

Rhodes College Sigma Iota Rho

MODUS VIVENDI



Contemporary Issues in International Relations

Volume XVII, Spring 2011

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Any inquiries regarding the journal should be made to Kim Stevenson,
2000 North Parkway, Memphis, TN 38112.

Letter from the Editors

Dear Readers,

The title of this journal, *Modus Vivendi*, literally translates as “way of life.” In International Relations, however, the phrase means “a state of affairs where two opposing parties agree to differ.” Thus, the goal of this journal is to provide a forum for discussion and exchange on issues in international relations. One of the few undergraduate journals of international relations, *Modus Vivendi* is published by the International Studies Department at Rhodes College, in conjunction with the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho.

The subtitle of this year’s journal, “Contemporary Issues in International Relations,” speaks to the fact that the following five papers all deal with relatively recent, and sometimes barely studied, issues in international relations. This theme arose during the selection and editing process for the journal as we, along with our assistant editors, found ourselves drawn to papers written on trends in the past twenty years of international affairs. Of the five papers published in this year’s edition of *Modus Vivendi*, four deal with the developing world. This, we feel, reflects a fundamental shift in the focus of international relations. The discipline has grown from the study of war and great powers to include analysis of development and non-state actors. The Western world is no longer the predominant actor studied in international relations—it is now the “developing” world’s turn to receive some much needed attention and scholarship.

This issue of *Modus Vivendi* includes five papers, representing a variety of theoretical and public policy issues. Sarah Dockery’s paper examines sex trafficking in Asia in an attempt to explain variation of the practice within the region. In the subsequent piece by Morgan Rote, she explores the factors that determine individual attitudes toward redistribution of wealth. In an analysis of Turkey’s changing demographics, Natalie Malouf assesses how population affects power. Next, Amanda Smith looks at the successes and failures in India of the agricultural practice known as the “Green Revolution.” Finally, Anna Laymon breaks ground in her analysis of the female terrorists in Palestine and Chechnya.

Modus Vivendi is what it is thanks to the dedication of the faculty, staff, and students of our international relations department. We are grateful to the faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department for preparing us to be critical consumers of information. Without their energy in the classroom and the countless hours they spent discussing international relations with us during their office hours, we would not be where we are today. A special thanks to Professor Ceccoli and Professor Sciubba, as well as Kim Stevenson, for their guidance and help with the journal. We would also like to thank our amazing assistant editors, Allison, Drew, Jon, and Katherine for taking the time to read, discuss, and make comments on literally hundreds of pages of text. Finally, thank you for taking an interest in international affairs, and we hope you enjoy!

Emily Sellers and Sarah Smith
Editors of *Modus Vivendi*

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MODUS VIVENDI
VOL. XVII, Spring 2011

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**Sex Trafficking in South Korea, Indonesia and China:
Analyzing the Variance of Sex Trafficking Levels through a
Structural and Feminist Approach**

Sarah Dockery

International Studies-Economics Major, Class of 2011

An Introduction to the Crime of Sex Trafficking

Each year, women and children around the globe are deceived or coerced, and trafficked to become victims of the international sex industry. This process is one of the most prevalent forms of modern day slavery. The criminals in this industry recruit women and children into forced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, buying and selling them for profit as if they were commodities. Due to the illegality of sex trafficking, the full extent and growth of the industry is unknown. It is estimated by the U.S. State Department (2005), however, that 1.2 million people are trafficked annually, many of whom are trafficked for sexual exploitation.

The numbers and statistics tell only a small part of the story. To put this issue into perspective, the following excerpt from an interview with a former sex slave, conducted by Siddarth Kara, conveys the severity and inhumanity of this practice.

When I was nineteen I was studying interior design...My father died, and there was no one to support me. I saw a posting in the university newspaper for a job in housecleaning. The agent for the posting...promised a salary of five hundred dollars per month. [She] paid for my passport and sent me on an autobus...Six other girls came with me. A man...met us at the station. He took us to a hotel called Meke. I will never forget that hotel. [The man] took out passports and said, "You must shower and get dressed. Tonight you will go on your first program." That night, he sold us to [another] man. This man raped us in the hotel with five other men. They made us have sex with many men that night. [They] made me work like this for sixteen months. I was kept locked in a hotel room with three other girls. One client who came was a lawyer...and he offered to buy me. I was sold for four thousand euros. [The lawyer] kept me locked with chains in a room in his home, and he forced me to have sex with men who visited. If I complained, he would cut me with a knife. After two months ... I made up my mind to escape.¹

Kara writes that his interview with this young woman was the first time she had left her home in weeks. She lived in perpetual fear that the traffickers would discover her and harm her or her son and was thus unable to search for work. She was only able to subsist because of support and donations from neighbors and a local NGO. According to Kara, "[She] was free from sex slavery, but her life was still a prison."² Stories like this must be kept in mind in order to



Jaipur, India

Carly Agre, Class of 2011

better grasp the severity and importance of each case, and the necessity to combat this inexcusable crime.

Although sex trafficking is prevalent worldwide, the Asian continent has been especially susceptible to such practices. The commercial sex industry in Asia has been growing substantially in the last decades.³ UNICEF recently warned that the trade in women and children for sex is spiraling out of control in South Asia. In an alarming assertion, UNICEF maintained that the numbers being trafficked in Asia represented nearly half the world.⁴

In order to better comprehend this crime, I ask the following research question: What explains the variance levels of criminal participation in the sex trafficking industry in South Korea, Indonesia and China? The dependent variable is the prevalence of criminal participation in the sex trafficking industry. As the research question asserts, this paper will explain sex trafficking by analyzing the role of the criminals who participate in trafficking victims, as well as the national environments in which they operate. The international sex trafficking business would not exist without traffickers and the economic, social, political and legal contexts in which this activity takes place. The fact that individuals in different countries make the decision to become criminals and engage in this industry fuels its persistence and growth. This paper will focus on the recruiters, traffickers, and exploiters to explain the prevalence of sex trafficking in South Korea, Indonesia, and China.

The case studies of South Korea, Indonesia, and China are selected on the dependent variable, as they all have differing levels of sex trafficking prevalence as origin countries. In order to better conceptualize the dependent variable—the variation in sex trafficking levels—it will be operationalized as Low, Medium, and High. In applying these rankings to the cases, South Korea is characterized as having a Low level of sex trafficking, Indonesia as Medium, and China as High. The level of sex trafficking assigned to each case comes from two sources: the 2010 U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report and the 2006 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns Report.

To explain the variance in the prevalence of sex trafficking in these countries, two approaches will be employed: a structural approach and a feminist approach. A structural approach focuses on the role of the state as an institution. The paradigm of historical institutionalism will be coupled with Gary Becker's economic model of crime to analyze reasons that individuals choose to become traffickers in this industry. Through this structural approach and Becker's model of crime, I hypothesize that ineffective rule of law and unsuccessful law enforcement in-

stitutions lead to higher levels of sex trafficking. In this approach, the independent variable is the effectiveness of the institution of law enforcement, which determines expected cost of sex trafficking. Second, a feminist approach analyzes the role that gender inequality plays in sex trafficking in each case. Through the independent variable of gender inequality, high levels of gender inequality are thought to yield higher levels of sex trafficking. The following table summarizes these approaches and hypotheses, and can be referred to throughout the paper:

Approach	Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Data Source
Structural	Ineffective rule of law and law enforcement institutions decrease the expected cost of sex trafficking and lead to high levels of sex trafficking in a country.	X_1 = Effectiveness of rule of law / law enforcement	2009 Global Integrity Report
Feminist	High gender inequality leads to high levels of sex trafficking in a country.	X_2 = Gender inequality	2010 Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum)

Understanding Sex Trafficking

Although each case is different, sex trafficking is generally a process involving three steps: (1) victims are abducted or recruited in a region of origin, (2) trafficked through transit regions, and then (3) exploited in a destination region (which may or may not be in the same country as the region of origin). This process is often repeated several times through a victim's life; it is common for women to be re-trafficked to secondary and tertiary regions so that the brothels and other places of exploitation can keep a steady inflow of new "products." Once in destination regions, forced prostitution is the most common form of exploitation, but other forms of sexual exploitation include forced stripping and participation in videos or other pornographic material.⁵

First, as suggested earlier, all sex trafficking cases have an element of deception or coercion when obtaining victims. In this way, sex trafficking cases differ from sex work in which there is an element of voluntary choice or a decision to enter the profession. In sex trafficking, victims are recruited or obtained by means of either trickery or violent force. These can include forceful methods such as coercion, manipulation, deception, abuse of authority, initial consent, family pressure, past and present family and community violence, economic deprivation, or other conditions of inequality for women and children.⁶ In many cases, women

are also kidnapped, purchased from their families, or offered marriage proposals. Most commonly, recruiters obtain victims by luring them with advertisements containing false promises of work abroad, as illustrated in the previous interview.

Second, victims are transported to a different destination. Although victims are usually trafficked across international boundaries, there are also many cases in which the traffickers recruit, transport, and exploit victims all in the same country. When trafficked internationally, traffickers often smuggle victims into new countries or forge their immigration paperwork, usually paying off border and immigration officers with bribes. This promise of a speedy entry into a foreign country is often used to lure women, as legal immigration can be costly and time-consuming, especially when moving from a poor country to a wealthier one.⁷

Third, after victims arrive at their destination, they suffer continued exploitation. Sexual exploitation can take several forms, most commonly that of forced prostitution. Frequently, debt bondage is used to keep victims enslaved; as traffickers claim that the victims owe a debt from transportation, forged paperwork or passports, etc. Because of this debt, the traffickers leave victims no other choice but prostitution.⁸ Women and girls are often unable to escape this indebted servitude, even after years in the sex trade.⁹ The false promise of attaining freedom is a powerful tool that brothel owners use to control their victims.¹⁰ In addition to debt bondage, in almost every case of sex trafficking, the traffickers threaten to kill or harm the victim's family if she fails to work or attempts to escape.

Sex Trafficking in Each Case

South Korea

The locations to which South Korean women are most commonly trafficked include the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. In recent years, the growing use of the internet has enlarged the sex trade in South Korea as brokers are increasingly used to arrange for forced prostitution overseas, particularly in the Philippines, Thailand, and China. To South Korea's credit, there very few reports of government officials complicit in trafficking; in fact, there were no such incidences reported in 2009.¹¹ In South Korea, there are various laws that criminalize sex trafficking, such as the 2004 Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts and The Juvenile Sexual Protect Act.¹² On the whole, South Korea is consistently one of the Asian countries with the lowest levels of sex trafficking. It is an important case to use because it is an example of a country located in a region generally susceptible to sex trafficking, yet it has

very low levels, especially as an origin country.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a major source country for sex trafficking, but also a transit and destination country to a much lesser extent. UNICEF estimates that 100,000 women and children are trafficked annually for commercial sexual exploitation in Indonesia and abroad, and 40,000-70,000 Indonesian children are victims of sexual exploitation.¹³ Indonesian women and children are most commonly trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, and the Middle East.¹⁴ According to the U.S. State Department's TIP, debt bondage is particularly common in Indonesian sex trafficking cases, with an initial debt of some \$600-\$1,200 imposed on victims. Like in South Korea, 2010 has seen an increase in the use of the internet in the sex trafficking industry; traffickers were found to use various internet social networking media to recruit victims, particularly children, for sex trafficking.¹⁵

China

Chinese women and children are trafficked for sexual and labor exploitation to Malaysia, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Europe, Canada, Japan, Italy, Burma, Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan.¹⁶ The Chinese NGO, All-China Women's Federation, reports rapid economic development along China's east coast and 150 million surplus laborers in rural areas has resulted in massive internal migration. This mass movement has created opportunities for traffickers to lure women and girls who often migrate at lower ages and education levels than men.¹⁷ Some experts and NGOs suggest that a shortage of marriageable women fueled the demand for abducted women, especially in rural areas.¹⁸ In China, trafficking cases often involve well-organized international criminal syndicates, as opposed to loosely organized individual traffickers. Sources claim that cross-border trafficking and criminal methods are becoming more covert, and traffickers have been continuously changing tactics and searching for new targets in the past few years, making them more difficult to catch.¹⁹

Explaining the Variation

As discussed earlier, very different levels of sex trafficking are observed in South Korea, Indonesia and China. Two theoretical approaches will be employed to explain this variance—a structural and a feminist approach. Each of these approaches will be briefly introduced in order to effectively apply them to explaining the variance in the prevalence of sex trafficking. As a framework under which the structural approach can better apply to sex

trafficking, a crime model will first be introduced.

Introduction of Crime Model

Originally established by economist Gary Becker, the model of crime is instrumental in the theory of historical institutionalism, as it shows how a particular type of state institution—rule of law and law enforcement—alters the choices individuals face, and affects their decisions. In this case, the institutions are rule of law and law enforcement, and the decision faced by an individual is whether or not to commit crime. Becker's model is built on the assumption of individual rationality; he sees criminals as rational individuals who respond to reward and punishment contingencies just like everyone else.²⁰ Rational decision-making is based on the notion that individuals and firms make decisions based on cost-benefit analysis, or the rewards or penalties that result from a decision. Becker argues that the probability of punishment is much more important than the magnitude of the punishment itself. Becker concludes that the certainty of conviction is the most effective crime deterrent.²¹

Becker's work provides key insight into the motivations of traffickers. From Becker's conclusions, we can infer that countries with low law enforcement will have a relatively high rate of sex trafficking; as the probability of conviction and punishment decreases, risk decreases as well. According to cost-benefit analysis, the lower the cost of the crime, the more potential criminals will decide to commit the crime of sex trafficking. Economists Lyn Squire and Sethaput Suthiwart-Narueput use this same theory to create an equation, as shown in Appendix A, to assess the likelihood an individual would choose criminal behavior. According to this model, crime occurs when the difference between licit and illicit profits is greater than a combination of the probability of being caught and the actual financial cost of the punishment. Through Becker's model of the economics of crime, individuals who have made the decision to become sex traffickers can be seen as rational actors seeking to maximize their personal utility. In doing so, they will make decisions with the intent to minimize risk and personal cost.

A Structural Approach

I am coupling this crime model with a structural approach to discover the factors that explain global sex trafficking in South Korea, Indonesia and China. The international relations paradigm of historical institutionalism reveals the importance of institutions and their ability to shape individual behavior. The norms and rules specific to each state in the international system create very different social, political, and economic structures for each country. Such structures greatly govern individuals' decisions. These state structures, defined by their institutions, may

give us a more detailed insight into why certain countries have a high prevalence of sex trafficking while others do not. Through the structural approach of historical institutionalism, we can not only gain a better understanding of how the institutions of countries affect political and social outcomes, but also how state-instituted norms can impact an individual's decision to become a trafficker. Simply put, institutions are the rules and norms which govern society. As such, they are the foundation of all political behavior.²² Examples of institutions include laws, cultural norms, or beliefs held by a society. These institutions guide people in their decisions and shape political and social outcomes.

In the discussion of sex trafficking, historical institutionalism is useful, as it reveals the impact that institutions have on individual behavior. Historical institutionalism uses two methods to explain how institutions directly influence an individual's behavior: the calculus approach and the cultural approach. In the calculus approach, institutions provide actors with greater or lesser degrees of certainty about the present and future behavior of other actors. They provide information relevant to the behavior of others, enforcement mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection, etc. The cultural approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the extent to which individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their purposes. Individuals are seen as utility-satisficers, not maximizers. The individual is seen as an entity deeply integrated in a world of institutions that provides filters for interpretation. These institutions and institutional factors affect the identities, self-images and preferences of individuals.

Another key concept of historical institutionalism is conceivability, or restrained rationality. Under the calculus approach, institutions affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to his own action. In a sense, this constrains the individual's rationality by limiting choices to only those allowed or provided for by institutions. In the cultural approach, too, behavior is bounded by an individual's worldview; institutions provide moral or cognitive templates that the individuals must operate within. Ellen Immergut illustrates this by saying that institutions provide filters for interpretation. Practically, institutions then do not only provide obstacles to particular policy choices, but according to Immergut, they "ultimately structured the menu of choices available in different regimes."²³ These rules and constraints enable certain outcomes to occur in different countries, and prohibit them from occurring in other countries.²⁴

Historical institutionalism stresses the way in which past lines of policy condition

subsequent policy by encouraging societal forces to organize along some lines rather than others, to adopt particular identities, or to develop interests in policies that are costly to shift.²⁵ Consequently, institutions and their effectiveness shape the decisions available to individuals, and therefore have a great impact on why someone would choose to become a sex trafficker. The structural approach will use the economic model of crime introduced in the previous section to model the effectiveness of institutional law enforcement agencies in each case study. Looking at the equation in Appendix A, the structural hypothesis aim is to separate and decrease beta, the probability of being caught or convicted.

