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Letter from the Editors

Although its literal translation from Latin is "way of life," in international relations parlance, *Modus Vivendi* signifies "a state of affairs where two opposing parties agree to differ." In a similar spirit of fostering intelligent discussion, *Modus Vivendi* attempts to provide a forum for diverse viewpoints on a variety of issues pertinent to the field of international studies. One of the few undergraduate journals of international relations, *Modus Vivendi* is published by the International Studies Department at Rhodes College, in conjunction with the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho.

This issue of *Modus Vivendi* includes four articles, representing a variety of theoretical and public policy issues. Brendan Keegan opens the journal with a discussion of the historical motivations for the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, incorporating analysis from the perspective of three international relations paradigms. Rob Phelps delves into a very current issue with an examination of the factors contributing to Coalition troop deaths in Iraq. Andy Roads analyzes the effects of HIV/AIDS on women's rights in Swaziland. Finally, Valisa Berber-Thayer looks at a burgeoning field in her comparison of the impact of ecotourism versus traditional tourism on development.

Modus Vivendi is the product of enormous efforts on the behalf of many people. The editors would like to thank the associate editors for all of their hard work; their efforts were essential to the completion of the journal. The editors would also like to extend their gratitude to the faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department. Without their outstanding talents, teaching abilities, and tutelage, this journal would not exist. Additionally, special thanks must be given to Kim Stevenson and the faculty advisor to Sigma Iota Rho, Professor Shadrack Nasong'o for their constant support and encouragement. Also, thanks to the Modern Languages Department for sharing their photo contest winners with us, as well as Lynn Conlee and John McGeoch for their help with graphics and layout.

Heather Houser and Valisa Berber-Thayer
Editors of *Modus Vivendi*





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Explaining the U.S. Invasion of Panama

Brendan Keegan
Philosophy Major, Class of 2010

The U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 is unique among U.S. interventions during the Cold War period both because of the heavy-handed use of force against the Panamanians as well as because of the justification for the mission. Beginning on December 20, the invasion involved 24,000 U.S. military personnel employing "airborne transport, fighters, tanks, mortars, and light armored vehicles" (Conniff, 1992: 164), as well as the newly developed F-117 Stealth Bomber. The following day, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed that the invasion was necessary in order "to protect U.S. citizens, to bring democracy back to Panama, to stop the illegal flow of drugs through Panama, and to defend the Panama Canal" (Sanchez, 2008: 171). This marked the first time since World War II that communism was not a stated reason for a U.S. intervention. The President's claims, however, have been the cause of much dispute in the years since as they provide an explanation of U.S. actions that does not satisfy the curiosities and criticisms of some of the major paradigms in international theory. As a result, the invasion is like any other international conflict in that no single interpretation can satisfy all the questions or criticisms regarding the motives and actions of those involved.

This paper will focus on the different explanatory strengths of liberalism, realism, and constructivism to shed light on the event. Examining the invasion through the liberal focus on the influence of domestic politics and individual decision makers, realist considerations of power and security, and constructivist concerns about identities and relationships will help to develop an explanation that is both deep and broad. Further, by viewing the invasion through liberal, realist, and constructivist perspectives, this paper

will provide an argument for why strict adherence to a single paradigm's principles is ultimately less helpful in understanding international relations than are explanations that draw from the concurrent application of several theories. Consequently, through the careful examination of the U.S. invasion of Panama, liberalism, realism, and constructivism will ultimately be seen as interlocking pieces of the same puzzle, as the U.S. invasion will be proven to not be easily explainable by a single factor or perspective.

The Invasion

Though the U.S. invasion of Panama caught many people by surprise, it was preceded by a deteriorating relationship between the two countries and was the result of months of prior planning. While the Panamanian leader, General Manuel Noriega, had been a close and trusted ally of the United States for the better part of twenty years, the U.S. claimed that his persistent repression of democracy during his 1983-1989 military rule was unacceptable. In response to Noriega's refutation of the democratic process, exemplified by his stealing of the 1984 democratic elections and the brutal put down of an opposition movement three years later, in 1987 the United States "eliminated Panama's sugar quota and closed the [Agency for International Development] offices" (Conniff, 1992: 157). The following February, relations between the two countries deteriorated even further when Noriega was indicted for drug trafficking by U.S. domestic courts. Then, in April 1988, when Noriega still refused to step down from power the U.S. "cut off Panama Canal payments, suspended trade preferences, held up international bank transfers, barred U.S. companies in Panama from paying local taxes, and created a cash-flow crisis by stopping shipments of dollars" (Conniff, 1992: 159), all of which were intended to increase anti-Noriega sentiment among the military and foster the emergence of a coup. When the hoped-for coup finally emerged, only to be quickly routed in October 1989, the United States

began planning military action to topple Noriega and his loyal Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) that resiliently held onto power (Conniff, 1992: 161).

Though U.S. preparations for the invasion were ongoing for at least two months before the final decision was made, the apparent justification for the conflict came on December 16, 1989. That evening, U.S. Lieutenant Roberto Paz was shot and killed after he and a group of U.S. soldiers failed to stop at a PDF roadblock close to the PDF headquarters (Sanchez, 2008: 170). While the U.S. and Panama disputed the nature of his death, with the U.S. claiming he was shot trying to escape a mob attack and Panama arguing the U.S. soldiers were armed and had intentionally provoked the PDF guardsmen by running the barricade, this event triggered the beginning of the conflict. During the next two days the United States built up its forces. Over 14,000 servicemen were flown into the U.S. administered Canal Zone, a five mile wide territory on either side of the canal that extended the entire width of Panama and was home to fourteen U.S. military bases, including the U.S. Southern Command (Poland, 2003: 109). Upon joining the approximately 10,000 servicemen already stationed in the Canal Zone, the 24,000 strong combined force began "Operation Just Cause" at 1:00 AM on December 20, 1989, targeting PDF units at their "headquarters in Panama City, the Rio Hato base, and Tocumen airport" (Conniff, 1992: 164). General Noriega, surprised by the swiftness of the U.S. attack, evaded the subsequent U.S. manhunt by hiding in the Papal nunciature where he eventually surrendered on January 3, 1990, some thirteen days after the invasion began (Donnelly, 1991: 365).

While the majority of the conflict was over within a week, the results were long lasting. As a result of the intense street-to-street fighting between U.S. and PDF forces as well as U.S. bombing sorties made against PDF targets closely located to heavily populated neighborhoods, an "estimated 300 Panamanian soldiers died" (Molineu, 1990: 248), along with 23 U.S. servicemen, while civilian death approximations range from several

hundred up to a thousand. Part of the uncertainty about the final cost of the war is because "a register of Panamanians killed during the invasion has never been published, even in Latin America" (Poland, 2003: 119). The number of displaced Panamanians whose homes were either destroyed or severely damaged rose towards eighteen thousand; five thousand more were held in U.S. prison camps (Poland, 2003: 118). The conflict damaged the Panamanian economy as well. Panamanian businessmen reported losing "as much as $700 million because of the looting and rioting that followed" (Blum, 2004: 313). Meanwhile, the "damage, looting, and the U.S. sanctions of 1988-89 had shrunk Panama's economy by 30 percent" (Blum, 2004: 313), which contributed to a difficult reconstruction period during which unemployment rose to more than twenty-five percent by 1990.

Liberalism

As acknowledged in the introduction, the reasons claimed for the U.S. invasion, the buildup to the conflict and the conflict itself can be interpreted in many ways, of which liberalism is one. In general, liberalism is concerned with domestic considerations and holds that, though the key actors in the international system are nation-states, "corporations, organizations, and associations of all kinds" are also important (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 126). Also important are how these domestic moods and pressures influence the decisions of state leaders. Consequently, liberals argue that leaders of nation-states make decisions based on considerations of domestic undercurrents. Seen through this lens, liberals would argue that any attempt to explain the U.S. invasion of Panama must take into account individual-level factors including the backgrounds, personalities, and domestic considerations of the leaders in power at the time: General Manuel Noriega and President George H. W. Bush.

The long, bittersweet relationship between Manuel Noriega and the

United States began in the mid-1950s when he was recruited as an informant. In 1967 he began taking courses in intelligence and counterintelligence at the School of the Americas as well as trained for psychological warfare at Fort Benning (located in Columbus, Georgia, U.S.A.) (Poland, 2003: 110). Through these programs, Noriega established connections with representatives of Latin American intelligence agencies and became even further entrenched in the U.S. intelligence community. By 1968, Noriega had risen to the rank of Lieutenant in the Panama National Guard (though he remained on the CIA payroll as an informant) (Conniff, 1992: 149) and was promoted to Chief of Intelligence in 1970 (Poland, 2003: 110).

During his gradual rise to power, Noriega used connections with Central American military and intelligence agencies to become involved in the inter-American drug trade. In 1972 he was briefly considered for assassination when the CIA discovered his growing role in drug trafficking, but his value to the United States as a strong man capable of promoting U.S. interests in the region outweighed objections to his illicit activities (Blum, 2004: 306). His importance to broader U.S. goals for the region only increased when the Panamanian military strongman Omar Torrijo was killed in an unexplained plane crash in 1981. With the Panamanian National Guard exercising considerable control over the political establishment of Panama, the two years following the crash were marked by a series of resignations. In 1983 though, Noriega became the de-facto military ruler of Panama, a position that he would hold until his forced deposal in 1989 (Conniff, 1992: 152). It was during this time period especially that Noriega's "gunrunning, money laundering, and drug smuggling were tolerated by the United States...because of the other services he performed" (Conniff, 1992: 152), which included providing the U.S.-sponsored Contras with equipment and money for their war in Nicaragua. This relationship provided the United States with a means to continue its Central American

military operations while it also furthered Noriega's involvement in transiting drugs as he began "airlifting arms and supplies to the Contras and moving cocaine up and down Central America" (Conniff, 1992: 151).

Unfortunately for Noriega, his privileged status with the U.S. did not last. While he proved to be a capable, if not completely clean, ally of the United States in Central America, his increasingly oppressive military dictatorship and high-profile narcotics reputation had strong and adverse effects on his public image in the United States. Particularly during the late 1980's, growing criticism of Noriega's lack of concern for human rights and his perceived responsibility for the rising levels of U.S. drug trafficking caused him to go from a valuable military asset to a political stain. The alienation of Noriega in U.S. domestic society was finalized in 1988 when grand juries in both Miami and Tampa indicted Noriega on charges of drug trafficking (Poland, 2003: 111). As a result of these public indictments and his reputation with many U.S. citizens as being a ruthless dictator and drug-running criminal, association with Noriega became increasingly poisonous in Washington political circles.

This reversal of Noriega's political and domestic appeal in the United States can in part be attributed to domestic pressures behind the political ascendancy of George H.W. Bush. The relationship between Bush and Noriega is long and complex: Noriega's role in the drug trade and as a CIA informant spanned Bush's stint as director of the CIA (1976-1977) and as Vice President for the Reagan administration (1981-1988). Though during his 1988 presidential campaign Bush claimed that "he knew of no clear evidence that the Panamanian leader was involved in drugs until [Noriega's] indictment" (Blum, 2004: 308), he did admit to meeting Noriega as Director of the CIA in 1976. Complicating their relationship was the evidence showing that the CIA had known and tolerated Noriega's drug trade activities since he was first marked in 1972, information shared with President Reagan and Vice President

George Bush during their time in the White House (Blum, 2004: 308).

As a result, from the domestic perspective, Noriega's mark fell hardest on Bush when he began his 1988 run for the presidency. The criminalization of a one-time political ally reflected poorly on Bush, who was criticized for having tolerated and worked with the drug-running Noriega while he and President Reagan passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 (Poland, 2003: 112). Because of the increasingly heated anti-drug sentiment shown by the general population, Bush's policy choices regarding Noriega were limited as, in the words of Linda Robinson, "the Government could not afford to be seen as coddling a dictator-druglord" especially "after its own courts called for his prosecution" (Gilboa, 1995-96: 547). Bush's toleration of Noriega's role in the drug trade, which made him appear unable (or worse, unwilling) to overthrow the renowned criminal, also contributed to domestic criticism of Bush's perceived fear to make a decision. This so-called "wimp factor" weighed heavily on Bush in October 1989 when Noriega brutally crushed the military coup that had been implicitly supported by the United States. In the aftermath of the coup, the mass media and Congressional leaders intensified their criticisms, hammering the President for not providing more assistance to the Panamanians and removing Noriega when he had the chance (Conniff, 1992: 162).

Following Noriega's change in fortune and the gathering pressure on Bush from his domestic political base, liberals would argue that the President had little choice but to take military action against Noriega. In the aftermath of the failed economic and political sanctions, further toleration of Noriega would have weakened Bush's reputation and turned the media, the population, and his own government against him, as well as reinforced criticism concerning his weaknesses as an international policy maker. Consequently, the domestic pressures calling for Bush to act and the criticism he drew for failing to act offered Bush few choices

that would appease the U.S. population other than the direct removal of Noriega. In this regard, according to a liberal interpretation of the event, Noriega suffered the same fate as past U.S. allies such as Ngo Dinh Diem in pre-war Vietnam, as both were too good at being dictators, too regardless of human rights and democracy, and ultimately too politically embarrassing to be associated with the United States, despite their talents at fulfilling U.S. desires. The imperative for Noriega's removal then was not because of his faults, which had been both acknowledged and accepted by the United States, but because of the pressure Noriega's faults put on Bush to address the increasing public outcry for action. Consequently, liberals would assert that the *domestic* pressures asserted by the general population pushed for the President to stop Noriega's drug-running and human rights abuses; *political* pressures pushed the President to renounce his past association with Noriega; and *personal* pressures pushed the President to once and for all refute the so-called "wimp factor."

However, these reasons do not provide entirely satisfactory explanations for why President Bush ordered such an overt, fully-fledged invasion to bring Noriega down. Relative to many past U.S. involvements in Latin America that followed the form of the "Guatemala Solution," using secretive, discreet, covert operations to bring about desired changes, the heavy-handed use of force in invading Panama, and even the invasion itself, seems puzzling. Despite the fact that the indirect methods of removing Noriega had been tried to no avail, and that Bush presumably wanted to make a name as a respectable international leader, the U.S. invasion of Panama, which was condemned by almost the entirety of the international community, does not seem like the best choice for earning a positive name or removing an unpopular dictator. Furthermore, as the invasion cost millions of dollars to enact, put the lives of thousands of U.S. troops in danger, and then committed troops to stay for months during the reconstruction period, it appeared to be

more a show of hard power capabilities than merely a means to removing an unpopular government. As a result, domestic pressures and the political differences between Noriega and Bush may have made action against Panama necessary. Yet, these pressures and differences, as captured so well by the liberal paradigm, cannot explain the extent and measure of the invasion itself. Consequently, it is imperative to continue pursuing the exploration of the conflict through other perspectives. Fortunately, realist interpretations of the invasion are helpful in picking up where liberalism is lacking.

Realism

While liberalism focuses on the power of domestic institutions and their influence on decision makers, asserting that state actions must be examined through various underlying pressures and influences, realism contends that nation-states are unitary actors within the international system. This means that nation-states should be viewed as autonomous of the domestic societies within them and that the real motivations for state action in the international system are "based on the intelligent calculation of one's power and one's interests as against the power and the interests of rivals and competitors" (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 95). Furthermore, realists argue that in an anarchic international system, where every actor is assumed to be looking out for its own security, power and its uses are of primary importance. As a result, competition between nation-states is expected since realists assume that states with the most material power will use that power over others in order to guarantee their security and survival (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 94). In regards to the invasion of Panama then, realists would contend that the conflict was a means to reassert U.S. power throughout Latin America. Through the heavy use of force, the United States showcased its military strength, protected its interests in and around the Panama Canal, and demonstrated to the entire region that the U.S

was willing and able to militarily intervene when, were, and how it wished.

There are many reasons that realists would find the U.S. invasion of Panama a likely outcome of the deteriorating relations between the two countries. First, realists would point to the geo-political importance of Panama as a base of U.S. operations in Latin America. The U.S.-administered Canal Zone was home to the Southern Command, which coordinated insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout Latin America; it also hosted fourteen military bases along with their approximately 10,000 civilian and military personnel (Poland, 203: 109). Furthermore, because of Panama's proximity to multiple areas of U.S. interest during the 1980s, Panama was an important ally in operations such as aiding the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua and supporting U.S. missions in El Salvador and Honduras. The Canal Zone was also useful in training regional military and intelligence agencies at the School of the Americas, located at Fort Gulick (Poland, 2003: 108). In other words, Panama was essential for exporting U.S. military support and training to armies throughout Latin America, promoting U.S. power in the southern hemisphere in the process.

