Modus Vivendi

A Journal of International Affarirs

Modus Vivendi

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About the Journal

Although its literal translation from the Latin is "way of life," in international relations parlance *Modus Vivendi* signifies "a state of affairs where two opposing parties agree to differ." Therefore, we feel that *Modus Vivendi* is an appropriate name for a journal dedicated to fostering intelligent discussion in the forum of international relations issues. *Modus Vivendi* is published under the auspices of the Theta Chapter of Sigma Iota Rho, the International Studies Honor Society. One of the few undergraduate research journals dedicated to advancing student discourse in the field, *Modus Vivendi* is intended to recognize undergraduate scholarship and promote debate within the field of international relations.

The contents of this year's journal cover vastly different topics and regions. Dane Meyer examines the influence of domestic politics on the desire of nations to join and participate in international institutions. Sarah Sanders discusses the roles of religion and political ideology and motivating factors in an examination of transnational terrorist groups. Dayna Baer's *The Fuel Behind the Fire* examines the factors which predicated the increase in militant Islam in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s. Finally, Susie Weller discusses socialization techniques that affect support for American aid to African nations suffering from the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Modus Vivendi is the product of enormous efforts on the behalf of many people. The editors would like to extend their gratitude to the faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department. Without their outstanding talents, teaching abilities, and tutelage, this journal would not exist. Additionally, special thanks must be given to Brenda Somes and the faculty adviser to Sigma Iota Rho, Professor Lawrence Hamlet.

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Why Countries Join International Institutions: A Domestic-Based Approach

Dane Meyer

Introduction

As a variable in political science, international institutions have been crucial to shaping political events in the twentieth century. Regional institutions such as the European Union have influenced everything from a member nation's currency and trade policies to how members recognize foreign patents. Likewise global institutions such as the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization have created new nations such as Israel and formed bipolar security alliances responsible for fifty years of global conflict, respectively. Consequences like these deserve attention as to how they originated, and while the future ramifications of international institutions may be difficult to predict, international relations theory can explain what

forces within the international system create these agreements. Because of their importance to understanding international relationships, I will closely examine international institutions, and more specifically, what causes states to join or reject international institutions. After first examining the common realist interpretation on the formation of international institutions, I will derive my own theory according to domestic-based principles. This theory is then applied to the three case studies of Poland and the European Union, Japan and the "Coalition of the Willing," and Russia and the Kyoto Accords. I will then discuss criticisms raised about the explanation, and outline future steps to further strengthen the hypotheses and research.

Realists such as Joseph Grieco have already examined this question of why countries join international institutions. They first assume that the international system is anarchic, and as the only primary actor a state's primary focus is on survival. Furthermore states are preoccupied with their relative power and security which makes them predisposed toward conflict and competition. Because of these assumptions, realists have determined that a nation's choice to join an international institution is dependent upon the relative gains of the other states within the

agreement, the number of states involved, and the institution's attempts to link related international issues together. Because of their concern for relative gains, Grieco and other realists argue that states will not participate in international institutions if they fear their "partners will surge ahead of them in relative capabilities" and as a result of this surge "their increasingly powerful partners in the present could become all the more formidable foes at some point in the future." Also while other theories would suggest that the smaller the number of states involved in an international institution the more likely these states will reach a consensus, Grieco argues that states are more likely to join international institutions with larger memberships, because the distribution of gains is more evenly divided. If a state is unsure of the relative gains of certain partners, it would prefer more partners because "larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that the relative achievements of gains [of] better-positioned partners could be offset" by sharing gains with weaker partners. Lastly, states are less likely to join institutions if the institution links issues together so that the relative gains in one issue are tied to the relative gains on another issue. In this situation Grieco notes that states which were previously unwilling to cooperate out of fear of the relative gains of a partner will certainly not

participate in an institution which allows the same partner further gains in an interrelated issue. Because a state's enrollment in an institution is based on the three conditions of relative gains, size of membership, and issue linkage, realist theory postulates that states will only join international institutions if their relative gains from joining are higher than other members, or in the event of uncertain relative gains, if the institution is free of issue linkage and the membership is large enough to spread out the gains of partners.

However by emphasizing the role of the state in determining why nations join or do not join international institutions, realism fails to consider the influence of domestic actors on state policies. In answer to this omission I propose an explanation based around four core assumptions shared among domestic-based theorists. The first of these states that domestic groups are the primary actors within the international system, due to the systematic role they play in establishing state governments and influencing state policy. Secondly, I assume that domestic groups are both "rational and risk-averse" and organize to promote different interests. As rational actors, domestic groups will go about achieving their preferences in an ordered manner. Thirdly, I assume that domestic institutions "represent some subset of

domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposefully in world politics," and lastly that these actions are determined by the "configuration of interdependent state preferences."

[Insert Figure 1]

Theory

Based on these assumptions, this theory argues that domestic preferences working with and through domestic institutions create a combined preference for joining or not joining an international institution. In this analysis the dependent variable is whether or not countries join or do not join an international institution. The independent variables are domestic preferences and domestic institutions, which vary according to influence, agreement, and the status quo. This is further illustrated in Figure 1. International institutions are any formal or informal agreement between states, and can range from established organizations such as NATO to treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Domestic preferences are the interests of the general public and private groups such as interest groups, which are rational and organize in a way to promote their own interests. Examples of domestic preferences include the interests of both

business and non-business lobbying groups, military groups, and religious groups. The dominant domestic preference is represented by any combination of these groups' interests which form to represent the majority preference. However, if a majority preference fails to form, for example if an issue is particularly contentious, then two potential outcomes will shape the dominant domestic preference: the opposing interests may compromise and form a coalition which would then represent a dominant domestic preference, or in the case of a deadlock between opposing interests, the individual interest groups which are more vocally adamant and influential may represent this dominant preference. The role of influence is further explored later.

Domestic institutions are governmental structures or laws responsible for representing the state, and include legislative bodies, the judicial system, state leaders, and bureaucracy. Similar to the dominant domestic preference, the dominant domestic institution is represented by the majority opinion among the government bodies mentioned above, or by the most adamant government body.

Both of the independent variables vary in terms of influence and agreement, and both must also operate in relationship to the status quo. Agreement is simply defined as both independent

variables sharing mutual preferences. If both variables are in support of or against joining a specific international institution, then they are considered to be in agreement, and this agreement is easily measured by comparing their publicly stated preferences toward the international institution.

Influence, however, is more complicated. In the theory influence is defined as control over the mechanism used to join the international institution, and this mechanism varies between different types of governments. In democracies this mechanism is usually a legislative body such as the United States' Congress, which is responsible for ratifying treaties, and in less democratic countries this mechanism is usually an executive leader or unelected group of leaders. Therefore a domestic preference or institution is said to have influence if the leader or part of the legislative body supports their interests. For more democratic governments influence is measured by first examining public statements concerning the issue from the individual lawmakers, or if their position is unclear, then by examining past voting records on related issues. Campaign contributions and resources spent on lobbying lawmakers are also useful methods for measuring influence if data on this spending is available. In less

democratic governments influence is similarly measured by first examining the leader's public statement on the issue, and then evaluating past policy choices by the leader.

Lastly, the status quo is defined as the conditions previous to any decision to join or not join an international institution. Therefore by opting to not join an international institution, a country is maintaining the status quo.

From these variables three models and four hypotheses have been constructed in order to cover the wide range of potential variances. The first model examines a situation where both the domestic institutions and domestic preferences share common preferences, and from this the hypothesis argues that the more the preferences of the domestic institutions and the domestic preferences agree, the more likely the state will join an international institution which reflects these preferences. The second model examines a situation where the preferences of the domestic institutions and domestic preferences conflict, and there is an unequal degree of influence between the two independent variables. According to this configuration the hypothesis argues that the greater the disparity of influence between domestic institutions and domestic preferences with conflicting interests, the more likely the state will

join an international institution that reflects the more influential variable's preferences.

[Insert Figure 2]

The final model examines a situation where the preferences of the two independent variables again conflict, but have equal influence over the mechanism for joining or not joining. For this model the theory supports two separate hypotheses in order to account for variations in the independent variable's support of the status quo. The first hypothesis states that the closer the status quo is to the interests of the domestic preferences or domestic institutions, which are in disagreement and have equal influence, then the more likely the combined preferences will reflect a deadlock resulting in a failure to join the international institution. The second hypothesis states that the further the status quo is from the interests of the domestic preferences or domestic institutions, which are in disagreement and have equal influence, then the more likely the combined preferences will reflect a compromise that is more desirable than the status quo. This is further illustrated in Figure 2. Here the spatial model shows a status quo which is far from the pro-free trade interests of both the domestic institution and domestic preference. Rather than suffer the status quo, both groups compromise on a position which

more closely resembles their interests. This compromise may involve concessions on other issues in the form of issue-linkage, or restrictions on the degree of sovereignty the state will give up when joining the institution. Because the causal question does not deal with specific types of institutions joined, my hypothesis only argues for the likelihood of any compromise, and does not address the form the compromise will take. However, this hypothesis statement is still essential in determining how the independent variables will react given equal influence and conflicting interests.

[Insert Table 1]

Case Selection

In order to test the hypotheses generated from these models, three case studies offer significant variance in influence and agreement of the independent variables to represent all three models. The three case studies also represent both informal and formal institutions, as well as regional, global, multi-state, military, economic, and environmental forms of agreements in order to ensure enough variation within the dependent variable. These cases are further illustrated in Table 1. The case of Poland and the EU will

represent the first model, Japan and the "Coalition of the Willing" will test the second model, and lastly the third model will be tested by Russia and the Kyoto Accords.

Poland

In June of 2003 77 percent of Polish citizens said yes to joining the European Union in a nation-wide referendum that took place over the course of two days. The most prominent and vocal government officials in the Polish Government, President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Leszek Miller, were both strong supports of joining the EU since their coalition government was formed in 2001. Before the official vote President Kwasniewski toured thirty cities to encourage support for the referendum, and he was responsible for pushing forward the two-day voting format in order to increase voter turnout – the referendum would only pass if 50 percent of registered voters cast ballots. Also, while the prime minister had distanced himself from the referendum due to the Polish public's association of him with corruption, it was still well known that he also supported EU membership, and it was considered unlikely that Prime Minister Miller "could long survive the humiliation of a botched

referendum." The positions of these two central figures within the Polish government suggest that the preference of the dominant domestic institutions is for joining the European Union.

Similar to the domestic institution, the domestic preference also strongly supports EU membership, in spite of noticeable yet negligible opposition from several extreme rightist and leftist groups. Both Andrzej Lepper's Self Defense Party and the Peasants' Party claim to represent the interests of Polish farmers, and argue that the European Union's limitations on farming subsidies for new members amounts to discrimination. While both of these parties have gained public support and seats in Poland's parliament since PM Miller's Democratic Left Alliance took power in 2001, they still represent only a small minority of the Polish public. The pro-free market Civic Platform Party is also uncomfortable with EU membership unless it is reassured that Poland will receive the total weight of votes in the EU Parliament allotted to them under the Nice Treaty, which is likely to be nullified if the new EU constitution is ratified. Further opposition comes from conservative Christian groups such as the League of Polish Families who view the European Union's regulations on birth control and abortion as immoral; however, like the rest of these groups

combined, it is also too small to represent the dominant domestic preference.

This dominant domestic preference however is represented by the Democratic Left Alliance and the Roman Catholic Church, both of which have much more public support. The Catholic Church supports EU membership on the grounds that PM Miller's government refrains from addressing sensitive social issues such as abortion until after the referendum, and news analysts from sources such as the *Economist* view Pope John Paul 2 as supporting EU membership as a way to "restore Christian values in Western Europe." The Democratic Left Alliance views EU membership as a way to solve Poland's growing unemployment problem, by encouraging further foreign investment in Poland's economy. The preference of these two groups is widely supported by the public, and opinion polls before the referendum showed that "65 percent or more Poles back EU membership." When compared to the support of opposition parties such as Self Defense, which has hovered around 20 percent since 2002, it is clear that most Poles are in favor of EU membership. Therefore despite the numerous opposition groups to EU membership, the dominant domestic preference is for joining the European Union. When combined with the

preference of the dominant domestic group, these two variables created a combined preference for joining the international institution, which is consistent with both the model and the hypothesis.

Japan

While Poland demonstrates a shared preference among the dominant domestic preference and domestic institution, Japan exemplifies conflicting preferences between this theory's independent variables. In its decision to join the United States in the "Coalition of the Willing" Japan's government displayed strong support for joining through both Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's public statements surrounding the decision, and his positions on previous military legislation. Before the decision to send troops in December 2003, Koizumi had already supported two measures allowing Japan to use military force in separate incidents, and this past history demonstrates a sustained preference for supporting an increase in Japanese military involvement. In 2001 Koizumi approved measures to send support ships to aid in the invasion of Afghanistan, and also in June 2003 he supported the approval of emergency laws designed to allow Japan to more easily respond to military attacks on Japanese

territory. In addition to his past voting record, the statements he released when announcing the decision to send troops to Iraq further demonstrate his strong preference for increased military involvement. Statements such as "Japan …has to take responsible measures in dealing with the situation" and "our Self Defense Forces must still fulfill this mission" clearly highlight Koizumi's approval of Japanese military action within Iraq. This preference is echoed by Koizumi's cabinet, which was required to approve the decision, and where the only opposition to sending troops was represented by Justice Minister Daizo Nozawa's mild concern that any decision should wait for further debate. This data suggests that the strong preferences of both PM Koizumi and his cabinet for sending troops and actively participating in the "Coalition of the Willing" are clearly representative of the preference of the Japanese government and the dominant domestic institution.

However while PM Koizumi's government thoroughly supported joining the "Coalition of the Willing" by sending troops to Iraq, the dominant domestic preference is equally adamant against joining the informal military agreement. This disapproval of military action is not only present within the opposition party to Koizumi's government, but is also evident through public

opinion polls and civil protests leading up to the Dec. 2003 decision. Although it agreed to the June 2003 legislation that allowed Japan to respond to a direct attack, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan has continuously criticized the decision in an attempt to have it reversed. After failed attempts to slow the measure through filibuster tactics such as votes of no-confidence against members of Koizumi's government, the party tried another boycott in February 2004 as the government had already started sending troops, and the party's leader, Naoto Kan, has publicly labeled the decision a "historic mistake."

Opposition to the "Coalition of the Willing" is further evident among the Japanese public, and as early as July "55 percent of respondents [were] opposed to sending in SDF troops." While this number fluctuated between 45 percent and 50 percent between November and December of 2003, the November poll also noted that an additional 43 percent said the troops should stay at home until Iraq was stable, and that only "10 percent of Japanese [supported] sending troops to Iraq while the current instability [continued]." Similar polls during the same month of November found that only "9 percent of Japanese [supported] sending troops to the region." The discrepancy in

these polls suggests a certain degree of inaccuracy on the total percentage of Japanese citizens against the measure. However, nearly all the data suggests a strong majority of Japanese are against deploying troops, especially when asked closer to the date of the December 2003 decision. When combined with the consistent opposition from the Democratic Party of Japan, this data suggests a strong preference against joining the "Coalition of the Willing" in military exercises in Iraq within the dominant domestic preference, and reinforces the model's premise that both independent variables disagree.

Due to the disagreement between the domestic preference and domestic institution, it is necessary to consider the degree of influence both variables hold over the mechanism for joining. While further troop deployment has been debated within the Japanese Diet, the decision to join the "Coalition of the Willing" and send troops to Iraq was first made by the Japanese Prime Minister and his cabinet. This suggests the mechanism for joining the international institution is controlled by these three groups, and as previously stated Prime Minister Koizumi and his Liberal Democratic Party are in firm control of all three of these governing bodies. Therefore the domestic institution variable has the majority influence over

the decision to join or not join, and as this theory states such influence allows the domestic institution to impose its will over the domestic preference. This is exactly what happened in the case of Japan, and by joining the "Coalition of the Willing" through military involvement this case provides support for the hypothesis and model.

Russia

While Russia's decision to ratify the Kyoto Accords in October 2004 is used to describe the theory's third model, a lack of available information has made identifying the preferences of the dominant domestic preference and institution difficult. The three most vocal groups on joining Kyoto are Russia's oil industry, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and environmental groups like Greenpeace. Russian oil companies have previously tried influencing Russian politics through donations to political parties within the Duma, and in 2003 the oil industry used a "major public relations drive" aimed at the Kremlin in order to persuade the Russian government against joining Kyoto. Also Russia's science academy, after it was asked by the government to weigh the effects of the Kyoto accords on Russia's economy, further argued against signing the treaty due to the

negative effects omission restrictions would have on reviving Russia's economy. Domestic preferences within Russia in support of ratification include primarily Russia's branch of Greenpeace and members of Russia's Green Party. As expected these groups have urged Russia to sign Kyoto due to environmental concerns and have accused Russia of "lagging behind the world community."

While it is clear that there are domestic interest groups on both sides of the issue, the lack of any data on Russian public opinion makes it difficult to determine which groups are in line with the dominant domestic preference, and in this situation my definition of dominant domestic preference suggests the most adamant and vocal group represents the dominant domestic preference. Under this definition the Russian oil industry and science academy have a distinct advantage over the environmental groups. Greenpeace claims ten thousand members in Russia, which represents a minute proportion of Russia's population, and is significantly smaller than the number of activists in countries such as France and Great Britain. While this is understandable for an environmental group viewed by many as extreme, the Green Party in Russia is similarly unsupported, and currently holds no seats

in Russia's parliament. In contrast the Russian Academy of Sciences is viewed as prestigious and respected, while the oil industry, as previously mentioned, has support within the Duma and has spent much more in terms of resources on lobbying the Russian government to reject the Kyoto Accords. Further indirect evidence to suggest that the dominant domestic preference is represented by the more economically minded anti-Kyoto faction is the language used by members of the Russian government when discussing the Kyoto Accords. Arguments were almost predominantly framed in economic terms within Vladimir Putin's council of advisors, and politicians often argued over economic implications and the treaty's effect on Russia's European relations, not over environmental protection and safety. This suggests that the dominant domestic preference debating this issue with representatives of Russia's domestic institutions is using economic rhetoric and political considerations, neither of which is a noted concern of Russia's pro-Kyoto environmentalists. Therefore the dominant domestic preference is most represented by anti-Kyoto groups such as the oil industry and science academy, not the Green Party or Greenpeace.

Similar to the problems faced when

determining Russia's dominant domestic preference, political figures within Russia's domestic institutions are split on the issue. The most important advisors for ratification include the Minister for Economic Development and Trade Mukhammed Tsikanov, and the Minister for Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko. Both ministers have argued that the treaty poses no risk towards Russia's economy, and Tsikanov has stated that previous economic data against the Kyoto Accords does not take into account the fact that by 2010 the Russian economy's energy requirements will have fallen by 26-28 percent. Although three months previously he was against joining Kyoto, Tsikanov is now in direct opposition to both Economic Advisor Andrei Illaryonov, and Putin's science advisor, Yuri Izrael. Both advisors have argued that the Protocol is "overly expensive, ineffective, and bad science," and Illaryonov warned that Kyoto signatories would be unwilling to buy Russian emission quotas, and argues that no country can increase its GDP while also reducing its emission levels. This split among Putin's more influential advisors suggests a split domestic institution variable, which results in a pro-Kyoto government faction vying against an anti-Kyoto government faction and domestic preference. This type of division is not something this theory can account

for, and clearly requires a dominant domestic institution that represents a specific preference. However, indirect evidence on the control of influence and the nature of the status quo within Russia could potentially still demonstrate a divided combined preference seeking a compromise in order to avoid the status quo, and through doing so the hypothesis and model would be partially validated.

Control over the mechanism for joining or not joining the Kyoto Accords theoretically is maintained by Russia's bicameral legislature, and similar to the United States, the treaty must first be approved by both the Duma and the Federation Council before being given to President Putin, who must sign the legislation in order for it to pass. However, President Putin's political party, United Russia, controls the Duma and has traditionally rubber stamped any legislation Putin wants passed. Furthermore, the Federation Council is appointed by upper executive officials within Russia's administrative units, who are also loyal to Putin and his party. This gives President Putin almost complete control over the fate of any legislation regarding the Kyoto Accords, As the prime controller of influence, the domestic institution or domestic preference that most clearly persuades President Putin has the dominant control over the

mechanism for joining or not joining Kyoto.

Putin's past public statements regarding the Kyoto Accords offer an insight into which group most closely influenced the president. Before November 2003 the international community had expected Putin to fully support Kyoto, but at a climate change conference in November, Putin backed down from his previous support. Further evidence of indecisiveness within Putin's government was clear a month later, when within two days of each other advisors Illaryonov and Tsikanov released conflicting reports on Russia's decision to sign. This wavering suggests that no one group had sufficiently influenced Putin before his decision to sign, and that a compromise of some sort must have occurred in order for Putin to finally ratify the agreement. Evidence of this compromise exists through an examination of both the pro-Kyoto and anti-Kyoto factions dislike of the status quo. Anti-Kyoto business elements have expressed far more interest in Russia's accession into the WTO, and analysts have stated that when compared to the WTO "[Kyoto] hasn't been the thing business people have been talking about." Furthermore, the preference of the domestic institution was also for accession into the WTO, as Greenpeace representatives lamented that joining Kyoto relies upon European concessions toward

the government, and Putin was accused of purposefully stalling in order to seek better terms from Europe. This suggests evidence of a possible compromise through issue-linkage, and is further supported by Putin's own direct statements. After signing an agreement with the EU in May 2004 to support Russia's entry into the WTO, Putin stated that "having resolved…WTO entry, Russia could compromise on Kyoto because 'it lessens the risk for our economy in the medium term,'" and that Russia would speed up Kyoto ratification because "the EU met us halfway on the WTO." This data strongly suggests that the force which broke Russia's deadlock on Kyoto a few months earlier was a compromise between the EU and Russia on linking Kyoto with Russia's entry into the WTO. While the research on the dominant domestic institution and dominant domestic preference proved inconclusive, Putin's indecisiveness leading up to the EU concession indirectly demonstrates the equal influence between the anti-Kyoto and pro-Kyoto factions, as well as the use of issue linkage in order to reach a compromise due to a dislike on both sides of the status quo. The presence of this compromise partially supports this theory's third model and hypothesis.

Challenges

The imperfect explanation of the case study of Russia and the Kyoto Accords, as well as complications surrounding the power of government within the case study of Japan and the "Coalition of the Willing" raise significant challenges to my theory and hypotheses. Specifically, there is some evidence to suggest in all three of these case studies that the government drove the decision to join the international institution, and therefore can be better explained through realist variables. While in the case of Japan and Russia this may appear to be true, this criticism falls short of accounting for the influence wielded by the Polish public through the referendum. However, this points to a more subtle problem with less democratic nations, and the question of whether or not this criticism still holds true when faced with more centralized states such as Japan and Russia. In the case of Japan there is additional evidence to suggest domestic preference still plays a role in determining international policy. During the decision to send troops to Iraq, support for PM Koizumi's cabinet dropped 14 percent from the previous survey in October, and the opposition party gained seats in the Diet in the following July 2004 election for the first time since 1989. Unfortunately, the continued importance of domestic preference in Russia is more difficult to discern. It is clear that ministers

such as Putin's Science Advisor, Izrael, adopted a position similar to Russia's Academy of Sciences, and this suggests that domestic preferences are still represented in less democratic states. This is aided by statements from a small collection of minor government posts, such as the state head of Russia's Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring Service, who actually use environmental reasoning in describing Kyoto. Therefore, in the case of Russia even minority domestic preferences such as Greenpeace can find a similarly minor government official to influence Putin where they are unable to do so. However, this only works when a domestic preference and government official share the same position on an issue, and a larger sample size of fewer democratic nations is necessary in order to fully combat the criticism that this theory is less viable in explaining the actions of less democratic nations.

        This criticism ties into an explanatory problem with situations where the nature of the rules of the government system can cause certain domestic preferences or domestic institutions to dominate specific issues. While a regulation like this could undermine a potentially influential dominant domestic preference or institution, this situation is still subject to the same stipulation faced by dictatorships or highly centralized

regimes; the regulation is only effective in so far as the dominant domestic preference accepts it. If the dominant domestic preference is disenfranchised by the regulation for too long it will use either legal or illegal means to remove it.

Further limitations of the explanation revolve around the use of opinion polls, the effects of outside influences, and the broad definition of domestic groups. Specifically, there is a criticism raised that by defining almost everything as a domestic group, I cannot meaningfully determine when my hypothesis has been falsified. However, as the Russian case suggests, falsifying my theory is not a significant problem. Furthermore, having widely defined domestic groups as my primary independent variables is not a problem, as long as the specific domestic groups responsible for affecting a state's international policies are identified. By directly stating that only the dominant domestic preferences and institutions are responsible for influencing state policy, the theory provides the necessary specificity required to explain why states join or do not join international institutions.

