarrassing actions taken by others in his department. If he was being forced by the actions of unruly subordinates to look like a fool and a liar in public, however, it is very unlikely that he would have allowed such actions to continue unless he at very least agreed with their general intent. There is ample evidence, moreover, that Grachev had substantial motivations to at least tacitly support aid to the Abkhaz. On February 22, 1993, for instance, Grachev made an infamous (at least in Georgia) appearance on Russian television in which he stated that Georgia's Black Sea coast "is an area of strategic importance to the entire Russian army... [We]

must take every measure to ensure that our troops remain there. otherwise we will lose the Black Sea."52

When Yeltsin put Grachev in charge of negotiating one of the many ceasefires which punctuating the war in May 1993, he took the opportunity to use his position to press for another of his desired ends. Grachev told Georgia's Defense Minister, with whom he was meeting for the ceasefire, that the conflict in Abkhazia could be resolved by the negotiating and signing of a bilateral treaty of collective security between Georgia and Russia.<sup>53</sup> Four months later, in early September, he publicly reiterated this claim, adding that Russia would help Georgia set up a national army if such a treaty were to be signed.  
54

Georgia politely rejected this offer in September; in October (after the fall of Sukhumi, the disintegration of the Georgian army, and a pro-Gamsakhurdia uprising in western Georgia) negotiations for just such a treaty would begin. This treaty, in its finished form, essentially made Georgia a Russian protectorate, which seems to have been exactly what Grachev had intended. 55

The tide of events in Abkhazia shows definite signs of manipulation by Grachev, and if he was not in fact using the carrot and stick) approach to provide grounds for the occupation of a region which he evidently thought militarily important, then he was extremely lucky in the circumstances surrounding his dealings in Abkhazia.

Aside from Grachev's very public role, however, there are also rumors of much more private actions by the Georgian high command. These rumors, though they do not specifically mention Grachev, involve actions that could not have occurred without Grachev's knowledge and consent. In the middle of October 1992, for instance, as Russian and Georgian leaders were meeting in the Kremlin to discuss the situation in Abkhazia, a report surfaced that Abkhazian Ardzinba had been a block away, discussing an arms transfer with Russian Security Council Secretary Yuri Skokov. Ardzinba's presence and his meeting with Skokov were later confirmed in other reports, although the subject of their discussion was not. 56

Another source, which was never confirmed, reported that Abkhaz leaders had been seen in Moscow carrying on discussions with generals and admirals, both active and retired.<sup>57</sup>

Both of these reports have a good chance of having been either the misconstruing of meetings with peaceful intent or deliberate fabrications by the Georgians, but they certainly add to the general atmosphere of conspiracy which surrounds the dealings of the Defense Ministry on the subject of Abkhazia.

### **Local Forces, Mercenaries, and the 14th Army**

The Russian Defense Ministry did not, however, necessarily have complete control over the situation in Abkhazia. The local commanders of the units (and sub-units) stationed there retained considerable capacity for independent action, and substantial roles were

played by Russian military men who were serving as mercenaries but who may or may not have had the consent and/or encouragement from the official military apparatus. Also, forces from the Russian 14th Army, commanded by the staunchly nationalistic General Lebed, and from the breakaway republic of Trans-Dniestria (which Lebed had helped to gain de facto independence from the former Soviet republic of Moldova, where the 14th Army was stationed) may have also played significant roles in the Abkhazian war.

The Russian army in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 (as seems to be increasingly the case with the Russian army everywhere today) was an unsettlingly fragmented and somewhat demoralized force whose higher commanders were increasingly unable to ensure compliance of their orders by the forces in the field. In this environment, local commanders had considerable independence, a fact demonstrated in the varied attitude of Russian units towards the two warring parties in Abkhazia. In some parts of Abkhazia, Russian troops went so far as to deploy their troops in parts of the front where the Abkhaz defenses were weak in order that those sections of the front not be attacked by Georgia.<sup>58</sup> In other parts of Abkhazia (those under Georgian control), commanders allowed Georgian troops to raid their bases and carry off weapons by the truckload - and were most likely compensated by the Georgians for their laxity.<sup>59</sup>

Most local commanders in Abkhazia, however, seem to have preferred to deal exclusively with the Abkhaz in weapons transfers and give them help in planning military operations<sup>60</sup> while refraining from siding with them too overtly. They had no compunction, however, about retaliating against attacks on them, and several officers admitted to having ordered airstrikes and artillery strikes on Georgian units that they thought were threatening.<sup>61</sup>

It is important not to overemphasize the freedom of action felt by local commanders, however. While the actions of the aforementioned majority group of local officers may not have been the result of a direct order from the Russian High Command, they could not have taken place on as large a scale as they did without at least the tacit consent of the "higherups."

Other Russian military forces, however, had the ability to act without even the tacit consent of the Russian high command. The maverick General Lebed, for instance, essentially controlled his own fiefdom in the Trans-Dniestria, and would have

he would not make such a move when the two had previously discussed it in private.<sup>76</sup> The most unified action that peacekeeping contingents took was the almost unanimous withdrawal of western troops from Somalia after the U.S. forces declared that they would pull out. Despite UN and U.S. pleas for continued western support of the chaotic mission, the majority of the European states in Somalia chose to bring their forces home when American peacekeepers left.<sup>77</sup>

The operation in Somalia was plagued with other resignations. UN special envoy to Somalia Mohammed Sahnoun quit due to his frustration with UN bureaucrats.<sup>78</sup> Sahnoun later accused Boutros-Ghali of harming UNOSOM by undermining the

envoy's power, weakening the credibility of the UN in Somalia, and permitting corrupt practices.<sup>79</sup> Such a negative relationship between the leaders in the field and UN headquarters limited the possibilities for implementing creative and unified solutions to any problems that arose, as Ajello was able to do in Mozambique.

Even within the UN command structure, disunity prevailed. Separate civilian and military leadership existed, with military forces under the control of Turkish general Cevik Bir and civil operations under the command of American Jonathan Howe.<sup>80</sup> Later in the operation, the UN made plans to at least move the civilian and military staffs into the same headquarters building, but only after the violent attack on the UN in June of 1993 did peacekeepers take steps to facilitate closer coordination between the two departments. Even then, their motivations for doing so stemmed from safety concerns as much as from a desire for greater integration in planning.<sup>81</sup> A more streamlined leadership structure would have been helpful, considering the close coordination between civilians and soldiers necessary to perform the mission's primary goal –using the military to protect humanitarian supplies from attack.

### Allocating Resources

Mozambique. As the UN prepared for ONUMOZ, it was determined not to repeat the failure of its recent mission in Angola, where a lack of sufficient resources led to a peacekeeping disaster that embarrassed the UN.<sup>82</sup> In order to salvage the reputation of international peacekeeping, the international community fully committed itself to providing as much support as necessary to make ONUMOZ succeed. Donors were also more willing to offer funding for ONUMOZ because they felt confident in the prospects for success. Most donor states did not feel that Mozambique was a risky investment, since the parties seemed committed to preserving the peace, and the UN appeared to be committed to ensuring their success at this.<sup>83</sup>

However, in its zeal to meet the financial needs of the operation in Mozambique, the UN may have overcompensated. The overwhelming amount of resources provided for the operation led peacekeepers to establish a program much larger than Mozambique initially requested. The resulting force faced allegations that it infringed on national sovereignty by performing duties that the Mozambican government was perfectly capable of doing itself. A smaller and more streamlined force could have met the UN's goals just as well.<sup>84</sup> What weakened ONUMOZ was not the availability of too many resources, but the resulting expectations that the UN created for itself, under the impression that it should expand its program to utilize all of the anticipated financial support.

In addition, peacekeepers may not have used all of the available resources most efficiently. The obstacles that arose in Mozambique, such as difficulties starting the demobilization process, were not due to a lack of resources, but to logistical problems that required planning and diplomacy to resolve.<sup>85</sup> High expenses were incurred in the initial months of the operation because troops had to rent equipment until the operation's budget was officially approved by the UN in New York, so that more permanent equipment could be purchased. In addition, UN officials neglected to negotiate a



preliminary agreement with the government to exempt the UN from Mozambican taxes, forcing peacekeepers to pay taxes until such an agreement could be reached. 86 These funds could have been directed towards more substantial needs, such as humanitarian aid or reintegration programs for soldiers.

Somalia. Peacekeepers in Somalia faced the exact opposite problem than in Mozambique. The shaky peace that UN forces were sent in to preserve did not inspire confidence in international donors, which made them reluctant to commit resources to the operation. Donors wanted to see proof that their money would be put to good use before they invested very much. However, this created a vicious cycle that prevented peacekeepers from proving the potential success of UNOSOM because they lacked sufficient resources, which they could not get unless the mission was succeeding. The possibility of implementing a demobilization and reintegration program fell through without the funds to establish it.87 Such a program could have significantly decreased the number of soldiers fighting one another and the UN, and made the UN's ability to preserve peace much easier. Unfortunately, as long as the international community saw fighting in the streets of Mogadishu, it was unwilling to throw more money into Somalia so such programs could be established.

while the Russian community is clearly not happy there (96,000 of a pre-independence Russian community of 342,000 had left for Russia by 1993),

Abkhazian independence or autonomy achieved through Russian support clearly would do nothing to rectify this situation. The community itself was clearly not in favor of Abkhazian independence, at one point even staging a demonstration outside the Russian embassy in Tbilisi to protest the Russian role in the conflict 74 It seems fairly clear that the ethnic Russians in Abkhazia and Georgia neither directly aided the Abkhaz on a large scale nor were important in influencing Moscow or the Russian military in Abkhazia to do so. **The Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus** The ethnic groups of the northern Caucasus region, which resided in more or less autonomous governing units within the Russian Federation, had been acting increasingly independently of Moscow ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the Russian government feared (with some reason, as the Chechnyan war would prove) that these groups would provide a catalyst for a further ethnic disintegration of the state. Moscow therefore was careful to tread lightly in regards to the interests of these groups, and when war broke out in Abkhazia and radical nationalists in the northern Caucasus took the war as a national cause, they were able to pursue a relatively independent policy. The primary North Caucasian actor that Russia had to deal with in Abkhazia was an amorphous organization called the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus (CPC), a regional group which claimed to speak for the 16 stateless ethnic groups of the northern Caucasus (including the Abkhazians and the Southern Ossetians in Georgia and 14 other groups which were within the borders of the Russian Federation). 75 This group had seen the initial Abkhazian declaration of sovereignty as the first step towards the formation of a confederation of independent ethnic groups in the North Caucasus region and viewed the Georgian incursion into Abkhazia as an attack on the sovereignty of the Abkhaz people. While the CPC had no clear claim to be representative of the views of the majority of northern Caucasians (only

the leaders of two ethnic groups, Chechuyais Dudayev and Abkhaziais Ardzinba, initially supported the formation of the group) 76 it clearly represented the most independence-minded segment of the northern Caucasians, which was the segment that offered the greatest risks to Moscow and therefore the group with which Moscow was most concerned.

By the time of the outbreak of the Abkhaz war, Russia had already come into conflict with the CPC on two separate occasions. The first of these came when the Chechen-Ingush autonomous region declared its independence from Russia in November 1991 and the CPC (only about a week after its foundation) began raising volunteers from among its constituent ethnic groups to fight any Russian attempt to force Chechen-Ingushetia back into the Russian Federation. 77

Then, when fighting flared up in South Ossetia in early 1992, a battalion of volunteers was formed by the CPC to go to the aid of the South Ossetians. 78 The Russian reactions in both cases were remarkably similar and offer a sample of Russian policymaking in regard to the organization. In the first case, Russia protested fiercely against the raising of what were essentially insurgents in the northern Caucasus, but failed to take any action against either the CPC or the Chechens and essentially let the issue die temporarily. 79 In the second, the Russians again protested against the raising of illegal armed formations; on its territory but took no action, allowing the pro-Russian leader of the North Ossetian autonomous region of Russia to do their work for them by refusing to allow the CPC battalion to proceed through North Ossetia to South Ossetia. 80

The Russian attitude in dealing with the CPC seems to have been one of reluctance to involve Russia in direct confrontations with the CPC, but amenability to the prospect of subtly undermining the CPC's ability to act.

This Russian policy is indeed the one that seems to have been carried out in the initial stages of the Abkhazian war. Very soon after the August 18, 1992 Georgian attack on the Abkhaz parliament building which started the war, the CPC began mobilizing volunteer groups to go to the aid of the Abkhaz, and the first official Russian reaction to this mobilization was a speech by Yeltsin in August expressing support for Georgian territorial integrity and calling on northern Caucasians to "check their emotions and not be drawn into a dangerous situation." 81

The same week in which he had made this speech, Russian border guards had fumed back an armed contingent of 150 Caucasian volunteers from the Abkhazian border, though many more volunteers were managing to evade the guards and enter Abkhazia. 82 The game between the guards and the volunteers would last well into the second month of fighting, with the Caucasian volunteers becoming increasingly confrontational (taking actions such as hijacking a commuter bus and threatening to storm a mountain pass blocked by border guards) 83 in attempts to enter Abkhazia. The border guards, apparently under orders from the worried Russian government to avoid fighting the volunteers, grew increasingly ineffective

tive at stemming the flow of the volunteers to Abkhazia. Seeing this, Russia began to take more desperate measures in order to keep the situation under control. A declaration in late August by the Russian Ministry of Justice that stated that the CPC was an illegal organization<sup>84</sup> was followed by the arrest on September 23 of Musa Shanibov, the president of the CPC. When this move backfired dramatically, sparking protests in the autonomous region of Kabardino-Balkaria so massive that a state of emergency was declared, Shanibov was evidently allowed to escape after being incarcerated for only 72 hours and charges were dropped.<sup>85</sup>

In this increasingly tense climate, the Russian border guards in Abkhazia were apparently ordered not to challenge CPC volunteers, and a few days later, the breaking of a Russian-brokered ceasefire and the fall of the city of Gagra to Abkhaz forces coincided with the first Georgian allegations of Russian aid to the Abkhaz and marked the beginning of a quick worsening of relations with Russia.

From October of 1992 until October of 1993, Russian and CPC forces coexisted uneasily, sometimes cooperating in support for the Abkhaz, and sometimes in conflict, especially in situations in which it was inconvenient for Russia to be seen as an open supporter of the Abkhaz. The Russian foreign ministry would from time to time issue a statement saying that it was considering the closure of the border between Russia and Abkhazia, but CPC volunteers and supplies flowed freely into (and out of) Abkhazia. There was also a considerable degree of tension throughout the war between Russian and Cossack mercenaries fighting in Abkhazia on the one hand and the Caucasian CPC volunteers on the other. In any case, the marriage of convenience between Russia and the CPC didn't appear to have been intended to be permanent - the case of the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, who was the commander of the CPC forces in the Abkhaz war alongside the Russians whom he would fight against in less than two years (spectacularly taking the entire Russian town of Budyonovsk hostage in 1995 during the Chechen independence struggle),<sup>86</sup>

is indicative of the relationship between the two parties. Whether the primary Russian motivator in its dealings with the CPC was a reluctance to directly go against a CPC policy (as it had been in the Chechen Ingush and South Ossetian cases mentioned earlier), a desire to funnel the CPC's aggressions elsewhere (and distract it from demonstrations against Russia) or to allow the CPC to operate on behalf of Russia's interests without directly implicating Russia is an irrelevant question; what matters is that the CPC undertook to provide aid to the Abkhaz completely on its own initiative, often in direct contradiction to the wishes of Russia, and aid proffered by the CPC must therefore be considered independently from complicity by any branch of the Russian government in aiding the Abkhaz.