In light of the strategic importance of Panama, realists would contend that one motivation for the invasion was Noriega's increasingly anti-U.S. stance, which threatened the stability and security of U.S. interests. One way in which Noriega threatened U.S. interests was the perceived danger his continued rule had for the Panama Canal. The canal had been an integral part of U.S. strategic interests following the 1903 treaty, when the United States became the Canal's chief defender through the establishment of the Canal Zone and its U.S. military bases (Molineu, 1990: 45). Throughout the century, the canal had been central to the U.S. efforts to protect its military and economic interests in the Pacific and increase its influence throughout the world. As a result, the United States was very slow in relinquishing control of the canal, and did so while maintaining the necessary neutrality

of the Canal Zone and ensuring the U.S. right to intervene. This was seen even in the 1977 Canal Treaty between the United States and Panama that laid out a framework for the gradual transfer of canal jurisdiction, with the final handover of power to Panamanian authorities set for 1999. Though it was settled then that the canal would be transferred to the Panamanians, the treaty would likely not have been ratified had the United States been unable to retain a clause guaranteeing its "right to defend the canal unilaterally and to transit its warships ahead of all other vessels" (Conniff, 1992: 135).

Noriega became increasingly problematic to the United States following the implementation of this 1977 treaty. As he and his PDF consolidated power within Panama following his 1983 takeover, he "resisted the maintenance of U.S. military bases...and appeared to be derailing treaty implementation, soiling America's image, and challenging U.S. leadership" (Sanchez, 2008: 172). When the Reagan administration pressured Noriega to either change his policies or step down as a consequence of his increasing domestic and international unpopularity as a dictator and drug-trafficker, Noriega responded by claiming that the U.S. accusations were simply excuses whose goals were to "abrogate the 1977 treaties and prevent the turnover of the canal" (Conniff, 1992: 156). In an effort to force Noriega to change his stance, the United States began actively trying to push him from power using economic embargos starting in 1987, domestic indictments in 1988, and breaking diplomatic relations altogether in 1989 (Conniff, 1992: 157-159). Noriega remained resilient in the face of these pressures though, and used them to consolidate his position as defender of Panama and Latin America against the bullying of the United States.

Noriega's successful resistance of these policies also limited the United States' bargaining abilities. Since Noriega weathered the economic sanctions, stood firm throughout U.S. and international denouncements of his character, and overcame the coup attempt as well, he made it apparent

that he would not bend to U.S. demands and that other methods would be necessary to affect change in the situation. In the meantime, the U.S. was losing its ability to ensure stability around the Canal because, in a sense, Noriega and the PDF surrounded the U.S. civilian and military personnel living in the isolated Canal Zone. Confronted by a hostile government with a military strengthened by Noriega's resolve to resist U.S. demands, the United States faced the problem of being unable to ensure the protection of its own personnel in one of its most strategically important areas (Conniff, 1992: 162).

Consequently, realists would argue that ensuring Noriega did not control the Canal and thereby weaken U.S. influence in Panama, the longstanding base of U.S. authority over the rest of Latin America, was a vital security concern (Sanchez, 2008: 1972). While the Canal was not as economically important to the United States as it had been in the past, the United States could not afford to turn over the symbolically valuable waterway to the drug-running Noriega or his PDF in the event that they remained in power throughout the continued administrative transition, due to be finished completely by December 31, 1999 (Sanchez, 2008: 174). Even in the case that Noriega had been quietly removed by then, the problem remained that his loyal and corrupt PDF followers would most likely remain in power and thereby continue the problems of the United States. Consequently, the United States was concerned that it would not just have to remove Noriega, but would have to take out the entire structure of the PDF as well. With these considerations in mind, realists would argue that the military option for changing the situation became increasingly viable.

Furthermore, because Noriega represented one of the few overtly anti-U.S. governments in Latin America, realists would also contend that putting him down would reestablish the regional authority of the United States. With the Cold War tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the wane and the threat of communism in the Western Hemisphere falling from

focus, the possibility arose that Latin American countries would feel that the United States would have less incentive to intervene and so they would be given more freedom to break away from U.S. leadership. As a result, realists would argue that the United States resorted to military action against Noriega in order to protect the stability and security of the Canal as well as to ensure the prevalence of U.S. authority in Latin America. Seen through this lens, the 1989 invasion of Panama re-asserted U.S. power in the region by securing its interests in the Panama Canal, overthrowing one of the few staunchly anti-American governments, and sending a clear signal through the swiftness, ease, and impressive use of its military might that the United States would not tolerate dissent in its traditional sphere of influence. In short, while President George H.W. Bush argued that the United States invaded to stop drug trafficking, promote democracy, protect its citizens, and protect the Canal itself, realists would interpret the event as having to do completely "with regional strategy and the preservation of hegemony" (Sanchez, 2008: 174).

Drawing all these factors together, realists would argue that the heavy-handed U.S. invasion of Panama showed that the United States still maintained the power to intervene when, where, and how it wished in its Latin American backyard. However, the fact that the U.S. was willing to intervene in its traditional sphere of interests with such a powerful use of force reflects a considerable inequality in relations between the U.S. and its neighbors. Though realists agree that it was a basic inequality in power that allowed the U.S. to do what it wished in regards to its Southern neighbors, a critique of realism would question whether power considerations alone are enough to explain a nation-state's actions. While the U.S. had the ability to carry out the invasion and gained from the experience of trying out its newly equipped and trained military forces, the question arises as to why the United States felt an invasion was an acceptable course of action.

Arguing that the U.S. invaded because it had superior power

capabilities does not seem to draw upon the full dimension of this problem. This assertion makes the invasion appear to be solely a consideration of inequalities in power, while leaving out considerations that part of this decision was necessarily based on an unequal perception of the identities and relations of the United States and Panama. As a result, though realism works very well in explaining how power considerations influenced the U.S. decision to invade, by definition realism does not consider the effects that unequally perceived identities might have on why the United States chose to begin the conflict. In other words, the realist explanation assumes that hard power inequalities translate into inequalities in identity and relation as well, while it does not consider the importance that national, cultural, racial, and personal perceptions have in international theory independent of facts about power. In order to even further develop this explanation of the U.S. invasion then, a constructivist interpretation might helpfully be considered.

Constructivism

So far, liberalism has helped to reveal some of the domestic motivations that pushed the U.S. and Panama towards conflict, but not why such a large amount of military force was necessary. Realism does explain why the United States used a heavy-handed strategy of force, but seems incomplete in its assertion that power inequalities are the only consideration in understanding why the U.S. invaded. Constructivism, though, helps explain a second level of inequalities by examining the underlying social relations and identities of the U.S. and Panama that have influenced their perceptions of one another. As these perceptions further influence actions, constructivism provides another level to view the U.S. invasion, and gives crucial supplementation to the liberal and realist theories.

Instead of concerns over how power and security influence state actions or how the role of institutions and individual-level factors facilitate

state interaction, constructivism asserts that normal human relations lead to the creation of social structures that are in turn responsible for shaping the beliefs and identities of larger groups. Consequently, while it is tempting to look at nation-states as unitary actors or through domestic considerations via individuals and institutions, constructivists argue, "even regions that seem most natural and inalterable are products of political construction and subject to reconstruction attempts" (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 575). This means that despite temptations to view the international system as abiding by fixed rules, it would be better understood as a relation of human identities and perceptions that is constantly changing.

However, this does not mean that realists and liberals are incorrect in their respective assertions that security and institutions matter. According to constructivist thought, people perceive security and institutions as fundamental to the realist and liberal paradigms, these characteristics are expected and acted upon in the international system. As a result, constructivism adds another layer to realist and liberal claims by stating that without perceptions of relations and identities there would be no context with which to frame what states regard as their best interests or determine how they perceive others in the institutions they choose to join. In other words, to realism, constructivism adds "considerations of the effects of ideational rather than material structures, specifically the effects of identity on actor interests" while to "liberalism, constructivism adds consideration of the effects identities have on both formal and informal institutions" (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 577). Consequently, though the U.S. invasion of Panama may have been influenced by concerns over power, security, and domestic pressures, these concerns are strengthened by understanding the identities that shaped each country's interests and perceptions of one another.

One place to start the constructivist explanation of the conflict is to examine how identity and relation have influenced U.S. policy towards

Panama. Constructivism has a powerful tool with which to accomplish this goal in the form of social identity theory. Social identity theory predicts that "once people identify themselves as part of a particular group, they treat members of that group very differently than those outside the group" (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 587). For example, in Christopher Hammer and Peter Katzenstein's article "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," the authors argue that the U.S. decision to form and join NATO was because the United States took into account "racial, historical, political, and cultural factors" that caused U.S. policymakers to see "potential European allies as relatively equal members of a shared community" (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 575). This shared identity was juxtaposed with that of the potential Asian allies who "in contrast, were seen as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior community" (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 575).

It is arguable that this same unequal relationship of insiders and outsiders has shaped the identities of the United States and its Latin American neighbors. One historical and symbolically significant place to start examining the relationships between the neighbors is with the assimilation of Latin America into the U.S. sphere of interest through the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In the Monroe Doctrine, the United States "claimed for itself a special role in the Western Hemisphere as the protector of the weaker countries in the south" (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 2005: 314), in the process affirming what constructivists would point to as important identities of inequality. This tentative relation between the weak Latin Americans "protected" by the strong United States took on a new meaning when, after a century of increasing interventions and contacts with its southern neighbors, the United States adopted the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary with which it "asserted the right to intervene in Latin American countries to maintain political order" (McWilliams and

Piotrowski, 2005: 314). This newfound increase in responsibility, with the United States going from mere protector of Latin America to the arbiter of justice and order in the Western Hemisphere, led to the entrenchment of three important identities: "Banana Republics," "Yankee Imperialism" and the "Colossus of the North." Furthermore, the Roosevelt Corollary implied that Latin Americans were unable to effectively govern themselves.

In regard to how constructivism would view relationships between the United States and Latin America, these identities are particularly important for what they meant and for how they represent the actors' perceptions of each other. For example, the term "Banana Republic" was developed at the beginning of the century as a derogatory name for underdeveloped Latin American countries which were seen by Americans as economically, politically, and arguably racially inferior to the prosperous, developed, and powerful United States. Though they were considered useful in regard to their cheap labor, land, crops, and minerals, the people of "Banana Republics" were generally perceived and used as unintelligent and expendable peasants who were assumed to benefit from association with the educated, white businessmen of the United States. Conversely, the educated white men were known as the "Yankee Imperialists" who dominated the economy and interfered in the political governance of the Latin Americans (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 2005: 314). Furthermore, these Yankees were backed by the "Colossus of the North," referring to the image of the United States as a giant with a violent tendency to intervene and force its smaller, weaker neighbors to accept its will.

As a result, constructivists would point back to decades of abuse by the "Colossus of the North" and its "Yankee Imperialism" to help explain the U.S. invasion. After nearly a century of what the Panamanians saw as U.S. military occupation of their land and intervention into their government, Panamanians were hostile to ideas of longer U.S. influence.

The Panamanians wanted to be rid of the American military bases that were physical reminders of the continuing U.S. military occupation and, more importantly, wanted to own the Panama Canal, which was itself perceived as a symbol of U.S. imperialism (Molineu, 1990: 45). Consequently, when the U.S. and Panamanian Heads of State ratified the Canal Treaty in 1977, Panamanians felt that they were finally receiving their independence from the United States after decades of submission (Conniff, 1992: 136).

Unfortunately, this anti-U.S. sentiment came at a time when the United States was having a hard time coming to grips with its own identity. While anti-U.S. riots broke out in Panama, citizens of the United States felt as if they were losing an important symbol and inseparable part of U.S. heritage. Especially since the treaty came just over a decade after the Vietnam War, news regarding the handover of the Panama Canal angered many people in the United States. Many citizens saw the concession of the canal to a Panamanian drug-running dictator responsible for the rise in drug trafficking to the United States as another example of the United States losing power and prestige in the international system. As a result, just when the Panamanians were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands for an end to the century of U.S. intervention and occupation, "the United States –a benevolent but undisputed world power in 1960 –had by 1979 lost a war in Vietnam and seen its government disgraced by malfeasance in the White House [and] now wanted to 'stand tall' again and to demand respect abroad" (Conniff, 1992: 139). Consequently, by the 1980s citizens of the two countries were on opposing sides as the Panamanians were anti-United States while citizens of the U.S. were against granting any concessions to the Panamanians. Perhaps not surprisingly, these two identities would react explosively when pitted against each other during the next ten years.

Constructivists would argue then that, while the time of the Banana Republics, Yankee Imperialism, and the Colossus of the North may have

passed, the identity of the United States as "protector" and "big brother" of its "relatively backward" and "uncontrolled little neighbors" in Latin America remained. As a result of the identities of the United States and Panama, constructivists would argue that one reason that the United States intervened, underlying those proposed by liberalism and realism, was because it has historically valued Panama, and Latin America in general, as an unequal partner. For example, because the United States was not concerned about being fair with its Southern neighbors or considering their thoughts on the conflict, the fact "that Latin Americans viewed the interventionist solution [to Panama] as an affront to their sovereignty and dignity was not a major concern for Washington" (Molineu, 1990: 249). Going back to the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary that implied that the U.S. perceived Latin Americans as unable to govern themselves, "it was obvious that U.S. officials had given up on the ability of the Panamanians to peaceably solve their own problems—in contrast to what Eastern Europeans seemed capable of at the time" (Molineu, 1990: 249). These assertions drive home the point that to the United States, Panama and Latin America were inferior, a perception that constructivists would ague is very important to how they are treated by the U.S. This constructivist conclusion, however, has implications for the realist and liberal paradigms as well.

For instance, constructivists would argue that realism cannot just be about the security of a state as state perceptions of security and power are different depending on the relationships and identities of the actors involved. Instead, constructivists assert that "variables like power, status, and threats are social facts, whose significance, while anchored in material reality, cannot simply be read off as material capabilities" (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 585). This means that perception of identity, relation, and the inequalities that may exist between them are very important for action. Consequently, though realists would argue that the invasion was meant to

protect U.S. interests in Panama and reassert U.S. dominance in the region, constructivists would contend that without the fundamental identities of inequality that existed between the two countries, the United States would not have felt it acceptable to use such overt force to remove an unpopular dictator. Furthermore, constructivists would claim that relenting and choosing not to confront the Panamanians, especially Noriega, would be inconsistent with the international perception of the U.S. being a dominant power in the region.

As liberals look to the domestic politics, individuals, and institutions to explain the actions of nation-states, constructivists would again emphasize that the perceived identities of those involved in these institutions make a huge difference in how they act. For example, Noriega was, at his lowest, the drug-running and human rights-abusing dictator of Panama. To the U.S. public, "Noriega came wholly to represent the tropics' primitive and hostile forces and the object towards which so such military fury was directed" (Poland, 2003: 119). Constructivists would point out that in direct contrast with this depiction of Noriega was President Bush, the symbolic leader of the "Free World" who would soon be leading the triumphant United States out of its Cold War battle with the U.S.S.R. As a result, the two men faced off as an inferior criminal dictator against the respected leader of the most powerful nation-state in the world. Constructivists would argue then that beneath the relevant and real domestic pressures brought to bear on President Bush was the national identity of the United States as a superior nation to that of the "criminal" and "backwards" people of Panama, as exemplified by Noriega.

Conclusion

The overlap of the three paradigms and the significance of considering them in a complementary fashion can be further emphasized in a summation of the U.S. invasion. First, liberalism asserts that General Noriega's role as a violent and oppressive dictator also involved in the inter-American

drug trade clashed with the anti-drug policies of President Bush, while the domestic pressure in the United States to act against Noriega pushed the U.S. towards military confrontation. While the liberal paradigm helps us think about the need to remove Noriega, it does not help us understand why a costly and highly overt military operation was needed. Despite the fact that economic and political sanctions had failed to move Noriega, the subsequent jump to large-scale military invasion does not seem so easily explainable, especially since less costly and lower profile tools for removing Noriega, such as more strongly supporting another military coup, assassination, or abduction, were presumably available. Realism helps in this regard, since it explores possible reasons for the overt U.S. invasion such as the necessity of reasserting its authority and leadership in the region. Realists would contend that the United States was also concerned about ensuring the security of the Panama Canal in order to protect the interests of the United States.