A Feminist Approach

Feminism seeks to interpret events and situations as a function of gender identification and gender inequality. Feminists investigate how the behavior of states and individuals are constructed, embedded, and determined as consequences of unequal gender relations. These inequalities are based on socially constructed gender identities and oppressive patriarchal structures. In addition, these inequalities lead to power struggles between genders, out of which women often are subject to objectification and violence by males. Feminist theory argues that gender is an acquired identity that one learns from the behaviors and expectations found on their society. In this way, gender is an identity that is acquired by acting out these prescribed gender roles; it is not bestowed upon someone biologically or genetically.²⁶

Beyond gender as a constructed identity, the concept of inequality and power inequality between the genders is vital to understanding feminist theory. Due to the fact that socially constructed characteristics and roles attributed to men and women are different, gender inequality emerges. In society, a more positive value is often associated to masculine characteristics. This inequality is also referred to as gender hierarchy.²⁷ The worldwide institutionalization of this hierarchy is what feminism uses to explain the unequal treatment and outcomes concerning men and women around the globe. These inequalities are rooted in the dynamics and inequality of power between men and women.²⁸ According to Peterson and Runyan, “Gender is about power, and power is gendered.”²⁹ Feminists argue that it is not sex the sex worker is really made to sell; it is degradation. And the buyer is not buying sexuality, but power, power over another human being.³⁰ From this, we see the interconnectedness between gender and power; gender inequality leads to power inequality, and the male gender identification implies greater power than the female.

The male need for power often leads to the commodification or objectification of women to be used for their sexuality which is another key concept of feminism,³¹ Sandra Lee Bartky

defines female sexual objectification as occurring when a woman’s sexual parts or functions are separated from the rest of her person and reduced to the status of mere instruments or regarded as if they were capable of representing her.³² This identification of a woman with solely her sexuality becomes degrading and oppressive, stripping away the rest of her identity and forcing her to be valued for only her sexual parts and functions. It inhibits women’s self-expression and self-determination, and degrades their humanity.³³

On the surface, a structural explanation fails to adequately explain sex trafficking because it ignores the fact that this is an inherently gender-based problem. From feminism, we see the position of women in today’s world as an extension of gender-motivated power struggles, sexual objectification, and violence. Feminist theory argues that gender inequalities around the world encourage all kinds of sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking. This assumption that a woman can be commodified and sold through force and deception comes from the socialization of gender inequality. Thus, when taking gender into account, we should expect to see that countries with higher gender inequality result in a high prevalence of sex trafficking.

Presentation of Evidence

A Structural Explanation

As Becker’s model of crime concluded, crime occurs when expected benefits are greater than expected costs. It is clear from this that the lower the expected cost of crime, the more likely a criminal will make the decision to participate in the sex trafficking industry. Since Becker concludes that the probability of punishment is more important than the punishment itself, the evidence presented below will focus on corruption in institutions in regard to law enforcement.

In order to operationalize the probability of being caught or convicted, rule of law and law enforcement in each case study are measured through the 2009 Global Integrity Report, an independent annual study. Each country assessment contained in the Global Integrity Report comprises two core elements: a qualitative Reporter’s Notebook and a quantitative Integrity Indicators scorecard. The data from the index are aggregated and used to generate the cross-country Global Integrity Index, which categorizes countries as having Strong, Moderate and Weak levels of integrity. In this case, “integrity” is simply defined as a lack of corruption and the capability to address issues of bad governance and ineffective state institutions. Having a comparable measure of integrity for each of these country cases allows for measurement

of the impact that good governance and effective law enforcement have on sex trafficking levels.

The Overall Integrity score is used to compare each of the case studies. Also, to measure and compare the rule of law and effectiveness of law enforcement in each case, the Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law category scoring is also utilized. This particular score is comprised of scores from four indices, which reveal levels of rule of law and law enforcement in a country.

South Korea

South Korea, the case considered to have the lowest amount of sex trafficking, achieved an Overall score of 88 (Strong) and an Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law score of 87 (Strong). These scores are higher than both China and Indonesia. South Korea was cited to have Very Strong anti-corruption laws, Strong anti-corruption agencies, Strong rule of law, and Strong law enforcement.

According to the U.S. State Department, the South Korean government made some anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts over the last year. South Korea's 2004 "Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic" and its Labor Standards Act prohibits trafficking, and 27 offenders were prosecuted under this Act in 2009, 17 of which were convicted and the remaining 10 of which are still on trial. Foreign officials did express concern that local police were not motivated to investigate some sex trafficking leads that had been provided to South Korean authorities. Last year there were several reports that police officers took bribes from brothel owners in exchange for prior notice about police raids. In May of last year, however, seven police officers were subjected to disciplinary measures after accepting small bribes from brothel owners and one officer was sentenced to a year in prison for accepting bribes from brothels. It is incredibly uncommon for officers to be indicted in this way, and this speaks to the success of some of South Korea's anti-trafficking efforts.³⁴

Indonesia

Indonesia, considered to have a Medium level of sex trafficking, scored 74 (Moderate) overall and 77 (Moderate) in Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law. Indonesia was cited to have Moderate anti-corruption laws, Strong anti-corruption agencies, Strong rule of law, and Weak law enforcement. Its lowest ranking was that of Law Enforcement (it scored 60), because there is no clear mechanism for citizens to complain about police actions.

Although scoring higher than China on overall integrity and anti-corruption and rule of law, the International Labour Organization cites lack of enforcement of relevant laws as a root cause of trafficking in Indonesia.³⁵ The government is reportedly working on drafting a law on

women and child trafficking eradication, and was collaborating and networking with non-governmental organizations on women's issues. Although this is an important step, the law is not yet implemented and therefore has had no chance to take effect. The Indonesian State Minister of Women's Empowerment, Sri Redjeki Soemaryoto, said, "Law enforcement is the key step. Other countries' experiences show that once you start the law enforcement and take it seriously, it will raise people's awareness that [trafficking in women and children] is a crime."³⁶

China

Finally, in terms of trafficking, China is operationalized as a High country because it is considered to have a Very High level of sex trafficking by the UNODC Global Patterns Report and it is on the TIP Tier 2 Watch List. China's overall score was 60 (Weak). Its Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law score was 70 (Moderate). The report noted that China has moderate anti-corruption laws, weak anti-corruption agencies, weak rule of law, and weak law enforcement. China scored the lowest in the Law Enforcement category (with a score of 67). In the Reporter's notebook, it was written that the law enforcement (e.g., the police) were not effective because the law enforcement agency is not protected from political interference, as law enforcement agencies are under the leadership of Communist Party of China. Because of this, the report expresses concern that law enforcement officials cannot be held accountable for their actions, thus allowing for corruption.

According to the South China Morning Post, "In China, the authorities throw a lot of resources into catching traffickers but are only scratching the surface. It is a profitable business that attracts organized crime and breeds corruption". The article claims that the government's position on prostitution and trafficking does nothing to address the problem. Outreach groups and NGO's working with prostitutes and victims voice frustrations that the Chinese government neither funds them nor provides services to sex workers or victims. In 2004, one particularly telling case was reported in which 19 Chinese girls were forced into prostitution. Once discovered, not one of the 261 men found at the brothel where they worked was arrested. In regards to this case, National Human Rights Commission chairman Talib Othman claimed that the country's police and legal system were clearly stacked against the women.³⁷

Conclusion

As can be seen in Appendix B, law enforcement institutions are most effective in South Korea, then Indonesia, and lastly China. This supports the hypothesis, as China has the

highest levels of sex trafficking and South Korea the lowest. Our economic model of crime holds up; in our three cases, the higher the law enforcement, and therefore the expected cost of committing the crime of sex trafficking, the less trafficking is committed. Within this crime model, it would be very beneficial to study the expected benefits of sex trafficking in each case. This was impossible in this paper because of the lack of data available concerning indicators of profitability of sex trafficking in different countries. Data concerning how much money individuals make in this industry and what levels of participation yield what kinds of profits would be very helpful to explaining the variance in sex trafficking levels among countries.

Feminist Explanation

In order to operationalize levels of gender inequality in South Korea, Indonesia and China, the World Economic Forum's (WEC) 2010 Global Gender Gap Index is used. Since 2006, the WEC has used this report to quantify the magnitude of gender-based disparities and track their progress over time and across national boundaries. The Global Gender Gap Index scores countries based on four main criteria: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment. In the next section, a short overview of the situation of gender equality and women's issues in each country will be provided, along with the data found in the Index for each country.

South Korea

First, South Korea received an overall Gender Gap score of .634 and an international ranking of 104 out of 134 countries. Sources have reported that government commitments and efforts to increase equality in the labor market and politics has only had limited success to date. The prevailing traditional belief, based on Confucian principles, that women belong in the home raising children, still persists. Along with inflexible work practices, this leads to the exclusion of women once they have children.³⁸ Further, local news sources support the fact that gender inequality has been an ongoing problem in Korea.³⁹ Other sources claim that government commitments and efforts to increase equality in the labor market and politics have only had limited success to date.

In the 2008 Global Gender Gap Report, South Korea was ranked 108 among 130 countries, higher than only a few Arab and African countries. Korea has continuously fallen in the rankings, from 92 in 2006 to 104 in 2010. The report asserts that the nation's failure in promoting wage equality and the employment of women in technical and professional positions has been cited as factors that attributed to the decline.

Indonesia

Second, Indonesia received a Gender Gap score of .662 and a ranking of 87 (its score and ranking are higher than South Korea, even though it is considered to have a Medium level of sex trafficking and South Korea has a Low level). The ILO's Project Overview of trafficking in Indonesia cites gender inequality in the labor market and distribution of resources, and family expectations towards daughters' household income contribution as root causes of trafficking in Indonesia.⁴⁰

Despite Indonesia's ranking of Medium, women continue fighting for their rights to access political power. For example, women constitute less than 1% of officials with decision-making authority.⁴¹ This is exacerbated by limited education, training, and experience along with traditional perceptions of women's roles in society. In some areas decentralization has also been accompanied by a revival of conservative religious interpretations of gender roles, which have led to local practices that discriminate against women. It is not easy, women's groups say, to combat laws and norms that perpetuate gender inequality, for fear that questioning the Sharia laws would cause them to be considered an unfaithful Muslim.

The structural influence of Islam in Indonesia is applicable here, as Indonesia is almost completely Muslim. Much of Indonesian legislation emphasizes the importance of equal opportunities for men and women, but secular laws coexist with Islamic principles and traditional customs that affect the lives of Indonesian women. Islamic law and many traditional customs tend to favor male heirs over female heirs.⁴² In addition, feminist and anti-trafficking activist Donna Hughes claims that Islamic states see a high prevalence of female repression, and that repression, dehumanization and exploitation are closely associated.⁴³

China

Finally, China scored .688 and received an international ranking of 61. Interestingly, China scores and ranks higher than South Korea and Indonesia. Experts and NGOs report that China's population planning policies, coupled with a cultural preference for sons, creates a skewed sex ratio in China, which may contribute to the trafficking of women and children within China for forced marriage, leaving them vulnerable to involuntary domestic servitude or forced commercial sexual exploitation by their spouses.⁴⁴ Also, the incidence of kidnapping and selling women in rural areas has been increasing since the mid-1980s.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), however, provides evidence that may be contrary to

China's relatively high WEC Global Gender Gap Index score. The OECD expresses concern that the gender gap in China is widening again in the wake of China's rapidly changing economic, social and political conditions. Women are considered the weaker sex (although to a lesser extent than in the past) and women are over-represented among the country's poor. In addition, families show a strong preference for male offspring, which can result in infanticide and the country's "missing women" phenomenon, the disparity in the number of women in China relative to the number that there would be if not for sex-selective abortion and female infanticide.⁴⁶

Conclusions

The data shown by the Global Gender Index reveals surprising conclusions. Among our three cases, China earned the highest score (.688), while Indonesia ranked in the middle (.662), and South Korea the lowest (.634). This is precisely the inverse of the gender hypothesis. Appendix C compares the scores each case received. Appendix D shows more overtly the disparity between China and the other two. Within the three case studies, differences in gender inequality do not do much to help us explain the varying levels of sex trafficking in South Korea, Indonesia, and China.

Although the data from the Global Gender Index revealed China to be the most equal country and South Korea to be the most unequal among my three cases, it is questionable whether or not these numbers are telling the whole story. In China, for example, the Communist government urged women into the labor force, which may yield a higher score on the Global Gender Gap Index, but does not necessarily lead to equality between men and women, as female repression and gender inequality in China is persistent. For example, the China Daily Newspaper claims, "What is more disconcerting is that people have somehow grown tired of the outcry for gender equality...Some laws even still contain clauses that maintain the gender gap between men and women."⁴⁶ With such challenges to the Global Gender Gap scores, it is clear that gender inequality can be deeply and subtly woven into a society, and that these deeper implications of gender inequality in a country are still potentially correlated to high levels of sex trafficking in that country.

Conclusion—A Crime that Shames Us All

To conclude, the effectiveness of the structural and feminist approaches to answer the research question is briefly reviewed. In the structural approach, we used an economic model of crime and an emphasis of the effectiveness of institutions to conclude that crime exists when expected cost (essentially risk) is low. This hypothesis proved to be useful in the three cases, as the

highest levels of rule of law and law enforcement belonged to South Korea, the case with the lowest level of sex trafficking. Additionally, the most ineffective law enforcement institutions belonged to China, the case with the highest level of sex trafficking. In the feminist approach, gender inequality has the potential to help explain why certain regions of the world have more sex trafficking than others, but it does not explain sex trafficking within the three East Asian case studies. Also, the validity of the Global Gender Gap Index as a measure of the qualitative effects of gender inequality in a country is questionable.

Overall, there is a definite need for more sex trafficking-related research. Some of the reported data included labor trafficking, which is another form of modern day slavery, but certainly has unique implications and root causes than those of sex trafficking. Also, country-specific research needs to be done. Within regions of the world, such as East Asia, there are high levels of sex trafficking, but the countries within these regions play distinctive roles in the international sex trafficking industry. Additionally, the movement to abolish sex trafficking needs a more comprehensive approach. The goal of this paper is to analyze the traffickers' decision to participate in this illicit and morally repugnant industry. This research seeks to explain how and why traffickers would be influenced by law enforcement institutions, and patriarchal social contexts when entering this industry.

In another interview by author and researcher Siddarth Kara, he concludes by asking a former child slave how she felt about sharing her story with others. She responded, "I want to tell people my life story, so they know what happens to people like me. I want other people who have suffered like me to know they are not alone."⁴⁷ The UNODC rightfully claims that trafficking is "a crime that shames us all."⁴⁸ When combating sex trafficking, awareness is the first step towards the research and data that is so desperately needed. Thus, it remains imperative to raise awareness and understanding about the complexities and possible explanations for this widespread and tragic crime that truly does shame us all.

Appendix A

Model of Crime (Lyn Squire and Sethaput Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997)

$$\Delta\pi \equiv \pi - \pi^* > [\beta A / (1 - \beta)]$$

$\Delta\pi$ = “illicit profit”, i.e. the difference between profits made with illicit activities (π) and the profits that can be made with legal activities (π^*)


β = the probability of being caught or convicted by authorities

A= the financial amount of the penalty in case of being caught or convicted by law enforcement authorities

Appendix B

Overall Global Integrity and Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law Scores


(Data source: 2009 Global Integrity Report)



Appendix C

Overall Score and Subindex Score


(Data Source: The Global Gender Gap Report 2010—World Economic Forum)



Appendix D

Changes in Global Gender Gap Overall Score from 2006-2010


(Data Source: The Global Gender Gap Report 2010—World Economic Forum)



Appendix E

2010 Global Gender Gap Overall Scores by World Region

(Data Source: The Global Gender Gap Report 2010—World Economic Forum)



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Budapest, Hungary

Sarah Smith

Slicing the Pie with an Invisible Hand: Individual Attitudes Toward Redistribution of Wealth

Morgan Rote

International Studies-Economics Major, Class of 2011

Introduction

Taxation is one of the most heavily discussed matters on the domestic political agenda of countries around the world. Why does it generate such debate? Taxation is controversial not because of its role in compensating for government spending, but because it serves as a country's primary tool for ensuring social welfare – essentially, for redistributing wealth.