## Conclusion

The picture of Russian foreign policymaking presented by this analysis of Russia's covert support for the Abkhaz is simultaneously reassuring and disquieting. The evidence of the Yeltsin government's lack of a role in the aid belies the comments made by observers

who used the Russian role in Abkhazia as an example of Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies, crypto-expansionist views, or generally unsavory nature. This is not to say that Yeltsin does not have these characteristics - only that the Abkhazian situation is not an example of these characteristics in play. Similarly, the inability of either branch of the civilian government to affect the making of policy in Abkhazia at least had the positive effect of freeing the Abkhazian conflict from being held hostage to the power struggle between Yeltsin and the Parliament, a comforting thought given Yeltsin's propensity to quarrel with the Parliament.

These somewhat optimistic findings, however, are far outweighed by other, more disquieting conclusions that may be drawn from the Russian activity in Abkhazia. Probably the most important of these of these latter concerns civil-military relations in Russia. The specter of a Defense Ministry with near-total autonomy in its foreign policy dealings from any form of civilian control is, to say the least, an uncomfortable one. The Defense Ministry from August 1992 to October 1993 showed little or no desire to conform to Yeltsin's policy preferences, or even to save his government from serious ,-, embarrassment. Clearly, loyalty to the institutional interests of the military came before loyalty to the civilian government IIE to whom Grachev and his fellow appointees in the Defense Ministry ostensibly owed their positions. The implications of, this independent Defense Ministry posture extend much wider than just the frustration of a Third World nation trying to reincorporate an autonomous region. Perhaps the military would be more likely to toe the government line if it were foreign policy outside of the iNear Abroad which was being detemlined, but there is no hard evidence to make this case. The West is therefore lefl with the possibility that in future dealings with Russia, its negotiations with the Foreign Ministry may be negated by the actions of the Defense Ministry.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the lack of control that the Defense Ministry/High Command had over the actions of the ' Russian troops actually in Abkhazia. The ease with which local Russian commanders were able to essentially set thei

own foreign policy, the heavy availability of ax-military men from Russia for work as mercenaries, the if oreign aidi from

a maverick Russian army hundreds of miles away, and the paralysis of Russian border controls in the face of North

Caucasian paramilitary groups all combine to fomm a frightening picture of chaos and disintegration of any central

control.

There is, however, still hope. While it must be granted that the Abkhazian experience presents a bleak picture of the Russian army's lack of accountability to civilian institutions, more recent developments have perhaps reversed this trend. Most important among these developments has been the 1995 Chechuyan War, in which the Russian debacle led to calls by the Parliament for increased accountability of the Russian military

and a general wariness by all actors in the Russian government towards military intervention which still persists. Additionally, political deals made by Yeltsin during the 1996 presidential election eventually led (through a process too long and complicated to be described here) to the sacking of General Grachev and much of the rest of the top Defense Ministry officials. Their replacements may yet prove more amenable to civilian control, more forward in exercising authority towards their subordinates, and less prone to military intervention than was the fold guard.) Still, the future of relationships between Russia's domestic actors remain murky, and the influence that these relationships exert on Russia's Near Abroad policy should remain a concern of U.S. policymakers.

**Notes:**

1. Ekkehard Krafl, "Who Are the Abkhazians?" *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. November 1993.
2. Tamara Dragadze, "Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control", *Jane s Intelligence Review 3 . Intelligence Review*. February I, 1994: p. 71.
4. Ibid.
5. Ulrich Schmid, "Georgia After the Fall," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. July 1993. 6. Dragadze, *Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control*
7. Dodge Billingsley, "Georgian-Abkhazian Security Issues." *Jane s Intelligence Review*. February I, 1996.
8. "Conflicting Claims Surround Downing of Russian Helicopter." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. December 18, 1992.
9. Agnes Gereben. "Georgia's Circle of Hate." *World Press Review*. (January, 1993), p. 33.
10. Stephen Jones and Robert Parsons, *Georgia and the Georgians. The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*. Ed. Graham Smith. (New York: Longman, 1996.), pp. 292-293.
11. Ibid., pp. 299-301.
12. Ibid., p. 302.
13. The Georgians, of course, deny that the Abkhaz represent a separate ethnic group at all. Their denials, however, are refuted not only by most international historians who have studied the subject, but also by most linguists. These scholars point out that rather than being a regional dialect of Georgian, as the Georgians claim, the Abkhazians belong to an

entirely different language family and are linguistically most closely related to the Khurits, an ethnic group in Armenia. For more on the debate over Abkhazians origins, see:

14. Agnes Gereben, "Georgia's Circle of Hate." *World Press Review*. January, 1993.
15. Ekkehard Krafl, "Who Are the Abkhazians?" *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. November, 1993.
16. "Press Conference by Abkhazian Government and Parliament Members on the Situation in the Republic." *Official Kremlin International News Broadcast*. August 28, 1992.
17. Krafl, "Who Are the Abkhazians?"
18. "Interviews With Rival Abkhaz Leaders." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. July 28, 1993. 19. Krafl, "Who Are the Abkhazians?"
20. Ibid.
21. Billingsley, "Georgian-Abkhazian Security Issues."
22. "Address by RF President Boris Yeltsin to the Supreme Soviet." *Official Kremlin International News Broadcast*. October 6, 1992.
23. Julia Rubin, "Tanks, APCs Begin Assault on Russian White House." Associated Press. October 4, 1993.
24. John Kampiner, "Yeltsin to Act Over Georgia Fighting." *The Daily Telegraph*. August 27, 1992.
25. Brian Friedman, "Yeltsin: Russia Taking Full Control of Railway, Coast in Abkhazia." Associated Press. October 6, 1992.
26. Ibid.
27. "Georgia Accuses Russia of Arms Supplies to Abkhazians." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. October 5, 1992.
28. "Russia Warns Georgia Not to Steal Weapons." *Reuter Library Report*. October 4, 1992.
29. "Yeltsin Talks to Intelligentsia; Mentions Differences with Rutskoy." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. April 17, 1993.

30. "Attempts to Mediate in Abkhazia Break Down Amid Renewed Fighting." *Agence France Presse*. July 4, 1993.
31. Igor Gvritishvili and Gennady Talalyev, "Treaty with Georgia Will Be Signed in September." *TASS*. August 23, 1993. 32. Liam McDowall, "Shevardnadze Issues Emotional Appeal To Yeltsin Amid New Crisis." Associated Press. September 16, 1993.
33. Liam McDowall, "Rebel Troops Continue Attack Despite Russian Warning." Associated Press. September 17, 1993. 34. "Russia Cuts Power to Rebel Georgian Region." *The Reuter Library Report*. September 18, 1993.
35. Eduard Shevardnadze, "Georgia and Russia Must Not Be At War." *Moscow News*. April 16, 1993.
36. Lee Hockstader, "Georgian Leader Flees From Rebels; Shevardnadze Blames Russia For Abkhazia War." *The Washington Post*. September 28, 1993. p. A1.
37. Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodmen, *The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze*. (University Park, PA: Perm St. Press, 1997). p. 68
38. Nodar Broladze, "Shevardnadze Issues Appeal to Support Yeltsin" *Russian Press Digest*. April 22, 1993.
39. Hockstader, "Georgian Leader Flees From Rebels; Shevardnadze Blames Russia For Abkhazia War," p. A1 .
40. Kevin Fedarko. "In Russia's Shadow." *Time*. October 11, 1993.
41. Hockstader, "Georgian Leader Flees From Rebels; Shevardnadze Blames Russia For Abkhazian War," p. A1.
42. The projected provisions of this treaty, which would be echoed almost exactly by a treaty signed between the two countries in February 1994, after the situation had stabilized, included the continued stationing of Russian troops in Tblisi, Batumi, and Akhalkalaki, a legal recognition by the Georgians of these troops) status and arrangement for their provisioning, and a resolution of the status of the Russo-Georgian border which implicitly recognized Russia's right and duty to patrol it. It should be added here that it is highly unlikely that the Abkhaz or their backers in Russia deliberately sabotaged this treaty, as the Abkhaz would not have really lost anything as a result of a Russo-Georgian rapprochement on these terms. The fact that they disregarded the possible consequences to the prestige of the Yeltsin government (which had negotiated the ceasefire and was touting the treaty of friendship as a way to solve the conflict) in their opportunistic

violation of the ceasefire, however, demonstrates that they were probably not really beholden to Yeltsin or the Foreign Ministry.

43. "Shevardnadze Warns of Danger of Civil War." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. September 8, 1993.

44. Mikhail Kasoyev, "Russia Is Blamed for Aggravation of Situation in Abkhazia." *TASS*. October 2, 1992.

45. "Russian Parliament Denounces Georgia." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. September 28, 1992.

46. Stuff on Russian civil-military relations from some website.

47. Fred Hiatt, Margaret Shapiro, and Lee Hockstader, "Russia's Night on the Brink."

*Washington Post*. October 8, 1993. p.A1.

48. "Russia Concerned Over Developments in Abkhazia." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. August 17, 1992

49. Anatoly Stasovsky, et al, "The Confederation of Caucasian Highlanders Joins Battle." *Russian Press Digest*. August

27, 1992. 111

50. Guy Chazan, *Abkhazian Leader to Meet Shevardnadze and Yeltsin*. UPI. August 28, 1993.

51. "Conflicting Claims Surround Downing of Russian Helicopter." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. December 18,

1992.

52. Roman Zadunaisky, "Defense Minister Grachev Orders Tougher Security Measures." *TASS*. December 16, 1992.

53. A. Mursaliev, "Visit as a Blow." *Russian Press Digest*. March 3, 1993. ~

54. "Russian Defense Minister Reported As Recognizing Georgian Territorial Integrity." *BBC Summary of World Broad-*

*casts*. April 17, 1993.

*casts*. April 17, 1993.



55. Serge Schemann, "Georgia Truce Collapses in Secessionist Attack on Black Sea Port." *The New York Times*. September 19, 1993.
56. "Russia's Grachev Tells Georgians to Quit Abkhazia." *The Reuter Library Report*. September 20, 1993.
57. "Shevardnadze Elected to Top Post." *Facts on File World News Digest*. October 17, 1992.
58. Valery Chaava, "We Are Neighbors." *Russian Press Digest*. October 17, 1992.
59. Michael Dobbs, "Russian Jet Downed in Georgia." *Washington Post*. March 20, 1993.
60. Richard Boudreaux, "Georgia Shoots Down Russian Warplane Over Abkhazia." *Los Angeles Times*. March 20, 1993
61. "Shevardnadze Wants Russian Troops Out of Abkhazia." *The Reuter Library Report*. February 23, 1993.
62. "Russian Article Traces Possible Improvement in Russian-Georgian Relations." *BBC Summary •/World Broadcasts* May 21, 1993.
63. "Grachev Says Russia Could Help Set Up Georgian Army." *The Reuter Library Report*. September 1, 1993.
64. "Russia and Georgian Leaders Sign Agreement On Military Cooperation." *Jane's Intelligence Review*. February 1, 1994.
65. Valery Vyzhutovich, "Will Yeltsin Support Shevardnadze?" *Moscow News*. October 11, 1992.
66. Dragadze, "Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control."
67. Richard Boudreaux, "Soviet Army All In Pieces." *Los Angeles Times*. July 20, 1993, p. A1.
68. Billingsley, "Georgian-Abkhazian Security Issues."
69. Zhilin Alexander, "Dogs of War." *Moscow News*. July 16, 1993.
70. Boudreaux, "Georgia Shoots Down Russian Warplane Over Abkhazia."

71. Henry R. Huttenbach, "Chaos in Post-Soviet Caucasia, Crossroads of Empires: In Search of a U.S. Foreign Policy."

*The Successor States to the USSR*. Ed. John W. Blaney. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), p.227.

72. "Special Purpose Group in Pemm Reportedly Ready to Be Deployed in Abkhazia." BBC Summary of World Broad

casts. July 7, 1993.

73. Fyodor Angeli, "Russian Dniester Army Is Not Involved in Abkhazian Conflict." TASS. July 7, 1993.

74. "Ukrainian National Assembly to Help Fight Against Russian Empire in Georgia." BBC Summary of World Broad

casts. July 29, 1993.

75. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. "The Postcommunist Wars." *Journal of Democracy*. (1995) p. 25.

76. Alexander, "Dogs of War."

77. Ibid.

78. Billingsley, "Georgian-Abkhazian Security Issues."

79. Igor Gvirtshvili, "Civic Diplomacy Mission Denies Statement by Russian Military." TASS. April 9, 1993.

80. Voronov was assassinated by ethnic Chechens in September 1995. While the Abkhazian government for the assassi

nation and the Georgian government blamed the Abkhaz, there is no clear evidence that either side was involved - it is in

fact just as likely to have been a result of some conflict with the Chechen mafia, which has been fairly ruthless in assassi

nating officials in the region whom it felt hindered its operations.

81. "No Doubts in Sukhumi About the Political Nature of the Crime." *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*. October 11,

1995.

82. "Russian Defense Minister Promises to Protect Russians in Georgia." *Associated Press*. September 17, 1992
83. Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 245.
84. Pal Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 208.
85. "Russia and Georgia; Their Choice of Hornet's Nests." *The Economist*. October 17, 1992.
86. Ibid.
87. Shelbakov and Medvedev, "Volunteers Mobilized in Northern Caucasus." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. November 12, 1991.
88. "Mountain Peoples Troops Unwelcome in Vladikavkaz." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. June 18, 1992.
89. Shelbakov and Medvedev, "Volunteers Mobilized in Northern Caucasus."
90. "Mountain People's Troops Unwelcome in Vladikavkaz."
91. Rajiv Tiwari, "Renewed Fighting Brings Abkhazia Closer to Civil War." *Inter Press Service*. August 26, 1992.
92. Alexander Mnatsakanyan and Yuri Zainashev, "A Model Civil War; Baburin in the Caucasus." *Russian Press Digest*. August 25, 1992.
93. Lyndmila Leontyevna. "Northern Caucasus: The Path of War." *Moscow News*. September 6, 1992.
94. "Mountain Peoples Acting Outside the Law According to Russian Justice Ministry" *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. August 27, 1992.
95. . Natalia Pachegrina, "Muse Shanibov Has Escaped From Detention, But Square in Front of House of Soviets in Nalchik Does Not Calm Down." *Russian Press Digest*. September 30, 1992.