Meanwhile, the constructivists' emphasis on identity and relation brings an entirely new element to both theories. To realism it adds the expectation of the United States to act the way it did because of its historic relationship of inequality with Latin America. In regards to the liberal importance placed on identities of President Bush and General Noriega, constructivism helps draw parallels of expectations for the leaders as well. According to constructivism, President Bush, as defender of "The Free World," would be motivated to use military force against Noriega because of their contrasting identities and the widening social cleavages in regards to their domestic perceptions. Consequently, constructivism provides depth to liberal and realist assertions by examining the complex social identities and relational perceptions that existed between the United States, Panama, and Latin America as a whole.

This paper's exploration of the U.S. invasion of Panama through the liberal, realist, and constructivist paradigms has revealed some of

their strengths and weaknesses as explanatory tools for international relations. By identifying the limits of specific policy prescriptions, the singular example of the U.S. invasion is opened to a much broader and more comprehensive realm of interpretation. State interactions then, both in terms of conflict and cooperation, must be explored by multiple paradigms and perspectives since the factors that embody any event seem far too complex for a single view to conclusively explain.

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Assessing the Effect of the Surge and "Anbar Awakening" on Coalition Troop Deaths

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Abstract: The U.S. troop 'surge' and 'awakening movements' are the two factors most often associated with the recent decrease of violence in Iraq. In order to test the validity of this association, the effects of the troop surge and awakening councils on Coalition deaths were, as much as possible, isolated from each other. The data suggests that both the troop surge and awakening movements individually contributed to a decrease in Coalition troop deaths. Though violence was rising throughout Iraq before surge operations began, areas with awakening movements experienced a smaller increase in violence than areas without awakening movements. After surge operations began, areas with established awakening movements and low surge troops experienced a significantly greater decrease in Coalition casualties than areas with high surge troops and weak awakening movements. The combination of substantial surge troops and well-established awakening movements caused a positive synergistic effect, which resulted in the most dramatic decrease in Coalition casualties.

Explaining Improved Counterinsurgency in Iraq

From June 2007 to present, a steady decrease in insurgent activity and lethality has occurred in Iraq. Determining the factor, or combination of factors, that contributed to this success has resulted in an important and often very politicized debate. While innumerable variables are at play in the Iraqi conflict, the troop 'surge' and 'awakening movements' are discussed most often. The troop surge refers to the sending of additional infantry brigades to Baghdad, Diyala, Babil, and Salah-ad-din beginning in January 2007, and the extension of tours of duty in al-Anbar. Awakening movements are Sunni tribal groups newly aligned against insurgent fighters, often with the material

support of the U.S. The most well-established awakening movement is the 'Anbar Awakening,' which began in 2005 and was operational by August 2006.

There are two main reasons these factors are politicized: the debate leading up to the troop surge was heavily partisan, and there is a misperception that the surge should be viewed as a foreign solution while the awakening movements are a purely domestic solution. In reality, awakening movements rely on support from U.S. troops, and surge troops operating in areas with awakening movements undoubtedly benefit from the intelligence gathered by these Sunni leaders.

Determining the effect of the surge and awakening movements is not important for partisan political reasons; it is important because it will help shape the exit strategy in Iraq, it might provide solutions to the problems in Afghanistan, and it will contribute to counter-insurgency theory in general. Understanding what effect these factors had could determine how the U.S. should best invest its resources, the implications of disbanding awakening movements, and the levels of force required to provide security in a conflict zone. This analysis attempts to contribute to such an understanding by observing the effects of these two factors on Coalition troop deaths. After partially isolating for both strategies and taking into consideration the disproportionate levels of surge troops sent to various provinces, this paper suggests that both the troop surge and the Anbar Awakening had a significant individual effect on reducing Coalition casualties. Areas with established awakening councils and low surge troops, however, experienced a significantly greater decrease in violence than areas with high surge troops and weak awakening movements. In other words, the presence of awakening councils appears more important than that of surge troops when each is examined individually. When and where the two strategies were combined, however, a synergistic effect took place, which caused the most dramatic decrease in Coalition casualties.

Counterinsurgency Thinking and Theories of Ethnic Conflict

Any solution in Iraq must be understood in the context of counter-insurgency doctrine in general, and the ethnic security dilemma specifically. When the power structure in Iraq was dissolved and replaced, at least temporarily, by a relatively small number of U.S. troops, divided Iraqis were placed in a situation where the government no longer protected them from ethnic, religious, and tribal rivals (Kaufmann 2007). Given this insecurity, each ethnic and tribal group had incentive "to mobilize for defense" (Kaufmann 2007:1). As the security for one group increased, it decreased for all others, leading to a cycle of mobilization that exacerbated the pre-existing conditions for civil war.[1] Added to this mix were foreign insurgents who often indiscriminately killed in attempts to destabilize the country and put greater strain on already overburdened U.S. troops. With a decreased sense of security came greater opposition to Coalition forces, who were now viewed as incompetent, and greater reliance on non-government leaders for protection and guidance (Totten 2008).

Going into Iraq with a small number of soldiers was not only a product of necessity, as the "Coalition of the Willing" had a difficult time attracting members, but also a matter of a specific 'light footprint' counter-insurgency strategy (Totten 2008). The idea was to prevent an insurgency from ever taking hold by sending enough troops for the limited mission of taking Saddam out of power, but not enough troops to be viewed as "oppressive occupiers" (Totten 2008). At the same time, the light footprint strategy was intended to minimize casualties, which would hopefully ensure continued domestic support in the U.S. (Totten 2008). Whether this strategy was doomed from the beginning is debatable, but once Coalition Provisional Authority Orders 1 and 2 disbanded the Iraqi army and removed many of the Baathists who were in charge of the nation's security from their jobs, this particular counterinsurgency strategy became extremely dangerous (Friedman 2008:4).

The logic behind the surge was that additional troops could remedy this problem by providing enough security in especially violent regions to allow political progress to take hold and give the Iraqi security forces more time to grow in strength. The surge strategy had six key objectives: "1. Let the Iraqis lead; 2. Help Iraqis protect the population; 3. Isolate extremists; 4. Create space for political progress; 5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and 6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach" (whitehouse.gov 2007). Troops were sent to the areas of Iraq with the heaviest presence of insurgent forces. The primary focus of the troops was to provide security to civilians, even if that meant reducing the security of Coalition troops by dispersing them away from heavily protected bases (Totten 2008). This counter-insurgency strategy has at least two well-known precedents: the British experience in Malaya and the French experience in Algeria, both in the 1950's (Gentile 2007). In both situations, the occupiers established "combat outposts in areas of a country controlled by insurgents with the primary purpose of providing security and protecting the people" (Gentile 2007). For Iraq, this increased civilian security translated into political progress as it became clear to many Iraqis that the Coalition was becoming more capable of instituting rule of law and providing basic services.

A competing explanation states that the surge in isolation cannot explain the decreased levels of violence. Instead, a domestic backlash against insurgents was already brewing in tribal communities that were experiencing out of control violence and loss of power. A variation on the 'hearts and minds' theory, U.S. troops were not so much winning the support of the population as extremist insurgents were losing it. Sunni leaders saw their own power waning as foreign militants took over their cities, instituted fundamentalist Islamic law, and wreaked havoc on the population with improvised explosive devices (IED's). According to this theory, the insurgency could not be defeated militarily unless Sunni tribes

started giving at least temporary allegiance to U.S. troops and working with them to out the most destructive element of the insurgency, the jihadists. Iraqis themselves knew the location of militants and could give the best intelligence to Coalition forces. At the same time, foreign militants could no longer count on safe havens in areas such as Fallujah, which reduced the frustrating problem of launching a major operation in one city, just to have the insurgents avoid heavy losses by quickly relocating to a different city.

Methodology

To rigorously assess the main factors that contributed to Iraq's recent drop in violence, areas were selected that had the presence of surge troops, awakening movements, or both of these factors.[2] By isolating each factor by both time and location, it was possible to see how these strategies affected Coalition casualties individually and in combination. The relative importance of the two strategies, as well as their effect when combined, could thus be measured. In line with current counterinsurgency doctrine, this study theorized that areas that experienced both awakening movements and the troop surge should have a greater decrease in Coalition deaths than areas with only one of these factors.

Coalition troop deaths were tallied from the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count Database. A more robust study would have taken into account civilian casualties; however, the widely varying civilian casualty estimates made this impossible. The effect of the awakening movements was deduced by comparing Coalition deaths in al-Anbar province in the six months before and after August 2006 to Coalition deaths in Baghdad during the same time period.[3] If the awakening movement was having a positive effect, then Coalition casualties should have risen more dramatically in Baghdad than al-Anbar—assuming that casualties were generally rising across Iraq.

The surge was only partially isolated for using the timeframe of

six months before and after June 2007. Al-Anbar province was the only area comparable enough to Baghdad in levels of violence to consider as a control, and the awakening movement in al-Anbar was in full swing well before the surge began. At the same time, parts of Baghdad had experienced awakening movements—though they were weak compared to al-Anbar.[4] If surge troops played the more important role in reducing Coalition casualties than awakening movements, then Baghdad should have seen the most significant drop in casualties for this time period, as it was an area with heavy surge troops and fledgling awakening movements. Conversely, if awakening movements were central to the success of the surge, then al-Anbar should have seen the most dramatic decrease in Coalition casualties, as it had established awakening movements and a much lower level of surge troops.

Assessing Effects of Awakening Movements and the Surge

To get a general idea of Coalition casualty trends in Iraq from 2003-2008, Coalition deaths from hostile action in this time period were compared in al-Anbar province, Baghdad province, Diyala Province, al-Basrah province, Babil province, Ninawah province, and Salah-ad-din province (see chart 1).[5] The statistics show that there was a natural ebb and flow of Coalition troop deaths from 2003 to 2007, which could not be explained using either of the main variables. Every province examined showed a significant drop in Coalition deaths in 2008, which demonstrated that some new factor or combination of factors caused a universal drop in violence. The most noticeable difference between the provinces was that every province saw a greater number of Coalition deaths in 2007 than in 2006, with the exception of al-Anbar province. Since 2006 and 2007 are the years that awakening movements and surge troops became active, respectively, this suggested that one or both of the factors had a clear effect. With this information, it became important to try and

isolate the effect of the Anbar awakening from the effect of the surge.

To isolate for the immediate effect of awakening councils on Coalition casualties, the average Coalition death rate for the six months prior to August 2006 – the month awakening councils became active[6] – and the six months after August 2006 was calculated (refer to graph 1). From February 2006 to July 2006, the average Coalition death rate per month in al-Anbar was 25.8. From September 2006 to February 2007, the average Coalition death rate was 31.8. Therefore, Coalition deaths increased an average of 23.3 percent in the six months following the activation of the awakening councils (see graph 1). This seems to suggest that awakening councils did not have a significant effect on decreasing Coalition troop deaths, but this cannot be determined without comparing al-Anbar with Baghdad – an area with no awakening councils at the time. From February 2006 to July 2006, the average Coalition death rate per month in Baghdad province was 16.3 per month. From September 2006 to February 2007, the average Coalition death rate was 29.5 per month. Therefore, Coalition deaths per month were up 80% in Baghdad at the same time they were only up 23.3% percent per month in al-Anbar (see graph 1).

The effect of the surge was partially isolated by using the six months before and after June 2007—the beginning of surge operations—as a comparative time frame.[7] From December 2006 to May 2007, the average Coalition death rate per month in Baghdad was 35.8, which dropped to 24.5 in the six months following the beginning of surge operations. In al-Anbar province, the Coalition death rate went from 25.2 per month to 7.6 per month. Therefore, Coalition deaths dropped around 32 percent following the beginning of surge operations in Baghdad, while Coalition deaths dropped around 70 percent in al-Anbar during the same time period – more than double what was observed in Baghdad.[8]

This data strongly suggest that both the awakening movements and

the troop surge had a significant individual effect on reducing Coalition casualties. Although Coalition deaths increased in al-Anbar during the six months following the first awakening movement, they increased much more drastically in Baghdad where there was no presence of an awakening movement. During the surge period, al-Anbar province experienced a greater drop in violence than Baghdad, which had far more surge troops but weak awakening councils. This suggests that awakening movements played a central role in the success attributed to the surge. This is not to say the surge did not have a significant impact on decreasing Coalition troop deaths, as every province which was experiencing high levels of Coalition casualties saw a significant decrease in Coalition casualties in the six months following the beginning of surge operations. The most dramatic success, however, occurred when these strategies were combined.

Conclusion

The synergistic effect of awakening councils and surge troops likely results from a combination of mutually reinforcing factors. Awakening councils provide two main benefits to Coalition troops: they gather intelligence that would be otherwise difficult for foreign forces to ascertain, and they limit the safe havens of insurgent groups. When Coalition troops launch an operation in an area that is patrolled by these councils, they have a better idea of where the enemy is hiding, and they have a greater ability to track enemy movements. While Coalition troops and secret service officers stand out easily in the tribal areas of Iraq, a member of an awakening council looks like an everyday civilian. This decreases the comfort zone of any foreign or domestic insurgent.

Surge troops, and the Coalition as a whole, also provide the awakening movements with several benefits. When surge troops are present, security is increased for everyone, especially awakening council

members who are prime targets for the insurgents. While the councils have the best intelligence, the Coalition troops have the best weapons. By assisting each other and conducting joint operations, Sunni leaders get to take credit for protecting their own people. This political capital—along with the weapons and money provided by the Coalition—quickly increases the power of groups cooperating with the Coalition. In line with the ethnic security dilemma, Sunni leaders who do not cooperate with Coalition forces gradually grow weaker compared to awakening groups. Not only do they forego material support from the Coalition, but they also risk being labeled as jihadi enemies by rival groups, which are cooperating with the Coalition.

These findings have pragmatic implications for Iraq. With limited resources, the U.S. must decide what investments will have the most positive effect on increasing security. This data shows that adding additional troops helps to a point, but at a certain level more troops does not mean more security. Moreover, maintaining troops at surge level is a costly and unsustainable endeavor. It is clear from the data that supporting awakening movements was at least temporarily a good investment. The real questions revolve around how these groups will react when they stop receiving resources from the Coalition and are asked to give up some of their power and how the Iraqi population will respond when surge troops are replaced by newly trained Iraqi troops.

In order for the Iraqi Government to have a semblance of a monopoly on the use of force, these awakening councils will have to be disarmed eventually. Prematurely disarming these groups could have severe implications, however, as they have had a clear and likely reversible effect on reducing Coalition casualties. Many of these groups once supported the AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and even fought Coalition troops; disbanding them before the Iraqi Army and Police are ready could cause a new wave of violence and insecurity. While these groups are helping Coalition troops, they certainly have their own political agendas and motives for cooperation.

There is a fine line to walk for the Coalition and the Iraqi government. If the awakening councils are given heavy support they will more effectively fight insurgents, but their own power will increase dramatically. As the power of Sunni awakening councils increases, the relative power of Shiites and Kurds decreases. The destabilizing effect of this can be minimized if Shiites and Kurds can be convinced that this power is temporary and available to non-Sunni groups as well. If Shiites and Kurds feel like these Sunni groups will not disarm, or will gain a significant strategic advantage before disarming, then the ethnic security dilemma will come fully into play. Moreover, if Sunni militias refuse to give up this power when their services are no longer needed, or are not offered the chance to integrate into the Iraqi military and police forces, then the Iraqi Army will have to face a new and well-equipped enemy. In contrast, if the awakening councils are given weak support, then they will be less effective at both combating insurgents and inspiring other Sunni leaders to seek Coalition assistance.

If the Iraqi government integrates these awakening members into the Iraqi police force and army, it should do so in such a way that these members still take ownership of the security of their cities. These local security forces should be given great deals of autonomy. At least for the short term, threats to Iraq will emerge at the local level, and that is where resources should therefore be placed. Although both the surge and awakening movements had a profound effect on bringing violence down, it will be local leaders and not Coalition forces that keep it down.

Lessons for Afghanistan?

These results might seem to suggest that the success in Iraq can be replicated in Afghanistan. After all, it seems possible to send additional Brigades to Kabul and buy the support of Afghan tribal leaders. This assumption is only partially correct. An awakening movement might be

possible in Afghanistan if more prominent tribal leaders can be convinced to fight the Taliban in exchange for money and weapons. Even elements of the Taliban, which has become much more divided since the invasion, could possibly be convinced to switch allegiances in exchange for a degree of political and military power. If the Coalition provides one tribe, or Taliban faction, with additional power, a possible positive aspect of the ethnic security dilemma might take place. Other tribes will seek to balance this power by reaching for assistance. The Coalition would need to ensure this assistance came from them and not from the Taliban or jihadi groups. Sending additional troops might allow for these awakening movements to take root, but the situation will prove more difficult than in Iraq. Unfortunately, the area where a surge of troops is most needed lies not in Afghanistan, but in the Pashtun region of Pakistan. A crucial aspect of the surge/awakening combination was the ability to eliminate many of the sanctuaries and hiding places of insurgents. This prevented the 'whack a mole' problem of launching heavy operations in one area, just to have insurgents return when the troops left or move their operations to other areas of Iraq.

