


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
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International Studies Department

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About this journal

International relations is one of the longest continuously studied fields in human history, going back at least to Thucydides' study of the Peloponnesian War. It is with this tradition in mind that *Modus Vivendi* attempts provide a forum for the intelligent discussion of current global issues. *Modus Vivendi* is one of the few, if not the only, undergraduate journals of IR in the United States. *Modus Vivendi* is published by the International Studies Department of Rhodes College and accepts submissions from any Rhodes College student.

In this issue of *Modus Vivendi* we benefit from papers comprising different styles and issues. Our first two submissions are written in the style of senior papers that adhere to strict social science guidelines. Andrew Corey's discussion of the Czechoslovak breakup is particularly relevant in light of today's many failed states and intra-state ethnic conflicts. Adam Nunnallee's discussion of a U.S. National Missile Defense addresses an important contemporary issue. The third submission, by Scott Williamson, is an example of a comparative politics study that follows the evolution of Venezuela's political system and the lessons to be drawn from Venezuela's experience that can be applied to developing democratic polities.

Special thanks must be given to the faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department. Without their outstanding teaching skills and guidance, the papers in this journal would not exist. We must also extend special thanks to Mrs. Brenda Somes, the adviser to Sigma Iota Rho, the International Studies honor society responsible for producing *Modus Vivendi*.

The Editors

An Explanation of the 1992 Czechoslovakian Divorce

Andrew C. Corey

At midnight on December 31, 1992, the Czechoslovak Federation divided into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The Czechoslovak Federation, consisting of two components, the Czech Republic (population ten million) and the Slovak Republic (population ten million) dissolved without bloodshed. The two countries divided common property, hoisted flags, sent ambassadors to each other, and even took separate seats in the United Nations.

The Czechs and the Slovaks are both Slavic. The two groups share similar and mutually intelligible languages. Since 1918, with the exception of the World War II period, both the Czechs and Slovaks shared common political institutions for nearly seventy years. Beginning in 1944, both groups endured decades of prolonged, intrusive Soviet influence, and a subsequent invasion and occupation in 1968. The Czechs and the Slovaks suffered through a similar experience during World War II with Nazi Germany. Why then, after sharing and enduring so much in common as a nation for the majority of the twentieth century, did the two groups part ways? Specifically, this paper seeks to explain the following question: why did Czechoslovakia break up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992?

It is important to analyze why Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia for a number of reasons. First, Czechoslovakia had always been an important Eastern European country. Czechoslovakia was geo-strategically fundamental to the Nazi expansion that preceded World War II. Throughout the Cold War, Czechoslovakia served as a key strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and the Western European-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. In the post-Cold War period, the Czech Republic and Slovakia play extremely important roles in the debate over NATO expansion. Germany is especially interested in the fate of Slovakia. As a NATO member, Slovakia would fall under the German sphere of strategic and economic influence.

Second, the breakup of Czechoslovakia is a rare example of a state breaking up in a predominantly peaceful manner. Peaceful state dissolution is a rare event in the modern state system. Throughout the twentieth century, most states that have broken up, such as the former Yugoslavia, have done so violently. It is therefore important to understand why Czechoslovakia broke up because a peaceful state breakup is such a rare political event.

Finally, though the Czechoslovakian case may be unique, by examining why Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia at the end of 1992, it may be possible to derive some policy prescriptions that could help other collapsing states to break up peacefully. Specifically, it is important to understand why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 so we can understand and possibly apply the lessons of a peaceful state breakup to those countries that are struggling with violent state dissolutions.

I am going to use economic, cultural, and historical data to illustrate the important differences between the Czech and Slovak experiences since the construction of the pre-communist Czechoslovakian state. I will examine how specific economic, cultural, and historical differences eventually led to the breakup of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1992.

In the next section of this paper, I will provide my hypotheses for why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992. I will also explain how I will test those hypotheses. In the section to follow I will provide evidence to test which of my hypotheses are correct. Finally, I will interpret and examine the evidence and explore the broader implications of that evidence for the Czechoslovakian breakup in 1992. It may then be possible to apply those findings to help other countries break up in a peaceful manner.

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Theory & Hypotheses

One reason why Czechoslovakia split apart at the end of 1992 could be associated with the role of Czech and Slovak nationalism. Specifically, I hypothesize that over time, growing Czech and Slovak nationalism led to Czechoslovakia breaking up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992. I theorize that the way states are historically formed matters. Different historical experiences lead to different national identities. Distinct and conflicting national identities can produce separatist trends between groups and within states.

I will test this hypothesis by examining how Czechoslovakia was originally formed. I will examine historical data pertaining to the Czech and Slovak economic, political, and social structures from the seventeenth century to the creation of the Czechoslovakian state in 1918. Specifically, I will look at the effects of the Magyar and Austrian legacies on the Czechs and Slovaks. Furthermore I will test this hypothesis by using economic, political, and demographic data to measure and categorize the Czech and Slovak historical experiences and national identities.

This hypothesis will be supported if the evidence shows that a majority of the Czech and Slovaks cited nationalist based reasons for wanting to split up. This hypothesis will be refuted if the evidence suggests that nationalism was not a causal variable in explaining why Czechoslovakia broke up.

A second reason why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 could be because of asymmetrical representation in political institutions. I hypothesize that Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 because the Slovaks felt under-represented by the federal political institutions in the years preceding the breakup. I postulate that a group may decide to form its own state if it believes the political institutions in place unfairly favor and represent a different political or ethnic group. If a group feels that a government's institutional status quo favors another group's political agenda to the point where the first group no longer feels like it is a salient part of policy making, that group may decide to create its own state. It follows that in this new state, the dissatisfied group will be able to shape political institutions and influence policy in a manner that is favorable to its own political interests.

I will test this hypothesis by examining the makeup of the major Czech and Slovak political bodies including the Czech and Slovak Chamber of People, Chamber of Nations, and National Councils. I will specifically look at how much representation each group had in the Czechoslovakian federal political bodies relative to their populations. I will also look at the amount of confidence the Czechs and Slovaks had in the federal political institutions.

This hypothesis will be supported if the Czechoslovakian political institutions functioned poorly and gave the Czechs much more representation and policy-making input than the Slovaks possessed. In addition, this hypothesis will also be supported if the Czechs and/or the Slovaks did not have confidence in these institutions. This hypothesis will be refuted if the evidence suggests that the Czechoslovakian political institutions were fairly designed and implemented to incorporate Czech and Slovak interests equally, and if the Czechs and Slovaks had confidence in these institutions.

Third, Czechoslovakia could have split up in 1992 because the political elites felt it was in their best interest to do so. I hypothesize that Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar facilitated Czechoslovakia's breakup because they wanted to increase their own political power and prestige. I theorize that political elites are constantly looking for ways to increase their own political power. Political elites may attempt to restructure a state if they are able to, and if they think such a restructuring will result in a relative increase in their political power and prestige.

I will test this hypothesis by examining the amount of power allotted to the President in the Czechoslovakian Constitution. I will specifically examine whether or not Klaus and Meciar used their constitutionally allotted power to tangibly increase their own political power relative to other political parties within the Czechoslovakian federal political institutions. I will also examine the negotiations between Klaus and Meciar regarding the future of the Czechoslovakian state that took place in the summer of 1992 prior to the breakup.

This hypothesis will be supported if both Klaus and Meciar supported the split. It will also be supported if the split led to an increase in Klaus and Meciar's political power. This hypothesis will be refuted

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if both Klaus and Meciar opposed the breakup. This hypothesis could also be refuted if neither elite made any attempt to increase his own power as a result of the split.

Finally, Czechoslovakia could have broken up in 1992 because of economic considerations. I hypothesize that Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 because the Czechs and Slovaks decided that continued union was an economic burden on both groups. I theorize that disparities in gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, inflation, and unemployment lead to asymmetrical economic performance between two groups within a state. Specifically, over time one group may accrue more wealth through relatively larger levels of direct investment and development of infrastructure. As a result, a group may eventually decide to split off if it believes it can develop faster and perform better economically as its own state or if that group is doing relatively worse than another group. Essentially, disparities of wealth between two groups resulting from asymmetrically performing economies can cause states to breakup.

I will test this hypothesis by examining economic data including statistics on GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, and unemployment rates in both regions. I will evaluate how the Czech and Slovak economies performed in the years prior to 1992. This hypothesis will be supported if prolonged asymmetrical economic performance existed in the years prior to the breakup, and if the Czechs and/or Slovaks were sufficiently dissatisfied with the disparity. This hypothesis will be contradicted if there is no evidence of Czech and Slovak asymmetrical economic performance, or if Czechs and Slovaks were not sufficiently dissatisfied with the economic disparity.

Evidence

I.

The following section analyzes the Czech and Slovak historical experiences. This section explores how the differing Czech and Slovak historical experiences translate into distinct Czech and Slovak national identities in three ways. First, this section examines how the Czech and Slovak historical experiences differed under the Habsburg Monarchy. Second, this section explores how the differing Czech and Slovak experiences as part of the Habsburg Monarchy affected the Czech and Slovak national identities prior to the creation of the independent Czechoslovakian state in 1918. Third, this section also explores how the Czech and Slovak historical experiences continued to affect the Czech and Slovak national identities after the creation of the Czechoslovakian state in 1918.

The Czechs and Slovaks are both Slavic. Historically, both groups are descendants of fifteenth century Central European tribes. The Czech and Slovak languages are related and mutually intelligible. The Czech and Slovak histories are both linked with European culture and history. Specifically, the Czech and Slovak histories are most importantly linked to their long time rulers, the Austrians of the Habsburg Dynasty and the Hungarians. Unlike some other Eastern and Central European groups, the Czechs and the Slovaks were never part of the Russian Empire.

More importantly, the Czechs and Slovaks had distinct experiences as part of the Austrian and Hungarian Empires. After the defeat of the independent Czech Kingdom in the seventeenth century, the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Austrian Habsburg Empire. On the other hand, King Stephen of Hungary incorporated Slovakia into the Hungarian Empire around A.D. 1000. In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was formed, with the Habsburg monarch as ruler of both Austria and Hungary, though both nations retained separate spheres of domestic influence within the Empire.

As a result, the Czechs and Slovaks coexisted under the Habsburg Empire, but whereas the Slovaks associate with Hungarian rule and historical experience, the Czechs associate more with the Austrian rule in Bohemia and Moravia. You need to go back to the small pre-national ninth century Great Moravian Empire to find a common Czech and Slovak political frame of reference. However, the Great Moravian Empire was not a nation-state and is too historically distant to be an effective model for a shared Czech and Slovak state identity.

As a result of the distinct Czech and Slovak experiences as part of the Habsburg Empire, the Czechs ranked higher than the Slovaks on major development indexes including literacy, political develop-

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ment, and industrialization when Czechoslovakia gained its independence in 1918 after World War I. Furthermore, as a result of their historical experiences the Czechs emerged with a much more developed national identity and more developed economic and political infrastructures.

First, the Czechs emerged from Habsburg rule with a much more industrialized and developed economy than the Slovaks' economy. The Czech lands were geographically located in the more economically developed Austrian part of the dual Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1921, 33.64 percent of Czechoslovakian inhabitants were employed in industry and 39.56 percent were employed in agriculture.

However, a much bigger percentage of Czechs were employed in industry, and a much bigger percentage of Slovaks and Ruthenians were employed in agriculture. Just over 40 percent of Czech inhabitants in Bohemia and 37.8 percent in Moravia were employed in industry. In the same year, only 17.5 percent of the Slovaks and 10.4 percent of the Ruthenians were employed in industry, and 60.63 percent of Slovaks and 67.63 percent of Ruthenians were employed in agriculture.

Second, the Czechs had a higher literacy rate than the Slovaks. In 1930, 8.1 percent of Slovaks ten years of age and older were illiterate and 30.8 percent of Ruthenians ten years of age and older were illiterate. By contrast, 1.2 percent of Bohemians and 1.5 percent of Moravians were illiterate in 1930.

In addition, the Austrians were also fairly tolerant of the languages and cultures of imperial minorities. Both the Czechs and Slovaks experienced national and cultural revival movements in nineteenth century, but the results and impact of the two movements differed. Both movements were concentrated on the Czech and Slovak languages and national literatures. Czech scholars, poets, and linguists such as Josef Dobrovsky and Josef Jungmann, and historians and journalists such as Frantisek Palacky and Karel Havlicek promoted the importance of a separate Czech ethnic identity.

Contrary to the Czech movements, early efforts to revive Slovakian ethnic and national identity through literature revolved around the writings of Catholics such as Father Anton Bernolak. However, minority Protestant Slovaks tried to keep ethnic Slovak identity from developing and revolving around Catholic influence. Poet theologians like Jan Kollar and Pavel Josef Safarik opposed the Hungarian-supported Catholic influence on the Slovak identity. Instead, Protestant intellectuals supported Czech literary and language development, but still tried to reflect their Slovak identities in their writing. In short, the Slovaks experienced a degree of opposition from their Hungarian rulers and from some of their intellectual and religious elites that the Czechs did not face when attempting to revive their national identity in the late nineteenth century.

Third, though higher levels of Czech literacy and education made for a wider and more receptive base for the Czech national revival movement, it was greater levels of political and regional autonomy that made for a more successful national Czech revival movement. Austrian rule over Czech lands was much more moderate and less authoritarian than Hungarian rule over Slovak lands. As a result, Czech politicians and citizens had more opportunities to participate politically within the imperial and regional governments. For example, Austrian rulers tolerated the formation of pro-Czech nationalist groups in Bohemia, and allowed Czech leaders to participate in the Bohemian and Moravian Diets and Parliament in Vienna. Such Czech representation was limited in influence and size, but did result in some changes such as the creation of a separate division of the University of Prague for Czechs, which in turn helped to further a more developed independent Czech culture. In addition, universal male suffrage was granted to the Czechs in 1907, which increased opportunities for participation.

By contrast, the Hungarians were much more rigid and authoritarian. Non-Hungarians were not allowed to participate in political life, and anti-suffrage laws hindered Slovak political participation. The Slovaks were also pressured by the Hungarian leadership to give up their national and ethnic identities and assimilate into the Hungarian national and cultural identity. For example, one organization that promoted Slovak nationalism, the Slovak Cultural Association, known as Matica Slovenska, was founded in 1863, but was quickly forced to close in 1874 as part of the Hungarian Magyarization campaign. Many Slovak high schools were also closed in 1874, which produced even lower levels of Slovak literacy.

Fourth, the Czechs and Slovaks think about religion in terms of their national identities very differently. Specifically, the Czechs and Slovaks are both predominantly Catholic, but the relationship between religion, nationalism, and politics differs in each group. The Czechs are more secular than the Slovaks and

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the Catholic Church has historically played a much smaller role in Czech politics. Specifically, Martin Luther's Protestant Reformation substantially affected the Czechs under the Habsburg Empire. The Hungarians championed Catholicism and consequently battled against Protestant influence. For example, the resulting strong anti-reformation movement of the seventeenth century produced Slovak groups such as the Capucin Order and Brothers of Mercy Bratislava that influenced education, literature, and Slovak culture in general. By contrast, the Czechs did not oppose the Protestant Reformation in the same way as the Slovaks. The Czechs did not experience the same kind of anti-reformation movement. Consequently, the Reformation did not have the same effect on Czech society as it did on Slovak society. In short, religion is just not as big a part of the Czech national identity.

Religion is still an important part of the Slovak national identity today. (Appendix A) In 1991, 72.8 percent of Slovaks polled stated that they were believers of a religion, whereas only 44.1 percent of Czechs indicated they were religious. Of that 72.8 percent, 60.3 percent were Roman Catholic. Only 39.2 percent of the total number of Czech believers was Roman Catholic.

The differing Czech and Slovak national identities translated into profound and lasting political differences between the two groups after the Czechoslovakian state was created in 1918. Over the four elections between 1920-1935, a party received more than 15 percent of the total vote only twice. (Appendix B) The Social Democrats amassed 25.6 percent of the total vote in 1920 and the Sudete Deutsche Partei amassed 15.2 percent of the total vote in 1935 when there was a strong German national sentiment in Bohemia and Moravia. These statistics are important because Czechoslovakians were not voting for any of the national parties such as the Czechoslovak Populists.

By contrast, citizens of Czechoslovakia voted for parties such as the Slovak Agrarian Party and the German Social Democrats. Czechs, Slovaks, and other ethnic minorities were not thinking of themselves as possessing any kind of pan-ethnic national Czechoslovak identity. The voters did not think their Czechoslovak national identity was as important as their regional identities. Instead, they felt that the regional parties better represented their ethnic and societal interests, and as a result they voted accordingly.

The widespread lack of over-arching Czechoslovakian national identity is observable when comparing the strength of statewide parties and regional parties in the 1920-1935 elections. (Appendix C) The statewide Czechoslovakian parties were strong in 1920 when the Czechoslovakian state was formed. Specifically, Czechoslovak statewide parties accumulated 66 percent of the total vote, and regional parties only amassed 26.8 percent of the total vote. The statewide parties decreased in strength in the subsequent three elections. In 1925 statewide parties amassed 28 percent of the vote, whereas the regional parties accumulated 45.2 percent of the vote. In the 1929 election, statewide parties amassed 40.5 percent of the total vote, whereas regional parties accumulated 44.2 percent of the total vote. Lastly, in 1935 statewide parties won 38.7 percent of the total vote, whereas regional parties won 44.3 percent of the total vote. The fact that more people voted for regional parties than statewide parties suggests that a lot of Czechs and Slovaks did not believe in any over-arching Czechoslovak national identity.

In addition, this fragmented dispersion of political party support translated into an unstable political system. This point is illustrated using Czechoslovakian cabinet durability over time to measure government stability. High rates of cabinet turnover can be correlated with high rates of turnover in government. It follows that governments with high rates of turnover are unstable. Compared to other peacetime political systems, the number of Czechoslovak cabinets lasting nine months or less was well above average. From 1920 forward, only 50 percent of the Czechoslovakian cabinets lasted more than nine months, as compared to 71.5 percent of other peacetime political systems in Europe. Such a statistic suggests an unstable Czechoslovak government over time.