In response to criticisms that opinion polls do not properly determine public opinion due to the potential of confusing wordings and the fact that some cultures use opinion polls more than

others, I argue that there is no more thorough way to gauge public opinion besides polling. In some instances very large domestic groups that represent a strong majority of the population, such as the Catholic Church in Poland, could service as a gauge for public opinion. However, this gauge would deteriorate as public opinion is sought on more controversial issues within the group. Furthermore the easiest way to avoid polls invalidated due to confusing questions is to adhere to trusted news sources, and when available check the wording of the questions. Despite these apparent limitations, polling data appears to be the most thorough way to determine public opinion, and therefore this data must be taken into account.

Lastly, the effects of outside influences are a variable my theory does not take into account. Yet, such influences could potentially persuade domestic institutions or preferences to adopt specific positions. However outside influences are not listed as a variable due to the structure of my argument. The reader does not necessarily need to understand where the preferences of domestic institutions and preferences originate, because the interest is in how those preferences shape the decision to join or not join an international institution. For my theory it is enough to know that they exist, but further research on these

preferences' origins might be useful in judging the systemic value of the independent variables.

Conclusion

The cases of Japan and Poland clearly argue for this theory's accuracy. The interests of Prime Minister Miller and the Democratic Left Alliance clearly represent a combined preference for joining the EU that coincides with the theory's first hypothesis. Likewise the role that influence plays in determining Japan's decision to join the "Coalition of the Willing" fit this theory's explanation. While Russia fails to fully conform to the last model and hypothesis, indirect explanations still serve to partially validate the theory's validity. The difficulties experienced through my research with Russia, and the criticisms on government structure and outside influences on decision makers, suggest that an investigation of more case studies with less democratic regimes is necessary. Furthermore a potential restructuring of the relationships between the theory's independent variables, as well as a reexamination of Russia in an attempt to narrow down the precise dominant domestic preference and domestic institution, is also needed. Information on Russian public opinion and inside

details on the preferences within Putin's cabinet could reveal that the structure of the original theory is still accurate. These are naturally the next steps for future research into the plausibility of such a domestic-based explanation of international relations. Through these steps the role of domestic variables in explaining the actions of countries in the international system will be further verified, and this theory will be further vindicated as a useful paradigm.

Notes

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The Effects of Religious Motivation on Transnational Terrorism

Sarah Sanders

Introduction

"When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, Jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims. In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of Jihad. This would require the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels. We must spread the spirit of Jihad among the [Islamic] Umma, clash with the enemies and join the ranks of the Jihad fighters."

Hamas—Islamic Charter

"Soon we will be asked to kill, but we will kill with love in our hearts because God is with us."

American Christian Patriots Statement

The past twenty-five years have witnessed a revival of religious extremism. Religious and international terrorist groups are now thriving across the globe, from Europe to Indonesia. This is seen through the increase of

international terrorist attacks committed in the name of God, such as the 9/11 attacks or the Olympic bombings in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, new groups are currently responding out of a need to follow God's will and thus use jihad or religiously-motivated terror against civilians. A type of "holy" or "sacred terror" has created an avenue for increased terrorist attacks. Some analysts have argued that these groups, though they are religious, do not commit terrorist acts, especially suicide bombings, out of religious motivation, but rather they commit terrorist attacks because of the empirical evidence that terrorism produces concessions from the group's adversaries. Thus, *religious* groups are politically-motivated and rational, even if they commit acts of *sacred* terrorism and suicide bombings, the later of which seems contradictory to rationality. Yet, while many of the tactics of religious terrorist groups may be logical, strategic, and rational, what accounts for the list of targets (which are usually in the list of: non-believers, wayward believers, and indiscriminate crowds) of those terrorist attacks? In short, does religion have an independent causal effect on the shape of terrorist attacks? Further, why would an individual join such a group when it poses a threat to his/her own interest, that is, survival and high risks?

Two theories seek to address if and/or how does the interpretation of religious beliefs affect terrorist organizations' behavior: religious terrorist theory and rational choice. The religious terrorist theory states that religious beliefs lead to terrorist behavior. This theory argues that there are three main factors which differentiate religious terrorism from non-religious terrorism: the goals of the religious terrorists, the audience of religious terrorists, and the targets of religious terrorism.

There are five overall goals of "sacred" terror. They include: pleasing God by punishing non-believers; ritual sacrifice (less prevalent); cleansing the religion of impure practices; taking revenge against perceived or actual oppressors; and establishing the dominant religious order that will govern their territory.

The audience of religious extremists is also different because the organization, of which they are a part, desires to have its name in the public, its cause known. It is about publicity. Further, the audiences that religious terrorists appeal to (in order) are God, believers, and non-believers. It is this severity in audience that justifies religious extremists' mass casualty terrorism. An apolitical religious terrorist is not concerned about bringing people into his/her group (as in politics), but about doing God's will.

The targets of religious terrorism are also an important distinction within this theory. Targets are listed as and pursued in order of importance to the group. Thus, non-believers are attacked the most, followed by wayward believers, and very rarely, indiscriminate targets are attacked. Further, most terrorist attacks committed by a religious terrorist organization are committed against non-believers. Differentiation and debate within groups about the selection of targets demonstrate the strategic decision-making of these groups. It also shows that these groups are not solely politically-minded, for they divide their targets primarily into "believers" and "non-believers." For instance, this is the exact list that Hamas debated about and whether or not they should continue to adhere to *jihad*, or armed struggle.

Bruce Hoffman, one of the main proponents of the religious terrorist model, in particular lays out the reasons why religious terrorism differs from other types of terrorism. He defines religious terrorism as possessing three characteristics that make religious terrorism distinct from other types of terrorism: "sacred terror"; dehumanization rhetoric; identity formation and alienation.

The "sacred" act of violence is committed

because of what the terrorist perceives as God telling him/her what to do. The terrorists claim that the edict was from God, and thus, terrorists who adhere to this command are not constrained by any ideological, moral, political, or social view. Therefore, large-scale violence is permitted.

Alongside the use of terrorist acts, dehumanization occurs in the form of rhetoric. Since rhetoric is used as a tool for legitimacy within the organization, dehumanizing terms such as "infidels," "dogs," and so on, are employed by leaders within the group. This further legitimizes the practices of the religious terrorist organization as well as fuels the motivations for future terrorist attacks. In view of this, the recruitment rate into the movement increases.

Further legitimacy and comfort is found for members of the group through identity and pact formation. Extremists begin to share a sense of alienation from society and from the people they are committing terrorism against. Through identity formation in the form of a shared sense of alienation, a greater distinction between them and the "other" is formed. Thus, religious terrorists perceive themselves as outsiders and not as a part of the societal/governmental system.

Critiques of the religious terrorist model

are many. First, just because an individual is religious does not form that person into a terrorist. It would be like stating that Gandhi was religious, and religion causes terrorism, therefore, Gandhi was a terrorist. Further, Islam began when Muhammad received his first revelations from God in 632 AD. Thus, the sudden increase in militant Islamic terrorism cannot be attributed to the argument that religion causes terrorism. The issue here is that religion, in this case Islam, may not be the only variable causing a surge in Islamic radicalism (perhaps band-wagoning, secularization, rise of fundamentalism, and so forth, are other independent variables to consider). Additionally, the line between religion and culture is extremely undefined and many elements of one are inherent in the other. Thus, it is difficult to measure "religion" if religion is the only factor leading to religiously-motivated terrorism. This reflects how the role of culture is largely ignored in this theory. Finally, from a rational choice critique, the power and wealth aspect is excluded. From this perspective, religion is only a mask, a tool, for the rationalization of violent acts committed by religious terrorist organizations.

Rational choice also seeks to address if and/or how the interpretation of religious beliefs affect terrorist organizations' behavior. This

theory assumes people who choose to be terrorists are making a rational self-interested choice to be a terrorist. There is always a personal pay-off included (accordingly, there are no altruistic terrorists). By having a personal pay-off as a necessity, the theory then assumes that actors have stable and ordered preferences and pursue those preferences in a rational utility-maximizing fashion. These strategic choices are made for the sole purpose of wealth and/or power for the religious terrorist. If religion is employed, it is only used as a tool to achieve the goals of wealth and/or power. Analyst Robert Pape argues that every terrorist attack since the 1980s that has involved a suicide campaign has been for the sole purpose of forcing a foreign country's military from what the terrorists perceive as their homeland (and have been given concessions by their opponents). Thus, because the goal is political and rational, the strategy of suicide bombing is used by religious groups because it gains concessions from their adversaries. This, he argues, divorces religion from the picture. Religion is not an independent factor for religious terrorism; only political goals motivate a terrorist organization to commit terrorist acts.

While rational choice theory is a very logical and testable theory that uses self-interest in

identifying why individuals and groups engage in terrorist tactics, it has attracted an array of assailments and critiques. One of the critiques of the rational choice model is the fact that the members (especially the leadership) of a terrorist group are typically from wealthy and powerful backgrounds, which seems to contradict the notion of the main goal of the rational choice model: the accumulation of wealth and power. Further, members put their lives at risk and thus jeopardize their self-interest by joining an organization and participating in suicide terrorism (for those who choose to do so). This would seem to directly contradict rational choice theory's hypothesis: the higher personal costs increase without a perceived higher rate of return, the actor will not undertake the action. Also, this theory does not take into account that most religious terrorism is committed primarily against non-believers. This demarcation between "believers" and the "other" indicates the role that religious ideas have had on an extremist group.

Lastly, the issue of suicide terrorism is very difficult for a rational choice theorist to explain. First of all suicide itself rejects the notions of rational choice theory (the idea of self-preservation), but more importantly, suicide terrorists are not usually in possession of their

potential wealth or power before they go on their suicide campaign.

Hypothesis

Therefore, since neither the religious terrorist model nor rational choice fully explains why religious terrorism occurs, I combine the strengths of both of these approaches. While the religious terrorist model is deficient because it proposes that only religion is the motivating factor for the shape of terrorism, the rational choice model proposes that religion is used as a cover for the political goals of a terrorist organization which determines the shape of terrorism employed by the organization. From the religious terrorist model, I am asking the question of whether or not religion alters a terrorist organization's tactics or targets of terror. From rational choice theory, I assume that religious extremists are rational actors in their tactics and targets of terrorism. Thus, from a combination of these two theories, I argue that the interpretation of religion is used as an independent variable for the strategic terrorist attacks committed by a religious extremist group. A terrorist organization's interpretation of a religion as well as its own political goals establish a worldview in which the terrorists operate rationally and strategically, which affects the shape of the terrorism employed by the organization.

That is, if a person is Hindu, Muslim, or Christian, that person adopts and pursues certain preferences that pertain to that religion. Further, certain religious ideologies "offer strategies for fulfilling divine duties and maximizing the prospects of salvation on judgment day." Thus, members of extremist groups partake in "high risk/cost activism" because of the spiritual benefit and pay-off in the after-life.

In fact, most of the attacks committed by religious terrorist groups fit into the pattern of the religious terrorist model of targets: non-believers, wayward believers, and then indiscriminate crowds. I found this to be true with two of the four case studies. I am basing my use of terrorism from the State Department's definition of terrorism: "terrorism is pre-meditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets usually intended to influence an audience." I will look at four cases to test my theory, two religious terrorist groups (HAMAS and The Christian Patriots—Phineas Priesthood) and two non-religious terrorist groups (IRA and Tamil Tigers). The time periods I will use are as follows: HAMAS: 1987 to the present; the Christian Patriots: 1990 to present (but peak in 1995); the IRA (Provos): 1969 to 2001; and Tamil Tigers: 1976 to 2001.

Methodology

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There are three main ways in which I measure how the interpretation of religious beliefs affects terrorist groups' behavior. The main method is content analysis. Content analysis involves compiling and analyzing the findings from a given source of communication. In particular, I focused on the charters or covenants of these terrorist groups because they state the purpose of the group in more detail than other documents or news sources. Though the main sources of communication I have looked at is primarily charters (stated purposes of why the organization exists, is primarily used for members within the group), I have also looked at pamphlets, books, newspapers, propaganda, sermons and speeches (especially before terrorist attacks) (See Appendix II). These sources, however, are not used by all terrorist organizations. For instance, not all religious terrorist organizations have a religious charter stating their purpose in a formal document. In reference to the charters or documents of purpose, I set a threshold of 30 religious words in order to determine if a document is "religiously-based" or not. In order to gain a context of the word, the 10 words preceding and following the word is necessary in order to determine if the context is a religious one or not.

The incorporation of religious leaders into

the power structure of a religious terrorist organization is also counted as a way to measure the degree of religion's impact within a terrorist organization. A religious founder or leader within an organization that has a leading role in the decision-making process of the group illustrates how much value is placed on that individual or group of individuals. This is also true if a chair or committee of religious activities and goal-setting is formed. Further, if their statements and suggestions are taken into consideration in the form of decisions and tactics of the group, then this reflects how the religious ideas they bear change the nature of the terrorist organization. This measure, however, is not completely accurate because it is hard to test exactly the level of influence the religious leaders have, (unless they became a martyr because many martyrs are highly valued in terrorist organizations) because it is hard to measure the beliefs of the members unless one is within the terrorist organization. Also, this measure is not comprehensive because not all religiously-based terrorist groups have a set religious leadership or council.

Finally, in order to determine how to measure the impact of religion on a terrorist group, it is necessary to observe how people are selected for membership, especially for suicide attacks (if

suicide tactics are employed). In religiously-motivated groups, members are usually recruited at mosques or churches. In addition, the area surrounding a mosque or church is also considered to religious terrorist groups as potential ground for recruitment. Not all religious terrorist organizations recruit from a religious gathering place; however, some are recruited from sermons being spoken on street corners and even websites.

The other variable is political goals (that is, political preferences of actors), which can include the desire for separation within an existing state, independence from an existing state, access to territory, or the desire for a unified state to name a few. I measured political goals by using content analysis as well. Again, my focus is on charters (statements of purpose) and detailed content analysis of the charters of terrorist groups. Books, newspapers, sermons and speeches, however, were taken into consideration as well but no detailed coding was performed; rather, similar to the religious coding mentioned above, the context was taken into account in order to determine if a statement in a newspaper and so forth was politically-based or not. As stated above, I have set a threshold for how many political references would be necessary to code a speech, text, sermon, newspaper articles, and so forth, as politically-

motivated or not. In reference to the charters or documents of purpose, I set a threshold of 30 political words in order to determine if a document is "politically-based" or not. In order to gain a context of the word, the 10 words preceding and following the word is necessary in order to determine if the context is a religious one or not (see Appendix II for the list of political words used).

The shape of terrorism can be measured in two primary ways. One is the stated and actual targets of terrorism and the other is how that attack is legitimized within the group. The targets of terrorism stated by the group is essential in understanding how religion plays a role within the organization because if the stated targets of terror are carried out, then that reflects the religious or political goals of the group. For instance, religiously-motivated terrorist groups state their targets usually in this order: 1. non-believers, 2. wayward believers, and 3. indiscriminate crowds. I observed stated targets in *fatwas* (non-binding legal opinions), speeches, sermons, books, and newspaper articles. If a religious terrorist organization stated that their primary targets are non-believers, who are *most* of their victims? If they are non-believers, then the terrorist organization has followed its stated targets and

implemented them, showing that religion has had an independent effect upon the tactics of the terrorist organization.

Likewise, I hypothesize that if a group states that its main targets are political and the actual targets of the group are political, then the terrorist group is politically-based rather than religiously-based. For instance, if such targets (or perceived targets) include the prime minister, president, bankers, military units, members of parliament, collaborators with members of the perceived or actual "other," office buildings of major economic/political/cultural significance, or civilians of the perceived enemy state, then the group is politically motivated in its terrorist tactics and targets.

Further, how the terrorist attack is framed/ justified/legitimized is also a determining factor in measuring the shape of terrorism. This includes the justification of the terrorist act after it was committed, specifically, if religious leaders issue a sermon, speech, or text that justifies the attacks employed by the terrorist group. This could also be done through political protests, public marches, or demonstrations. This will either reflect that a religious worldview is an independent causal factor in the shape of terrorism in a religiously-motivated terrorist group or the group is basically

motivated by political goals and uses religion as a tool for legitimation of those goals.

Case Studies

The Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a terrorist group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its main goal is to violently overthrow Israel and the Occupied Territories so that they can be entrusted to the Palestinian people once again and establish *shari'a*, or Islamic law, as the basis of governance for the state of Palestine. This goal can only be accomplished through *jihad*, or holy war. This is directly seen through their statement of purpose, the Islamic Covenant. Hamas's charter is an overtly religious document citing that their "allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam." In its charter, Hamas states that it wants to Islamize society and regain the Holy Land stolen from them by Israel. References made to any of the religious words listed in the coding section in Appendix II were 562 as compared to the political references which were only 285 in comparison. Thus, overall given numbers of religious words, context, and goals listed by the group, Hamas presents itself as a religious movement to its members, potential recruits, Palestinian society, and to the international body

as well.

In addition, Hamas also presents itself as a religious organization through the incorporation of religious leaders into its power structure. For instance, Sheikh Ahmad Isma'il Yassin is both the founder as well as the spiritual leader of Hamas. He created the Association of Religious Sages of Palestine to be the "supreme religious body [in Hamas] that grants legitimacy to the movement's activities." This supreme religious body included in its leadership Yahya Ayyash, whose nickname was the Engineer (who died because of a small explosive in his mobile phone, thus clearly he is not on the religious leadership council) and Emad Aqel (the leader of *Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades* in Gaza who was killed by Israeli forces in 1993). This religious body issue fatwas, have debates about whether or not to participate in politics, and overall decide the direction of Hamas. Further, Hamas is also connected to an auxiliary religious group, the Association of the [Islamic] Scholars of Palestine (*Rabitat 'ulama' filastin*). It was an official Islamic institution with eighty members that served to persuade the religious community and educated classes in the role that Islam was to have in their lives, this including members of Hamas. Thus, they are a source of credibility and legitimacy to the organization as a whole.

A third measure is how individuals are selected for membership. Since there is a lack of intelligence agents in Hamas and because Hamas does not declare how they select their membership, there is not much information on how people are selected. There is an interview on Al-Maij TV, however, in which a Hamas spokesman, Faraj Shalhoub, addresses how suicide bombers are selected:

> **Moderator**: How are the martyrdom bombers selected? How are they recruited and prepared mentally, and morally?
>
> **Faraj Shalhoub**: I want to talk about recruiting, before I talk about the selection. The level of faith among a wide sector of the young believers instills in them the concept of Jihad, true Jihad in defense of the message, the homeland, the people, and the nation. They are committed even before they reach the fighting stage. They are committed to their cause and draw their belief in it from the mosque […] It also requires morale preparation and so, he spends some time in religious ritual and intensive spiritual preparation until

he reaches a certain level of conviction that pushes him commit martyrdom, regardless of the fact that his mental readiness was high to begin with […] This comes following his decision to commit martyrdom. The volunteers are those who initiate and accept upon themselves to commit a martyrdom operation. There is a widespread misconception, propagated by the Zionist enemy, that there are recruiters among the Palestinian fighters who look for martyrdom bombers. The opposite is true - the martyrdom bombers are the ones looking for the resistance factions in order to commit martyrdom operations. We are talking about hundreds of martyrdom bombers waiting in line to commit martyrdom operations. The factions' inability to supply enough operations for all of them is the only obstacle preventing them all from committing martyrdom operations.

Further, another religious spokesman for Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, comments that "there are

hundreds of female martyrdom bombers, who stream en masse and insist on participating in martyrdom operations. This is a unique phenomenon, reflecting the live spirit of Jihad among this people."

While these spokesmen for Hamas are correct in stating that the number for suicide bombers is increasing and they claim it is because of the martyr's ideas of jihad, they also mentioned that certain mosques tend to be more radical than others and are therefore the prime centers for recruitment. Hamas generally targets young men who are deeply religious, although some bombers have been older. The recruits do not fit the usual psychological profile of suicidal people, who are often desperate or clinically depressed. The bombers often hold paying jobs, even in poverty-stricken Gaza. The only thing they share, studies say, is a passionate hatred of Israel. More knowledge can be gained through interviews with failed suicide bombers on television and with the Israeli military/security reports, recruitment is better understood. This measure has many problems, however, because one, the failed suicide bombers are low in number, and two, it is hard to measure accuracy after the fact and three because the Israeli military and security reports are not disclosed to the public.

The final and strongest measure used to determine whether Hamas is a religiously-based terrorist group is the stated targets of terror by the group, which affects the shape of terrorism committed by Hamas (the actual targets of terror). I assume that targets are made rationally and fit into all groups' political and/or religious motives and that the targets are therefore rewarding to the terrorists. I hypothesize that a religiously-motivated terrorist organization will target their victims in this order, the same order as used by Hamas: non-believers, wayward believers, and then indiscriminate crowds. Hamas not only has stated religious targets but political targets as well such as the Israeli military/police. Hamas, however, views its political targets in religious terms, that is, even though the targets may be political they are still viewed as non-believers of the faith and therefore in direct opposition to God and his law. Hamas also targets Israeli citizens who are distinctly viewed as non-believers. It established the Qassam Brigades, its military wing, to target not only Israeli citizens and soldiers, but also its own wayward believers. This military wing of Hamas is then further divided to the Striking Arms which targets Israelis and the Islamic Police, targeting Palestinian collaborators.

Not only are their targets aligned with the

prediction for selecting for attack first non-believers, then wayward believers and then indiscriminate crowds, Hamas also has accepted responsibility and distributed pamphlets concerning the reasons for accepting responsibility (not done on all occasions). Hamas has claimed responsibility for around 1/3 of the terrorist attacks it has committed. Hamas has especially accepted responsibility for terrorist attacks that were committed in retaliation. For example, Hamas claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on an Israeli citizen because it stated that the attack was carried out in retaliation for killing Imad Akel by Israeli forces, a religious Hamas leader in Gaza. Further, when a Hamas suicide bomber blew up a bus, killing 26 people and injuring some 80 others, Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing in retaliation for the Hebron massacre two months before, but later denied involvement. Hamas also issued a leaflet assuming responsibility for the bombing; this statement was signed by the Squads of the New Disciples of Martyr Yehiye Ayyash, the Engineer, claiming the bombing was in retaliation for Ayyash's death on 5 January 1996. Since 1994, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have dispatched more than 80 suicide bombers. The bombings have killed 377 Israeli civilians and wounded thousands, according to the Israeli government.

American Christian Patriots

The American Christian Patriots (ACP) is a terrorist group based in the United States that peaked in its terrorist attacks in 1995 with the Okalahoma City Bombing. The American Christian Patriots' Doctrinal Statement of Beliefs on their website is heavily laden with Biblical references and proceeds to discuss how the White race is the chosen seedline of God and that Adam is the father of the white race only and thus God gave **"**him a higher form of consciousness and distinguished him from all the other races of the earth (Deut. 7:6, 10:15; Amos 3:2)." Thus Israel became the chosen race of God; however, they racially intermixed with each other and became tainted and satanic because "Race-mixing is an abomination in the sight of Almighty God." Thus in the conquest "to BUILD A NEW, ALL-WHITE NATION," they turned their attention to the United States as the "place where Christians from all tribes of Israel would be gathered." Their overall goal is to establish in the United States a theocracy in which God is the ruler and those who are evil, such as feminists, abortionists, homosexuals, and Jews, are destroyed. As seen in the above points, the charter of the American Christian Patriots is an overwhelmingly religious

document citing religious goals and targets, with 161 religious words and only nine political words cited. While their political goals included the creation of a theocracy in the United States and some of their political targets have included Jews as seen as part of the government in the past, their overarching goal of a theocracy in this statement of purpose suggests that God is the head of the government, not a body of priests or religious men. Further, almost all of their terrorist attacks have been committed against abortion clinics, homosexuals, and racially mixed couples.

While Hamas has a committee and a founder that are both religiously-motivated, the American Christian Patriots claim that they have no founder and that they have no human leadership. They claim that God is their leader and tells each of them what to do for the Kingdom. They are not professional terrorists, Bruce Hoffman notes; they consider themselves ordinary American citizens that will take up arms at God's command. Even though religious leaders are not incorporated, the center of the group's ideology is from the Aryan Nations, started by Reverend Richard Girnt Butler in 1974. The Aryan Nations provided an ideological base for the ACP; this is seen through the shared beliefs of anti-Semitism, anti-homosexuality, anti-abortion and an

overriding belief in the inherent superiority of the white race. Further, what has been cited as the Bible of the Christian Patriots is the novel *The Turner Diaries* written by William Pierce (under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald). This novel explains how there will be an all-out race war and that it will be won by a white supremacist revolution. The white revolution will eventually gain control of the United States' nuclear weapons supply and proceed to target Israel (the seed of Satan) and the former Soviet Union. In addition, the fallacious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* is strongly supported by this group. Thus, although religious leaders are not centered in a committee in the ACP, religious leaders, often clergymen, are still important to its religious ideology and legitimacy.