In Iraq, the most secure hiding places for Sunni militants were in Sunni-controlled tribal areas. When these areas turned against them, they had fewer and less secure places to set up a base of operations. In Afghanistan, the Taliban does not have to rely on the protection of the population. The mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan provide a good place to retreat when cornered. At best, sending surge troops to Afghanistan might push the Taliban into Pakistan and temporarily produce enough security for some local political change. Unfortunately, the problem of the Taliban cannot be eliminated without full and more effective cooperation from Pakistan and even stronger awakening movements than those seen in Iraq. Even with increased Pakistani tribal opposition to the Taliban, which might be a growing possibility, long-term security depends on a more fundamental

change in the security environment. Given that Afghanistan's population is roughly 70% rural, compared to Iraq's 70% urban population, protecting far flung rural villages from insurgent penetration will prove a much more daunting task than in Iraq – even with Afghan awakening councils. Even more so in Afghanistan than in Iraq, foreign and domestic fighters can always slip away into bordering countries or lay dormant in anticipation of an opportunity to continue operations. Nonetheless, the situation in Afghanistan has a chance of improving if local leaders take personal responsibility for security and are given the means and support to maintain it. Encouraging awakening movements and providing surge troops set the foundation for this kind of political progress in Iraq. The real challenge will be to continue this trend in Iraq, and effectively adapt these concepts to fit Afghanistan.

Afterword

Most recently, another study was conducted that suggests the decreased violence in Iraq is not the result of additional troop deployments or awakening movements. The study, which used satellite imagery of Baghdad to measure population levels, claims that massive population transfers out of Iraq caused the drop in violence (Sullivan 2008). The population transfer resulted in fewer targets and possibly fewer insurgents. While this does not fall in line with counterinsurgency doctrine, it does follow the logic of the ethnic security dilemma. In the absence of a government that can prevent ethnic fighting, one ethnic group will eventually end up on top. The Sunnis, who comprised the bulk of the insurgency, would undoubtedly be defeated by the numerically superior and better equipped Shiites (Kaufmann 2007). With the partial intervention of U.S. troops, fighting will continue but at a lower level since the Shiites have greatly weakened the Sunnis. Although this theory fits well in Baghdad Province where ethnic strife reached civil war proportions, provinces of Iraq with

extremely low ethnic diversity are also now experiencing decreased levels of violence. If ethnic population transfer is a key variable, then areas of high ethnic diversity should experience a larger decrease in violence than areas with low ethnic diversity. As this study shows, that is not the case.

[1]Of course, not all Iraqis displayed much of a sectarian (ethnic, religious, or tribal) affiliation. Those without such affiliations proved particularly isolated and vulnerable, and soon had an incentive to rediscover or invent them.

[2]Awakening movements were defined as militias, which had recently (post 2005) begun cooperating with Coalition forces, are not part of the Iraqi police force or military, and are being paid for their services by the U.S. While at the time of this study the areas experiencing awakening movements were Anbar province, Salahuddin, Diyala, western Baghdad, Nineveh, and Babil, this study especially focused on the Anbar Awakening as it is the most well-documented awakening movement in Iraq and it became fully operational before the arrival of surge troops.

The surge was defined as the deployment of five brigades consisting of the 82nd Airborne Division and four Infantry divisions from January 2007 to May 2007. The surge also included the 4,000 Marines in Anbar, who served extended tours as part of the overall surge strategy. Areas that experienced the troop surge were the Anbar province, Diyala, Baghdad, Salahuddin, and Babil. The area of heaviest focus was Baghdad Province, since more surge troops were sent there than any other region of Iraq.

[3]Using the database, the study analyzed fluctuations in hostile Coalition casualties from 2003-2008 in the provinces of Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, Salah-ad-din, and al-Anbar. While the Anbar Awakening started mobilizing in 2005, it was not fully operational until August of 2006. For ten months of this one-year time frame, Baghdad had no Surge troops and no significant awakening councils. Surge troops began arriving in January 2007, but were not actively launching operations until months later.

[4]Both of these problems were taken into account in an admittedly imperfect control. This study takes into account both the presence of heavy surge troops versus residual surge troops and well-established awakening movements versus fledgling awakening movements. Of the five new Brigades, two were sent to central Baghdad, and two were sent just to the south of Baghdad. New 'surge' troops were not sent to al-Anbar, but around one Brigade had their tour extended. At the same time, the Anbar Awakening had its roots as early as 2005, while Baghdad saw awakening movements form much later. Baghdad, during this time period, will be used to examine an area with a heavy surge presence and a weak awakening movement. For the same time period, al-Anbar will represent a strong awakening movement and low levels of surge troops.

[5]In al-Anbar province, the peak of hostile Coalition deaths was in 2004, which is largely a result of the Battle of Fallujah. Between 2005 and 2006 there is a relatively stable level of casualties followed by a dramatic drop in casualties in 2007 and 2008. In Baghdad province, casualties increased each year until there was a peak at 352 casualties in 2007 followed by a dramatic 70% drop in 2008. This differs from Anbar province as Anbar experienced a decrease in Coalition casualties in 2007 and an even more dramatic drop in 2008. In Diyala province, hostile Coalition deaths stay relatively steady from 2004-2006, especially considering the small number of casualties in each year, but increase

drastically in 2007. This is similar to the peak in Coalition deaths that Baghdad province experienced in 2007, and also similar is the large drop in Coalition deaths in 2008.

In al-Basrah province, Coalition casualties drop from 2003 to 2004, remain relatively stable until 2005, and then rise drastically until their peak in 2007. Like Baghdad province and Diyala province, the most Coalition casualties were inflicted in 2007, which was followed by an extremely significant drop in violence in 2008. In Babil province, the highest number of hostile Coalition deaths was experienced towards the beginning of the war in 2004. A drop in Coalition deaths occurred in 2005, followed by moderate increases in 2006 and 2007. As with the other four provinces, a large drop in Coalition deaths occurred in 2008. Ninawa province experienced the greatest decrease in Coalition casualties in 2006, but also experienced a significant decrease in 2008 as expected by the results of the other provinces. Ninawa province had an increase in Coalition casualties in 2007, similar to every other province with the exception of Anbar. Finally, Salah-ad-din province experienced rising Coalition casualties until the end of 2005, experienced a dramatic drop in Coalition Casualties in 2006, and then saw a spike of casualties in 2007. As expected from previous results, violence dropped dramatically in 2008.

[6]Again, while the notion of an Anbar Awakening dates back to 2005, the Anbar awakening councils did not actively begin fighting AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) until August 2006.

[7]While Surge troops began arriving in Baghdad as early as January 2007, the troops were not fully operational and launching missions until June 2007.

[8]In Basra, where no surge troops were placed, the Coalition death rate went from 2.8 per month to 2.5 per month (a decrease of 11%). In Salah-ad-din, the death rate went from 4 per month to 5.3 per month (an increase of 32.5%). Salah-ad-din province was the only province where there was not a significant drop in violence in the months following the surge. Areas with casualty rates below 10 per month were excluded from analysis because of statistical insignificance. While ideally a place like Basrah, which experienced neither surge troops nor awakening movements could be used as a control, the level of Coalition casualties in Basrah was too low to make for a fair comparison. Therefore, Baghdad and al-Anbar were used as a more fair comparison as both provinces have experienced high levels of violence fairly consistently throughout the war, and casualties were significantly high during the surge time period.

Graph 1.



Graph 2.



Chart 1:

Hostile Coalition Deaths by Province in Areas with Surge Troops

Year	Baghdad	Babil	Diyala	Salah ad-din
2003	**127**	**32**	**22**	**58**
2004	**175**	**51**	**27**	**85**
2005	**242**	**37**	**31**	**102**
Jan. 2006	13	0	1	3
Feb. 2006	17	0	1	6
Mar. 2006	7	0	0	3
Apr. 2006	20	8	0	5
May. 2006	27	10	0	2
June. 2006	15	4	1	3
July. 2006	12	1	1	1
Aug. 2006	20	1	0	4
Sep. 2006	26	4	1	2
Oct. 2006	44	2	5	7
Nov. 2006	24	0	6	9
Dec.2006	38	5	5	5
2006	**266**	**35**	**20**	**54**
Jan.2007	19	4	4	4
Feb. 2007	26	0	9	3
Mar. 2007	37	0	12	12
Apr. 2007	38	6	17	3
May. 2007	57	17	21	6
June. 2007	52	3	9	7
July. 2007	43	2	3	3
Aug. 2007	38	0	7	5
Sep. 2007	31	0	13	5
Oct. 2007	16	4	0	7
Nov. 2007	10	1	8	7
Dec. 2007	9	0	1	5
2007	**403**	**38**	**119**	**69**
Jan. 2008	12	1	9	6
Feb. 2008	13	3	5	0

Mar. 2008	28	0	5	2
Apr. 2008	27	1	2	7
May. 2008	6	2	2	2
June. 2008	9	3	2	0
July. 2008	4	0	1	2
Aug. 2008	11	0	0	4
Sep. 2008	11	2	1	2
Oct. 2008	3	0	1	1
2008	**129**	**12**	**28**	**29**

Chart 2:

Hostile Coalition Deaths in al-Anbar and Total Coalition Deaths by Month in Basra

Year	al-Anbar	Basra	Year	al-Anbar	Basra
2003	**54**		May. 2007	13	3
2004	**385**		June. 2007	4	6
2005	**323**		July. 2007	19	8
Jan. 2006	20	3	Aug. 2007	13	5
Feb. 2006	19	0	Sep. 2007	10	1
Mar. 2006	18	1	Oct. 2007	2	0
Apr. 2006	38	1	Nov. 2007	1	0
May. 2006	27	9	Dec. 2007	1	1
June. 2006	30	1	**2007**	**163**	
July. 2006	23	2	Jan. 2008	1	0
Aug. 2006	35	1	Feb. 2008	1	1
Sep. 2006	24	3	Mar. 2008	1	0
Oct. 2006	37	2	Apr. 2008	4	1
Nov. 2006	29	6	May. 2008	7	0
Dec.2006	46	1	June. 2008	5	0
2006	**356**		July. 2008	2	0
Jan.2007	22	1	Aug. 2008	3	0
Feb. 2007	33	2	Sep. 2008	0	0
Mar. 2007	15	2	Oct. 2008	1	0
Apr. 2007	22	8	**2008**	**26**	

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HIV/AIDS as a Vector for Progress within Swaziland: Short-Term and Long-Term Considerations

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The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), and subsequent Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has become a pandemic, with over 37 million infected individuals globally as of 2003 (Kates & Leggoe, 2005). Yet nowhere in the world has the impact of HIV been felt stronger than in Sub-Saharan Africa, where an estimated 25 million people live with HIV (Kates & Leggoe, 2005). The Kingdom of Swaziland has recently surpassed Botswana as the country with the highest HIV prevalence, the percentage of individuals living with HIV at a given time, in Sub-Saharan Africa and also the world (Whiteside et al., 2003: 7). The deleterious effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic are numerous and stem primarily from the deaths of economically productive individuals aged between 15 and 49. These losses can have far-reaching impacts regarding economies, development, and social and cultural health. Despite its negative effects, the HIV/AIDS crisis in Swaziland has served as a vector for change within the nation by empowering women, garnering the attention and support of the international community, and extending, deepening, and strengthening Swazi culture through innovative yet traditionally based community structures.

It is important to first examine the HIV/AIDS crisis briefly from an epidemiological and historical perspective in order to accurately evaluate its effects in Swaziland. HIV/AIDS has a unique epidemic pattern. A standard epidemic begins with a small number of initial cases, followed by an increasing incidence of new infections. The epidemic reaches its apex when all the individuals susceptible to the infection have been infected,

and as people recover or die the disease dissipates. HIV is different because individuals do not recover and remain in the group of HIV-positive people until their death. Also, infection by HIV is not immediately followed by sickness; rather, the onset of AIDS does not occur until between five and eight years after infection. Thus, seemingly healthy individuals can spread HIV, and there is no possibility of recovery from this infection. It is primarily for these reasons that HIV/AIDS has become a pandemic. (Whiteside et al., 2003: 8)

Swaziland's response to the outbreak of HIV/AIDS has been consistent with, and in some ways has surpassed, international norms. The first cases of HIV in Swaziland were identified in 1986, three years after its discovery in the United States (Whiteside et al., 2003: 6). The government responded by creating a National AIDS Prevention and Control Program (NAPCP), later renamed the Swaziland National AIDS/STI Program (SNAP), and both were supported by the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Program on AIDS. Swaziland was among the first nations to include HIV/AIDS in their national development plans. It was also the first nation to conduct a study on the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS. A new HIV/AIDS policy was developed in 1998, which focused on preventing and mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS and caring and supporting for those afflicted with HIV/AIDS. The policy was supported far beyond the government, through programs initiated by the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, and communities. The current government body "mandated to coordinate and mobilize resources" for HIV/AIDS initiatives is the National Emergency Response Committee on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA) (Whiteside et al., 2003: 7).

Despite the rapid formation of organizations such as NERCHA, unique qualities of Swaziland have contributed to the spread of HIV that

has culminated in the highest prevalence in the world. In Swaziland, the epidemic is uniformly bad between the urban and rural areas and among the state's four districts. This uniformity is indicative of a highly mobile population that is able to move between rural and urban areas. In most African nations, there is often a disparity among the prevalence rates between rural, urban and ethnic districts. In addition, the primary route of transmission of HIV in Swaziland is through heterosexual intercourse. This indicates that the transmitters of HIV are among the mainstream population rather than through a much smaller population engaging in risk-taking behavior such as intravenous drug use. These factors have contributed to the incredibly high prevalence rate of over 38% (Kates & Leggoe, 2005).

It is helpful to examine the impact of HIV/AIDS through the context of the Gender and Development (GAD) approach. GAD emerged at the grass-roots level in the 1980s as a response to other gender-focused development approaches. GAD focuses on the relationship between men and women and the intertwined connection among gender, class, and race. Women are seen as agents of development; however, GAD also recognizes that women experience development initiatives differently among themselves and from men as well (Parapet et al., 2000). GAD argues that the status of women in society is affected by four main issues: "their material conditions of life", "their position in the national, regional, and global economies", "the nature of patriarchal power in their societies at the national, community, and household levels", and the accepted norms and values that define gender in a specific society (Parapet et al., 2000). These criteria are employed to evaluate the progress toward gender-neutrality and development achieved in Swaziland as a result of the HIV/AIDS crisis (Parapet et al., 2000).

In order to evaluate the empowerment of women as a result of

“On Top of the World”



The Batwa are an indigenous minority group living in Southwest Uganda. They have been evicted from their ancestral homelands in the name of conservation and currently live in a state of extreme poverty and marginalization. These two brothers live in a community that has been resettled outside of Echuya National Forest.

Photo and Caption by: Heather Houser

“Kuna Indian Market”

This photo was taken at a Kuna Indian market outside of Panama City. The Kuna, indigenous people of Panama and Colombia, are known for their beaded arm and leg bands, as well as their molas, brightly colored textiles used to adorn blouses and dresses. An outsider of this rich culture, it was unique items such as these that my friend was searching for in the photo.

Photo and Caption by: Sarah Dockery

“The Silent Observer”

This photograph was taken in Soweto, South Africa on June 27, 2007. I caught this boy peering through the fence looking down the alley of shacks that millions of people call home. This is a village with no plumbing or electricity. The boy is looking at a future unlike anything we can imagine.

Photo and Caption by: Peter Hall

“A Stroll to Ever After”

Bob and I had just arrived in Paris to celebrate our 30th wedding anniversary. We dropped off our bags and hurriedly set out to explore the area between our hotel and the Eiffel Tower. As we were walking through the Jardin des Tuileries, I spotted an older couple strolling along, not saying a word to one another. They looked so content and comfortable with their silence. They seemed in no hurry to reach their destination and were only in the moment. This wonderful nameless couple reminded us to slow down and to appreciate our moment.

It was not until after the photograph was downloaded that we noticed the dark tunnel in front of them. There is a sense of uncertainty of what is beyond, but comfort in knowing they will reach it together. With this in mind, I named the photo – “A stroll to ever after.”