96. Fairbanks, *The Postcommunist Wars*.

# Contrasting the Theoretical Just War Doctrine with the Strategic Air Campaign of the Persian Gulf Conflict

by **Raleigh Finlayson**

As modern combat bears increasingly harmful consequences on civilian populations, our natural compassion compels us to analyze the nature and causes of those consequences through strict moral criteria. While relying on the theoretical framework of the just war doctrine set forth by Western intellectuals and philosophers, modern scholars of international security have a responsibility to objectively examine developments whose consequences confront fundamental questions of justice. Accordingly, the strategic air campaign of the Persian Gulf Conflict provides an excellent case study for contrasting such moral criteria with military strategy in the post-Cold War international system. Although existing literature on the just war doctrine and Persian Gulf Conflict probes important questions about the just recourse to war, few scholars have focused on the strategic air campaign, including serious issues such as discrimination of targeting and proportionality of military tactics within the historical development of the doctrine. In the first section of this analysis, I will explore the major conceptual contributions of notable just war scholars ranging from St. Augustine to contemporary theorists such as Paul Ramsey. In the second section, I will switch gears and analyze the objectives, execution, and consequences of the United States strategic air campaign in the Persian Gulf Conflict. Having examined the theoretical concepts of the just war doctrine and juxtaposing those principles with the Persian Gulf Conflict's air campaign, I will conclude by examining the degree to which the United States adhered to principles of discrimination and proportionality in the execution of the coercive decapitation air power strategy. Part One: Historical Development of the Just War Doctrine

The historical progress of scholarly contributions to the just war doctrine, or *bellum justum*, has focused primarily on two theoretical concepts: *jus ad bellum*, or the justifiable recourse to war; and *jus in bello*, the conduct and means used to achieve a political objective through armed conflict. By examining the theory's development, we can view this framework of broad thoughts and concepts as central to Western civilization, where scholars within specific cultures, both secular and religious, have attempted to justify defense from aggression through moral and ethical codes. Significant contributions to this body of thought have developed since St. Augustine of Hippo decried the injustices of power struggles between rulers. Following the Romans, the just war theory flourished throughout the Middle Ages, with the most significant contributions from Gratian (a twelfth century monk) and St. Thomas Aquinas. After centuries of neglect, the just war theory achieved a renaissance in 1961 when International Studies theorist Paul Ramsey published *War and the Christian Conscience*. The writings of Augustine, Gratian, and Aquinas eventually gave rise to the attempt by twentieth century scholars to establish military codes of justifiable recourse to war with appropriate conduct.

Early Christian Contribution: St. Augustine

The contribution of St. Augustine's just war philosophy stands apart in the history of Western political thought. Augustine's conceptual framework for the development of the just war theory centers around three guiding principles: just cause, requirement of legitimate authority to wage war, and right intention. These three requirements for a just war concentrate entirely upon *jus ad bellum*, for they prescribe the justifiable recourse to war. The primary sources of St. Augustine's philosophical ideas stem from two influential schools of thought, the Bible and the scholars of Roman Law. From the Bible, Augustine learned how Christ used a sword to murder enemies. Augustine reasoned that since Jesus Christ used armed weapons for the pursuit of a just cause, it is therefore possible to wage a just war. Roman Law provided Augustine with comparable legal conditions specifically designed to address the issue of legitimate authority in Roman society. These sources, as well as his witness to the sacking of Rome, influenced him to seek out a morally justifiable canon of conditions for *jus ad bellum*.

To Augustine, just cause is designed to call attention to the occasion in which justifiable war occurs, those instances when we are permitted or required to use potentially lethal force. He concluded that war is justifiable as a defense against external dangers: risks to innocent life, threats for the future of a community, and violations of basic human rights. According to his conditions, war is justifiable to vindicate justice or to avenge wrongdoing. However, Augustine held that war is not justifiable as an exercise of revenge or domination. To Augustine, just war must be waged strictly for the restoration of peace, and must be the last resort of a prudent sovereign state. His underlying assumptions were that killing is morally wrong, and recourse to war may only be undertaken to prevent further loss of life.

In addition, Augustine wrote that a just cause would require the punishment of an aggressor who has violated conventional ideals of justice. Drawing from the Ten Commandments, specifically, love thy neighbor, Augustine felt that sovereign states have a moral obligation to defend and punish aggressive, and therefore unjustifiable, violence. Furthermore, crucial to Augustine's understanding of the issue is the stipulation that a just cause would require the restoration of peace and order. (By peace and order, Augustine meant tranquility, concord, and a set of commonly held values and morals among humans that prevent dominating ambitions, not just the absence of violence. He also carefully maintained that the Peace of the Heavenly City is the only peace deserving of its name.)

A third key point for Augustine is that an otherwise just war may only be permissible if the aggressive state has legitimate and competent political authority to wage war. Augustine's criteria precluded resort to war by private individuals, allowing only those who are responsible for the public order to declare a war in his *jus ad bellum* subdivision. Augustine believed that man's political authority is God-given and arises from human sin. The legitimate political authority's role, then, is to wage war only for the health and preservation of the public.

Finally, Augustine explicitly covered the issue of right intention in his writings. Right intention refers to the legitimate goals of the use of lethal force. According to Augustine, we must seek to achieve good, or that which is perceived to work against evils through

war. He wrote, "For the true followers of God even wars are peaceful, not being made for greed or out of cruelty, but from desire of peace, to restrain the evil and assist the good." These legitimate goals are typically confined to self-defense and protection of innocent life. For Augustine, these criteria prohibit lust for cruelty and condemn the use of force to acquire control over an adversary. A just war permits the establishment of stronger conditions of peace than those that preceded it. Augustine argued that given the presumption against harm, it would seem appropriate to seek these peaceful conditions, if only to reduce the likelihood of the recurrence of war. While witnessing the sack of Rome in 410 A.D., Augustine became profoundly sensitive to the plundering and slaughtering of the town and its citizens. However, in order to combat the evil vices of ambition and to repel man's natural state of sin, Augustine remarked:

But, say they, the wise men will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage' them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the wrong-doing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to no war, would still be a matter of grief to man because it is man's wrongdoing. Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one either endures or thinks of them without heartfelt pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling.<sup>3</sup>

This passage chiefly shows the interrelationship of Augustine's three principles as he demonstrates that war shall never escape our consciousness and more specifically for Augustine, God is Providence.<sup>4</sup>

### Just War Tradition in the Middle Ages

From St. Augustine's contributions until the tenth century, the just war theory had virtually no significance in military combat, and it was given little attention by serious scholars. In fact, it was not until the middle of the twelfth century that the Bolognian monk Gratian wrote the classic *Decretum*. Drawing upon the just war writings of Augustine and many other Roman, Greek, and Germanic scholars, *Decretum* was a collection and analysis that concentrated all previous theories of writers, theologians, philosophers, and academics into one discourse on the just war doctrine.

While Gratian himself offered little to the theories themselves, *Decretum* became a watershed in the historical canon. The collection developed a conceptual framework with which all medieval writers could derive legislative and moral principles. Until this point, Augustine's just war theory had enjoyed very little publicity. Gratian was responsible for making Augustine's ideas recognized in the law schools of Europe, eventually producing two successive waves of theorists in the following century.<sup>5</sup> The Decretists and the Decretalists, as they were known, focused largely on the issue of defining legitimate authority in order to restrict religious authority to wage war and ultimately to reserve authority to make war to secular powers.<sup>6</sup> Their most significant contribution to the doctrine was the idea that a just war should avoid noncombatants and innocent civilians.

At first, they merely wanted to protect religious officers such as bishops, priests, monks, and nuns; later, however, they broadened the concept to include all those who did not bear arms, such as women, children, elderly civilians, and both the physically and mentally impaired. In these canons of just war theories we see some of the first developments of the jus in bello theories as well, particularly with regard to proportionality in the conduct of war.

In the later periods of the Middle Ages, the just war theory received considerable attention due to the influential writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas molded political, philosophical, and religious theories around Aristotelian ethics and reason. His brief discourse on the just war theory in *Summa Theologiae* provided an essential benchmark of the Middle Ages. Going further than Gratian, Aquinas developed and strengthened some of the various subdivisions of jus ad bellum, most notably issues such as legitimate authority, just cause, and right and moral intention. He decried that competent authorities must not wage wars for their own thirst of power or political hegemony over different cultures, but only to avenge an evil done onto them. Like Augustine, Aquinas believed that a right and moral intention of the people going to war is defined only as a means to achieve peace in the long term or to achieve some good. In *De Verbis Domini*, he even cited St. Augustine's aforementioned reference to this issue. Thus the pursuit of lasting peace must always be the primary and ultimate objective of a just belligerent.

For centuries after Aquinas' work, there were few serious contributions to the just war doctrine. There were, however, a handful of academics that helped organize the existing theories. Francisco de Victoria, for example, incorporated the theology of Thomas Aquinas into his teachings. This helped to initiate the intensive study of Aquinas that established his thought as a theological basis for the Catholic Church in the modern period. Despite efforts such as this, just war theory received only mild recognition as a body of serious criteria for restraining war. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the just war theory received renewed attention, led by the scholarship of Paul Ramsey.

Drawing upon a diversity of sources, from the New Testament and St. Augustine to Immanuel Kant and Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey's *War and the Christian Conscience* revolutionized thinking about the just war doctrine in modern warfare and established Ramsey as the premier authority on jus in bello.<sup>7</sup> Augustine's understanding of agape (love for thy neighbor) was essential to Ramsey's principles and conditions in the conduct of war. According to Ramsey, agape establishes a set of obligations which all Christians must steadfastly obey. He insists that even the use of force to protect oneself violates the requirements of indifferent neighborly love, a concept derived from the Sermon on the Mount. The aggressor must never be denied the love Christ teaches; the enemy, however wicked or deceitful, remains one's neighbor for whom Christ died.<sup>8</sup> Central to Ramsey's dependence on neighborly love is his insistence that agape is a positive duty, not an exception to the presumption against violence. Thus, for Ramsey, the use of force for the sake of agape is not really an exception but a determinate expression of justice and compassion.



Consideration of Ramsey's understanding of agape reveals a distinct use of reason in his philosophy for the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality. As a principle limiting the use of force, agape supports

inclined to go to war if they thought themselves to be the enemy's principal target. The value involved is the same one established in classic international law, which holds political and military leadership liable for the wars waged at their advantage.<sup>34</sup> There are some inherent problems with this strategy, as Robert Pape points out, such as the possibility of escalation of the bombing to include pressure points of the civilian infrastructure and the use of weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of political assassination. These problems are likely to remain if the decapitation strategy is pursued in future conflicts.

The two most significant issues raised in assessing the degree to which the strategic air campaign followed jus in bello are proportionality and discrimination. Recalling that just proportionality requires a rough measure of a goal's relative good compared with the unintended losses involved in achieving that goal, I conclude that the collateral devastation wrought upon the Iraqi economic infrastructure was not proportionate with the liberation of Kuwait. In January 1991, President Bush explained his confidence in the strategic air campaign's justified use of proportionality:

We all know that war never comes easy or cheap. War is never without tragedy. But when a war must be fought for the greater good, it is our gravest obligation to conduct a war in proportion to the threat. And that is why we must act reasonably, humanely, and make every effort possible to keep casualties to a minimum. And we have done so. I'm very proud of our military in achieving this end.<sup>35</sup>

Yet the consequences of the air campaign produced an overwhelmingly disproportionate effect on civilians through the decimation of life-support systems such as food, water sanitation, energy used for heating residential homes, and lack of medical supplies to treat epidemics. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was unquestionably a significant violation of the just use of force, and resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 Kuwaiti citizens. However, in theoretical just war terms of proportionality, the air campaign reduced a once modern, technologically advanced Iraqi culture to essentially a nineteenth century, pre-industrial society within a matter of months.<sup>36</sup>

The issue of discrimination is at the center of the just war analysis in this case study. I have found no evidence in the existing literature that suggest the strategic targeting planners or the CENTCOM leaders directly sought to destroy civilian residential homes. In fact, the literature indicates that just the opposite is true. The leaders at the highest levels of CENTCOM actively tried to avoid civilian casualties. However, evidence shows a conscious effort to pursue psychological operations on civilian populations in order to effectively execute the objectives of the decapitation strategy mentioned above. John Warden considered strikes on the economic infrastructure directed to convince the Iraqi populace that a bright economic and political future would result from the replacement of the Saddam Hussein regime.<sup>37</sup> Again, all evidence shows that military planners were

not intentionally trying to produce the type of humanitarian catastrophe that followed the war. However, negligence of possible consequence is no excuse in just war theory. The fact that the strategic air campaign actively sought to pursue political objectives by inconveniencing the Iraqi civilian population through manipulation of life-support components of the Iraqi infrastructure signals a salient departure from the just war principle of discrimination. Based on the history of the just war theory and an examination of the Persian Gulf Crisis, the strategic air campaign was thus unjust.

charged Kuwait with stealing Iraqi oil from the Rumaila field and issued Kuwait four demands: 1) that Kuwait stop stealing Iraqi oil and also compensate Iraq for the lost \$2.4 billion; 2) that Iraq be granted a moratorium on repayment of wartime loans; 3) that OPEC prices be raised to at least \$25 a barrel; 4) that Iraq be the recipient of an Arab Marshall Plan with compensation for wartime losses against Iran.<sup>9</sup> On July 18, doubting Iraqi credibility, Kuwait refused all four proposals. Two days later, Iraq deployed 140,000 troops toward the Kuwaiti border. Motivated by the political and economic humiliation of the Kuwaiti refusal, two Iraqi Republican Guard armored divisions moved rapidly toward Kuwait City. With only 16,000 enlisted soldiers in the Kuwaiti army, Iraq's total mobilization of 1,800 tanks faced little opposition. Hussein sought complete hegemony over Kuwait's political and financial resources, a clear violation of an independent state's sovereignty. The Kuwaiti government estimated that over 1,000 civilians were killed during the invasion and occupation.

#### U.S. Strategic Air Campaign in the Persian Gulf Conflict

Following the invasion, the United Nations Security Council adopted eleven resolutions for Iraqi compliance with Security Council Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces from Kuwait. Resolution 678 authorized member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti government to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant Resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area unless Iraq withdrew forces from Kuwait and fully implemented all Security Council resolutions by January 15, 1991.<sup>11</sup> In the United States Congress, support for the intervention was marginal; however, on January 12, both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted in support of Security Council Resolution 678 and the January 15 deadline. Accordingly, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was given the leadership responsibility for coordination of non-Arab countries in the military coalition. In order to analyze strategic air campaign's moral conduct in the Persian Gulf, it is presented in three components: the philosophy and objectives of the decapitation strategy, the target selection, and the execution and success of these original objectives.