For the ACP, people are usually selected for membership because of their beliefs displayed through action, that is, whether they are a part of a group that opposes legislation that would ban firearms (i.e., the Second Amendment) or from more rural churches that are known to have a more radical preacher or reverend, such as the Idaho-based Aryan Nations' leader, Pastor Norman Olson. The approximate number of people involved in the right-wing religious terrorism is estimated to be around 10,000 people.

Finally, the stated targets of terror are aligned with the religious terrorist model in that they attack nonbelievers, wayward believers and indiscriminate crowds. Most of their "targets of justice" include abortion doctors and clinics, homosexuals and gay gatherings, and racially-mixed couples. This reflects the American Christian Patriots' belief of establishing God's law on earth here and punishing those who disobey God's law. Their religious beliefs affected their stated targets of terrorism which in turn affected the shape of terrorism employed by this group. Most of their victims are abortion doctors and clinics, homosexuals and gay gatherings, and interracially married or dating couples. In fact, the ACP's pattern of terrorism aligns with the religious terrorist hypothesis of nonbelievers, wayward believers, and indiscriminate crowds. For example, Paul Hill, a Christian fundamentalist preacher, murdered an abortion clinic doctor in Pensacola, Florida in 1994. He subsequently wrote a book about the legitimacy associated with killing those who disobey God's law; the book was entitled, *Should We Defend Born and Unborn Children with Force?* Other attacks have included the July 1996 bombing at Centennial Park during the Atlanta Olympics, which killed one person and injured more than 100, and the Summer 1999 shooting sprees by members who targeted

minorities in the Chicago and Los Angeles metropolitan areas, which left three people dead. The ACP has not been as successful in terms of terrorist activity because many of their attacks have been prevented by local law enforcement and the FBI. The main attack, however, was the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing in which 168 people were killed by a truck bomb. In all of these incidents as well as others, the victims are stated as nonbelievers according to both ACP's Doctrinal Statement of Beliefs and to other sources of communication thus reflecting the religious motivations of the group and its shape of terrorist attacks.

Irish Republican Army (Provos)

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is one of the longest standing and most professional terrorist groups in Western Europe if not in the entire world. It was formed as a guerilla army by Michael Collins with the purpose of gaining independence from Britain. Thus, between 1919 and 1921, the IRA began a violent campaign against British military personnel within Ireland. In 1921, the separatists' political party, Sinn Fein, reached an agreement with Britain in which Britain agreed to grant full independence for the southern 26 counties of Ireland while remaining in control over the remaining six counties in the northeast

(later known as Northern Ireland). These six counties have largely Protestant majorities as well. This placated most of the Irish nationalists, however, there was a fierce debate within the IRA as to whether they should accept the treaty or not as the UK did not allow for complete independence of Ireland. A large faction of the IRA wanted one unified Irish and Catholic state but the Protestants do not want one state because they fear that they will lose their political and religious rights. Thus, Provos broke away from the IRA, but because the older leadership of the IRA is deceased and because Provos took over Sinn Fein, Provos and the IRA are one and the same.

Their goals and the reasons of why they exist are listed in their charter, the IRA Green Book. Though the IRA is viewed as a Catholic terrorist organization, it is classified by many terrorist knowledge bases in Europe and in the US as a nationalist/separatist group. Further, in the Green Book, there is no reference to the words Catholic or Protestant. It had nine religious references and 336 political references, which included the political goals, the tactics, and targets of the IRA. The IRA never intended to attack civilians in its bombing campaign—even the Birmingham Six bombings were targeted at the

British military and not civilians (even though civilians were injured). The IRA has consistently attacked British military personnel as a method of pressuring the British for independence. Further, their main political goals are as follows: achieve independence from Britain, establish a unified Irish state, and govern that unified Irish state with Marxist principles.

While Hamas has actual religious leaders incorporated into its structure and the ACP turn towards religious leaders for inspiration as well as legitimacy, the IRA does not have religious leaders incorporated into its structures nor does it try to consult religious leaders unless it is to gain more followers from a Catholic perspective. The IRA was supported financially by various Catholic churches; however, shortly after its creation, all churches have ceased their support for the IRA. This was especially true after the Bloody Friday attacks in 1972 in which 22 bombs were planted in Belfast. Provos insists that civilians were given warnings and that they did not intend to injure or kill anyone from the bombings, however, 436 civilians (including Catholics) died. Brendan Hughes, one of the Provisionals, remarks:

> What happened on Bloody Friday
> was a disaster. It was largely the
> fault of the IRA…. To my

knowledge there was never an attempt at any time to kill people with the car bomb because the people who were putting the car bombs there had their own families shopping there as well.

Did "Bloody Friday" change IRA tactics?

I think it certainly made people much more careful about what they were doing, in particular with regard to car bombs in the town.

In view of this, many churches and pastors once sympathetic to the IRA began to withdraw funding. While some churches and pastors supported the IRA's fight for the rights of Catholics and the overarching goal of a unified Irish state, very few supported its violent means of gaining independence. Though church influence decreased, the IRA maintained its overriding goal of independence through violent means up until the 1994 and 1997 ceasefires and the 1998 Good Friday Accords.

The recruits for the IRA are selected for membership based on proximity and political identity. Its members are numbered around 3000 and its supporters around 10,000. These numbers

were largely in the previous decades as shown through its increase in political support and its dramatic decrease in the years afterwards. The IRA, via its political party, Sinn Fein, won municipal elections in the North, in which Catholics are 25% of the population. In the remaining six Catholic counties in the North, there are certain neighborhoods that are designated as either Catholic or Protestant in Northern Ireland and members of the IRA ask for membership from individuals in the Catholic communities. In the Green Book, however, though these members may be Catholic, it states that any potential volunteer that decides to join the IRA "should examine his *political* motives bearing in mind that the Army are intent on creating a Socialist Republic" (emphasis mine). In view of this, potential volunteers are not chosen on any religious basis by the IRA but rather they are chosen because of an individual's political identity and goals. This method of recruitment does not exclude the possibility of Catholic volunteers and supporters of the IRA, but rather this selection of volunteers suggests that religion is not a motivating factor for recruitment.

If potential recruits decide not to join, then the IRA asks for financial assistance instead. If this is refused, the IRA's perfected tactic of "knee-

capping" is utilized. Knee-capping is a form of violence that involves shooting the back of a knee cap. This usually cripples the person for life. This practice is reserved for traitors or perceived traitors that have leaked information about the IRA or for people who will not support them financially or strategically.

The last measure of how religion has affected the IRA's tactics and targets is to look at the stated targets of terrorism. The IRA's violence has been restricted to a specific target set: British military personnel and government officials, the English public, and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Further, the IRA's stated goals include the removal of British troops and military personnel from Northern Ireland, the reunification of the North with the South; and the establishment of a democratic/socialist state. Earlier, I hypothesized that a religious terrorist group will pursue its targets in the form of non-believers, wayward believers, and indiscriminate crowds. Most of the IRA's attacks, however, have been committed against British military personnel. Further, even though Protestants are a target identified for the Catholic terrorist group, less than 20% of the IRA's victims between 1969 and 1993 were Protestant civilians.

Further, perceived traitors are targeted,

<u>Notes</u>

Article 15 of Hamas's charter. See
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/h_cov.htm for more information.

[2] Quoted in Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman. 1995. "Identity and the Militia." *Arkansas Democrat Gazette* **(Little Rock).**

[3] David C. Rapoport. 1998. "Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam." <u>Origins of Terrorism</u>. p. 103.

[4] Robert Pape. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* **97, 2 (2003): 343-363.**

[5] Quintan Wiktororwicz and Karl Kalthenthaler. 2005. "The Rationality of Radical Islam: Al-Muhajiroun and High Cost/Risk Activism."

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Appendix: Data Tables

Content: Religious Words

Abortion
Abraham
Allah
Allah's Will
Ark
Arm of the Lord
Armageddon
Babylon
Believers
Bible
Book
Brotherhood
Buddhist
Children of Darkness
Children of Light
Children of Satan
Chosen People
Christian(s)
Christianity
Cleansing
Cleric(s)
Commissioned
Covenant
Coward(s)
Cross
Crusade(s)
Crusader(s)
Decree of Allah
Destiny
Devil
Directed by God
Divine Purpose(s)/Plan(s)

Divine Race
Duty
Earth
Enemy(ies)
Evil(s)
Faith
Fight
Fighter(s)
Fighting
Fundamentalist
Gay(s)
God
Gods
Hadith
Heathen
Heaven(s)
Hindu
Holy
Holy City(ies)
Holy Land
Holy Site(s)
Homosexual(s)
Homosexuality
Idol(s)
Idolator(s)
Infidels
Inter-Racial Marriage
Islam
Islamic
Islamic civilization
Islamic world
Israel
Jesus
Jew(s)
Jihad
Jihadi(s)

Judaism
Judge
Judgement
Justice
Kill
Killed
Life Order
Martyr(s)
Martyrdom
Master
Message
Messenger
Moral(s)
Mosque (Aqsa)
Mud People
Muhammad
Mujahedeen (holy warriors)
Muslim(s)/Moslem(s)
Paradise
Path
Praise(s)
Pray
Prayer(s)
Priest(s)
Promised Land
Prophet
Protocols of the Elders of Zion
Punishment
Qur'an/Koran
Quranic/Koranic
Race(s)
Religious Values
Sacred
Satan
Scripture
Shari'a

shirk
Sin(s)
Sunna
Sword
Traditions of Islam
True
Truth
Umma (universal Muslim community)
Victory
Virgin(s)
Warrior(s)
Worshipper(s)
Yahweh (YHVH)

Content: Political Words

Aggression
America
Arab
Arab World
Army
Aryan
Attrition
Balfour Declaration
Belfast
Black Tiger(s)
Blue-Eyed
British Public
Campaign
Capitalist
Catholic(s)
Colonialism
Communist
Disarmament
East
Ethnic Conflict

Exploit
Exploitation
Firearm(s)/Weapon(s)
Force(s)
Forcing
Foreign
Freedom
Government
Guerilla
Hero(es)
Holocaust
Homeland
Honor
Human Rights
Humanity
Imperialism
Imperialist
Independence
Indian Government
International Law
Intifada (armed resistance)
Invasion
Irish People
Irish Republic
Irish Republican Army
Jewish
League of Nations
Liberate(d)
Liberation
Militant
Military Training
Militia(s)
Minutemen
Movement
Nation
National

National Conflict
Nationalism
Nationalist
Nazi
Negotiation(s)
Northern Ireland
Occupation
One-World Government
Oppression
Palestine
Palestinian Authority (PA)
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinian people
Patriot(ic)
Plight
Police
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Protestant(s)
Racial Purification
Representative(s)
Republic
Republican(s)
Resistance
Revolt(s)
Revolution(s)
Revolutionary
Sacrifice(s)
Self-Determination
Self-Governing Authority
Separation
Sinhalese
Socialism
Socialist
Southern Ireland
Spy(ies)
Sri Lankan Government

Struggle(s)
Talk(s)
Tamil Eelam
Tamil Masses
Tamil People
Territory(ies)
Tigers
Torture
Traitors
Tyranny
United
United Nations
United States
Velupillai Pirapaharan
Volunteer(s)
War
West
Western
Zionist
Zionist terrorism

The Fuel Behind the Fire

Dayna Baer

The September 11 attacks on American soil reminded the citizens of the United States that we are not invincible. The questions echoing through the mind of each American were, "How could this happen on American soil?" and "What motivated people to organize and carry through these attacks?" There is a widespread conception throughout the Middle Eastern Islamic community that the United States is fundamentally alien and antagonistic to Islamic values and beliefs. Are we experiencing the "Clash of Civilizations" as suggested by Huntington? Is this the war between Islam and the West that Huntington suggested would inevitably happen? Radical Islamists turned to terrorist tactics on September 11, ultimately because terrorism works. Terrorism is a way in which the less powerful can bring devastation to the most powerful. On September 11, the radical Islamists found a way to generate a national reaction of horror and social outrage within the United States. President Bush has declared "War on Terrorism;" however, this concept is

unrealistic because one cannot wage war on a specific tactic. We must ask ourselves, "Who exactly is the enemy?" We are at war with certain groups, states, and non-state actors. Social scientists must attempt to understand and explain what fuels radical Islamism, in order to even begin taking steps toward deterring terrorism.

After learning that fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were Saudi Arabian citizens, one must wonder what provided this fertile field for radical Islamism in Saudi Arabia in particular. Saudi Arabia is a longtime ally of the United States. The United States-Saudi Arabia relationship is perhaps one of America's most important connections in the Middle East, but this relationship has been seriously questioned since the September 11 attacks. This paper will investigate Saudi Arabia in the decade prior to the September 11 attacks. The focus will be on the dominant militant Islamic group in Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda. Therefore, the research question is as follows: Which specific factors fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s?

When Al Qaeda is mentioned today, most know that Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization of the twenty-first century. Al Qaeda is a multinational terrorist group, and "Al Qaeda has moved terrorism beyond the status of a technique

of protest and resistance and turned it into a global instrument with which to compete with and challenge Western influence in the Muslim world." The worldwide Al Qaeda movement is and will continue to be one of the primary challenges facing the international community.

Al Qaeda militancy will be broadly defined as planning, implementing, or encouraging terrorist tactics in the name of Islam. The first section of the paper will present a set of hypotheses, each of which introduces a plausible answer to what fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. The next section will present detailed evidence for each hypothesis, and lastly, conclusions will be drawn on which hypothesis holds the most weight.

A brief history of religion in Saudi Arabia is necessary in order to get the full picture of why Saudi Arabia is definitely known as a hotbed of fundamentalist thought in the Middle East. Madawi Al-Rasheed notes, "The symbolic significance of Saudi Arabia for Islam and Muslims cannot be overestimated." Saudi Arabia is the home of two of the holiest shrines of Islam, Mecca and Medina; therefore, it is not only significant to Saudi society, but also Muslims all over the world. The Saudi interpretation of Islam reflects of teachings of Mohammad Ibn Abdul

Wahab; he ultimately reshaped and reformed all elements of Sunni society in the 1700s. Ibn Wahab believed that society should strictly adhere to the Quran and Sunna, especially in every major public policy decision. The Wahhabi movement throughout Saudi Arabia called for "the purification of Arabia of unorthodox forms of religiosity and the enforcement of the *sharia* among Arabia society." According to Ibn Wahab, Islam and politics should be meticulously intertwined. This form of Islamism has often served as a hindrance for Saudi Arabia, especially as the country approached modernity in the twentieth century. Al Qaeda's followers and leaders are often described as "Wahhabis" because members often claim they turn to terrorist tactics because they believe that Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries, are straying from the Wahhabi legacy. This term "Wahhabi" was constructed by the British, and religious Saudis do not necessarily refer to themselves in this way. Al Qaeda members have taken this embedded Wahhabi ideology of Saudi Arabia to an extreme and will fight for God's will on earth until the Muslim world is re-shaped and a true Caliphate is re-established.

Four Factors that fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s:

I. Afghanistan-Soviet War

A decade of conflict from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan is the first factor that contributed to the rise of radical Islamism in Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East. The Afghanistan-Soviet War gave Islamic extremists a rallying point and a training field. Volunteers throughout the Middle East left their homelands and went to Afghanistan to participate in the "holy war" against the Soviets in the late 1970's. This war sparked support for the Afghan resistance throughout the Middle East—many devout Muslims wanted to participate in jihad against the Soviet invader. The *mujahidin*, Muslim Afghan guerillas, were supported by aid from the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Money, extensive training, and weaponry were provided for the mujahidin. Around 12,000 young Saudi Arabians traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the war against the Soviets, and nearly 5,000 were trained and fought in combat. The Soviet Union seemed to have the upper hand in every way; however, the superpower was surprisingly defeated. After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, most of these "Arab Afghans" returned to their homelands or became refugees in neighboring countries. The Arab Afghans are devout Muslims, and they believe they must continue fighting until

Islamic rule is established in all Arab and Islamic countries. Thus, I hypothesize that *these Arab Afghans who returned to Saudi Arabia contributed to the rise of Al Qaeda militancy in the 1990s.* The Arab Afghans offered combat experience, hope, and a strong Islamic ideology to assist in the resurgence of Islamic activism.

The first hypothesis, the Arab Afghans returning to Saudi Arabia fueled Al Qaeda militancy, will be tested by looking at articles discussing the Arab Afghan's resistance and taking up arms upon returning home, statements from Arab Afghans using the Afghanistan-Soviet war as a mobilizing factor in speeches and statements and encouraging jihad, interviews with Al Qaeda members and Arab Afghans who fought in the war citing the impact of the Arab Afghans on Al Qaeda militancy, and by examining biographical sketches of Al Qaeda members in Saudi Arabia. Documents produced by the United States government about the Arab Afghans will also be explored.

II. The Gulf War—stationing of foreign troops

The Gulf War from 1990-1991 caused much dissent in Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Saudi Arabia was under an imminent threat of invasion by a neighboring Arab state, and Saudi Arabia was

especially worried about the oil fields of the eastern province. The Saudis knew that they had to restore the Kuwaiti ruling family, as well as push the Iraqi army beyond its immediate borders. King Fahd agreed to station American and British troops in Saudi Arabia in order to drive out Iraqi forces from Kuwait and protect Saudi Arabia. Saudi elite, businessmen, and the general public expressed much resentment against the Saudi royal family, the United States, and Britain during the Gulf War. The devout Muslims saw the American military presence as a violation of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina. These Muslims were also angry with the rulers of Saudi Arabia for allowing this military presence on holy soil. Not only were troops present during the Gulf War, but also throughout the 1990s. The United States has stationed approximately 25,000 military personnel in the Persian Gulf region, as well as around 5,000 in remote bases in Saudi Arabia.   Thus, I hypothesize that *the continuous presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil in the 1990s sparked Al Qaeda militancy.*

This second hypothesis will be tested by *fatwas* (religious statements) from Al Qaeda leaders that condemn foreign troops on holy soil and call for jihad, general public opinion results in support of Al Qaeda and opposing troops on holy

soil, sermons condemning foreign presence on Saudi soil and calling for jihad, and interviews with Al Qaeda members who discuss dissatisfaction with troops on Saudi soil and call for jihad. Jihad, translated from Islam, means to exert effort or to struggle. There are three different kinds of jihad used within the Muslim context: Struggle with the soul, struggle of the tongue, and struggle against the enemies of Islam. For clarification, jihad, in the context of this paper will be a call for jihad against the enemies of Islam.

III. Grievances against the al-Saud regime

In the 1990s, grievances among the Saudi public began to emerge. Political criticisms that were once only discussed in private became public in the 1990s. The people began to call for accountability and rule of law in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi citizens also began to speak out against the corrupt authoritarian system. The Saudi public did not agree with the absence of representation in the political system, and the public blamed the Saudi royal family for the severe mal-distribution of wealth and corruption. The general public turned to Islam during this time of dissent and dissatisfaction with the al-Saud regime. Mosques became places to express these political grievances and organize contention. Local sheikhs openly

expressed their grievances with the political system, and many were thrown in jail. Ultimately, the general population seriously questioned the Islamic legitimacy of the al-Saud family. Thus, I hypothesize that *the grievances against the ruling ability of the al-Saud in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s contributed to the rise of Al Qaeda militancy*.

The grievances against the al-Saud regime contributing to the rise of Al Qaeda militancy will be tested by public statements or fatwas originating from Al Qaeda leaders calling for overthrow of the regime, general public opinion facts expressing dissatisfaction with the regime and support for overthrow of the regime, sermons expressing dissatisfaction with the regime and calling for jihad against the regime, and religious scholars calling for reform and regime overthrow.

IV. Funding from the elite and charities

The more funding a radical group receives, the more able the group is to carry out terrorist attacks and recruit new members. Saudi Arabia is one of the main financers of Islamist movements within the Middle East and several other countries. Saudi Arabia is one of the wealthiest countries in the Middle East, and the Saudi regime "finance[s] Islamist groups over which they do not exert any particular control, in hope that these groups will not call into question the power of their dynasty."

Basically, the Saudi regime offers money to Al Qaeda as a sort of protection guarantee. The Saudi Royal family, elites, and charities have all been accused of allowing money into the hands of Al Qaeda. This protection money is then used to carry out attacks such as September 11. Thus, I hypothesize that *the funding offered by the al-Saud regime, elite, and charities, fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.*

This final hypothesis will be measured by documents issued by the United States government on records of money given to Al Qaeda by Saudi royals, businessmen, and charities, and articles that discuss funding from elites and charities to Al Qaeda. This hypothesis must be measured in this way because it is nearly impossible to gather primary sources revealing the funding of Al Qaeda.

Testing of Hypotheses:

I. The Arab Afghans returning to Saudi Arabia fueled Al Qaeda militancy in the 1990's.

i. Newspapers and Reports

The *New York Times* printed an article by a freelance journalist who spent six weeks in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War. In

1981, the journalist records "images of fierce, even fanatical men who are willing to make heavy sacrifices and may even be eager for martyrdom as they fight the Soviet soldiers and struggle against alien beliefs." These men fought in this war against the Soviets for almost ten years. The 9/11 Commission Report noted that the United States and Saudi Arabia supplied billions of dollars worth of secret assistance to these rebel groups in Afghanistan over the course of the war. This assistance helped in training the rebels and distributing arms. The United States helped create trained and armed rebels. When these Arab Afghans returned to their respective countries, they brought with them a new sense of power—power that they witnessed when they defeated a superpower, and power that they would continue to use in their struggle of jihad against oppressors. This Afghanistan-Soviet war ultimately served as a popular ideological revolution from which all Muslims could join.

The article, "Blowback: From the Afghan Battlefield," discusses the "tens of thousands of Islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some forty nations have come to Afghanistan to learn the lessons of the jihad," and have ultimately brought "the struggle back home." The author notes that the CIA backed "freedom

fighters" became the core for the instruction and indoctrination of terrorists. An American Intelligence official states that the Afghan Arabs, "Their jihad credentials, religious and political, are impeccable," and "They beat one of the world's two superpowers and now they're working on the second." The article also discusses the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The "militants took the torch of the Afghan rebels' holy rage and turned their energies to a greater battle"—the battle against the Crusaders. These Arab Afghans were able to turn their jihad energy from the Afghanistan-Soviet War towards a new war immediately after returning home.

ii. Biographical Sketches

Osama bin Laden was only twenty-three when he went to Afghanistan to fight in the holy war against the Soviets. In 1988, the Soviets began their withdrawal, and the jihadi leaders debated what to do next. The 9/11 Commission Report concludes that in 1988, Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam decided to create Al Qaeda, which would serve as a base for future jihad. Azzam died shortly after in a car bombing and Osama bin Laden ultimately became the head of Al Qaeda. A veteran of the Afghanistan-Soviet war became the leader of one of the most renowned terrorist organizations in the world. One

of the top bin Laden aides in Saudi Arabia is Khalid bin Udah bin Muhammas al-Harbi. Al-Harbi recently surrendered to authorities in Saudi Arabia. Aljazeera notes that Al-Harbi fought in Afghanistan alongside bin Laden in the early 1980s. Ali Abdul Rahman al-Ghamdi, known as Al Qaeda's top leader in Saudi Arabia, also spent years fighting in Afghanistan. Abu Zubaydah is one of the most senior Al Qaeda members who has been captured by the United States. Zubaydah was born in Saudi Arabia, but was accused of building up Al Qaeda in Pakistan. In the 1990s, "he was al-Qaeda's chief recruiter, selecting new members and arranging their visits to training camps." It is difficult to find detailed demographical information on Al Qaeda members; however, it is obvious that the top Saudi Al Qaeda operatives did fight in the Afghanistan-Soviet War and recruit for training camps during the war.

The first major attack that took place in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War was on November 13, 1995 in Riyadh. This was also the first attack against United States troops on Saudi soil. A bomb exploded outside a building which housed the US Army Materiel Command's Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi National Guard (a U.S. operated Saudi National Guard training center). This attack killed seven people, five were

Americans, and it wounded around sixty. Four Saudi men were arrested, and later confessed to the bombing. Three of these men had fought with the mujahideen forces in Afghanistan, and one had fought in Bosnia. In the confession, these men also claimed that they had been inspired by Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden has denied involvement in this attack; however, he praised the attacks on the Americans.