Photo and Caption by: Amy Radford

HIV/AIDS, it is important to note that there are unique biological factors that contribute to an increased vulnerability of women to HIV infection compared to men. In Swaziland, women compose a greater percentage of adults living with HIV than men: 55% to 45% as of 2003 (Kates & Leggoe, 2005). Biologically, women are more likely to contract HIV from heterosexual intercourse than men, because semen, a vector for HIV transmission, enters and remains inside the body. Vaginal secretions are also a vector for infection; however, these fluids do not enter the body as readily or remain as long (Whiteside et al., 2003: 12). In addition, young women are at an even greater risk of infection through heterosexual intercourse because their virginal vaginal tracts are more prone to tearing during intercourse, which leads to blood-semen exposure, another venue for transmission (Whiteside et al., 2003: 17). The vulnerability of young women to HIV is further evident because 75% of HIV-positive individuals aged between 15 and 25 are female (Whiteside et al., 2003: 1). This statistic is also indicative of the practice of intergenerational intercourse because most of the men in this age group have not yet been infected. While these biological factors certainly place females at a higher risk for infection, it is social factors like intergenerational intercourse that are the facilitators of transmission (Whiteside et al., 2003: 17).

The occurrence of intergenerational intercourse is one result of the unequal social, legal, and traditional society of Swaziland, which contributes to the vulnerability of women to HIV. There are numerous gender-biased laws in Swaziland. Adultery is defined differently for each sex. A man can engage in intercourse with any woman, permitted that she is not married to another man (Daly et al. 2001: 26). Women, on the other hand, commit adultery by having sex with any man other than her husband. Swaziland is a traditionally polygamous society, in which only males may take multiple spouses. Economically, women have been severely disad-

vantaged. Women are able to own businesses; however, married women are unable to own property or be granted loans without the authorization of their spouse (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 80). A man may also sell his wife's business, and his family may claim the business upon his death. Men are able to gain property rights through the kukhonta tradition, whereby men swear allegiance to a certain chief in exchange for land (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 80). Women have been excluded from this traditional practice. These unfair laws and traditional practices have placed women in Swaziland into a place of submission to men. Women are economically dependent on their spouse, who can claim any business or possession of his wife (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 80). As a result, women are unable to protect themselves against risky sexual behaviors out of fear of violence and economic ostracism (Daly et al. 2001: 27).

While these gender roles and rights are somewhat lopsided, HIV/AIDS has helped initiate changes to some of these practices. The horrific stories of HIV and AIDS in Africa have garnered sympathetic attention towards those affected by the disease, and this sympathy has, on an international scale, translated into large amounts of foreign aid and support. Swaziland was allocated approximately US$42 million for HIV/AIDS prevention programs in 2006 (Tsela & Odido, 2008: 60). Incidentally, this foreign aid has not been limited to monetary supplements. NGOs, faith-based organizations, and international organizations have been essential in mitigating the impact of HIV in Swaziland. As a result of this widespread attention, HIV/AIDS relief has begun to encompass not only the treatment of the disease but also social factors that contribute to its perpetuation, such as human rights violations, specifically the denigration of women's rights. Improving women's rights and gender equality is now seen as an essential factor in mitigating HIV, at least from an international perspec-

tive. The exposure of gender-biased laws to the international sphere has resulted in external pressure to create gender-neutral laws. This move towards neutrality is evident in a few parts of the recently-drafted constitution, which give women some land ownership rights (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 79).

Some of these international organizations have helped project a unifying voice for gender-neutral change and HIV rights. The International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS (ICW) is an active international membership network of HIV-positive women. The ICW relies on personal testimonies and activism as its primary mode of communication. In Swaziland, it began the Young Women's Dialogues, which consulted twenty young HIV-positive Swazi women about creating an appropriate advocacy agenda to promote their rights in the nation. This organization views young women as a vital front in the fight against HIV and in the fight for women's advancement in Africa. The ICW is one example of the type of women's advocacy groups that have helped create a voice for women in Swaziland (ICW, 2005: 226).

Organizations such as the ICW have spoken out against King Mswati III of Swaziland for his hypocritical practices. In 2001, he re-established the Umcwasho tradition, where young women wear woolen tassels to indicate their abstinence, and he placed a five-year ban on intercourse for this group of young women, hoping to stem the spread of HIV (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 71). In addition to the civil rights violations endemic to the policy, King Mswati violated the ban soon after enacting it, and he paid the fine of one cow to the seventeen-year-old's father. In 2005, he received more criticism for marrying another teenage bride, his thirteenth wife, following the annual reed dance ceremony (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 71). These hypocritical events have been sounding boards for Swazi women to highlight their struggles to the international

community.

In addition to addressing well-known acts of hypocrisy and gender-bias, women living on the fringe of society have not been forgotten by these international organizations. Population Services International (PSI) administered a survey to illegal sex workers in Swaziland. The majority of the sex workers surveyed were female, and there are many social stigmas associated with them, making it easy for them to be forgotten in national development planning (PSI, 2008). However, sex workers in Swaziland are very likely to greatly contribute to the spread of HIV. Swaziland is a highly mobile society where men often travel alone either between rural and urban areas or between Swaziland and South Africa for work (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 81). Men traveling on their own tend to have different behaviors than when they are in company, behaviors that may often include engaging in very high-risk sex (Whiteside et al., 2003: 34). These behaviors may also contribute to the relatively equal prevalence of HIV throughout Swaziland. PSI has begun to reach out to these sex workers to gauge their knowledge of HIV, their access to knowledge about HIV/AIDS, and their use of condoms in order to determine if services are needed or need to be expanded to incorporate this small but highly influential sect into HIV/AIDS planning (PSI, 2008).

Through the internationalization of gender issues and HIV in Swaziland, some progress has been made regarding the empowerment of women. Swaziland has viewed HIV/AIDS as a part of its national development plans since 1992, and the publicity of the importance of women in the spread of HIV has led to the consideration of women as a part of development programs (Evans, 2006: 6). The Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) is a transmission prevention program that provides antenatal care to HIV-positive mothers. The target of this initiative is to ensure that 80% of pregnant HIV-positive women have access to

PMTCT by 2010 (Evans, 2006: 8). In addition to this antenatal care, other programs help prevent unintended pregnancies and help infected mothers learn how to care for and support their infected children.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Swaziland has led to the creation of innovative yet traditionally-based communal structures that impact HIV/AIDS support, development, and gender empowerment at many levels. Swaziland won the "Best Practice Collection: Helping Communities Help Themselves" award from the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in 2006 (Evans, 2006: 1). This award is given for innovative and successful responses to HIV/AIDS. Swaziland established three innovative structures that contributed to this award: Neighborhood Care Points (NCPs), Indlunkhulu Fields, and KaGogo Social Centers. While these structures were initiated by Swazi communities, their spread and support was facilitated by the Swazi government and through numerous international contributors and NGOs such as The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the Global Fund, and the European Community Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) (Evans, 2006: 19). Contributions of the international community, support from the Swazi government, and desire and hard work from Swazi communities has made these initiatives successful.

NCPs were created as a community response to the growing number of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in the community. OVC consist of children who have lost one or more parents to AIDS and children who are at risk of losing at least one of their parents to AIDS (i.e. have an HIV-positive parent). OVC are one of the most visible impacts of AIDS (Evans, 2006: 20). There are an estimated 130,000 OVC in Swaziland, and this number is expected to rise to almost 200,000 by 2010 (Whiteside & Whalley, 2007: 30). There is no Swazi synonym for the western concept of "orphan" (Evans, 2006: 11). Orphaned children are cared for

either by aunts and uncles, or most often by grandparents (Evans, 2006: 11). Grandparents caring for OVC have helped mask the true number of OVC in Swaziland. In addition, grandparents are not a long-term solution to the growing population of OVC, because as grandparents die, the number of child-headed households increases. Child-headed households and OVC have begun to further strain Swaziland's ability to cope with HIV/AIDS in general by increasing the number of individuals in need of aid, and as the grandparents and extended families of these children die, this strain will increase (Evans, 2006: 31).

The first Neighborhood Care Point was created by women in the Mambatfweni community in order to try to set up a project to support the startling number of orphans in their community. The women were able to garner 80 bags of maize and water tanks from NERCHA and were given the responsibility of distributing these rations (Evans, 2006: 17). More care points were established as a result of women requesting training and support from the Deputy Prime Minister's Office. NCPs originally offered one hot meal a day for the attending OVC, and inadvertently, this setting also provided them with invaluable psychosocial interactions as well as informal educational opportunities. NCPs have since evolved into child development centers specifically aimed at reintegrating OVC into Swazi culture (Evans, 2006: 18). Children at some NCPs are taught how to farm on their own plots of land. This provides them with not only essential knowledge, but also a source of pride and ownership, which is central to their morale and development (Evans, 2006: 17). UNICEF has been instrumental in this transformation by providing training for caregivers to understand the trauma that these children have suffered. UNICEF has also provided literate caregivers and "School in a Box kits," which have helped integrate OVC into formal education circles (Evans, 2006: 18). Many NCPs have access to clean water, sanitation structures, and even structural

buildings, which indicate UNICEF and Swaziland's commitment to the permanence and success of these NCPs to reintegrate OVC into Swazi society.

There are numerous effects of NCPs. NCPs have made OVC visible within their communities. This visibility has allowed communities, international organizations, and the Swazi government to coalesce to help these children and provide the infrastructure necessary to support this growing demographic. Communities, as well as women, have gained a sense of empowerment through their efforts to initiate, build, and manage NCPs. The NCPs have provided an invaluable service to OVC by providing a safe environment for children to eat, interact, develop, and learn. NCPs also serve as a mechanism for non-formal and formal education and are able to integrate some children into a more formal educational setting. During times of drought, NCPs have served as emergency suppliers of food to this vulnerable population. Finally, NCPs have influenced national development programs and policies, highlighting the success and future of community based initiatives and encouraging the decentralization of HIV/AIDS infrastructure. (Evans, 2006: 23)

Indlunkhulu fields were a traditional practice in which the Chief allocated land for communal purposes of growing crops. This practice has been reinvigorated, largely in response to the growing food crisis in Swaziland that has affected nearly one fifth of the nation (Evans, 2006: 23). While a food crisis may not seem directly linked to HIV, HIV is actually more easily transmitted to mal- and undernourished individuals. The growing number of OVC has also influenced the revival of this practice to help the community feed these children. Indlunkhulu fields provide communities with more than just food for the needy; they develop and strengthen the feeling of community through people working together for a common goal (Evans, 2006: 24). Indlunkhulu fields also are a ground

for agricultural knowledge expansion. Through the interaction with other farmers, better agricultural practices are shared within the community.

Indlunkhulu fields have promised and accomplished much since their implementation in 2002. There are over 350 chiefdoms working with or developing Indlunkhulu fields. These fields have helped reinvigorate communities through common goals and the sharing of knowledge. Indlunkhulu fields have made communities more self-sufficient, providing them with a sense of pride and confidence. Community involvement in these fields ensures that the distribution of these resources will be fair and transparent. They are also a conduit for the exchange of agricultural information; with support and interaction with Agricultural Extension Officers from the Ministry of Agriculture, better farming methods have been spread. (Evans, 2006: 25-26)

The second revived traditional structure is the KaGogo social center, which serves multiple functions within the community. The term KaGogo means in Siswati "grandmother's house," and it refers to an area of refuge and neutrality where discussions can take place to resolve family disputes (Evans, 2006: 27). KaGogo centers are now being used to "provide a formal and physical centre for coordinating community initiatives and a forum for discussions and meetings about how to respond to the epidemic's impact" (Evans, 2006: 30). These centers serve as an outreach point for other services such as education, food distribution, and HIV/AIDS awareness for the community. They are instrumental in collecting community data that helps shape national policies.

KaGogo centers are also a source of empowerment for communities. The communities elect leaders who help run and coordinate the center (Tsela & Odido, 2008: 52). Also, the centers are constructed by the communities, which supply both the labor and the materials (Evans, 2006: 27). Microfinance programs have been implemented by the government and

civil societies through these structures (Tsela & Odido, 2008: 46). Microfinance provides women with access to communal funds to use in entrepreneurial activities; however, these loans come with a 20% interest rate from which all women who participate in these microfinance "schemes" receive dividends (Evans, 2006: 23). Thus, there is a great incentive to invest these funds wisely and pay back the loan not only for individual benefit, but also for the group's benefit. Microfinance systems can be seen as a step towards fiscal autonomy for women in Swaziland.

Although women are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS in Swaziland, HIV/AIDS has initiated some change in their status in terms of GAD. Gender equality has recently begun to be seen as a necessity for stemming the spread of HIV, and as a result, the material condition of Swazi women has begun to slightly improve. Women under the new constitution are able to own property, albeit for domestic purposes only. Microfinance systems have enabled women to access loans, and they benefit from personally utilizing these loans as well as through the shared revenue garnered from the interest payments made by other women on their loans. In addition, infrastructure for HIV/AIDS antenatal care has provided women with treatment and education that has spread to other generations and other women. Thus, women have a greater ability to improve their material condition as a result of HIV/AIDS. Since HIV/AIDS has been seen as one of the primary deterrents of development in Swaziland, the nation has begun focusing on ways to stem the spread of the virus as a development strategy rather than just a national health strategy. As women are affected more by HIV/AIDS than men, women have become a focus in Swaziland's national development plans. The voices of women's advocacy groups, such as the ICW, have begun to alter gender norms and the nature of patriarchy. King Mswati III has been under great scrutiny from these organizations for his hypocritical practices and gender biased laws.

According to GAD criteria, HIV/AIDS has helped empower women by improving their social status to some degree.

These gains by Swaziland, and specifically Swazi women, are a promising sign of the resilience of its society to handle the HIV/AIDS emergency. However, it seems that these gains are primarily short-term gains that will either regress or become nonentities if further measures are not taken within the nation to prevent and limit the spread of HIV/AIDS. Despite the efforts of the Swazi government, Swazi communities, and the international community, the prevalence rate of HIV has continued to increase. This increase resulted in a negative population growth rate beginning in 2004, which is predicted to continue through 2050 (Whiteside & Whalley, 2007: 26). Swaziland faces issues of funding, capacity, a declining economy, and a massive need for antiretroviral drug therapy (ART). Yet the main need of Swaziland is a change in behavioral patterns to mitigate the spread of HIV.

The funding situation within Swaziland is an interesting case. The nation has the highest prevalence rate of any nation on Earth, and its funding for HIV/AIDS from the international community has been fairly minimal. Swaziland has a relatively high GDP per capita, which places them in the low-middle income country range (Whiteside & Whalley, 2007: 59). This range does not garner the same amount of international aid that other, poorer nations receive. Swaziland desperately needs this funding to initiate programs to help with capacity, economic, and ART issues.

Capacity is a huge issue for any nation facing an HIV/AIDS epidemic, and capacity deficiencies often accompany insufficient funding. Swaziland has felt capacity strains within both the health sector and the education sector. Around 50% of hospital beds are occupied by HIV/AIDS patients, which strains the ability of individuals to access health care (Daly et al., 2001: 33). Health care workers have also been infected with

HIV, limiting the number of trained individuals in the nation. Education has been severely handicapped by HIV/AIDS, both in terms of students and teachers. Student attendance rates are low as a result of OVC and of higher incidences of poverty. Young adults not enrolled in school are the most likely population to contract and spread HIV (Physicians for Human Rights, 2007: 69). In addition, the number of properly qualified teachers has been strained by losses due to HIV/AIDS. The education system, on average, now employs less educated and experienced teachers, diminishing the quality of education within Swaziland (Daly et al., 2001: 33). Capacity issues have had deleterious effects on the economy of Swaziland. Foreign investment in business and industry is lacking because of the necessity to constantly train new individuals, replacing those lost to HIV/AIDS (Daly et al., 2001: 31). This cost is substantial; as a result, businesses are likely to invest in less vulnerable markets.

ART is a promising front for combating HIV/AIDS in Swaziland. ART has recently become more affordable and can be widely distributed among the populous. This therapy can lengthen the lives of individuals by delaying the transition of HIV into AIDS. This delay increases the economic capacity of those affected by HIV/AIDS, which include the most economically productive age groups in society. ART has the possibility to improve the Swazi economy; however, a massive roll-out of these drugs is needed and will need to be sustained to impact the nation. (Whiteside et al., 2003: 44)

While Swaziland certainly is in need of more funding, better capacity, and accessible ART, what is truly needed in Swaziland to reverse the prevalence rate of HIV is behavioral change. Uganda is one of two nations that have shown a peak in HIV prevalence, meaning that HIV prevalence is now declining. Its prevalence rates fell from 21.1% to 9.7% from 1991to 1998 (Whiteside et al., 2003: 45). Uganda did not have access to

ART therapy during this period or any prior period. Its main mechanism for reducing the spread of HIV was through a reduction in non-regular sexual partners. Between 1989 and 1995, there was a 60% reduction in non-regular sexual partners (Whiteside et al., 2003: 45). This does not mean that Ugandans practiced abstinence for six years; rather, Ugandans tended to maintain committed sexual relationships, involving only one individual (Whiteside et al., 2003: 45).