It is clear that the Slovak and Czech national identities and experiences are still salient parts of both groups' political identities. The preamble of both independent constitutions reflects a sense of nationalism in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The preamble of the 1992 Slovak constitution suggests the importance of the historical Slovak national identity in defining the independent Slovak state. The preamble states:

"We, the Slovak nation, mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our forebears, and of the centuries of struggle for national existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the

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spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire, proceeding from the natural right of nations to self-determination, together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic, seeking the application of the democratic form of government and the guarantees of a free life and the development of spiritual culture and economic prosperity..."

The 1992 Slovak constitution's preamble highlights the Slovak independent political and cultural heritage of its forebears. The preamble also acknowledges the centuries of struggle for an independent Slovak experience, and the importance of self-determination and a spiritual Slovak culture.

In the same way, the preamble to the 1992 Czech constitution conveys the importance of the Czech historical and national identity in its description of the constitution's purpose. The preamble reads:

"We, the citizens of the Czech Republic in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, at the time of renewal of an independent Czech State, being loyal to all good traditions of the ancient statehood of Czech Crown's Lands and the Czechoslovak State, resolved to build, protect and develop the Czech Republic in the spirit of the inviolable values of human dignity and freedom..."

The Czech preamble references the Czech traditions of ancient statehood in Bohemia and Moravia. It is significant that the preamble of the Czech constitution highlights the importance of the pre-Czechoslovakian state history as a declaration of purpose behind the 1992 Czech Republic constitution. Such a declaration indicates that the Czech people and political elites still value their national identity and history.

The distribution of votes in the 1990 and 1992 Czech and Slovak national elections among the individual Czech and Slovak Republics suggests that fewer people identified with smaller regional parties than in the past. Instead, more people seem to be associating with their broader Czech and Slovak national identities. The evidence suggests that Czechs were voting more for the national Czech and Slovak parties respectively. For example, the Czech Civic Forum amassed close to four million votes, equating to 53.15 percent of the total vote in the Chamber of People in 1990. By contrast, the Moravian Silesian Movements (MSDMS) barely amassed half a million votes in the Chamber of People and only a few thousand more votes in the Chamber of Nations and National Council.

Similarly, the Public Against Violence (PAV) party, comprised of the Civic Democratic Union and the Movement Democratic Slovakia (MDS) parties, amassed upwards of a million votes in the Chamber of People and even more in the Chamber of Nations in the 1990 election. By contrast, there were really no meaningful regional Slovakian parties to speak of in the 1990 and 1992 national elections. In the 1992 elections, the MDS party, Democratic Left (PDL), and the Slovak National Party amassed well over half the vote in the Chamber of People, Chamber of Nations, and even more in the National Councils.

II.

The following section analyzes the degree of Czech and Slovak representation in the Czechoslovakian government and political system after the Czechoslovakian democratic transformation in 1990 and subsequent national elections in 1991 and 1992. First, this section briefly discusses the structure of the main bodies of the Czechoslovakian government and political system. Second, this section examines the proportions of Czech and Slovak representation in each of the major Czechoslovakian governing parties relative to the Czech and Slovak populations after the 1991 and 1992 national elections.

Any discussion of Czech and Slovak political representation must focus on the main bodies of the Czechoslovakian government. The 1968 liberalization movement, led by Alexander Dubcek, produced a truly federal Czechoslovak constitution. The Czech and Slovak Federation (CSFR) was comprised of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The 1968 constitution created the Czech and Slovak National Councils, with executive and some legislative power. It also created the Federal Assembly, which was made up of the House of the People and House of Nations. Both bodies were elected by proportional rep-

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resentation. The Federal Assembly chose the president, and the president chose the prime minister, who was responsible for putting the government together. The National Councils were unicameral. There were 150 members in Slovakia and two hundred in the Czech Republic. Presidential functions were fulfilled by each council's Presidium.

With respect to the major national Czechoslovakian political and governmental bodies, the Slovaks were slightly underrepresented in the elections for the Federal Assembly and the National Councils in 1990. As of 1991, the Czech Republic's population totaled approximately 10,299,000. (Appendix D) The majority of the ten million plus people living in the Czech Republic were of Czech nationality. As of 1991, Slovakia's population totaled 5,269,000. The majority of the five million plus living in Slovakia were Slovak nationals. In total, as of 1991, there were approximately 15,568,000 people comprising the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR).

The Czech Republic accumulated 7,245,450 votes that equated to 68.11 percent of the vote and 101 seats in the elections to the Chamber of People in 1990. (Appendix E) Slovakia amassed 3,393,046 votes that equated to 31.89 percent of the vote and forty-nine seats in the Chamber of People. Close to 66 percent of the CSFR is Czech, and the Czech Republic received 68.11 percent of the vote in the Chamber of People. About 34 percent of the CSFR is comprised of Slovaks, and Slovakia amassed 31.89 percent of the vote in the Chamber of People. With respect to population, the Slovaks were slightly underrepresented by about 1-2 percent in the Chamber of People in 1990.

Similarly, the Czech Republic accumulated 7,211,047 votes that equated to 69.86 percent of the vote and two hundred seats in the National Council in 1990. Slovakia amassed 3,111,288 votes that equated to 31.14 percent of the vote and 150 seats. Close to 66 percent of the CSFR is Czech, and the Czech Republic compiled 69.86 percent of the vote in the National Council. About 34 percent of the CSFR is comprised of Slovaks, and Slovakia amassed 31.89 percent of the vote in the National Council. With respect to population, the Slovaks were a little more underrepresented by about 2-3 percent in the Czechoslovak National Council in 1990.

The Slovaks were even less underrepresented in the elections for the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly and the National Council in 1992. (Appendix F) The Czech Republic possessed 67.72 percent of the vote in the Chamber of People, whereas the Slovaks amassed 32.28 percent of the vote. With respect to population, the Slovaks were underrepresented in the Chamber of People by about 1.5 percent. Similarly, with 32.19 percent of the vote in the National Council elections, the Slovaks were underrepresented with respect to population by a little less than 2 percent.

However, three public opinion polls conducted in Czechoslovakia in June 1990, November 1991, and March 1992 suggest that most Czechs and Slovaks alike did not support the idea of forming independent Czech and Slovak states. (Appendix G) In June of 1990, only 12 percent of the Czechs and 13 percent of the Slovaks polled indicated a preference for independent Czech and Slovak states. Similarly, in November of 1991, only 5 percent of the Czechs and 14 percent of the Slovaks polled indicated a preference for independent Czech and Slovak states. Even in the spring of 1992, only 11 percent of the Czechs and 17 percent of the Slovaks polled indicated a preference for independent Czech and Slovak states.

In addition, when asked in 1990, a majority of Czechoslovakians polled (58 percent) indicated that they trusted their Local National Committee representatives the least out of all the Czechoslovakian political bodies. (Appendix H) If people associated with smaller regional parties, it would make sense that they would trust those local politicians to best represent their interests. The evidence suggests the opposite is true. Close to 88 percent of the people polled in 1990 indicated they trusted the President of the Republic, and 83 percent indicated they did in fact trust their federal government. Similarly, 79 percent of the Czechs and Slovaks polled indicated they trusted the Czech and Slovak Republic governments. In other words, the evidence suggests that the Czech and Slovak people did in fact trust their federal and national political leaders more than their local representatives.

III.

The following section compares the relative amount of Czechoslovakian presidential power from Czechoslovakia's creation in 1920 to its dissolution in 1992. This section analyzes Czechoslovak presiden-

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tial power in three ways. First, this section examines the amount of constitutionally appropriated presidential power in the 1920 and 1968 Czechoslovakian constitutions. This section also examines the degree of presidential power as appropriated by the 1992 independent Czech and Slovak constitutions. Second, this section compares how Czechoslovakian presidential power translated into tangible political power for the Czech and Slovak presidents after the two groups became independent states in 1992. Third, this section addresses the negotiations throughout 1992 between Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar regarding Czechoslovakia's continued political union.

The original 1920 Czechoslovak constitution is very detailed, and grants the President of the Republic a relatively large degree of power. Article six of the 1920 Czechoslovak constitution states that the legislative power of the Czechoslovak Republic is composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Article fifty-six states that the president is elected by a joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate called the National Assembly, with no less than a three-fifths majority.

Article sixty-four of the 1920 constitution lists the rights and duties of the President of the Republic. Specifically, the president represents the state in its relations with other states including negotiating international, commercial, military, and financial treaties. Any such treaty requires the affirmation of Parliament, but the ability to negotiate such a wide range of treaty types gives the president a relatively large degree of power to shape Czechoslovak foreign policy in any way he or she sees fit.

Under Article sixty-four, in addition to appointing, dismissing, and defining the number of his or her cabinet ministers, the president is granted the power to nominate university professors, judges, and all state officials and army officers of the sixth class and upward. Such a provision grants the president considerable power to indirectly shape the thinking and orientation of the Czechoslovak political, intellectual, and civic elite by personally selecting whom he will appoint to those positions. One would expect the president to appoint professors and officials of like mind and background.

However, presidential power is limited by Article seventy-five. The president's government is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, which may vote a lack of confidence in the government. Such a vote of no confidence can be achieved with a relatively small number of deputies present. A vote of no confidence in the Chamber of Deputies is valid if more than half of the deputies are present and if 50 percent of those deputies vote a lack of confidence. This provision means that it is hypothetically possible for the Chamber of Deputies to dissolve a government with just over a quarter of its members present and voting to dissolve the government. As a result, the president and his government cannot act with complete autonomy from the Chamber of Deputies.

The 1960 Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic gave considerable power to the National Assembly and granted the President of the Republic little power. Article sixty-two of the 1960 constitution states that the President of the Republic is responsible for the appointment of the premier and other members of his government. Article sixty-two also states that the President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The president's ability to construct his government gives him some influence in policy making, but the 1960 constitution grants the preponderance of Czechoslovak political power to the National Assembly.

Articles forty-three through forty-nine diagram the National Assembly's political power over the President of the Republic and his government. The National Assembly is responsible for electing the president. Specifically, Article forty-four, section two states that the National Assembly will supervise and control the activities of the government including the president and other members. The National Assembly also has the power to direct the President of the Republic to recall the government or its individual members. In addition, presidential appointees in the government, including the premier, are required to answer to the deputies of the National Assembly. The National Assembly is also responsible for electing and recalling members of the Supreme Court, which is responsible for ensuring the socialist legality of legislation. In short, all of these provisions limit presidential autonomy and independent policy-making power because the president and his or her government are constitutionally constrained by the National Assembly.

The Slovak constitution, adopted on September 1, 1992, gave the Slovakian president a considerable degree of political power. Whereas the 1992 constitution granted considerable power to the Slovak

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president over the government of the Slovak Republic, the government has no real check on the president's power. Article 101 of the 1992 constitution states that the president is the head of state of the Slovak Republic. Article 101 also states that the president is elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic by secret ballot for a maximum of two five-year terms. Furthermore, a three-fifths majority of all deputies' votes are required for the president to be elected. Since the president is in charge of constructing the government, and since the government is in charge of drafting laws and making governmental decrees, the president has considerable influence on policy outcomes.

Article 102 of the 1992 Slovak constitution states that the president calls the constituent meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The president may dissolve the National Council of the Slovak Republic if the policy statement of the government of the Slovak Republic is not approved three times within six months of the elections. More importantly, Articles 102 and 110 state the president is also responsible for appointing and recalling the prime minister, deputy ministers, and ministers of the government of the Slovak Republic.

The president is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. In addition, under Article 102, the president is guaranteed the right to be present at meetings of the National Council and has the right to be present at and chair meetings of the Slovak government. Article 107 of the 1992 constitution states that the president can be prosecuted only on charges of high treason. This article is important because it is the only direct reference to limiting presidential power.

In addition, the 1992 constitution makes no direct reference to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic having any direct check on presidential power outside of deciding on high treason charges against the president filed by the National Council. Article 138 states that the president has the power to recall a judge of the Constitutional Court if that judge neglects to participate in the court's activities for more than a year.

Such constitutional provisions allow the president to manipulate and construct the government in any way he or she sees fit. Meciar and Klaus both formed very tight governments. Meciar reduced the size of his cabinet from twenty-three to fourteen members. The cabinet consisted of twelve members of Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia (MDS) party, one member of the SNP, and one independent general in command of the Eastern Military District. Meciar also revamped the bureaucracy by recalling fifty-three deputy ministers.

In addition, Meciar realigned the National Council Presidium, which is responsible for selecting the government and setting the Council's agenda. The Council was made up of fifteen members, seven from the MDS, three from the Democratic Left (former communists), two from the SNP, two from the Christian Democratic Party, and one from the Hungarian party. Such an alignment translated into a 60 percent majority for the MDS and SNP parties despite those parties only winning 45 percent of the vote in the 1992 election. Furthermore, Meciar named an MDS member to the high-ranking post of Chairman and other members to the roll of Deputy Chairmen.

The Czech Republic's constitution, adopted on December 16, 1992, is not as long as the Slovak constitution, and includes a few more checks on presidential power than the 1992 Slovak constitution, but still grants the president of the Czech Republic considerable power and autonomy in creating and influencing his government. Specifically, Article fifteen of the Czech constitution states that legislative power in the Czech Republic is vested in the Parliament, which is composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Article fifty-four states that the President of the Republic is elected by Parliament in a joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Article fifty-eight states that a presidential candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes of all deputies and an absolute majority of votes of all Senators is elected President of the Republic.

Once elected, Article sixty-two of the 1992 Czech constitution gives the president the power to appoint and dismiss the premier and other members of government. The president is also responsible for convening the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, with the consent of the Senate, the president has the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and appoint the judges of the Constitutional Court and members of the Supreme Court. Article sixty-two also charges the president with appointing the president and vice president of the Supreme Inspection and the members of the Bank Council of the Czech National

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Bank. In short, the Czech president is given a lot of power to construct his government in any way he or she wishes. The ability to construct so much of the Czech government in any way the president desires equates to a lot of policy-making autonomy.

The Czech government as appointed by the president does have some checks on the government the president constructs. Article sixty-eight of the 1992 Czech constitution states that the government is accountable to the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Deputies may pass a vote of no confidence in the government. However, the president does have power over the Chamber of Deputies. Article thirty-five gives the president the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies if the Chamber of Deputies passes a vote of no confidence in a newly appointed government whose premier was appointed by the president of the Czech Republic. Such a provision makes it hard for the Chamber of Deputies to dissolve the President of the Republic's government.

Consequently, President Vaclav Klaus also used his constitutional authority to form a tight coalition government consisting predominantly of his own Civic Democratic Party (CDP) members, despite winning only a narrow majority in the National Council. Klaus reduced the size of his cabinet from nineteen to seventeen members. Klaus appointed CDP party members to nine posts, including six of the nine economically related posts. Klaus also revamped the National Council Presidium. Klaus broke precedent by naming only CDP party members to five major positions including chairman and deputy chairman. Furthermore, Klaus attempted to exclude the communists and extreme right wing parties from the other seventeen positions of the Presidium altogether.

Finally, the five rounds of negotiation between Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar took less than a month to complete in the summer of 1992. Klaus and Meciar reached the decision to break up Czechoslovakia into two independent republics in a relatively short period of time. The details of the negotiations between Klaus and Meciar are unclear. However, by the fourth round of negotiation, it was clear that both parties were advocating the Czechoslovakian split.

On June 19, after thirteen hours of negotiations, Klaus and Meciar released a statement announcing their decision to create the independent Czech and Slovak Republics. Specifically, the political agreement between the CDP and the MDS acknowledged that the different CDP and MDS political goals made it necessary for the two parties to initiate a process that would create a transitional framework to take effect upon the extinction of the CSFR. The agreement stated that the deputies of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly would be made members of legislative organs of the independent Czech and Slovak Republics.

IV.

The following section examines the overall Czech and Slovak economic situations from 1989 to the Czechoslovakian breakup at the end of 1992 in four ways. This section will focus on analyzing the Czech and Slovak gross domestic products (GDP), GDP per capita, inflation, and unemployment. These four main economic indicators accurately represent how well the Czech and Slovak economies functioned as part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic prior to Czechoslovakia breaking up.

The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic had relatively similar economic experiences as part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) after 1989. First, the Czech Republic's real gross domestic product (GDP), or total amount of goods and services produced by its economy in a fiscal year, steadily decreased from 1989 to 1992. (Appendix I)

As part of the Czechoslovak Federation, the Czech Republic's GDP increased by 1.4 percent from 1988-1989. The Czech Republic's GDP decreased by 1.2 percent from 1989-1990. The Czech Republic's GDP decreased again by 14.2 percent from 1990-1991, and by 6.4 percent from 1991-1992. Slovakia's GDP decreased even more than the Czech Republic's GDP between 1989 and 1992. (Appendix J) Like the Czech Republic, as part of the Czechoslovak Federation, Slovakia's GDP increased by 1.4 percent from 1988-1989 and decreased by 2.5 percent from 1989-1990. Slovakia's GDP decreased by 14.5 percent from 1990-1991, and again by 6.6 percent from 1991-1992.

Specifically, the Czech GDP in 1989 was \$34,254,000,000, and dropped to \$27,173,000,000 in 1992. Slovakia's GDP dropped from \$15,888,000,000 in 1989 to \$12,364,000,000 in 1992. The Czech GDP dropped by over \$7 billion between 1989 and 1992, whereas the Slovak GDP decreased by \$3.5 bil-

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lion in 1992.

Second, the Czech and Slovak GDPs per capita, or income per person, both dropped significantly between 1989 and 1992. The 1989 Czech GDP per capita was \$3,325. (Appendix K) The Czech GDP per capita decreased by 1.26 percent to \$3,283 between 1989 and 1990. The Czech GDP per capita dropped even further in 1991 to \$2,815 from the previous year. Finally, the Czech GDP per capita decreased again between 1991 and 1992 by 6.47 percent to \$2,633.