It is difficult to find biographical sketches of Al Qaeda operatives. Osama bin Laden and the top Al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia all fought in Afghanistan, which ultimately created a base for Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, however, does not only consist of those who fought in Afghanistan; Al Qaeda attracts a wide range of supporters.

iii. Interviews and Statements

In an interview with a French journalist in April of 1995, Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden discusses his decision to fight alongside Afghan mujahidin. Osama bin Laden stated, "To counter these atheist Russians, the Saudis chose me as their representative in Afghanistan […] I did not fight against the communist threat while forgetting the peril from the West." He later commented,

> "For us, the idea was not to get
> involved more than necessary in the

fight against the Russians, which
was the business of the Americans,
but rather to show our solidarity
with our Islamist brothers. I
discovered that it was not enough to
fight in Afghanistan, but that we
had to fight on all fronts against
communist or Western oppression."

Osama bin Laden notes that the war against the
Russians displayed the "solidarity" among
"Islamist brothers." Osama bin Laden uses this
sort of rhetoric to appeal to the Afghan Arabs who
fought beside him in the war and to appeal to
others who wish to join the Islamic brotherhood.
He also notes that they fought and will continue to
fight against any sort of oppression. It is obvious
from the previous bin Laden quote that this idea of
continuing jihad is rooted in the Afghanistan-
Soviet war. In an Al Qaeda's fatwa released in
1996, Osama bin Laden used this rhetoric once
again. Bin Laden addresses the United States
Secretary of Defense towards the end of the fatwa:
"The sons of the land of the two Holy Places had
come out to fight against the Russians in
Afghanistan" and "they have been made victorious
over your partner, the Russians." Bin Laden
ensures the United States that the Mujahedeen will
witness victory again in the name of Allah.

Bin Laden was interviewed by CNN in 1997, and stated, "I have benefited so greatly from the jihad in Afghanistan […]. Our experience in this jihad was great, […] and the most of what we benefited from was that the myth of the superpower was destroyed not only in my mind but also in the minds of all Muslims." Bin Laden emphasizes the fact that the idea of a superpower no longer exists to Muslims. However, this rhetoric is used in many of bin Laden's statements and fatwas.

In May 1998, Osama bin Laden participated in an interview with ABC reporter John Miller. In the interview, Miller explains that no one thought the mujahedeen could beat the Russians in Afghanistan. He then asks bin Laden, "What do you see as the future of American involvement in the Middle East in taking on groups like this?" Osama bin Laden replies,

> "Allah has granted the Muslim people and the Afghani mujahedeen, and those with them, the opportunity to fight the Russians and the Soviet Union. […] They were defeated by Allah and were wiped out. There is a lesson here. The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan late in December of

’79. The flag of the Soviet Union
was folded once and for all on the
25 of December just 10 years later.
It was thrown in the waste basket.
Gone was the Soviet Union forever.
We are certain that we shall—with
the grace of Allah—prevail over the
Americans and over the Jews.”

Osama bin Laden uses the Afghanistan-Soviet war
as a “lesson” of what is to come for the
Americans. He uses the example of the Soviet
defeat in order to encourage his followers. He
goes into great detail in order to emphasize the fact
that the Soviet Union was gone forever. Osama
bin Laden believes that it was by the will of Allah
that the Afghan Arabs were able to defeat the
Soviets, and he believes that he and his followers
must to continue in this jihad against the
oppressors in the name of Allah.

In an interview conducted by Martin
Smith, Dr. Saad Al-Fagih explains the impact of
the Afghanistan-Soviet war on Muslims
throughout the world. Dr. Saad Al-Fagih is a
Saudi Arabian dissident living in exile in London,
and he took part in the Afghan rebels’ war. As a
fellow Saudi dissident, he knows about bin Laden
and his views. Dr. Saad Al-Fagih states that bin
Laden was a “nobody” until he went to

Afghanistan and encouraged people to go and join him there, and he became "a hero and a symbol of sacrifice." He goes on to explain that bin Laden felt it was his religious opportunity to practice jihad in Afghanistan, and this war was a chance for Muslims "to meet their Islamic obligations, including jihad in its military form. […] It was a window created by the Soviet Union and by America for Muslims to live this sort of life." Through this interview, one learns that the Afghanistan-Soviet War served as a sort of camp in which Muslims trained and prepared for a new life of jihad. Dr. Saad notes that Muslims were ultimately preparing for a "new world order"—a world of jihad against oppressors.

Prince Sultan, the second deputy premier and Minister of Defense and Aviation, announced a year after the September 11 attacks that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia accepted no responsibility for the attacks on the United States. The blame must be placed on militant individuals and groups. The Sultan stated "Some from these groups went to Afghanistan to fight communism […] and became criminals, saboteurs and evil-doers, and that is the truth. The Kingdom shelters no criminal or terrorist." He clearly blames the militancy of Al Qaeda on the Afghanistan-Soviet war. The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia

expressed this same idea in his speech to the US-Saudi Business Council in April of 2004. Prince Saud Al Faisal states,

> "If Saudi Arabia is guilty of blame for what [Bin Laden] has become, the United States must surely share the blame. Both of us backed the mujahideen to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet Occupation and allowed such people as Bin Laden to the fray. We all remember the days when […] Mujahedeen were honored, praised, even received in the White House."

Prince Saud Al Faisal recalls the days when the term *mujahidin* was used to describe the true freedom fighters in America and Saudi Arabia. Prince Saud Al Faisal seems to believe that the militancy is an outcome of the Afghanistan-Soviet war.

King Fahd called for a crackdown on militants in Saudi Arabia. Mohsen al-Awajy, a leading cleric, noted that the thousands of Saudi veterans of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, who were once supported by the Saudi government, were now the main targets of King Fahd's crackdown. This

article makes it clear that the government continues to have problems with these Afghan veterans; these veterans seem to be the group that is immediately targeted as extremist in Saudi Arabia.

Hypothesis I Results

A new mentality was ultimately created during the Afghanistan-Soviet War; the mentality that jihad must endure until all Western influence is rid from the Islamic world.   There is evidence that supports the hypothesis that the returning Arab Afghans fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia. It seems as if the Afghanistan-Soviet war brought out this militant strain of Wahhabi Islam—the idea that *jihad* is acceptable and religiously required in the name of Islam. This drastic change in what are permissible forms of warfare in Islam was definitely a result of the Afghanistan-Soviet War. It is evident that Osama bin Laden created Al Qaeda in order to continue the jihad that began in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and his top aides in Saudi Arabia all fought in the Afghanistan-Soviet war. Through interviews and statements by Saudi officials and intellectuals, one understands the significance of the Afghanistan-Soviet war on Al Qaeda militancy.

However, it is difficult to determine how much weight should be given to this hypothesis. Al Qaeda attracts a wide range of support throughout Saudi Arabia, and not all of this support comes from those who fought in Afghanistan. It seems as if this variable is often used by Saudi authority in order to justify the militant Islamists that have spread throughout the country. Perhaps Saudi authority is looking for someone else to blame, and it would make sense to blame the Untied States because we did help support the mujahidin. In conclusion, the Afghanistan-Soviet War did introduce a new element of Wahhabism—religious justification of violence and extremism. New ideas were ultimately born from the Afghanistan-Soviet war. For this reason, this first hypothesis can be considered the variable that sparked the initial interest of continuing and encouraging jihad. It is, however, difficult to say whether these ideas would have come to light without the Afghanistan-Soviet War.

II. Foreign troops on holy soil fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.

The United States and allied forces moved into Saudi Arabia in January 1991 to drive President Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait.

The international arena immediately began to witness the discontent of Saudi citizens due to the foreign troops on Saudi soil. As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia is the home of the sacred land of Mecca and Medina; therefore, this sparked Muslim anger throughout the Middle East. Foreign troops on holy ground are a desecration in the eyes of a Muslim, as well as prohibited according to Islam.

i. Al Qaeda leaders, fatwas and interviews

In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Crusader occupation of Islamic holy lands. A fatwa is a legal opinion or ruling issued by an Islamic scholar. This particular fatwa specifically called for jihad against U.S. forces, and the language resembled that which appeared in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996.

Bin Laden's fatwa in August of 1996 is entitled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." This fatwa calls for all Muslims to take up arms against the crusaders. Bin Laden states, "It is out of date and no longer acceptable to claim that the presence of the crusaders is a necessity and only a temporary measures to protect the land of

the two Holy Places." Bin Laden notes that American's said they would only stay a few months; however, it has been seven years. Osama bin Laden makes it clear that

> "The regime is fully responsible for what had been incurred by the country and the nation; however, the occupying American enemy is the principle and the main cause of the situation. Therefore efforts should be concentrated on destroying, fighting, and killing the enemy until, by the Grace of Allah, it is completely defeated."

Bin Laden expresses the opinion that it is a devout Muslim's duty to push the American forces out of Saudi Arabia, and because there is an obvious imbalance of power between the Muslims and Americans, new tactics must be adopted.

In a CNN interview with Osama bin Laden, he once again declares jihad against the United States because of the occupation of the two holy grounds in Saudi Arabia. This same rhetoric is seen in Bin Laden's second fatwa, issued in 1998. The fatwa issued in 1998 is solely devoted to the

call for Muslims to kill Americans. One of the strongest statements is as follows:

> "We—with God's help—call on
> every Muslim who believes in God
> and wishes to be rewarded to comply
> with God's order to kill the
> Americans and plunder their money
> wherever and whenever they find it.
> We also call on Muslim ulema,
> leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch
> the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and
> the devil's supporters allying with
> them, and to displace those who are
> behind them so that they may learn a
> lesson."

Bin Laden concludes this fatwa by telling those who believe that if they do not go forth and kill Americans, Allah will punish them. Three months after this fatwa was issued, Osama bin Laden interviewed with ABC and expanded on his fatwa and claimed "It is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities." Bin Laden also made it clear that Al Qaeda will by no means differentiate between the military and civilians—all will be

considered rightful targets in his eyes.

Osama bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda operatives recorded tapes that made frequent references to the American "crusade" against Islam. Once again, Osama bin Laden calls for jihad against the Americans. Such tapes were broadcasted on the pan-Arabic satellite channel, Al-Jazeera, in 2001. It seems as if the majority of bin Laden's public statements, whether interviews, recordings, or fatwas, address jihad against the "crusader" or "oppressor". Bin Laden attempts to mobilize followers by using this anti-American, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian rhetoric. He uses his words carefully to ensure devout Muslims that the troops within their borders are attempting to bring an end to Islam. Osama bin Laden utilizes the fact that Saudis are deeply religious; therefore, he gets large responses from the public when he makes it seem as if the foreign troops are trying to wipe out their religion. Because Saudi Arabia is known for fundamentalist Islam, Osama bin Laden's claims that Americans are against their religion draws much attention and brews much anger toward the foreign troops.

Aljazeera recently released an audio tape

from a senior Saudi Al Qaeda leader who stated, "The Jews, the Americans and crusaders [Christians] in general will remain the targets of our coming attacks and this year, God willing, will be fiercer and harsher for them."

ii. General Public opinion

Public opinion polls are not available for Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Therefore, this research has relied on newspaper articles to get a general view of what the Saudi public thinks about jihad against the foreign troops. After the September 11 attacks on America, support for Osama bin Laden was "running high in his native Saudi Arabia," BBC reports. The report declares that Saudi people see bin Laden as a Muslim hero who is willing to stand up to the aggressor—the United States. The Saudi's "hate the West for what they see as its biased policies against Muslims," and "they adore Bin Laden." In 1998, the Economist printed an article that refers to Osama bin Laden as "Today's new cult hero." This article notes, "Mention the name of Osama bin Laden in a Saudi public place and heads will turn, first to check that nobody from the government is listening, and then to give you their

views." There is much support for bin Laden because of his stance against the crusaders, and "almost overnight, everyone in the region wants to know who he is and what he stands for."

In 1999, the New York Times conducted interviews with senior American officials and knowledgeable observers of Osama bin Laden, and found that there was a widespread support among ordinary citizens in the Muslim world. Almost all agreed with his "central political argument: that American troops should get out of Saudi Arabia." Overall, it can be concluded that Bin Laden is widely supported in Saudi Arabia because of his Anti-American rhetoric. The Saudis see foreign troops all around them; therefore, this Anti-American, Jew, and Christian rhetoric is one that appeals to people throughout the devout Muslim country of Saudi Arabia.

iii. Sermons

The Middle East Media Research Institute released a series of Friday sermons that were delivered in Saudi mosques. These sermons are available on a Saudi-based website called Alminbar. Some of the sermons are undated, but most rage from 1995-2002. After reviewing these

sermons, the major themes are centered on the "Infidel Christians and Jews." The Middle East Media Research Institute divides the sermons into sections- two of the sections are as follows: "The Christians and the Jews are 'Infidels,' 'Enemies of Allah,'" and "'Muslims must Educate Their Children to Jihad… and to Hatred of Jews and Christians.'"

One sermon states, "The enemies of Islam attack it with vice and depravity, opening wide every gate that corrupts the virtuous moralities and supreme ideal so fits followers," and "the enemies of Islam are also attacking it militarily, in order to weaken its followers, disunite them and scatter them in every direction." The sermon then calls for young Muslim men stating, "You are the future! You are the men of firm resolution! […] Embark upon training if you are not doing so already. […] Allah has created you and requires you to defend your religion and the Muslim nation." This sermon calls for me to train and defend their country. The sermon calls for jihad of two types, jihad against the soul and jihad against the enemy—the occupiers.

Sheikh Muhammad Saleh Al-Munajjih calls

all Muslim parents to educate their children to Jihad. He states, "Muslims must […] educate their children to Jihad. This is the greatest benefit of the situation: educating the children to Jihad and to hatred of the Jews, the Christians, and the infidels." This is an undated sermon; however, it can be implied that this imam is calling for jihad against the infidels who are occupying Saudi Arabia.

After September 11, Saudi Arabia's religious establishment has come under scrutiny. The United States is urging Saudi Arabia to take measures to make sure that the religious establishment of the kingdom no longer fuels the kind of thinking that led to the September 11 attacks. The United States places partial blame on the religious institutions for the 9/11 attacks because it has been found that imams have been encouraging jihad against the United States. The Kingdom has been monitoring thousands of sermons throughout Saudi Arabia over the past few months, and the ministry spokesman, Salih al-Sadlan, has suspended many imams. Last year, Saudi Arabia suspended around 1,357 religious officials—517 imams, 90 Friday preachers, and 750 callers to prayer.

Hypothesis II Results

As noted above, foreign troops on holy soil deeply fueled Al Qaeda militancy. This hypothesis is strongly supported. Al Qaeda, as well as the citizens of Saudi Arabia, saw the American troops as an infringement on their sovereignty and a threat to their religion. Statements from Al Qaeda leaders and religious authorities reinforced the idea that Americans are against Islam as a religion and attempting rid the region of this religion. As seen through Al Qaeda statements made in interviews and fatwas, sermons, public opinion, foreign troops on holy soil brewed much anger and dissent in Saudi Arabia and ultimately fueled militancy. The removal of American troops from Saudi Arabia seems to be the most immediate concern of Al Qaeda.

III. **Grievances against the Al Saud Regime fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.**

Since the attacks of September 11, the United States has urged for political, economic, and social reform in Saudi Arabia. In Gwenn Okruhlik's, "Understanding political dissent in Saudi Arabia," she notes that the 1990s was a complicated decade for Saudi Arabia. Political criticism became public in the 1990s— citizens criticized the repressive and corrupt

regime, the mal-distribution of wealth, and the absence of representation in the political system. Saudi citizens also disapproved the regime's allowing of United States military forces in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is a tightly policed country, it is most likely that an individual will be punished for speaking out against the regime. Al Qaeda created a strong support base in Saudi Arabia, consisting of tightly knit small cells, and Al Qaeda members smuggled in much anti-royal propaganda, which was dispersed by these supporters in Saudi Arabia.

In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia experienced high birth rates, which ultimately led to an increasing population of young men who could not find satisfying jobs. These men, discontent with their social status, became great targets for radicalization. Overall, all of the grievances seemed to root back to the al-Saud regime. Gwenn Okruhlik notes that male, female, rich, or poor, Saudis began to grow tired of the arbitrary governance in Saudi Arabia. This decade of crisis became even tenser when King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995. Crown Prince Abdullah took over in 1998 and implemented a series of small reforms in order to respond to the grievances of the public; however, many claimed these reforms did little, and "the radical right remained potent, as 9/11

made evident."

Saudi Arabia is an extremely devout society, and Saudi politics revolve around religious legitimacy. Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries in which the majority of politically conscious adult citizens are actually more conservative than the very conservative regime. The extremists accuse the Saudi regime as corrupt in religious, political, and social terms. The al-Saud regime is hypocritical because it claims that it is based on religious law; however, they are not perceived in this way by society.

i. Statements and fatwas from Al Qaeda leaders

In August of 1995, Osama bin Laden issued a communiqué called "an Open Letter to King Fahd." In this letter, bin Laden outlined Al Qaeda's major grievances against the Saudi regime. Through this letter, bin Laden does not directly say he wants to overthrow the regime; however, he does voice his opinion. Bin Laden claims that the Saudi regime does not rule following Islamic law in its entirety, is unable to conduct a viable defense policy, has misused public funds and oil money, and has depended on non-Muslim forces for protection. Bin Laden also calls for guerilla attacks in order to drive American

forces off of Saudi soil. This is one of the first times that bin Laden publicly states his dissatisfaction towards the Saudi regime; however, he does not call for overthrow of the regime.

Al Qaeda's fatwa published in 1996 declared war against America for occupying the land of the two holy places; however, it also addresses the inability of the Al Saud regime to rule Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden spends much time addressing the every day grievances of the Saudi citizens. He begins this section of the fatwa by reaching out to all Saudi citizens: government officials, young and old, and university students. He addresses the failing economy, poverty and suffering, and severe government oppression. Bin Laden also points out the illegitimate behavior of the regime, such as ignoring the Shari'ah law and allowing Americans to occupy the land of the two Holy Places. Bin Laden clearly lays out everything that the Saudi regime has done that he believes are "the greatest sins." Bin Laden claims that "the regime is fully responsible for what had been incurred by the country and the nation." He notes that peaceful measures were taken by many to work for reform, but the "regime closed all peaceful routes and pushed the people toward armed actions?!! which is the only choice left for them to implement righteousness and justice." Bin

Laden does not directly call for jihad against the regime; however, it can be implied through certain statements. Al Qaeda's fatwa published in 1998 focused solely on declaring a holy war against the West.

In an interview conducted in 1998 with ABC, Osama bin Laden was asked what he saw for the future of the Saudi royal family and their involvement with the United States and the US military. Bin Laden responded, "The fate of any government which sells the interests of its own people, and betrays the nation […] is known. […] They shall be wiped out." Once again, Osama bin Laden does not call directly for jihad against the regime, yet it can be implied. It seems as if Bin Laden knows he must choose his words carefully because of the way in which the repressive regime may react towards his comments.

Bin Laden does express the fact that he thinks the Saudi regime needs to be reform and stop sinning; however, he does not call for an overthrow of the regime in the same way that he calls for jihad against the crusaders. It seems as if Bin Laden's core concern is not necessarily the Saudi regime. The United States seems to be first on his list, and the Saudi regime will follow.

ii. Public dissent towards regime-

Newspaper Articles

It is difficult to find public opinion polls from Saudi Arabia in the 1990s; however, many articles express the dissatisfaction of the people towards the regime, as well as the unemployed, disgruntled youth turning to Al Qaeda. In an article released by New York Times, a senior Saudi official notes that although Saudis hate the Americans, "their real target, and the subject of their wrath is the regime." The wrath is against the regime because of unemployment, illegitimacy of the Saudi regime, and the declining economy. The senior Saudi official also notes that this "cancer is growing"—more and more people in Saudi Arabia are beginning to speak out against the regime. This article also points out that the growing ground of dissent seems to be among tens of thousands of graduates from Saudi universities. Most of these graduates are dissatisfied because they are unable to find jobs in the Saudi society. *Aljazeera* noted that unemployment in Saudi Arabia is ultimately threatening Saudi stability. In 2004, out of the 24 million people in Saudi Arabia, it is estimated that somewhere between 10 and 30 percent of Saudi nationals are unemployed, and it must be taken into account that six million of those 24 million are foreigners. This article also notes that unemployment is definitely fueling anti-

government violence. The government accuses Al Qaeda members for the violence, and "the new phenomenon of unemployment has fed their disenchantment."

Time Magazine reported that Saudi Arabia's per capita income collapsed from $15,000 in 1981 to less than 7,000 today. The young generation of Saudis is suffering, and they serve as a great target as Al Qaeda recruits. *Time* concludes, "For several years, a new generation of Saudis, including Islamic militants and youths grumbling about corruption and economic decline, has increasingly challenged the al Saud clan's fitness to rule," and "young Saudis, eager for bolder leadership, are glued to Arab satellite-TV channels for the latest bin Laden news." Because public opinion polls are unavailable, we must look to newspaper articles that report discontent among the public in Saudi society. It is obvious that the vast unemployment, especially among newly graduated Saudi students, is fueling support for Al Qaeda's cause among the younger generations.

iii. Sermons and Religious scholars call for reform

In "Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia," Gwenn Okruhlik confirms that Friday sermons in the 1990s became a place for

political criticism. Several prominent sheikhs (religious officials) in Saudi Arabia were jailed by the regime for speaking out against the system and calling for overthrow of the regime.

In 1990, a group of 400 religious scholars, clerics, and technocrats all signed a petition demanding reforms and ending corruption within the regime. The Saudi regime, however, rejected their demands. King Fahd began to make arrests against those who signed these petitions. In 1992, 107 leading clerics in Saudi Arabia sent a 46 page "Memorandum of Advice" to King Fahd. This Memorandum called for enforcement of Islamic law, an end to human rights abuses, and ending of relations with non-Islamic countries. This memorandum also called for United States troops evacuating Saudi Arabia. Due to this memorandum, King Fahd released seven elderly religious leaders from the Supreme Authority of Senior Scholars, the most senior clerical body in the country, because they did not denounce the memorandum. Shortly after, King Fahd gave a speech in which he condemned the use of mosques for political expression.

In 1993, six senior religious scholars founded the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, demanding an end to government corruption. They made cassettes

attacking the Saudi regime, and these were distributed all over Saudi Arabia leading to more arrests. Mr. Hawli, one of the founders of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, was jailed and numerous violent threats indicating violence began to emerge. Finally, in 1993 and 1994, many Muslim religious scholars gave up the peaceful tactics and started calling for the removal of the Saudi royal family.

Hypothesis III, conclusion

This hypothesis, the grievances against the ruling ability of the al-Saud in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s contributed to the rise of Al Qaeda militancy is supported; however, it seems as if the dominant grievance against the al-Saud regime is its allowing of foreign troops on holy soil. Therefore, it seems as if the grievances against the regime are rooted in the stationing of foreign troops. Although these religious clerics have called for extreme reform of the al-Saud regime, most do not represent Islamic extremism, but rather Saudi religious nationalism. The religious authorities' main grievances seem to be based on external issues such as Western domination. Overall, religious leaders claim the Saudi regime did not do enough to spread Islamic faith or preserve it from the ambush of Western secularism.

As noted early, Osama bin Laden does not necessarily call for jihad against the regime, or violent overthrow of the regime in the same way as he calls for killing and ousting the crusaders. As with the dominant clerics, it seems as if bin Laden's grievances against the al-Saud regime are deeply rooted in hatred toward the West and the regime's allowing of Western troops on holy soil. Also, it must be noted that bin Laden's opposition against the al-Saud regime became more and more prominent after he had been expelled from the country in 1991.

One must note, however, that it seems as if the new recruits of Al Qaeda are the young, unemployed Saudis. These young men did not fight in the Afghanistan-Soviet war—they are young men who join Al Qaeda's cause because it seems to be the one of the only outlets to their unemployment and discontent against the al-Saud regime. It is obvious from the presented Aljazeera articles that Saudi Arabia knows this young generation of unemployed graduates are the perfect recruits for Al Qaeda. Thus, Saudi Arabia is taking measures to improve unemployment. Overall, the regime is a concern of Al Qaeda; however, it is not the primary concern. The most significant finding from this hypothesis is that the unemployed youth are most likely the best

potential recruits for Al Qaeda. The disgruntled youth need an outlet—an outlet in which they can express their anger.