Political questions of taxation naturally intertwine with the fundamental questions of income equality and redistribution. Such questions render a vast array of policy prescriptions, and typically, a divergence in public attitudes. A 2005 survey performed by Michael Norton and Dan Ariely addresses this issue of public opinion toward wealth distribution. The study found that not only did American respondents severely underestimate the degree of wealth inequality persistent in the US; when asked to select their ideal distribution pattern, 92% preferred the welfare structure of Sweden to that of the United States.^{1,i} Yet a recent Gallup Poll finds that only 3% of Americans clamor for higher income taxes, with 46% arguing that their own rates are “too high” and 48% feeling that they are “about right.”^{2,ii}

Drake Bennett summarizes the two contrasting views, stating, “People support the abstract goal of equality, it seems, while staunchly opposing specific government measures – whether increasing tax rates or limiting executive pay – designed to impose it.”ⁱⁱⁱ This suggests several important concepts. First, Americans – and plausibly, individuals at large – often hold inaccurate perceptions of actual wealth distribution. Furthermore, they appear to view the ideological notion of income equality and the practical prescriptions of taxation as somehow disconnected. Their attitudes toward redistribution – much less state intervention – seem definitely complex, and possibly inconsistent.

Certain questions, then, naturally emerge within this inquiry. What factors make certain individuals more likely to favor income equality than others? Do these same factors also translate

into support for corrective policy action? By answering the preceding questions, this paper attempts to explain individual level of support for redistributive policies. Specifically, the paper seeks to develop and test a variety of economic, social, and political explanations for the divergence in attitudes towards redistribution. The research design is as follows.

Research design

The dependent variable, support for income equality, is operationalized through a survey question from the 2005 World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS question reads: “How would you place your views on this scale? ‘Incomes should be made more equal’ versus ‘We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.’” The score ranges in one-unit intervals from one to ten – one correlating with the former view, ten with the latter.

In addition to the primary test on the dependent variable, two additional tests for robustness are conducted. The results of these tests should either reinforce prior assumptions or perhaps identify previously overlooked factors. The two robustness tests use variables operationalized in the same self-expressed ten-point scale as the dependent variable. The first serves a theoretical purpose, measuring how strongly one supports a protectionist system versus free market ideals. It asks respondents about their views towards market wealth as a zero-sum or positive-sum relationship, ranging from “People can only get rich at the expense of others” to “Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone.”

The other question addresses the more pragmatic aspects of redistribution. It asks about the appropriate source of welfare provisions, with potential responses ranging from, “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for,” to, “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.” This extra variable attempts to supplement the attitudinal position on income equality by raising the issue of government intervention. That is to say, would an individual who supports the notion of income equality truly support policy action as well? Does the individual actually understand the practical procedure for redistributing wealth – which presumably involves the more material concepts of taxes and subsidies? This analysis considers a number of economic, social, and political explanations. Each explanation provides a distinct lens for evaluation, with certain assumptions building the foundation for relevant hypotheses.

In addition to simply exploring individual attitudes, this paper also seeks to speculate about larger systemic outcomes – for example, differences among countries and their welfare regimes. Overall, the WVS offers the most comprehensive measure of individuals' opinions

1. This selection was made blindly, with respondents choosing between three theoretical distributions: one divided into five equal quintiles, one following the existing Swedish distribution, and the last following the existing US distribution.

2. The 2009 Gallup Poll asked the question: “Do you consider the amount of federal income tax you have to pay as too high, about right, or too low?”

towards the redistribution of wealth. While the survey covers respondents in 57 countries, the case selection in this paper has been narrowed to the citizen responses of ten particular countries: Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Canada, and the United States. These countries represent a relatively cohesive group, for they are all stable, developed nations subscribing to some form of capitalist economic system. However, they were selected precisely on the basis of subtle differences in their interpretation of capitalism. That is, some (like Sweden) are more welfare-oriented, while others (like the United States) rely much more heavily on free market ideals. By selecting cases on the basis of the independent variable, it is possible to examine whether or not differences in economic systems shape patterns in individuals' survey responses.

Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Francis G. Castles divide these nations into four different welfare categories: social democratic, conservative (or corporatist), radical liberal, and liberal. Such a categorization originated with Esping-Andersen, who argued that countries can be categorized into three models based on history, culture, belief systems, and subsequent economic policies.^{iv}

He described a 'corporatist' regime—such as Germany or France—as socially conservative, with the society organized into a relatively rigid hierarchy under the control of a paternalistic state.^{v,vi} Entitlements are distributed on the basis of work performance and socioeconomic status, such as the privileged welfare benefits that civil servants receive in Austria.^{vii}

Opposite of such a conservative system is a universalistic one. It serves as the origin for both social democratic and liberal regimes. In theory, such a system promotes equality of status, with all members enjoying modest egalitarian benefits offered by the state. A sense of liberty and mobility hence emerges. However, Esping-Andersen explains the factor for divergence between the regimes – the rising influence of the middle class. In one case, the state incorporated the new middle classes into a universal welfare system. Benefits that once targeted only the lower class were upgraded to a level satisfactory to the new middle class (using a scheme based on accustomed earnings). This fostered a system in which everyone depends upon and benefits from welfare, and thus feels an obligation to contribute.^{viii} In such a 'social democratic' regime – seen in Sweden, Norway, or the Netherlands,^{3, ix} – entitlement is based on universal rights of

3. In his original 1990 work, Esping-Andersen included the Netherlands as a social democratic country. Goodin, et al. reinforced this categorization in their 1999 work, selecting the Netherlands as the model social democratic regime. However, in his own 1999 work, Esping-Andersen revised his original analysis to include Netherlands as "squarely a member of the conservative Continental European fold," or corporatist regime. (See endnotes 9 and 12 for citation.) Esping-Andersen also includes Denmark in the social democratic family. However, the WVS did not produce data for Denmark, so the country

citizenship and offer non-contributory benefits to entire populations irrespective of need.^{x, xi, xii}

In the other case, the rising middle class is not met with universalism, but rather stratification. In such a system, the state allows the market to augment the modest equality otherwise enjoyed. The middle class thus turns to private insurance as a supplement. In such a 'liberal' regime – seen in Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Canada, and the US – privatization, competition, and class cleavages all play a prominent role. Individuals rely not on the state, but primarily on the market for provision and redistribution of resources.^{xiii, xiv, xv} The welfare policies that exist are most often means-tested assistance, selective programs based on demonstrable need – for example, food stamps in the US.^{xvi}

This paper considers a fourth category – one influenced by the writings of Castles and Mitchell, who divide the liberal family into two separate categories: 'truly liberal' and 'radical.' While perhaps similar in origin and certain characteristics, they differ strongly in other ways. The truly liberal regime – seen in Canada and the US – is marked by low levels of social expenditure, taxation, and resulting benefit equality. Labor parties and trade unions have limited influence in such a system. The radical regime – seen in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK – offers similar, relatively low levels of social expenditure and taxation, yet in conjunction with a high level of benefit equality.^{xvii} Welfare coverage tends to be extensive, though the actual services are often slight.^{xviii} Labor movements enjoy some degree of power, though mitigated by an equally strong political right wing. Perhaps most significantly for this paper, radical regimes are much less suspicious of state intervention, provided that such intervention is targeted toward the most disadvantaged members of society.^{xix}

The models estimated in this paper will primarily measure an individual's level of support for redistribution with approximately 5,600 independent observations.⁴ In this way, I first run a pooled analysis by examining the entire sample of respondents. Next, the effects of welfare family on individuals' attitudes towards redistribution – if an effect does indeed exist – is examined. As hinted by both welfare regime theory and empirical tax rates, one would hypothesize that social democratic and conservative countries are more supportive of redistribution. Specifically, social democratic countries like Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands should display the greatest egalitarian attitudes (redistribution in theory), while

is omitted from this analysis.

4. The ten countries actually generated 12,972 observations. However, the model was forced to drop the observations that contained any missing data, which included all from New Zealand (see later explanation). The exact number of observations for each test is included in Part 5 of Appendix C.

conservative countries like Germany and France should more likely prefer state policies to encourage income equality (redistribution in practice). On the other hand, one would hypothesize that radical – and especially liberal – regimes are less likely to support redistribution, particularly if it requires large-scale state intervention.^{xx}

Theory

Economic explanation

The framework of rational choice theory assumes that the individual, as a rational actor, will perform a self-interested calculation of any action's impact before acting. That is, an individual will carefully calculate his own gains and losses before determining his action or stance on an issue, choosing the option that offers the greatest personal value or utility.^{xxi} Describing individuals as rational utility-maximizers, Adam Smith (1776) suggests that, driven by self-interest, humans are not inclined to altruistic economic behaviors. They are not motivated by benevolent goodwill but by competition and profit. Smith insists that a competitive market functions optimally without external interference. He applauds the natural system of compensation and rewards that emerges from a free market, arguing that individual self-interest actually promotes the public interest, as an “invisible hand” guides the market to optimal utility.^{xxii}

Regardless of societal impact, the self-interested individual makes decisions based above all on her own interest. When determining her support for a welfare policy, she considers her own need relative to that of others. An individual who considers herself a “winner” in free market competition would be less likely to support government interference, for she already enjoys the skills necessary to succeed. This notion of “human capital” is most strongly associated with Gary Becker, who argued that human capital, like monetary and physical capital, is a “means of production” with a certain rate of return. It requires investment, which can come in several forms, including “schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, migration, and searching for information about prices and incomes.”^{xxiii} Then seemingly, individuals who have enjoyed high investment in their human capital – that is, those who are educated, skilled, and healthy – would compete in the market with greater success. Correspondingly, those who lack investment in their human capital would face significant obstacles to success and thus call for policies to develop their own human capital.

In large part, the correlation seems to hold true. Matthew Gabel and Harvey D. Palmer find empirical evidence to support human capital as a predictive indicator for citizen support for

European integration, a largely redistributive issue.^{xxiv} In both cases, the individual considers the costs and benefits he expects to derive from a policy before determining their support.^{xxv} Thus, one would expect people's attitudes to vary based on their different socioeconomic situations, with those falling in the bottom half of the income bracket more likely to support redistribution than those in the upper half.⁵

Operating from within the economic utilitarian framework, then, certain factors should contribute significantly to variance in support for income redistribution. First, one would expect an individual's gender, age, and state of health to be significant factors. Certain economic opportunities are more accessible to healthy middle-aged men than they are to women, the disabled, or the elderly. This is reflected in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, shown in Table 1.

Furthermore, elaborating on the notion of human capital, those with greater potential for success (based on what they deem satisfactory preparation) would likely express less support for income equality. A highly educated, employed individual would have a smaller incentive to promote egalitarian measures, for he considers himself less likely to benefit from redistribution. Similarly, an individual with a successful income who enjoys upper class status and is satisfied with his financial situation would see very little personal gain to be had from redistributive policies. Hypotheses 4-8, as shown in Table 1, relate to the notion of human capital.

Social explanation

Whereas the economic utilitarian mindset analyzes the individual's decision-making as a purely self-interested mechanism, the framework of collective action interprets the actions of individuals as conscious of their role within a collective entity. The collective welfare model examines the notion of altruism and concern for others. For example, in his discussion of redistribution, Dennis Mueller describes an experiment performed by Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1997). The researchers set up a game of “Dictator,” in which certain students were selected to be dictators based on a high score they received on a short test. They were given seven Swiss francs and paired with another anonymous non-dictator student, with whom they could voluntarily give some, all, or none of their seven francs. On average, dictators distributed about one-third of their francs, keeping the remainder

5. This income division of upper half versus lower half exists relative to the country's median income. Thus, it is included as a self-reported, relative decile (see v253 in Appendix A).

for themselves. Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee surmised that such altruism emerged from a “fairness norm” – people recognize the element of chance in the distinction of becoming dictator (i.e. the distribution of wealth), and thus feel a pull toward sharing some of their wealth.^{xxv}

While pure altruism can largely be discounted as a motive, certain elements can hold true, if incorporated into a more rationalist approach.^{xxvi} For example, David Goetze and Peter Galderisi suggest an elastic “trade off” model, in which individuals weigh the extent of benefits accruing to others against the cost incurred to themselves. They cite James C. Coleman’s explanation:

“Classical economic theory always assumes that the individual will ‘act in his interest,’ but it is never examined carefully the entity to which ‘his’ refers. Often [...] men act as if the ‘his’ referred to some entity larger than themselves. That is, they appear to act in terms, not of their own interest, but of the interests of a collectivity or even of another person.”^{xxvii}

People thus appear to self-identify on multiple levels – on not only the individual, but also the collective level. They view themselves as somehow belonging to a larger category. This, then, steers us towards the notion of social identity.

Social identity theory originates with the work of Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1979), although in later years it has been significantly refined. It argues that an individual’s true identity is multi-faceted, with social identity serving as an important component. Individuals often allow their behaviors and mentality to be shaped by their social group, which serves as a “point of reference” for actions and decisions.^{xxiii} Social capital theory expands on this notion, stating simply that social networks have value. It argues that, in addition to physical and human capital, there is a third element that affects productivity and utility – social capital, defined by Robert Putnam as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”^{xxix} Individuals recognize the benefit they receive from investing in their own social capital – among other things, access to jobs and companionship.

Several variables can be used to test these arguments of collective welfare and social identity. First, one would expect an individual’s immediate relationships to play a role. An individual who is married with children would likely feel a greater willingness to sacrifice time, energy, and money for her family – or perhaps by extension, for her community. The trait of benevolence might translate to a more welfare-oriented perspective. Thus Hypotheses 9-10 are generated, shown in Table 2.

After an individual’s immediate relationships, the next important factor is his level of community involvement. Membership in certain organizations contributes to a sense of

social identity and presumably, an awareness of collective welfare. As group participation builds upon social capital, it tends to shift one’s perspective of the unit of analysis from the individual to the larger community. General membership (in any organization) would then positively influence an individual’s attitudes toward income equality. Furthermore, the literature has shown that as an individual tends to take on the identity of his organization, the group’s stance on an issue will likely influence the individual’s own position. Certain organizations, such as labor unions, have historically been more supportive of redistributive policies. Similarly, an individual’s level of religious affiliation would likely influence his attitudes, for religious organizations often boast charitable giving as a major tenet of their belief systems, promoting a general spirit of egalitarianism. These factors are addressed in Hypotheses 11-13, also shown in Table 2.

Inherent in the last two sections – immediate relationships and community involvement – is another crucial factor: how an individual perceives herself in relation to others. An individual who does not trust others would logically be less willing to contribute to their welfare. Similarly, an individual who considers herself an autonomous entity (rather than a world citizen or proud nationalist) emphasizes her own independence, likely neglecting any spirit of social welfare. Hypotheses 14-17 are thus generated, found in Table 2.

Political explanation

In addition to economic and social factors, ideological factors also typically play a large role in predicting individual support for a policy issue. To an extent, this explanation incorporates aspects from the other two theories, economic utilitarianism and social identity. For example, a rational, self-interested calculation may drive one individual to a conservative political party, while ties to family values may push another to a liberal party.^{xxx} Herbert Kitschelt highlights the complexities of an individual’s self-categorization. He takes issue with the widespread assumption that socioeconomic class serves as the great political divider between the ‘working class’ and the ‘capitalist class’. Rather, he argues that people’s work experience and lifestyle heavily shape their preferences and political disposition, with three main factors coming into play: their source of income – from profit and interest or from wages; their sector of work – public or private; and their focus of work – within a competitive international or an insulated domestic field.^{xxxi}

Kitschelt incorporates a basic assumption of the individual as a rational actor, interested in both maximizing and safeguarding his wealth. Thus, an individual who operates

in a private, internationally competitive, and profit-driven industry will most likely support policies that allow him opportunities for entrepreneurship and investment on a global scale. On the other hand, an individual who earns wages in the public domestic sector worries more about his own consumption patterns than about his ability to successfully invest and compete in the world market and would thus be more likely to support redistributive policies.^{xxxii} In this respect, the individual's decision-making resembles the economic utilitarian model discussed previously. However, the political explanation takes this assumption further, incorporating it into a political predisposition that produces an important intermediate effect.

As Kitschelt suggests, a 'Left'-leaning individual falls to the socialist side of the spectrum, and in so doing, would naturally support efforts to improve income equality. A 'Right'-leaning voter, on the other hand, would tend to rely on market competition to produce efficient outcomes and hence distrust deliberate attempts to redistribute wealth. Hypothesis 18 emerges from this prediction, shown in Table 3.

This Left-Right (socialist-capitalist) spectrum is indeed an established political concept. Yet Kitschelt emphasizes organizational experiences as an even more influential factor. For instance, the degree of control that one has within her work environment, coupled with the level of social interaction and communication that she enjoys, yields a great impact on the individual's level of satisfaction. Thus, distinct from the marketplace 'socialist-capitalist' dimension, there exists a cultural 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimension that dictates how an individual views social and political organization. Libertarians (or perhaps more accurately named, populists) envision politics as a tolerant, interactive environment in which individuals feel both free and inclined to participate in collective decision-making. Authoritarians (or perhaps elitists) prefer a more conservative, hierarchical version of the political realm.^{xxxiii} Presumably, a 'libertarian' (or populist) would be more likely to support egalitarian measures than would an 'authoritarian' (or elitist). Due to limitations imposed by the survey questions available, this ideology is best operationalized as the importance one places on living under a democratic government. The influence of this second political spectrum is predicted by Hypothesis 19, shown in Table 3.