#### Philosophy and Objectives of the Decapitation Strategy

Developed by Colonel John Warden III of the Air Force, the strategic planning of how the air campaign was to be fought, which targets were to be selected, and for what purposes, is described with a decapitation strategy. The philosophy of this strategy bases

itself on the belief that in modern war, the primary targets should be two fold leadership and telecommunications. These were the critical elements of a state's ability to functionally operate in a war. Warden defined the strategic advantages of disrupting the opponent's ability to command:

The command structure is the only element of the enemy, whether a civilian at the seat of government or a general directing a fleet that can make concessions. In fact, wars through history have been fought to change (or change the mind of) the command structure to overthrow the prince literally or figuratively or to induce the command structure to make concessions. Capturing or killing the state's leader has frequently been decisive. In modern times, however, it will become more difficult but not impossible to capture or kill the command element. At the same time, command communications have been more important than ever, and these are vulnerable to attack. When command communications suffer extreme damage the leadership has great difficulty in directing the war efforts. In the case of an unpopular regime, the lack of communications not only inhibits the bolstering of national morale but also facilitates rebellion on the part of dissident elements. 12

With the advantage of highly accurate precision-guided missiles, specific targets such as presidential palaces, bunkers, and general areas which make up the opponent's command and control infrastructure could be targeted and destroyed without historic parallel. Robert Pape points to three major components of this general strategy. First, by seeking to assassinate key political and military leaders, the strategy will result in successive leaders being less motivated to pursue the objectives of their predecessors. This naturally carries the assumptions that the leadership is driving the armed conflict and that the successors will indeed bring about a change of policy. Second, the decapitation strategy

may be the best means for motivating domestic opposition who seek to overthrow the existing government. This targets the regime's ability to internally control security forces, loyal military units, and counterintelligence, and also disrupts telecommunications. Third, in order to isolate the leadership from its units in the field, targeting would focus on national command and on communications networks in order to destroy a state's ability to direct and coordinate defense operations. Without planning and intelligence from the command and control centers, an enemy's field forces would be weak and disorganized. 13 The name decapitation suggests that a nation's leadership is like a body's brain: destroy it and the body dies; isolate it and the body is paralyzed; confuse it and the body is uncontrollable. 14

### Target Selection

From the general philosophy of the decapitation strategy, targets for the strategic air campaign were designed by Warden, who described the strategy with a dartboard with five specific target areas. As an early August planning document on the decapitation strategy made clear, the targeting sought to: a) induce Saddam Hussein to withdraw all Iraqi forces completely from Kuwait and restore the legitimate Kuwaiti government; b) create conditions conducive to the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime by patriotic Iraqi

elements who may be more amenable to withdrawal from Kuwait; c) render Iraq incapable of providing strategic and operational support to its forces in Kuwait and significantly reduce Iraq's offensive and defensive potential for a prolonged period.<sup>15</sup>

The center of this bullseye represented the primary resources of the leadership, mainly the command, control, communications, and intelligence of the Iraqi decision-making leadership, specifically targeting Saddam Hussein's presidential bunkers and palaces, telecommunications sources, the Baiath party and secret police headquarters and government ministries. The command and control infrastructure was modeled upon Soviet design in a hierarchical organization from Hussein on down. <sup>16</sup> There were 26 main targets of the leadership command structure that were to be destroyed. Although not publicly explicit in the media, it soon became clear that the primary objective of the first ring would be to either assassinate, overthrow, or isolate Hussein, which CENTCOM believed would inevitably lead to the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan explained, "Saddam is a one-man show. If for any reason he went away, it is my judgment that those troops would all of a sudden lose their legitimacy and they would be back in Iraq within a matter of hours, in disarray. That kind of thinking has been at the heart of the advice that I've brought to discussions in the past couple of weeks."<sup>17</sup>

The second ring sought to destroy Iraq's economic production capabilities such as factories, electrical grids, hydroelectric plants, and oil refineries. Without the ability to sustain units in the field through these energy sources, particularly oil, the Iraqi army had little chance of withstanding combat much further. The third ring included the transportation outlets, bridges, highways, airfields, and ports, which would sever Iraq's mobility for tank divisions and resupply convoys to troops. The fourth circle consisted of the population, mainly centers of food sources to break down their ability to resist the coalition. Although the U.S. military did not include this section in their public disclosure regarding their specific target sets, reports from the Middle East Watch concluded that food warehouses in Diwaniyya, Hilla, and Bwra6w well as water treatment facilities, dairy production factories, and agricultural sector facilities, were all destroyed by Tomahawk missiles. <sup>18</sup> The last ring of targets was the least important, Iraq's military conventional forces consisting of Scud missile storage facilities, defense capabilities, and their weapons of mass destruction facilities.<sup>19</sup>

### Execution and Success of the Strategic Air Campaign's Objective

The execution of the strategic air campaign combined both the philosophy of the broad decapitation strategy and the specific target selection into a four-phase execution itinerary. First, the Instant Thunder philosophy used precision bombing to destroy command and control centers as well as other components of the economic and leadership infrastructure. This would also include the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon production facilities. The second phase would essentially continue the attacks on targets of the Instant Thunder strategy, but would add Iraqi

defense targets in southern Iraq and Kuwait to the target list. The third phase was focused solely on military units to prepare the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) for the ground war.<sup>20</sup>

The Instant Thunder plan was initiated on January 16, 1991, with F-117 Stealth bombers using precision laser-guided bombs against key targets in Baghdad. Instead of striking the Iraqi military units in KTO, the Instant Thunder plan sought to strike a total of 235 targets distributed among the various pressure points in the Iraqi infrastructure: leadership and telecommunications, energy resources (electricity and oil refinery), means of transportation (railroads, bridges, and airfields), WMD facilities (nuclear, biological, chemical site), strategic air defense systems, and naval and military support units. Pape notes over 90 percent of the targets attacked in the first seventy-two hours fell into the original Instant Thunder categories, despite the fact that the target list had expanded since August. The timing of attacks also remained faithful to Instant Thunder's goal of speed. Almost 70 percent of the Instant Thunder-related targets were hit in the first few days.<sup>21</sup> Although the bombing was an overwhelming success, the intended objectives either killing Hussein with strikes on presidential bunkers and political headquarters of the Baiath Party, or psychologically coercing the Iraqi population to overthrow Hussein through extensive bombing, fell short of CENTCOM and Warden's expectations for a few reasons. Despite the resourcefulness of intelligence gathering, it becomes extremely difficult to locate high-ranking military and political leaders whose schedules are continually shifting to changing events, especially considering Hussein himself was a former prisoner of war. Following the predawn strike of January 15 on his political, presidential, and military leadership buildings, Hussein was unquestionably a key target for U.S. strategic bombers. For a possible overthrow or coup d'Etat of Hussein's regime, strategic psychological coercion of the population would not prove effective due to the distribution of power within Iraq's domestic political structure. Hussein's regime held the support of Iraq's six million Sunni Arabs, an ethnic group consisting of upper level economic, political, and military elites. Since Iraq had a hierarchical structure of power, Hussein also had strong control over domestic security institutions such as police headquarters and the military. The Baiath Party was another pillar of support, with a membership of nearly one million Hussein-supporters. With support of Hussein's regime distributed over key social, political, and security institutions with little communications, the Instant Thunder plan failed to meet its goal of overturning Hussein from political authority.<sup>22</sup>

The second phase of the air campaign allowed for continuing air strikes against the target sets of the Instant Thunder plan while achieving air supremacy in the KTO. The air campaign proved to be effective in cutting off supplies to front line infantry divisions as the morale of the Iraqi army dropped precipitously in a matter of weeks, if not days, after Instant Thunder began. Particularly, bombing limited the flexibility of reserves to concentrate their forces for mobile combat inside the KTO. Since Instant Thunder had crippled the Iraqi Air Force, hundreds of coalition aircraft were able to bomb the Iraqi Army with little resistance. The result was a massive decline in the army's morale, which produced large-scale desertion by Iraqi front line infantrymen. Postwar studies suggest that about 100,000 desertions occurred across the theater compared to approximately 30,000 to 36,000 casualties inflicted by the air attack.<sup>23</sup>

Following the bombing of a bunker sheltering over a hundred civilians in Al-Fridos, General Colin Powell and CENTCOM decided to shift the air campaign almost exclusively towards the KTO.<sup>24</sup> The third phase would prepare the KTO for the ensuing ground war. Since Phase II was so successful due to the desertion of the front line Iraqi infantry, Phase III faced little opposition. Planning sought to effectively damage and degrade the Iraqi Army forces, averaging over 1500 sorties a day in order to decrease the possibility of American casualties.

### Consequences and Results of the Strategic Air Campaign on Civilian Populations

After the conflict, Martti Ahtisaari, the Under-Secretary General for Administration and Management of the U.N., led a group to assess humanitarian needs in Iraq during March 1991. Their assessment concluded the war wrought near-apocalyptic results, particularly with regard to food and agriculture, water, sanitation, and health, transportation, communication, and energy. The electrical and oil refining infrastructure was by far the most severely damaged component of the strategic target list. The air campaign paralyzed Iraqi oil and electricity production,

including four out of five Iraqi hydroelectric facilities. By January 25, 1991, their electrical capacity was crippled to less than 25 percent of prewar output.<sup>25</sup> Stocks of oil and lubricant products as well as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) energy necessary for heating oil were nearly exhausted by the end. These electrical facilities were essential for Iraqi water purification and distribution, sewage removal and treatment, the operation of hospitals and medical laboratories, and agricultural production. <sup>26</sup> Previously a modern, highly urbanized, post-industrial country, Iraq suffered such devastation of electrical grids and oil refineries that recovery was a possibility only within five to nine years.<sup>27</sup>

Food and agriculture products received similarly devastating results. Ahtisaari concluded that flour reached a critically low level, and supplies of sugar, rice, tea, vegetables, oil, and powdered milk were crippled as well. Additionally, the grain harvest was seriously affected by the lack of irrigation and the lack of electricity for use in pumping water. Tomahawk missiles reportedly destroyed four government food warehouses and flourmills in Diwaniyya, one food warehouse in Hilla, and food warehouses and dairy production plants in Bwra. Segments of the population most affected by the damage included the elderly, the disabled, mothers and children, hospital patients, orphans, and refugees. Water treatment plants and sanitation facilities were also hit by the strategic air campaign. Prior to the bombing, seven water treatment facilities based along the Tigris River distributed about 450 liters per person daily in Baghdad and 200-250 liters per person across the rest of the country.<sup>28</sup> Iraq's water supplies were sanitized by 238 central water treatment stations and 1,134 smaller water projects which all operated on electrical grids. According to the Ahtisaari report, following the destruction of power plants, various oil refineries, oil storage facilities, and water-related chemical plants, every one of the water treatment facilities ceased to function.<sup>29</sup>

Iraq's regional sources of transportation received similar devastation, exacerbating the public health crisis because only one surface transport link remained following the

bombing.<sup>30</sup> Bridges, highways, roads, both of the operating ports, and all airfields were specifically targeted and destroyed. This posed serious problems for the importation of food, medical supplies, and other necessary staples of everyday life. Bombing of residential homes, intentional or unintentional, created a homeless crisis estimated at nearly 72,000 Iraqi civilians from over 9,000 destroyed homes (including 2,500 in Baghdad and 1,900 in Bwra).<sup>31</sup> Without proper transportation capabilities, these vulnerable citizens have little opportunity to seek refuge from the unbearable temperature extremes or even to seek treatment in hospitals.

Every one of the over 18 million Iraqi civilians in some way felt the effects of the strategic bombing of the Iraqi infrastructure. The most precise estimates of the direct Iraqi deaths from the air campaign point to 2,278 killed and 5,965 wounded, including both civilians and military personnel. Although these estimates may seem somewhat low relative to the number of soldiers who lost their lives in the two world wars, Korea, and Vietnam, the public health crisis described above was expected to reach far beyond that number. A Harvard public health team assessed that the consequences from the attack on the Iraqi infrastructure led to extensive civilian losses from malnutrition and disease and threatened a health catastrophe with the spread of cholera and typhoid epidemics.<sup>32</sup> Equally somber was the Harvard team's estimate that 170,000 children would die the following year from malnutrition and epidemics. United States officials report that over 60,000 Iraqis were killed from the air campaign, most of those civilians dying from the collateral damage.<sup>33</sup> The decimated infrastructure left noncombatants little chance to seek refuge and cut off Iraq's life support systems.

## Conclusion

Before examining the degree to which the strategic air campaign adhered to the just war principles of *jus in bello*, a discussion of the decapitation coercive air strategy is warranted. On a broad conceptual level, wide from how the decapitation strategy was carried out in the Gulf by CENTCOM, the philosophy of the decapitation strategy has some moral advantages. With respect to proportionality, the theoretical degree of force used is subjected to the small target set of leadership installations, telecommunications, and military facilities. Ideally, the decapitation strategy would limit the destruction of the opponent's infrastructure to the command and control center, proportionality would be determined through the leadership's ability to destroy one another. Equally important, state politicians might be less

inclined to go to war if they thought themselves to be the enemy's principal target. The value involved is the same one established in classic international law, which holds political and military leadership liable for the wars waged at their advantage.<sup>34</sup> There are some inherent problems with this strategy, as Robert Pape points out, such as the possibility of escalation of the bombing to include pressure points of the civilian infrastructure and the use of weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of political assassination. These problems are likely to remain if the decapitation strategy is pursued in future conflicts.

The two most significant issues raised in assessing the degree to which the strategic air campaign followed *jus in bello* are proportionality and discrimination. Recalling that just proportionality requires a rough measure of a goal's relative good compared with the unintended losses involved in achieving that goal, I conclude that the collateral devastation wrought upon the Iraqi economic infrastructure was not proportionate with the liberation of Kuwait. In January 1991, President Bush explained his confidence in the strategic air campaign's justified use of proportionality:

We all know that war never comes easy or cheap. War is never without tragedy. But when a war must be fought for the greater good, it is our gravest obligation to conduct a war in proportion to the threat. And that is why we must act reasonably, humanely, and make every effort possible to keep casualties to a minimum. And we have done so. I'm very proud of our military in achieving this end.<sup>35</sup>

Yet the consequences of the air campaign produced an overwhelmingly disproportionate effect on civilians through the decimation of life-support systems such as food, water sanitation, energy used for heating residential homes, and lack of medical supplies to treat epidemics. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was unquestionably a significant violation of the just use of force, and resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 Kuwaiti citizens. However, in theoretical just war terms of proportionality, the air campaign reduced a once modern, technologically advanced Iraqi culture to essentially a nineteenth century, pre-industrial society within a matter of months.<sup>36</sup>

The issue of discrimination is at the center of the just war analysis in this case study. I have found no evidence in the existing literature that suggests the strategic targeting planners or the CENTCOM leaders directly sought to destroy civilian residential homes. In fact, the literature indicates that just the opposite is true. The leaders at the highest levels of CENTCOM actively tried to avoid civilian casualties. However, evidence shows a conscious effort to pursue psychological operations on civilian populations in order to effectively execute the objectives of the decapitation strategy mentioned above. John Warden considered strikes on the economic infrastructure directed to convince the Iraqi populace that a bright economic and political future would result from the replacement of the Saddam Hussein regime.<sup>37</sup> Again, all evidence shows that military planners were not intentionally trying to produce the type of humanitarian catastrophe that followed the war. However, negligence of possible consequence is no excuse in just war theory. The fact that the strategic air campaign actively sought to pursue political objectives by inconveniencing the Iraqi civilian population through manipulation of life-support components of the Iraqi infrastructure signals a salient departure from the just war principle of discrimination. Based on the history of the just war theory and an examination of the Persian Gulf Crisis, the strategic air campaign was thus unjust.