IV.   The funding offered by the al-Saud regime, elite, and charities, fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.

i. Newspaper Articles

In 1993, *The New York Times* printed an article, "Saudis Try to Curb Money Aiding Islamic Militants," which reveals the problems Saudi Arabia has with money falling into the pockets of extremists. This article notes that "there is a growing recognition that, especially in the last two years, some of the money has ended up in the hands of radical Islamic movements hostile to Saudi policy and interests abroad." The Saudi regime took measures in order to control the flow of money by restricting groups from soliciting donations for any Islamic causes unless they have been officially authorized by the Saudi government. The article notes, however, despite these regulations, it is extremely difficult for the Saudi government to control charities. The Saudi regime also cannot necessarily control individuals. Many wealthy Saudi's donate money to radical groups, and "There is nothing to prevent any

number of Saudi billionaires from writing million-dollar checks against their overseas foreign accounts which cannot be monitored here to any movement they wish to support."

The New York Times reported in 1996 that much of the financial support for terrorists can be traced back to wealthy individuals from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries. The article notes that over the last decade, the United States has been focusing its efforts on state sponsors of terrorism, and that now this focus has shifted. Authorities are beginning to notice the "emergence of sophisticated, privately financed networks of terrorists," which ultimately poses an "even thornier set of diplomatic and legal challenges for Western governments." American intelligence agencies are focusing their efforts on Osama bin Laden. Officials in numerous countries have found that Osama bin Laden has helped raise money and fund terrorist acts in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. As seen from this article, suspicion arose about Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s. It is evident from both of the previous presented articles that Saudi Arabia had problems controlling money flow in the 1990s. Money was getting into the hands of terrorist organizations from elite and charities, and the regime could do little to handle the situation.

ii. Documents

A report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2002 addresses the flow of money throughout Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a long tradition of charity, both public and private, and this charity money often seems as if it is going to legitimate Islamic causes, but this does not always happen. People do not always know the character of the groups involved in charity or where the money went. Saudis have admitted funds that seem to be going to reputable causes such as the Saudi Red Crescent and the Muslim World League have often gone to elements of Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia enforced controls on Osama Bin Laden's sources of funding in 1994; however, senior Saudi officials have admitted that members of the royal family and Saudi businessmen donated to extremist causes. However, it is difficult for the Saudi regime to control this flow of money from Saudi businessmen because much of this private capital is held and invested outside of Saudi Arabia.

United States documents identified Saudi Arabian families as the first to help finance Al Qaeda activities. The "Golden Chain," which is a compiled list of Saudi bankers, industrialists, and entrepreneurs played a key role in funding the activities of Al Qaeda, specifically the 9/11

attacks. This list was established at the time of Al Qaeda's formation in 1988. The list was seized in Bosnia, and the donators range from Osama bin Laden's brothers to a man who controls BMW sales in Saudi Arabia, to a man who has been a leading financial figure in the Saudi community for decades. Along with this list, the United States agents found documents that reveal that Al Qaeda received money and supplies from government charities.

Hypothesis IV Results

The al-Saud regime has been accused of funding Al Qaeda. One may wonder why a regime would support a terrorist organization that openly states their intention to destroy that very regime. Several assumptions have been made about why members of the Saudi royal family would support Al Qaeda. The Saudi regime plays sort of a double game—they want to exert their influence in the Middle East, as well as cooperate with the Americans. This two-fold game is hard to play because most in the Middle East are gravely opposed to the United States, which is where the funding comes into play. Richard Labeviere suggests that the Saudi regime "finances this 'checkbook diplomacy' to buy legitimacy and peace while exerting its hegemony over Sunni Islam." The money given to Al Qaeda from Saudi

royals can be considered protection money. Prince
Turki, who was Chief of Saudi Intelligence in
2001, is said to have

> "'stuck a deal' in July, 1998 with
> the Taleban and senior Al Qaeda
> representatives in Kandahar,
> Afghanistan whereby Al Qaeda
> would refrain from making trouble
> for the Saudi regime within the
> Kingdom, in exchange for the
> Kingdom allowing a free hand in
> Afghanistan and supporting the
> Taleban regime financially."

Also, one must consider that some Saudi royals are
in fact sympathetic to Al Qaeda's goals.
According to the Saudi-American forum, six Saudi
royals have been accused of aiding terrorist
organizations. Prince Sultan, for example, is
accused of taking "radical stands against western
countries since the Gulf War" and is accused of
sponsoring many charities that gave money
directly to Al Qaeda. The allegations continue as
to whether or not Saudi officials supported the
September 11 attacks on America. BBC reported
that the United States has found no hard evidence
that the Saudi government funding the September
11 attacks; however, "Saudi officials have some
reason to feel relieved but they are not entirely let

off the hook."

The funding from Saudi elite, businessmen, and charities did seem to fuel Al Qaeda militancy. The Al Qaeda organization as a whole needs funding in order to recruit new members and carry out attacks. However, it is difficult to find primary documented records of money given directly to Al Qaeda to fund terrorist attacks. It seems as if the assumption is made that money goes to the group for extremist actions; however, this cannot necessarily be proved at this point in time. The United States continues to look into the funding of Al Qaeda. Future research must be devoted to this area in order to draw more precise conclusions.

Overall Conclusion

Summary of findings

Through research, I wanted to find what exactly fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. All four of the presented hypotheses contributed to the fueling of Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Through researching the four hypotheses, however, one hypothesis seems to carry the most causal weight. The stationing of foreign troops on Saudi soil fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s definitely holds the most explanatory power for the research question. Troops were on Saudi soil

all throughout the 1990s. These troops have been constant in Saudi Arabia throughout the decade, as well as the disapproval against the troops. As seen through Al Qaeda's fatwas issued in 1992 and 1996, interviews and statements made by Al Qaeda leadership, public opinion against the "oppressors" and support of Osama bin Laden, and sermons calling for jihad against the enemy (the United States-West), it is evident that this hypothesis holds the most explanatory power of what fueled Al Qaeda militancy. The removal of American troops from the holy land seems to be the primary goal of Al Qaeda.

The Afghanistan-Soviet War ultimately changed the dynamics of Wahabbism in the Middle East; the war fueled this new justification for violence that was used by Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda members. This change in Wahabbism led to a rise in militancy—violence was now completely justifiable according to Al Qaeda. The Arab Afghans obviously gave initial drive and fuel to Al Qaeda militancy; however, it is difficult to determine how much weight this variable holds throughout the 1990s. The founder and top leaders of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia did fight in Afghanistan, but this does not mean that all of the supporters or recruits fought in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda does use the rhetoric from

the Afghanistan-Soviet war, we defeated one superpower and we can do it again, but the majority of fatwas and statements are devoted to calling for jihad against America and the West. The Afghanistan-Soviet War was a rallying point and a breeding ground for Al Qaeda militancy. It seems as if the Arab Afghans helped provide the ideology and hope for Al Qaeda; however, it is difficult to say that this transition to extremism would not have transpired without the occurrence of the Afghanistan-Soviet War.

The grievances against the al-Saud regime did seem to fuel militancy in Saudi Arabia; nonetheless, it seems to be rooted in a deep hatred toward the occupying forces. As noted earlier, Osama bin Laden does not directly call for jihad against the regime in the same way he calls for jihad against the oppressor. Bin Laden directly said that the regime is responsible for what has happened in Saudi Arabia, but that the American enemy is the principle problem. It seems as if once Al Qaeda successfully rids the Middle Eastern region of outside Western influence, they will then move on to the non-Islamic regimes. The grievances against the regime have, however, enabled Al Qaeda to attract a new generation of recruits. One must take into consideration that the new recruits of Al Qaeda seem to be the newly

graduated, unemployed men. These young men turn to Al Qaeda because it serves as an outlet for taking action against the regime that has forced them into their unbearable circumstances.

The final hypothesis, funding from the al-Saud regime, elite, and charities does have some explanatory power for the fueling of militancy. It seems as if Saudi citizens often offered money to reputable charities and did not necessarily know that the money was going directly to extremist causes. Funding is necessary for Al Qaeda as an organization; however, funding did not necessarily encourage militancy in the same way that the troops on Saudi soil fueled militancy. Funding does not seem to fuel militancy, but rather offers the necessary aspect—money—which helps recruit members and carry out attacks. Funding seems to be an "after the fact" aspect, rather than an aspect which fuels militancy. After all, Al Qaeda would not even need this funding in the first place if it did not have an underlying reason for its militancy.

In conclusion, I found that the stationing of troops on foreign soil held the most weight in what fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. In response, one may ask the following question: United troops have pulled out of Saudi Arabia, so why does Al Qaeda support persist? Al Qaeda support continues to persist because foreign

troops are stationed all over the Middle East, especially right now with the War in Iraq. Also, one would assume that Al Qaeda will consider it their religious duty to help neighboring Middle Eastern countries if they are under suppression from Western nations, as we saw in the case of the Afghanistan-Soviet war. Al Qaeda members will continue their mission as long as necessary—as long as they believe their religion is in jeopardy. Also, Al Qaeda will not stop until the regimes in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, are truly and strictly in adherence to Wahhabi Islam. The American forces were the obvious immediate problem; American forces stand in the way of Middle Eastern regimes. It can be assumed that once American forces have left the Middle East, Al Qaeda will turn to what is next in line—the unfit regimes of the Middle East.

Implications for Theory-

All of the presented theories and hypotheses were supported and did pan out. As for the first theory/hypotheses, it can be concluded from my findings that American troops on Middle Eastern soil in general is greatly reprimanded by the public as well as members of Al Qaeda. Also, the second theory and hypotheses imply that mujahidin who fought in the Afghanistan-Soviet war returning to their home countries most likely

stirred up militancy. Lastly, the third theory can imply that Middle Eastern countries in which grievances against the government are high, will most likely see more joining groups such as Al Qaeda.

Problems with Research-

Several problems with the research process were confronted in attempting to answer this particular research question. First of all, Saudi Arabia is a closed society, and it is rather difficult to find primary sources, such as polling and interviews, from the early 1990s. Zogby International, an organization that has been tracking public opinion since 1984 in North America, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, did its first polling in Saudi Arabia in April, 2001. Little effort, especially in Saudi Arabia, has been made to conduct the kind of opinion research that is done in the United States and West in an effort to probe more deeply into the perceptions and worldview of the Arab and Muslim people. I was forced to look at newspaper articles in order to get a picture of the general mindset of the Saudi public; however, one must take into account that these newspaper articles may not be relying on the reliable sources and may also be biased. After September 11, interest in Saudi Arabia grew drastically. Polling and interviews in

Saudi Arabia after September 11, 2001 are becoming more readily available. Helpful websites for Middle East Research, such as The Middle East Media Research Institute, have an abundance of information; however, there is limited information that dates back to the mid or late 1990s. New efforts have begun, especially in studying Saudi Arabia, since the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Through research, I was unable to locate specific needed documents. For example, the "Golden Chain" list has not been released to the public. I was only able to find secondary information about the Golden Chain. Also, some information is yet to be found, such as who is to blame for specific attacks. It is also difficult finding all the needed information on Al Qaeda in general because Al Qaeda operates discretely and through a complicated web of underground networks. It is nearly impossible to find detailed biographical sketches of Al Qaeda members, especially those who have carried out attacks—specifically the fifteen Saudis who attacked the United States on September 11. General biographical and demographical information of Al Qaeda members can be found on BBC News website; however, the sketches offered very little help to research. The profiles found did not give

any background information, such as if they had fought in the Afghanistan-Soviet war.

Problems arose with the testing of the final hypothesis: funding offered by the al-Saud regime, elite, and charities, fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. This hypothesis was difficult to test because it was nearly impossible to find enough primary sources to support or refute this hypothesis. If evidence were available, this hypothesis would be tested, for example, through documented records of money given directly for Al Qaeda, and documented records of money spent on Al Qaeda attacks.

Further research-

Steps are currently being taken in order to further this line of research. As mentioned earlier, Zogby International and The Middle East Media Research Institute are taking measures to increase polling, interviews, and tracking of the media in Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia. This trend needs to continue and increase through other organizations. Efforts must also be made in order to translate information into different languages, for this case, specifically English. Many Saudi newspapers and websites would have been helpful for this particular research process if they had been available in English. Scholars need

to continue translating information so that the language gap is not such a barrier in researching the Middle East.

Research questions to be explored-

After taking a close look at what fueled Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, new research questions have been raised through this specific research. Research needs to be particularly devoted to the funding of Al Qaeda. From whom exactly does Al Qaeda receive funding and what measures can be taken to cut off this funding? It has been found that the Saudi regime, elites, and charities offer funding to Al Qaeda, but this must be continually researched because funding has obviously not stopped and needs to be alleviated and eventually cut. Saudi Arabia and the United States are currently attempting to cut off funding that is reaching the hands of extremists. However, more research and measures will have to be taken in order to find out the exact flow of this money. As discussed earlier, the Saudi regime is accused of supporting Al Qaeda; therefore, one would assume that the Saudi regime would not be willing to fully cooperate in order to uncover the trail of money—especially if that trail leads back to the Saudi regime.

Perhaps one of the most important

questions that must be addressed is as follows: What measures can be taken in order to prevent the spread of Al Qaeda support and membership? Al Qaeda has managed to establish a global network of supporters and members. The international community must work to counter the ideology that Al Qaeda has created. Something must be done in order to keep this cancer from continuing to spread.

Lastly, the United States must ask itself what can be done in order to alleviate the hostility and hatred that Middle Easterners have developed towards Americans. As found through the presented research, the most prominent factor in the fueling of Al Qaeda militancy in Saudi Arabia was the presence of American troops on their soil. This presence brewed hatred throughout Saudi Arabia, yet the United States has yet to pull out of the region. However, the United States cannot just pack up and leave the region. Osama bin Laden has created a worldwide network of followers who oppose the "Enemies of Islam," specifically the United States.

The United States can continue to hunt down Osama bin Laden, but his death, or the death of Al Qaeda leaders, will not bring an end to Al Qaeda as a whole or alleviate hostility towards the United States. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda

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Affects of AIDS-Related Articles on Rhodes Student's Opinions Concerning U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa

Introduction

The existence and increasing number of people infected with HIV and AIDS in Africa are baffling. While many in the developed world believe that HIV/AIDS is under control, the sad truth is that the epidemic is devastating large swaths of the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In these countries in particular, there are a vast number of roadblocks to prevention and treatment including: armed conflicts, chronic poverty, food shortages, widespread illiteracy, and poor access to medicine and information. As a result, infection rates in many African countries have risen to levels that most health officials never imagined possible. Despite attempts by foreign countries to help fight the epidemic, there continues to be a shortage of income to realistically alter its growth.

As the country with the world's largest economy, many countries look to the U.S. for

economic, political, and military assistance. As a result, the United States is expected to respond diplomatically and morally to nations experiencing discord. In terms of foreign aid, for example, the U.S. is expected to behave generously because it can afford to spare some of its resources to come to the aid of others. Conventional wisdom is that the amount of humanitarian aid provided by the United States to countries in need is determined solely by government representatives. However, it is also true that U.S. citizens influence their government representatives' decisions to at least a small extent. The American public supports certain policy-making decisions based on their beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. Therefore, the amount of foreign aid provided by the United States to countries in need is influenced by the opinions, beliefs, and attitudes of the American public.

This research will explore this relationship between public opinion and foreign aid. In particular, it will involve an experiment to evaluate some of the variables which contribute to individuals' opinions about the amount of foreign aid the United States should supply to African countries with large percentages of AIDS victims. The experiment will involve four groups of students from International Studies classes at Rhodes College. The students participating will be primed by reading an article that either does or does not support an increase in foreign aid to the countries. They will answer a brief questionnaire

before and after reading the article, in which they will answer questions about their political ideologies, backgrounds, beliefs about foreign aid and AIDS, and other important issues. Through these questionnaires, it is expected that several conclusions can be derived regarding which variables contribute to the change, if any, of these students' opinions regarding an increase in the amount of foreign aid given to African countries by the U.S. In other words, this research seeks to answer the question: How does priming affect Rhodes students' opinions about U.S. foreign aid to AIDS-stricken African countries?

AIDS in Africa: A Brief Historical Background

Scientists have developed several theories about how humans first contracted Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). One theory supported by Edward Hooper claims that AIDS originated in a laboratory and was then contracted by humans in the world's first mass polio immunization. Another theory argues that humans first contracted the disease as a result of hunting and eating chimps in Africa in the first half of the century. Whichever theory one chooses to believe, it is an undisputed fact that AIDS develops from HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus). HIV/AIDS weakens the immune systems of the infected, making them more susceptible to illnesses known as "opportunistic infections," which eventually lead to death.

The first signs of AIDS in the United States

appeared in the late 1970s in New York and California. A few years later in the mid-1970's, AIDS was first diagnosed in Africa, from where it is believed that the disease originated. Compared to other regions of the world, AIDS has struck Africa with unparalleled force since its discovery. According to the Joint United Nations Program on AIDS (UNAIDS), Sub-Saharan Africa contains just over 10 percent of the world's population, but is home to more than 60 percent or roughly 25.4 million of the world's population of HIV-infected individuals. In 2004, approximately 3.4 million individuals were infected, while 2.3 million others died of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Young girls are now especially vulnerable to the disease, partly because females are more biologically susceptible to acquiring the virus and because they are sleeping with older, richer men. Women and girls now represent 57 percent of adults living with HIV/AIDS in the region. According to recent UNAIDS population-based studies, for every 10 young men living with the virus, there are 36 young women also living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. These figures are alarming when considering the potential spread of the virus.

The prevalence of AIDS cases in Southern Africa has demonstrated its status as the worst affected sub region in the world. South Africa, for example, has the largest population of HIV infected individuals in the world. In a country of over 40 million people with an estimated prevalence rate of 12.5 percent, an estimated 5

million South Africans are carrying the disease.

Researchers have found several causes for the large population of individuals infected with HIV/AIDS in Africa. To begin with, poverty plays a leading role. Poverty has forced many women to join Africa's large prostitution industry, despite its almost certainly lethal implications. In Nairobi, for example, more than 85 percent of sex workers are predicted to be HIV-positive. Africa's large number of migrant laborers often sleep with HIV-stricken prostitutes and then infect their wives when they return home. A survey conducted in Zambia found that three out of four wives thought they "could not refuse sex with their husband, even if they knew he was unfaithful and HIV-positive". The women who contract HIV from their husbands or elsewhere generally pass the virus on to their children through birth or breastfeeding.

AIDS mostly attacks the young and uneducated. The virus has destroyed many African countries economies because infected workers are less productive and families struck by the virus exhaust their savings on medications. Infected individuals who do not expect to live long place less value on future investments. For instance, when these individuals save less, they are less likely to risk setting up a business as well. In addition, these individuals generally do not invest in their children's educations. A study in Côte d'Ivoire found that households afflicted by AIDS halved their spending on education. Many

children of bread-winning age are forced to drop out of school to care for their stricken parents. A gap in the communication of knowledge is lost when these children lose their parents and teachers to AIDS. Children who grow up without any education will most likely grow up to be poorer and less able to provide for their children's education. Victims' immune systems become vulnerable to other diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, which often spread and debilitate the continent even further when contracted.

Secondly, cultural factors are at work. For instance, AIDS has spread because no one is willing to discuss the issue of sex and/or the ways in which one can contract the virus. Specifically, a lack of educational programs about these issues has contributed to its spread. Many parents who ideally should be teaching their children about sex and AIDS find it difficult to discuss these issues with their children. For example, most individuals are unwilling to discuss how culturally-enforced virginity tests, such as those in Zimbabwe, encourage girls to have anal sex. These girls, in effect, are never taught that their chances of contracting AIDS greatly increase when they engage in anal sex. Furthermore, motherhood is so highly esteemed, (so much that women are often buried with rats to symbolize missing offspring), that many women would rather risk the chance of acquiring HIV than remaining without child.

Thirdly, as a political argument, the foreign aid provided to African governments to prevent its

spread often does not reach those in need. Instead,
corrupt government officials are prone to pocket
this money. Other times, countries simply fail to
responsibly distribute foreign aid funds. In 2005,
for example, Kenya's Health Ministry admitted
that it had failed to distribute $54 million provided
for the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis. These tendencies often prevent
AIDS-stricken individuals from receiving the little
antiretroviral drugs they are provided to cope with
the virus.

The pathways by which low levels of
economic and social well-being affect health are
easily found and are a daily reality for hundreds of
millions in Africa. One pathway is the skewed
spending priorities of governments which may
have high levels of military expenditure or may
devote most of their health budgets to secondary
health care for urban citizens, at the expense of
primary and preventative health services. In
Uganda, with one of the highest infant and
maternal mortality rates (and an AIDS epidemic),
the government spends annually only US$3 per
capita on health. The poor people of Africa cannot
afford decent health care, and without antibiotics
they cannot treat other sexually transmitted
diseases.

AIDS orphans lacking the guidance of
parents, teachers, and other community leaders
often become engaged in crime. The lack of
guidance and the expectation of dying young
encourage many young men to become reckless.

As a result, these boys are more likely to join a gang or a rebel army. Resulting instability in Africa most likely furthers the spread of AIDS. The number of HIV-positive foreign soldiers who fought in Congo's war came close to 50 percent. Scientists have studied Congolese villages that were afflicted for 5 years by the Rwandan, Ugandan, Zimbabwean, and Angolan soldiers. Their research has shown a "frenetic mix of different HIV sub-types in local bloodstreams which could cause new drug-resistant strains to develop". Clearly, AIDS not only affects the health of Africans, but also the stability, and political and economic development of the continent as well. Given this brief look at the prevalence of AIDS throughout Africa, the following section describes the recent opinions of Americans towards U.S. foreign aid in general and specifically to Africa for HIV/AIDS.

American Public Opinion: Foreign Aid and AIDS

American public opinion regarding foreign aid to developing countries for HIV/AIDS was evaluated as recently as 2003. The Kaiser Health Poll Report found that the percent age of Americans who believe HIV/AIDS is the number one health problem facing the United States has been gradually declining since 1987. In 1987, nearly 70 percent of the population named HIV/AIDS as the leading health problem facing the United States. However, this number decreased to approximately 21 percent in 2004.

Instead, Americans named cancer, health care costs, health insurance, and access to health care as more significant issues. Figure 1 illustrates the gradual decline between 1987 (68%) and 2004 (21%).

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

The poll also found that over half of the population agrees that the United States is a "global leader" and has a responsibility to provide foreign aid to developing countries to help HIV/AIDS. The first pie chart in Figure 2 illustrates these opinions, indicating that while 53 percent of the population agrees with the statement that the U.S. is a global leader and has a responsibility to spend more money to help fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing, 42 percent disagree, and 5 percent were unsure. The second pie chart in Figure 2 illustrates that approximately 71 percent of the population agreed with the statement that the U.S. should address problems at home first rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries, 25 percent disagreed, and 4 percent were unsure. The third pie chart shows that of these two statements, 62 percent believed that the U.S. should first address problems at home, 30 percent believed that the U.S. has the responsibility to fight HIV/AIDS in developing countries, 6 percent disagreed with both statements, and 2 percent were unsure. Overall, the responses shown in Figure 2 seem to suggest that Americans are more concerned with domestic issues than they are with

issues abroad.

[Insert Figure 2 Here]

One pie chart found on the right side of Figure 3 illustrates that in May of 2000, 35 percent strongly favored and 25 percent somewhat favored the U.S. government spending money to help solve the problem of AIDS in other countries. On the other hand, 16 percent somewhat opposed, 17 percent strongly opposed, and 7 percent were not sure about the U.S. government providing foreign aid to help fight the global AIDS epidemic. The other pie chart in Figure 3 reveals that in August of 2000, 34 percent of the population strongly favored and 31 percent somewhat favored the United States government spending money to help solve the problem of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, 17 percent were somewhat opposed, 12 percent strongly opposed, and 5 percent of the population were unsure about the U.S. government providing money to sub-Saharan Africa to solve the problem of HIV/AIDS. This data shows that in 2000, a slightly higher 65 percent of the American public supported government spending for AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa than the 60 percent who supported the use of U.S. resources for this cause in other countries. In addition, Figure 3 demonstrates that while 33 percent of the population was opposed to giving money to other countries to fight AIDS, a slightly lower 29 percent of the population was opposed to giving money to sub-Saharan Africa to fight AIDS.

[Insert Figure 3 Here]

Figure 4 shows that in 2002 and 2003, approximately 30-40 percent of the population said they believed the U.S. government was spending too much money on foreign aid to developing countries, such as those in Africa, Latin America, and Asia to fight HIV/AIDS. About 20-25% of the population in 2002 and 2003 believed the U.S. was spending too little. In 2002, about 30 percent believed the U.S. was spending about the right amount of money and in 2003, this number had slightly declined to 21 percent. The number of people who believed the U.S. was not spending enough money on developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS increased drastically from 20 percent in 2003 to 36 percent in 2004. Those who believed the U.S. was spending the right amount increased to 34 percent and the number of people who believed the U.S. was spending too much decreased to 15 percent in 2004.