The Slovak GDP per capita decreased even more than the Czech GDP per capita between 1989 and 1992. (Appendix L) The Slovak GDP per capita in 1989 was \$3,035. The Slovak GDP per capita dropped by 2.9 percent to \$2,947 in 1990. The Slovak GDP per capita decreased again in 1991 by 14.9 percent to \$2,508. Finally, the Slovak GDP per capita decreased again in 1992 to \$2,333.

Overall, whereas the Czech GDP per capita decreased by 21.99 percent, or \$692 between 1989 and 1992, the Slovak GDP per capita decreased by 24.78 percent, or \$702 over the same period of time. The Slovak GDP per capita decreased more than the Czech GDP per capita over the same period of time, but not by much. The Czech and Slovak GDPs per capita were both relatively low between 1989 and 1992.

When asked, 60 percent of Czechs and 70 percent of Slovaks polled in 1990 expressed fears about a decline in their standard of living. In addition, 48 percent of Czechs and only 37 percent of Slovaks indicated they would be willing to accept a loss of employment. As many as 47 percent of Slovaks polled in 1990 indicated that they thought the state should bear complete responsibility for finding employment for every citizen. This statistic suggests that almost half the Slovaks would be likely to blame the state for high levels of unemployment. Furthermore, 47 percent of Slovaks and 32 percent of Czechs polled thought that the state should bear complete responsibility for ensuring a decent standard of living for each citizen. This statistic is important because it indicates that close to a majority of Czechs and Slovaks blamed the state for their poorer standards of living.

Third, the Czech Republic's rate of inflation increased from 2.3 percent in 1989 to 10.8 percent in 1990. (Appendix I) The Czech Republic's inflation rate increased to 56.7 percent in 1991. However, the inflation rate did decrease substantially from 1991-1992. Like the Czech Republic, Slovakia's rate of inflation increased from 2.3 percent in 1989 to 10.8 percent from 1990. (Appendix J) Slovakia's inflation rate also increased to 61.2 percent in 1991, but substantially decreased in 1992.

The Czechoslovak Federation's rate of unemployment was 0 percent and 0.8 percent for 1989 and 1990 respectively. (Appendix I) The Czech Republic's rate of unemployment was 4.10 percent and 2.6 percent at the end of 1991 and 1992 respectively. (Appendix I) Slovakia's rate of unemployment increased even more than the Czech Republic's rate of unemployment from 1989 to 1992. (Appendix J) Similar to the Czech Republic, Slovakia's rate of unemployment was 0 percent and 0.8 percent for 1989 and 1990 respectively. Slovakia's rate of unemployment was 4.10 percent and 2.6 percent at the end of 1991 and 1992 respectively.

To summarize, decreasing levels of Czech and Slovak GDP indicate poor overall Czech and Slovak economic growth. Prolonged levels of economic decline have negative consequences on standards of living, such as possible increased levels of unemployment. Perhaps more telling, GDP per capita, inflation levels, and unemployment rates are especially important statistics. In this case, decreasing levels of GDP correlate with increased levels of unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics between 1989 and 1992. In addition, Czech and Slovak income levels dropped substantially as inflation rates increased between 1989 and 1992.

As income levels dropped and inflation rates increased, Czechs and Slovaks brought home less money to buy goods and services that cost more because the value of each of their dollars decreased. In general, poor overall economic performance including high levels of unemployment, low levels of income, and high inflation rates can result in decreased standards of living and can translate into dissatisfied individuals.

Evaluation of Evidence

There are two relevant conclusions to be drawn from the evidence presented in Section I. First, it is

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clear that the Czechs and Slovaks had very different historical experiences that translated into fundamentally different Czech and Slovak national identities upon the creation of the Czechoslovakian state in 1918. Second, the evidence suggests that differing Czech and Slovak national identities were not enough to cause Czechoslovakia to break up in 1992.

The fundamentally different Czech and Slovak experiences as parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire are the most profound historical difference between the Czechs and the Slovaks. The Czechs enjoyed a substantially more industrialized and prosperous economic situation under the more economically advanced and liberal Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire than the Slovaks experienced under Hungarian rule. The Slovaks were not nearly as industrialized as the Czechs and a much greater percentage of the Slovak population was employed in agriculture. Furthermore, Slovak literacy rates were much lower than the Czech literacy rates. In addition, the Catholic religion played an influential and profound role in defining the Slovak national identity. The Austrian rulers never really forced any kind of religion on the Czechs. As a result, religion is just not as important to the Czech national identity.

Perhaps more important, the Austrian rulers of the Habsburg monarchy were much more tolerant of the Czech language and culture than the Hungarians were of the Slovak minority. The overall Hungarian intolerance of the Slovak minority impeded the nineteenth century Slovak ethnic and national revival movement. Furthermore, the more liberal Austrian rulers allowed the Czechs to participate in regional governments and develop their national identity through Czech universities and nationalist oriented organizations. On the other hand, the Hungarian leadership forced the Slovaks to assimilate into the Hungarian national identity through anti-minority campaigns that involved shutting down Slovak schools and systematically forcing Slovaks to assimilate into the Hungarian national identity. In short, the creation of the common Czechoslovakian state in 1918 attempted to merge two groups that had little in common other than geographical location.

Whereas the Czechs historically enjoyed limited political and cultural autonomy, the Slovak historical experience under their authoritarian Hungarian rulers contributed to a Slovak national identity built in part on oppression and assimilation. The Czech national identity was never threatened in the same way that the Hungarian leadership repressed the Slovak national identity because the Austrian half of the Habsburg monarchy granted the Czechs a degree of political, ethnic, and cultural autonomy. In other words, the Slovak national identity was historically threatened and based in part on a reaction to the chauvinistic Magyar sentiments and practices of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg monarchy.

I argue that these national identities were not compatible with each other when Czechoslovakia was created in 1918. If one looks at the way Czechs and Slovaks voted in national elections from 1920 forward, the results suggest that Czechs and Slovaks did not think of themselves as possessing a common national identity. Traditionally, the smaller regional Czech and Slovak parties were supported as much and in some cases more than the larger national parties. In general, people vote for political parties that best represent their interests and subsequent political agendas and identities. If the Czechs and Slovaks thought of themselves as having any kind of common national identity they would have voted more for the national Czechoslovakian parties over the regionally based parties.

The evidence suggests that the different Czech and Slovak historical experiences produced different Czech and Slovak national identities. However, it appears that the differing Czech and Slovak national identities, and subsequent nationalist sentiment between the two groups, is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for explaining why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992. Though it is clear that the Czechs and Slovaks had differing historical experiences and national identities, it is also true that no more than 17 percent of Slovaks and 14 percent of Czechs polled between 1990 and 1992 indicated their preference for independent Czech and Slovak states. The fact that most Czechs and Slovaks polled between 1990 and 1993 did not want to establish independent Czech and Slovak states suggests that the fact that the Czechs and Slovaks have distinct national experiences and identities was not enough to cause Czechoslovakia to breakup in 1992.

Consequently, the evidence does not seem to completely support the hypothesis that Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 because the Czech and Slovak national identities were too different, and that nationalist sentiment essentially caused the country to break up. The fact that the Czechs and Slovaks had funda-

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mentally different historical experiences and national identities seems to be a contributing factor toward explaining why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992, but is clearly not the only reason why the country broke up.

The evidence in Section II suggests one important conclusion. The Slovaks were not really underrepresented in the Federal Assembly or the National Councils of the CSFR in the 1990 and 1992 Czechoslovakian elections. Specifically, the Slovaks were only underrepresented by 1-2 percent in the Chamber of People and National Council relative to their populations. In other words, the Slovaks had between 1-2 percent fewer seats in the Federal Assembly and National Councils than they should have had with respect to their population.

It would make sense for the Slovaks to push for the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state in 1992 if they were drastically underrepresented in the major Czechoslovakian political bodies. It is logical to assume that if a group of people felt very underrepresented by the government that they might consider, if not push for, the dissolution of the state that was not adequately representing their group.

However, first, the Slovaks were not drastically underrepresented in the Czechoslovakian government preceding the breakup. It would seem logical that a group that was only slightly underrepresented would find other ways to increase their representation than by dissolving the state of which they are a part. Under these circumstances, it would seem illogical to deduce that the Slovak people facilitated the Czechoslovakian breakup in 1992.

Second, the fact that most Slovaks polled indicated that they did not prefer the creation of an independent Slovak state corroborates the notion that the Slovak people were not responsible for facilitating the Czechoslovakian breakup in 1992. The evidence does not seem to support such a hypothesis. The fact that the Slovaks were not drastically underrepresented and the fact that the Slovak people did not appear to prefer establishing an independent Slovak state refute this hypothesis.

There are two important conclusions to be drawn from the evidence in Section III. First, it is clear that neither Vaclav Klaus nor Vladimir Meciar tried very hard to preserve a unitary Czechoslovakian state throughout their negotiations in the summer and fall of 1992. Second and more important, Klaus and Meciar used their constitutionally guaranteed presidential power to increase their own political power relative to the state.

First, it is true that both Meciar and Klaus expressed their desire to preserve a unitary Czechoslovakian state to the media, but the evidence suggests that the two political elites had no real desire to preserve the Czechoslovakian state. The 1992 negotiations on the future of the Czechoslovakian state between Klaus and Meciar revealed a few key areas that Klaus and Meciar disagreed about resolutely. Specifically, Klaus and Meciar disagreed on the possible economic and defense organization and makeup of the Czech and Slovak bodies. More importantly, the fact that Klaus and Meciar refused to compromise and reconcile their political, economic, and ideological positions throughout the 1992 negotiations suggests that the two political elites had little desire to preserve a unified Czechoslovakian state. The point is that both Klaus and Meciar were relatively quick to concede that continued union would not be possible.

Second, it is clear that both Klaus and Meciar used their presidential and constitutional power to alter the shape of their governments and political power relative to the Czech and Slovak political systems. Both Klaus and Meciar increased their political power by decreasing the number of cabinet positions and increasing the number of government ministers and officials from their respective political parties. Essentially, both Klaus and Meciar tried to eliminate their political and ideological competition within their own governments. By decreasing the amount of political opposition and influence within the government, and within the broader context of the Czech and Slovak political systems, it is significantly easier to implement policy. Decreased opposition equates to fewer checks on power and ideas, which in turn translates into more policy-making autonomy for political elites. Policy-making autonomy is synonymous with political power in the sense that the more autonomy a politician has the easier it will be for that politician to implement his or her own social, economic, or political ideas and visions.

It is important to reiterate the fact that most Czechs and Slovaks polled did not indicate a preference for the creation of two independent Czech and Slovak states. Since the Czech and Slovak people did not push for the 1992 Czechoslovakian dissolution, it is logical to deduce that the dissolution process was

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driven by the political elites. If a majority of Czechs and Slovaks wanted to establish two independent Czech and Slovak states in 1992 it would make sense that Meciar and Klaus would support such a course of action. Furthermore, it would seem illogical for a political elite to act against the will of his or her constituency.

The question remains, why would a political elite undertake a course of action contrary to the preferences of his or her constituency? It is true that political elites need the support of their constituencies to stay in power and to get reelected. However, Meciar and Klaus's actions relative to the will of the Czech and Slovak people, as expressed by public opinion polls, further the argument that the two elites were acting in pursuit of increased political power. In other words, the fact that Klaus and Meciar supported the termination of the unitary Czechoslovakian political union suggests that the two political elites were acting with something other than the will of their constituencies in mind. Though there are few specifics known about the negotiations between Klaus and Meciar in the summer of 1992, it seems clear that they were acting with their own political power and self-interests in mind.

The evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 because Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar wanted to increase their political power. Not only did Klaus and Meciar increase their respective political power after the split, but it is clear that throughout the 1992 negotiations neither leader wholeheartedly supported a continued Czechoslovakian political union. If both Klaus and Meciar had fought hard for continued union between the Czech and Slovak Republics and did not use their positions as leaders of the newly formed Czech Republic and Slovakia to increase their own political power this hypothesis would clearly be refuted. The evidence simply does not corroborate such a hypothesis. In short, the evidence presented in Section III suggests that both Klaus and Meciar facilitated if not expedited the process of creating independent Czech and Slovak states to increase their own political power.

There are three important conclusions to draw from the evidence in Section IV. First, both the Czech and Slovak economies performed increasingly poorly from 1989-1992. The Czech GDP decreased by just over 20 percent between 1989-1992, and the Slovak GDP decreased by 22 percent between 1988-1992. The Czech GDP decreased by \$7 billion between 1989-1992, whereas the Slovak GDP decreased by \$3.5 billion over the same period.

Second, the Slovak GDP per capita was not only lower than the Czech GDP per capita between 1989 and 1992, but the Slovak GDP also decreased more than the Czech GDP per capita over the same period of time. It is important that the Slovak GDP per capita was lower than the Czech GDP per capita and decreased more than the Czech GDP per capita because lower levels of GDP per capita translated into lower standards of living for the Slovak people. This is important because people with lower incomes are generally more unhappy with their economic systems. It is not uncommon for people to blame their poor economic situations on their political systems. It follows that unhappy individuals are more likely to want economic and subsequent political change.

Third, Slovak inflation and unemployment were higher than Czech inflation and unemployment between 1989 and 1992. Lower income levels coupled with higher levels of inflation and unemployment also equate to lower standards of living. Between 1989 and 1992 Slovaks had less money and fewer jobs to buy essentially more expensive goods and services than the Czechs over the same period. Again, these statistics are relevant because lower standards of living translate into unhappy people, and unhappy people are more likely to want political and economic change.

These three conclusions suggest two possibilities. First, the Czechs viewed the Slovaks as an economic burden and initiated the breakup as a result. Second, the Slovaks felt they could do better economically as their own independent state and subsequently initiated the breakup in 1992.

Statistics suggest that the hypothesis that continuing Czechoslovakian union was too big a burden on the Czech and Slovak economies to continue as a common state seems to be supported because between 1989 and 1992 the Czech and Slovak economies both steadily decreased. In addition, since the Slovak economy performed relatively worse than the Czech economy it is possible to conclude that the Slovaks decided they might be able to do better economically as an independent state.

The evidence does suggest that Slovaks were more concerned with their lower standards of living.

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including higher rates of unemployment, than the Czechs were. In addition, the evidence shows that close to a majority of the Czechs and Slovaks polled held the state responsible for their standards of living. However, public opinion polls conducted between 1990 and 1992 suggest that the poorly performing Czech and Slovak economies were not the main reason why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992. If the Czechs and Slovaks were unhappy enough with their economic situations it would make sense that this sentiment would be supported by a desire for political and subsequent economic change.

When polled, most of the Czechs and Slovaks indicated their preference for continuing federation between the Czech and Slovak Republics or a unitary Czechoslovakian state. In fact, slightly more Slovaks than Czechs indicated a preference for an independent state, which correlates with the lower levels of the Slovak standard of living. However, more than three-quarters of the Czechs and Slovaks polled between 1990 and 1992 indicated their preference for a political arrangement of something other than independent Czech and Slovak states. In short, it is clear that the poorly functioning Czech and Slovak economies were not reason enough to split up the Czechoslovakian state in 1992. The public opinion polls simply do not represent such a Czech or Slovak sentiment.

The evidence does suggest that the Czechs and Slovaks both experienced economic decline between the years of 1989 and 1992. The evidence even suggests that a lot of Slovaks and Czechs were dissatisfied and even blamed the Czechoslovakian state for economic decline and subsequent lower standards of living. However, the fact that the majority of Czechs and Slovaks did not indicate their preference for establishing independent Czech and Slovak states suggests the hypothesis that Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 because continued economic union was too big of a burden on both groups to continue as a federal republic is clearly incomplete.

It seems clear that the poorly functioning Czech and Slovak economies prior to the Czechoslovakian breakup in 1992 coupled with distinct Czech and Slovak historical experiences and subsequent national identities set the stage for the Czechoslovakian dissolution. In addition, there were fewer Slovaks than Czechs in the 1990 and 1992 CSFR government, but with respect to population the Slovaks were not proportionally underrepresented in those governments. As a result, the poorly functioning Czech and Slovak economies and subsequently lower standards of living may have made people unhappy. Given the distinct Czech and Slovak historical experiences and national identities, they probably should not have been coupled in 1918 as a common Czechoslovakian state. The Slovaks probably would have enjoyed having the same amount of people in the CSFR governments in 1990 and 1992, but none of these explanations are the most significant causal variables for explaining why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992.

The evidence suggests that the single most important causal variable in explaining why Czechoslovakia broke up in 1992 is the evidence that Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar facilitated the 1992 Czechoslovakian breakup because they wanted to increase their own political power. The evidence most completely explains and supports the hypothesis that Klaus and Meciar facilitated the Czechoslovakian breakup. Whereas it is difficult to reconcile how poorer standards of living, underrepresentation, and distinct national identities did not add up to the Czechs and Slovaks desiring the creation of independent Czech and Slovak states, it is possible to explain this divergence by considering Klaus and Meciar's role in the breakup. In addition to all other explanatory factors, the evidence suggests that Klaus and Meciar's desire to increase their own political power is the single most important factor best able explain the 1992 Czechoslovakian breakup.

Implications, Policy Prescriptions, and Future Questions

The evidence suggests that Czechoslovakia broke up peacefully in 1992 for three main reasons. First, the Czechs' and Slovaks' vital interests were not threatened. Czechoslovakia did not face widespread drought, famine, or intense competition for other vital resources between groups that often lead to violence. Consequently, the evidence does not suggest that there was dispute between the Czechs and Slovaks over who would control vital and profitable natural resources.

Second, Czechoslovakia's dissolution was peaceful because the mutually reinforcing Czechoslovakian political, religious, and ethnic cleavages made it easy for two groups to evenly divide Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics. Cross-cutting cleavages often make splitting up the land between

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groups upon dissolution of the state difficult and violent because members of the groups are often interspersed throughout the state. As a result, Czechs and Slovaks were not displaced from their land and homes in order to create the new Czech and Slovak Republics.