Notes:

1. Frederick Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp 292-293.



2. St. Augustine, *The Free Choice of the Will*. Translated by Francis E. Tourscher. Philadelphia: Peter Reilly, 1937, p. 49.
3. St. Augustine, *City of God*. New York: Penguin Books, 1972, pp. 861-862.
4. Herbert Deane, *Political and Social ideas of St. Augustine*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, p. 157.
5. Russell, p. 86.
6. James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, *Just War and Jihad*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 14.
7. William V. O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited Wars*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981, p. 45.
8. Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1961, p. 13.
9. Barbara M. G. Green and Alan Geyer, *Lines in the Sand: Justice in the Persian Gulf*. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992, p. 39.
10. Ibid., pp. 122-125.
11. Ibid.
12. John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, eds. Richard H. Schultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzmaff Jr. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1992, p. 79.
13. Robert J. Pape, *Bombing to Win*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 80.
14. Ibid.
15. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. New York: Bantam Books, 1992. In Pape, p. 222.

16. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsch, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 323.
17. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), *Planning and Command and Control*. Washington: GPO, 1993, volume 1, part 1, p. 175. In Pape, p. 221.
18. Middle East Watch, *Needless Deaths in the Gulf War*. Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1991, pp. 160- 169.
19. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1995, p. 79.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188. See also Pape, p. 226.
21. Pape, p. 279.
22. Pape, pp. 232-235.
23. GWAPS, p. 220.
24. Gordon and Trainor, p. 327.
25. Middle East Watch, p. 171.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
27. Freedman and Karsch, p. 322.
28. "Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management, dated 20 March 1991." Annex to letter in *Beyond the Storm*, eds. Phyllis Bemnis and Michael Moushabeck. New York: Olive Branch, 1991, p. 398.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

31. Ibid.

32. Green and Geyer, p. 149.

33. Ibid., p. 150.

34. James Tumer Johnson, *Can Modern War Be Just?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p. 146.

35. Geyer and Green, p. 148.

36. Ahtisaari Report, p. 397.

37. GWAPS, Summary, p. 44. In Pape, p. 223.

# **The Secret of Success: Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique and Somalia**

by Diane Faires

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has focused increasing attention and resources on peacekeeping efforts. These multilateral attempts to prevent violent conflict in unstable states seem to be an appropriate and worthwhile effort for a global organization meant to foster peace among its members. The ability of peacekeeping operations to prevent continued fighting in states such as Mozambique shows the valuable potential of this type of intervention in the settlement of disputes. Unfortunately, the work of the UN's blue-helmeted peacekeepers frequently fails to have the desired effect. Many recent peacekeeping efforts are viewed as failures by the international community. States such as Somalia remain unstable, impoverished, and under the control of the warring parties in spite of the UN's presence. What causes UN peacekeepers to be more successful at deterring some conflicts than others? By comparing the two cases of Mozambique and Somalia, variations in how the UN handled each operation can provide clues as to the most critical prerequisites for a successful peacekeeping operation. Although each peacekeeping situation is unique, and the willingness of local groups to cooperate with the UN influences the final outcome, there are steps the UN can take in every mission to improve its chances of success. If factors can be identified that create the conditions for an effective operation, the UN can strive to implement these and improve its success rate.

Before the elements of a successful peacekeeping mission can be determined, it is necessary to define success in the context of peacekeeping. For the purposes of this paper, a successful operation will be considered one which establishes a secure and peaceful environment which facilitates the cessation of violent conflict. This may include temporary maneuvers, such as acting as a physical barrier to separate belligerent parties, or programs with a more long-term impact, such as disarmament, demobilization, or overseeing elections.

If contributing states witness repeated failures, they could lose faith in UN peacekeeping efforts, and valuable opportunities for maintaining peace will be lost. In order to improve the chances of a successful resolution to future conflicts, it is important to understand what factors make a particular peacekeeping effort more effective than others.

## **Background**

The cases of Mozambique and Somalia lend themselves to comparison. Both provide examples of early post Cold War peacekeeping efforts. The two African states attracted world attention in the early 1990s due to the humanitarian crises affecting their populations. The UN authorized operations in each state beginning in 1992. The UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) ended two years later, in 1994, and The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) concluded in 1995, three years after its inception. In both cases, the UN intended to help implement cease fire agreements signed by warring

parties which had been fighting one another for power. Neither ethnic nor religious differences played a role in either conflict. Peacekeepers sought to perform some similar activities in both countries, including demobilization programs, providing security for humanitarian and civilian personnel, and distributing humanitarian aid. <sup>1</sup> In spite of the similarities between these two cases, UNOSOM is generally considered to be a failure, while the international community usually regards ONUMOZ as a successful example of peacekeeping.

In Mozambique, peacekeepers arrived on the heels of a fifteen-year civil war between Frelimo, the formerly Marxist governing party, and Renamo, a rebel group originally supported by neighboring states.<sup>2</sup> Both parties strongly supported the General Peace Agreement (GPA), which they signed in Rome in October 1992.<sup>3</sup> The UN officially approved ONUMOZ in December of 1992, but the first troops did not arrive until February 1993, and the full contingent was not deployed until April.<sup>4</sup> In the interim, several violations of the GPA ceasefire occurred. However, once peacekeepers arrived and began programs for the assembly and demobilization of troops, formation of a new unified national army, delivery of humanitarian aid, transformation of Renamo into a political party, and the preparation of the country for elections, almost all violence ceased. After several delays in the operation's original timetable, successful elections occurred in October 1994, and the peacekeepers withdrew by the end of the year.<sup>5</sup>

The conflict in Somalia had only been raging since President Siad Barre was removed from power in 1991, leaving a multitude of clans fighting one another for power. By the time the UN arrived, most of the fighting in the countryside had subsided, but in several major cities, particularly Mogadishu, the violence continued. With widespread starvation and devastation creating a humanitarian crisis throughout the country, warlords in Mogadishu signed a ceasefire agreement in March of 1992, and in April the UN established UNOSOM I to oversee the ceasefire and protect humanitarian aid and personnel. As the ineffectiveness of the UN mission became clear, the U.S. proposed to lead a multinational humanitarian intervention in December 1992. This large force, called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), established a degree of control in Somalia, thanks to its authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, in May 1993, when UNITAF transferred control back to the UN - now acting with an expanded mandate under UNOSOM II - the warring clans, particularly those loyal to General Mohamed Farah Aideed, began launching attacks against peacekeeping troops.

The situation climaxed in October 1993, when 18 U.S. Rangers died in a battle with Aideed's forces. The U.S. declared its intention to withdraw all of its forces from Somalia by April 1994, and most other western states followed suit.<sup>8</sup> Conditions continued to decline until the UN finally ended the operation in March of 1995. The humanitarian situation had improved, and a great deal of progress had been made in the countryside, but the environment in Mogadishu remained highly unstable.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly, two very different peacekeeping environments emerged in Mozambique and Somalia. The following sections will explore various hypotheses on the factors necessary for a successful peacekeeping operation before examining in detail how these hypotheses

apply to both ONUMOZ and UNOSOM. The final section will compare these two cases with regard to each of the four theories outlined below and draw conclusions on the implications for peacekeeping efforts around the world.

Hypotheses

### *Credible Impartiality*

Peacekeeping operations are tailored to fit the environment in which they intervene. This kind of flexibility is important for meeting the needs of each particular case, but some basic standards can be established that apply to almost every situation, regardless of the circumstances. Below, I will outline four such standards, beginning with establishing a neutral and credible presence.

If peacekeeping forces are perceived to be neutral and credible, the conflicting parties will be more likely to refrain from violence. One party to the conflict may feel threatened by the peacekeepers or vulnerable to an attack from the opposing party if they believe the peacekeeping forces support the other side. Threatened or vulnerable states are more likely to feel the need to gain an advantage through force or make a preemptive attack. Peacekeepers present an impartial image from the beginning of the operation by carefully investigating all reported violations of existing agreements and treating all actors equally. Although one party to the conflict may be perceived by the international community as the antagonist, merely enforcing appropriate punishments for verified treaty violations instead of taking sides allows peacekeepers to maintain an impartial attitude towards all parties involved in the conflict. Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits peacekeepers to become partial in a conflict when it is necessary and justified,<sup>10</sup> but doing so invariably changes the nature of the operation by making the goal the defeat of one party instead of the impartial creation of a peaceful environment. In addition, a neutral peacekeeping mission ensures that conflicting parties do not appear to lose prestige by cooperating with the UN. No one actor feels like the winner or the loser of the conflict.

Neutrality is best preserved when the aims and intentions of the intervening forces are clear, so all parties to the conflict know what to expect from the peacekeepers and understand their motivations.<sup>11</sup> An important first step in achieving this is the creation of an unambiguous mandate for the operation.<sup>12</sup> When local actors know the peacekeepers' intentions, they will not misinterpret them as aggressive or supportive of the opposing side. In addition, when UN troops maintain open lines of communication with all parties, including local civilians, domestic police, and belligerent forces, the peacekeepers gain their confidence and trust.<sup>13</sup> Established lines of communication with leaders of the various factions involved in a conflict facilitate faster solutions when disagreements or misunderstandings do arise. If peacekeepers are regarded as credible and neutral, the belligerents will be more likely to use the UN's services to resolve minor disputes instead of picking up their weapons.<sup>14</sup>

Operations with multinational support and participation also contribute to the degree of perceived neutrality.<sup>15</sup> Every state has national interests that guide its actions, and these

interests do not disappear merely because the state's current actions help preserve international peace and security. 16 Ideally, states contributing troops do not have ties to one political party in the recipient state or a strong national interest in a particular outcome, other than a general desire to establish peaceful conditions. 17 However, the frequent need for the involvement of a powerful donor nation, as well as the tendency for states with a bigger stake in local politics to offer their services, tends to make such an ideal difficult to realize. When multiple states with various interests work together, each state has less opportunity to guide the mission to serve its own national interests, and instead must cooperate with other states to serve the best interests of the international community as a whole. 18 It is especially important for the UN military commander in charge of the operation to come from a state that does not have a significant national interest in the outcome of the conflict. 19 The UN must also be particularly careful to preserve its impartial image when involving former colonial powers in their previous colonies. Although the former colonist may have a pure desire to establish peace and stability in the state, old resentments and emotions may remain that color the two countries' perceptions of one another.

To be truly effective, neutrality must be paired with credibility. This requires establishing a firm presence from the beginning, since the first six weeks of an operation can determine the degree of credibility it commands from locals for the duration of the mission. 20 Before it will exchange its weapons for a security guarantee from the UN, a belligerent faction must feel confident that peacekeepers are not only willing to protect it against attack, but that they possess the strength to overcome the aggressor. In addition, a belligerent group might disarm peacefully only if it believes that the UN can forcefully disarm it otherwise. In the case of such an uncooperative actor, peacekeeping forces must be neutral as well as credible, because even under the supervision of credible UN troops, an actor that distrusts the UN's willingness to shield him from attack will try to maintain weapons for defensive purposes. Table A shows how the relationship between neutrality and credibility affects conflicting parties' responses to disarmament efforts.

### *Coordinated Leadership*

Highly coordinated leadership also helps maintain the peace effectively. A clear chain of command enables peacekeeping forces of various nationalities to cooperate with one another and with the UN, as well as to present a quick and coherent response to the conflict and avoid miscommunication. 21 When various national forces each attempt to address similar problems without consulting one another, wasteful duplications occur and their efforts may even counteract one another. Separate chains of command for the civilian and military aspects of the operation are also detrimental, since their tasks often overlap. 22 The most successful peacekeeping missions coordinate not only various national contingents, but also the various functional components of the operation. 23

States are often unwilling to place their troops under foreign command due to national pride and domestic government stipulations. Differences in language and military customs, strategies, ideas also complicate peacekeepers' ability to work together. However, the unifying force of a common goal can overcome these difficulties when

leaders work together.<sup>24</sup> The UN has an established system of unified command-and-control that has proved to be effective in nearly all of the operations where it has been employed.<sup>25</sup> Even when one UN commander clearly overrules the operation, states may give more precedence to orders from home than to UN leadership.<sup>26</sup>

The strength of the operation's leader himself, and his relations with UN headquarters and the parties to the dispute, impacts the success of the mission. When appointing a special representative (SRSG) to run a peacekeeping operation, the Secretary General must take into consideration the candidate's credibility, problem-solving skills, knowledge of the region, nationality, and ability to work within the constraints of the UN.<sup>27</sup> His or her credibility and ability to manage crises can be invaluable in quickly overcoming obstacles to maintaining peace. Both donor states and conflicting parties must trust the SRSG to handle potential problems if they are to entrust their money, troops, and safety to the mission. A familiarity with local culture, customs, history, politics, and geography is essential for creating solutions that will work for that particular area, as well as for earning the trust of the local population and leaders. Like the origin of the peacekeeping troops, the nationality of the mission's leader may evoke certain emotions related to his or her home state's past ties to the recipient state. Finally, the relationship between the operation's leader and the UN Secretariat and Security Council influences the amount of resources and degree of international support the operation receives.<sup>28</sup>

Miscommunications or differences of opinion between peacekeepers in the field and bureaucrats in New York prevents efficient and coordinated responses to setbacks and can cause the entire operation to shut down.

### *Resources*

UN bureaucrats or donor states can also disrupt chances for the mission's success if they do not commit the right

amount of resources to address the problem.<sup>29</sup> In order for a mission to be successful, peacekeepers must have the

necessary resources. The limited availability of resources often pushes the UN to send peacekeepers into situations that ~

they are not equipped to handle. A lack of sufficient resources may also stem from an unrealistic initial assessment of the 11

problem.<sup>30</sup> As in any military operation, the states involved in peacekeeping must be careful not to be overly optimistic

—

when planning their actions. While it is important to address threats to international peace, putting a band-aid on a broken



~

leg will not cause it to heal. The strength of the peacekeeping operation must be sufficient for the task at hand. 81

Conversely, injecting too many resources into a particular situation weakens its chances of success.<sup>31</sup> When \_

the UN sets unrealistic goals for a state, it overextends itself and its achievements fall short of donor states' expectations. ~

Overinvolvement in a state can also lead to allegations that the UN is infringing on national sovereignty. 11

Not only must an appropriate amount of resources be allocated for the task at hand, but those resources have to be used in a productive and efficient manner. When donor states feel that their money is being used effectively, they are more willing to make further contributions. The gap in equipment and technology available to peacekeeping forces from different states can reduce productivity.<sup>32</sup> Coordination of resources is one way to increase their effectiveness. A preassembled stock of equipment can also be beneficial for starting peacekeeping operations quickly.<sup>33</sup> Currently, initial expenses for rental equipment and the long bureaucratic process to approve the budget of an operation often cause paralysis and waste at the beginning of a mission, when it is most in need of resources to establish a strong precedent and stabilize the situation in the recipient state.<sup>34</sup>

### *Seizing Opportunities*

Once the UN has decided to act in a particular dispute, it must fully commit itself to the operation, not only with resources, but also in its actions.<sup>35</sup> Peacekeepers can be most effective if they act when an appropriate opportunity presents itself, instead of waiting until the situation has deteriorated too far to resolve the problem. When the UN deploys peacekeepers immediately following a peace agreement, it can prevent early violations from setting a pattern.<sup>35</sup> Peacekeeping forces must be firm in the execution of their mission from the beginning. Their initial responses to belligerents' actions set the tone for the duration of the operation. If peacekeepers remain on the sidelines and allow minor violations to occur with the intention of intervening only in extreme cases, they will find it harder to prevent the conflict from escalating. They may also lose the respect of the conflicting parties. Only by seizing every opportunity to preserve the peace can UN forces accomplish their goal.