Together, these two spectrums create a two-dimensional space of political ideologies. While theoretically an individual can fall anywhere within this space, in practice, people tend to fall in one of two categories: socialist-libertarianism or capitalist-authoritarianism. For example, (libertarian) professions in social services and healthcare tend to exist in the public or non-profit (socialist) sphere, while (authoritarian) jobs in finance and law tend to lie in the private or

profit-driven (capitalist) sector.^{xxxiv} For Kitschelt, this two-dimensional model has important implications for determining the agenda and success of political parties. However, for this paper, it could serve as a telling indicator of an individual's support for certain policies. Presumably, some interaction effect exists between the two spectrums. An interacted variable of 'socialist-libertarianism' would be even more highly correlated with support for income equality than would either component on its own. Hypothesis 20 predicts such an outcome and is outlined in Table 3.

In addition to political ideology, there is yet another element that likely determines one's support for government policy – whether or not an individual trusts the state. Donald E. Stokes defines political trust as an individual's basic perception of the government founded on how well his political expectations are being met. Considerations of ethics, efficiency, and correctness of decision-making all influence this perception.^{xxxv} In fact, the greater the sacrifice a policy requires of an individual, the more important the notion of political trust becomes. When a policy conflicts with self-interest as a decision-making criterion, the level of political trust must be sufficient to serve as a viable alternative, or the individual will not lend his support.^{xxxvi} Hence political trust is expected to play a large role in determining whether or not an individual will support redistribution, a policy that inherently favors some at the expense of others. Hypothesis 21 (shown in Table 3) posits that confidence in the government is positively related to support for income equality.

Model and Results

This paper uses a series of ordered probit models to test the hypotheses developed above. The models are run first on the primary dependent variable – one's attitude toward income equality versus inequality. Each model is then run in two subsequent tests for robustness with only the dependent variable changed – the first measuring one's attitude toward market wealth as zero-sum versus positive-sum, and the second measuring one's attitude toward welfare responsibility as governmental versus personal. Explanatory variables are generally deemed significant if they fall within a 95% confidence interval; that is, if their p-value is less than 0.050. The operationalization of explanatory variables is explained in Appendix A.

While summarizing the data for each variable by country, I realized that large portions of data were missing; presumably, not every country asked all the relevant survey

questions. In order to run accurately, the model could include either all indicators or all countries, but not both. I deemed the countries more critical to my analysis, but I was curious to first discover any significance among the indicator variables I was soon to drop.

Model 1- Preliminary model with limited observations

In order to test these variables' significance, I ran a preliminary version of the model, including all explanatory variables but dropping all observations for the countries missing data: the Netherlands, France, Britain, and New Zealand. I then observed which of the ten problematic variables show a level of statistical significance. Table 4 presents a summary, while Appendix B offers complete results.

Out of these variables, the only economic factor of relative importance – and indeed, the only factor significant in the primary test for income equality – is class. As expected, upper class status is negatively correlated with support for income equality and the perception of market wealth as zero-sum.

From the social factors, several variables display some significance scattered across the two tests for robustness. However, none are particularly noteworthy; that is, no variable shows consistently strong support for our hypotheses. The number of children, for example, shows a reasonable negative correlation with the perception of market wealth as zero-sum (people with many children view wealth as positive-sum), but it also defies our expectations by being negatively correlated with support for government welfare responsibility. Additionally, an individual's perception of himself shows inconsistent results. Seeing oneself as a world citizen has an unexpected negative correlation with support for government welfare responsibility. Seeing oneself as an autonomous individual, on the other hand, has no effect at all.

Out of these variables, I have selected a few as the best sample of indicators. They are indeed measured in an incomplete model lacking four countries' observations, meaning they cannot be deemed truly significant. However, I find the variables of 'number of children,' and 'perception of oneself as autonomous' relevant to include in the summary results listed in Table 5, while the variable of 'class' is strong enough to include in the written analysis that follows.

Model 2- Pooled model with all observations

This model – with limited explanatory variables – considers all observations within a pooled analysis.⁶ The issue of country variation is addressed in a couple of ways. First,

6. In order not to skew the results, this model does not include the observations from New Zealand. New Zealand's survey results showed a high level of missing data, including many of the variables this paper has chosen to highlight. Furthermore, while this model does include the Netherlands, France, and

two variables – GNI per capita and Gini coefficient – are included in order to localize an individual within a particular financial and socioeconomic environment.⁷ Additionally, the model also incorporates the notion of welfare regimes, or families. It explores whether, *ceteris paribus*, an individual's residence in a liberal regime (versus corporatist, social democratic, or radical) would influence his attitudes. By adding the dummy variables 'corporatist,' 'socialdem' and 'radical,' the model assumes 'liberal' as the baseline for comparison. An excerpt of the model's results is shown in Table 5, although a more thorough explanation follows below. This discussion will be organized into the three explanations previously outlined: economic, social, and political. Additionally, Appendix C offers a complete list of all thirty-nine variables included in the model.

In discussing one's attitudes within the economic explanation, several interesting findings emerge. The most consistently significant economic factor is an individual's income. As anticipated, one's position in the upper half of the income distribution is negatively correlated with support for income equality and government welfare responsibility. Additionally, the variables of employment status and education level follow predictions, for both are negatively correlated with support for income equality.

On the other hand, the variable of female gender provides a surprising result. While I had hypothesized a positive correlation with support for redistribution, it is actually negatively correlated with the perception of market wealth as zero-sum. That is, females they recognize that wealth can grow to accommodate everyone – typically a premise of free market ideals. It is not statistically significant for income equality. Furthermore, an individual's health is not a significant factor in any of the three tests. It seems, then, that only certain human capital factors are influential. Education and employment definitely matter, gender matters somewhat, but health does not matter at all.

Finally, the Gini coefficient of an individual's country is significant in all three tests. It is negatively correlated with support for income equality and government welfare responsibility, and positively correlated with the perception of market wealth as zero-sum. To summarize the reverse, individuals living in more equal societies show greater support for income equality and government intervention, and they believe that there is enough wealth to

Britain, it does not include the ten problematic variables (listed in Table 4).

7. These two variables (GNI per capita and Gini coefficient) were included in the preliminary model as well, although the welfare regimes were not.

accommodate everyone.

Overall, as a class of variables, the economic explanation indicates moderate-to-strong support. The majority of variables show some level of significance, and three (class, income, and the Gini coefficient) are significant in at least two tests, including the primary measure of income equality. Furthermore, the results contradict our hypotheses in only one instance – our finding that females view wealth as positive-sum.

In addition to economic factors, several social elements are found to affect one's attitudinal position. The most consistently significant variable is one's membership in a labor union. As hypothesized, it is positively correlated with support for income equality and government welfare responsibility. However, general membership in an organization is not statistically significant. This suggests that the relevant factor here is not a sense of group belonging, but rather the influence that the group's views has on the individual.

Three social variables show unexpected results. First, having a spouse or partner is *negatively* correlated with support for income equality. While initially surprising, this outcome is perhaps explained by the fact that married individuals internalize a sense of financial security. To incorporate an economic rationalist spin, married individuals acknowledge that they run less risk of actually needing the benefits of redistribution. Second, the variable of religiosity shows an unanticipated *negative* correlation with support for income equality. That is, religious individuals actually favor income differences as incentives for individual effort. This seems to suggest a sort of Protestant work ethic at play, rather than the Christian charitable love that I had presumed relevant. Finally, the variable of national pride defies its hypothesis, as it is *negatively* correlated with support for income equality and government welfare responsibility. That is, those possessing great national pride are less supportive of redistribution – or more supportive of incentives for individual effort.

As a class of variables, the social explanation shows mixed-to-little support. As Appendix C reveals, a large number of variables lack any significance. Furthermore, individual variables frequently show unexpected or inconsistent results. However, it is important to note that within the social category, one variable shows strong findings – the results for membership in a labor union follow expectations in two of the three tests. This suggests the influence of a social identity, in which certain groups' philosophies shape the individual's attitudes and beliefs.

Next, the political category offers several interesting results among the ideological and trust factors. As anticipated, a left-leaning political ideology is positively correlated with support

for income equality. On the other ideological spectrum, a libertarian leaning – that is, placing a heavy importance on democracy in government – is actually negatively correlated with support for government welfare responsibility and the perception of market wealth as zero-sum. Libertarians, then, believe that there is enough wealth to accommodate everyone – on second thought, a reasonable finding. However, the fact that they favor personal responsibility is less easily explained. The variable does not significantly affect one's support for income equality. Furthermore, the interacted variable of socialist-libertarianism does not hold significance in any test. This appears to disprove Kitschelt's theory of a heightened interaction effect between the two spectrums.

Ideology aside, the variable measuring confidence in government is significant in two tests and seems to strongly defy previous hypotheses. Confidence in government proves negatively correlated with support for income equality, and, more surprisingly, with support for government welfare responsibility. This finding invites further research and explanation, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, as a class of explanations, the political category shows little support. The majority of variables either prove insignificant or defy our predictions. In general, the results suggest that the factors of political ideology and trust are likely inconsistent – or at best, merely insignificant.

Hence among the three frameworks – economic, social, and political – the economic category provides the best explanation and offers moderate-to-strong support for our hypotheses. Economic factors, particularly those pertaining to human capital and socioeconomic status, matter most when determining individual's attitudes toward redistribution. The social and political explanations, on the other hand, show less support for our hypotheses. Within these categories, membership in a labor union and left-leaning views offer the only predictable and consistent indicators of attitude. These can best be seen as supplemental components to the overarching economic explanation. In determining one's attitudes, then, it appears that considerations of morality, altruism, or collective duty are often overridden by rational, self-interested calculations.

Country-level variables

Next, this paper will explore the country-level variables, first by welfare regimes, then by individual countries. As mentioned before, the pooled model includes three family dummies – corporatist, social democrat, and radical – thus using liberal as the baseline for comparison. For the purpose of this section, it is helpful to consider each dependent

variable as a spectrum. On the far left side falls ‘the state,’ with associated support for income equality, government welfare responsibility, government ownership of business, and a zero-sum perception. On the far right falls ‘the market,’ with associated support for income differences, personal welfare responsibility, private ownership of business, and a positive-sum perception. Before running the model, I anticipated that, with only slight variation between tests, the regimes would align more or less in the following order: social democrat to the farthest left, followed by corporatist, then radical, then liberal to the farthest right.

The results, however, were surprising. Among the latter three families, slight rearrangement occurred, mostly with the radical and corporatist regimes alternating order. Yet by far the most shocking result came from the social democratic family. Rather than to the far left, the social democrat regime actually fell to the far right in two of the three tests. The specific results for each test are outlined below, and a visual aid is provided in Figure 6.

In the test for income equality, all three variables are significant. The radical regime shows the greatest support for income equality, followed by corporatist, then liberal, then social democratic at the far right. In the test for responsibility, all three variables are significant, as well. The corporatist regime shows the greatest support for government welfare responsibility, followed by radical, then liberal, then social democratic at the far right. Lastly, in the test for sum of wealth, all three variables are significant once again and follow the predicted placements. In this case, the social democratic regime subscribes most strongly to the perception of market wealth as zero-sum, followed by corporatist, then radical, then liberal to the far right.

These results include highly unexpected outcomes. First, in the primary test for income equality, the radical regime actually falls to the left of the corporatist regime. It appears that individuals in Britain and Australia prefer greater income equality than do individuals in France and Germany. French and Germans, though, seem to prefer greater government welfare responsibility than Brits and Aussies. As anticipated, all four fall to the left of Canada and the US.

More surprising is the placement of the social democratic regime in two of the three tests. Completely contradictory of our hypotheses, it actually appears that Swedes, Norwegians, and Dutch prefer income *differences* and *personal* welfare responsibility more so than even Canadians and Americans. Yet puzzlingly, social democrats still perceive wealth as zero-sum more than any other family. These findings, while clearly indicating the need for further research, suggest that attitudes within certain welfare regimes do not necessarily align with political realities.

Such complexity is highlighted in Table 7, which lists the mean value of the primary

dependent variable for each country. Low numbers indicate support for income equality, and high numbers signify support for income differences. As expected, Germany and France (the corporatist regimes) fall below the average, while Canada and the US (the liberal regimes) fall above it. Both of these mimic the regime’s placement on the left-right (‘state to market’) welfare spectrum. The radical countries, though, display some discrepancy. Britain and Australia each fall above the dependent variable average, yet their regime lies on the left (or ‘state’) side of the spectrum. Furthermore, the social democratic countries show the strongest inconsistency. Norway falls below the dependent variable average, while the Netherlands and Sweden fall above it – with Sweden even having the second highest mean, just behind the United States. This surprising result is reinforced by their regime’s placement on the far right (or ‘market’) side of the spectrum. In these cases, great variation exists between predicted outcomes, individual country responses, and welfare regime effects.

In this matter, my analysis is left largely to speculation. With regard to wealth distribution in countries, I argue that great discrepancy exists between perceptions, attitudes, and reality. Recalling the Norton and Ariely study mentioned in the introduction, it seems that Americans displayed a skewed perception of current inequality levels. Furthermore, when asked to choose their ideal distribution pattern, they blindly selected the one reflective of Sweden. However, Table 7 and Figure 6 both suggest an individual preference for income differences and reliance on the market, seemingly reflected in the United States’ relatively low tax rate. Sweden, on the other hand, shows similar inconsistencies. As in the case of the US (and perhaps even more so), Table 7 and Figure 6 indicate an individual preference for income differences and reliance on the market. Yet Sweden offers relatively comprehensive welfare benefits, financed by one of the world’s highest tax rates.

In both cases – and presumably, in general – perceptions, attitudes, and reality diverge. Perhaps, as with the United States, the public is largely misinformed about the existing distribution patterns and forms its views on a flawed basis. It is possible that policymakers do not listen to constituents’ demands, or that the demands themselves are not made. More likely, though, welfare policies are not entirely unreflective of citizens’ preferences. Rather, a subtle factor of relativism plays a role in influencing individual attitudes. For example, the data suggests that Americans score a mean value of 6.18 when ranking support for income equality, while Swedes score a mean value only slightly lower, at 6.09. However, these scores say nothing about either perception or reality of existing

standards. It is possible that Americans view the status quo as a 7.0 (highly unequal), suggesting that they prefer greater equality than currently exists – although their goals might not reach anywhere near socialist levels. Swedes, accustomed to universal welfare and egalitarian principles, might view the status quo as a 3.0 (highly equal). Thus, they claim to support income differences, for their ideal society is one slightly more reliant on the market – although, compared with other countries, still relatively equal.

Relativism, then, could play a significant role in this paper's findings. Citizens prefer one situation *relative* to that which they know best, that of their own society. Indeed, this explanation does not fully account for the unpredictable results among welfare regimes. Further, it fails to adequately address the discrepancy noted between perceptions, attitudes, and reality. However, it proposes a new, useful approach for further analysis – though unfortunately, such elaboration is beyond the scope of this paper. I merely seek to highlight the variation and suggest the error in assuming all individuals to be informed, all opinions absolute, and all policies reflective of preference.

Conclusion

The results of this model offer several conclusions, in addition to the findings that beg further exploration. First, with regard to individual attitudes, several factors prove most influential. The social variable of labor union membership and the political variable of leftist ideology both significantly affect support for income equality. Yet it is apparent that the most significant factors emerge from the economic explanation. The human capital factors of education and employment, the socioeconomic factors of class and income, and the systematic factor of the Gini coefficient serve as the most critical elements in forming an individual's attitudes toward redistribution. Overall, individuals are more inclined to act in a rational, self-interested manner. They make decisions after performing a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the extent and necessity of the welfare benefits they would enjoy with the cost that would be personally incurred. Those who perceive themselves as market winners – those who are educated and employed or enjoy high income and class status – are less likely to support income equality, while those who would benefit most from redistribution – those who are less educated and unemployed, or of lower class and income – are more likely to support it.