Third, Czechoslovakia broke up peacefully in 1992 because Czechoslovakia's democratic institutions functioned. Czechoslovakia did not face a military coup or period of tribal warfare that would have created a violent dissolution of the state. Instead, the dissolution was conducted democratically. Democratically elected Czech and Slovak political elites decided to dissolve the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Furthermore, the Czechs and Slovaks trusted and respected the legitimacy of the Czechoslovakian political institutions and the political elites that negotiated the breakup.

Can the reasons behind the 1992 Czechoslovakian breakup be applied to other troubled states? Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that many of the troubled African states could apply the experiences of the peaceful 1992 Czechoslovakian breakup to their own situations. A lot of these troubled African states are facing famine, plague, and competition for resources. Interspersed ethnic and tribal populations make it difficult to easily divide up African land among competing groups. Finally, there are few respected and legitimate democratic political institutions to broker the dissolution of African states.

Finally, my research leads me to consider the following issue for future research. It is clear that the negotiations between Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar in the summer of 1992 regarding the possible dissolution of Czechoslovakia were short and definitive. Within one month's time the two political elites decided that the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state was desirable. However, there is little information available concerning the negotiations between Klaus and Meciar in the summer of 1992 regarding Czechoslovakia's breakup. It would be worthwhile to revisit the negotiations in the future when more definitive information becomes available regarding the negotiations. This information may likely become publicly available once Klaus and Meciar have left politics for a period of time and no longer have an incentive to conceal the true nature of the negotiations. The question remains, why did Klaus and Meciar conclude their negotiations regarding the future of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1992? It is likely new definitive information would show that both elites were eager to increase their political power by pushing for the creation of independent Czech and Slovak states as hypothesized.

Appendices

Appendix A

Population of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) According to Religion 1991						
Religion	Czech Republic			Slovak Republic		
	Thousand	% of total	% of believers	Thousand	% of total	% of believers
Believers	4541	44.1	100	3836	72.8	100
Roman Catholic	4039	39.2	88.9	3179	60.3	81.9
Greek Catholic	9	0.1	0.2	180	3.4	9.7
Orthodox	20	0.2	0.4	34	0.7	0.9
Czechoslovak Hussite	173	1.7	3.8	0	0	0
Evangelical Bohemian Brethren	191	1.9	4.2	2	0	0
Silesian Evangelical	49	0.5	1.1	1	0	0
Slovak Evangelical	3	0	0.1	326	6.2	8.5
Slovak Reformed	4	0	0.1	85	1.6	2.2
Other	53	0.5	1.2	29	0.6	0.8

Source: Kalvada, *The Breakup of Czechoslovakia*, 50.

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Appendix B

Party Strength in First Republic Elections (percentage of total votes cast)				
Parties	1920	1925	1929	1935
Agrarians	9.7	13.7	15	14.3
Social Democrats	25.6	8.9	13	12.6
National Socialists	8.1	8.6	10.4	9.2
Czechoslovak Populists	11.3	9.7	8.4	7.5
National Democrats	6.2	4	3.9	5.6
Small Tradesmen	2	4	3.9	5.4
Hlinka Slovak Populists	-	6.9	5.8	6.9
Communists	-	13.1	10.2	10.3
German Social Democrats	11.1	5.8	6.9	3.6
German Christian Social Democrats	2.5	4.4	4.7	2
German Agrarians	3.9	8	5.4	-
German Nationalists	5.3	3.4	2.6	-
Sudete Deutsche Partrel	-	-	-	15.2
German-Magyar Christian Socialists	4	1.6	3.5	3.5

Source: Skalnik Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 51.

Appendix C

State and Regional Party Strength in Slovakia (percentage of total vote)				
	Election Year			
	1920	1925	1929	1935
Statewide parties	66	28	40.5	38.7
Regional parties				
(Magyar and Slovak)	26.8	45.2	44.2	44.3
Communist Party	-	13.9	10.7	13
Other Ethnicities	3.4	11.4	2.4	2

Source: Skalnik Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 71.

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Appendix D

Nationality	Czech Republic		Slovak Republic		CSFR	
	1991		1991		1991	
	Thousand	%	Thousand	%	Thousand	%
Czech	8373	81.3	53	1	8426	54.1
Moravian	1356	13.2	4	0.1	1360	8.7
Silesian	44	0.4	1	0	45	0.3
Slovak	308	3	4512	85.6	4820	31
Hungarian	20	0.2	567	10.8	587	3.8
Rome	33	0.3	81	1.5	114	0.7
Polish	59	0.6	3	0.1	62	0.4
German	48	0.5	5	0.1	53	0.4
Russian	2	0	17	0.3	19	0.1
Ukrainian	7	0.1	14	0.3	21	0.1
Other	23	0.2	7	0.1	30	0.2
Not Ascertained	26	0.2	5	0.1	31	0.2
TOTAL	10299	100	5269	100	15568	100

Source: DEMOGRAFIE 34, no.1, 1992.

Appendix E

Republic and Party	Chamber of People			Chamber of Nations				National Councils			
	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats		Votes		Seats	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Czech Republic	7,245,450	68.11%	101	7,232,125	68.11%	75	50%	7,211,047	69.86%	200	57.14%
Slovakia	3,393,046	31.89%	49	3,386,155	31.89%	75	50%	3,111,288	31.14%	150	42.86%
Total	10,638,496	100%	150	10,618,280	100%	150	100%	10,322,335	100%	350	100%

Source: Olson, *Democratization and Political Participation: the Experience of the Czech Republic*, 174.

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Appendix F

Party Votes and seats in elections to the Federal Assembly and National Councils in Czechoslovakia, 1992											
	Chamber of People			Chamber of Nations				National Councils			
	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats		Votes		Seats	
Republic and Party	Number	Percentage	Number	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Czech Republic	6,483,462	67.72%	99	6,485,739	67.74%	75	50%	6,473,250	67.81%	200	57.14%
Slovakia	3,090,974	32.28%	51	3,088,426	32.26%	75	50%	3,072,696	32.19%	150	42.86%
Total	9,574,436	100%	150	9,574,165	100%	150	100%	9,545,946	100%	350	100%

Source: Olson, *Democratization and Political Participation: the Experience of the Czech Republic*, 174.

Appendix G

Public Opinion on the Preferred Form of Czech-Slovak State Relationship (in percent)					
	Unitary State	Federation	Confederation	Independence	Other/Don't Know
Jun-90					
Czech Republic	30	45	-	12	13
Slovakia	14	63	-	13	6
Nov-91					
Czech Republic	39	30	4	5	22
Slovakia	20	26	27	14	13
Mar-92					
Czech Republic	34	27	6	11	22
Slovakia	13	24	32	17	14

Source: Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State*, 138.

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Appendix H

Trust in leading governmental bodies (in percentage)						
Trust	Feb. 23-28, 1990			April 23-May 5, 1990		
	Yes	No	Don't know	Yes	No	Don't know
President of the Republic	88	9	3	88	10	2
Federal Government	83	11	6	81	16	3
Czech and Slovak Republic Govts	79	13	8	78	16	6
Federal Assembly	76	19	5	54	41	5
Local National Committees	31	58	11	31	60	9

Source: Wolchik. *Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics, and Society*, 117.

Appendix I

Indicators of economic trends in the Czech Republic since 1989				
	1989	1990	1991	1992
Real GDP (in millions 1990 U.S. dollars)	34,254	33,837	29,027	27,173
% change previous year	1.4	-1.2	-14.2	-6.4
Rate of Inflation	2.3	10.8	56.7	11.1
Rate of Unemployment	0	0.8	4.10	2.6
GDP - % change over previous year				
rate of inflation - % change in end of year retail/consumer prices				
rate of unemployment - end of period				
note: 1989, 1990 numbers for Czechoslovak Federation				

Appendix J

Indicators of economic trends in the Slovakia since 1989				
	1989	1990	1991	1992
Real GDP (in millions 1990 U.S. dollars)	15,888	15,489	13,236	12,364
% change previous year	1.4	-2.5	-14.5	-6.6
Rate of Inflation	2.3	10.8	61.2	10.1
Rate of Unemployment	0	0.8	11.8	10.3
GDP - % change over previous year				
rate of inflation - % change in end of year retail/consumer prices				
rate of unemployment - end of period				
note: 1989, 1990 numbers for Czechoslovak Federation				

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Appendix K

Czech Republic Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at constant 1990 U.S. dollars				
	1989	1990	1991	1992
Per Capita	3,325	3,283	2,815	2,633
% increase over previous year	-	-1.26	-14.26	-6.47

Source: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, New York: No. 44, 30 Nov 1997.

Appendix L

Slovak Republic Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at constant 1990 U.S. dollars				
	1989	1990	1991	1992
Per Capita	3,035	2,947	2,508	2,333
% increase over previous year	-	-2.90	-14.90	-6.98

Source: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, New York: No. 44, 30 Nov 1997.

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The Bush Administration and NMD: Motivations for Policy

Adam R. Nunnallee

The United States of America has entered the twenty-first century as the main political and military power in the international system. The international system today, however contains many states that possess the capability to launch a nuclear-armed ballistic missile attack. During the Cold War a system of nuclear deterrence was pursued by the United States against the Soviet Union. Under the nuclear deterrence strategy the United States never entered into a nuclear conflict with another state or any other actor in the international system. The Cold War, despite massive nuclear arms buildups on both sides, did not result in any type of nuclear conflict. The nuclear deterrence policy of the United States was successful in discouraging the use of nuclear weapons even at times of imminent conflict. The deterrence policy used by the United States was an outright success in avoiding nuclear conflict, but the administration of President George W. Bush has moved away from deterrence and assumed a policy of national missile defense.

Clearly the practice of a deterrence policy during the Cold War kept the United States out of a nuclear conflict. If deterrence was such a success why has the Bush administration moved away from an exclusive policy of nuclear deterrence and assumed a policy of national missile defense? The concept of national missile defense or ballistic missile defense, whichever term one prefers politically speaking, is to use satellites to monitor ballistic missile launches by an enemy and then launch defensive systems to destroy the enemy missiles before they reach the defender's territory. The change in policy by the Bush administration is important because deterrence proved to be successful without a national missile defense system in place. There is a fear that the creation of an NMD system could trigger another arms race like the one that was seen during the Cold War. At the present time a nuclear offensive is not seen as a viable option for any nuclear equipped state because of the fear of the destruction they would receive from another nuclear power in retaliation. If a nuclear power could defend against retaliation from another nuclear power due to an NMD system then it might be more likely to launch a nuclear offensive of its own. Many NMD critics have voiced this concern since its conception in the 1980s.

The question of why the Bush administration has chosen to pursue a policy of national missile defense is clearly important. To understand why the Bush administration has taken this route in its foreign policy it is important to understand why the previous administrations of Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush did not pursue NMD to the same extent as the current administration. It is important to understand the state of the international system during those previous administrations to find out what has changed to prompt the Bush administration to pursue NMD. In order to answer this question theory on state behavior in the international system will be applied to these specific circumstances. The application of theory on state behavior will help to introduce possible motivations for the Bush administration's NMD policy. New theory may be developed to answer this question also, because no national missile defense system has ever been built before by any nation.

After presenting the different theoretical explanations for why the Bush administration has pursued NMD, the strengths and weaknesses of each explanation will be analyzed. The validity of each explanation will be weighed against how well the theory explains past behavior and the new behavior of the Bush administration. Evidence that strengthens or weakens each theory will also be presented to find why Bush has pursued a policy of NMD instead of the proven system of deterrence. All possible answers to the question will be considered equally in order to find the best possible explanation for the actions of the Bush administration. After considering all explanations for the move towards NMD the

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findings from these explanations will be interpreted in order to find if any broader implications for state behavior or the international system are present.

In summary it is important to discuss and understand why President Bush made the decision to leave deterrence and pursue a policy of national missile defense. This is because deterrence was a successful strategy for the United States during the Cold War. Deterrence helped America avoid a nuclear conflict during many close calls like the Cuban missile crisis. This brings up a question: If policies worked so well for so many years why abandon them for a new and unproven one? It is important to study why the Bush administration pursued the NMD policy in order to study how our leaders make policy decisions. Some of the reasons why President Bush chose NMD over deterrence might be useful in creating theory about how the President of the United States makes policy. Most importantly, NMD is one of the most controversial issues in American politics today because the stakes are very high. American relations with the rest of the world will be affected by whether or not we deploy NMD. If the wrong strategy on NMD is taken, then the United States could force itself into armed conflict that would otherwise be avoided.

The implications of the Bush administration pursuing NMD are very important. First, the decision to pursue NMD will affect U.S. relations with China and Russia. If the United States violates the 1972 ABM treaty, which NMD will, Russia may try to start another arms race like during the Cold War. Also, it is feared that American NMD creation will cause Russia and China to stop adhering to non-proliferation treaties and give missile and other weapon technology to states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. A final implication of American NMD creation is the way that this policy will affect U.S. allies. Many states in Europe have voiced displeasure with American NMD efforts, while allies in East Asia have been more receptive to the idea.

Hypotheses Section

Hypothesis 1:

I hypothesize that the Bush administration has left its policy of nuclear deterrence and has moved to a policy of NMD due to an increasing ballistic missile threat from states that are acknowledged as states of concern.

The United States no longer has one main threat against national security. During the Cold War the main security focus of the United States was to avoid nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. Today there is no other superpower present to rival the United States, but there are less powerful states that could present a challenge to the national security of the United States. A potential future superpower, China, joins Russia as a viable threat to the United States. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and most recently Afghanistan, are listed by the United States as states of concern. If the Bush administration were to develop and deploy a national missile defense system national security would be increased and states of concern would be less of a threat to the United States.

The theory behind Hypothesis 1 is that President Bush was led to pursue NMD policy because a new ballistic missile threat to the United States is developing.

Hypothesis 2:

I hypothesize that pressure from interest groups inside the United States that are committed to NMD caused the Bush administration to leave its policy of nuclear deterrence and pursue a policy of NMD.

Interest groups play an important role in influencing the type of policies that an administration will pursue. Interest groups divert large amounts of funding toward lobbying politicians in order to gain support for the issue or issues that they are concerned with. Interest groups can be very powerful due to the large numbers of people that they represent; or, a relatively small group of people with strong lobbying power and influence can emerge due to financial strength and organization. If interest groups have begun to support NMD then the Bush administration must listen to these concerns. If the influence of interest groups that support NMD is strong enough the Bush administration may change its deterrence policy to a policy of NMD. Interest groups in the United States are also made up of businesses, industries, think

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tanks, and other organizations. All of these groups have been known to influence the policy that politicians make.

The theory behind this hypothesis is that those people or groups that helped them gain office will influence politicians, even the president, in policy decisions.

Hypothesis 3:

I hypothesize that the United States has developed the technology to build an NMD system, which has prompted the Bush administration to abandon its deterrence policy and assume a policy of NMD.

In the past the United States did not have the technology to build a national missile defense system. Now the United States has the technology to develop and build an NMD system. The previous administrations did not have a choice of whether or not to develop an NMD system because they did not have the necessary technology to do so. A lack of technology was the only thing keeping previous administrations from pursuing NMD and now the Bush administration has the necessary technology.

The theory behind this explanation is that the Bush administration is the first to proceed with deployment of an NMD system because earlier administrations did not have the technology to deploy NMD.

Hypothesis 4:

I hypothesize that President Bush chose to leave deterrence policy and pursue an NMD policy for the United States due to pressure from inside his administration to pursue NMD.

The President of the United States is the most powerful leader in the world, but this does not mean that the president is an expert in every policy area. The president relies on his cabinet and advisors to keep him up to date on all issues in various areas. Therefore not every policy that President Bush supports is solely of his own creation. That policy was developed through consultation with his advisors and his cabinet. Due to this input it is possible that the president is being led to support an NMD policy for the United States by the influence of an individual or individuals inside his administration.

The theory behind this hypothesis is that because President Bush does not create his policies on his own, he may be influenced to pursue NMD from pressure inside his administration by a specific individual or individuals.

Evidence Section

Evidence 1:

During the Cold War the United States focused all security measures against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union followed the same type of security policy, which made nuclear deterrence the best policy for avoiding nuclear conflict between the superpowers. Today the United States is the only remaining superpower after the fall of the Soviet Union, while China is the closest peer competitor to the United States. America is not rivaled by another large state with nuclear capabilities like it was during the Cold War. China has nuclear weapons and is large, but is nowhere close to the same type of threat as the U.S.S.R. was during the Cold War. Moreover, unlike in the Cold War, the United States is not in a period of high tension with another nuclear-armed state. American national security today is threatened by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to less powerful states that are known as states of concern. The United States's national security could also be threatened by nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups inside these states. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are listed as states of concern by the United States. These countries are rising ballistic missile powers or are trying to obtain ballistic missile technology, but Russia and China still remain. There may be some evidence that the Bush administration is pushing for a national missile defense system and moving away from deterrence due to the threat coming from states of concern.

States of concern that have not been militarily powerful in the past compared to the United States are trying to develop missile technology to complement the improvement of their conventional forces. For example, Iran has created an ambitious domestic arms development sector since an embargo by the United States in the early 1980s. Iran has built and produced its own tanks, armored personnel carriers, a fighter plane, and, most importantly, missiles. Iran has built and tested a ballistic missile with a range of eight

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hundred miles. The missile can carry a one-ton warhead. The State Department sees the Iranian development of medium-range ballistic missile technology as a threat because it threatens allies to the United States and could lead to the development of long-range missile technology. Israel has voiced concern over the Iranian development of missile technology. The Clinton administration cited missile threats from Iran as justification for a national missile defense system and the Bush administration has begun a real pursuit of implementing this type of thinking.