Endence

### *Impartiality with credibility*

**Mozambique.** ONUMOZ peacekeepers established working relationships with both the Frelimo government of e

Mozambique and the opposition group Renamo, which allowed them to keep the lines of communication with both sides

open, even when the peace process itself was at a standstill. The government frequently voiced its concern over the UN's

infringement of Mozambique's sovereignty, and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama refused to cooperate on numerous~

occasions, but because the UN remained impartial and communicated openly with both groups, Dhlakama and Presidenti

Joaquim Chissano remained willing to work towards solutions with UN leaders instead of reverting to violence. 111

Assertive diplomacy maintained open communication with both sides of the conflict and gained the trust of Dhlakama and Chissano. When he felt that his demands weren't being sufficiently addressed, Dhlakama frequently chose to boycott negotiations and disappear to his headquarters in the bush. During these standstills in the peace process, UN leaders would travel to Dhlakama to discuss his concerns and convince him to return to the bargaining table. To entice the = Renamo leader to end a particularly long standoff, the Secretary General personally flew to encourage him to cooperate. The UN also worked closely alongside Frelimo government leaders to accomplish the necessary tasks without appearing 11 to take over the running of the country.<sup>36</sup> Frequent personal contact with the leaders of all factions enhanced the operation's ability to remain impartial and address concerns in a non-violent manner.

From the beginning, the peacekeeping contingents and the conflicting parties understood the goals of the operation. The General Peace Agreement signed by both Frelimo and Renamo called for the UN to oversee the assembly, demobilization, and disarmament of both armies, as well as the creation of a new united national army.<sup>37</sup> The peacekeepers' mandate was clear, and the expectations for both belligerents relatively equal. Because both parties knew the UN's intentions before the peacekeepers even arrived in Mozambique, they felt more comfortable complying, especially since each side knew that its rival would be held to the same standards.

The UN offered incentives for cooperation to both parties, so that neither side forfeited prestige by complying with ONUMOZ. Renamo received large sums of money from the international community to facilitate its conversion from a militant opposition group to a legitimate political party.<sup>38</sup> In order to help the government address soldiers' demands for unpaid wages and reduce the defense budget, the UN created and funded programs to reintegrate former government soldiers into society.<sup>39</sup> Both sides recognized the positive impact of ONUMOZ's programs for their followers. Of course, the government

disliked the idea of political opposition from Renamo, but it provided a more manageable alternative than continued military opposition from Dhlakama's group. The clearly peaceful intentions of ONUMOZ's efforts, as well as the mission's constant efforts to answer the concerns of both groups impartially, eased the government's criticisms of infringements on national sovereignty, although it did not dispel them entirely.

Because Frelimo was still considered to be the government of the country, the potential for peacekeepers to interfere with national sovereignty was high. Some of the functions that the UN took on gave it government-like powers. The government disliked limitations placed on its authority by the UN.<sup>40</sup> Government officials also expressed resentment at the inclusion of Renamo in decisions, such as regulations for the elections process. Frelimo did not feel that Renamo, a rebel group, should be given equal footing with the established governing party. In the eyes of Frelimo, complete impartiality between it and Renamo was unwarranted. Large international donations for the conversion of Renamo to a political party also invoked anger within Frelimo, as it felt the international community's support of an opposition party was directed against its rule. To ease Frelimo's concerns, the UN stopped pushing it to form a national unity government, which would incorporate Renamo into the government, and instead focused on general support for sustained democracy.<sup>41</sup> Through careful diplomacy, the UN managed to gain the government's consent for all necessary components of the peacekeeping operation, so no blatant violations of sovereignty occurred.

The multinational composition of ONUMOZ also worked to dispel concerns over infringements of Mozambique's national sovereignty. Italy, which hosted the initial peace talks between Dhlakama and Chissano, provided a large contingent of troops for the operation. Italy's facilitation of the peace process from the beginning made it a good candidate to lead the operation, since it had an interest in ensuring the success of the General Peace Agreement (GPA), but no incentive to see one particular political party succeed over another. The United States added its authority to the operation by contributing five battalions to the initial UN force. Other states whose troops participated in ONUMOZ included the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Zimbabwe.<sup>42</sup> Some initial concerns existed over Portugal's role, due to its former colonial relationship with Mozambique, but Portuguese troops performed their designated tasks without controversy and no subsequent problems arose. Peacekeepers frequently consulted with the UN Security Council, and no one state dominated in ONUMOZ decision-making, preventing individual states' national interests from guiding the operation.

ONUMOZ leaders initially avoided pressuring either side to assemble their soldiers in the approved demobilization areas too quickly in order to ensure that both sides felt the process occurred equally. Once the assembly process began, UN officials pushed both government and Renamo forces for more comprehensive participation, instead of focusing attention on only one group.<sup>43</sup> In fact, the Frelimo government complained that the UN disarmed Frelimo soldiers too slowly, leading to riots incited by their idle soldiers.<sup>44</sup> Peacekeepers carefully investigated the complaints of both sides and proposed solutions that did not undermine either group's feeling of security. Neither side

was allowed to occupy new territory once its adversary withdrew to an assembly area, and only justified and approved logistical movements of troops were permitted.<sup>45</sup>

Although the government of Mozambique and Renamo had already signed a peace agreement signaling their intention to demobilize their forces, both sides refused to begin the demobilization process until UN troops arrived to oversee it.<sup>46</sup> The impatience with which conflicting parties in Mozambique awaited the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces indicated the trust they placed in the peacekeepers' ability to impartially dispel further conflict. This credibility that Mozambicans assigned to the UN allowed peacekeepers to function largely unchallenged. Most of the ceasefire violations occurred during the period between the signing of the General Peace Agreement and the arrival of the UN in Mozambique.

Once UN troops established their presence, very little violent conflict occurred.<sup>47</sup>

The methods of assembly and treatment of troops inside the assembly areas were questioned, particularly by

Mozambique's government, but neither side accused the UN of treating the adversary's soldiers differently from its own.<sup>48</sup>

Due to the UN's impartial procedures, as well as the conflicting parties' confidence in the UN's ability to provide protection

from an attack by the other side, neither Renamo nor the government resisted the assembly and demobilization of their

forces.

Somalia The dominant role of the U.S. and the mission's violent response to one faction in the Somali conflict destroyed

UNOSOM's ability to create an impartial atmosphere in which it could preserve peace. After warlord Mohammed Farah

Aideed's army attacked peacekeepers, the UN was forced to choose between preserving its authority by retaliating or

maintaining a neutral stance. Neither option allowed UNOSOM to remain both credible and impartial. From the beginning,

the UN force did not command a great deal of credibility with Aideed, which led him to attack. The strength of Aideed's

forces in Mogadishu, especially relative to the undersupplied UN peacekeepers, made other factions reluctant to give up

their weapons and entrust their safety to UNOSOM.<sup>49</sup>

The three different operations under which the UN operated in Somalia between 1992 and 1995, UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II, indicate the lack of cohesiveness and clarity which weakened peacekeeping efforts. Differing interpretations existed as to what role the peacekeepers were supposed to play. The UN Secretariat held the impression that the large contingent of U.S.-led forces sent under UNITAF planned to pursue a disarmament program, but U.S. leaders insisted that they never agreed to such an ambitious plan. If those involved in operating the peacekeeping mission were confused about its goals, then the conflicting parties in Somalia could not be aware of the operation's goals either. This left room for Somalis to misinterpret the peacekeepers' actions as directed against a particular group or as aggressive tactics to impose foreign control on the country. Not only did this lack of agreement tarnish the peacekeepers' impartial reputation, it harmed their credibility as well. The warlords did not expect the UN to prevent them from attacking each other if its members could not even come to a consensus over its role in Somalia. Without confidence in the UN's ability to protect itself or Somali clans from violence, these clans refused to disarm.<sup>50</sup> They maintained their weapons supplies to continue fighting one another, raiding humanitarian aid shipments, and even attacking peacekeepers.

Since the UN was unwilling and unable to carry out a voluntary disarmament program, peacekeepers forcefully

destroyed weapons stockpiles belonging to the clans.<sup>51</sup> However, such tactics could not be evenly applied to various

groups. This gave the impression that the UN chose to target certain clans over others. Regardless of whether or not it was

the UN's intention to weaken a particular clan, the resulting loss of neutrality in the eyes of the conflicting parties further

@

damaged the UN's ability to maintain peace with an impartial international force. The UN may also have damaged its

reputation as a neutral peacekeeper when it attacked General Aideed's weapons sites, shortly after Aideed allowed the UN to

inspect them.<sup>52</sup> Such actions might have prevented factions from allowing UN inspectors access to their weapons sites

@

out of fear that they would subsequently be destroyed. Other tactics weakened the neutrality of UN forces as well. When

a Pakistani contingent allegedly tried to seize one of Aideed's radio stations in response to anti-UN broadcasts, a fight

erupted in which twenty-five Pakistanis died.<sup>53</sup> Events such as these occurred because the UN became a party to the ~

conflict instead of remaining impartially above it. 11

Choosing how to respond to attacks on UN forces by Aideed presented a difficult dilemma. Both the credibility and neutrality of the peacekeepers were at stake. By retaliating against Aideed, the UN severely damaged its chances of bringing peace to Somalia, since Aideed could no longer cooperate with the UN without losing prestige. Because Aideed remained the most powerful warlord in Mogadishu, other belligerents in the area were afraid to cooperate and face an attack by Aideed's army. Some clans in the countryside, where Aideed's power did not reach, showed a greater willingness to exchange their weapons for guarantees of UN protection. Without a powerful warlord present to call their authority into question, the rural clans put more faith in the peacekeepers' ability to shelter them from attack. If the UN had made a more concerted effort to establish a similar degree of credibility in the capital city, it may have received a warmer response from the warring factions, and deterred attacks against the peacekeeping forces. Although the UN should be firm in punishing parties who attack it or violate previous agreements, its primary objective should be to avoid taking sides in a conflict. = Such actions only renew conflict, which the peacekeepers are there to prevent. Peacekeepers must always keep the ultimate reason for their presence—to keep the peace—in mind. Any response to violence against UN forces should be 11 quick, fair, and carried out by either multinational forces or a contingent of a nationality other than the one which suffered the initial attack. This presents a more unified international front, and prevents a violent rivalry from developing between ~

the faction involved and a particular nation. When at all possible, the UN should seek political, economic, or other nonviolent means of punishment in order to better preserve the peaceful environment which peacekeepers strive to maintain.

No open lines of communication existed between the UN and Somali leaders to prevent misunderstandings from leading to conflict. Due to their continued violations of peace agreements, the UN was reluctant to sit down with Aideed and his primary rival. It thought such recognition would give these warlords more legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis. The UN leadership criticized the SRSG for holding discussions with these two clan leaders upon his arrival in Somalia. However, such open dialogues and further communication with Aideed and his rivals might have provided an alternative outlet to fighting and assured them of the UN's neutral intentions. Some quiet attempts were made to hold secretive negotiations with all of the warlords, but Aideed showed only nominal interest in participating, preferring instead to repeatedly ambush UN forces. Because the

UN held such little credibility in Aideed's eyes, he saw no reason to work out a solution with the peacekeepers. He was able to continue using violent tactics to achieve his goals. Aideed did not assign more credibility to U.S. forces than to the UN peacekeepers as a whole. After a contingent of U.S. Rangers arrived in Somalia in the summer of 1993, he indicated a willingness to talk to the UN, but this cooperative attitude soon relapsed into further ambushes of less intimidating UN troops.<sup>54</sup> As relations between Aideed and the UN deteriorated, the potential for open communication between them decreased, but this was the point when such a relationship would have been most beneficial to saving the peace process.

Unlike the multinational collaboration in Mozambique, peacekeeping efforts in Somalia were dominated by U.S. troops, particularly during the UNITAF phase. This unilateral dominance was exacerbated by the U.S. policy of reporting to its own leaders instead of UN command.<sup>55</sup> Even the contingents of other nationalities that took part in the Somali operations found it difficult to maintain a united international image. The Italian forces faced allegations that they negotiated a private deal with Aideed to protect his gunmen. Due to the loss in the Italian's perceived neutrality after this alleged incident, the entire contingent had to be replaced by Nigerian forces.<sup>56</sup> When the U.S. and other forces made it their goal to root out Aideed, they entangled themselves in Somali politics and indicated that they had an interest in seeing a particular outcome, instead of remaining impartially above the conflict. This severely damaged these contingents' ability to be an effective part of the peacekeeping mission.

Leading the way to peace in Mozambique. Initially, the prospects for strong and coordinated leadership of ONUMOZ seemed weak. At UN headquarters, bureaucrats disagreed over many of the personnel appointments, particularly the SRSG. Even after the UN appointed Aldo Ajello to this position, rumor circulated that he would be replaced by another candidate, leaving his authority in a state of uncertainty.<sup>57</sup> Tense relations also developed between Ajello and the UNDP representative in Mozambique, Erick de Mul, due to the overlap in the UNDP's and ONUMOZ's jurisdiction. While Ajello was out of the country on diplomatic business, de Mul stepped in and acted in Ajello's place without consulting him, and ONUMOZ's humanitarian arm, UNOHAC, took over many of the duties that previously fell under the UNDP.<sup>58</sup> What could have been a beneficial and supportive relationship

between the UNDP and ONUMOZ started out as an uncoordinated effort to function independently.

However, these initial tensions soon gave way to a powerful example of creative and coordinated leadership as Ajello brought the UN and its various donors together and kept all involved parties well-informed at each stage of the operation.<sup>59</sup> He included the donor nations in decisions about how the money would be spent, especially on more controversial programs such as the incentive package for demobilizing soldiers and the aid package for converting Renamo to a political party. During standstills in negotiations, he assured the international community that the UN remained in control of the situation, and his confidence and firm leadership gave credibility to these assurances.