The two tests for robustness measure support for government versus private welfare responsibility and perception of market wealth as zero-sum or positive-sum. These tests were designed not only to verify the results of the primary test, but also to measure individuals'

understanding of redistribution. I sought to examine whether people comprehended the full application of welfare policy, which is most often achieved through government intervention. Overall, I found little evidence to suggest inconsistent views. In general, explanatory variables showing significance in the primary test for income equality did not flip their coefficient signs in the latter two robustness tests; a positive correlation did not become a negative correlation, and vice versa. Attitudes toward income equality are often confirmed by, or at least not contradicted by, attitudes toward the other two indicators. Thus there is no evidence that individuals do not understand the practical implications of redistribution.⁸

However, inconsistency did persist within the country-level analysis. Differences in welfare regime proved to be a significant factor, but the specific effects were largely unexpected. The distinction between corporatist and radical regimes is less clear than anticipated, and in several tests, their placement on the welfare spectrum contradicted my hypotheses. Furthermore, the social democrat regime defied all presuppositions, emerging as the regime most in favor of free market ideals. I discovered that with regards to redistribution, great variation exists between perceptions, attitudes, and reality. A degree of relativism might play a role; that is, citizens prefer one situation *relative* to that which they know best, that of their own society. Yet regardless of the underlying explanation, I stress the importance of acknowledging that such discrepancy exists. In order for effective welfare to be implemented, individuals must be aware of the current distribution patterns; they must form and express attitudes based on such knowledge; and they must insist that policies are indeed reflective of such preferences.

8. This does not mean that support for redistribution is necessarily matched by willingness to contribute, for problems of collective action (i.e. free riding) likely play a role. The discrepancy between citizens' attitudes toward redistribution and their countries' empirical tax rates invites further research.

Table 1
Economic Hypotheses

H	Explanatory variable	Expected relationship with support for redistribution:	Mean value	Standard deviation	# of observations	Min value	Max value
H1	Female	Positive	0.534	0.50	11999	0	1
H2	Middle age	Negative	0.698	0.46	11986	0	1
H3	Health	Negative	0.750	0.43	11988	0	1
H4	Education	Negative	5.884	2.20	11913	1	9
H5	Employment	Negative	0.550	0.50	11933	0	1
H6	Class	Negative	0.297	0.46	8363	0	1
H7	Income	Negative	0.400	0.49	10518	0	1
H8	Satisfaction with financial situation	Negative	0.698	0.46	12018	0	1

Table 2
Social Hypotheses

H	Explanatory variable	Expected relationship with support for redistribution:	Mean value	Standard deviation	# of observations	Min value	Max value
Immediate relationships							
H9	Married, living together as married	Positive	0.628	0.48	11958	0	1
H10	Number of children	Positive	1.737	1.48	10685	0	8
Community involvement							
H11	General membership in organizations	Positive	0.772	0.42	11976	0	1
H12	Membership in labor union	Positive	0.239	0.43	11781	0	1
H13	Religiosity	Positive	0.533	0.50	11592	0	1
Perception of yourself in relation to others							
H14	Trust in people you meet for the first time	Positive	0.453	0.50	11668	0	1
H15	See yourself as a world citizen	Positive	0.738	0.44	8550	0	1
H16	National pride	Positive	0.882	0.32	11491	0	1
H17	See yourself as autonomous individual	Negative	0.762	0.43	8253	0	1

Table 3
Political Hypotheses

H	Explanatory variable	Expected relationship with support for redistribution	Mean value	Standard deviation	# of observations	Min value	Max value
H18	Left-leaning (socialist) views	Positive	0.609	0.49	10695	0	1
H19	Emphasis placed on democratic government (libertarian views)	Positive	0.937	0.24	11817	0	1
H20	Combination of socialist-libertarian views	Positive	0.503	0.50	12018	0	1
H21	Confidence in government	Positive	0.357	0.48	11669	0	1

Table 4
Summary of preliminary model (Model 1)
(Omitting the Netherlands, France, Britain, New Zealand)

Variable	Expected relationship	Actual relationship with:		
		Support for income equality	Support for gov. responsibility	Perception of wealth as zero-sum
Class	Negative	Negative	--	Negative
Number of children	Positive	--	Negative	Negative
See yourself as world citizen	Positive	--	Negative	--
See yourself as autonomous	Negative	--	--	--

Table 5
Summary of pooled model (Model 2)

Variable	Expected relationship	Actual relationship with:		
		Support for income equality	Support for gov. responsibility	Perception of wealth as zero-sum
Economic hypotheses				
Female	Positive	--	--	Negative
Middle age	Negative	--	Negative	--
Health	Negative	--	--	--
Education	Negative	Negative	--	--

Employment	Negative	Negative	--	--
Income	Negative	Negative	Negative	--
Gini coefficient	Negative	Negative	Negative	Positive
Social hypotheses				
Married, living together as married	Positive	Negative	Negative	--
Number of children	Positive	--	Negative	Negative
General membership in organizations	Positive	--	--	--
Membership in labor union	Positive	Positive	Positive	--
Religiosity	Positive	Negative	--	Negative
Trust in people you meet for the first time	Positive	--	--	Negative
See yourself as autonomous individual	Negative	--	--	--
National pride	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Political hypotheses				
Left-leaning views	Positive	Positive	--	--
Libertarian views	Positive	--	Negative	Negative
Socialist-libertarian views	Positive	--	--	--
Confidence in government	Positive	Negative	Negative	--

Figure 6
Spectrum of welfare structure




Table 7
Dependent variable: Income equality

Country	Mean	St. Dev.	# Obs.
Germany	4.40	2.40	1961
France	5.04	2.84	999
Norway	5.07	2.32	1017
Average	5.4098	2.54	11736
Britain	5.41	2.65	1018
Netherlands	5.63	2.49	1037
Canada	5.64	2.47	2111
Australia	5.67	2.55	1391
Sweden	6.09	2.45	991
US	6.18	2.20	1211

1 = Incomes should be made more equal

10 = We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort

Appendix A

Operationalization of explanatory variables

Source: 2005-2006 World Values Survey, OECD-Split Version (Ballot A and B)

Inc_equality

V116: How would you place your views on this scale? “1” means you agree completely with the statement on the left (“Incomes should be made more equal”); “10” means you agree completely with the statement on the right (“We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort”); and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Responsibility

V118: How would you place your views on this 10-point scale; 1 = “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”; 10 = “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”

Sum_wealth

V121: How would you place your views on this 10-point scale; 1 = “People can only get rich at the expense of others”; 10 = “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone”

Familyimp, Friendsimp, Politicsimp, Workimp, Religionimp

For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is 1) Very important, 2) Rather important, 3) Not very important, 4) Not at all important

- V4: Family
- V5: Friends
- V7: Politics
- V8: Work
- V9: Religion

1 = Very important or Rather important

0 = Otherwise

Happy

V10: Taking all things together, would you say you are 1) Very happy, 2) Rather happy, 3) Not very happy, 4) Not at all happy

1 = Very happy or Rather happy

0 = Otherwise

Healthy

V11: All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is 1) Very good, 2) Good, 3) Fair, 4) Poor

1 = Very good or Good

0 = Otherwise

Trustgeneral

V23: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 1) Most people can be trusted, 2) Need to be very careful

1 = Most people can be trusted

0 = Otherwise

Memberany and Memberlabor

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are 2) an active member, 1) an inactive member or 0) not a member of that type of organization?

- V24: Church or religious organization
- V25: Sport or recreational organization
- V26: Art, music or educational organization
- V27: Labor Union
- V28: Political party
- V30: Professional organization

- V31: Humanitarian or charitable organization

- V32: Consumer organization

Memberany: 1 = Active or inactive member of any organization listed above; 0 = Otherwise

Memberlabor: 1 = Active or inactive member of labor union; 0 = Otherwise

Freechoice

V46: Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where “1” means “no choice at all” and “10” means “a great deal of choice” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

1 = Numbers 6-10 (more choice than not)

0 = Otherwise

Partner

V55: Are you currently 1) Married, 2) Living together as married, 3) Divorced, 4) Separated, 5) Widowed, 6) Single

1 = Married or Living together as married

0 = Otherwise

Kids

V56: Have you had any children? 0 = No children, 1 = One child, 2 = Two children, 3 = Three children, 4 = Four children, 5 = Five children, 6 = Six children, 7 = Seven children, 8 = Eight or more children

Satisfied

V68: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? [10-point scale with 1 = Completely dissatisfied; 10 = Completely satisfied]

1 = Numbers 6-10 (more satisfied than not)

0 = Otherwise

Polaction

Have you or have you not done any of these activities in the last five years?

- V100: Signing a petition
- V101: Joining in boycotts
- V102: Attending peaceful demonstrations

1 = Have done at least one of the three

0 = Otherwise

Left

V114: In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? [10-point scale with 1 = Left; 10 = Right]

1 = Numbers 1-5 (more left than not)

0 = Otherwise

Competeharms

V119: How would you place your views on this 10-point scale? 1 = “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas”; 10 = “Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people”

1 = Numbers 6-10 (more harmful than not)

0 = Otherwise

Hardworkbad

V120: How would you place your views on this 10-point scale? 1 = “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life”; 10 = “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections”

1 = Numbers 6-10 (more inefficient than not)

0 = Otherwise

Trustfamily, Trustneighbor, Trustpersonal, Trustfirst, Trustreligion, Trustnation

I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group 1) completely, 2) somewhat, 3) not very much or 4) not at all?

- V125: Your family
- V126: Your neighborhood
- V127: People you know personally
- V128: People you meet for the first time

- V129: People of another religion
- V130: People of another nationality

1 = Trust completely or Trust somewhat 0 = Otherwise

Confgov

V138: How much confidence do you have in the government (in your nation's capital): is it 1) a great deal of confidence, 2) quite a lot of confidence, 3) not very much confidence, or 4) none at all?

1 = A great deal or Quite a lot 0 = Otherwise

Democracy

V162: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where "1" means it is "not at all important" and "10" means "absolutely important" what position would you choose?

1 = Numbers 6-10 (more important than not) 0 = Otherwise

Leftdemocracy

V114 * V162

Religious

V187: Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are 1) A religious person, 2) Not a religious person, 3) An atheist

1 = A religious person 0 = Otherwise

Pride

V209: How proud are you to be [insert nationality]? 1) Very proud, 2) Quite proud, 3) Not very proud, 4) Not at all proud, 5) I am not [insert nationality]

1 = Very proud or Quite proud 0 = Otherwise

Seeworldcit, Seelocalcomm, Seenation, Seeautonomous

People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? 1) Strongly agree, 2) Agree, 3) Disagree, 4) Strongly disagree

- V210: I see myself as a world citizen.
- V211: I see myself as part of my local community.
- V212: I see myself as part of the [insert nationality] nation.
- V214: I see myself as an autonomous individual.

1 = Strongly agree or Agree 0 = Otherwise

Immparent

Are your mother or father immigrants to this country or not? Please, indicate separately for each of them: 1) Immigrant, 2) Not an immigrant

- V215: Mother
- V216: Father

1 = At least one immigrant 0 = Otherwise

Ethdivgood

V221: Turning to the question of ethnic diversity, with which of the following views do you agree? Please use this 10-point scale to indicate your position: 1 = "Ethnic diversity erodes a country's unity"; 10 = "Ethnic diversity enriches life"

1 = Numbers 6-10 (more good than not) 0 = Otherwise

Vote

V234: Did you vote in your country's recent elections to the national parliament? 1) Yes, 2) No

1 = Yes 0 = Otherwise

Female

V235: (Code respondent's sex by observation) 1) Male, 2) Female

1 = Female 0 = Otherwise

Age

V237: You are ___ years old (write in age in two digits)

1 = 20-60 years old 0 = Otherwise

Education

V238: What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

- 1 = No formal education
- 2 = Incomplete primary school
- 3 = Complete primary school
- 4 = Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
- 5 = Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
- 6 = Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
- 7 = Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
- 8 = Some university-level education, with degree
- 9 = University-level education, with degree

Employed

V241: Are you employed now or not? (paid employment)

1 = Yes 0 = Otherwise

Chiefwg

V248: Are you the chief wage earner in your household? 1) Yes, 2) No

1 = Yes 0 = Otherwise

Familysave

V251: During the past year, did your family 1) Save money, 2) Just get by, 3) Spent some savings, 4) Spent savings and borrowed money

1 = Save money or Just get by 0 = Otherwise

Upperclass

V252: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the 1) Upper class, 2) Upper middle class, 3) Lower middle class, 4) Working class, 5) Lower class

1 = Upper class or Upper middle class 0 = Otherwise

Upperincome

V253: On this card is a 10-point scale of incomes on which "1" indicates the "lowest income decile" and "10" the "highest income decile" in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

1 = Numbers 6-10 (upper half) 0 = Otherwise

Appendix B

Results of preliminary model (Model 1)
(Omitting the Netherlands, France, Britain, and New Zealand)

	Inc_equality	Responsibility	Sum_wealth
# of obs.	3263	3271	3243
Pseudo R2	0.0457	0.0338	0.0132
Log likelihood	-6926.5817	-7058.3163	-6901.2106
Variable			
upperclass	0.000	0.056	0.001
	5.30	1.91	3.28
	0.237	0.085	0.147
satisfied	0.650	0.025	0.219
	-0.45	2.25	-1.23
	-0.021	0.104	-0.057
familysave	0.817	0.355	0.792
	-0.23	0.92	0.26
	-0.011	0.044	0.012
kids	0.310	0.023	0.000
	1.02	2.28	3.50
	0.015	0.034	0.053
seeworldcit	0.267	0.001	0.219
	1.11	3.20	1.23
	0.049	0.140	0.054
seelocalcomm	0.825	0.792	0.496
	-0.22	-0.26	-0.68
	-0.015	-0.018	-0.046
seenation	0.858	0.785	0.013
	0.18	0.27	-2.49
	0.016	0.024	-0.217
seeautonomous	0.758	0.107	0.471
	0.31	1.61	-0.72
	0.016	0.082	-0.037
ethdivgood	0.219	0.197	0.163
	1.23	1.29	1.40
	0.053	0.056	0.061
immparent	0.309	0.967	0.142
	1.02	0.04	-1.47
	0.056	0.002	-0.080

Key: 1st line: p-value (bold if ≤ 0.050)

2nd line: z-score

3rd line: coefficient

*Negative coefficient signifies support for income equality

*Negative coefficient signifies support for gov. responsibility

*Negative coefficient signifies perception of wealth as zero-sum

Appendix C

Results of pooled model (Model 2)

Part 1: Economic variables

Variable	Inc_equality	Responsibility	Sum_wealth
upperincome	0.000	0.000	0.242
	7.07	5.88	1.17
	0.224	0.186	0.037
education	0.000	0.333	0.551
	3.56	-0.97	-0.60
	0.029	-0.008	-0.005
employed	0.022	0.368	0.176
	2.30	0.90	-1.35
	0.085	0.033	-0.050
workage	0.217	0.021	0.583
	1.23	-2.31	-0.55
	0.047	-0.088	-0.021
freechoice	0.129	0.003	0.000
	1.52	2.96	4.69
	0.064	0.125	0.120
female	0.25	0.591	0.004
	-1.15	-0.54	2.85
	-0.035	-0.016	0.088
healthy	0.809	0.126	0.189
	0.24	1.53	1.31
	0.009	0.055	0.047
workimp	0.337	0.795	0.593
	-0.96	-0.26	0.53
	-0.041	-0.011	0.023
chiefwg	0.12	0.083	0.140
	1.55	1.73	1.47
	0.050	0.056	0.048
competeharms	0.002	0.430	0.055
	-3.15	-0.79	-1.92

	-0.125	-0.031	-0.076
hardworkbad	0.051	0.284	0.000
	-1.95	-1.07	-4.36
	-0.061	-0.034	-0.137
GNI per capita	0.000	0.000	0.538
	-10.04	-10.97	-0.62
	-0.039	-0.042	-0.002
gini	0.000	0.000	0.000
	8.66	7.36	-4.39
	0.062	0.052	-0.031

Key: 1st line: p-value (bold if ≤ 0.050)

2nd line: z-score

3rd line: coefficient

*Negative coefficient signifies support for income equality

*Negative coefficient signifies support for gov. responsibility

*Negative coefficient signifies perception of wealth as zero-sum

Appendix C

Results of pooled model (Model 2)