Some critics have said that nuclear attack from states of concern is not a real threat because their missile technology is not good enough to attack the United States. This is not really true because even inaccurate or unreliable ballistic missiles are a threat to the United States's national security if they are equipped with a nuclear warhead. The possibility that a rogue state could obtain nuclear material has increased with the fall of the Soviet Union. Unauthorized sales and smuggling of materials used to make nuclear weapons are a possibility in the former Soviet Union due to a lack of government control. The United States fears that states of concern that are developing ballistic missiles may some day be able to equip those missiles with nuclear warheads. The instability in the current Russian government also gives the United States a reason to build a national missile defense system despite Russia's commitment to not target U.S. territory. The United States cannot assume that Russia and China are no longer possible threats just because of some democratization in Russia and trade ties with China. China is also seen as a possible nuclear threat to the United States because of disagreements over proliferation of nuclear technology, nuclear materials, and the ever-present issue of Taiwan.

In 1996 China attempted to influence Taiwan's elections by conducting so-called ballistic missile tests near Taiwan. During these same times at least one Chinese official made not-so-subtle threats to attack Los Angeles if the United States interfered with the Chinese attempt to influence the Taiwanese election. The Chinese threat may not be seen as a viable option today due to the U. S. nuclear arsenal, but a threat of that type of attack must be considered a threat to U.S. national security. Former Defense Secretary Les Aspin frequently argued that the United States could be threatened by rogue states as they obtain better and better missiles. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq already possess ballistic missile technology and are constantly trying to improve the range of these weapons. If these weapons are combined with a growing problem of nuclear proliferation a real threat to U.S. national security could occur. The growing number of states with ballistic missiles also makes it harder and harder for the U.S. to predict when and where an attack could come from. This presents the possibility that an unpredictable rogue leader could hold the entire international system hostage to his whims.

President Bush addressed this very concern in May 2001 in a speech at the National Defense University. Bush said that rogue states that are seeking weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, might not be deterred by the possibility of U.S. retaliation. Bush argued that without missile defenses the United States and others could be susceptible to nuclear blackmail by rogue states. The United States does not want possible proliferation of nuclear capabilities to rogue states to allow those states to assume a more influential role in the international system solely due to their nuclear capabilities. The Bush administration feels that moving to build a national missile defense system would neutralize to an extent the power of these rogue states should they obtain nuclear warheads and long-range ballistic missile technology.

In order to have a good understanding of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, each of the ballistic missile capabilities of each of the five states of concern must be analyzed. All of these nations either have the capability to hit the United States with ballistic missiles or are trying to develop long-range missile technology for the future. The spread of long-range missiles warrants concern not on the issue of whether or not countries are likely to use the missiles, but on the consequences of a ballistic missile hitting the United States. The development of nuclear programs in these states has only stoked this fear. One missile hitting a major U.S. city would cause a catastrophic loss in human life.

The scale of the potential long-range missile threat that Russia poses to the United States exceeds that of any other country by a long shot. Like the United States, Russian missiles can be fired at a moment's notice. Russian missiles are highly accurate and are used to target both American cities as well as military installations such as missile silos. As of mid year 2000, Russia possessed 756 land-based ICBMs

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equipped with 3,540 warheads, as well as 348 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) equipped with 1,576 warheads. These numbers will likely fall further during the next decade. Under the terms of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II), Moscow and Washington have agreed to reduce deployment to 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads apiece. Under this agreement they will also eliminate land-based multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and to deploy no more than 1,750 warheads on SLBMs. Moscow has agreed to destroy its largest and most destructive land-based ICBM, the SS-18.

U.S. and Russian officials are also engaged in discussions on a START III treaty. Through negotiations Washington and Moscow agreed that the treaty might someday reduce the number of warheads to two thousand to twenty-five hundred. This number is seen to be how many warheads the United States needs to keep its nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration may be even more open to deep cuts in warheads according to a statement by President Bush during his campaign. Bush stated, "the Cold War logic that led to the creation of massive stockpiles on both sides is now outdated. Our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of terror." Over the next ten years President Bush has pledged to reduce American nuclear warheads to between seventeen hundred and twenty-two hundred while President Putin has pledged in the same time span to reduce the Russian nuclear warhead arsenal to fewer than fifteen hundred. President Bush stated that his agreement with Mr. Putin is enough to ensure these reductions, but Congress would like to see formal documentation of the agreement.

The number of Russian ballistic missiles will probably drop due to problems with funding. But while a steep drop in the number of Russian strategic warheads is likely, it is not inevitable. Much depends on whether Moscow adheres to START II, which it might abandon if the United States builds an NMD system. U.S. intelligence officials and civilian observers agree that without START II, the only thing preventing Russia from keeping its multiple warhead missiles, Moscow could maintain a force of three to four thousand strategic warheads for at least the next decade. This is not including the many thousands of short-range nuclear weapons that the Russians possess. Russian early warning systems and an aging nuclear arsenal may be of even greater concern to the United States than the possibility of a ballistic missile attack.

Almost 60 percent of Russia's ballistic missiles have exceeded their operational life span, and its modernization programs are hampered by a lack of funding. This situation is actually even worse because aging Russian missiles remain on hair-trigger alert, with the coordinates of U.S. targets in their computers, ready to launch at any time. Russian early warning systems may be even more of a problem than the age of their missiles. In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a rocket to study the northern lights and Russian radar mistook it for a nuclear attack on Moscow. President Yeltsin was alerted and nuclear codes activated before the mistake was discovered. Despite these problems, the U.S. intelligence community believes that accidental launch from Russia is unlikely as long as current technical and procedural safeguards are in place. This is a highly debated issue in the U.S. because no one knows for sure how large an accidental or unauthorized launch by Russia would be. An accidental attack would probably be one warhead, but an unauthorized rogue launch would send ten missiles. Also between forty-eight and two hundred warheads could be launched by a Russian submarine depending on class.

The real question to ask about Russia is what would happen if Russia deliberately attacked the United States. In such a situation, Moscow would probably fire a thousand warheads or more at the United States. Dozens to hundreds could also hit America's NATO allies and other countries deemed to threaten Moscow. Even if deep cuts in Russia's arsenal are made with the START treaties, Russia will still have this type of striking ability. Moscow will likely retain several hundred ICBMs if it proceeds with de-MIRVing, and its SLBMs will remain MIRVed.

China's strategic nuclear arsenal of twenty single-warhead ICBMs is only a fraction of the size of the Russian arsenal, and far less sophisticated. China has one ballistic missile submarine and it rarely leaves port with missiles with a range of about one thousand miles. Chinese rockets are liquid fueled and based on a 1960s design, which is relatively inaccurate. As a result the Chinese have chosen a counter-value strategy over a counterforce strategy. This means the Chinese target American cities with their ballistic missiles and not smaller military sites. Beijing is believed to have opted for this minimal deterrent

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posture rather than the far larger counterforce arsenals that the United States and Russia developed because of cost considerations and because China believes the threat to destroy major population centers is sufficient to deter Washington and Moscow from attacking its territory.

Presently China is expanding and modernizing its strategic forces. It is developing two ICBMs known as the Dongfeng-31 and Dongfeng-41. Both are road mobile in order to prevent the threat of U.S. or Russian attacks destroying the Chinese second strike capability. These missiles would replace the Dongfeng-5A, the current ICBM in the Chinese arsenal, which was deployed in 1981. China is also developing an SLBM that could hit targets in at least parts of the United States from Chinese territorial waters. Although none of these missiles are expected to be delivered for several years, the Chinese are still a threat due to their other ballistic missiles. China's decision to modernize should not be alarming in and of itself because it has relatively primitive nuclear forces to begin with. It should be noted that the United States continues to modernize its SLBM forces even as it cuts nuclear stockpiles.

More importantly is whether or not China will substantially expand the number of ICBMs and ICBM warheads it possesses from twenty. Experts disagree on the answer, though they do agree that China is not likely to approach even the low end of reduced U.S. or Russian arsenals. U.S. intelligence analysts believe that "by 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted against the United States, having added a few tens of more survivable land-based and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads." Chinese officials repeatedly state that they will tie the size and speed of their modernization efforts to what the United States decides to do on its national missile defense program.

If China were to launch a missile attack against the United States it might actually launch all twenty of its ICBMs. This is because they might feel that any missile not fired in the first attack would be destroyed in an American retaliatory attack. The number of missiles that could be fired in an accidental launch is not presently clear, but an accidental launch is less of a threat from China than it is from Russia. This is because China maintains its ICBMs without fuel or warheads, unlike Moscow. This makes it impossible for Beijing to strike quickly, but it also prevents the Chinese from firing missiles accidentally or erroneously under normal alert conditions. This stance by the Chinese is less threatening to its enemies but does make its deterrent vulnerable to a first strike by highly accurate U.S. missiles. Most experts agree that China will most likely deploy their next round of missiles with the warheads already in place just as Russia and the United States do. However, China will not adopt a launch on warning posture, like the Russians, because they lack the early warning radar needed to detect a missile strike.

When the Clinton administration justified its proposal on an NMD system they saw a need to respond to the potential threat posed by three countries that the U.S. State Department referred to as "rogue states." These three states are North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Assessments of these three states' ballistic missile capabilities have vacillated in the intelligence community. In the early and mid-1990s the major declared nuclear powers were seen as the only states in the next fifteen or so years that could threaten the United States with ballistic missile attack. In the late 1990s, the view that new ballistic missile powers posed a threat to the United States that was "broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly" began to gain popularity. Critics who argue that this report is inherently flawed feel that fears of ballistic missile proliferation were overblown in the report intentionally by its authors.

North Korea has the most advanced ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program out of the three rogue states. They have produced and exported short-range missiles based on Soviet Scud designs that have a range of 180 to 300 miles. These types of missiles are suited for use against South Korea, and cannot reach Japan or any other American ally in East Asia. North Korea has deployed the No Dong, a single-stage liquid-fueled, intermediate range missile that it first tested in the early 1990s, which can travel up to eight hundred miles. This gives North Korea the ability to hit Japan and they have the ability to produce up to one hundred No Dongs a year.

The long-range capabilities of the North Korean ballistic missile program were originally underestimated in the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate. The 1995 NIE said that North Korea was developing a missile that could possibly "strike portions of Alaska and Hawaii" but it still regarded North Korea as "unlikely to obtain the technological capability to develop a longer range ICBM." Supporters of NMD felt this to be a faulty assessment and created the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the

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United States, known as the Rumsfeld Commission. The commission found that the intelligence community had underestimated the North Korean ballistic missile threat. The commission felt that if North Korea could harm any part of the United States that it was a threat, not just the continental forty-eight states. The commission stated that North Korea "would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability" and went on to say, "the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment."

The commission bases this assessment on the North Korean test in August 1998 of their Taepo Dong-1 missile. The test failed in the final stage, but indicated that North Korea was developing the ability to build multistage missiles capable of traveling to other continents. It is seen as highly likely that North Korean scientists continue to work on developing the Taepo Dong-2 and other ICBM technologies in their laboratories. The 1999 NIE stated that North Korea could develop ICBM technology in the next fifteen years, but the Rumsfeld Commission report stated that North Korea could have this capability in as little as five years. This equates to the U.S. intelligence community saying that North Korea will have ICBM technology between 2005 and 2015. This appears to be the best estimate available concerning North Korean ballistic missile capabilities.

While North Korea has tested a missile with the potential to strike the United States, Iran has not developed such a capability. Iran has focused its ballistic missile efforts on developing medium-range missiles capable of hitting Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional targets. Current Iranian focus is on the Shahab 3, a one-stage missile with an eight hundred mile range and one-ton payload. It has been tested three times; in the first it exploded during launch, and in 2000 when it worked once and failed once. Teheran is currently also working on the Shahab 4, with a range of about twelve hundred miles, and the Shahab 5, with a range of up to thirty-three hundred miles. This long-range Shahab would have to travel at least twice that far in order to strike a major city in the United States.

Iran is seen as a threat because it used North Korean designs to build the Shahabs, but has improved them with the help of Russian and Chinese technology. Because Iran received help from Russia and China, the Rumsfeld Commission felt that "the ballistic missile infrastructure in Iran is now more sophisticated than that of North Korea." Considering the quality of Iranian technology and their commitment to developing medium range missiles, the 1999 NIE states "Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in the latter half of the next decade."

Some hope for American relations with Iran to improve due to the 2000 election of a reformist majority in parliament. The U.S. has lifted some economic sanctions on Iran in hope of encouraging Iran to pursue a more moderate foreign policy. There is no evidence however that that effort by the United States has achieved the intended result or that the reformists are successful in Iran; hardliners, led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, remain in control. Even if the U.S. gains better relations with Iran, it does not mean that they will not develop an ICBM. Despite more moderate rule in the Iranian government, the moderates may also see the development of an ICBM system and nuclear weapons as essential to deterring the West, Iraq, and Israel. It must also be noted that what is considered a moderate party in Iran is not the same as a moderate party in the United States. The United States actually supplied Iran with a nuclear research reactor during American support for the shah. Coupling this fact with the desire of Ayatollah Khamenei, who continues to dominate Iran despite the 2000 elections, to possess a nuclear bomb, makes it very likely that Iran has had a nuclear weapons program for at least fifteen years.

Iraq's ballistic missile program lags far behind the other rogue states. This is because of the consequences of the Persian Gulf War and not through any lack of desire to develop a missile program. The United States destroyed much of Iraq's missile infrastructure during the war and as part of the cease-fire Iraq agreed to not develop any missiles with a range of more than one hundred miles. Iraq cooperated with the UN inspections reluctantly and repeatedly tried to conceal the status of all of its banned programs such as missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons. As American and British officials predicted, bombing in 1998 in response to Iraq barring UN weapon inspections did not stop Iraq's ballistic missile program permanently. Iraq has resumed test flights in 2000 of a short-range missile as permitted under UN restrictions. It is feared that Iraq is again attempting to hide further missile development. Iraq is said to be pursuing technology on ballistic missiles from Russia and China.

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Iraq is seen as a threat to the United States due to its history of misleading the United Nations inspection teams, which suggests the possibility of Iraq secretly developing ballistic missiles. Although the bombing by the United States during Desert Storm and Desert Fox knocked out Iraq's ballistic missile infrastructure, Iraq still has a substantial knowledge base and may have hidden missile parts and equipment for production. The 1999 NIE concluded "Iraq could test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States during the next fifteen years." The analysts on the NIE were undecided on whether or not this was "unlikely" or "likely" before 2015. The 1999 NIE said that if Iraq could buy a Taepo Dong-2 from North Korea it could have launch capability within months of purchase.

In summary there appears to be a real threat to the United States from ballistic missiles. There appears to be enough evidence to conclude that President Bush left a policy of deterrence and pursued a policy of national missile defense due to an increasing ballistic missile threat from states of concern. This proliferation of hostile states with possible nuclear and ballistic capabilities creates a situation inherently more dangerous and unstable than the Cold War. Russia has a sophisticated array of ICBMs and is a tactical threat as well as a threat of accidental launch. China has a limited, but improving, ballistic missile program that can hit the United States. Iran has the most promising program of the rogue states while North Korea already may have an ICBM that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. Finally, Iraq does not pose an immediate ballistic threat to the U.S. but may in the next twenty years. This evidence seems sufficient enough to accept the hypothesis that President Bush is pursuing a national missile defense policy for the United States due to an increasing ballistic missile threat from states of concern.

Evidence 2:

The Bush administration may have been prompted to pursue a policy of national missile defense due to pushing from interest groups inside the United States. These interest groups include think tanks that have been producing literature that supports building a national missile defense system since before the end of the Cold War. The military industrial complex has also supported the creation of a national missile defense system due to the large contracts that would be awarded by the U.S. government to their industry. Logically companies that might build components of a national missile defense system would push the Bush administration towards an NMD policy. President Bush has already increased funding for ballistic missile defense during his current term. The \$8.3 billion Bush has requested for next year's ballistic missile defense budget is an increase of \$3 billion from fiscal year 2001. Support from the military industrial complex became even stronger when the Bush administration announced that more companies would be hired to work on the same NMD technology in order to increase the odds of developing a working system sooner.

The Boeing Co. is the prime contractor for the national missile defense system and has the power to evaluate what companies could potentially join the program in the future. Boeing contracts many companies inside the military industrial complex to build different components for a national missile defense system. These contracts are usually very large and last for several years. Raytheon, which is developing a homing device for the missiles, has a contract with Boeing that runs through 2007 for an amount that Raytheon will not disclose. Boeing possessed the contracting position before the Bush administration came to power and has profited greatly from Bush's choice to increase NMD funding and research. Any company that builds technology that is useful for building a national missile defense system would stand to possibly profit greatly from the government pursuit of such a defense system. The military industrial complex has clearly benefited financially from researching missile defense in the past because more than \$50 billion has been spent since the early 1980s on missile defense technology. The emphasis put on NMD by the Bush administration should please the industry, which supports Bush in his decision to pursue NMD.

Other large military contractors would also benefit from the creation of a U.S. national missile defense system. Lockheed Martin Corp. provided a rocket used in test flights in 1999 along with Boeing built rockets from United Technologies and Alliant Techsystems. The possibility of a backup set of hardware developers may improve the odds of developing a successful system, which is due to the large budget that the Bush administration has set aside for NMD. Military contractors are part of a very large lobbying group in Washington and employ many people. Senators and Congressmen must listen to their constituen-

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cies in their home districts, where frequently military and defense contractors are major employers. If these contractors have a missile defense system to build, then they can maintain or increase employment levels. This allows firms in the military industrial complex to indirectly pressure the Bush administration to establish a national missile defense system. The Bush administration could lose support from people who will lose jobs if they cut back on military spending and fail to support NMD programs that those companies participate in developing.

One of the strongest proponents of deploying a national missile defense system is the Heritage Foundation, which was founded in 1973. The group is a think tank that "formulates and promotes conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense." The Heritage Foundation lists the modification of the ABM treaty and the creation of a national missile defense system as one of its key issues. They have created several publications that urge American politicians to pursue NMD such as *Issues 2000: Missile Defense: Ending America's Vulnerability* and *Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat*. Outside of these books members of the Heritage Foundation have published at least twenty-four studies and articles concerning the creation of an NMD system for the United States. These publications concern NMD deployment options, Russia and the ABM Treaty, NMD concerning China and Asia, and the concerns with rogue states. The Heritage Foundation also has four staff members that are policy experts on missile defense that regularly write on behalf of the foundation.