Ajello's personal strengths added a great deal to the operation. He used obstacles in the peace process to his advantage.<sup>60</sup> Instead of despairing over deadlocks in talks between the opposing forces, Ajello used the interim time to improve conditions that could lead to further agreements and seek added support from UN members for the operation. For example, when Renamo refused to come to the bargaining table in the spring of 1993 because it wanted to see more progress towards demobilization and demanded money for its political convenion, Ajello did not sit and wait for Dhlakama to change his mind. Instead, he trained Renamo personnel to staff assembly areas and began the process of establishing a trust fund for Renamo's political activities.<sup>61</sup> He recognized when to encourage compliance with Renamo and Frelimo demands, and when to refuse superfluous demands without damaging the peace.<sup>62</sup>

Like the peacekeeping forces in general, Ajello remained a credible and neutral leader throughout the operation. He was able to oversee all facets of the operation, including political, humanitarian, and military efforts, preventing overlap or conflict between the various aspects of ONUMOZ. In the operation's mandate, the UN recognized the interrelated nature of the various aspects of ONUMOZ and structured the command accordingly. The Secretary General emphasized that the SRSG was given oversight of the different branches of the operation in order to coordinate them, since failure in one area would harm progress in the others.<sup>63</sup> Ajello established personal contacts with both Chissano and Dhlakama, and he did not hesitate to call on either one in order to further the mission.<sup>64</sup> The SRSG also made personal visits to various national leaders, particularly in Italy, to seek both financial and political support for the operation. When the UN bureaucracy failed to provide the necessary resources, Ajello sought them elsewhere, instead of allowing the operation to stall. Some cited one of Ajello's strengths as his "ability to act as a politician rather than as a UN bureaucrat".<sup>65</sup> Ajello's unfamiliarity with the intricacies of the UN Secretariat was overcome by the appointment of Behrooz Sadry as his deputy. Sadry was an experienced peacekeeper who cooperated well with the Secretariat and helped coordinate communication between the UN bureaucracy and ONUMOZ.<sup>66</sup>

The SRSG was honest and communicative with all parties. He held weekly consultations with a committee of international representatives, known as the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC), and he often talked openly with the press in Mozambique. His honesty was not always appreciated, particularly when it took the form of hot-tempered outbursts towards the ONUMOZ staff, but it proved to be an effective means of achieving credibility and progress.<sup>67</sup> Ajello had great success with gathering support from all the necessary groups, both within UN agencies and among various other actors, and with establishing a positive relationship between these groups and the conflicting parties. At the end of the operation, many observers cited Ajello's flexibility and determination as one of ONUMOZ's primary strengths.<sup>68</sup>

Even beyond Ajello's personal support for coordinating donor efforts, the various contingents established effective cooperative efforts that contributed to the operation's success. No one actor dominated the operation. Although the Italians provided a strong presence in Mozambique, the mission was clearly an international effort. The European



Union and U.S. agencies such as USAID led various aspects of the demobilization process' and other UN agencies, such as the WFP and UNDP, provided valuable assistance for both demobilization and elections.<sup>69</sup> The unity and hard work of the Supervision and Control Commission and its subsidiary bodies contributed greatly to the international image of the operation. That group included not only Western donors, but African representation from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well.<sup>70</sup>

The international community provided a shining example of its united influence during the final stages of the operation. Before elections began, Dhlakama withdrew from national elections, alleging that Frelimo intended to tamper with the votes. After a day of intense pressure from UN leaders and representatives from Mozambique's National Elections Commission, western governments, South Africa, and other African states in the region, the Renamo leader agreed to end his boycott. The global community made it clear to Dhlakama that they would fully support the election outcome, regardless of his stance.<sup>71</sup> This final display of successful teamwork on the part of various nations and organizations epitomizes the strong leadership that allowed ONUMOZ to maintain a peaceful and secure environment in Mozambique.

Somalia. De facto separate chains of command developed in Somalia because national contingents, particularly U.S. troops, tended to report back to their own command instead of to UN military leadership. This method worked well during the U.S.-led UNITAF operation, but after the UN took over it created confusion and disunity.<sup>72</sup> While the majority of U.S. forces were supposed to report to UN command during UNOSOM II, a smaller emergency rescue force remained strictly under U.S. control. However, when this emergency force began to take part in additional UN excursions, the U.S. military leadership did not have the opportunity to approve each action. After the emergency force became involved in controversial operations such as hunting for Aideed, U.S. leadership balked.<sup>73</sup> A very ambiguous line existed between U.S. and UN control. The handover from U.S. leadership to UN control was badly timed and uncoordinated. The abrupt and sudden withdrawal of the strong U.S. force was detrimental to the operation, with the smaller contingents that replaced U.S. troops did not command as much credibility with the locals, and overextended peacekeepers by attempting to implement an overambitious mandate.<sup>74</sup>

Italian troops also gave greater precedence to orders from Rome than from the UN. This became such a problem that the UN had to ask Italian General Romeo Longo to resign, alleging that he refused to follow orders from the UN.<sup>75</sup> The resignation request was controversial, since Italy's foreign minister claimed that Secretary General Boutros-Ghali indicated

he would not make such a move when the two had previously discussed it in private.<sup>76</sup> The most unified action that peacekeeping contingents took was the almost unanimous withdrawal of western troops from Somalia after the U.S. forces declared that they would pull out. Despite UN and U.S. pleas for continued western support of the chaotic mission, the majority of the European states in Somalia chose to bring their forces home when American peacekeepers left.<sup>77</sup>

The operation in Somalia was plagued with other resignations. UN special envoy to Somalia Mohammed Sahnoun quit due to his frustration with UN bureaucrats. 78 Sahnoun later accused Boutros-Ghali of harming UNOSOM by undermining the envoy's power, weakening the credibility of the UN in Somalia, and permitting corrupt practices.79 Such a negative relationship between the leader in the field and UN headquarters limited the possibilities for implementing creative and unified solutions to any problems that arose, as Ajello was able to do in Mozambique.

Even within the UN command structure, disunity prevailed. Separate civilian and military leadership existed, with military forces under the control of Turkish general Cevik Bir and civil operations under the command of American Jonathan Howe.80 Later in the operation, the UN made plans to at least move the civilian and military staffs into the same headquarters building, but only after the violent attack on the UN in June of 1993 did peacekeepers take steps to facilitate closer coordination between the two departments. Even then, their motivations for doing so stemmed from safety concerns as much as from a desire for greater integration in planning.81 A more streamlined leadership structure would have been helpful, considering the close coordination between civilians and soldiers necessary to perform the mission's primary goal—using the military to protect humanitarian supplies from attack.

#### Allocating Resources

Mozambique. As the UN prepared for ONUMOZ, it was determined not to repeat the failure of its recent mission in Angola, where a lack of sufficient resources led to a peacekeeping disaster that embarrassed the UN.82 In order to salvage the reputation of international peacekeeping, the international community fully committed itself to providing as much support as necessary to make ONUMOZ succeed. Donors were also more willing to offer funding for ONUMOZ because they felt confident in the prospects for success. Most donor states did not feel that Mozambique was a risky investment, since the parties seemed committed to preserving the peace, and the UN appeared to be committed to ensuring their success at this.83

However, in its zeal to meet the financial needs of the operation in Mozambique, the UN may have overcompensated. The overwhelming amount of resources provided for the operation led peacekeepers to establish a program much larger than Mozambique initially requested. The resulting force faced allegations that it infringed on national sovereignty by performing duties that the Mozambican government was perfectly capable of doing itself. A smaller and more streamlined force could have met the UN's goals just as well.84 What weakened ONUMOZ was not the availability of too many resources, but the resulting expectations placed at the UN created for itself, under the impression that it should expand its program to utilize all of the anticipated financial support.

In addition, peacekeepers may not have used all of the available resources most efficiently. The obstacles that arose in Mozambique, such as difficulties starting the demobilization process, were not due to a lack of resources, but to logistical problems that required planning and diplomacy to resolve.85 High expenses were incurred in the

initial months of the operation because troops had to rent equipment until the operation's budget was officially approved by the UN in New York, so that more permanent equipment could be purchased. In addition, UN officials neglected to negotiate a preliminary agreement with the government to exempt the UN from Mozambican taxes, forcing peacekeepers to pay taxes until such an agreement could be reached. 86 These funds could have been directed towards more substantial needs, such as humanitarian aid or reintegration programs for soldiers.

Somalia. Peacekeepers in Somalia faced the exact opposite problem than in Mozambique. The shaky peace that UN forces were sent in to preserve did not inspire confidence in international donors, which made them reluctant to commit resources to the operation. Donors wanted to see proof that their money would be put to good use before they invested very much. However, this created a vicious cycle that prevented peacekeepers from proving the potential success of UNOSOM because they lacked sufficient resources, which they could not get unless the mission was succeeding. The possibility of implementing a demobilization and reintegration program fell through without the funds to establish it.87 Such a program could have significantly decreased the number of soldiers fighting one another and the UN, and made the UN's ability to preserve peace much easier. Unfortunately, as long as the international community saw fighting in the streets of Mogadishu, it was unwilling to flow more money into Somalia so such programs could be established.

Battles in Mogadishu misled many donors into thinking that the whole country had erupted into violence. Much-needed aid failed to reach rural and northern areas of the country, which had been able to create a tentative peace without the presence of UN troops, but still required humanitarian assistance to ensure their long-term stability.88 In addition to financial shortcomings, UNOSOM desperately needed more personnel. Not enough people with the necessary skills were provided to agencies in the field.89 This lack of resources not only harmed the UNOSOM's credibility with donors, it also contributed to the UN's lack of authority with Somalis.

Technological shortcomings also harmed the operation's ability to function effectively. The UN operated under outdated procedures, and communications systems failed to relay messages between the headquarters in Mogadishu and personnel in the field. The SRSG for civilian operations, Jonathan T. Howe, recalls that there was only one phone for his entire office.90 Operating with such inefficient equipment was not only frustrating for UN officials, it also must

have been difficult for modernized forces such as the U.S. contingent to coordinate their advanced technology with the UN's limited provisions.

### Opportunities for Success

Mozambique. The UN lost a great deal of momentum in Mozambique by failing to capitalize on the initial excitement following the signing of the General Peace Agreement. Although Frelimo and Renamo signed the GPA, which called for the

presence of UN peacekeepers to help implement the agreement, in October of 1992, the first contingents of UN troops did not arrive until February 1993, and the full forces were not deployed until April.<sup>91</sup> During this interim period, the UN lost a valuable chance to enter Mozambique with a strong credible force. By deploying troops in slow spurts, Mozambicans' first introduction to UN troops was a limited number of peacekeepers with little equipment or power to act authoritatively. Without a viable force to hold them accountable, both parties to the conflict took this opportunity to violate the cease-fire. In late October, Renamo forcefully took control of four government-held towns. SRS/G Ajello made concerted efforts to mediate these early disputes through aggressive diplomacy until the long-awaited arrival of peacekeeping forces.<sup>92</sup> Despite Ajello's general success in preventing occasional violations of the GPA from escalating, a faster introduction of UN troops would have elicited better compliance from the very beginning.

The parties themselves indicated their desire for a faster response from the UN. Renamo refused to begin the assembly and demobilization process until the presence of a full UN peacekeeping force assured the safety of its supporters.<sup>93</sup> Even once the UN operation was fully deployed in spring of 1993, bureaucratic obstacles slowed substantial progress.<sup>94</sup> Elections were postponed for over a year while the UN worked to establish a secure environment that would decrease the chances for an armed challenge of election results. The initial timetable called for elections to occur in June 1993, but demobilization was just beginning at this time, pushing elections back to October 1994.<sup>95</sup> Several setbacks in starting the assembly of Frelimo and Renamo troops left the soldiers idle and restless, and demonstrations and riots erupted sporadically as they waited for the chance to demobilize and return to their homes.<sup>96</sup> The tedious personnel and budget approval process at UN headquarters in New York was the primary cause for the delays experienced in Mozambique, although Renamo chose to stall the process on a number of occasions as well.

Once ONUMOZ began full operations and received the proper equipment, peacekeepers worked to capitalize on many opportunities that presented themselves. Demobilization, reintegration, and elections programs left a lasting impact on Mozambique. Efficient and well-organized units such as the military observation team and the Technical Unit for Demobilization provided flexible groups that could quickly respond when needed.<sup>97</sup> Ajello also seized many opportunities provided by Dhlakama and Chissano to revive talks when they had stalled, and he frequently formulated creative solutions to the two leaders' demands.<sup>98</sup>

The UN finally managed to make substantial progress on the goals it set out to accomplish in Mozambique, but only after missing a variety of opportunities to put the country on a quick road to recovery from its fifteen-year civil conflicts. Many critics allege that the only reason the peacekeepers' slow response did not destroy their chances for success was the strong desire for peace among the conflicting parties and the people of Mozambique.<sup>99</sup>

Somalia. The weaknesses in UN bureaucratic processes for establishing a peacekeeping operation could also be seen in the slow start of UNOSOM. When the Security Council finally authorized a mission in April of 1992, the initial fivehundred soldier Pakistani force it sent wasn't large enough or equipped enough to impose a commanding UN presence on warring clans in Mogadishu. 100 The UN should have impressed the clans with the powerful entrance of a massive initial arrival. This meager start of UNOSOM I set the tone for the operation and made the Somalis believe that the UN wasn't

strong or committed enough to firmly protecting the peace. Peacekeepers lost a valuable opportunity to gain the respect of the clans from the very beginning.

Later opportunities to turn the operation around fared no better. Plans were laid to restore a Somali police force and judicial system, which would have given Somalis greater responsibility for enforcing control in their country and laid the foundations for long-term stability. Unfortunately, Jonathan T. Howe writes, "it took nearly a year of strenuous bureaucratic warfare in New York and numerous survey missions before we began to receive the equipment, training, and funding that police organizations desperately needed to begin to be effective. An opportunity had been lost".<sup>101</sup> The possibility for a disarmament program also slipped by because the UN was unready to provide the necessary support services, in spite of the fact that clans declared their desire to demobilize. Such sentiments did not last long, though, as fighting continued to erupt. Only by acting at the appropriate moment could the UN have initiated peaceful disarmament of many of the clans. 102 Many opportunities to arrest Aideed also passed by, at first because the UN wanted to be sure of his involvement in attacks before targeting him, and because peacekeepers did not feel that they were prepared to defend themselves against retaliatory attacks by Aideed's supporters. Once the UN felt that it had justification for his arrest, it still lacked the intelligence and skilled manpower necessary for his capture. By the time U.S. Rangers with the appropriate supplies and equipment arrived in Somalia two months later, Aideed's defenses were up and peacekeepers found his arrest would be much more difficult than if they had acted earlier. 103

The UN even received a second chance to revive its operation by replacing U.S. forces when they ended the UNITAF segment of the Somali peacekeeping effort. The U.S. had made substantial progress towards creating a secure environment. However, the UN's takeover from American forces was too slow and uncoordinated, and the warring factions soon took advantage of the lapse in authority to hurl Mogadishu back into violent chaos. 104

## Conclusion

ONUMOZ peacekeepers established an impartial and credible force in Mozambique from the beginning, while UN troops in Somalia struggled to balance authority and neutrality, and ended up forfeiting both. Peacekeepers in Mozambique operated under a clear mandate that the conflicting parties understood and accepted. Such openness continued through close communication between UN officials and both faction leaders, assuring the factions of the peacekeepers' impartiality. ONUMOZ was composed of a multinational force which cooperated effectively to accomplish a common goal without

allowing individual national interests to interfere. Neither Frelimo nor Renamo lost prestige by cooperating with peacekeepers. Both sides received positive incentives to take part in the missions programs. In addition, neither side appeared to lose the conflict. Frelimo won the elections, but Renamo achieved international recognition as a legitimate opposition party, and received resources to establish itself as a viable political force in the future. The UN impartially investigated alleged violations of both groups during demobilization and elections, and it treated both sides equally during the assembly and demobilization process.