Part 2: Social variables

Variable	Inc_equality	Responsibility	Sum_wealth
memberlabor	0.000	0.000	0.143
	-4.68	-3.67	-1.46
	-0.161	-0.126	-0.050
pride	0.011	0.019	0.146
	2.53	2.35	1.45
	0.118	0.110	0.068
trustgeneral	0.347	0.451	0.399
	-0.94	-0.75	0.84
	-0.030	-0.024	0.027
trustpersonal	0.294	0.192	0.313
	1.05	1.31	1.01
	0.090	0.113	0.087
trustfirst	0.217	0.173	0.000
	1.23	1.36	3.52
	0.042	0.046	0.119
trustnation	0.986	0.183	0.045
	0.02	1.33	2.00
	0.001	0.066	0.098

partner	0.005	0.049	0.742
	2.83	1.97	0.33
	0.091	0.063	0.011
religious	0.000	0.057	0.005
	4.18	1.91	2.82
	0.148	0.067	0.100
memberany	0.719	0.066	0.366
	0.36	1.84	0.90
	0.015	0.074	0.037
religionimp	0.127	0.746	0.301
	-1.53	-0.32	1.04
	-0.056	-0.012	0.038
trustfamily	0.780	0.519	0.276
	-0.28	-0.65	-1.09
	-0.036	-0.083	-0.143
trustneighbor	0.154	0.588	0.623
	-1.43	-0.54	-0.49
	-0.060	-0.023	-0.020
trustreligion	0.142	0.160	0.513
	-1.47	-1.41	-0.65
	-0.072	-0.069	-0.032
familyimp	0.939	0.610	0.288
	0.08	0.51	1.06
	0.010	0.067	0.142
friendsimp	0.787	0.834	0.335
	-0.27	-0.21	-0.96
	-0.020	-0.015	-0.070
happy	0.309	0.006	0.396
	1.02	2.74	0.85
	0.057	0.153	0.047

Key: 1st line: p-value (bold if ≤ 0.050)

2nd line: z-score

3rd line: coefficient

*Negative coefficient signifies support for income equality

*Negative coefficient signifies support for gov. responsibility

*Negative coefficient signifies perception of wealth as zero-sum

Appendix C
Results of pooled model (Model 2)
Part 3: Political variables

Variable	Inc_equality	Responsibility	Sum_wealth
left	0.010	0.136	0.264
	-2.58	-1.49	1.12
	-0.354	-0.205	0.157
democracy	0.450	0.034	0.016
	0.75	2.12	2.41
	0.091	0.257	0.301
confgov	0.000	0.000	0.685
	4.84	4.08	0.41
	0.141	0.119	0.012
politicsimp	0.531	0.018	0.876
	-0.63	-2.36	0.16
	-0.018	-0.069	0.005
polaction	0.076	0.777	0.223
	-1.77	-0.28	-1.22
	-0.055	-0.009	-0.038
leftdemocracy	0.453	0.176	0.064
	-0.75	-1.35	-1.86
	-0.105	-0.190	-0.266
vote	0.371	0.224	0.105
	-0.89	1.22	1.62
	-0.037	0.050	0.067

Key: 1st line: p-value (bold if ≤ 0.050)
2nd line: z-score
3rd line: coefficient

*Negative coefficient signifies support for income equality
*Negative coefficient signifies support for gov. responsibility
*Negative coefficient signifies perception of wealth as zero-sum

Appendix C
Results of pooled model (Model 2)
Part 4: Welfare families

Variable	Inc_equality	Responsibility	Sum_wealth
corporatist	0.000	0.000	0.010
	-3.58	-4.25	-2.57
	-0.243	-0.288	-0.175

socialdem	0.000	0.000	0.005
	6.77	6.62	-2.84
	0.634	0.619	-0.267
radical	0.000	0.000	0.000
	-5.98	-5.67	-3.72
	-0.286	-0.271	-0.178

Key: 1st line: p-value (bold if ≤ 0.050)
2nd line: z-score
3rd line: coefficient

*Negative coefficient signifies support for income equality
*Negative coefficient signifies support for gov. responsibility
*Negative coefficient signifies perception of wealth as zero-sum

Appendix C
Results of pooled model (Model 2)
Part 5: Summary statistics

	Inc_equality	Responsibility	Sum_wealth
# of obs.	5649	5667	5628
Pseudo R2	0.0415	0.0335	0.0121
Log likelihood	-11993.490	-12290.162	-11832.443

Appendix D
Dependent variables

Responsibility

Country	Mean	St. Dev.	# Obs.
Germany	4.40	2.53	2015
Norway	5.09	2.21	1016
Netherlands	5.28	2.47	1041
Average	5.58	2.60	11815
Australia	5.81	2.63	1383
France	5.88	2.70	998
Britain	5.95	2.70	1032
Canada	5.95	2.49	2118
US	6.01	2.68	1215
Sweden	6.47	2.18	997

1 = The government should take more responsibility to ensure that every-one is provided for
10 = People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves

Sum wealth

Country	Mean	St. Dev.	# Obs.
Netherlands	5.75	2.37	1012
Britain	6.02	2.45	1002
France	6.14	2.43	993
Germany	6.15	2.54	1987
Australia	6.17	2.31	1382
US	6.19	2.12	1214
Average	6.29	2.31	11657
Norway	6.55	2.00	1014
Sweden	6.56	2.15	957
Canada	6.75	2.12	2096

1 = People can only get rich at the expense of others (zero-sum)

10 = Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone (positive-sum)

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Santorini, Greece
Jenna Wray, Class of 2014

Turkey: Changing Demographics in Light of a Changing Political Arena

Natalie Malouf

International Studies Major, Class of 2012

Introduction

The Republic of Turkey has been traditionally known as the bridge between continents and the philosophies of the West and the East. Over the last few decades, however, it has emerged in the international community as a strong and viable player both economically and politically. Having what demographers call a transitional age structure, Turkey's population is transitioning from one that is young and steadily growing to one that is more and more aged and growing at a slower rate. This transitional structure boosts Turkey's position as a potential rising power because it engenders a prime atmosphere for increased economic and military growth.¹

As a democratic and Islamic state, Turkey acts as a stabilizing influence in the Middle East, and thus the United States and Europe seek to benefit from its geopolitical importance. Turkey also boasts a relatively stable economy, with a per-capita GDP of \$11,400 and a large working force.² In fact, Turkey's economy currently stands as the 16th largest in the world.³ Despite these advantages, Turkey faces a number of concerns affecting its national security, which have led it to increase its soft power among its neighbors in the Middle East (namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria), maintain its hard power in the face of growing Kurdish nationalism, limit its support of U.S. policies in the Middle East, and enhance its foreign trade, especially with the European Union. Turkey's most important security goal, however, lies in taking advantage of its current status as a transition state—a state that is on its way to becoming part of the “developed” world.

In this paper, I discuss how demographic trends contribute to the security of the country in light of current regional issues and international events. I also explore the impact demography will have on the Turkish economy, and how that will affect Turkey's campaign for E.U. membership. Specifically, I ask the following questions:

1. How will a substantial youth population influence the rise of domestic tensions between secularism and Islam? How will this pose challenges to its military security (the ability of a state to defend itself militarily) and regime security (the ability of a state's government to stay in power)?

2. In light of Europe's declining population as well as Turkey's economic progress and youthful workforce, how has the immigration of Turks into Europe and Germany already affected Turkey's vision of national security?
3. How does Turkey's transition from a high total fertility rate (the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime) to a replacement level influence its development trajectory and future economic success?

Undoubtedly, the manner in which Turkey understands and addresses these concerns and its ability to translate numbers into policy will determine whether Turkey becomes a new and powerful actor in the international community or whether it misses its chance and falls to the way-side. If Turkey takes advantage of its transitional age structure while framing its security agenda, it could rise in rank in the international community as not only an important regional power, but also a model for other states.


Population Trends

Turkey has a TFR, or total fertility rate, of 2.13.⁴ This is a dramatic decrease from a TFR of 6.93 between the years 1950 and 1955. Furthermore, it is projected that between 2025 and 2030, Turkey's TFR will drop to 1.85, a number below replacement level.⁵ This projection uses the medium fertility variant, which is used for countries, like Turkey, “where fertility has been declining but whose level was still above 2.1 children per woman in 2005-2010.”⁶ The difference between these two numbers, 6.93 and 1.85, is crucial; it is the difference between the current TFR of a rapidly growing African country and one for the majority of “developed” European countries. Turkey has essentially reduced its TFR by half in roughly half a century. This gradual leveling out and eventual decline means that Turkey follows the demographic transition. As its total fertility declines, its population will slowly age. Because a decline in fertility is a common effect of development, this suggests that Turkey has undergone some serious development over the last sixty years.


The graphs below in Figure 1 reflect this development in Turkey. Giving three different snapshots of Turkey's population, the graphs illustrate the change in population every twenty years, starting in 1990 and ending in the projection for 2030. The first graph demonstrates a relatively youthful population structure, with a continual increase in population until the most

recent (youngest) cohort. Before this point, Turkey had been experiencing fairly rapid population and economic growth: “since 1950...major advances have been made in the spheres of infrastructure and production.”⁷ These years of unprecedented growth, however, may not reveal the whole picture, as will be addressed in the section on the Turkish economy.


Figure 1



U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php>



U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php>




U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.
<http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php>

The second graph, illustrating the 2010 population, shows a reduction in its most youthful cohorts, reflecting a stabilization of the population. In the next twenty years, however, it is predicted that the fertility rate will decline, as shown by the changes in population in the final graph. Even as Turkey’s TFR steadily declines, it still surpasses the current TFRs of many countries in Europe, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, Malta, France, and Germany.⁸ With a rapidly overall declining TFR in Europe, Turkey’s replacement-level TFR might support its case for E.U. membership. If Europe intends to stay economically strong in the midst of the welfare situations of many of its countries, it may want access to Turkey’s economy and potential supply of workers.

The graph in Figure 2 linearly represents the percentage of Turkey’s total population between the ages of 15 and 59, which encompasses the majority of Turkey’s work force, as its retirement age is 64.⁹ From 1950 until today, the percentage of this group of the population has stayed at or above 50%, meaning that half of its population is of working age. Furthermore, it is projected to stay at or above this level up to 2050, with a spike of over 60% in the year 2030. This shows that even in the midst of its transition, Turkey still has a sizeable working-age population to support its elderly population. While this provides immense benefits to the state at this time, this will not always be the case, as the country will be on its way

to becoming aged. Workers nearing the age of retirement will soon leave the workforce, creating more dependence and financial strain on its young population entering the workforce. If Turkey wishes to avoid a dependency situation, it must take this opportunity to profit from its current demographic situation by using the current pool of potential workers as an economic buffer for anticipated future strain.

Figure 2



Data taken from: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

As Turkey's population slowly ages, its death rate increases. According to U.N. data, the number of deaths per year between 2005 and 2010 was 437,000.¹⁰ This number had been steadily declining since the 541,000 deaths per year between 1950 and 1955, with occasional fluctuations; however, it is expected to increase to 614,000 between the years 2025 and 2030.¹¹ This higher expected death rate reflects the increase of aged persons that Turkey will deal with in the next few decades. The age dependency ratio, or “the ratio of dependents—people younger than 15 or older than 64—to the working age population—those aged 15-64” was 49.38 in 2008.¹² Although Turkey faces an increase in its elderly population, its robust working-age population may prove useful in supporting them. However, unlike countries that have had to adapt in order to provide for their elderly populations, such as Japan, Turkey has its solution built-in. All it has to do is enact economic policies that will encourage steady growth and search for long-term solutions for its aging population.

On one hand, Turkey has a good base for economic stability; on the other, many of its people are leaving the country. The net-migration rate between 1950 and 1955 was -0.2.¹³ Between 2005 and 2010 this rate was -0.1; in the years between 2025 and 2030, it is projected to be 0.0.¹⁴ The negative migration rates reflected in years prior to 2005 could be attributed to the migration of workers in search of better economic prospects in Europe. In recent years, for example, a large number of Turks have moved to Germany—there are roughly three million Turks in Germany today.¹⁵ This may be due largely to more recent economic hardships in Turkey just within the last few years, which should pass in time. Coincidentally, Turkey has a fairly healthy and robust economy, as will be outlined further on. However, the high emigration it faces brings up a red flag for its future economic prosperity. If Turkey intends to maintain its stable economic growth it must draw in these emigrants and find ways to encourage them to stay. Turkey must take advantage of its economic and population situation soon, so as to avoid the negative consequences of emigration, such as brain drain – the loss of the state's more educated individuals who seek better opportunities in more developed countries – and other negative impacts. These population trends have significant political and economic implications for Turkey and will affect its policymaking in the realm of national security.

Economy

In spite of the current global recession, Turkey, with a few exceptions, has remained economically stable. In fact, Turkey survived the recent downturn surprisingly well and, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “the recovery in Turkey was the strongest in the OECD area as measured by the cumulative increase in GDP.”¹⁶ This economic stability provides the framework with which Turkey can utilize its advantageous demographic situation to become a more influential global power. First of all, with a large population, Turkey can draw more manpower for its military. Also, it can use its purchasing power to fund the military, in the forms of better technology, equipment, training and intelligence.

Another important facet of a strong and stable economy is its correlation to a higher standard of living. Citizens with a higher standard of living are less likely to act out against the state because they have better economic opportunities.¹⁷ Most importantly, “countries with transitional age structures also have higher chances of peaceful democratic governance and of being able to provide for their populations in terms of health and education.”¹⁸ Finally, Turkey's

economic prosperity allows it to reach out to other states in various regions to promote business and trade.¹⁹ Thus, in a broad sense, Turkey's economic success has important implications both for its domestic and foreign affairs.

Turkey has an invaluable resource of population to go hand-in-hand with its economy. With such a large potential pool of workers, Turkey will prove to have the necessary components for avoiding economic collapse that some European countries may face if they do not address their aging populations. These workers will be the engines for economic stability if they are used effectively and are not inclined to leave Turkey for economic prospects in other countries. In light of Europe's declining population, Turkey's economic progress and youthful work-force should be an appealing quality for supporting immigration. Europe would have the advantage if these available workers migrated and planted themselves in the European economy. The immigration of Turks into Europe has already affected its vision of national security, in that it is not in Turkey's best interest to lose most of its working-age population to Europe. While Turkey has a large population in the working age group, it still suffers in certain areas of social progress. It struggles with, for example, an unfavorably high illiteracy rate. In 2001, Turkey's illiteracy rate for its population of 15 years and up was 15% and 25% for women of that age bracket.²⁰ It is important to note, also, that not all of its eligible working-age citizens are currently in the workforce.²¹

In addition to having a low Labor Force Participation Rate, Turkey also has a lower participation rate for women than men.²² Moreover, Turkey's growth spurt was met with an accompanying slow rate of social development, including education, culture, and public health, and, as a result, is part of a middle category of economic development.²³ Statistics such as these pose challenges for Turkey's rise as an international power and reflect some underlying domestic issues that Turkey must address to maintain its economic stability. Despite these forlorn statistics, Turkey still has the ability to remedy them by enacting proper policy and taking advantage of its population as a resource. It is, however, imperative that Turkey take advantage of its economic growth and working population because of the "window of opportunity" associated with transitional age structures.²⁴ In spite of a recent economic downturn, the Turkish government seems to understand the importance of taking hold of its economic future and acknowledges the need to maintain consistent economic progress. In fact, the Turkish Premier, Ali Babacan, recently stated that the government should focus on long-term financial projects, rather than short-term "fixes" that have not had the kind of impact needed.²⁵ This long-term perspective reflects exactly the mindset Turkey needs going forward.

National Security

In terms of regime security, Turkey has gone through many changes in political stability, through military intervention, political party transformations, and reforms. Overall, however, it has maintained a fairly secure political system. When defining its regime security, perhaps the most important consideration takes the form of tensions between secularism and Islam and how such tensions are heightened by a substantial youth population. On the surface, Islam itself does not pose a major threat, as most Turks are proud of their Muslim identity. Rather, political Islam is perceived as a threat by the secularist government, and causes regime problems because of the struggle it creates within the state.

Turkey's modernization has contributed to the rise of political tensions because the pluralism of democracy has allowed for multiple parties to emerge (including Islamic ones), "leading to greater internal strains and political polarization."²⁶ As a result of openings for Islam to enter into politics, there is the possibility that young Turks will support movements to revert back to an Islamic state. Movements in countries such as Iran and Syria, which border Turkey, could also leak radical Islamic viewpoints into Turkey, leading to potential domestic instability. This is where the youthful population, who often suffer the most from economic crises and who are the most impressionable when it comes to political views, may have an effect on regime security. While this is possible, the likelihood of Turkey establishing an Islamic government remains slim. For one thing, the Turkish military as well as its constitutional courts have consistently fought to oust or ban Islamic political parties and uprisings throughout Turkey's history.²⁷ Moreover, Turkey would not want to jeopardize its chances for E.U. membership even further by succumbing to an Islamic regime.²⁸ Domestically, if Turkey could find a way to successfully incorporate Islam into politics and still maintain its democratic status, Islam would not be a regime security issue.

Internationally, though, Turkey's ties to Islam challenge its bid for E.U. membership, although Europe has continually denied this claim. As will be shown later in this paper, this claim seems rather outdated and unfounded, as Turkey has shown quite a bit of devotion to maintaining its secular identity. Many painstaking measures have been taken on the part of the government to develop economically, socially, and politically. Thus, Europe's image of Turkey's relationship to Islam as being too strong - though the majority of its citizens practice Islam - does not apply to the country as a whole, politically speaking, and should not influence its ability to be a member.