[Insert Figure 4 Here]

One question included in the poll asked respondents to whether they favored or opposed three ways in which the U.S. government could provide financial aid to help fight AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately 77 percent of the population favored spending money on AIDS prevention and education in Africa; 75 percent supported spending money on AIDS treatment and care in Africa; and 65 percent favored reducing the amount of money these African countries owe to

the United States so they can adequately deal with the AIDS epidemic. Figure 5 illustrates that when asked to chose one of these statements as the top priority of the U.S. government, 44 percent named spending money on AIDS prevention and education in Africa; 27 percent listed spending money on AIDS treatment and care in Africa; and 15 percent believed reducing the amount of debt owed by these African countries to the U.S. in order to pursue the fight against AIDS as the U.S. government's top priority. All in all, Figure 5 demonstrates that in 2000, the majority of the population supported an increase in the amount of money provided by the U.S. government to sub-Saharan Africa for AIDS prevention and education, spending money on treatment and care, and reducing the debt of African countries to better help them deal with AIDS.

[Insert Figure 5 Here]

Another segment included in Kaiser's poll informed participants that the U.S. spends close to $1 billion to fight AIDS in developing nations. After reading this information, respondents were asked if they supported doubling this amount of foreign aid provided to fight AIDS. Figure 6 illustrates that in 2002, 59 percent of the population stated they did not know enough about the issue to decide if the U.S. should double the then current one billion dollars given to developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS. In addition, Figure 6 shows that close to a quarter of the population opposed such an increase and

approximately 14 percent favored this increase in funding.

[Insert Figure 6 Here]

Figure 7 shows that the American public is reasonably divided on their beliefs about whether increasing aid to Africa to fight HIV/AIDS will make a difference. Figure 7 illustrates that in 2000, close to half of the population believed that spending more money in sub-Saharan Africa would make a difference, while 40 percent did not believe this would have a significant affect, and 8 percent were unsure. In 2002, a lower 40 percent of the population believed that spending more money in Africa in general would make a meaningful difference, while a greater 48 percent believed this would not make a difference. In 2004, however, the number of people who believed increasing the amount of foreign aid to Africa would make a difference rose from 41 percent in 2002 to 55 percent. The number of people who believed increasing this foreign aid would not make a significant difference declined from 48 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2004. Although the American public's opinion about whether increasing foreign aid to Africa would make a difference, the fluctuations of these numbers remained quite small from 2000 to 2004. These statistics may be useful to compare to those found through my experiment about Rhodes students' opinions about whether they do or do not support an increase in foreign aid to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS.

Priming Theory

The individuals' exposure to these articles makes this type of media impact a key independent variable in the experiment. In the field of political psychology, significant research has been devoted to examining the influences of media priming, or framing, on public opinion. Priming Theory claims that prior reference to a word or concept can trigger a memory about that issue and consequently affect the attitudes of individuals to that concept when it is presented next. In other words, priming can make an individual more likely to recognize and associate an issue with its past presentation. A politician's presentation of the issue of abortion in a negative context, for example, might cause individuals to unconsciously and automatically associate this issue with much the same meaning at a future point in time. The primary reliance of the American public on the media to acquire information demonstrates the potential impact of media priming on their judgments, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. This theoretical approach will attempt to demonstrate the affect of media priming on Rhodes students' public opinions regarding U.S. foreign policy to African countries.

Shanto Iyengar and Daniel Kinder have produced some of the most well known literature on the affects of media

priming. In their book, <u>News that Matters</u>, the scholars develop and test Priming Theory on the public's opinion of presidential performance. They claim that rather than legitimately debating a president's performance, the public immediately bases their judgments on the first idea with which they associate that individual. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) found that television news typically focuses on one issue or characteristic of a president. Consequently, they determined that viewers are more likely to associate and judge a candidate based on those aforementioned aspects rather than on their all-encompassing performance. Former president Bill Clinton, for example, is often solely associated with the Monica Lewinsky or WhiteWater scandals because the media devoted so much coverage to those issues. Iyengar and Kinder's research reveals that television news is capable of influencing and changing public opinion.

Similar to Iyengar and Kinder's experiment, Mark Joslyn and Steve Ceccoli (1996) addressed the influences of media priming on the public's evaluations of presidential candidates during the last two months of the 1992 presidential campaign. News appraisals were conducted to determine the amount of coverage from the CBS, NBC, and ABC television networks given to the three candidates: George Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot. The results of these inquiries showed a correlation between increased attention levels to television news, improvements in Clinton's

evaluations, and declines in Bush's and Perot's evaluations. This model controlled for politically relevant social characteristics such as race, education, age, and party identification. Also measured in the candidates' news appraisals were the overriding tones of the television news coverage. As expected, the findings revealed that positively toned media coverage resulted in positive candidate evaluations and negatively toned television news coverage resulted in negative evaluations. Therefore, these findings indicate that at least part of the respondents' evaluations were largely influenced by their exposure to media priming.

In addition, Joslyn and Ceccoli grouped the participants according to their associated political party and ideology in order to determine the impact of respondents' political predispositions on their candidate evaluations. Increased attentiveness to campaign coverage encouraged Democrats and Liberals to support and evaluate Clinton, the Democratic candidate, more positively and judge Bush, the Republican nominee, poorly. Conversely, evaluations for Clinton suffered and those for Bush improved when greater Republicans and Conservatives attention was paid to the campaign. These discoveries demonstrate that in addition to the tone of and exposure to television news coverage, the respondents' political and ideological predispositions also largely influenced their evaluations of the 1992 presidential candidates.

Priming Theory claims that exposing individuals to a persuasive message or concept can increase the likelihood that those individuals will develop thoughts with similar meaning as the stimulus. Based on this assertion, one could hypothesize that after reading articles that support or discourage increases in U.S. foreign aid for AIDS-stricken African countries, Rhodes students will develop attitudes similar to those presented in the article they read. In other words, students who read the article supporting an increase in foreign aid to these countries will adopt similarly encouraging views about the issue after reading the article. In addition, as a result of reading the article opposing such increases, students will develop opinions that discourage the U.S. from increasing the amount of foreign aid provided to African countries for AIDS prevention.

Framing Theory

The research of Thomas Nelson, Zoe Oxley, and Rosalee Clawson in <u>Toward A Psychology of Framing Effects</u> is also included within this framing approach. Apart from the other scholars in this framework, these authors suggest that although media coverage does affect public opinion, its content is not necessarily an influential factor. The scholars place emphasis on the psychological difference between framing and persuasive arguments meant to change individuals' beliefs. They argue that individuals' level of sophistication, or prior familiarity with the content of the frame, are key factors in determining

whether or not they will change their beliefs or attitudes about a particular issue. The authors hypothesize that those individuals with more long-term knowledge about the issue will be less likely to change their views on the subject because they will be more familiar with the issue; the additional information will be trivial in comparison to their background knowledge; and their additional knowledge will allow them to respond to such new information with counterarguments.

The authors conducted an experiment among individuals with various levels of sophistication regarding welfare policy to determine if such knowledge would control the impact of media priming. The experiment included two questionnaires, one with messages meant to alter the beliefs of the participants regarding welfare policy, and the other with framing manipulation questions. The framing questions were designed to represent opposing beliefs regarding the benefits and downsides of welfare policy. The authors intentionally designed the framing questions in this way in order to encourage the participants to pay attention to the obvious framing stimulus.

Surprisingly, the data gathered from this experiment proved that those with greater sophistication in the realm of welfare policy were more easily influenced than those with a lesser degree of knowledge. These findings indicate that "framing can affect the balance of considerations that individuals weigh when contemplating

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political issues". Another unexpected discovery in this experiment was that participants responded more to framing than to messages meant to alter their beliefs regarding welfare policy. In conclusion, this experiment proves that even without intentional manipulation or persuasion, the mass media can influence public opinion.

Mood Theory

The Mood Theory, developed by Gabriel Almond, is another theoretical approach to determine how Rhodes students' opinions about U.S. foreign aid to African countries with high percentages of AIDS victims are affected. In The American People and Foreign Policy, Almond argues that the American public is generally unconcerned and uninformed about foreign affairs. He states that the 'mood' of the American public regarding international relations is in constant flux. "Permissive mood" is the term Almond uses to describe the passive acceptance of Americans to international policies urged upon them by their political leaders. At the time of his book's publication in 1960, the United States was engrossed in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In his book, Almond maintains that this foreign policy decision is not intellectually based, and will eventually change when the international environment is altered. The only situation in which Almond claims that Americans will become interested in foreign affairs is when they are on the brink of war, such as during the Cold War. Almond's Mood Theory might be useful in the

attempt to show that Rhodes students' opinions about U.S. foreign aid to African countries for the prevention of AIDS are not affected by reading an article on the topic because they are uninterested in foreign affairs.

In "Burning Issues: Then and Now," Jan Larson (1996) explains public opinion in America concerning government spending from 1974 through 1994. Unlike Almond, Larson does not solely concentrate on American public opinion concerning foreign affairs. However, she does address the ebb and flow of Americans' public opinions regarding government spending on its domestic and international fronts. Larson hypothesizes that America's mood swings toward government spending vary depending on vagaries of economic, political, and media events. Information obtained by researchers at the National Opinion Research Center in Chicago has revealed that although Americans frequently complain of taxes, they are nonetheless more willing to spend money on improving health care and education, and fighting crime, drug addictions, and urban problems, than on foreign aid and welfare.

Larson found that although certain catastrophic events sometimes sway Americans' views concerning these issues, they have not seriously changed in the past twenty years. For practically every year studied, the majority of Americans agreed that too much money was being spent on foreign aid. Even in 1994, when civil war

broke out in Rwanda, more than 70 percent of the American public believed that the government was spending too much on foreign aid and not enough on crime prevention at home.

The Mood Theory maintains that Americans are generally uninterested and unconcerned about international affairs. The theory claims that Americans are fundamentally ethnocentric and concerned only with themselves and domestic issues. Although Almond's theory was formed in 1960 during the Cold War, these ideas still apply to Americans and the foreign policies of the U.S. in many ways. Other than the U.S.'s military presence in the Middle East, the key issues that concern most Americans include gay marriage, healthcare, education, and social security. Based on the Mood Theory, one could hypothesize that Rhodes students' opinions will not be affected by media priming because they are unconcerned about international affairs.

Rational Choice Theory

The Rational Choice Theory is another approach to examine the affect on Americans' public opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid to African countries with large populations of HIV/AIDS victims. This theory assumes that every individual behaves out of self-interest. These actors rationally calculate their preferences and choose the course of action that will benefit them the most. According to George Homans, rational actors behave based on the rewards and

punishments of their actions, and believe that every social interaction involves a degree of reciprocity or social exchange. Power is another element involved in rational actors' exchanges. The bargaining power of a nation is determined by how much dependence they have on the exchange relationship, "and this dependence varies, in turn, on the extent to which there are alternatives available to them". This approach explains that Americans' support increases in U.S. foreign aid to African countries for the prevention of AIDS because it is in their best interest.

Todd Moss (1995) examines the relationship between United States foreign policy and Africa. Moss maintains that the United States bases its foreign policy with Africa on two factors: self-interest and moral idealism. On the one hand, Moss argues that the U.S. marginalized Africa because of a lacking interest in the continent. In 1988, for example, the Department of Defense admitted that it had "no major military goals in Africa". This statement is still true today, as shown through the U.S. military's slow and limited aid in Rwanda in 1994 and recently in Sudan. Carol Lancaster, author of The U.S. and Africa: into the twenty-first century, summarized the U.S.'s stance by stating that, "Sub-Saharan Africa is seen less and less as a credible or useful economic and diplomatic partner and increasingly as a humanitarian problem to the world".

However, Moss explains that as U.S. foreign policy goals gain momentum, as seen

today in the Middle East, Africa becomes more of an experimental playground for America's democratic ideals. In accordance with Rational Choice Theory, the United States seeks to democratize Africa purely out of self-interest. As suggested by the Democratic Peace Theory, Moss explains that the strengthening and uniting of democracy abroad is seen as a means to protect the U.S.'s national security. In addition, Moss argues that the U.S. is based on the liberal philosophies of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson's idea that "all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights". The values of capitalism, individual freedoms, and human progress create what George Weigel refers to as the U.S.'s "morally based nationalism". Moss adds that Americans maintain optimism about the human condition and their ability to succeed despite misfortune. Considering the benefits associated with the spread of democracy in Africa and the morally optimistic attitude toward the development of the continent, Moss's theories suggest U.S. foreign aid for the prevention of the spread of AIDS as a plausible course of action.

Other theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau (1962), have written about America's need to exercise diplomatic relations with nations abroad, particularly when military means can not be employed. Morgenthau explains that humanitarian aid, such as that for the prevention of AIDS in Africa, a natural disaster, agriculture, and other

areas, is *per se* nonpolitical. However, he emphasizes that this "nonpolitical" aid can and does go a long way in strengthening political ties with other nations.

J. Brian Atwood (1997) argues that international diplomacy on behalf of the U.S. is needed to maintain social and economic progress. Atwood recognizes that the U.S.'s Defense Intelligence Agency is aware of the potential instability that could result in several regions of Africa if the United States does not offer humanitarian aid to the continent when needed. Failure to intervene when countries needed aid for crop-failure or ecological deterioration, for example, would be far more expensive than actually preventing a crisis. In addition, Atwood notes that 60 percent of the world's nations are now democracies, up from 40 percent in 1983. Atwood argues that the amount of money spent during the Cold War on the development of democracies throughout the world would be a waste if the U.S. were to give up on developing the African continent. The continued support of these democracies would eventually strengthen the national security of the U.S. and in affect, benefit its self-interest.

Rational Choice Theory is based on the principle that individuals act out of self-interest. According to this theory, individuals weigh their choices and act according to that which will benefit them the most. Any relationship maintained by individuals should be one of

reciprocity. According to Rational Choice Theory, I hypothesize that after reading an AIDS-related article that supports an increase in foreign aid provided by the U.S. to African countries, Rhodes students will also support an increase in foreign aid because they believe it is in the best interest of their nations and themselves. I also hypothesize that after reading an AIDS-related article that does not support such an increase, Rhodes students will similarly not support an increase in foreign aid for AIDS prevention because they do not believe it is in the best interest of their nation or them self.

Among these theoretical approaches, the Mood Theory Approach and the Rational Choice Approach are most similar. Both of these frameworks deal with the interests of the American public. In comparison, the Mood Theorists suggest that Americans maintain more narrow-minded, domestic values and views of the world than Rational Choice theorists. Rational Choice theorists depict Americans as a more ambitious, opportunistic people. While Almond claims that Americans do not make intellectually based decisions, the Rational Choice authors base their theory on the assumption that individuals always thoughtfully examine their options and make their decisions based on what will most benefit their self-interest. The Mood Theory approach has to deal more with the attitudes and personal likes and dislikes of the American public. The Mood Approach does not consider the affects of isolationist foreign policies on the perceptions of

the U.S. as does the Rational Choice Theory. Rational Choice Theory concerns individuals' self-interests, and in the case of Moss, also deals with moral idealism. The Priming Theory is not very similar to either of the other theoretical approaches because it deals more with outside factors that influence individuals' behavior rather than with personal, non-manipulated decisions. Joslyn and Ceccoli's findings, however, are similar to Almond's in that they both determine that individuals with less education regarding the issue are more likely to be close-minded and favor more isolationist policies.

All three of these theoretical approaches by themselves do not provide enough of an explanation to answer the research question. Although applicable many years ago, the Mood Theory is now too outdated to explain current international relations. On the other hand, this theory does represent the majority of the American public who are not interested in giving aid to African countries to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. Rational Choice Theory also does not seem like a sufficient approach because it is not in the best interest of the United States. The political, economic, technological, and military underdevelopment, along with the numerous conflict-stricken regions on the continent, demonstrates that Africa does not have much to offer the U.S. in terms of a reciprocal relationship. On the other hand, American aid in Africa could provide the U.S. with opportunities to spread its

democratic values and increase the security of the nation. One problem with this theory, however, is the assumption that the United State and its democratic values would be peacefully accepted in Africa. Considering the current foreign policies of the U.S. in the Middle East and the incredibly primitive civilizations in some regions of Africa, the chances that this would occur peacefully is unlikely. The impact of the spread of AIDS around the world, and potentially in the United States, in future generations is a good reason to increase foreign aid to these countries as well.

In combination with the Mood Theory Approach and Rational Choice Theory approach, Priming Theory approach seems most appealing and appropriate for my experiment. In addition to these theories, a framework accounting for the influence of Americans' political ideologies and another for the influence of Americans' unfavorable socio-cultural attitudes towards HIV/AIDS victims are also needed for this topic.

These theoretical approaches lead me to inquire about the socio-cultural, political, economic, international, and domestic opinions and values of the American public. I believe that the media priming, economic status, political ideology, political affiliation, and international variables are more important than Americans' opinions and attitudes about socio-cultural and domestic issues. I expect to find that these variables will affect the participants' opinions regarding increases in U.S. foreign aid more than

the other measured variables.

My hypotheses are based on Priming Theory, Mood Theory, and Rational Choice Theory. Based on the Priming Theory, I hypothesize that after their exposure to media priming, Rhodes students will support the idea proposed in the AIDS-related articles about whether the United States should increase the amount of foreign aid provided to African countries for AIDS prevention. Using Mood Theory I hypothesize that Rhodes students opinions will not be affected by media priming because they are not interested in international affairs. According to Rational Choice Theory, I hypothesize that Rhodes students who read the AIDS-related article supporting an increase in U.S. foreign aid will also support an increase because these students believe it is in their best interest. Similarly, I hypothesize that those students who read the article that opposes an increase in U.S. foreign aid will not encourage growth in foreign aid because these students do not believe it is in their best interest.

Method Section

The application of an experiment was necessary in order to determine how Rhodes students' opinions of U.S. foreign aid to African countries with large populations of AIDS victims are affected by reading AIDS-related articles. The students were recruited based on their enrollment in International Studies (IS) courses. The

experiment involved two groups of students, with each group encompassing three separate IS classes. Students from one of Professor Gelleny's IS 100 level classes, referred to as Gelleny #1, Professor Copper's IS 432 U.S. Intelligence Community class, and Professor Ceccoli's IS 200 Introduction to Comparative Politics class comprised the first group. The second group was comprised of students from another 100 level IS class taught by Professor Gelleny, referred to as Gelleny #2, and students from Professor Kaltenthaler's IS 312 International Political Economy class. These groups were chosen so that each contains at least one introduction-level IS class, comprised predominantly of Freshmen and Sophomores, and at least one upper-level IS class, comprised mostly of Juniors and Seniors. The groups were chosen this way to determine if age and college experience has any affect on the students' opinions. Altogether, 85 students from five IS classes were involved in the experiment.

The articles provided to the students were of the caliber that one might find in *Time Magazine*. The first group of students were asked to read an article entitled "Help Must Be On The Way," referred to as the 'pro-AIDS article'. This article was slanted in support of an increase in foreign aid to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS. The other group of students was asked to read an article entitled "AIDS in Africa: A Lost Cause," referred to as the 'anti-AIDS article'. This article was biased in that it

discourages an increase in U.S. foreign aid to African countries. The purpose of this dichotomy was to determine how media priming affects student opinions about U.S. foreign aid to African countries.

The students were asked to complete a survey before and after reading one of these AIDS-related articles. The survey questions completed by the students asked particular questions to determine if the students' political ideologies, sex, and other characteristics affect their opinions about U.S. foreign aid to African countries. The survey taken by the students before reading the article asked basic demographic questions about the students, their political ideologies, their general attitudes concerning AIDS, U.S. foreign aid, and Africa, and their knowledge about the issue. The survey given after reading the articles asked similar and often identical questions to determine whether the students' opinions were affected by reading the article.

Data Section

In total, 85 students from five IS classes participated in the experiment. Sixteen students from Professor Copper's U.S. Intelligence Community class participated in the experiment; 16 students from Professor Ceccoli's Introduction to Comparative Politics class participated; 19 from Professor Gelleny's #1 Introduction level class participated; 18 students participated from Professor Gelleny's #2 IS course; and 16 students

from Professor Kaltenthaler's IPE class were involved in the experiment. The students who read the pro-AIDS article entitled "Help Must Be on the Way" came from Professor Copper and Professor Gelleny's #1 classes. In addition, half (8) students from Professor Ceccoli's class also read the pro-AIDS article. Professor Ceccoli's class was included as a fifth group in the experiment in order to gain more participants and as a result, more data. Therefore, to make the number of students who read each article almost equal, half of Professor Ceccoli's students read the pro-AIDS article and half read the anti-AIDS article. All in all, 43 students were primed with the pro-AIDS article. The students who read the anti-AIDS article, or "AIDS in Africa: A Lost Cause" included those from Professor Kaltenthaler, Professor Gelleny's #2 class, and eight students from Professor Ceccoli's class. These classes contributed 42 students who were primed with the anti-AIDS article.

The age, gender, and other demographic information of participants were acquired through the surveys. The number of participants who were 18 years old was 7; 25 students were 19 years old; 27 students were 20 years old; 19 students were 21 years old; and 7 students who participated in the experiment were 22. There were 45 male participants and 40 female participants. Twenty six freshmen participated in the experiment, with 16 reading the anti-AIDS article and 10 reading the pro-AIDS

article.

Twenty six Sophomores were involved, with 11 reading the anti-AIDS article and 15 reading the pro-AIDS article. The number of underclassmen made up of Freshmen and Sophomores who participated in the experiment, therefore, came to 52 students. There were 21 Juniors involved in the experiment, 12 of which read the anti-AIDS article and 9 of which read the pro-AIDS article. The number of Seniors who took part in the experiment came to 12, with 3 reading the anti-AIDS article and 9 reading the pro-AIDS article. Therefore 33 upperclassmen comprised of Juniors and Seniors that were involved in the experiment. The number of students who are majoring in International Studies, including those with double majors, and who participated in the experiment was 34.

Results: Priming Theory

Priming Theory maintains that prior exposure to a persuasive message causes individuals to associate and develop attitudes about that concept in much the same manner in which it was previously presented. Priming is considered to be an automatic and unconscious process. Based on Priming Theory's assumptions and hypotheses, one would expect to find a clear tendency of Rhodes IS students supporting the stance presented in the AIDS-related article they read on whether the U.S. should increase the amount of U.S. foreign aid provided to African

countries. Using several survey questions, I attempt to show that priming affects Rhodes students' opinions about the amount of foreign aid provided by the U.S. to AIDS-stricken African countries.

Question 1: Foreign Aid

One question included in both surveys asked students to rank the importance of 10 issues to the welfare of the United States, where 1 represented "least important" and 10 symbolized "most important". Included in the ten answer choices were healthcare, social security, unemployment, immigration, gay marriage, abortion, crime, foreign aid, drugs, and education. The number each student gave for foreign aid signified how important they believed this issue is compared to the other more domestic issues. The data revealed that Rhodes IS students' overall mean was 4.97 and the overall standard deviation (SD) was 2.492. The data obtained from the two groups of students was divided according to whether they read the pro-AIDS or anti-AIDS articles. The data revealed considerable changes in the students' opinions about the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States after reading the articles.

[Insert Figures 8 & 9 Here]

Students' answers to this question averaged at approximately 4.8 before reading the anti-AIDS

article. The standard deviation before reading the article was 2.29. After reading the article, however, the mean increased to 5.7 and the standard deviation decreased to 2.01. The difference between the mean of Rhodes IS students answers before and after reading the article came to -0.91. Essentially, this result suggests that before reading the anti-AIDS article, the answers of Rhodes IS students were somewhat varied. This figure also shows that the majority of Rhodes IS students believed that foreign aid was not a very important issue to the welfare of the United States. However, Figure 9 reveals that after reading the anti-AIDS article, the majority of Rhodes IS students changed their opinions about the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States. Most students increased their ranking of foreign aid as a more important issue to the welfare of the United States. Changes in the Rhodes IS students' answers about the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States prove that their opinions were affected by media priming.

The mean of Rhodes IS students' answers for this question before reading the pro-AIDS article was 5.07, which increased to 6.49 after reading the article. The difference between the mean of students' answers before and after reading the pro-AIDS article was -1.42.

[Insert Figures 10 & 11 Here]

Before students read the pro-AIDS article,

their standard deviation was 2.622. This number decreased to 2.293 after the students read the article. Figure 10 reveals the wide range of variation in students' answers prior to reading the pro-AIDS article. This data shows that before their exposure to media priming, these students were less concerned about the issue of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States. However, Figure 11 demonstrates that the standard deviation after reading the article decreased, meaning their concern about the issue of foreign aid relative to the welfare of the United States increased. Figure 11 also shows that the majority of students ranked foreign aid as an issue of greater importance to the welfare of the U.S after reading the pro-AIDS article. These statistics reveal that the opinions of Rhodes IS students were affected as a result of reading the pro-AIDS article.