This decrease in non-regular sexual intercourse resulted from a variety of factors, all of which are reproducible within Swaziland. Education played an important role in Uganda; as early as 1989, 85.2% of the population believed that AIDS could be avoided (Whiteside et al., 2003: 45). This indicates that Ugandans were optimistic about their ability to avoid infection, and this outlook translated into their actions. Communication about HIV/AIDS was also one of the main deterrents to its spread. There was a united front between the communities and the national government regarding HIV/AIDS; the community and government reinforced each other (Whiteside et al., 2003: 44). A dialogue was also created among families and communities about HIV/AIDS. One specific interaction was between mother and daughters and/or aunts and daughters, resulting in the education and empowerment of women to resist sexual advances and demand one-partner relationships. There was also an emotional force driving this assault on HIV/AIDS in Uganda, because a large proportion of the population - over 85% - knew someone who had died of AIDS (Whiteside et al., 2003: 46). Many other nations have promoted condom usage to stem the prevalence of HIV; however, condoms were not promoted in Uganda until the initial decline had already occurred by 1995. There, behavioral change was the primary mechanism for a decline in HIV prevalence.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Swaziland has had conflicting impacts. The first effect is the strain that HIV/AIDS has placed on the Swazi

society, economy, and health care system. The majority of HIV/AIDS victims fall within the economically productive age range. Thus, HIV/AIDS significantly limits the capacity and quality of education and health care, and it limits the growth of the economy directly due to the loss of this age group and through decreased foreign investment interests. Stress has also been placed on the Swazi economy, culture, and society by the continuously rising number of orphaned and vulnerable children. However, these negative effects have also served as a stimulus for change within Swaziland.

One of the primary reasons for Swaziland's high HIV prevalence rate has been its unequal gender laws, which place women, who are biologically more susceptible to HIV infection than men, into a place of economic and societal subordination and further increase their susceptibility to HIV infection. These gender-biased laws have come under national and international scrutiny for their hypocrisy and facilitation of the spread of HIV. Women's activist groups, such as the ICW, have publicized Swaziland's gender inequalities and have helped pressure the government for policy changes. While initial HIV/AIDS relief came in the form of health care support, recent initiatives, such as the KaGogo Social Centers, have taken a more proactive approach to limiting HIV spread through promoting education and providing novel economic opportunities to Swazi women. These innovative approaches accord with GAD theory, which stresses the need for gender neutrality. One sign of the change in women's empowerment in Swaziland is the development of Neighborhood Care Points, which were created by women in the Mambatfweni community to help support orphans within their community. Gender equality in Swaziland has become an international issue, and has begun to be seen as a necessary event to improve the HIV/AIDS crisis.

Swaziland faces a multitude of complications within the HIV/

AIDS crisis, but one easily implemented measure must be taken for HIV prevalence to decrease. Sexual behavioral change needs to be initiated in Swaziland. It requires very little infrastructure and has proven to be highly effective. One-partner relationships would stem HIV spread as well as begin a transformation away from the gender-biased, repressive practice of polygamy. Intergenerational intercourse would abate, and young populations would be predominantly HIV negative. This measure should be taken within Swaziland. However, neither foreign aid nor international intervention can initiate these behavioral changes; only the citizens of Swaziland can alter these practices and thus curb the spread of HIV.

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Ecotourism: a New Path to Development?

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Introduction

With the recent realization of the extent of the negative effects of human behavior on the environment (think: global warming), environmentally friendly practices are in ever-higher demand. In spite of having fewer resources, developing countries are joining developed countries in taking action to reduce their negative environmental impact. For example, the percentage of Costa Rica's annual energy consumption comprised of clean energy (an example of an environmentally-friendly policy) has jumped from just 27% in 1995, to 41% in 2005 (WDI, 2007). Media sources and scientists worldwide encourage people to reduce their negative environmental impact not only in the context of their daily actions, but also in their leisure activities. One such leisure industry is travel. With the rise of the importance of all things "eco-friendly," the ecotourism industry has recently been expanding. But what exactly are the social and political implications of ecotourism? Is there a significant difference in the impact of ecotourism versus traditional tourism on the quality of development?

Though many papers have examined the issue of ecotourism at the individual case study level (Gawande, 2007; McAlpin, 2008; Lee, 2007) or in terms of its general characteristics (Butcher, 2007; Dowling, 2003), they do not provide a model by which the gains from ecotourism can be compared to those of traditional tourism. This study creates a model in which ecotourism's costs and benefits can be compared to those of traditional tourism as a tool for evaluating its impact on a nation's political and economic structure. These costs and benefits encompass not only the economic gains from each industry, but also the industries' impact as a means for develop-

ing countries to protect the natural and cultural aspects of their heritage that they value most. The study begins with a discussion and definition of ecotourism. It then describes various measures of the quality of development and develops a model for the analysis of the impact of each type of tourism on development quality. The study provides insight into the future of this popular new industry and provides a model which will not only be interesting to travelers and environmentalists, but also will have useful applications for policy makers and industry specialists around the world.

Theoretical Basis and Conceptualization of Key Terms

Before an analysis of tourism can commence, definitions of traditional tourism and ecotourism are in order. Traditional tourism is defined as any activity involving travel for reasons of leisure, business, education, or religion (Diamond, 1977). It is said to transect many parts of not only the economy, but the social and political makeup of the world itself, ranging from "the hotel industry to National Parks authorities, from tourist boards to government departments, and from tour operators to conservationist organizations" (Cater, 1995: 21). With so many interests represented in one industry, it is difficult to precisely measure gains and losses to a country as a whole. Thus, it is necessary to review tourism's impact by constituency. As each action within the industry will have negative effects for some and positive impacts for others, it is important to maximize net benefits by minimizing the negative and maximizing the positive.

A growing specialization within tourism that is meant to counteract some of the negative impacts of traditional tourism on social and environmental structures is ecotourism. As stated by David Vaughan:

> There are no definitions that adequately cover ecotourism as practiced in all countries, but typically it suggests a type of tourism involving small to medium-sized operators, low environmental im-

> pact infrastructure (including community lodging), a recognition of local culture and a willingness to forgo some Western comforts in the interests of sustainable development. (Vaughan, 2000: 285)

This growing subfield of "sustainable development" purports to "[meet] the needs of present tourists and host regions while protecting and enhancing opportunities for the future" (Vaughan, 2000: 286). In other words, ecotourism targets the perceived gaps in tourism and attempts to remedy them by emphasizing the tourist's environmental and social awareness, facilitated by increased cultural interaction. Sustainable development takes this one step further by creating a framework for tourism that provides revenue without depleting the non-renewable resources on which this tourism relies.

The International Ecotourism Society outlines its principles for ecotourism, a set of guidelines that may prove helpful in recognizing programs as specifically ecotourism- oriented. They are as follows:

- minimize impact
- build environmental and cultural awareness and respect
- provide positive experiences for both visitors and hosts
- provide direct financial benefits for conservation
- provide financial benefits and empowerment for local people
- raise sensitivity to host countries' political, environmental, and social climate. (The International Ecotourism Society, 2008)

According to a 1999 submission made by the German Development Agency, "the most promising initiatives (in terms of ecotourism objectives) are those that link resource conservation and local participation with professionalism in the tourism business, entrepreneurial thinking and market orientation" (Vaughan, 2000: 293). In other words, for ecotourism to maximize net benefits, initiatives must begin locally and be steered by locals while connecting to the wider world in a thoroughly professional manner. They also must be open to changes in the market and responsive to consumer preferences.

This paper looks in depth at the negative and positive impacts of traditional tourism and ecotourism, which can be described by the

term 'externalities'. Though each industry has the obvious effect of income generation, there is also a range of external effects resulting from them. The positive impacts may include environmental protection, cultural preservation, development of infrastructure, and decreased poverty, while the negative effects could include environmental degradation, lack of sustainability, and destruction of natural resources in the case of, for example, a multinational resort chain that builds an enormous, fully air-conditioned high rise with multiple swimming pools on a pristine beach.

With the recognition of these external effects comes the ability to attempt to include them in the price of the good; with this inclusion comes the ability to better measure the true worth of tourism services. By conceptualizing goals of environmental and cultural protection, ecotourism begins to include these externalities in its travel package, and thus allows consumers to express their value for these activities. Though it is difficult to put a precise price on factors such as environmental and cultural protection, the addition of some sort of premium to pay for these beneficial effects of the industry causes the true value of ecotourism to be more fully defined. This in turn creates the ability for the market to express its true demand for travel services with external benefits (ecotourism) versus traditional tourism.

Because of the importance of consumer preferences in tourism, the profile of the tourist is also an important factor to take into consideration. There are several ways to define the profile of a tourist. Travel for pleasure has been said to be divisible into locations that satisfy "sunlust" and those that satisfy "wanderlust" (Diamond, 1977: 548). "Sunlust" destinations offer the opportunity to enjoy the natural endowments of a place such as beaches or sunshine, and encompass such destinations as resorts. "Wanderlust" destinations provide a traveler with the opportunity to learn about a new culture and experience its institutions and cuisine (Diamond, 1977). Into this second category falls cultural tourism, defined as travel in which "the dominant

tourist motivation is to experience the local cultures" (Wood, 1980: 573).

Another method of profiling the traveler is specific to the environmental sector. This also categorizes them based on their motivations for traveling into one of four categories: "hard core" travelers, who are often scientists or belong to environmental groups; "dedicated travelers", who travel solely to see protected areas; "mainstream" tourists, who participate in an eco-trip such as a visit to the Amazon simply for the experience; and "casual" tourists, who go to a protected area in the course of a more expansive trip (Vaughan, 2000: 286). Members of each of these groups will have varying interest in how much of an impact they make on the country they are visiting relative to how much they are enjoying a relaxing vacation. In other words, while scientists may not mind camping out to see a rare species of bird, a casual tourist will often prefer to stay in a nice hotel with their access to the country's natural environment facilitated by a guided tour. Such profiles are very important because they reflect the desires of the tourist and the demands that they will place on the host economy.

As this paper focuses on tourism in the context of being a resource for development, it is important to work from a theoretical base that incorporates development theories. The disparity between developed and less developed nations has been a recurrent theme in world politics. Linked to this acknowledgement of disparity have been numerous attempts to create a means to overcome it and bring about the development of the group of countries known by terms such as the 'third world', 'developing world', and the 'global South'. These attempts have manifested themselves in an array of theories regarding the best pathway to closing the gap of inter-state economic disparity and explaining the nature of the relationship between developed and developing nations. These theories are important in the study of tourism as it is one of the most direct means of interaction between countries. Tourism not only links countries

economically, but it also transmits cultural knowledge across borders.

One theory regarding international relationships is dependency theory. This theory argues that the economic situations existing in the developing world are a result of the origins of states' relations with one another. As Driscoll (2004:63) argues, "it's indisputable that the end of formal colonialism saw trade and capital largely 'mimicking' previous colonial structures…colonial-like profits continued in the resource sectors, and technological rents resulting from the shift to the production of producer goods in the North led to neocolonial dependency." In other words, the relationships established under colonial rule changed in name alone, while their nature remained the same. Additionally, "imperialism, it also seems reasonable to suppose, has not been unrelated to the industrialization of the Western center and the non industrialization of the periphery" (Hopkins, 1969:133). According to dependency theory, the modernized nature of developed countries rests solely on their previous ability to extract resources from their colonies without reservation. A necessary component of this ability was to keep the colony in a permanent non-industrialized state so that it would be helpless in terms of restructuring its relationship with the developed world.

This theory would have much to say about the role of tourism in a developing country's economy. Dependency theorists would see tourism as a visible sign of the continued aggression of the developed country. For example,

> The luxury required for [foreign] clientele may at best stimulate the 'demonstration effect' [in which a person's wealth is ostentatiously displayed, furthering visible perceptibility of economic stratification] and at worse exacerbate feelings of resentment toward foreigners, and in some countries it has given rise to the accusation of 'neocolonialism'. (Diamond, 1977: 540)

As a resource, tourism would be seen as being mobilized for the benefit of the citizens of developed countries at the expense of the developing. The way in which citizens of developed nations participate in the economy and society

of developed nations would imply that tourism, while generating revenue, does not provide tools for the developing country but rather is another channel through which the developing country can be exploited. Dependency theorists "believe that development can and will proceed rapidly only when the existing elites have been forcefully removed from power" (Hopkins, 1969:133). Thus, the involvement of tourists in controlling the framework and development related to tourism would serve to perpetuate the system in which the developing countries are subservient to the developed. As ecotourism involves a consciousness of the cultural and ecological uniqueness of each country and an emphasis on local control of programming, it may receive a better review under dependency theory than traditional tourism.

Another view of development that has been proffered is that of modernization theory. "Modernization theory is often referred to as 'convergence theory', which… assumed that all places would eventually 'converge' into simulacra [likeness] of the United States" (Driscoll, 2004:73). In other words, the theory argues that all countries have the potential for equal development, and eventually will converge in a state of equality. The theory also argues that:

> Modernization is a revolutionary process. This follows directly from the contrasts between modern and traditional society. The one differs fundamentally from the other, and the change from tradition to modernity consequently involves a radical and total change in patterns of human life. (Driscoll, 2004:74)

In other words, developed countries have a homogenous cultural form that must be followed in order for a country to attain a high level of development. This theory thus implies that cultural diversity is in opposition to development.

However, this paper argues that tourism, especially ecotourism, as a tool for development actually gives the people of the developing country the means to protect their cultural heritage. In the case of ecotourism in particular, such cultural differences are the basis for the unique experiences that each developing country has to offer the tourist. Thus, the modernization

theorist's prediction that "as modernized development moves to advanced stages, socio-cultural difference is narrowed and ultimately eliminated" (Driscoll, 2004:74) is actually the opposite of ecotourism's predicted effects.

One international studies theory that particularly caters to an economic view of behavior is the rational choice model. It "starts with the assumption that actors know what they want and can order their wants transitively" (Riker, 1995:24). Humans have wants and will follow the behavior most likely to facilitate their attainment of these wants. This can also be abstracted to the state level. Because a state is an aggregation of the wants of a people, or groups of people, it acts in much the same way as an individual in that a state will make choices in such a way as to maximize the potential for accomplishing its goals.

The problem with this theory in general is that it assumes that a state can determine how to achieve its goals in the best way possible. As Riker states, "the assumption does imply that actors try to choose the best means to their ends. But while we assume that they can order their goals, we do not assume that they necessarily know the appropriate means" (Riker, 1995:25). When looking at the effects of ecotourism, it is implied that there are groups within the state with differing and sometimes contradictory goals. While rational choice theory can explain the motivations of each group, it is not as useful in looking at the overall effect of tourism on quality of development in the state as a whole.

However, the market may provide a means to counteract the lack of differentiation between groups within the state. When a market emerges, it means that there are people willing to sell a good and people willing to consume that good, be it bananas or tourism. Then, according to how much the suppliers are willing to sell the good for and how much consumers are willing to pay, a price is reached. With the presence of externalities, this price does not accurately reflect true supply and demand for the good because of

the incomplete expression of its costs and benefits until these externalities are conceptualized in a way in which they can be included in the price. For example, if a company builds a factory, and the cost to the environment of the pollution generated by that factory is not taken into account, the price of the good will be too low. Therefore, more of the good will be produced than is optimal for the consumers within the host environment, given the pollution that comes with it. Once the pollution is added into the price, however, there will be less people willing to pay the higher price demanded to offset pollution's effects, reducing the amount of the good produced as well as pollution.

The same situation can be applied to ecotourism. Because environmental and cultural protection are monetarily costly, taking them into consideration will raise the costs of associated tourism. With the inclusion of the value of these protections in the price of the good, consumers can make a choice about how much they value protection versus being able to take an inexpensive vacation. This choice goes back to the idea that there are groups of tourists with differing values. Due to the differences in their values, each group will make a different, but rational, choice to pay for what is most important to them. With this scenario, the market expresses how much of each type of tourism truly ought to be produced to maximize the satisfaction of both supplier (local) and consumer (tourist), and at what price they should be valued.