Rather, keeping in mind that the European Union was initially founded to unite Europe economically, this organization might do well to review Turkey's economic standing and to better evaluate its potential for membership. More importantly, Turkey uniquely finds a happy medium between Islam and politics because "Turkish Islam has many faces, from the whirling dervish of the tourist's guidebook to the smiling figure of Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Justice and Development Party...who could easily pass for a smartly dressed bank manager."²⁹ This balance shows Turkey's comfort with its relationship to Islam, as well as its commitment to a secularist government. Furthermore, the vision of secularism, which was enacted during the regime of Atatürk, is a force that should not be underestimated. The tenacity of the Turkish government and military to maintain a secular and democratic state has been a key prerogative in its national security for decades.

Having joined in 1952, Turkey is a member of NATO, which provides a foundation for its ties to the West. While the United States and others over time have forged strong alliances with Turkey, the European Union today denies Turkey membership, in spite of its economic ties to the West. This has been one of Turkey's biggest issues in recent years, and continues to strain its relations with Europe. With the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Turkey's originally good ties to the United States began to deteriorate, and its faith in U.S. support and foreign policy continues to waver. In addition to the opening of various political movements, this souring of relations gave rise to an anti-Western sentiment in Turkey and a growing influence of Islam in politics. Because of its neighbors, namely Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Turkey must play its cards carefully in order to maintain its security agenda.

Turkey should avoid, therefore, supporting U.S. policies toward Iran, which have been strained to say the least. Any obvious support of U.S. interference in Iran would jeopardize Turkey's own security in the region. For one, Turkey receives much of its natural gas from Iran.³⁰ It also looks to Iran and Syria for support against the formation of a Kurdish state; Turkey has a Kurdish minority and faces attacks from the PKK, a Kurdish Workers Party labeled as a terrorist group by the West.³¹ On the other hand, Turkey does not support the idea of a nuclear empowered Iran, as it would lead to instability in the region.³² In addition to its desire for security in terms of Iran, Turkey is also wary of an unstable Iraq,³³ which is exacerbated by the war and has resulted in sectarian violence that Turkey fears may "spill over and draw in outside powers."³⁴ Moreover, Turkey does not want to see the Kurdish population in Iraq gain independence, as that might negatively affect the already strained relationship with the Kurds living in Turkey.³⁵

With the emergence of a more independent Kurdish autonomous state, as well as attacks launched by the PKK, Turkey's Kurdish minority population poses threats to its military, regime, and internal security. In terms of military security, the PKK threatens the effectiveness and manpower of the Turkish military. By having to focus on squelching unanticipated attacks by this hostile group, Turkey expends extra force that could be devoted to larger national security issues. It not only literally loses men, but also loses focus, as it has to channel more energy into deterring terrorist attacks than it otherwise would. Regime security, not just military security, might also be affected by this threat because the people may see these attacks as weakness on the part of the government and voice their dissatisfaction or distrust.

Turkey's government, however, does not seem to be in imminent danger of this occurring. In terms of Turkey's internal security, the negative impact of attacks from this group could stir up domestic tensions with the Kurdish population living in Turkey, leading to domestic instability and possible uprisings. With more frequent uprisings, the government may find it harder to address the issues of its citizens, and then, perhaps, internal order could break down. This scenario is, however, the weakest and least likely to happen of all the threats. Nonetheless, when defining its national security, Turkey will at least want to incorporate the issue of Kurdish nationalism and the PKK into its plan.

Conclusion

More important than focusing on its military concerns, external factors, and internal strife, Turkey's should prioritize its population. Turkey's transition from a high TFR to a replacement level has greatly influenced its development trajectory and future economic success, because it has led to a boom in development over the last 60 years. Fortunately, this development has allowed Turkey to pursue alliances, become a member of NATO, work alongside the U.S., and be regarded as a greatly influential force not only in the Middle East but also in the economic sector. Turkey has an invaluable resource and an advantage over other states with less favorable population trends and economic situations. Essentially, Turkey's status as the "middle man" and a transition country places it at a unique crux. It has never seen a greater time to be pro-active than now, while it has the proper resources (a relatively healthy population within working ages) and economic backing.

It also has the ability to expand its influence through soft power, due to the nature of its balance of religion and politics. On the other hand, it still faces domestic issues in the

realms of education and overall public health and still has issues with domestic tensions. This is why Turkey must take control of its economic prosperity, have confidence in its potential, and reach for high ambitions as it moves forward. Other states in the international community must also recognize Turkey for its worth, and be willing to foster stronger relations. For years, Turkey has been recognized as a modernizing country willing to adopt progressive policies while also maintaining its rich traditions, thus giving it the perfect background for advancing into the future as an immensely invaluable country. It contains a hidden gem waiting to be unearthed, and in the years to come, Turkey will hopefully surprise the world.

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Istanbul, Turkey
Sarah Endres, Class of 2011



Shanghai, China
Bradley Bledsoe, Class of 2011



Buenos Aires, Argentina
Emily Sellers, Class of 2011



Tianjin, China
Bradley Bledsoe, Class of 2011



Vrindavan, India
Carly Agre, Class of 2011



Kunene Region, Namibia
Lee Bryant, Class of 2011



Fes, Morocco
Sara Pellegrom, Class of 2011



Swakopmund, Namibia
Adam Alsamadisi, Class of 2012

The Varied Success of the Green Revolution

Amanda Smith

International Studies Major, Class of 2011



Masai Mara National Reserve, Kenya
Sara Pellegrom, Class of 2011

The world's poor are doubly disadvantaged. Not only do they live in poverty and cannot produce or pay for food, but the majority also tends to live on land where agricultural potential is low and natural resources are poor.¹ Many poor, rural farmers are at the mercy of droughts and other natural catastrophes.² Their lack of access to land or credit further inhibits them from escaping poverty and malnourishment. This vicious cycle became a popular worldwide topic during the 1960s and 1970s, when population projections sent a Malthusian chill through the international community. Around the same time, the Green Revolution (GR), an agricultural development tool created by an American agronomist, Dr. Borlaug, came into global favor.³ With an increase of inputs, including fertilizer, irrigation, and pesticides, crop yields were shown to double, triple, sometimes quadruple in only a few harvests.

These rapid increases in production have seen no precedent.⁴ The hope was that, in time, these struggling countries would become food sufficient at the very least, and maybe even become food grain exporters. Thirty and forty years later, the outcomes have received mixed reviews. Some regions have seen positive economic and developmental transformation, while others have seen little to no changes, and still others have seemed to regress after the implementation of the Green Revolution.⁵ The disparities are wider than they have ever been before.⁶ As these disparities grow to new levels, the question becomes, why has this distribution of benefits from the GR been so uneven?

Research Question and Rationale

This paper seeks to explain the varied successes and failures of the GR as a development tool in the Third World. Numerous organizations and governments have cited the GR as an effective and successful, even miraculous, development tool, not only in terms of improving nutrition and meeting other basic needs, but also as a pacifying and politically stabilizing force.⁷ If the GR truly is a miracle development tool, then its significance for global economic change is of the utmost importance. Could the GR be more broadly applied to struggling countries in the Third World, such as many states in Sub-Saharan Africa? What has made the

GR so successful in some cases, while in others it is blamed for changes such as increased rates of violence, poverty, suicide rates and disenfranchised women?⁸ The wide spread of reported results begs to be explained. The conclusions from such a research project could reveal new tools for future development. With millions of souls destitute throughout the Third World, these questions mean the difference between life and death.

Literature Review

For most scholars of development, the GR's successes in Mexico and Asia are extolled as some of science's greatest contributions to society.⁹ Not only did this agricultural transformation feed millions of people, but it also helped to politically stabilize certain regions and propel them forward economically.¹⁰ For the purposes of this paper, I will therefore define the GR not only as biological in the usage of genetics in altering seeds, but also as an experiment in social, political, and economic development. Thus, the GR encompasses biology, society, politics and economics.¹¹ Because of its widespread issues, the GR has its fair share of proponents and critics. Whether or not the GR was truly a success is yet to be determined.

Many scholars contend that the failures of the GR stem from the cost of the technology needed to sustain the genetically modified seeds.¹² The seeds are designed to respond to massive amounts of irrigation, fertilizer, and pesticides. Without these key ingredients, the seeds will not yield the promised crops come harvest time.¹³ For small-scale farmers in the developing world, these inputs usually are financially out of reach. Additionally, tractors and other forms of large agricultural machinery are similarly out of reach for farmers stuck in poverty. While these barriers may be surmountable with help from the local government or high-interest loans, these costs are not sustainable in the long run. The annual cost of inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation, etc.) for farmers only increases as they continue to use GR agricultural techniques, which creates a debt trap for many small-scale farmers in the third world.¹⁴

When farmers have to buy expensive farming equipment and inputs to achieve high yields, they are forced to take out loans to afford these amenities. Debt is a serious problem for farmers and has become a major criticism of the GR.¹⁵ If the farmers have a bad harvest one year, they quickly fall behind on their payments and may never be able to catch up.¹⁶ This vicious cycle of debt results in high rates of loan defaults.¹⁷ Somewhat related to the problem of expensive inputs is the lack of relative technical information available to farmers.¹⁸ There have been many cases of farmers not knowing how much fertilizer to apply or that some fertilizers cannot be put

on edible foods.¹⁹ This has resulted in decreased yields, ruined crops, and even deaths to farmers who inadvertently consume the deadly fertilizers.²⁰ Applying the wrong ratios of fertilizers and pesticides can also be harmful to both the crops and the farmers.²¹

Others blame the lack of infrastructure for the bleak outcome of the GR.²² Many governments are not willing to invest money in basic infrastructure such as roads and water systems, impeding full implementation of the GR. For example, if farms do not have access to a water system, they are not able to heavily irrigate the crops, as is demanded by the genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Furthermore, many farmers are held back by the lack of reliable roads connecting their farms or villages to outside markets.²³ This means that even if they do have a successful crop, they are unable to reach the demand in neighboring markets. Along those same lines, some scholars point to widespread corruption in the developing world as a reason for why the GR has yet to be successful.²⁴ Farmers may have to pay hefty bribes at roadblocks to reach markets. These fines minimize their profit and, thus, their incentive to farm. This same idea also applies to farming products reaching farmers. Fertilizers are already expensive as it is, and because of bribes and corruption, their prices can easily double en route to their farm destination.²⁵ Corruption has a profoundly negative influence on small-scale farmers. The evidence to support this is strong because corruption is easily quantitatively measured by international watchdog organizations, and can therefore be proven in a correlative, or even possibly casual, relationship.

Many scholars point to the environmental factors that limit the success of the GR.²⁶ Especially in the case of Africa, sometimes no matter how much fertilizer, irrigation, and pesticides are used, the land cannot yield the amount of crops needed to turn a profit. The climatic and environmental prerequisites for success are not present. Fertile soil is a necessary prerequisite to the success of GR agricultural techniques.²⁷ Not letting land lie fallow also contributes to this environmental obstacle.²⁸ The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) summarizes this phenomenon,

Driven to meet the food demands of a growing population, African farmers have steadily abandoned traditional practices that restore soil nutrients, such as leaving fields fallow for several years between plantings. Without replacing lost nutrients, the soil gradually becomes incapable of supporting adequate crop growth. More than three-quarters of sub-Saharan Africa's arable land now has serious soil fertility problems.²⁹

It is easy to see that the environment can have grave, long-term effects on the success of the GR. This approach holistically incorporates the biological limits of nature. Not only does

industrial agriculture cause irreparable environmental destruction; when paired with an ignorance of local traditions and norms, it can be fatal to the crops and the people.³⁰ Land that was already weak to begin with has only further been handicapped by soil erosion because of intensive irrigation and high levels of nitrogen in the soil due to fertilizer.³¹ It is not clear whether this relationship between agricultural outputs and the application of dangerous chemicals is ultimately beneficial for the new output gains.

The GR as a development tool has unquantifiable potential to transform the lives of the world's poor.³² If implemented successfully, it could be the catalysis for change necessary to lift a country out of poverty, and propel it through healthy and sustainable development. To fully take advantage of the promise of the GR, its past failures must be studied, and changes should be made. These new variables could shed light on the movement, and clarify the improvements needed.

Argument and Theory

In my analysis, I look at corruption measures and infrastructure within my chosen case studies. My hypotheses are that with high levels of corruption, the GR is less likely to succeed, and with low levels of infrastructure, the GR is similarly less likely to succeed. Conversely, low levels of corruption facilitate the success of the GR and high levels of infrastructure will do the same.

Measuring corruption is important, as it can act as an explanatory factor in the outcome of the GR because, even if crop yields have increased, if farmers cannot buy their needed inputs because of bribes, then the social and political tenets of the GR have not been achieved. While I have found this measure to be used when studying overall regime and structural security, such as in Robert Guest's analysis of Africa's stagnation, I have not seen it used in the analysis of the success of the GR.³³ One of the reasons for this may be because on a sub-national level the success of the GR has been so varied, and corruption statistics are often only available on the national level.

For my second independent variable, I will be examining infrastructure levels. Infrastructure is important for the success of the GR because it provides the foundation for achievement. If farmers have access to irrigation, safe and reliable roads, agricultural extension services, rural credit institutions, etc., they are far more likely to participate in, and have success with, agriculture. Many studies have already shown the power of infrastructure to promote growth and reduce poverty. Basic infrastructure improves people's productivity as well as their quality of life.³⁴

Research Design and Methods

The Indian states of Punjab and Bihar are my chosen case studies.³⁵ The vast gulf between the outcomes of the GR in these two regions makes these two choices an enlightening comparative study. Punjab has been heralded as the flagship success story for the GR. Crops, especially wheat, responded well to new agricultural techniques, doubling, sometimes tripling the yields in less than two years. Punjab also has the best infrastructure in India and was therefore chosen first among the Indian states to test the GR techniques.

Bihar trails behind in almost all of India's economic and political success measures. In fact, "Bihar has some of the sickest, poorest and shortest-lived people in India."³⁶ It would seem, for this reason, that it would be an excellent case study for GR tactics. It has a growing population in need of extra food and an abundance of water for irrigation due to a strong monsoon season and a shallow water table. While Bihar lags behind other states in terms of infrastructure, roads and irrigation systems can easily be built with government aid. Bihar, however, seems to repel investment, especially foreign investment. Many scholars report, "India's boom has not reached Bihar, a state of 90 million people almost completely disconnected from the global economy."³⁷ One of the GR's explicit goals is the "transformation of agrarian social and economic relations by integrating once isolated areas or farmers into the capitalist market system."³⁸ As a case study, Bihar offers many puzzles as to why it has not profited from the GR. With many of the same environmental prerequisites that Punjab has, why has Bihar's development festered? Scholars such as Avinash Kishore argue, "more than agrarian structure, the lack of adequate infrastructure and economic incentives has contributed to the agrarian stagnation in Bihar."³⁹ I will demonstrate the validity of this argument in my empirical section.

Dependent Variable

To operationalize my dependent variable, I will be looking at fertility and hunger measures, as well as crop yields. Hunger indices are a strong case for operationalization because they speak directly to agriculture. If the goal of the GR is to stabilize, develop, and feed the hungry, then hunger rates should be down. If all of the new GR crops are being exported, or sold to other states before the locals can get food, and the hunger ratings are up, then that success is not definitive. I have chosen to include fertility measures in my analysis because it incorporates many important aspects of development. When a country is in the process of

transitioning its population age structure, it is a sign that the country is stabilizing politically and growing economically.⁴⁰ Declining fertility after the implementation of the GR would be a sign that families are making a profit off their land and that the government is beginning to provide social services such as education (particularly to its women) and family planning.⁴¹

The feminist element to this part of my analysis is especially important because the majority of the heads of families, and many of the heads of family farms, in the developing world are women.⁴² Through my demographic studies of the developing world, I have been astounded at the connections easily made between fertility rates and equality of women, education of women, and amount of the female population in the work force. In my opinion you cannot separate fertility and development, or the general well being of women and development.⁴³ They are inexorably linked, and can be strong indicators of a state’s political stability.

Next, I will be using crop yields to operationalize my dependent variable. The inclusion of the measure of crop yields is an obvious choice to measure the agricultural success of the GR. Specifically, I will be looking at Wheat and IR8 (a rice variety) yields, the two GMOs most widely grown in India. If after the application of GR technology and agricultural practices the crop yields are significantly increased, then this is a mark for success of the movement. Proponents of the Green Revolution in the developing world have used this measure, particularly agronomists such as Dr. Borlaug. This operation of my dependent variable cannot, however, stand by itself. Social and political measures must also be considered.