The Heritage Foundation dedicated an entire chapter in its latest publication, *Priorities for the President*, to persuading President Bush to push for national missile defense for the United States. The foundation points out that the National Intelligence Council concluded in 1999 that the United States will face ICBM threats "from Russia, China, North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq" in the next fifteen years. The foundation feels that the current administration has the best opportunity to deploy NMD in the United States and outlines what the President should do:

Immediately upon taking office, President George W. Bush should issue two directives that affirm America's commitment to defending Americans by deploying missile defense and that describe the global architecture of that system. The President will need to motivate the relevant executive branch agencies--the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community--to implement these directives. And he will have to clearly demonstrate his desire to uphold the mandate of the American people, who regardless of the closeness of the presidential race overwhelmingly want the federal government to protect the country from ballistic missile attack.

The Heritage Foundation urges the Bush administration to explain the benefits and capabilities to Americans that an NMD system could bring the United States if such a system were deployed. They urge the Bush administration to go beyond developing the technology for a limited missile defense architecture like the Clinton administration and actually set goals for the deployment of the "initial architecture's components and follow-on systems." The foundation wants President Bush to use presidential orders to ensure the research, development, and deployment of an NMD system for the United States. These orders would be used to direct the Department of State and the intelligence community on how to negotiate an NMD policy with American allies. The Heritage Foundation tries to push the Bush administration to create NMD arguing that lack of NMD endangers American homeland security. They emphasize that the only way to implement NMD in the United States is through strong leadership from the executive branch.

Not all think tanks have such a strong opinion in favor of President Bush pursuing national missile defense. Think tanks like the Hudson Institute at Stanford University and the Brookings Institution take a pro-NMD stance that is much less aggressive than the Heritage Foundation. Michael O'Hanlon at the Brookings Institution, for example, has recommended the U.S. pursue a limited national missile defense system because it will defend against rogue states, yet be more acceptable to China and Russia. The Hudson Institute has also taken a less radical route in recommending NMD for the Bush administration. Herbert London, president of the Hudson Institute, says the U.S. must have NMD to protect America. He goes on to say that Saddam Hussein will develop a weapon of mass destruction, despite UN sanctions. According to London the U.S. should pull out of the ABM Treaty because we are in a rut of "post- Cold War

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complacency." He does advocate gradually implementing NMD in order to avoid diplomatic problems with Russia and China. So clearly the Heritage Foundation is not the only think tank advocating NMD, but is the most radical pro-NMD think tank.

Some convincing evidence that President Bush was prompted by interest group politics to pursue NMD is the fact that the three main contractors working on NMD give large contributions to the Republican Party. Boeing Co., Lockheed Martin Corporation, and the Raytheon Co. are part of the military industrial complex that gave a total of \$5,929,692 to the Republican Party from 1998 to 2000. Lockheed Martin gave a total of \$757,400 in the same period while Boeing gave \$607,448 and Raytheon gave \$263,425 to the Republican Party. It is important to note that these companies gave roughly twice as much money to the Republican Party as they did to the Democratic Party, which stopped its NMD plans with President Clinton in early 2000. Since President Bush came into office in 2001 all three companies have increased their average per year donation to the Republican Party. For example Lockheed Martin in 2001 has already given \$10,000 more dollars than their average for the three years leading up to the election, 1998-2000.

Clearly the entire defense and aerospace industry gives a lot of money to both the Democrats and Republicans. While the industry gave the Republican Party around six million dollars, it also gave the Democratic party just under four million dollars. This does not appear to be a large enough disparity to show that the military industrial complex favors the Republican Party. These numbers are somewhat misleading because a large chunk of the total donation from the industry to the Democratic Party came from one company. Furthermore, this company does not deal in defense anymore. This company is Loral Space and Communications, which gave \$1,968,500 to the Democratic Party from 1998-2000. In the same period Loral only gave \$1,200 to the Republican Party. What is important to realize about Loral Space and Communications is that its party contribution constituted roughly 40 percent of the total donation to the Democrats. A key fact to this argument is that Loral sold all of its defense and computer systems business to Lockheed Martin in 1996.

Evidence that think tanks, as well as the military industrial complex, influenced President Bush in his NMD decision also exists. This is because President Bush has named former members of the Heritage Foundation, the most radical pro-NMD think tank, to political positions. The first of these people is Kay Cole James who was named by President Bush to become head of the Office of Personnel Management. James is currently a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. A second Bush appointee is Angela Antonelli, who was selected for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Policy, Management, and Budget. Antonelli left her position with the Heritage Foundation as director of the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies in order to take her government position. Also, President Bush selected Elaine Chao, a distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, to assume the role of Secretary of Labor. These appointments by President Bush are evidence that he is influenced or at least pays attention to members of the Heritage foundation, and could have been motivated by their ideas on national missile defense. An argument could be made though that President Bush has made appointments of former Heritage Foundation members in order to ensure political support from conservatives.

Some have argued that these appointments have more to do with keeping support from conservative voters in the United States than with national missile defense. This is because weak support from the right was seen as one of the reasons the President's father was not re-elected for a second term. The appointment of John Ashcroft to the position of Attorney General is seen to be an appeal by President Bush to the conservative parts of the Republican Party. Ashcroft is one of the GOP's most aggressive champions of religious conservative causes. Activists on the right who had begun to fear that Bush was giving too much ground to moderates in building a diverse and bipartisan administration welcomed the selection of Ashcroft. This is an example of conservatives that are not closely tied to NMD causes getting positions.

The possibility that President Bush pursued an NMD policy due to interest group pressure is hurt somewhat because none of the aforementioned appointees are in foreign policy positions. On the other hand President Bush did appoint Donald Rumsfeld as his Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld is a known conservative who is pro-NMD. While he is not a member of the Heritage Foundation his views on NMD fit well into the defense policy of the Heritage Foundation.

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Evidence that interest groups pushed President Bush to leave deterrence policy and pursue a policy of national missile defense is not as strong as evidence of a possible ballistic missile threat. The military industrial complex has a lot to gain from NMD implementation. Their industry would definitely not make as much money if the Democratic Party was in office because the Democrats would not be pursuing NMD, or at least not to the point President Bush is pursuing NMD. Also, conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation have shown some influence on the President. The best evidence for this influence is the appointment of three former Heritage Foundation members by President Bush to positions in the U.S. government. These appointments, combined with campaign donations from the military industrial complex, make the possibility that President Bush abandoned deterrence in favor of national missile defense because of interest group pressure a real possibility. This appears to be sufficient evidence to accept this hypothesis concerning the role of interest group politics and NMD policy.

Evidence 3:

One of the most important issues concerning the creation of a national missile defense system in the U.S. is whether or not it is technologically possible to create an NMD system. It is possible that until now deterrence was the only option for nuclear defense that the U.S. had due to a lack of technology. Put simply, the concept for national missile defense is to use networks of satellites to monitor ballistic missile launches and then launch rockets from the United States to shoot an enemy missile out of the sky. Around a half-dozen programs are operating in the U.S. under the umbrella of missile defense and are consuming more research and development money than any other category of weaponry in the U.S. military arsenal. There is a controversial debate over whether or not a national missile defense system could be created. Most of the companies working on developing the systems and components of the system, along with the Department of Defense, state that developing NMD is only a matter of working out small problems. Critics feel that the needed technology is far from ready and may not be possible in the near future.

The most recent failure in the testing of an NMD system came in July 2000, which prompted then-President Clinton to delay the pursuit of a basic national missile defense system. NMD proponents usually counter this recent failure with the October 1999 test that succeeded in destroying a target missile by way of a Global Positioning System inside a mock warhead above the Pacific Ocean. Critics point out the fact that this test was successful due to unrealistic testing under tightly controlled conditions. None of these tests used the kinds of sophisticated decoys that a real ballistic missile would use to confuse an antimissile system, but actually used a large balloon as a decoy that the system's sensors could easily distinguish from the target.

The August 2000 report from the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation (OOTE) highlighted the decoy problems in testing. The report also asserted that the Pentagon had not even scheduled a test involving multiple targets, which is the likely situation in a ballistic missile attack. The OOTE report also found software problems with training simulators that make it possible to appear as if twice as many warheads had been fired at the United States as had been intended in the 1999 test failure. The simulator actually failed also because it fired at "phantom tracks," which operators were unable to override. The OOTE report concluded, "Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions," and went on to state "such a capability is yet to be shown to be practicable for NMD." Of course the Pentagon along with developers disputed the report denying that the GPS system had guided the missiles in 1999. They also contended that the simulator did not fire at "phantom" missiles.

The Pentagon has acknowledged software problems with their simulators but said that future tests would be much tougher situations. These tests would include sophisticated decoys, multiple warheads, and different trajectories. Pentagon officials assured the Clinton administration and now the Bush administration that the development of an NMD system is only a matter of time. A spokesman for the organization, Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, said "We fully intend to stress the system to its maximum capability." Missile defense skeptics have countered optimism by the Pentagon and military contractors because they feel that tests have only shown that even the least advanced antimissile systems need years of testing to work. They feel that an advanced system, like the one needed to provide a national missile defense system, will take

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many more years of research and testing to develop. The Pentagon has most recently been studying a proposal by Boeing to install a basic antimissile system in Alaska by 2004 that would use existing radar and rockets as interim technology until more advanced systems were ready.

The main argument by the Pentagon and military contractors for the delays in development of NMD technology is that politics has slowed program development and not the technology itself. They blame delays on the absence of a firm commitment to develop NMD and shifts in research focus from elaborate space-based arsenals in the Reagan years to the predominantly ground-based architecture favored by the Clinton administration. Recently the Bush administration has expressed interest in protecting satellites, which could further the problem. One thing that the NMD supporters do have going for them technologically is that the Cold War 1980s left some technological legacies that could help develop a future national missile defense system. The U.S. has the best radars, infrared sensors, and composite materials for incorporation into the development of an NMD system.

A second argument that NMD technology developers have fielded is that they say failures in intercept tests can be attributed to lapses in quality control and not in the sophisticated technology. In other words the problems are not technical and easily solved. Examples of quality control problems include the failure of a simple cooling device in the Raytheon-built kill vehicle in a January 2000 test and low-tech problems such as battery failure in a booster built by Boeing. Development teams for military contractors feel that the science is not unknown for building an NMD system, but that it is a matter of "straight engineering" according to Shell Wald, program manager for Raytheon's "kill vehicle." This type of thinking by the Pentagon and military weapons developers could prompt lawmakers and President Bush to pursue a policy of national missile defense despite technology that is unproven to date.

The most recent tests of missile defense technology occurred on March 15, 2002. The Pentagon ran the tests off islands in the Pacific Ocean. The prototype interceptor missile struck a mock warhead in what is the fourth success out of six total tests of missile interceptors. Critics feel that this test proves nothing because the "kill vehicle" was told when the missile launched, what it looked like, and where it was headed. Pentagon spokespeople felt that this test was a "major step" in developing ABM technology. Whether or not the Pentagon has taken a large step towards developing technology for NMD is debatable. This most recent test does not yet clearly show that the United States has the capability to locate and destroy an enemy ICBM.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has been the strongest proponent of NMD development coming to the DoD. Appearing May 6, 2001, on NBC, Rumsfeld countered critics that say NMD will not do what it is supposed to do because of technological limitations. He felt it was "unfortunate" that people used the term "shield" in talking about missile defenses because this suggests greater capabilities than the administration envisions. Rumsfeld went on to say that an early American missile defense system would "certainly unlikely" be 100 percent perfect. In fact, he noted, "Most systems are imperfect; that is to say for every offense, there's a defense, and vice versa." Rumsfeld's points sum up the argument that is coming from the Pentagon to counter critics who say that the planned NMD system is ineffective. This argument makes the assertion that a limited defense will less antagonize Russia and China.

To summarize, the Pentagon and military developers have failed to develop national missile defense system technology. They point to a successful test in 1999, but the most recent tests had failed until March 2002. There is no sufficient evidence that the United States has the technology to develop national missile defense, and no evidence that it is feasible this will happen in the near future. Developers claim that they are close to developing NMD technology and it is only a matter of time until they do. The fact remains though, that they do not have the technological capabilities now. What is promising though is that present technology is much better than the past. This gives some credence to the idea that NMD technology is possible in the future. Unfortunately just because the technology is closer to being successful does not guarantee that an effective system can be created. Due to contrary evidence, the hypothesis that President Bush left deterrence policy in favor of NMD because of available NMD technology must be rejected. There is sufficient evidence to prove that the United States does not have the necessary technological capabilities to implement NMD at the present date.

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Evidence 4:

The Bush administration may not be motivated by sources outside the administration to pursue national missile defense instead of deterrence. Forces inside the administration have been long-time proponents of developing NMD. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld headed a panel on BMD, called less than bipartisan by many, that basically pushed for the development of NMD in Congress. Also when Rumsfeld teamed with now Vice President Dick Cheney during the Ford administration in the 1970s, they dominated a foreign policy weak president to put the administration on a track to oppose START II. Rumsfeld has been criticized as having an ideological bias because in the past he opposed "détente" with the Russians during the Cold War and still hangs on to those types of politics. During the late 1980s Rumsfeld headed the Committee for the Free World, which adamantly supported Reagan's Star Wars program.

When Rumsfeld served on Bob Dole's campaign the candidate made the development of NMD the first priority in U.S. national security. This type of background though may not have caused President Bush to pursue NMD because when selecting a Secretary of Defense Bush eliminated Senator Tom Ridge, Colin Powell's favorite, for being insufficiently pro-NMD. The Powell-Rumsfeld relationship is seen to balance inside the administration to some extent. Rumsfeld is much more conservative than Powell, who is more of a moderate. Rumsfeld's strong conservative tendencies were present during his time served with the Ford administration and the Dole campaign, but were also clearly seen when he was not directly involved in politics.

Despite the moderating influence brought to the administration by Colin Powell, the conservative history of Donald Rumsfeld cannot be overlooked. Rumsfeld was the leader of the chairman of the Committee for the Free World in 1989, which was a conservative think tank that went under in 1991. The Committee for the Free World was originally founded with \$125,000 from individuals and ultra-conservative foundations. Among the original founders were three of the major right wing foundations: Scaife, John M. Olin, and Smith Richardson. Rumsfeld, being the chairman in 1989, therefore has a history of being involved with groups that are pro-NMD.

The Committee for the Free World was an extremely anti-communist group that attempted to influence the Reagan administration. The group had three main principles, which were: to promote democracy, keep the public aware of threats to democracy, and oppose influence of those inside and outside of the United States, "who have made themselves the enemies of the democratic order." The CFW felt that President Reagan was not hard line enough with Gorbachev and they felt the United States should not cooperate with the Soviets in any way, especially arms reduction. The group was also a strong proponent of the Strategic Defense Initiative and along with other conservative groups pushed for SDI to become policy. A CFW member, Michael Ledeen, was actually involved with Col. Oliver North in the Iran-Contra affair. His work involved the development and dissemination of information. This is just one example of the ideological views of the CFW that Rumsfeld perpetuates today. Rumsfeld was involved with the CFW throughout the 1980s and was a staunch backer of their recommendations to the United States government, especially NMD.

The most important thing to know about Rumsfeld's time spent on the Ford administration is that he did influence policy. Rumsfeld is credited with pushing President Ford not to promote the SALT II treaty with the USSR. This agreement would have decreased the arms buildup between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. Advisors to President Ford have said that if he had gone along with SALT II, he would have probably been re-elected in 1976. President Ford made statements in a 1988 interview that show the extent of Rumsfeld's influence on his policy. When asked why his support for SALT II suddenly died, he replied, "The attitude in the Department of Defense made it impossible to proceed with SALT II." This appears to be convincing evidence that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld does influence presidents intentionally. This provides reason to believe that Rumsfeld has pushed his pro-national missile defense views on President Bush.

A second reason to believe that Rumsfeld could be exerting influence on President Bush is his close ties to Vice President Dick Cheney. Cheney served as White House Chief of Staff on the Ford administration where he was said to be mentored by Donald Rumsfeld, who was the Secretary of Defense for Presi-

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dent Ford. Cheney has much more government experience than Bush and is seen to be the most influential vice president in history. Cheney has said that he has no ambition to run for president himself, which Bush officials have stated makes him a good fit for advising the president. President Bush is considering having Cheney chair the meetings of the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council in 2002 on behalf of President Bush. This group will make recommendations on national security policy. This is far more power than any vice president has ever been given in the White House, especially Republican administrations that are notorious for isolating the vice president.

The fact that Vice President Cheney has such a high degree of influence in the White House and is an old compatriot of Rumsfeld makes it possible that Rumsfeld's pro-NMD ideas influenced President Bush. Cheney and Rumsfeld influenced policy during the Ford administration, so they could have done it again. This appears to be enough evidence to prove that President Bush abandoned deterrence policy for an NMD policy due to pressure from inside his administration. The evidence for this hypothesis is not as convincing as the interest group or missile threat evidence. This is because there is no way to prove influence from one person to another without President Bush actually saying that Rumsfeld influenced his decision to pursue national missile defense for the United States. President Bush was also an advocate for NMD during his campaign for the presidency. It is possible that Bush may have picked Rumsfeld because he was pro-NMD, rather than being persuaded of NMD's necessity by Rumsfeld and Cheney. Further evidence for this hypothesis is needed for accepting it, but enough evidence is present to not reject this hypothesis entirely.

Conclusion

Today the Cold War is over and the international system has taken on a new shape. The world is no longer in a state of bipolar balance between the two superpowers of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Today more countries have obtained, or may have obtained, nuclear weapons and the missile technology to deliver those nuclear weapons to locations across the globe. During the Cold War the United States was able to avoid a war fought with ballistic missiles through the use of deterrence. The fear of mutually assured destruction kept both the U.S. and the U.S.S. R. from entering into any type of ballistic missile launch upon the other. The deterrence strategy kept the United States safe during the Cold War, yet in the year 2001 the Bush administration has decided to not rely solely on deterrence to protect the United States from ballistic missile attack. The Bush administration has decided to pursue the creation and deployment of a national missile defense system for the United States. The preceding evidence attempts to explain why President Bush has pushed for a change in policy from relying on deterrence to a policy of national missile defense.