While each of these theories can be applied to certain questions asked in this paper, none is effective in addressing the entire range of issues involved in analyzing ecotourism and traditional tourism's impact on the quality of a country's development. For this, one must look to theories specifically developed around the topic of tourism. As Stronza (2001:261) says, "tourism can be an ideal context for studying issues of political economy, social change and development, natural resource management, and cultural identity and expression," a very far-reaching range of issues. Therefore, a theoretical base for the study of ecotourism and its effects on development

must take into account the differing motivations and perspectives involved in this subject. This paper will work from a base grounded in the idea that there are two primary sides to tourism, the perspective of the host country (suppliers of tourism) and that of the tourists (those that demand tourism), as well as the perspectives of groups within each country. Thus, a comprehensive view of tourism's effects must take into account all perspectives and the resultant differences in opinion about the impact of tourist activities.

In studying this field, one must also realize that tourism is a changing industry. Due to increasing emphasis on consideration of the environment and a reaction against the global homogenization of culture represented for some by the spread of American fast food chains across the world, demand for products that espouse environmental and cultural protection has been increasing. In response, "in the past decade or so, the tourism industry has taken major shifts toward goals of economic and ecological sustainability, local participation, and environmental education" (Stronza, 2001:263). A look at these shifts will aid in the differentiation between new "eco" methods of tourism and traditional forms in order to better study the differences in their impact. In ecotourism lies "the idea that tourism can serve as a unifying force in modern societies, bringing people together to define collectively the places, events, and symbols that are deemed important and somehow meaningful" (Stronza, 2001:265-6). An analysis from this point of view looks at the ability of ecotourism to give a voice to minority groups and traditionally underdeveloped countries around the world.

Of importance in this perspective is the idea of commodification, a word that is interchangeable with commoditization. "'Commodification of culture' has been used to describe a process by which things come to be evaluated primarily in terms of their exchange value, in a context of trade, thereby becoming goods" (Stronza, 2001:270). In other words, tourism can be viewed as a means by which a culture can actually become

a good for the consumption of visitors. Culture, the environment, the alleviation of poverty and the other externalities associated with ecotourism can be shown, through commoditization, to have value to locals and travelers alike by the instating and payment of a premium to reflect the impact of the industry on these areas of the host country's social and physical environment. Such commoditization provides monetary incentive for the perpetuation of environmentally and culturally friendly activities and may, for example, allow small indigenous cultures to protect themselves from losing their traditional way of life because of the value that this tradition is shown to have when tourists are willing to pay extra to protect it.

Though this mode of theory borrows elements from all of the development theories previously discussed, it contains the key aspect that it provides a theoretical overview of the perspectives of both tourist and host country, essential to determining the quality of development specifically as it relates to traditional tourism versus ecotourism.

Mode of Analysis

In addition to a theoretical base, a model must be developed to facilitate a comparison of traditional and environmental forms of tourism. It is important to note that this paper assumes that minority indigenous groups will be likely to be at the lower end of the income distribution, and thus "minority" is used in the sense of groups that may have differing cultural values from the cultural mainstream in the country and are at the low end of the income bracket. The first step in comparing the effects of ecotourism versus traditional tourism is to separate their impact from each other and from all other factors aside from tourism that may be correlated with traditional tourism and ecotourism and impact the quality of development, such as a country's infrastructure before the introduction of tourism, other sources of GDP besides tourism, political stability,

quality of existing natural resources, number of non-governmental organizations present in the country, and amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. This separation allows for a more detailed analysis of the changes in quality of development affected by each variable.

In order for this comparison to have meaning, a further analysis of the variables must occur. In this study, the "quality of development" is defined through a number of factors including tourism's effect on income distribution and poverty, whether or not increased income distribution leads to a greater political voice for minorities, the extent of environmental protection (which affects citizens' quality of life through its impact on water and air quality), the development of infrastructure resulting from tourism, the number and quality of jobs brought by tourism, and finally the effects of each type of tourism on GDP per capita. Each of these variables can be explained further.

The first variable that can be extrapolated from "quality of development" is the effect of traditional tourism and ecotourism on income distribution. Another way to interpret income distribution is by defining it as income inequality. While the author recognizes that each human comes with a unique set of skills and abilities which do and ought to result in variation in income, one must also recognize that "the way individuals or households perceive their position in society is an important aspect of their welfare" (World Bank, 2008). In addition, the equality of income distribution may have an effect on the political system in the host country as well, though this will be discussed later on in the paper.

According to the World Bank, the Gini coefficient of inequality is the most commonly used measure of income inequality. It assigns each country a coefficient between zero and one, with one being complete inequality (where one person has all of the income or consumption in a country while all others have none) (World Bank, 2008). Therefore, this paper uses the Gini as its measurement of the equality of income distribution. To analyze how they

affect the Gini coefficients, traditional tourism and ecotourism must again be separated from each other and from the combined effect of other variables that could influence the equality of income distribution such as programs to combat capital flight, tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax competition (Gurtner, 2006) instated by the government, the variance in education levels among the population, or government expenditure on redistribution programs.

While dependency theorists would predict that both traditional tourism and ecotourism would cause an increase in Gini, as they would be systems perpetuated by developed countries to extract wealth, benefiting only the few elite enablers of this extraction within the host economy, modernization theory would argue the opposite. Because both traditional tourism and ecotourism are means of development, they would cause a homogenization of the culture, evening out wealth distribution as well. The tourism and ecotourism theories on the other hand have yet another view. They would predict that, while traditional tourism causes a stratification of the host economy and thus increases the Gini, ecotourism focuses on equalizing income distribution, decreasing Gini. This paper sides with the tourism theories.

Another way to look at this effect is through a measure of the poverty rate in a country. This mode of analysis follows that of the Gini model, simply substituting a measure of poverty available through the World Bank Database for the Gini coefficient. The World Bank defines the poverty rate as "the percentage of the population living below the poverty line deemed appropriate for the country by its authorities. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys" (World Bank, 2008). This is interpreted just like the Gini model, resulting in similar predictions. The only difference is that the poverty model looks at the reduction of poverty in the host country as a means of looking at the developmental progress made.

The next factor of quality of development to look at is whether or not increased income distribution leads to a greater political voice for mi-

norities. This is more or less an extension of the Gini coefficient model and serves to investigate the extent of the impact of traditional tourism versus ecotourism on the host society in the area of politics. To determine this, one must look at the factors that affect minority representation. For this analysis, the dependent variable is the percentage of representational offices in government held by members of the particular minority. Variables that affect minority representation in government include the percentage of the population composed of the particular minority being analyzed, the effect of income inequality on the percentage of minorities in political office, a ratio of the campaign spending by candidates of the particular minority versus that of non-minority candidates, the length of time that the oldest party representing that particular minority has been in existence, the percentage of those that voted that belong to the particular minority group, and the effect of government type on minority representation. In keeping with the previous predictions, one would estimate that increased levels of ecotourism would result in increased minority representation due to decreased Gini, an increased minority to non-minority campaign spending ratio, and increased percentage of minority voters, while increased levels of tourism would not make any particular difference.

Another component of the quality of development is its impact on the natural environment of the host country. This can be analyzed by looking at traditional tourism, ecotourism, the diminishing effects of ecotourism on the environment (in that it only provides positive results up to a certain point, after which its size causes it to have a negative impact), the percentage of the land that is inhabited, the pollution levels in the country, and the percentage of land that is protected by either the government or non-governmental organizations and how these factors effect environmental quality.

In keeping with the theories of tourism and ecotourism, ecotourism is predicted to increase environmental quality through decreased pollution

levels and increased levels of protected land, in addition to direct increases through increased ecotourism. This rise in environmental quality is limited, though, because after a certain point of expansion, factors such as the percentage of inhabited land would increase to the point where positive environmental impacts would be crowded out by increased population in and traffic through natural areas. The diminishing effects of ecotourism show this effect. Tourism does not have the same emphasis on environmental protection as ecotourism. It is expected to increase the percentage of inhabited land, through migration to areas where jobs are available, and pollution, through increased levels of consumption, with no particular regard for the environment while not having any particular effect on the percentage of protected land.

Another element of development that affects how people live is the amount of infrastructure in a community. The existence and extent of infrastructure affects the mobility of people and goods across the country and makes the country more attractive to foreign investors. Thus, it is important to analyze tourism's effects on infrastructure by looking at traditional tourism and ecotourism as well as other variables that may influence the development of infrastructure such as the tax policy (how much revenue the government has available to potentially spend on infrastructure), the prevalence of motorized vehicles in the country, the distance between major cities, and how the population is distributed (is it concentrated in a couple of major cities, or spread throughout many smaller communities) and analyzing their impact on the level of infrastructure development in the country. Because both traditional tourism and ecotourism are forms of development, both would be expected to increase the level of infrastructure development. Ecotourism is predicted to minimize the negative effects of this expansion on the environment.

Yet another factor to take into consideration when thinking about the difference between traditional tourism and ecotourism is the quality of jobs created in each industry. Higher quality jobs have two components: the abil-

ity to maintain a traditional lifestyle, and the ability to have choices as to what sort of lifestyle to lead in the workforce. Jobs that require less change in traditional structures – those that the indigenous people are accustomed to – (for example, instead of having to train a worker to drive a tour bus, he guides tourists around the land using traditional trade canals and knowledge he already has) allow for greater preservation of lifestyle (time with family, working outdoors as opposed to in the basement of a resort hotel, and so on) and would thus be higher quality jobs. In addition, they would require less investment on the front end because they would not involve the re-education of workers.

While it is recognized that with a change in occupation, some changes in lifestyle will inevitably occur, the presence of different types of development creates the availability to choose the lifestyle one leads. This is reflected in the wage that a worker garners, called "compensating differentials" (Beckham Gramm, 2008). The idea is represented by the model:

wageET + benefits (such as working outdoors, etc.) = wageT.

This shows that in a well-functioning labor market, wages take into account the environment in which one works as well as the task that one is performing. This model predicts that though ecotourism jobs may not pay quite as much, there are external benefits which make the job equally desirable, such as the ability to work in the environment that the employee wishes, being able to direct the programming to some extent (a manner of local control), being part of a business with close ties to the community, and more reasonable hours.

An Anecdotal Analysis

Having established the profiles of different types of tourists and what sort of tourism they demand, an anecdotal look at the benefits and costs of associated tourism is in order. To make the analysis of tourism's impact easier, the type of tourism preferred by each type of tourist can be thought of as a different product. While some tourists look for an economical, re-

laxing vacation, others wish to spend their trip learning, being outdoors, or engaging in any number of other activities. These vacation types will each have a correspondingly different impact on both the traveler and the host country. This will be discussed in further detail later, but for now an analysis of the broad impacts of traditional tourism and ecotourism is in order.

Because ecotourism is such a new field and, to the author's knowledge, a study such as this one has not yet been done, numbers allowing for quantitative analysis of the factors enumerated above are not available. Thus, this paper relies on anecdotal evidence in addition to engaging in inductive reasoning to make general conclusions about traditional tourism and ecotourism. Tourism is theorized to have a significant impact on a country's development. However, it is important to look at this in practice. According to studies by Wood, "during the 1960s, international tourism emerged as the largest single item in world trade, although increases in oil prices in the 1970s have pushed it back to second place" (Wood, 1980:561). Studies show that international tourism is one of the leading sources of revenue for countries around the world, sometimes accounting for over 18% of a developing country's gross domestic product (GDP) (Cater, 1995). Therefore, the way in which a country manages its tourism resources can greatly affect the pattern of its growth and its GDP.

The first aspect to be considered is that which relates to the model of the Gini coefficient from above. Though there is not a set hiring practice in the general tourism industry, the above-mentioned principle set by The International Ecotourism Society to "provide financial benefits and empowerment for local people" manifests itself in a goal to hire as many local people as possible (The International Ecotourism Society, 2008). This, coupled with the emphasis on preservation of local culture, traditions and knowledge theoretically leads to the hiring of local people from all ethnic and social groups. This income then spreads throughout

the economy. In the case of the Galapagos Islands, "hotels, restaurants, and bars hire local workers, pay rents to locals, and purchase local 'intermediate inputs'… payments for these goods and services enter the Galapagos economy, influencing the incomes of local agents who may not have any direct contact with tourists" (Taylor, et al., 2003:981). The focus on hiring from all ethnic groups places money into the pockets of minority groups, lessening their financial barriers to political participation.

To facilitate comparison, it would be useful to gather data on the percentage of local employees in both traditional tourism and ecotourism programs, as well as the wages paid by each industry. In this manner, the magnitude of the difference in the practice of ecotourism versus traditional tourism is measureable. This data would also shed light on the ability of these industries to provide a means of development that avoids the great income gaps that develop when countries use other means of development, such as creating a manufacturing industry. This paper hypothesizes that tourism, especially ecotourism due to its emphasis on hiring local people and protecting local cultures, provides a more even distribution of development-generated wealth.

Problems with tourism that especially relate to dependency theory involve the origins of those that run the tourist industry in a specific country. When the infrastructure for tourism (i.e. the hotels or beach facilities) is provided by a foreign hotel company, this decreases the potential for growth of the host country's economy from tourism, as most of the profits are repatriated to the country of origin of the hotel chain instead of being invested locally (Cater, 1995: 25). Developing countries welcome investment in large chain hotels, but the repatriation of profits, the capital-intensive nature of these hotels, and the large amounts of imports that they require result in a much smaller gain to the developing economy than was expected by its leaders (Wood, 1980). With the use of local social structures and entrepreneurship, less revenue is directed back to the home countries of large hotel chains, resulting in

more of the profits from tourism staying within the host country's economy.

Economically, "tourism earnings can play a significant role towards the achieving" of the goal of "improved standards of living both in the short and long term" in developing countries (Cater, 1995: 21). Such earnings are especially important in developing countries whose economies rely on natural resources (non-renewable) and relatively inexpensive labor (which becomes more expensive as the labor force is educated). Tourism is a direction in which many developed countries move in order to distance themselves from the instability created by basing an economy in products such as agricultural goods whose price fluctuates for many reasons, including weather conditions and world market supply (Cater, 1995: 21). Finding a stable source of income enables economies to develop more fully as, instead of spending money to cover basic needs like they do during economic downturns, governments and citizens can invest in infrastructure and entrepreneurial activities that stimulate growth.

Many studies depict tourism as a burgeoning field. This is supported by the rapid growth in revenues from tourism relative to world trade and the fact that the developed countries (from which tourists usually originate) are creating environments for their citizens that are increasingly conducive to world travel, such as longer paid holidays, rising incomes, and the reduction in flight costs due to increases in technology and competition between such firms as Southwest, Jet Blue, Ryanair, and other low-cost airlines (Diamond, 1977). In the United States alone, travel expenditures of US citizens abroad increased from an estimated $76 billion in 1998 to $81 billion in 1999, including passenger fares (Symposium on Tourism Services, 2001). These indicators show tourism as a source for much-needed stable revenues for developing economies.

This potential for growth in the tourism sector is expected to translate into tangible benefits in the host country (the country which tourists visit). For

example, tourism in Southern Africa is expected "to create over half a million new jobs over the next decade" (2000-2010) and is expected to create "over 1.6 million jobs" from "travel demand" (Vaughan, 2000: 285). This means growth for Southern African economies. Because "tourism is a 'multiproduct' industry with numerous peripheral activities," the actual, complete gains from tourism are difficult to measure (Diamond, 1977: 544). But, it is proffered that "small-scale, locally-owned tourism ventures" are most likely to provide "enhanced standards of living for host populations" (Cater, 1995: 25).

With this growth comes potential for problems. "Increasing wages, fueled by labor-intensive tourist services, create a stimulus to migration from surrounding areas" (Taylor, et al, 2003: 980). Tourism creates opportunities for earnings that attract citizens from poorer areas of the country to centers of tourist attraction. The desirability of tourism jobs and resultant migration are contrary to the environmental goals of ecotourism. As one may imagine, increased population in a previously rural environment such as a rainforest where ecotourism programs are likely to exist brings increased levels of demand from the natural environment. With a larger population relying on the resources of an area in addition to the larger amount of land that this population uses, potential for environmental degradation increases. In response, "the strong links among tourism, economic growth, and migration have created political pressures to restrict tourism and migration in an effort to preserve…unique ecology" (Taylor, et al, 2003: 980). Though ecotourism focuses on bringing small groups to a country and does not encourage large-scale resorts (whose negative effects were outlined previously), to avoid the environmental costs of migration, limits must be set on the number of tourists allowed into an area at a given time. However, such limits cap the economic benefits that ecotourism can provide to an area.