The combination of the data for Rhodes IS students who read the pro-AIDS article and for those who read the anti-AIDS article revealed several interesting conclusions. To begin with, the majority of students who read the anti-AIDS article and viewed foreign aid as a relatively unimportant issue to the United States' welfare changed their opinions after reading the article, and ranked the issue as one of significance to the welfare of the United States. This finding was rather surprising because although they were subjected to negative media priming, the majority of Rhodes IS students finished the experiment with a more positive and supportive attitude about the

amount of U.S. foreign aid given to Africa for AIDS prevention. One would expect the students who were exposed to derogatory messages about Africa, AIDS, and the amount of U.S. foreign aid given for AIDS prevention to rank foreign aid as an issue of less importance after reading the anti-AIDS article. Instead, these findings go against the hypotheses of the Priming Theory.

In attempts to sway participants in the experiment in support of or in opposition to increases in U.S. foreign aid to Africa for AIDS prevention, a great deal of information about the affects of the epidemic on the African continent was included in both articles.

I speculate that despite their exposure to negatively biased information in the anti-AIDS article, the attitudes of these students were more greatly affected by the simple statistics of AIDS in Africa. I hypothesize that these students did not allow information from the anti-AIDS article to negatively affect their views about foreign aid provided to Africa. Instead, I speculate that the Rhodes IS students digested the statistics about AIDS in Africa provided in the article, found compassion with the plight of the African people, and as a result, changed their opinions about the importance of foreign aid to Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS. This reveals that although it did not have the perceived affect, the media priming to which these Rhodes IS students were exposed to affected their opinions about the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States.

The data acquired from students who read the pro-AIDS article also supports the Priming Theory. Students who read an article supporting increases in U.S. foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention would be expected to place greater value on the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the U.S. after reading the article. The change in students' opinions about foreign aid as an issue of less importance before reading the pro-AIDS article to one of greater importance after reading the article demonstrates the affects of Priming Theory on Rhodes IS students' attitudes. The increased awareness of these students to the issue, as demonstrated through the decrease in standard deviation before and after reading the article, also shows the influence of the Priming theory. Therefore, the presentation of AIDS in Africa and the need for U.S. foreign aid in the continent through the pro-AIDS article affected the opinions and attitudes of Rhodes IS students about the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States.

Question 2: Increasing Foreign Aid

A second question in the pre and post-article surveys was also included to determine if priming had any affect on the opinions of Rhodes students about U.S. foreign aid to AIDS-stricken African countries. Two statements were placed at either end of a 10-point scale. The following statement was placed on the left side of the scale: "The U.S. should increase the amount of foreign aid given to Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS".

The right side of the scale contained the following statement: "The U.S. should not increase the amount of foreign aid given to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS". Students were asked to place their views on the scale by circling a number that corresponded most with their beliefs. According to the scale, 1 meant that they completely agreed with the statement on the left, 10 meant they agreed completely with the statement on the right, and any number between 1 and 10 meant that their views fell somewhere between the two statements.

[Insert Figures 12 & 13 Here]

The data revealed that Rhodes IS students' overall mean was 3.87 and the overall SD was 2.334. The data was divided according to whether the students read the pro-AIDS or the anti-AIDS articles. Before reading the anti-AIDS article, the students' overall mean was 3.52 on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 represented the belief that the U.S. should increase its foreign aid and 10 represented the belief that the U.S. should not increase its foreign aid. The overall mean after reading the anti-AIDS article increased dramatically from 3.52 to 5.05. The difference between the students' mean after reading the anti-AIDS article and before reading the article came to -1.53. The standard deviation before reading the article was 1.954. The standard deviation increased slightly to 2.28 after students read the article. This data shows that prior to reading the anti-AIDS article, Rhodes IS students were surer of their beliefs

about how much U.S. foreign aid should be provided to African countries for AIDS prevention. Also, the data reveals that after reading the article, more of these students were not as sure about their beliefs concerning this issue.

Figure 12 demonstrates that before reading the anti-AIDS article, the majority of Rhodes IS students answered 1, 2, or 3 out of 10, where 1 supported the U.S. increasing foreign aid. This means that before reading the anti-AIDS article, fewer students believed the U.S. should not increase the amount of foreign aid it provides to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS and more students supported an increase in foreign aid. According to this data, approximately 76 percent of respondents chose numbers 1 through 4. This reveals that nearly three-quarters of Rhodes IS students supported an increase in U.S. foreign aid.

Figure 13 illustrates that after reading the anti-AIDS article, many more Rhodes IS students did not support an increase in foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention. The number of students who answered 1, 2, or 3 for this question before reading the article declined. Instead, more individuals chose higher numbers, particularly 7, as their answer. In addition, more individuals chose numbers 9 and 10 as their answers for this question, where no students chose these answers prior to reading the anti-AIDS article. This data reveals that as a result of reading the anti-AIDS article, the majority of Rhodes IS

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students' changed their opinions in opposition to increasing the amount of foreign aid provided by the U.S. to African countries for AIDS prevention.

[Insert Figures 14 & 15 Here]

The overall students' mean before reading the pro-AIDS article was 4.21 and the standard deviation was 2.633. After reading the pro-AIDS article, the mean decreased to 3.07 and the standard deviation also decreased to 2.176. Figure 14 illustrates that prior to reading the article, the answers of Rhodes IS students varied greatly along the 1 to 10 scale. The bar graph shows that close to 19% of students answered #1, almost 23% answered #3, and approximately 26% of Rhodes IS students chose #5 as their answer, while the rest of the students were fairly evenly divided among the other choices.

Figure 15 shows that after reading the pro-AIDS article, students were much surer of their beliefs about this issue, as signified by the large decrease in the standard deviation. This bar graph clearly shows that almost 80% of Rhodes IS students chose answers 1 through 4. In other words, more than three-quarters of respondents believed that the U.S. should increase its foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention. In addition, the number of students who chose numbers 8 through 10 as their answers decreased quite a bit in the post-article survey. This data reveals that before reading the pro-AIDS article, more Rhodes IS students were not as convinced of

their beliefs about this issue as they were after reading the article. In addition, these results prove that reading the pro-AIDS article increased the number of Rhodes IS students who supported an increase in foreign aid and decreased the number of students who opposed increasing foreign aid for AIDS prevention in Africa.

The Priming Theory is greatly supported from the results obtained for this question. To begin with, the opinions of the majority of Rhodes IS students' who read the anti-AIDS article were affected from priming. More of the students from this group were not as sure of their beliefs on this issue before reading the article. However, after reading the anti-AIDS article, a greater number of participants were able to more confidently determine their beliefs about U.S. foreign aid to Africa. In addition, the number of Rhodes IS students who did not support increases in foreign aid before reading the article grew after reading the anti-AIDS article. These results show that as a result of priming to negative messages about increases in U.S. foreign aid, the majority of Rhodes IS students adopted this attitude and asserted their disagreement with the idea of increasing foreign aid to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS. Therefore, this data supports the hypothesis that as a result of reading the anti-AIDS article, Rhodes IS students will develop opinions that discourage the U.S. from increasing the amount of foreign aid provided to African countries for AIDS prevention.

The data reveals that there was a slight increase in the standard deviation after students read the anti-AIDS article. This finding leads me to speculate that because the students were exposed to so much information regarding AIDS and its alarming affects on the African continent, many Rhodes IS students were somewhat overwhelmed by the information. As a result of this overexposure, I infer that more Rhodes IS students were unsure of their answer for this question following this priming.

Furthermore, this question revealed that the majority of students who read the pro-AIDS article supported increases in U.S. foreign aid after being exposed to this priming. As expected, most Rhodes IS students who did not support increases in U.S. foreign aid to Africa changed their opinions regarding this issue in support of these increases after reading the article. In addition, the number of students who were not completely confident about their belief on the issue prior to reading the article became more confident of their personal attitudes regarding U.S. foreign aid after reading the pro-AIDS article. These findings clearly support the Priming Theory because they show that as a result of prior exposure to a concept, individuals are more likely to adopt views about an issue similar to those previously presented.

Priming Theory is strongly supported from the results of these two questions.

The findings from the first question revealed that after reading the pro and anti-AIDS articles, the awareness and concern of Rhodes IS students about U.S. foreign aid was raised. The majority of Rhodes IS students who had placed foreign aid as a relatively unimportant issue before reading the AIDS-related articles stated that it was more important to the welfare of the United States after reading the AIDS-related articles. The second question revealed that most Rhodes IS students who supported increases in U.S. foreign aid prior to reading the anti-AIDS article changed their opinion after reading the article in opposition to increases in U.S. foreign aid to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS. Results from this question also revealed that more Rhodes IS students supported increases in U.S. foreign aid to AIDS-stricken African countries after reading the pro-AIDS article. Priming Theory claims that as a result of prior exposure to a concept, individuals will unconsciously and automatically adopt the attitude previously presented about this idea. Based on these results, the hypothesis that Rhodes IS students' opinions about U.S. foreign aid to AIDS-stricken African countries are affected by media priming can now be accepted.

Data: Mood Theory

The Mood Theory argues that most Americans are unconcerned about international affairs and instead are more troubled by domestic issues. Rather than concerning themselves with U.S. foreign policies and their affect on the world,

this theory claims that Americans maintain 'permissive moods' which make them impartial to U.S. foreign affairs. These permissive American attitudes also make Americans keener to willingly accept the foreign policies proposed by the U.S. government. Based on the Mood Theory, one would expect to find that Rhodes IS students' opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid are unaffected from reading AIDS-related articles because these individuals are indifferent to international affairs. Using several questions from this experiment, I will attempt to show that Rhodes students' opinions are not affected by the media priming involved in this experiment.

Question 3: Increasing Foreign Aid II

The question concerning whether the U.S. should or should not increase its foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention can be used to determine the validity of the Mood Theory. As mentioned, findings from this question revealed that after being exposed to priming, Rhodes IS students changed their opinions about U.S. foreign aid. According to Mood Theory, Americans are not interested in international affairs, and would therefore be unconcerned with the issue of U.S. foreign aid even if exposed to media priming. However, evidence presented through this question shows that Americans, or at least Rhodes IS students, actually do care about international affairs. The findings demonstrate that rather than showing a lack of interest in foreign affairs involving the United States, the majority of

students illustrated that exposure to information regarding such issues affected their opinions. Priming to the pro-AIDS article, for example, changed the opinions of Rhodes IS students in support of increases in U.S. foreign aid to Africa for AIDS prevention. Exposure to the anti-AIDS article changed the attitudes of Rhodes IS students to opposition to increases in U.S. foreign aid. These findings disprove the hypothesis of the Mood Theory because Rhodes IS students demonstrate interest in international affairs and modifications in their opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid to Africa after being exposed to media priming.

Question 4: Domestic vs. International Issues

[Insert Figure 16 Here]

In order to determine how interested Rhodes IS students are in international affairs, one question was included in the pre-article survey. This question asked Rhodes IS students if they cared more about domestic or international issues. The frequency table and chart included in Figure 15 shows that of the 85 participants, 48% or 41 students stated that they were more concerned with domestic issues and 34 students or 40% cared more about international issues, while close to 12% or 10 students were unsure about their preferences. These results show that although more Rhodes IS students are concerned with domestic issues than international issues, there is not a large gap between the numbers of students

who favor each. Therefore, these findings disprove the application of Mood Theory for Rhodes IS students because almost 40% of these students have declared their interest in international affairs.

Question 5: Identifications and Labels

[Insert Figure 17 Here]

Another question that was also only included in the pre-article survey asked students to pick one out of 6 labels that best described themselves. Included in the label choices were 1.) member of the human race, 2.) U.S. citizen, 3.) member of your home state, 4.) member of the Memphis, TN community, and 5.) member of the Rhodes College community, or 6.) other. Figure 17 clearly demonstrates that the majority or close to 50% of Rhodes IS students labeled themselves as U.S. citizens. The most frequently chosen label following U.S. citizen was member of your home state, which made up about 20% of the respondents. Close to 19% of Rhodes IS students labeled themselves as a member of the human race, 7% of the students chose member of the Rhodes College community and 'other', while only 1% of Rhodes IS students labeled themselves as a member of the Memphis, TN community. Therefore in order of 1 to 6 (1 being most common, 6 being least common), Rhodes IS students most identified with:

1.)United States- almost 50%

2.)Home state- 20%

3.)Human race- almost 19%

4.)Rhodes College

5.) Other

6.) Memphis, TN or current residence

These findings show that the majority of Rhodes IS students relate mostly to their nation, rather than the human race, college community, current city residence, or home state. The number of students who relate most with the human race and with their home state was almost equal, while those who related most to their college community or any other label were also equal. These results show that the majority of Rhodes IS students identify with their nation and fellow citizens, rather than internationally with their fellow man.

Question 6: Inclinations to Accept Foreign Policy Decisions

[Insert Figure 18 Here]

One question included in the pre-article survey asked students to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 how inclined they were to accept policies enacted by their political leaders if they did not agree with them, where 1 was "not at all inclined" and 10 was "very inclined". Figure 18 illustrates that about 27% of Rhodes IS students answered number 5 for

this question, meaning this number of students fell in between the two extremes. Most individuals chose numbers 3, 4, and 5 as their answer, meaning about 61% of students were either somewhat willing or not as inclined to accept foreign policies enacted by their political leaders with which they disagreed. The number of students who chose numbers 1 and 2, and were therefore not at all inclined to accept this idea equaled about 9%. About 30% of students answered numbers 6, 7, and 8, meaning this percent of Rhodes IS students were more inclined than not to accept U.S. foreign policies with which they disagreed.

These results to some extent go against claims made by Mood Theory about Americans' willingness to permissively accept foreign policies enacted by the U.S. government. Almost three-quarters of Rhodes IS students maintained they were somewhat or not at all inclined to accept such foreign policy enactments. The remaining percentage of Rhodes IS students were not willing to accept foreign policies with which they disagreed. Mood Theory asserts that Americans' permissive attitudes towards foreign policy decisions support the idea that they are unconcerned about international affairs. Although Mood Theory is supported by the 25% of Rhodes IS students that are willing to accept foreign policies with which they disagree, these results show that 3/4 of Rhodes IS students are not willing to accept foreign policies enacted by political

leaders with which they disagree. These results show that Rhodes IS students have more interest in foreign affairs than asserted by the Mood Theory.

Question 7: Importance of U.S. Foreign Aid

[Insert Figures 19 & 20 Here]

One question contained in the pre and post-article surveys asked students on a scale of 1 to 10 how important they believed it was that the United States provide aid to foreign countries, where 1 was "not at all important" and 10 was "very important". The data was divided according to which article the students read. The overall mean of the students' answers was 7.49 and the overall standard deviation was 1.896. Prior to reading the anti-AIDS article, the students' mean was 7.67 and the standard deviation was 1.648, as demonstrated in Figure 19. After reading the anti-AIDS article, Rhodes IS students' mean totaled 7.64 and the standard deviation was 1.923. Therefore, the difference between the mean before and after reading the anti-AIDS article came to 0.03%.

Figures 19 and 20 illustrate that there was almost no change in the overall mean and standard deviation before and after reading the anti-AIDS article. The most frequently chosen answers for this question were answers 7 through 10. Of the 85 participants, 83% were convinced that the U.S. providing foreign aid was a very important issue prior to reading the anti-AIDS article. The remaining 17% of Rhodes IS students did not

believe that this was that important of an issue prior to reading the article. After reading the article, the number of students who believed that the U.S. providing aid to foreign countries was an important issue only slightly dropped to 80%. Approximately 19% of Rhodes IS students believed this issue was not as important after reading the article. These results show that there was only a tiny increase in the number of students who believed that the issue of the U.S. providing aid to foreign countries was not important after reading the article. In addition, this data illustrates that although there was a small drop in the number of Rhodes IS students who consider this to be an important issue, there was not an overall significant change in Rhodes IS students' opinions regarding this issue after reading the anti-AIDS article.

[Insert Figures 21 & 22 Here]

The overall mean of Rhodes IS students who read the pro-AIDS article was 7.32 and the standard deviation was 2.126. The overall mean after reading the article was 7.52 and the standard deviation was 2.308. The difference between the mean before and after reading the pro-AIDS article was - .20. Figure 19 shows that close to 78% of the Rhodes IS students chose answers 7 through 10, meaning this percent of students considered the issue of U.S. foreign aid important prior to reading the pro-AIDS article. The remaining 22% of respondents were not as concerned with the issue of U.S. foreign aid. Figure 20 demonstrates that

after reading the article, 83% of Rhodes IS students considered this to be an important issue. The remaining 17% of students did not consider this to be an issue of importance. These results show that there was a very slight increase in the overall mean after reading the article and a 5% increase in the number of students who believed that the U.S. providing aid to foreign countries an important issue. In addition, the number of students who believed this was not an important issue increased by 5% after reading the pro-AIDS article.

These results reveal that despite the persuasive messages exhibited in the articles, Rhodes students' opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid were not significantly affected by media priming. There was no significant change in the opinions of Rhodes IS students who read the anti-AIDS article regarding U.S. foreign aid. Similarly, the results did not reveal any noteworthy change in the opinions of Rhodes IS students regarding U.S. foreign aid who read the pro-AIDS article either. These findings are surprising because one would expect the students' opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid to change after being exposed to media priming, as was demonstrated through several other questions supporting Priming Theory. However, I speculate that because so many students firmly believed this issue to be one of importance prior to reading the articles, there was not much chance that their opinions would be affected. In addition, I

speculate that because this question asked about students' beliefs regarding the importance of U.S. foreign aid in general, rather than about the importance of U.S. foreign aid to Africa, priming did not cause as significant of an affect as one might find if the question where phrased differently. The results show that despite attempts made to influence Rhodes students' opinions regarding the importance of U.S. foreign aid, no serious affect was made.

On the one hand, these findings support the hypothesis that Rhodes students' opinions are not affected by media priming because they are unconcerned with international affairs. This may be true because no serious change occurred among Rhodes students' opinions regarding the importance of U.S. foreign aid. However, the fact that the majority of students who answered this question listed the issue of the U.S. providing aid to foreign countries as one of importance disproves this hypothesis because it shows that the majority of Rhodes IS students are concerned with international affairs. As mentioned, one reason why the students' opinions did not change could be because they were already so convinced of this issue's importance that their positive attitudes regarding U.S. foreign aid did not have much room to improve. Due to the fact that it is quite difficult to pinpoint why Rhodes IS students' opinions did not change, this question does not successfully support the hypotheses of the Mood Theory.

In conclusion, the results from these

questions demonstrate that Rhodes IS students are very much interested in international affairs. However, the findings also show that Rhodes IS students on the whole are more interested in domestic than international affairs. The data illustrates that more Rhodes IS students identify with their nation or fellow U.S. citizen than with the world, or their fellow man. This shows that although Rhodes IS students think domestically, they are still concerned with affairs involving other nations. Furthermore, most Rhodes IS students do not have permissive moods that allow them to accept U.S. foreign policies with which they disagree. Again, this shows that Rhodes IS students are not solely interested in domestic affairs because they are willing to take action in international matters concerning the United States. All in all, these findings disprove the hypothesis based on the Mood Theory that Rhodes IS students are not affected by media priming because they are unconcerned about international affairs.

Data:Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory maintains that individuals behave out of self-interest. Each relationship maintained by individuals is expected to be one of reciprocity. According to Moss, for example, America maintains relations with Africa in order to democratize its countries and thereby to increase the U.S. national security. Based on Rational Choice Theory, one would expect to find

that Rhodes students who read the pro-AIDS article support increases in U.S. foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention because it is in the best interest of the United States. Similarly, one would expect that reading anti-AIDS articles leads Rhodes students to oppose increases in U.S. foreign aid to AIDS-stricken African countries because it is not in the best interest of America. Therefore, using various questions I will attempt to show that Rhodes students' will adopt the positions presented in the anti and pro-AIDS articles towards U.S. international affairs because they believe that those stances are in the best interest of the United States.

[Insert Figure 23 Here]

Question 8: Diplomacy

Participants were asked one question in the pre-article survey in order to determine if Rhodes IS students' beliefs coincide with those presented in the Rational Choice Theory. The question asked Rhodes IS students if they agreed that unless the U.S. gains from diplomatic relations with another country, it should not interact with that country. Five answer choices were incorporated in the question, including strongly agree, agree, don't know, disagree, and strongly disagree. Figure 23 demonstrates that close to 60% of respondents disagreed with the statement that unless the United States gains from diplomatic relations with another

country, it should not interact with that country; approximately 17% strongly disagreed; close to 12% agreed; and about 9% of Rhodes IS students were unsure. This data provides a good idea of how Rhodes IS students believe the United States should conduct international relations.

[Insert Figures 24 & 25 Here]

Question 9: Spread of AIDS

A second question was asked of Rhodes IS students in both surveys to determine whether their fear of contracting AIDS had any affect on their opinion regarding the supply of U.S. foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention. The question asked students if they agreed that because AIDS may continue to spread to the U.S., it is in Americans' best interest to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS. The question provided five answer choices, including strongly agree, agree, don't know, disagree, and strongly disagree. The overall mean before reading any articles was 2.5 and the overall mean after reading the pro and anti-AIDS articles was 2.4. Figures 24 and 25 show that after reading the AIDS-related articles, the amount of individuals who strongly agreed with this idea increased about 3% after exposure to media priming; those who agreed decreased by 3%; and the number that were unsure about this issue increased by 1%. These figures also show that the amount of individuals that disagreed increased by 1% and the number of Rhodes IS students that strongly disagreed with

the idea of the United States increasing its foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention because of fear that the epidemic will spread further to the U.S. increased by 1%.

[Insert Figures 26 & 27 Here]

The mean prior to reading the anti-AIDS article was 2.44 and the mean after reading the article was 2.58. The difference between the means after reading the article came to -0.14. Figures 26 and 27 show that after reading the article, there was a 5% decrease in the number of students who strongly agreed that because AIDS may continue to spread to the U.S., it is in Americans' best interest to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS; a 6% decrease in the number of students who agreed; a 7% increase in the number of students who weren't sure; about a 7% increase in the number of students who disagreed; and about a 4% decrease in the number of students who strongly disagreed.

The anti-AIDS article attempted to convince students that it is not in the best interest of the United States to increase foreign aid spending on AIDS prevention in Africa. According to Rational Choice Theory, it hypothesizes that more students who read the anti-AIDS article would disagree with the idea of increasing foreign aid to Africa because they were convinced it was not in the U.S.'s best interest. The results showed that more students did disagree with this idea, but the number of students who

strongly disagreed with the idea decreased. In addition, after reading the anti-AIDS article, less students agreed and strongly agreed that the U.S. should invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because it was in the U.S.'s best interest. More students were unsure if the U.S. should invest money in Africa for AIDS prevention.

These results demonstrate that after reading the anti-AIDS article, Rhodes IS students did not agree that because AIDS may continue to spread to the U.S., it is in the best interest of the United States to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS. One could speculate that after reading the anti-AIDS article, Rhodes IS students were convinced that any investment in Africa was not worthwhile for the United States. In addition, one could infer that Rhodes IS students were not thoroughly convinced that the epidemic is going to continue to spread to the United States. Therefore, due to these priming effects, these results prove the hypothesis that Rhodes IS students who read the anti-AIDS article oppose increases in U.S. foreign aid to Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because they believe this is not in the United States' best interest.

[Insert Figures 28 & 29 Here]

The mean prior to reading the pro-AIDS article was 2.51 and the mean after reading the pro-AIDS article was 2.37. The difference between the means after reading the article was

0.14. After reading the pro-AIDS article, the number of students who strongly agreed with the statement that the U.S. should invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because it is in the U.S.' best interest increased by 7%; the number of students who agreed decreased 2%; the amount of students who were not sure decreased 2%; the percent of students who disagreed decreased 2%; and the number of students who strongly disagreed did not change.

The pro-AIDS article attempted to persuade Rhodes IS students that it was in the United States' best interest to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because the epidemic may continue to spread to the U.S. Based on the Rational Choice Theory, it was hypothesized that after reading the pro-AIDS article, more Rhodes IS students would support the decision to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because they believed it was in the best interest of the U.S. The findings revealed that more students strongly agreed with this decision, but the number of students who simply agreed decreased slightly after reading the article. Fewer Rhodes IS students disagreed with the idea of investing money in Africa after reading the article as well. The number of students who strongly disagreed with the idea of investing money in Africa stayed the same and the amount of students who were unsure about the issue decreased.