The possibility that the Bush administration has moved away from deterrence and begun to pursue an NMD system due to increasing distrust with states of concern appears to have some validity. The fact that states of concern now have ballistic missiles that could reach U.S. soil or are quickly developing this technology has raised the threat to the United States. The Bush administration has publicly stated that the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to rogue states or states of concern is justification for building an NMD system. The traditional ICBM countries of Russia and China are no longer the only adversaries of the United States that have ballistic missiles that could reach America. North Korea, according to the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, may have the ability to hit Alaska and part of Hawaii with a ballistic missile and could build longer-range missiles in the next five years. The same commission found that Iran has successfully deployed medium range missiles and could create ICBM technology due to help they have received from Russian and Chinese scientists. The commission also stated that Iraq would pose an ICBM threat to the United States within ten years of United Nations imposed controls being lifted. Clearly these type of missile capabilities by countries the United States lists as states of concern would prompt the Bush administration to move towards NMD and leave deterrence.

The Bush administration may have been influenced somewhat by interest groups to pursue a policy of national missile defense for the United States. Companies that are part of the military industrial com-

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plex would benefit greatly from the U.S. pursuing an NMD system because the project would put large amounts of funds into their companies. Some of the most influential groups are think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, which have recently urged American politicians, especially President Bush, to pursue national missile defense. The interest group and think tank lobbies could be influential on Bush but this is very hard to prove. The best evidence for the influence of think tanks on President Bush is his appointment of three former Heritage foundation employees into government positions, but the motivation for their appointment can never truly be pinpointed.

More convincing evidence that President Bush was influenced by interest groups to pursue a national missile defense policy is the campaign donations by the military industrial complex. The Lockheed Martin Corporation, Boeing Co., and Raytheon have all given substantial amounts of money to the Republican Party. All three of these companies are highly involved in the research and development of national missile defense systems and related technologies for the United States. Their continuing contributions to the Republican Party, which increase each year, are fairly good evidence that interest groups are shaping President Bush's national missile defense policy to some extent.

The possibility that the Bush administration has moved toward creating NMD for the United States due to the technology now being available does not seem very likely. So far the Pentagon has not been able to consistently shoot down missiles during tests in the last few years. Critics of these tests also have stated that the success that the tests have had has been only because the companies doing the tests made sure that they would work. The Pentagon has claimed that developing the technology necessary for NMD is only a matter of time. They feel that the technology would already be available if research was not hindered by politics and the United States would provide a firm commitment to developing NMD. The Bush administration did not decide to pursue national missile defense because the United States now has the technology to create an NMD system. President Bush may see the technology as promising for the future, but the recent lack of success in testing would not be enough on its own to advocate creating an NMD system in the United States.

President Bush has possibly been influenced to pursue an NMD policy for the United States by his administration, but there is good evidence that he has not. The main source of this influence inside the Bush administration is Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld has been an advocate of conservative ideas before through his work with the Committee for the Free World and in the Ford administration. When Rumsfeld served on the campaign team for Bob Dole he made sure that the candidate's number one foreign policy goal was to develop national missile defense for the United States. When Rumsfeld served on the Ford administration he and current Vice President Dick Cheney were said to have dominated foreign policy. President Bush, who has been said to also be weak when it comes to foreign policy, is also likely to be influenced by Rumsfeld's presence. The history of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, combined with his pro-NMD stance, give good reason to believe that he has influenced President Bush's choice to pursue NMD for the United States. On the other hand it must be considered that President Bush chose Mr. Rumsfeld because he was pro-NMD. The fact that Rumsfeld and Cheney work well together and have worked together before only strengthens the possibility that the mandate to pursue NMD was prompted from inside the Bush administration.

The Bush administration has chosen to pursue a policy of creating a national missile defense system for the United States despite the historical success of deterrence. Presently the United States does not have the technology to build an NMD system, but according to the Pentagon the technological capabilities are not far away. While the influence of interest groups on the decision to pursue NMD has not clearly affected President Bush's decision, there is evidence that they could have.

The influence of Donald Rumsfeld does seem likely to have affected President Bush's stance on national missile defense policy for the United States. The Bush administration has stated that they have pursued NMD to counter the rising threat of missile attack from the emerging ballistic missile threats known as rogue states, along with the rising threat of accidental launch of ballistic missiles by Russia and China. Government studies and intelligence back up these claims about ballistic missile capabilities and future capabilities of states of concern. This threat ranges from none at all from Iraq, to a full out nuclear missile attack by Russia. The Bush administration has abandoned deterrence as the American defense

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against ballistic missiles and adopted a system that will combine Cold War style deterrence with new NMD technology. Whether this policy is wise, safe, or even possible is now more than ever a key issue for the security of the United States. No matter what conclusion is drawn, President Bush has pledged to make a missile defense shield for the United States of America a reality.

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Venezuela: Breakthrough and Breakdown—Pacted Democracy's Fragility

Scott M. Williamson

As Damarys Canache comments, "legitimacy is defined as an elite formula, projected from above and accepted or rejected from below." In other words, political elites form a pacted commitment to initiate a democratic mandate, which is then rejected or accepted by the population. This type of democratic formation is otherwise known as a "pacted democracy," upon which democratic institutions and norms are projected upon society by unified political parties. Different from many democratic states' origins, Venezuela nearly mirrors Canache's unique pacted democracy argument in that democracy was projected upon Venezuela's people by the political elites who compromised in the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo. Overall, this pact stated the intention of the political parties to unite, thoroughly penetrate society, and organize the political community in the hopes of forming a democracy that would become strong and legitimate through time. The short-term effects (thirty years) of the Pacto of Punto Fijo were amazingly effective, which was seen through heavy political participation by the citizenry, the establishment of civilian democratic institutions within a two party political system, relative economic growth, and an overall accommodation by the two major parties that helped project democracy as the only political system alternative available to Venezuela.

Nevertheless, this thirty-year period of democratic/economic growth began to mutate into long-term problems as Venezuela began to realize that party unity stopped at a certain point and different political and economic agendas would eventually take precedence over unifying compromises and pacted political reforms. Today, this realization and these growing negative consequences both have to come to dangerous fruition with the 1998 election of Victor Hugo Chavez, a radical leftist populist who ascended the Venezuelan presidential throne on a reformist and charismatic platform. Hence, with this event in mind, it is essential to ask two questions concerning pacted democracy's inherent success or failure. First, after forty years of a strong democratic history, where did Venezuelan democracy go wrong and how could such a strong democratic foundation become uprooted so quickly? Second, was a "suspect" or faulty pacted democracy foundation to blame for such a radical decline in 1998 Venezuelan democracy? This paper will explore these two questions through an examination of Venezuela's successes and failures as a pacted democracy from 1958 to 1974, which in turn will provide proof that indeed Venezuela's pacted two-party system would ultimately fail to meet the needs of its people in the 1990s amidst the parties' good political intentions. In the end, it will be discovered if a pacted democracy is inherently good in the short-run and if pacted ideas and political unification/monopolies are relatively necessary and applicable to the twenty-first century democratic era of Venezuelan political history.

Institutionalization of the Political Parties – Pact of Punto Fijo

Before 1958, Venezuela's political system was characterized as either a repressive or co-optive government that "resisted conceding autonomy to social movements." In other words, the political elites who controlled the country had serious reservations with accommodating the citizenry of Venezuela and thus made decisions to accommodate or repress society based on the relative gains the political elites could garner from either action. However, this alternation between high repression and minimal

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accommodation quickly subsided with the fall of a dictatorial leader. The death of Juan Vicente Gomez, Venezuela's dictator from the 1910s to the 1930s, "opened the way for a political struggle...between the military and civilian elites who were the heirs presumptive of the tyrant and new mass-based political developments."

As the struggle heightened between civilian and military elites, Acción Democrática (AD) formed in 1945 in response to the rampant fighting between elites. Mainly, AD sought to transform Venezuela's political system into one that was democratic and liberalized, or to "bring about rapid democratic revolution, including the full establishment of a liberal democracy" through a popular base of political support from the masses. However, AD's support dwindled in 1948 with the ouster of its candidate in a coup, which eventually led to the establishment of Marcos Perez Jimenez's dictatorship until 1957. It was at this critical point in 1957 that AD began to emerge again as a serious power contender because the party effectively mobilized the masses against Jimenez, had relative support from the military, and utilized an underground or guerrilla movement to show that AD had to be considered as a serious political force in Venezuela. AD's renewed public support stemmed from Jimenez's inability to build an inclusionary regime, which was seen through Jimenez's steady alienation of a broadening circle of Venezuelan citizenry and elites. However, AD had to contend with the fact that Perez Jimenez had transformed Venezuela more into an urban nation through high foreign investment, public works, and capital provided by ISI and oil exportation.

Nevertheless, by 1957, AD and several other political parties such as the COPEI (Christian Democrats) and the URD (Democratic Republican Union) saw the opportunity to overthrow Jimenez and succeeded in a coup on January 23, 1958. Beginning in 1953, "communication and consultation increased and these consultations bore fruit," which in turn urged these three major political parties to form an alliance in a collaborative effort to overthrow Perez Jimenez.

According to Daniel Hellinger, both AD and COPEI were successful because they based their movements on promises of unification through construction, participation, and maturation of an alternative political system that was greatly superior to a dictatorship. Otherwise known as "patridocracia," the ability of AD and COPEI to mobilize and increase their influence within society brought about the necessary conditions for change. AD and COPEI constructed principles such as inclusion and participation within the political parties and society that would later serve in the construction of the Pact of Punto Fijo. Not only was this characteristic seen in its interaction with society, but with other small political parties. In regards to the radical parties, the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV/MIRV) took some minor role in participating in the underground events leading up to the 1958 coup. However both major political parties (AD and COPEI) made sure that any radical communist movement would be heard and accommodated, yet contained and minimized simultaneously. This was Venezuela's first brilliant political move before its 1958 democracy. Venezuela was learning that the accommodation it had had so rarely experienced was the key to building a better political system through inclusionary tactics. Peeler echoes this assessment by listing accommodation as the "most important common element in the establishment of liberal democracy."

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Consequently, it was the idea of accommodation that led to the usage of compromise between all political parties in Venezuela: "The termination of the Perez Jimenez regime and the establishment of a liberal democracy in 1958 were the result of a new spirit of accommodation between formerly hostile elites." Most of the major parties wanted democracy as the political system for Venezuela, yet they differed in how each party thought this democracy could be attained and maintained. The Pact of Punto Fijo solved this difference of political preference because of several key factors. First, as Peeler mentions, accommodation between political parties and society and between political elites themselves helped provide a basis for internal compromise and unification in constructing a democracy. As a consequence, repression was discarded by the 1958 political parties: "Past repression induced the parties to set aside past sectarianism and make the democratic transition" together as one political force. Second, AD and COPEI were the "first mass-based, persistent, and relatively nonpersonalist political parties" that sought to achieve a com-

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mon goal rather than focusing on attaining power through personal motives. The idea of a transition to democracy was one that would benefit Venezuela itself, rather than the political and economic elites alone. Lastly, the pre-Punto Fijo Pact of Avimiento Obrero-Patronal, which "called for business elites and unions to ensure labor peace and the survival of democracy," gave the political parties a social and relatively moral platform from which to craft a democracy built on social legitimacy and political and economic peace.

In terms of the Pact of Punto Fijo, these three factors led to the creation of an agreement that had but one common goal: a transitional democracy. Venezuela had learned its lesson that accommodation and unification were of the utmost of importance if it desired to work towards a stable political system and a relatively successful economic program.

On October 31, 1958, top leaders from COPEI and AD "agreed to defend the constitutional government against any possible coup d'etat, to form a government of national unity, and to formulate a minimum common program to be enacted regardless of which party won the 1958 December elections" that would constitute the beginning of the democratic transition process. However, "the centrist elites chose, in effect, to build a winning coalition around procedural democracy, and mild reform and to risk the opposition of the Left." Hellinger notes that although there was high political competition, especially between AD and COPEI, the major political parties were collective enough to resist serious radical contenders that would threaten the moderate or centrist position of the political system. Moreover, AD and COPEI were able to resist overt tension and competition between each other. Clearly, AD and COPEI elites wanted to check the left, right, and themselves from making serious threats against a fragile democracy. As a result, the majoritarian political elites believed that a binary and partially unified party system early on would help create and stabilize the country because reformists or radicals would adhere to one party's general political platform. In turn, "small parties would append themselves to one of the major parties, by endorsing its candidate, while running separate lists for legislative bodies." Thus, radicals and reformists would have an incentive to push their policies peacefully in the hopes that their legislative seats would provide a vehicle for their opinions and proposals.

The Pact of Punto Fijo perpetuated a working relationship not just with the left and right, but also with the military. Peeler comments that, "the centrist leaders devoted much effort in the early years of the regime to forging an understanding with the armed forces that would lead the latter to accept the apolitical, non-deliberative role assigned to them." In effect, AD and COPEI were taking the military out of the political game to the extent that the military would have self-autonomy and political participation as citizens. However, the military would not have an intervening role in politics because to do so would negate the accommodation factor and lead Venezuela down the bureaucratic-authoritarian road. Once again, the role of accommodation revealed itself to be a huge factor in the negotiations because the military kept its role as the guardian of the state, but its role was clearly defined as apolitical. The Pact of Punto Fijo indirectly ensured the military both "full participation in decision-making (as citizens) and autonomy of action in all direct military affairs." By safeguarding participation and autonomy, the political elites had accommodated the military enough by strictly defining the military's role as the guardian of La Patria (the State) while also giving the military an incentive to participate democratically. This strategy sent a clear message to all Venezuelan social groups that AD and COPEI would remain true to their word. Consequently, the radicals, reformers, and the military were kept at bay because their roles were defined and they were allowed to participate in a new political system that was fragile, yet moving in a positive direction.

Short-Term Effects of Punto Fijo

Needless to say, the effects of Punto Fijo were amazingly successful and conducive to making the transition to a democracy, both pacted and liberal. In terms of the construction of the democratic political system, a constitution was created in 1961 that defined and solved several important issues. Among many amendments, the constitution created a presidential system with a majority quota needed to elect the president. Additionally, Venezuela created a bicameral legislature that allowed for proportional representation, which somewhat solved the issue of radical party political participation. By having proportional represen-

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tation, the left and the right could be accommodated and have the incentives to disseminate their views. Peeler comments on this important factor in that "the ability to absorb the Left without undermining stability has been enhanced in Venezuela by the interaction of a strongly presidential political system with proportional representation in congressional elections."

In effect, proportional representation provides "leftist elites an institutional base in Congress" so that "leftist elites can accept the liberal democratic constitutional order in the confidence that they will not be excluded from public forums." Furthermore, the idea of a presidential system mirrored the political system of the United States with only a few minor modifications. The system gave Congress more power in passing laws and left the president to run the country more effectively. Enrique A. Baloyra rightly describes this structure in that "strong presidentialism and strongly articulated parties have been the key referents of contemporary Venezuelan politics." Today, this system's structure still remains relatively the same.

As for the military and much more so with the radicals, a pacted democracy within a presidential system created the necessary conditions with which to deal with possible uprisings and discontent. As a result of the accommodation expressed in the Pact of Punto Fijo, the elements of inclusion, peaceful participation, and a constitution that guarantees certain inalienable rights "have kept the military domination out and contained the centrifugal tendencies of populism."

As a further result, Venezuela was "one of the few South American countries to escape the wave of military dictatorships that swept across the continent in the 1960s and 1970s" because it kept its pacted democracy flowing and mostly legitimate in the eyes of Venezuelan citizens. Consequently, Venezuela had much more time to construct and strengthen its democracy than other Latin American countries because the typical Latin American transitional equation of populist reform, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and eventually weak democracy had been negated by one single factor: mainstream accommodation for all. The results of this unique ideal were reflected not only in the growth of the political system, but also within civil society. From 1958 to 1988, "nine out of every ten of those eligible to vote actually voted," giving Venezuela the sixth highest electoral participation rate in the world. With this level of participation, it was evident that democratic legitimacy would in turn be strengthened because Venezuelan citizens actually believed they had a stake in demonstrating their political will to the government. Furthermore, it became clear that the percentage of the electorate voting demonstrated Venezuelans' beliefs in democracy's fruits and its processes. The political system answered to the people's will with numerous electoral transitions that occurred seven times from 1958 to 1988. Richard S. Hillman echoes this view in that voting, or "fairly sophisticated institutional procedures such as ballot voting have supported democratic practices." In a sense, the political system was not maintaining its same characteristics, but having a constant rejuvenation or renewal as AD and COPEI exchanged presidential regimes and congressional seats. Democracy was leaving its transitional phase and moving into the realm of consolidation.

As a consequence of high voter turnout, the effects of Punto Fijo endured for about thirty years, a period that saw the transition process near completion and the democratic consolidation phase begin. Accommodation and party unity created the necessary conditions for the crafting of strong democracy. These conditions transformed into effects that would help build Venezuela's democracy into one that would become the exception to the rule in Latin America. Clearly, the political elites "thoroughly penetrated society and organized the political community by emphasizing the necessity of democracy and showing the people the fruits of participation and accommodation, both within politics and social life." Additionally, party unity and a binary party system early on helped create and stabilize the fragile democracy of the late 1950s and the 1960s. Reformist and radical parties adhered to this unification, knowing that they too had a stake in democracy, a stake threatened if democracy foundered. Hillman expands on this point, commenting that the radicals, the reformers, and the military all knew they had to play "the rules of the game," which stated that cooperative pluralism would be the relational rule that would sustain Venezuela both politically and economically.

The legitimacy of Venezuela's political system increased in the short-term not only because of accommodation, but also because of the emphasis on working towards a common goal that excluded alienation and non-participation. Venezuela's political parties had become institutionalized and the citizenry

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had been shown that every citizen had a stake in government. Venezuela's democracy was on the road to greater legitimacy and relative political success because elections, the government, and civil institutions were legitimate in the majority of Venezuelans' eyes.