While it seems that ecotourism's benefits are limited because it forces a choice between the premiums paid for the achievement of environmental

goals and the comparatively larger wealth generation possible when these goals are no longer taken into consideration, ecotourism provides other opportunities through its aspect of social-consciousness. Because there is a greater emphasis on environmental and cultural stewardship in ecotourism, there is potential for the premium built into ecotourism's price to compensate for the limitation on expansion of the ecotourism industry that these goals create.

Because ecotourism explicitly values reducing environmental impact through such methods as carbon off-setting and protection of the natural environment, ecotourism is expected to have a much more positive impact in a vacation location. In fact, there are several examples of this. The Sian Ka'an Biosphere Reserve "operates using ecologically responsible technologies, including systems for wetland waste management, rainwater collection, and solar and wind energy generation" (Sian Ka'an Resort, 2008) in an effort to cause as little negative impact on the environment as possible. In addition, ecotourism can help in areas such as Brazil, where poaching, mining, drug trafficking and other behaviors are damaging the Amazon rainforest (Johnson, 2003: 84). Through job creation, ecotourism provides another option to locals trapped by poverty, desperate for a source of income.

Some forms of traditional tourism such as "sunlust" travel, on the other hand, are accompanied by the negative externality (i.e. negative effect of the good not reflected in its market price) of the "congestion caused in favored locations that diminishes their overall attraction" (Diamond, 1977: 540). This situation, exemplified by the beach resorts that cover the Mexican gulf coast for example, demonstrates how the very development of an area for tourism ruins the characteristics for which it was valued as a tourist destination. This is especially prone to happening in areas where low-end tourism is concentrated and in places where the attraction is based on commodities like beaches. In these cases, volume of consumption is emphasized. Though large resort hotels can afford ex-

pensive equipment to adhere to high environmental standards, this is often outweighed by the energy use of their extensive air-conditioned complexes and the water use of their numerous swimming pools (Cater, 1995: 26).

Ecotourism provides a structure for the correction of many of the issues associated with "sunlust" tourism. For example, the emphasis in ecotourism on using traditional traveling accommodations in each host country bypasses a number of obstacles to development. Such accommodations would be much less expensive in terms of the initial investment required because instead of introducing completely new structures, renovation of the existing structures would be all that was required, resulting in a much lower initial investment.

There are other externalities associated with ecotourism that serve to maximize the benefits of ecotourism in spite of the limits necessary for it to preserve its environmental mission. The Nihiwatu Resort in Indonesia partners with the Sumba Foundation (Nihiwatu Resort, 2008), a local non-profit devoted to "lessening the consequences of poverty on the island of Sumba by providing humanitarian aid by fostering village-based projects that impact health (including healthcare services and malaria control), education, water and income-generation, while preserving and respecting the fragile culture and traditions of its people" (The Sumba Foundation, 2008). By donating part of their profits to organizations like this, ecotourism resorts further the goal to equalize living standards in the areas in which they are based.

The next item of interest is to see if higher incomes do in fact lead to increased political voice. Logically, it seems that a higher income would increase one's likelihood of voting because one would have more interest in protecting that income and would also have the leisure time to vote. Additionally, because it costs money to run a campaign, higher incomes among minority groups are hypothesized to lead to greater likelihood of a member of that group running for office. Increased incomes may also result in more successful minority candidates as studies have "consistently found at least

some evidence of a positive relationship between candidate spending and electoral performance" (Nice, 1987: 465). Thus, an increase in the incomes of minority groups is in turn a tool for them to increase their representation in government and thus their political power, enabling them to protect their culture, land, or whatever is of interest to them. Political power can also be increased more indirectly. If an ethnic minority culture contributes to increasing GDP in the country by drawing in tourists, the government will be more likely to instate measures to protect that culture for economic reasons. To prove this hypothesis, data must be gathered on minority incomes, voting practices, leisure time, political representation and campaign expenditures.

While states tend to look at the bottom-line and notice that tourism increases revenue, the localities in which tourism occurs take a broader view of tourism's effects, not only economically, but also in terms of intangible factors such as cultural impact (Vaughan, 2000: 290). In other words, local citizens have different values than government as a whole. This can also be expressed as the question of whether interaction with tourists and the tourism industry causes a culture to lose or compromise the parts of its environment (such as cultural heritage, traditions or the preservation of natural areas) that are important to the people of that culture. The structure of traditional tourism is such that it often leads to an increased role of the national government in local affairs in an attempt to create a cohesive picture of that country's culture that is more easily marketable. For example, in the Mexican village of Cajititlan, the government stepped in to suppress traditions and styles of dress that were deemed as being unappealing to American tourists (Wood, 1980).

Some argue that the idea of cultural preservation is a Western notion and must be treated with circumspection (Wood, 1980). It is argued that cultures, by their very nature as evolving codes of beliefs and conduct, "are not passive, and we must become more sensitive to the cultural strategies people develop to limit, channel and incorporate the effects

of international tourism" (Wood, 1980: 566). For example, the traditional dances used within Balinese culture are slightly modified when used as a display for tourists in order to remove their religious meaning so as not to profane it (Wood, 1980). Additionally, some argue, "the most disruptive forms of tourism are the types which involve the least direct interaction with locals" (Wood, 1980: 569). Little interaction with locals results in a tourist gaining less of an understanding of the local culture. While tourism can have the negative effect of an authority dictating cultural standards to ethnic groups in an area, if structured correctly, it can instead allow ethnic groups to earn valuable resources while keeping their traditions intact.

It is important to note the centrality of local control in this instance. While those in the "West" or developed countries express their value for cultural diversity by spending money on programs which promote it, it is ultimately not a moral decision for them to make, but rather a choice of lifestyle to be made by the local indigenous peoples. One solution to this problem is to ensure that indigenous peoples have ownership of their land and that mechanisms exist within the society to ensure these property rights. Property gives indigenous owners the choice as to how many tourists to allow on the land at one time and what sort of services to offer. This ownership is the best way to ensure that the benefits from the situation are maximized and that the land is protected from destruction that could limit the sustainability of the industry.

Though government intervention may still expand, through a focus on community-based tourism "where the emphasis is on local management and operation" (Vaughan, 2000: 292), ecotourism provides tools for minorities to leverage their interests against those of the national government. "In Bali, for example, cultural tourism has provided a base for a new regional assertiveness about the place of the Balinese language and culture within the schools" (Wood, 1980: 576). The economic value that ecotourism gives to cultural institutions protects these institutions. In the

instance of Southeast Asia in particular, where cultural divides run deep, tourism centered on the exploration of these individual cultures provides a major source of income for the area (Wood, 1980). In Greece, such tourism has also facilitated the protection of traditional architecture by the local government (Wood, 1980). Thus, the revenue from ecotourism provides a tangible economic value that attempts to express the worth of local historical and anthropological treasures for the people that value them.

In addition, ecotourism emphasizing local control of tourism gives indigenous peoples the ability to share their culture on their own terms. "For example, the Kainamaro (of Guyana) limit the number of visitors to their community and require that all outsiders be briefed on cultural sensitivities" (Mastny, 2002: 96). Such powers enable a people, to some extent, to control the influence of tourists on their lifestyles. Measures such as housing tourists in traditional housing arrangements also increase interaction between tourists and locals and increase the tourist's knowledge of local culture and history (Wood, 1980).

A key component of ecotourism is the role of guides. References to guides as "translators of experience and knowledge" embody the link between a guide and a tourist's understanding of the country that they are visiting (Vaughan, 2000: 296). "Many training programmes have been set up specifically to train more local guides, for example in Costa Rica, where local guides have helped reduce the negative impacts of tourism by increasing environmental awareness in the community, [while] at the same time providing insights to the tourists" (Vaughan, 2000: 296). Guide programs and similar services provide jobs for locals that require little human capital other than the ability to tell a good story and knowledge of the culture and area, ideal for the populations of developing nations.

As seen in the above examples, ecotourism makes a difference in the quality of jobs provided in an area. While many jobs in tourist ar-

eas revolve around local hotels and include being a maid or local guide, ecotourism purports to provide a more agreeable version of these activities and is theorized to lessen the push for migration to urban centers. Any job which provides a way for locals to maintain some semblance of their traditional activities while earning a better living is considered by this study to be a more desirable job than one that completely changes their lifestyle. For example, many ecotourism resorts offer packages with trips such as the Sian Ka'an's Canal Tour, a kayaking tour that explores the Mayan trade routes used 1200 years ago (Sian Ka'an Resort, 2008). This allows guides to be outdoors exploring the lands of their ancestors as opposed to leading a tour on a bus. In addition, the introduction of an ecotourism industry in conjunction with other types of development in a country offers a choice of occupation, a luxury not always experienced in developing countries. This option in itself increases a person's well being.

A means by which to estimate the impact of traditional tourism versus ecotourism is to use regression analysis, gathering data through surveys of populations where a new ecotourism industry has been put in place and a traditional tourist industry was already in existence. Those surveyed would be asked what their values are in terms of lifestyle, and their new job in tourism would be compared to their previous lifestyle. The industry that provided a way for income to be made without placing significant hardships such as a long commute to the job or expensive training to meet job qualifications, in addition to providing the most fulfilling job experience would be seen as having the most positive impact.

The benefits of traditional tourism are diminished when one takes into account that the development of a tourist industry requires much from the normally unskilled labor force characteristically present in developing countries. In the case of Turkey, the start-up of its tourist industry required direct investment to tourism and money for the development of infra-

structure, assistance to the private sector for the construction of hotels, as well as costs for such things as workforce training and advertising (Diamond, 1977). This is a vicious cycle of sorts. Without the resources (capital) at hand to jump-start the industry by building necessary structures, the country cannot capitalize on the resource-generating industry of tourism.

Though these provide some solutions to the aspects of tourism with the potential to harm the economies they are meant to help, there are still challenges faced by economies in trying to develop in the ecotourism industry itself. First of all, with the development of ecotourism initiatives comes the need for funding and political support, often both in short supply in a developing country (Vaughan, 2000: 288). Both of these needs require stability. Though revenues from tourism are much more stable than those from industries such as agriculture, they are still subject to fluctuation. As Vaughan demonstrates, "factors such as political stability, accommodation, transport infrastructure and 'image'" are all important to the revenues generated by tourism for a particular country (Vaughan, 2000: 289). Thus, to ensure a stable flow of revenue from tourism, a country must maintain these factors, some of which require investment.

In addition, costs associated with ensuring the environmental friendliness of a tourism initiative can at times be somewhat prohibitive. "In Nepal, total economic benefits related to parks-related ecotourism are greater than the direct maintenance costs of the parks themselves; however, the cost of the national conservation agency, the body responsible for park maintenance, exceeded the income derived from tourism" (Vaughan, 2000: 289). Thus, the costs of institutionalization and upkeep of ecotourism facilities can at times be counterproductive for countries trying to develop.

Though ecotourism is not a complete answer to the development needs of developing countries, it does provide some steps in the right direction. With the building of closer ties between local peoples and travelers and

an emphasis on local control of the tourism industry, ecotourism can be a partial answer to quality development, and is an improvement on traditional tourism in that it has the ability to give minorities greater political power and prioritize environmental protection, while providing means of developing a tourist industry that are less capital-intensive than traditional methods.

Conclusion

Though both types of tourism provide means by which developing countries can start down the path of development, evidence shows that ecotourism, especially of the community-based variety, allows local citizens more control over the process of tourism. This in turn results in a greater ability for them to protect the aspects of their culture and environment that they value most through their "commoditization". While there is no set formula by which tourism can be instated to successfully develop a country's economy, a focus on local control of the industry would ensure that development follows the needs of and resources at the disposal of the host cultures. While there are differences in the impacts of each type of tourism, it is not nearly as striking a disparity as originally theorized. This paper provides a direction in which policymakers and those interested in development of less developed countries can focus and general guidelines for the building of a sustainable tourist industry.

Appendix

While a qualitative method of analysis to determine the difference in the impact of traditional tourism versus ecotourism has been outlined in the "Mode of Analysis" section, the availability of numerical data will provide the opportunity for a quantitative analysis of the factors discussed. In anticipation of future availability of these numbers, the following regres-

sion models have been outlined. These numbers will provide concrete data to facilitate comparison of the traditional tourism and ecotourism industries.

A. Quality of Development Model

$$Y = ß_0 + ß_T T + ß_{ET} ET + \sum ß_j z_j + u$$

- Y – represents some measure of the quality of development
- $ß_0$ – quality of development prior to the development of tourism in the country being studied
- $ß_T$ – the effect of traditional tourism on quality of development
- T – traditional tourism
- $ß_{ET}$ – the effect of ecotourism on development
- ET – ecotourism
- $\sum ß_j z_j$ – a vector of the effect of all other factors besides tourism that may be correlated with traditional tourism and ecotourism and impact the quality of development, outlined in the Mode of Analysis section
- u – accounts for any error resulting from the omission of other significant independent variables

B. Gini Coefficient Model

$$Gini = ß_0 + ß_1 T + ß_2 ET + \sum ß_j z_j + u$$

- Gini coefficient – the most commonly used measure of income inequality; assigns each country a coefficient between zero and one with one being complete inequality
- $ß_0$ – the Gini coefficient prior to the development of tourism in the country being studied
- $ß_1 T$ – the effect of traditional tourism on the Gini coefficient
- $ß_2 ET$ – the effect of ecotourism on the equality of income distribution
- $\sum ß_j z_j$ – the combined effect of other variables that could influence the equality of income distribution, outlined in the Mode of Analysis section
- u – any variables that may not be included in the regression but may influence the Gini coefficient and be correlated with traditional tourism and ecotourism

C. Poverty Rate Model

$$\text{Poverty Rate} = ß_0 + ß_1T + ß_2ET + \sum ß_j z_j + u$$

- Poverty Rate – a measure of poverty available through the World Bank Database
- $ß_0$ – the poverty rate prior of the country prior to the introduction of tourism
- $ß_1T$ – the effect of traditional tourism on the poverty rate
- $ß_2ET$ – the effect of ecotourism on the poverty rate
- $\sum ß_j z_j$ – the combined effect of other variables that could influence the poverty rate, outlined in the Mode of Analysis section
- u – any variables that may not be included in the regression but may influence the poverty rate and be correlated with traditional tourism and ecotourism

D. Minority Political Representation Model

$$MR = ß_0 + ß_1MPP + ß_2Gini + ß_3MCS/NMCS + ß_4EST + ß_5MV + ß_6GT + u$$

- MR – percentage of politicians that are members of the minority being analyzed
- $ß_0$ – the original percentage of offices held by minorities without taking into consideration any of the other variables
- $ß_1MPP$ – the percentage of the population composed of the particular minority being analyzed
- $ß_2Gini$ – the effect of income inequality on the percentage of minorities in political office
- $ß_3MCS/NMCS$ – a ratio of the campaign spending by candidates of the particular minority versus non-minority candidates
- $ß_4EST$ – the length of time that oldest party representing that particular minority has been in existence
- $ß_5MV$ – the percentage of those that voted that belong to the particular minority group
- $ß_6GT$ – the effect of government type on minority representation
- u – any unobserved or unrecorded terms that may affect the proportion of political offices held by members of the minority group being analyzed

E. Environmental Quality Model

$$E = ß_0 + ß_1T + ß_2ET + ß_3ET^2 + ß_4IL + ß_5P + ß_6PL + u$$

- $ß_0$ – the quality of the environment before tourism
- $ß_1T$ – the effect of traditional tourism on environmental quality
- $ß_2ET$ – the effect of ecotourism on environmental quality
- $ß_3ET^2$ – the diminishing effects of ecotourism on the environment
- $ß_4IL$ – the percentage of the land that is inhabited
- $ß_5P$ – the pollution levels in the country
- $ß_6PL$ – the percentage of land that is protected by either the government or non-governmental organizations
- u – the effects of all other variables not already observed or accounted for by the model

F. Infrastructure Model

$$I = ß_0 + ß_1T + ß_2ET + \sum ß_jz_j + u$$

- I – the level of infrastructure development in the country
- $ß_0$ – the level of infrastructure development before tourism and ecotourism
- $ß_1T$ – the effect of traditional tourism on infrastructural development
- $ß_2ET$ – the effect of ecotourism on infrastructural development
- $\sum ß_jz_j$ – a vector representing the combined effect of other variables that may influence the development of infrastructure, as outlined in the Mode of Analysis section
- u – the effect on the development of infrastructure of any other variables not already accounted for in the model

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