In contrast to the smooth, neutral agenda in Mozambique, peacekeepers in Somalia found themselves trying to enforce an unclear mandate in an operation dominated by uncooperative individual states. Due to the UN's inconsistent approach to tasks, such as forceful demobilization of some clans, peacekeepers became embroiled in the conflict instead of remaining above it. Without open communication between the UN and clan leaders, misperceptions of UN actions could not be clarified, and clans felt they had no alternative but to settle their disagreements through violence. After Aideed clearly developed a rivalry with peacekeepers, he could no longer submit to UN authority without losing prestige. Creating an image as a neutral and credible force allowed peacekeepers in Mozambique to contain further eruptions of violence. In Somalia, however, the UN's lack of impartial authority contributed to the continued violence. This hypothesis provides the best explanation for the degree of success experienced in the two previous cases because it strongly influenced the way the local parties responded to peacekeepers and set the tone for the operation as a whole. From these examples, it is clear that peacekeepers cannot establish a secure and peaceful environment if they themselves harbor hostilities, or if conflicting parties do not trust them to eliminate remaining hostilities. The UN can take many proactive steps to establish neutral, credible forces in all peacekeeping situations. In doing so, it will prevent many of the problems that have plagued past peacekeeping failures and create a stronger foundation for success.

The strong, coordinated leadership of ONUMOZ can also explain the UN's success at containing violence in Mozambique, especially contrasted with the divided and independent leadership of the Somali operation. Early leadership problems soon gave way for Ajello's firm, unifying influence. His efforts to bring all of the players together and integrate them in decision-making kept the operation running smoothly and helped turn obstacles to his advantage. Although Ajello often circumvented the UN bureaucracy when formulating solutions, he maintained close contact with the Secretariat through his deputy Sadry. Because the Secretary General appointed only one commander to oversee both civilian and military operations, the various facets of the operation could be more easily coordinated. The cooperation of various national contingents and agencies also proved to be highly effective for addressing challenges and maintaining the peace.

Such unity was lacking in Somalia, where national forces insisted on reporting to their own command structure instead of to UN leaders. This proved particularly detrimental during the transition between U.S. and UN forces at the end of UNITAF, as U.S. troops pulled out before the UN was fully prepared to replace them. Better communication and cooperation between national forces and UN officials would have allowed for a smoother

and more effective operation. A lack of unity between UN officials in New York and leaders in the field also prevented the operation from efficiently addressing problems in Somalia. Appointing separate commanders to oversee the closely-knit civilian and military aspects of the mission added to the disunity of UNOSOM's leadership. More unified leadership can strengthen any operation, but this factor is difficult to control in advance. The chemistry between the individuals involved is often unpredictable. Carefully selected leaders with appropriate skills for the mission at hand, as well as an effective command-control structure and open lines of communication, do make a difference in the degree of success experienced by an operation. However, these factors alone will not determine the outcome.

The long bureaucratic process of approving the budget for peacekeeping operations prevented both ONUMOZ and UNOSOM from using their resources most efficiently, particularly in the critical initial stages of the mission. In Mozambique, an abundance of available resources led the UN to play an excessive role. Less problems would have arisen if peacekeepers had limited themselves to the basic tasks outlined for them in the GPA. ONUMOZ had its greatest successes in these basic programs that it initially intended to run, such as assembling and demobilizing troops and overseeing elections. However, additional efforts, such as creating a national police force and demining, did not fare as well, and led the government to accuse the UN of infringing on national sovereignty.

Insufficient resources for Somali peacekeeping programs hurt the success of all aspects of the mission. Peacekeepers lacked equipment, skilled personnel, and adequate technology. Without the proper resources, the operation could not create initial successes, but it was unable to attract more resources unless donors were confident in the operation's progress. Thus, peacekeepers were stuck without the ability to implement programs that could have reduced fighting in Somalia. While this hypothesis did not provide a viable explanation for different outcomes in Mozambique and Somalia, it raises many concerns about peacekeeping procedures that should be addressed. The slow response to budgetary needs in the field clearly creates an obstacle for the efficient use of resources in the initial stages of peacekeeping operations. Current procedures are incompatible with the strict timeline on which peacekeeping missions must operate in order to accomplish their goal of maintaining a peaceful and secure environment. Reorganizing this procedure, as well as establishing a preassembled stock of standard peacekeeping equipment, provide possible options for bridging this gap in the future.

Both ONUMOZ and UNOSOM missed valuable opportunities to establish a secure environment in their respective countries of operation. During the long period between the Security Council's approval for a mission in Mozambique and the actual deployment of peacekeepers, several violations of the cease-fire occurred. This fighting could have been prevented if peacekeepers had been deployed sooner. Once the full UN force arrived in Mozambique, peacekeepers continued to miss chances to assemble and disarm troops, which further postponed elections and increased opportunities for idle soldiers to cause trouble. When peacekeepers did seize opportunities to work out disputes between Frelimo and Renamo, they successfully prevented these disagreements from being played

out on the battlefield. Missed opportunities in Mozambique may not have led to a peacekeeping disaster, but they allowed the conflicting parties several chances to disrupt the peace. Fortunately for ONUMOZ, the indigenous desire for peace prevented small outbreaks of violence from escalating, but this outcome was not due to the diligence of UN peacekeeping efforts.

clans in Mogadishu. Later in the operation, the UN allowed chances to disarm cooperative clans and increase security slip away. Even when the UN received a second chance to revive the mission with the start of UNOSOM II, they did not mobilize the strong and coordinated force needed to maintain a peaceful environment. By studying the examples of ONUMOZ and UNOSOM, one can see that this hypothesis had little impact on their success. Missed opportunities only turned out to be more harmful in Somalia due to the lack of local support there, as opposed to the strong desire for peace among the conflicting parties and citizens of Mozambique.

The impartial credibility of peacekeepers in Mozambique, along with the effective and coordinated leadership displayed there, contributed to the successful establishment of a secure environment. While inefficiently allocated resources and missed opportunities did not cause ONUMOZ to fail, a more adept handling of these factors could have further improved the operation. In Somalia, one could point to all four factors discussed in this paper - a lack of neutrality and credibility, disunified leadership, insufficient resources, and letting opportunities pass - as factors contributing to the instability and violence that persisted during the various phases of UNOSOM. However, the degree of impartiality and credibility in these two cases truly sets them apart from one another and points to the primary means for ensuring greater success in future operations. Even if the other three aspects of UNOSOM had been stronger, the lack of an impartial and credible UN force would have harmed its ability to establish a secure environment, since Aideed would have been compelled to continue fighting to prevent a loss of prestige, and other clans would not have entrusted their protection and safety to the peacekeepers.

In order to learn from these cases and better prepare itself for future peacekeeping operations, regardless of the situation, the UN should take a closer look at strengthening its ability to meet the four criteria outlined in this paper, with a particular focus on establishing impartial and credible forces. Careful consideration should be given to addressing challenges to peacekeepers' neutrality. How can the UN respond to attacks on peacekeepers in order to retain its credibility and still remain above the conflict?

It is not always easy to distinguish whether failures in peacekeeping are due to a UN shortcoming or the existing situation in a particular country. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that no one formula for success exists, since each peacekeeping mission is unique. However, factors within the UN's control, especially its efforts to present a credible and impartial image, have a large impact on any operation's chances for success by decreasing potential obstacles and creating a firm foundation. The UN must continue to take proactive steps to strengthen its peacekeeping program *if it hopes* to continue using peacekeeping as an effective means to resolving violent conflict around the world.



## NOTES:

1. [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko)
2. Jane Perlez. "A Mozambique Formally at Peace is Bled by Hunger and Brutality," *New York Times* (13 October 1992, sec. A).
3. Richard Synge. *Mozambique: UNPeacekeeping in Action, 1992-94* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 15-25.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
5. [www.un.org/dpho](http://www.un.org/dpho)
6. Jonathan T. Howe. "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation." in *Soldiers for Peace*. ed. Barbara Benton (New York: American Historical Publications, 1996), p. 182;
7. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation. ", p. 165-8.
8. Weiss, Forsythe, and Choate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, p. 80.
9. [www.un.org/dplo](http://www.un.org/dplo)
10. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation.", p. 182.
11. Richard Comnaughton. *Military intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War* (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 49
12. Synge, *Mozambique: UNPeacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 173; Weiss, Forsythe, and Choate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, p. 53.
13. [www.un.org/dpio](http://www.un.org/dpio)
14. Rod Paschall. "UN Peacekeeping Tactics: The Impartial Buffer." In *Soldiers for Peace*. ed. Barbara Benton (New York: American Historical Publications, 1996), p. 52-3.
15. Synge, *Mozambique: UNPeacekeeping in Action, 1992- 94*, p. 173-4.
16. Rod Paschall. "Solving the Command-and-Control Problem. " In *Soldiers for Peace*. ed. Barbara Benton (New York: American Historical Publications, 1996), p. 64-5.
17. Paul F. Diehl. *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 172-3.
18. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992- 94*, p. 172.

19. Pwchall, "Solving the Command-and-Control Problem.", p. 65
20. William J. Durch. "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation." in *The Evolution of UNPeacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 64.
21. Cevic Bir. "Inoperability and Intervention Operations." *RUSI Journal*. Vol. 142, no. 6, p. 22-6.
22. Durch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation.", p. 64-6.
23. [www.un.org/dpk](http://www.un.org/dpk)
24. Paschall, "Solving the Command- and-Control Problem."p. 61.
25. Ibid., p. 72.
26. Durch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation.", p. 64-6.
27. ChesterA.Crocker. "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol.74,no.3,p.29; [www.un.org/dpho](http://www.un.org/dpho).
28. [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko).
29. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation.", p. 182; [www.un.org/dplo](http://www.un.org/dplo).
30. Connaughton, *Military Intervention in the 1990s*., p. 29.
31. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 173.
32. Bir, "Inoperability and Intervention Operations."; Durch, "Running the Show.", p. 66-7.
33. [www.un.org/dpho](http://www.un.org/dpho).
34. Durch, "Running the Show.", p. 48-9; Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation.", p. 183.
35. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 8-9.
36. Synge, *Mozambique: UNPeacekeepinginAction, 1992-94*,p. 146, 152-3; [www.un.org/dpEo](http://www.un.org/dpEo).

37. [www.un.org/dpho](http://www.un.org/dpho).
38. Paul Taylor. "UN Finds Peace Hw a Price in Mozambique," *Washington Post* (24 October 1993, sec. A).
39. Synge, Mozambique: *UNPeacekeepinginAction*, 1992-94.
40. Ibid., p. 67.
41. Ibid., p. 148-9.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 62-3, 95-8.
44. Barnaby Phillips. "Maputo Riots Blamed on Observers," *Daily Telegraph* (2 August 1994).
45. Syuge, Mozambique: *UNPeacekeepinginAction*, 1992-94, p.48, 63.
46. Ibid.
47. [www.un.org/dplo](http://www.un.org/dplo).
48. Synge, Mozambique: *UNPeacekeepinginAction*, 1992-94 .
49. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation," p. 173-4.
50. Ibid., p. 173.
51. Ibid., p. 169-70.
52. Ibid., p. 169.
53. Richard Dowden. "UN Troops Died 'Trying to Take Somali Radio Station'," *Independent* (London) (8 June 1993).
54. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation," p. 175.
55. David Lauter and Paul Richter. "Clinton to Insist on U.S. Control of G.I.s inUN Roles," *Los Angeles Times* (15 October 1993, sec. A).
56. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation," p. 174.

57. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 37- 8.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 33-4.
59. *Ibid.*, p.65-7.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 41, 153.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
62. Taylor, "UN Finds Peace Has a Price in Mozambique."
63. [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko).
64. Synge, *Mozambique. UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 146, 152-3; [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko).
65. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 153.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 146-7.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 145-6.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 154; [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko).
71. Peter Stanley. "Renamo Drops Mozambique Election Boycott," *Financial Times* (London) (29 October 1994); Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 130-4; [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko).
72. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong."
73. Lauter and Richter, "Clinton to Insist on U.S. Control of G.I.s in UN Roles."
74. Frank Crigler. "Peacekeeping Task Demands Strong Hand," *Christian Science Monitor* (8 March 1993); Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong."
75. "What Comes Next in Somalia," *Plain Dealer* ( 15 July 1993, sec. B).

76. Mark Tran and Ian Black. "Italy Fumes as UN Fires Top General," *Cuardian* (London) (15 July 1993).
77. Francis Harris and Bruce Johnston. "Italians Join Rush to Pull Out of UN Forces," *Daily Telegraph* (14 October 1993).
78. Tran and Black, "Italy Fumes as UN Fires Top General. "
79. Thomas W. Lippman. 'IJN Chief Faulted in Somalia Mess," *Washington Post* (29 August 1994, sec. A).
80. Tran and Black, "Italy Fumes as UN Fires Top General."
81. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation, p. 168.
82. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 5-8.
83. Ibid., p. 32-4, 172.
- X4. Ibid., p. 35-6, 145.
85. Ibid., p. 53.
86. Ibid., p. 38.
87. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation," p. 174.
88. Ibid., p. 163.
89. Ibid.,p. 162-3.
90. Ibid., p. 163.
91. Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 27-8.
92. Ibid., p. 29-30.
93. [www.un.org/dpko](http://www.un.org/dpko).
94. Synge, *Mozambique. UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*, p. 37- 8.95. Fred B–ridgland. "Shoestring Peace About to Snap," *Sunday Telegraph* (21 February 1993); [www.un.org/dpho](http://www.un.org/dpho).

96. Paul Lewis. "UN Sets Deadline of November for Ending Role in Mozambique, '

*New York Times* (24 February 1994, sec. A); Paul Taylor. "Rebel Vows Peace as Mozambique Moves Toward First

Election, *Washington Post* (27 July 1994, sec. A).

97. Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94, p. 158.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 37.

100. Frank Crigler. "Peacekeeping Task Demands Strong Hand," *Christian Science Monitor* (8 March 1993); William J.

Durch. "Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory," In *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and*

*Cumulative Analysis*. ed. William J Durc (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 472-3.

101. Howe, 'The Frustration in a Failed Nation,' p. 164.