The students who read the pro-AIDS article supported U.S. investments in Africa to prevent

the spread of AIDS. In order to sway Rhodes IS students' opinions, the pro-AIDS article included information about the benefits of investing money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS. Based on this information and the potential fact that after reading the article, Rhodes IS students' awareness about and fear of AIDS increased, one could speculate that the students believed that investing in Africa was in the best interest of the United States. However, the miniscule changes in Rhodes students' opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid to Africa after reading this article showed that priming was not very effective in this case. Although there was a decrease in the number of students who disagreed and an increase in the number of students who strongly agreed with the decision to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS, Rational Choice Theory was not strongly supported through these results.

Rational Choice Theory claims that Americans' decisions are based on self-interest. Based on this theory, Rhodes IS students who read the anti-AIDS article should have opposed investing money in Africa because they were primed to believe that this was not in the United States' best interest. Students who read the pro-AIDS article, on the other hand, should have supported investments in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because they were primed to believe that this decision was in the U.S.'s best interest. The results prove that students who read the anti-AIDS article opposed the idea of investing

money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because they believe this was not in the U.S.'s bet interest. The findings also prove that students who read the pro-AIDS article agreed with the idea of investing money in Africa because it is in the U.S.'s best interest. However, the small amount of students who actually changed their opinions in support of investing money in Africa after reading the pro-AIDS article was so small that it is hard to establish the validity of Rational Choice Theory for this part of the question.

[Insert Figures 30 & 31 Here]

Question 10: Involvement in Africa

Another question was asked of Rhodes IS Students in both surveys to determine if they believed the U.S. should conduct its diplomatic relations based on self-interest. The question asked if Rhodes IS students agreed with the United States' decision to not become involved in many African conflicts because most African countries are not economically and diplomatically useful to the U.S. Again, five answer choices were given, including strongly agree, agree, don't know, disagree, and strongly disagree. The overall mean for this question was 3.57 and the overall standard deviation was 1.

Figure 30 shows that the mean prior to reading the anti-AIDS article was 3.27 and the mean after reading the article was 3.2. The data presented in this graph shows that before reading

the anti-AIDS article, close to 40% of Rhodes IS students disagreed; about 35% were unsure of their beliefs; almost 15% agreed; and about 4% of participants strongly agreed and strongly disagreed with the United States' decision to not become involved in African conflicts. Figure 31 shows that after reading the anti-AIDS article, exactly 34% of Rhodes IS students agreed and disagreed with this decision, while 22% were unsure and 10% strongly disagreed with the U.S.'s decision to not involve itself in African conflicts.

The results show that after reading the anti-AIDS article, the proportion of Rhodes IS students who disagreed with the U.S.'s decision dropped by 6% and the proportion of students who were not sure about their position on the issue also decreased by about 13%. The number of students who agreed with the U.S.'s decision, however, increased from 15% prior to reading the article to 34% after reading the anti-AIDS article. The percent of Rhodes IS students who strongly agreed with the U.S.'s decision decreased from 4% to 0% after the students read the article. In addition, the number of students who strongly disagreed with the U.S.'s decision to not become involved in African conflicts increased by 6% after reading the article.

These findings demonstrate that after reading the anti-AIDS article, more students strongly disagreed with the U.S.'s decision and less individuals simply disagreed with the U.S.'s decision to stay out of African conflicts. Also, the

number of students who strongly agreed with the U.S.'s foreign policy on this issue decreased while the number of individuals who simply agreed that this was the best policy increased dramatically by more than 15% after reading the anti-AIDS article. In addition, a greater number of students established their views on the issue of U.S. involvement in African conflicts after reading the anti-AIDS article.

The most significant aspect of these results is the fact that after reading the anti-AIDS article, 15% of Rhodes IS students changed their opinions in support of the U.S.'s decision to stay out of African conflicts because most African countries are not economically and diplomatically useful to the U.S. The anti-AIDS article attempted to persuade Rhodes IS students that any involvement in Africa was not in the United States' best interest. Therefore, this finding is to be expected due to the negative priming Rhodes IS students were exposed to through the anti-AIDS article should have affected these individuals' attitudes about U.S. involvement in AIDS-stricken Africa. I speculate that exposure to information about how the epidemic has and will continue to destroy the economies, political systems, infrastructures, health systems, and other aspects of African countries pessimistically altered Rhodes IS students' perceptions of African countries. Due to this information, Rhodes IS students probably adopted views of these African countries as economically and diplomatically useless to the

United States. As a result, I infer that Rhodes IS students increased their beliefs that the U.S. should not become involved in African conflicts because African countries are diplomatically and economically useless to the United States. These findings prove the hypothesis that after reading the anti-AIDS article, Rhodes students' adopted the opinions presented in the anti-AIDS article. As a result, more Rhodes IS students changed their opinions in support of the United States' decision to stay out of Africa because of its economic and diplomatic uselessness.

[Insert Figures 32 & 33 Here]

The Rhodes IS students' mean prior to reading the pro-AIDS article was 3.74 and the mean after reading the article was 3.56, making the difference between these two means 0.18. Figure 32 shows that before reading the article, close to 46% of students disagreed; about 23% strongly disagreed; almost 19% agreed; and about 12% were unsure about their stance on the issue of U.S. involvement in African conflicts. Figure 33 demonstrates that after reading the pro-AIDS article, about 47% of students disagreed; close to 23% agreed; almost 19% strongly disagreed; about 9% were unsure; and approximately 2% strongly agreed with the U.S.'s decision to remain out of African conflicts.

These results show that there was only a 1% increase in the number of students who disagreed with the U.S.'s decision after reading the

pro-AIDS article and about a 4% decrease in the number of students who strongly disagreed with the United States' actions. Also, there was about a 4% increase in the number of students who agreed with the U.S.'s decision, about a 3% decrease in the percent of Rhodes IS students who were unsure of their stance on the issue, and an increase from 0% to 2% of students who strongly agreed with the United States' decision to remain out of African conflicts.

According to these results, there were only a few more students who disagreed with the U.S.'s decision after reading the pro-AIDS article than there were before reading the article. There were fewer students who strongly disagreed with the United States' decision after reading the article as well. More students agreed with the United States' decision after reading the article and more students strongly agreed with this decision. In addition, less students were unsure of their position on this issue after reading the pro-AIDS article.

These findings are surprising because one would expect to find Rhodes IS students who read the pro-AIDS article opposed to U.S. decisions to stay out of African conflicts because of the lacking economic and diplomatic usefulness of African countries to the United States. After reading an article in support of increasing U.S. foreign aid to Africa, one would expect individuals exposed to this priming to adopt similar views on the issue. Instead, more Rhodes IS students agreed with the

U.S.'s decision to remain uninvolved in African conflicts because of the Africa's weak economic and diplomatic value to the U.S. after reading the pro-AIDS article. I speculate that after being exposed to so much information about Africa's bleak condition, students gathered that despite the encouraging messages received through their articles, Africa is realistically an economic and diplomatic drain on the United States. Therefore, results gathered from students who read the pro-AIDS article disproves the hypothesis that Rhodes IS students adopt the opinions and attitudes presented by AIDS-related articles on the United States' international relations.

Rational Choice Theory assumes that individuals calculate the benefits of each action made, and make their choice based on that which benefits them the most. The first question discussed in this section proved that over 3/4 of Rhodes IS students do not believe that the U.S. should always conduct foreign affairs with its best interest in mind. This implies that most Rhodes IS students believe that the U.S. should, at least at times, engage itself in international affairs that do not benefit the U.S. The second question, however, showed that Rhodes IS students do believe the U.S. should behave out of self-interest. The results showed that after being convinced that it was not in the best interest of the United States to invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS, Rhodes IS students who read the anti-AIDS article adopted this attitude towards U.S. foreign

aid. In addition, after being primed to positive messages about U.S. foreign aid in Africa, Rhodes IS students who read the pro-AIDS article agreed that the U.S. should invest money in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS because it is in the best interest of the United States. The third question only partly supported Rational Choice Theory. The results showed that after being convinced that Africa was economically and diplomatically useless to the U.S., Rhodes IS students who read the anti-AIDS article opposed U.S. involvement in African countries because they believed it was not in the U.S.'s best interest. On the other hand, Rhodes IS students who read the pro-AIDS article did not adopt the attitude that the U.S. should become involved in African affairs, as presented in the article. Most likely this means that despite attempts to change Rhodes IS students' opinions, the pro-AIDS article did not effectively convince the students that it was in the U.S.'s best interest to involve itself in African affairs. Based on the unreliable results provided through these questions, Rational Choice Theory's hypothesis that Americans, or Rhodes IS students, act only out of self-interest can not be accepted.

One aspect that most likely skewed the data from this survey is the fact that participants were taken only from International Studies classes. Close to 40% of respondents were International Studies majors. As a result, Rhodes IS students who chose International Studies as their major may be more inclined to answer liberally in terms

of international issues concerning the U.S. As a result of their enrollment in an IS course, these individuals may be somewhat biased in favor of more liberal U.S. foreign policies. On the other hand, the students enrolled in these courses and majoring in IS do not necessarily have liberal ideas about U.S. foreign policies. The fact that all respondents involved in the survey are enrolled in an IS course and could be an IS major may be counterbalanced by the reality that Rhodes College is set in a southern, relatively conservative city and maintains a high population of politically conservative students.

Conclusion

The following gives a brief overview of the results for each theory. In Question 1 regarding Figures 8 through 11, Rhodes IS students' opinions about the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the United States were tested. I found that there are significant differences between the responses of Rhodes IS students before and after reading the AIDS-related articles. Students who read the anti-AIDS and pro-AIDS articles increased the importance of foreign aid to the welfare of the U.S. This indicates that priming did occur in that Rhodes IS students altered their opinions regarding the importance of foreign aid to the United States' welfare. Question 2 regarding Figures 12 through 15 demonstrated significant changes in Rhodes students opinions after reading AIDS-related article. Students who were in support of increasing foreign aid to African

countries to prevent the spread of AIDS changed their opinions in opposition to increasing this foreign aid after reading the anti-AIDS article. Students who were not in support of increasing foreign aid to Africa changed their opinion to support these increases after reading the pro-AIDS article. These results indicate that priming occurred and impacted the opinions of Rhodes IS students about whether the United States should increase the amount of foreign aid provided to African countries to prevent the spread of AIDS.

Consequently, these questions provide support for the hypothesis regarding the two groups of students who read either the anti-AIDS or pro-AIDS articles. Rhodes IS students who read the anti-AIDS article and the pro-AIDS article showed indications of having different responses before and after reading the articles. Therefore, these findings indicate that priming conducted in this experiment did serve to influence Rhodes IS students' opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid to AIDS-stricken African countries. Reading the anti-AIDS and pro-AIDS articles served to influence Rhodes students' opinions in several ways. The views of Rhodes IS students tended to lean towards those presented in the articles.

Question 3, concerning whether the U.S. should increase its foreign aid to African countries for AIDS prevention, revealed that after being exposed to priming, Rhodes IS students changed their opinions about U.S. foreign aid. The responses of Rhodes IS students to this priming

and the increase in their awareness and concern for the issue of U.S. foreign aid to African countries indicated that Rhodes IS students are interested in international affairs. Question 4 regarding Figure 16 revealed that a greater number of Rhodes IS students are concerned about domestic issues than they are about international issues. Question 5 regarding Figure 17 indicated that most Rhodes IS students label themselves as a 'U.S. citizen' rather than a 'member of the human race,' 'member of your home state,' member of the Rhodes College community,' or 'member of the Memphis, TN community'. Question 6 regarding Figure 18 revealed that 75% of Rhodes IS students are not willing to accept foreign policy decisions with which they disagree, while 25% of Rhodes IS students are willing to accept these policy decisions. Question 7 regarding Figures 19 through 22 tested Rhodes students' opinions about the importance of the U.S. providing aid to foreign countries. The results demonstrated no significant changes in Rhodes IS students' opinions about this issue after reading the anti-AIDS and pro-AIDS articles. This indicates that priming did not occur because Rhodes IS students' opinions were not significantly affected. The lack of significant change in Rhodes IS students' opinions after reading the anti-AIDS articles indicates the accuracy of Mood Theory. However, the fact that the majority of students listed the issue of the U.S. providing aid to foreign countries as one of importance disproves Mood Theory because it shows that the majority of Rhodes IS students are

concerned with international affairs. Questions 3 through 7 indicate that the Mood Theory is not applicable to Rhodes IS students' opinions about U.S. international affairs.

Question 8 corresponding with Figure 23 indicates that more than ¾ of Rhodes IS students do not agree and less than 15% do agree that unless the U.S. gains from diplomatic relations with another country, it should not interact with that country. Question 9 regarding Figures 24 through 29 indicated that there was a change in the opinions of Rhodes students regarding their agreement with the statement that because AIDS may continue to spread to the U.S., it is in the United States' best interest to invest in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS. Priming occurred because Rhodes IS students supported this statement before reading the anti-AIDS article and mostly rejected the statement after reading the anti-AIDS article. Evidence of priming was also shown through the change in Rhodes IS students' opinions who read the pro-AIDS article. These students changed their opinions after reading the article in support of investments in Africa to prevent the spread of AIDS. This question indicates the validity of Rational Choice Theory because the students adopted the stances presented in the articles they read which they believed to be in the U.S.'s best interest.

Question 10 regarding Figures 30 through 33 indicate that priming occurred through the changes in Rhodes IS students' opinions

concerning U.S. involvement in African conflicts based on Africa's diplomatic and economic usefulness to the U.S. One part of this question disproved and another part proved the validity of Rational Choice Theory. Therefore, Rational Choice Theory can not be used to explain Rhodes IS students' opinions regarding U.S. foreign aid.

In conclusion, the results suggest that priming occurred in this experiment as a result of Rhodes IS students' exposure to AIDS-related articles. The data collected from the administered surveys support the hypothesis that priming does affect Rhodes IS students' opinions towards U.S. foreign aid to Africa. However, the figures collected do not support the hypothesis based on the Mood Theory that Rhodes IS students' opinions are unaffected by priming because they are unconcerned with international affairs. In addition, the data collected does not support the hypothesis that Rhodes IS students' adopt the opinions presented to them through priming because they believe those positions are in the United States' best interest. In the future, I would like to conduct this experiment using students from classes not within the International Studies Department to determine if being in IS classes has any affect on students' opinions concerning U.S. foreign aid to Africa. Although today more people rely on the television to acquire their news than any other source, journal articles, magazines, newspapers, radio, the Internet, scholarly journals, and other sources have the potential to

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Figure 1: Urgent Helath Problems Facing the Nation

Percent Naming HIV/AIDS as the Most Urgent Health Problem Facing the Nation

68%
49%
44%
38%
26%
17%
21%

Oct-87   Jan-90   Nov-95   Sep-97   Aug-00   Jun-02   Mar-04

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation *Health Poll Report*

**Figure 2: U.S. Responsibility to Fight AIDS
in Developing Countries**

United States Responsibility to Fight AIDS in Developing Countries

Now, I'm going to read you two statements and ask whether you agree or disagree with each...

The United States is a global leader and has a responsibility to spend more money to help fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries

- Agree 53%
- Disagree 42%
- Don't know 5%

The United States should address problems at home first rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries

- Agree 71%
- Disagree 25%
- Don't know 4%

Which of these two statements do you agree with more strongly?...The U.S. should address problems at home first rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries. The United States is a global leader and has a responsibility to spend more money to help fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries.

- U.S. should address problems at home first 62%
- U.S. has responsibility to fight HIV/AIDS in developing countries 30%
- Disagree with both (vol.) 6%
- Don't know/Refused 2%

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation *Survey of Americans on HIV/AIDS* (conducted March 15 – May 11, 2004)

Figure 3: U.S. Public's Support for U.S. Spending to Fight AIDS Internationally

Support for U.S. Spending to Fight AIDS in Other Countries

May 2000

In general, do you favor or oppose the United States government spending money to help solve the problem of AIDS in **other countries**? Do you favor/oppose this strongly or somewhat?

- Strongly favor: 35%
- Somewhat favor: 25%
- Somewhat oppose: 16%
- Strongly oppose: 17%
- Don't know/refused: 7%

August 2000

In general, do you favor or oppose the United States government spending money to help solve the problem of AIDS in **sub-Saharan Africa**? Do you favor/oppose this strongly or somewhat?

- Strongly favor: 34%
- Somewhat favor: 31%
- Somewhat oppose: 17%
- Strongly oppose: 12%
- Don't know/refused: 5%

Figure 4: Government Spending on AIDS in Developing Countries

Amount of Government Spending on AIDS in Developing Countries

Next, thinking about U.S. spending on foreign aid to deal with the problem of HIV/AIDS in developing countries such as those in Africa, Asia, and Latin America... Do you think the U.S. is now spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on foreign aid to deal with the HIV/AIDS problem in developing countries?

	Too much	Right amount	Too little	Don't know / refused
July 2002	30%	27%	24%	20%
February 2003	37%	21%	20%	22%
March 2004	15%	34%	36%	15%

Thinking about U.S. spending on foreign aid... Do you think the U.S. is now spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on foreign aid to developing countries?

	Too much	Right amount	Too little	DK / refused
July 2002	54%	25%	12%	10%
February 2003	60%	21%	9%	11%
March 2004	62%	18%	10%	11%

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation *Health Poll Report*

**Figure 5: Priorities for U.S. Spending to
Fight AIDS in Africa**

Priorities for U.S. Spending to Fight AIDS in Africa

I'm going to name some different ways in which the U.S. government might provide financial help to fight AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Please tell me whether you favor or oppose each one. Would you favor or oppose the US government...

When forced to choose... Which ONE do you think should be the TOP priority?

Percent saying "favor"

Percent saying "top priority"

Spending money on AIDS prevention and education in Africa — 77% — 44%

Spending money on AIDS treatment and care in Africa — 75% — 27%

Reducing the amount of money these African countries owe to the US so they can use the money to deal with the problems of AIDS — 65% — 15%

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation *AIDS Survey* (conducted August 14-October 26, 2000)

Figure 6: Support for Doubling Spending on AIDS in Developing Countries

Support for Doubling Current Spending on AIDS in Developing Countries

As you may know, the United States currently spends about one billion dollars to combat AIDS in developing countries. Would you favor or oppose doubling this amount, or do you feel you don't know enough about this to say?

Don't know enough to say

59%

26%

14%

Oppose

Favor

Source: *Washington Post*/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health *HIV/AIDS In The US And The World Survey* (conducted June 13-June 23, 2002)

Figure 7: Will Spending More on AIDS in Africa Make a Difference?

Will Spending More on AIDS in Africa Make a Difference?

In general, do you think that spending more money **to fight AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa** will lead to meaningful progress, or that spending more money won't make much difference?

In general, do you think that spending more money **on HIV/AIDS prevention in Africa** will lead to meaningful progress, or that spending more money won't make much difference?

Don't know/refused
Depends (vol.)

Not much difference

Meaningful progress

8%
4%

33%

55%

May-04

6%
5%

48%

41%

Jul-02

Don't know/ refused

Not much difference

Meaningful progress

8%

40%

52%

Aug-00

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation *Health Poll Report*

**Figure 8: Responses to U.S. Welfare
Question Before Reading Anti-AIDS Article**

USwelfare

ARTICLE: 1   anti

USwelfare

USWEL2

ARTICLE: 1   anti

USWEL2

Figure 10: Responses to U.S. Welfare
Question Before Reading Pro-AIDS Article

USwelfare

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
USwelfare

USWEL2

ARTICLE: 2   pro

USWEL2

Figure 12: Responses to Increasing Foreign Aid Question Before Reading Anti-AIDS Article

INCREASE

ARTICLE: 1   anti

INCREASE

INCREA2

ARTICLE: 1   anti

INCREA2

Figure 14: Responses to Increasing Foreign Aid Question Before Reading Pro-AIDS Article

INCREASE

ARTICLE: 2   pro

INCREASE

INCREA2

ARTICLE: 2   pro

INCREA2

Figure 16: Importance of Domestic vs. International Issues

ISSUES

ISSUES

VALID		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Domestic	41	48.2	48.2	48.2
	International	34	40.0	40.0	88.2
	Don't Know	10	11.8	11.8	100.0
	Total	85	100.0	100.0	

Figure 17: Self-proclaimed Identity

LABEL

LABEL

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Human Race	16	18.8	18.8	18.8
U.S. Citizen	39	45.9	45.9	64.7
Home State	17	20.0	20.0	84.7
Memphis	1	1.2	1.2	85.9
Rhodes College	6	7.1	7.1	92.9
Other	6	7.1	7.1	100..0
Total	85	100.0	100.0	

235

Figure 18: Rhodes Students' Inclinations to Accept Foreign Policies

POLICIES

POLICIES

Valid	frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	1	1.2	1.5	1.5
2	5	5.9	7.5	9.0
3	9	10.6	13.4	22.4
4	14	16.5	20.9	43.3
5	18	21.2	26.9	70.1
6	7	8.2	10.4	80.6
7	7	8.2	10.4	91.0
8	6	7.1	9.0	100.0
Total	67	78.8	100.0	
Missing System	18	21.2		
Total	85	100.0		

236

Figure 19: Responses to Importance of U.S. Foreign Aid Question Before Reading Anti-AIDS Article

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
2	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
4	1	2.4	2.4	4.8
5	1	2.4	2.4	7.2
6	4	9.5	9.5	16.6
7	11	26.2	26.2	42.9
8	11	26.2	26.2	69.0
9	8	19.0	19.0	88.1
10	5	11.9	11.9	100.0
Total	42	100.0	100.0	

Importance

ARTICLE: 1   anti

Importance

Figure 20: Responses to Importance of U.S. Foreign Aid Question After Reading Anti-AIDS Article

IMPORT2

ARTICLE: 1   anti

IMPORT2

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
3	3	7.1	7.1	7.1
4	2	4.8	4.8	11.9
6	3	7.1	7.1	19.0
7	6	14.3	14.3	33.0
8	14	33.3	33.3	66.7
9	8	19.0	19.0	85.7
10	6	14.3	14.3	100.0
Total	42	100.0	100.0	

238

Figure 21: Responses to Importance of U.S. Foreign Aid Question Before Reading Pro-AIDS Article

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	2	4.7	4.9	4.9
4	2	4.7	4.9	9.8
5	3	7.0	7.3	17.1
6	2	4.7	4.9	22.0
7	9	20.9	22.0	43.9
8	12	27.9	29.3	73.2
9	6	14.0	14.6	87.8
10	5	11.6	12.2	100.0
Total	41	95.3	100.0	
Missing System	2	4.7		
Total	43	100.0		

Importance

ARTICLE: 2   pro

Importance

IMPORT2

ARTICLE: 2   pro

IMPORT2

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	1	2.3	2.4	2.4
2	2	4.7	4.8	7.1
3	1	2.3	2.4	9.5
4	2	4.7	4.8	14.3
6	1	2.3	2.4	16.7
7	8	18.6	19.0	35.7
8	13	30.2	31.0	66.7
9	6	14.0	14.3	81.0
10	8	18.6	19.0	100.0
Total	42	97.7	100.0	
Missing System	1	2.3		
Total	43	100.0		

240

Figure 23: Rhodes Students' Positions on Rules of Engagement

Diplomacy

Diplomacy

SPREAD

SPREAD

Figure 25: Rhodes IS students' Opinions about Investing Money to Prevent the Spread of AIDS to the U.S. After Reading AIDS-Related Articles
**Rhodes Students' Opinions about Investing Money to Prevent the**

SPREAD2

SPREAD2

SPREAD

ARTICLE: 1   anti

SPREAD

Figure 27: Rhodes Students' Opinions about Investing Money to Prevent the Spread of AIDS to the U.S. After Reading Anti-AIDS Article

SPREAD2

ARTICLE:　　1　anti

SPREAD2

Figure 28: Rhodes Students' Opinions about Investing Money to Prevent the Spread of AIDS to the U.S. Prior to Reading the Pro-AIDS Article

SPREAD

ARTICLE:　　2　pro

SPREAD

Figure 29: Rhodes Students' Opinions about Investing Money to Prevent the Spread of AIDS to the U.S. After Reading the Pro-AIDS Article

SPREAD2

SPREAD2

Figure 30: Rhodes Students' Position on U.S. Involvement in African Conflicts Prior to Reading the Anti-AIDS Article

Uninvolved


Uninvolved

Figure 31: Rhodes Students' Position on U.S. Involvement in African Conflicts Prior to Reading the Anti-AIDS Article

UNINV2

ARTICLE: 1   anti

UNINV2

Figure 32: Rhodes Students' Position on U.S. Involvement in African Conflicts Prior to Reading the Pro-AIDS Article

Uninvolved

ARTICLE: 2   pro

Uninvolved

UNINV2

ARTICLE: 2   pro

UNINV2