Long-Term Effects of Punto Fijo – Specific Tests Against Democracy

At the end of 1974, Venezuela experienced the end of institutionalization within the political system and the effort to consolidate grew. Yet there were still many internal problems that Venezuela's political system had to address, specifically with perpetuating the legitimacy it had gained in a short period of time. Venezuela had to pass several tests that pushed its democracy to the brink of collapse both in the political and economic arenas. Politically, Venezuela had to endure several crises that dealt with the uprising of the radicals and populists, who either wanted a more populist political appeal or a communist government. Several years after the constitution had been established in 1961, the uprisings by several revolutionary and radical parties aimed to show that they were just as much power contenders as AD and COPEI. Peeler refers to this specific test as one incident that awoke Venezuela to the possibility that even though "liberal democracies emerged when the regimes proved able to absorb and co-opt substantial expansions of suffrage and other forms of political participation without so altering the balance of political power as to provoke rebellion by major interests," there were still other small parties looking for the opportunity to topple the existing regime. Their goal would be to institute a new and radical regime that promised sweeping changes, changes that the previous regime could not deliver.

The radicals, also known as MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria or Left Revolutionary Movement), saw this opportunity in 1962 after it split from AD in 1961 upon the formation of the constitution of 1961. Originally, MIR had adhered itself to AD in the hopes for more electoral seats throughout 1961. Michael Coppedge explains that the formation of MIR and its subsequent split from AD were not based purely on radical ideals, but also because the split "was a conflict between the Muchachos (young AD supporters) and the older two generations of AD." In effect, "the Muchachos believed that coalition with COPEI dampened AD's historic commitment to revolutionary change such as seen from AD's anti-Perez Jimenez strategies/counter-insurgencies from 1953 to 1958." Clearly, older generation MIRs differed in that they disagreed with the tactics used by AD and COPEI to build a democracy. The older AD's left the party and the younger supporters, the Muchachos (the boys), stayed with AD throughout this time period. MIR was the first sign that Venezuela's pacted democracy had cracks in the foundation.

In response to marches and protests by MIR and other small factionalist parties, the Venezuelan government responded with restrictions that undermined the idea of accommodation. "The government began by banning all unauthorized street demonstrations, and a clash soon came over police repression" in street demonstrations, which then urged the Communists to argue that "the streets belong to the people." Therefore, in the Communists' mind, the streets could be used for any demonstration of any kind. This incensed the AD democratic regime because the Communists were threatening the political system and AD/COPEI's power base. However, AD and COPEI knew that repression of the radicals would have to be handled delicately so as to preserve the legitimacy of the existing regime and transitional democracy. In other words, AD and COPEI had to find a healthy medium between accommodation and suppression of the left. As a result, Betancourt, the current early 1960s president, responded that, "a country cannot live and work, acquire culture and forge riches, if it is always threatened by the surprise explosions of street violence, behind which the ancient enemies of democracy... seek to engender its discredit."

This response demonstrated Betancourt's resolve to maintain the transitional democracy, yet it also did not condemn street demonstrations as long as they were peaceful and purposeful. Additionally, this comment appeared to maintain the values of accommodation that the Pact of Punto Fijo was founded upon. However, Betancourt knew that no such accommodation could take place as long as MIR and other political parties desired to disrupt democracy. For this, Betancourt made MIR a target, labeling it an enemy of democracy. Consequently, with increasing violence, attempted assassination plots carried out by foreign nationals, and economic stagnation in some sectors, Betancourt had to suspend the constitution 778 days out of the 1,847 days of his presidential term (1958-1963) in order to suppress the insurrection against

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Venezuela's fragile democracy. Betancourt was suspicious of all movements against democracy and seemed resolute in maintaining order even if repression had to be used. From this time period, it became apparent that pacted democracy had to be transformed into something more concrete and tangible other than a reactive political system that dealt with crisis after crisis. With this in mind, Betancourt hoped that a short-term and resolute stand against rebellion would demonstrate that democracy was the only political system worth fighting for.

As a result, the Betancourt regime closed down most student organizations that provided members for the for the MIR and PCV (Venezuelan Communist Party) parties, arrested several high MIR and PCV party leaders in response to guerilla operations, and successfully put down two military uprisings that were sympathetic to the left. With the 1963 elections around the corner, Betancourt preserved the idea of democracy, but only with costs. Venezuelans began to see Betancourt's regime as repressive and support began to wither for AD and COPEI. Meanwhile support began to heighten for MIR and the PCV. However, Venezuela weathered the storm because Betancourt's regime, coupled by strong internal support from AD and COPEI, had constructed the very barricades that stopped the radical and communist insurrection. These barricades such as slight repression and attempts for talks forced the radicals and reformers to use political means to attain their wants: "Recognition of the strength of political institutions led the Communists to seek reintegration into national politics" and thus, a peaceful way of communicating was reestablished between the democratic parties and the communists.

However, the overall effect of this radical movement had sweeping implications because the insurrection had been a "direct challenge to the party system: a complete rejection of its institutions as illegitimate and its methods as ineffective for identifying and solving national problems," such as political discord and economic stagnation. Venezuela's pacted democracy had passed its first test in 1963, but not without discord and the possibility of the government folding. Nevertheless, the short-term positives of the Pact of Punto Fijo demonstrated that "mutual confidence was promoted by the decision to form and *maintain* a coalition government from 1959 to 1963. This confidence and continuity of the coalition was further reinforced by the common threat posed by leftist revolutionary warfare, which drew many old enemies together in common defense" of the transitional democracy. Venezuela's pacted democracy had rejected and successfully negated the thought that revolution or suppression of political conflict was a necessary requisite for change. Political disputes would not be conducted through warfare, rather through institutional provisions that would channel conflict into normal procedures, rather than radical procedures. Political conflict would not be eliminated, but "contained and domesticated."

The second test to Venezuela's democracy was the growing fluctuation and stagnation of the economy that caused civil unrest and dissatisfaction within the population. Most of this dissatisfaction stemmed from the one major product that kept Venezuela afloat and in turn, created most of the capital necessary to improve living conditions and strengthen the economy. This product was oil, in which Venezuela was very rich. Under Betancourt's regime in the early 1960s, Venezuela's oil productivity and exports grew as it moved towards the road to OPEC, which eventually formed in the early 1970s. "Through 1960, Venezuela enjoyed the advantage of proximity to the U.S. market, and its proven reserves were among the most naturally productive in the world." As a result, Venezuela's "percentage of government revenues derived from the petroleum sector, including refining and other operations, rose from 58 percent in 1959 to a peak of 67 percent in 1967." However, high profits came with a high dependence on the oil export market and this could help or hurt Venezuela depending on the demand and price of oil throughout the world market.

In a sense, Venezuela was living or dying by the say of the world market. Thus, Betancourt and subsequent presidents began to institute policies that would make Venezuela less dependent on oil. The solution to this dependence was to diversify Venezuela's resources and divert these resources into new economic sectors. However, world investment hampered this new development while several Venezuelan regimes tried to "establish policies exonerating customs taxes on imports (machinery, raw materials, etc.), sell land cheaply to industrial enterprise, and allocate state subsidies and credits for investment." Despite the world investment decline, Venezuela did see a huge increase in manufacturing output in the 1960s and the labor market responded to this manufacturing increase, "with 100,000 new job seekers entering the

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work force annually."

However, other policies besides diversification led to some severe economic stagnation over a thirty-year span from 1958 to 1988. Land reform was one of these policies that failed miserably in terms of economic and social growth. Hellinger notes that, "ten years of reform (1960 - 1970) failed to reduce significantly the maldistribution of land" because total imports of food still rose 26 percent, which showed that redistributed land was not becoming productive for farming. It could hardly be said that the "agrarian reform had met the goal of 'molding' the peasantry into the modern economy" because the political elite had "failed so miserably in sowing the petroleum (capital from oil exportation) for development as in the countryside." As a consequence, Venezuela's pacted democracy started to become destabilized because political parties were instituting faulty reform policies. Moreover, the two major parties began to split dramatically along policy lines, which helped wither away some of the government unity that was present in the early 1960s. Because these reform policies failed to materialize, oil was even more emphasized as a source of constant capital for Venezuela. Oil reflected the destabilizing possibility of Venezuela's democracy both in the differences over policy prescriptions and the outlook of Venezuela's economic future. Economic stagnation and poor living conditions might prompt the lower classes to revolt because their expectations could not be met. This dissatisfaction was ultimately reflected in MIR and the PCV's attempts to topple the Betancourt government in 1963.

From 1958 to 1969, Venezuela tried many reforms that would strengthen both its economic and political legitimacy. Some of these reforms were successful and others were not, but there was at least a genuine effort made by the political elites of AD and COPEI to improve and satisfy society's immediate needs and expectations. The 1970s proved both to be fruitful and destabilizing with Venezuela's induction into OPEC, the oil crisis of 1973 that helped Venezuela in the short-run, and another energy crisis in 1979 that gave Venezuela high profits from oil because of stretched world supply. Yet after these crises had passed, Venezuela could not steadily count on crises to help its economy boom from high oil profits. Once again, the focus was on making sound macroeconomic decisions not purely based on oil exportation, rather on other exports through the commodity sector.

This change of effort began with AD President Carlos Andres Perez, who held office during the late 1980s. During Andres Perez's term, Venezuela experienced stagnation symptoms such as inflation, capital flight, trade deficits, and poverty, all of which reflected upon the inefficient macroeconomic decisions of Venezuela. Andres Perez finally came up with a turnaround plan aimed at solving most of these ill symptoms. Called "El Gran Viraje" or the "The Great Turnaround," Andres Perez laid out a blueprint that could feasibly spell economic success. El Gran Viraje called for export growth in all economic sectors, a single floating exchange rate, removal of price controls, trade liberalization, deregulation of capital, labor and agriculture reform, and many other changes that would move Venezuela towards more economic stability.

However, Moises Naim points out that these economic and political reforms "were not sufficient to compensate for the extremely negative perceptions Venezuelans had of the government, its reforms, and politicians in general." Andres Perez feared this societal perception, especially if another power contender emerged to disrupt his economic plan, which would in turn challenge the coalition government that had governed Venezuela for over thirty years. Perez feared that Venezuela's democracy would be threatened if a "new face, unrelated to the traditional power structures, offered to guide the nation back to prosperity, equality, and integrity" through radical or populist measures. Andres Perez responded to this fear by stepping up efforts to implement El Gran Viraje. However, Perez did not implement El Gran Viraje with force, but with a democratic attitude: "Perez displayed an unusual willingness to incur the political costs that inevitably accompany major reforms" because the continuation of democracy was paramount to Venezuela's well being. And the political costs were huge. On February 27, 1989, a huge riot broke out among Venezuelans in Caracas with three days of looting, killing, and maiming in response to Andres Perez's austere economic plan, El Gran Viraje. "The violence was unprecedented" and several experts commented that "yesterday, Caracas was Beirut."

Eventually, the riots were quelled, but that did not eliminate the great discontent of the Venezuelan people. Many movements and unions, as well as small political parties, called for Andres Perez's resignation, yet somehow the pacted democracy remained intact. Eduardo Fernandez, the Secretary General of

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the Christian Democrats, "stated that he too opposed the government, but the only acceptable way of expressing opposition was through democratic means." Other political parties soon joined this domino effect in support for democracy, even though many political elites greatly disagreed with Andres Perez's policies.

Two huge results arose out of this specific crisis, one that reflected the strength of Venezuela's democracy and the other that questioned the sustaining factor of Venezuela's democracy. First, the unification of political elites in times of crisis was clearly evident, even if the opposing parties disagreed with the majority party in power. The spirit of pacted democracy remained because the accommodation between AD and COPEI, as well as other smaller parties, remained intact. However, a huge question arose as to whether a pacted democracy was conducive to Venezuela's democratic maturation process. Political parties that were once solidly unified were now loosely tied together because policy prescriptions for Venezuela's democratic future were starting to divide parties along ideological lines rather than policy lines. Democracy was still embraced by the majority of political parties, yet how this democracy could be improved was questioned. Thus, it was evident that collective action was now becoming a destabilizing factor rather than a unifying action or principle. Andres Perez's regime proved this destabilization to be true due to the great division between AD, COPEI, and other political parties regarding economic and political policies. It appeared that a pacted democracy was only conducive for building a democratic transitional foundation and not healthy in the democratic maturation process.

Conclusion and Further Implications

Today, Venezuela has departed from this pacted democracy stage and moved into new and uncharted political territory. As mentioned, Venezuelans elected as their new president one Hugo Chavez Frias, a former army lieutenant colonel and leader of two failed coup attempts in 1992 that effectively put an end to the pacted political arrangement that had been in place for the past forty years. This Venezuelan election of a leftist such as Chavez not only ended the era of "partyarchy," or this pacted political government, but it also undermined the very idea of democracy and raised questions of its possible default because of Chavez's most recent policies and actions. Recently, Chavez's presidency has managed to suspend the constitution (1961), suspend the legislature through an indefinite recess, and give control of the judicial branch exclusively to Chavez's executive. The military has become highly politicized, the economy is posting a negative growth rate, "68 percent of Venezuelans still live below the poverty line," and the idea of an oil economy is tenuous at best with the recent capital departure of over \$5 billion in foreign direct investment. Without a doubt, Venezuela's political and economic plights are more tenuous today than before the 1998 presidential elections.

Hence, the pressing question still remains of whether Venezuelan democracy is to be overhauled or completely scrapped in light of these political and economic issues. With this in mind, it is essential to return to the larger question of this paper: *Where* did Venezuelan democracy go wrong and did a pacted democracy contribute to this democratic demise?

In exploring and analyzing the evidence of this paper, it is conclusive that the continuation of a pacted democracy, although good in its ideals/intentions, hampered the political system enough to the point that party patronage and "unity" took precedence over delivering to the needs of society. AD and COPEI focused more on maintaining their power base and electoral patronage rather than making concrete progress in political/economic reform. One or both of these reforms would have solidified their power base for years to come if this had been realized in 1998. Instead, Venezuelan society was only co-opted enough to contain outright rejection of the two-party system. Structural reforms were merely words in the AD/COPEI political message. Venezuelans realized this deceit and turned to another political candidate outside the pacted democracy arena, such as Chavez.

Second, socioeconomic conditions at the onset of the 1998 elections were poor at best. This factor most definitely contributed to the popular dissatisfaction with AD/COPEI and the subsequent failure of the pacted democracy. As Moises Naim rightly comments, "the disappearance of the party system that dominated Venezuelan society for more than four decades was not a sudden, Soviet-style collapse resulting from an excessive concentration of power in the hands of small clique politicians; in fact, (Venezuela's sta-

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bility problem) owes more to the long-term dilution of the political power once held by Accion Democratica and COPEI," a dilution that could definitely stem from declining social and economic standards.

In support of Naim's conclusion, many socioeconomic issues such as an 80 percent poverty level, government budget deficits, unemployment, inflation, and an overall decline in the standard of living hit all time highs in 1998. Preceding the presidential elections, due to an economic recession "over 350,000 jobs and as many as 2,400 businesses were closed or were on the brink of bankruptcy." Furthermore, 97 percent of Venezuela's twenty-three million citizens saw a drastic or partial decline in living standards, while purchasing power was cut one-third from what it had been twenty years ago. The nominal wage rate was reduced to \$100 a month, short \$700 of the \$800 per month requirement for general survival standards. Inflation also climbed 65 percent in 1998, further curbing consumer spending. Coupled by these financial factors, Venezuela saw its external financial debt increase towards \$25 billion, while its budget deficit hovered near \$6 billion. From these factors alone, it is quite evident that 1) AD and COPEI lacked public confidence as vehicles for socioeconomic delivery due to these conditions, and 2) the viability of a pacted democracy was discarded in favor of another system, party, and candidate that promised to curb these disastrous economic conditions.

Lastly, President Chavez entered the presidential race with the keen understanding that a majority of Venezuelans were poor, dissatisfied with the political status quo of AD/COPEI governments, and most importantly, anxious enough to call for radical social and economic change. Specifically, Chavez focused on AD and COPEI's lack of success in changing the oil leadership, industrializing the rural areas, and improving social services. Chavez offered a solution to the problem by promising to "invest in education and health care to further investments in the huge national oil company, while urging intervention to help economic sectors such as agriculture." Chavez clearly pushed for increased social spending, in order to gain the support of the masses through "improving society's well-being. Moreover, Chavez also promised to restore "order, authority, and dignity" within the government, claiming he would erase all political corruption in order to "refound the nation." This was considered a response "to the weakness or neglect of the country's institutions, especially the government, to tackle the country's pressing problems."

Ultimately, pacted democracy as a vehicle for political and economic change could not be applicable to Venezuela's plight during the 1990s. It might have been applicable to the establishment of Venezuelan democracy in 1958 and its transition until 1974, but it was and is still not applicable to the continuity of consolidated democracy in 2002. Instead of having two major political parties united on one political front with a common agenda, many other political parties such as Chavez's Patriotic Pole have emerged as serious power contenders for political control. Today's multi-party system "is the result of the crisis of the two dominant parties" because "party linkages (or unification) were too tight in Venezuela and they were asphyxiating society." Normally, "failure has rarely involved the permanent decline or disappearance of a particular major party or the basic realignment of a party system," yet Venezuela's pacted political democracy now appears to be outdated and too antiquated to handle social, political, and economic crises. Nevertheless, it is clearly evident that a pacted democracy is very valuable in the creation process of a democracy, yet not beneficial in the maturation process of a democracy. A pacted democracy cannot continue to be beneficial in the long run because a democracy has to be renewed and rejuvenated. With renewal comes new sets of economic and political policy prescriptions that will meet social needs. A pacted democracy is only beneficial in building the foundation for civilian institutions, relatively sound macroeconomic management, and a civil society that will perpetuate democratic growth in the democratic maturation process. Venezuela must learn this lesson and reinvent its democracy through a different political approach if it is to endure the deconstructive Chavez presidential term.

Notes

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