Lastly, I am going to look at hunger indices to understand whether or not these two states can be labeled as success stories for the GR. This measure is important, because of the original purpose of GR implementation: to feed a growing population and elevate said population through increased income and agricultural stability. To summarize my dependent variables, below is a chart comparing Punjab and Bihar in terms of crop yields, hunger indices, fertility rates and life expectancy. From this chart, we can conclude that Punjab can reasonably be considered a success in terms of the Green Revolution, while Bihar cannot. The question now is why is this so? What political or structural factors contributed to this difference in outcome?

Indian State	Crop Yields (IR8 and Wheat)	Hunger Index Severity	Fertility Rate	Life Expectancy	Outcome
Punjab	High	13.63 (Serious)	2.3	69.3	Success
Bihar	Stagnate	27.30 (Alarming)	4.3	61.6	Failure

Independent Variables

Specifically within corruption, I am focusing on bribes that farmers would have to pay officials in order to hold land tenure or sell produce at market. To measure corruption in these two states, I will be using information from Transparency International India. TI India’s corruption indices take into account perceptions as well as experience. Perceptions of corruption matter just as much, if not more, than experienced corruption because perception can act as a deterrent. Corruption, therefore, can prevent future growth and decrease present growth. TI India investigates corruption in eleven public services including land administration, electricity, water supply, and rural financial institutions for farmers, which are especially important to my study.⁴⁴

To study the infrastructure of Punjab and Bihar, I am going to turn to an important study by Buddhadeb Ghosh and Prabir De. In this research, the authors track infrastructure and economic development over the last quarter century in Indian states. Their research will give me some insight into how Bihar and Punjab started off in the 1960s and 70s, as well as how they have progressed since then. In Ghosh and De’s research, they split up infrastructure into three subcategories: physical, social and financial. Physical infrastructure consists mostly of transport (railways, roadways, airways and waterways), but also electricity, irrigation, telecommunication, and water supply. This measure will obviously be pertinent to the study of the success of the GR.⁴⁵ For the purposes of my research, physical infrastructure is

the only measure I will be taking into account. Under the Physical Infrastructure Development Index (PIDI), each Indian state is given a rank out of seventeen, with seventeen representing the state with the least amount of physical infrastructure and one representing the state with the most. Using this index, I will compare Bihar and Punjab's infrastructure over three decades.

I consulted another index of infrastructure from M.S. Bhatia's research. This research focuses on infrastructure specifically needed for agriculture, including fertilizer depots, grain storage facilities, the intensity of agricultural extension workers and researchers, rural roads, the proportion of villages receiving electricity, and rural credit banking. These measures can tell us more distinctively if not only Bihar and Punjab have general physical infrastructure, but also if they have the particular infrastructure needed for large-scale farming. Bhatia's research is valuable to research concerning the GR because it expresses infrastructure in agricultural terms. Additionally, Bhatia's research focuses on *rural* India, as opposed to infrastructure in urban centers, adding depth to my analysis. The majority of Bihar is rural; I was drawn to Bhatia's research for this reason.⁴⁶

Empirical Evidence

Research into the demographics in Punjab and Bihar confirmed my assumptions; Punjab is thriving while Bihar is struggling. This is shown through their respective fertility rates and life expectancy rates at birth. Punjab boasts a fertility rate of 2.3. This figure, close to replacement level, denotes a certain level of development for the Indian state. While its population is growing, it is doing so modestly and sustainably. Comparatively, Bihar's fertility rate is 4.3, the highest fertility rate of all Indian states.⁴⁷ This is a typical fertility rate of an undeveloped third world region, far from achieving development and stabilization. These fertility rates reflect the overall economic and development situation of these Indian states. Likewise, life expectancy can tell us a lot about the status of a country or region. In Bihar, life expectancy is 61.6, while in Punjab it is 69.3.⁴⁸ The average for India is 63.6, sitting comfortably somewhere in between Bihar and Punjab. This already shows us that Bihar sits on the lower end and Punjab on the higher end. This comparison can tell us a lot about the two states' respective healthcare services and nutrition. Just from knowing these two statistics, we can already make guesses as to who is failing and who is succeeding in the GR.

In Bihar, GR agricultural techniques were very promising in the beginning. Crop yields increased during the 1980s, higher than national figures, but could not be sustained in the 1990s.

Cereal yields have stagnated since then.⁴⁹ Since its implementation, the GR has not elevated Bihar economically, nor contributed to its development. Instead, Bihar might be worse off now than it ever has been. Annual monsoons devastate "wretchedly poor and overcrowded Bihar," making it hard to make meaningful development strides.⁵⁰ Bihar is almost completely cut off from the global economy, contributing little to nothing to India in economic terms. In Punjab, the initial success of the GR brought prosperity. As incomes rose from agriculture, the associated trade, industrialization, manufacturing and education took root.⁵¹ Crop yields have remained high, and since the 1970s, Punjab's agricultural contribution to India has continued to grow. Currently, Punjab produces 20% of the nation's wheat, 11% of its rice, and 11% of its cotton, from only 1.5% of its total national geographical area.⁵² Punjab is known as "India's bread-basket".⁵³ Today, the region is self-sufficient in food, even though the population has nearly tripled since the 1960s.⁵⁴ Punjab's current agricultural status is significantly more impressive than that of Bihar, who cannot even grow enough to export.

According to the India State Hunger Index of 2008, Punjab has the lowest level of hunger in India.⁵⁵ This relationship, between high agricultural production and low levels of hunger, tells us that not only is Punjab successful agriculturally, but also socially because it is feeding its own people. As could be guessed, Bihar's hunger index is deplorable. Bihar is ranked fifteenth out of seventeen Indian states for prevalence of calorie undernourishment, proportion of underweight children under the age of five, and under-five mortality rate. Bihar is categorized as "alarming" in the hunger index.⁵⁶ This indicates that not only are Bihar's crop yields low, but they are additionally too low to feed its own population. Where Punjab operates at an agricultural surplus, Bihar struggles to make ends meet. We can already see that in terms of GR goals, Bihar is failing while Punjab is succeeding. I will now delve into my independent variables, corruption and infrastructure, to get a better picture.

According to Transparency International's corruption indices, India scores a 3.3. This score ranks them at fourteenth in Southeast Asia, and eighty-seventh globally.⁵⁷ Within India, there is wide variation on corruption measures. A deeper look into these differences will shed some light on why the GR has been so successful in Punjab and so unsuccessful in Bihar.

TI India ranks public services corruption levels based on bribes, quality of service, the use of middlemen, perceptions of corruption, and commitment to reduce corruption. Then, it compiles all of these measures to come up with a composite index value, or grade, for the public service at hand. For example, the case of rural financial institutions in Punjab, 14%

of respondent had a direct experience with bribing, 18% said the quality of that public service was poor, 10% reported the use of influence or a middleman, 35% reported a perception that the department was corrupt, and 35% said there was a lack of commitment to reduce corruption. All of these measures combined gave Punjab rural financial institutions a score of twenty-one. In this example, all of the scores are relatively low, except for the corruption perception and commitment to reduce corruption measures. Using that same public service in the case of Bihar, we find that 49% reported direct experience with bribing, 56% said the quality of that public service was poor, 35% reported the use of influence or a middleman, 77% reported a perception that the department was corrupt, and 77% reported a lack of commitment to reduce corruption. Bihar was given a composite index value of fifty-six; more than double that of Punjab.⁵⁸ This highlights the need for the inclusion of perception in these measures. Perception can be just as strong a force as experienced corruption because it can also prevent economic activity and growth. For this reason, we can reasonably conclude that the corruption in Bihar is far more destructive to farmer's efforts than the corruption in Punjab.

Based on the corruption indices I have chosen to use, my hypothesis is somewhat verified and somewhat dismissed. Actual corruption seems to have a weak correlation with success of the GR, but when combined with perceived corruption, there is a strong correlation. Therefore, a more concise definition of corruption is needed to draw more concrete conclusions. This could be a subject for further study.

The second measure I will be using is infrastructure. Based on information from "How Do Different Categories of Infrastructure Affect Development? Evidence from Indian States", I will be looking at their PIDI (Physical Infrastructure Development Index).⁵⁹ This Index measures the level of transportation (roads, public transportation, airways and waterways), but also electricity, irrigation, telecommunication, and water supply. For the 1970s, Bihar is given a PIDI score of 4.1, ranking them ninth out of seventeen Indian states. For the 1980s, Bihar is given a PIDI score of 4.23, ranking them eighth. For the early 1990s, Bihar is given a 3.83, ranking them ninth, and for the late 1990s, Bihar is given a PIDI score of 3.79, ranking them eleventh.⁶⁰ This slow downward progression of Bihar in terms of score and rank shows its economic stagnation in comparison with other Indian states.

For the 1970s, Punjab is given a PIDI score of 11.1, ranking it first among seventeen Indian States. For the 1980s, Punjab is given a PIDI score of 10.44, ranking them first; for the early 1990s, a PIDI score of 8.82, ranking them first; and finally, for the late 1990s, a PIDI score

of 9.38, again ranking them first. Punjab's infrastructure, while perhaps not as strong as it was initially in the beginning of the implementation of Green Revolution agricultural techniques in the 1970s, is still strong compared to the rest of India. This study gives us a broad understanding of the differences in infrastructure between Bihar and Punjab.

For a more in depth look at what specific infrastructure is lacking or abundant in these areas, a study done by M.S. Bhatia, "Rural Infrastructure and Growth in Agriculture" is a useful tool.⁶¹ In this study, Bhatia looks at multiple levels of infrastructure, including power, irrigation, transportation, fertilizer, credit and finance, health, marketing, and agricultural extension and research. When it comes to percentage of villages electrified, more than half of Indian states are measured at 100%, an impressive statistic for a developing country. Punjab is one of these states. Bihar measures at 70.6%, far behind most of its neighbors. The study also measures how much of said electricity is used for agricultural purposes. In Punjab, almost half, 44%, of its electricity is used for agriculture. This shows a state priority for technology used in farming. In Bihar, less than a third, 21%, is used for agriculture.⁶² Bihar trails behind Punjab, and the majority of other Indian states, in most of Bhatia's measurements.

Similarly, in terms of rural roads, Bihar also trails behind Punjab. Bhatia measures road length in kilometers, per 100 square kilometers of land. Bihar's roads total to 49.2 kilometers, while Punjab's total 107.8 kilometers. These measures indicate that farmers in Punjab have far more access to fertilizer depots and markets. Bhatia also measures the quality of rural roads, in number of transport vehicles per 100 square miles. Not surprisingly, Bihar has 86.7 vehicles and Punjab has 196.4 vehicles. So not only does Punjab have more roads, but said roads are of better quality since large transport vehicles are frequenting them. Bhatia also measures the number of rural markets per 100 square kilometers. Bihar has 2.5 rural markets per 100 square kilometers, while Punjab has a healthier 13.2.⁶³ This shows the economic incentive available, or unavailable, to farmers in these areas. It is clear based on the indices I chose to study that infrastructure has a strong correlation with the success of the GR. My hypothesis is confirmed: strong infrastructure will lead to success, while weak infrastructure will lead to failure.

Conclusion

If the GR is to be properly understood, and its benefits properly cultivated, then its intricate relationships with existing political structures need to be examined. It is not enough

to implement agricultural techniques and expect to see a society transformed. Certain prerequisites are needed to achieve success, including a strong infrastructure and a commitment from the local and national government to eradicate corruption, especially the types of corruption farmers deal with (water, electricity, rural financial institutions, and land administration). Additionally, these prerequisites need to be maintained as agriculture modernization continues. Farmers will not grow crops if there are no economic incentives, and corruption takes away those incentives. Similarly, if farmers have no access to water for irrigation, passable roads to reach markets, or electricity for farming machinery, then they cannot make a profit no matter how many economic incentives there are. At the bare minimum, farmers need to feel assured that there exists the infrastructure needed to farm, and that they will not have to pay a bribe to receive access to said infrastructure.

In this way, the generalizations to be made from my research are very broad and applicable to many countries struggling with famine and malnutrition today. For example, many Sub-Saharan African nations today are implementing GR agricultural techniques and are not seeing the success they expected. With large populations worldwide living in poverty and chronic malnutrition, these findings are exceptionally important. With this information, governments seeking to improve their agriculture and food supply can now reprioritize their efforts on infrastructure and corruption. In terms of policy recommendations, that is what I would advise. Africa has encountered so many problems with basic development strategies, including opening up domestic markets or creating tax incentives for foreign investment, only to fail at reaping the benefits of those development tools.⁶⁴ This is due, largely, to widespread corruption and lack of infrastructure. Africa, as a continent, has benefitted the least so far from the GR.⁶⁵ To escape poverty and famine the government must focus its attention inward, where corruption originates. The example of Bihar, and many other regions worldwide where the GR has failed, should serve as a deterrent to those wishing to avoid dealing with corruption and infrastructure.

Appendix A

Table No. 14.1: Punjab-Ranking of Public Services (Figures in Percent of Respondents)

Department	Direct experience of bribing	Quality of Service is poor	Using influence or middlemen	Perception that department is corrupt	Lack of Commitment to reduce Corruption	Perception increased	Composite Index Value
NEED BASED							
Rural Financial Institutions	14	18	10	35	35	21	21
Income tax (individual Assesses)	18	18	08	60	46	32	31
Municipal Services	28	71	37	82	70	79	56
Judiciary	64	61	36	86	54	64	67
Land Administration	47	53	20	80	79	59	58
Police	56	79	35	90	69	74	69
BASIC							
Schools (up to 12 th)	08	12	06	30	23	20	16
Water supply	12	29	06	54	44	41	29
PDS (ration card / supplies)	08	58	16	72	61	57	39
Electricity	15	41	09	72	53	58	39

Table No. 1.1: Bihar-Ranking of Public Services (Figures in Percent of Respondents)

Department	Direct experience of bribing	Quality of Service is poor	Using influence or middlemen	Perception that department is corrupt	Lack of Commitment to reduce Corruption	Perception increased	Composite Index Value
NEED BASED							
Rural Financial Institutions	49	56	35	77	77	59	59
Income tax (individual Assesses)	61	43	20	78	37	59	59
Municipal Services	62	72	46	90	72	84	72
Judiciary	74	70	46	90	72	84	72
Land Administration	83	70	37	96	75	93	82
Police	67	84	34	96	82	86	78
BASIC							
Schools (up to 12 th)	36	42	18	78	35	65	50
Water supply	17	50	00	90	29	90	47
PDS (ration card /supplies)	24	67	09	91	64	74	53
Electricity	37	62	23	89	63	79	59
Govt Hospitals	45	58	25	85	57	76	60

Appendix B

Source: "How Do Different Categories of Infrastructure Affect Development? Evidence from Indian States." 2004.

States	1971-72		1981-82		States	1991-92		1997-97	
	PIDI	Rank	PIDI	Rank		PIDI	Rank	PIDI	Rank
AP	3.30	11	3.30	11	AP	3.52	10	4.28	8
AM	2.09	17	1.75	17	AM	1.51	18	1.61	18
BH	4.10	9	4.23	8	BH	3.83	9	3.79	11
					GA	4.63	5	5.44	5
GT	5.16	5	6.24	3	GT	6.33	3	6.19	3
HR	5.10	6	6.04	4	HR	6.38	2	6.57	2
HP	2.65	14	2.82	14	HP	3.26	12	3.79	10
JK	3.33	10	3.26	12	JK	3.11	14	2.82	16
KT	4.81	7	4.45	7	KT	4.16	7	4.18	9
KL	6.47	2	5.43	6	KL	4.12	8	4.56	7
MP	2.62	15	2.55	16	MP	2.89	16	3.22	14
MH	5.91	4	6.41	2	MH	6.05	4	5.81	4
OS	2.98	13	2.88	13	OS	3.13	13	3.24	13
PN	11.10	1	0.44	1	PN	8.82	1	9.38	1
RJ	2.36	16	2.79	15	RJ	2.90	15	3.11	15
TN	6.02	3	5.46	5	TN	4.59	6	4.87	6
UP	3.24	12	3.34	10	UP	3.33	11	2.57	17
WB	4.65	8	3.41	9	WB	2.70	17	2.57	17
Mean	4.47		4.40			4.27		4.49	
SD	2.13		2.05			1.71		1.75	
CV	0.48		0.47			0.40		0.39	

Appendix C

Source: M.S. Bhatia, "Rural Infrastructure and Growth in Agriculture". 1999.

State	Power		Irrigation		Transport		Fertilizer
	% of Villages Electrified	Share of Agri in %	% of Area Ir- regated	# of Tube wells per 1000 Ha	Road Length Per 100 Sq kms	# of Transport Vehicle Per 1000 Ha	# of Depot Per 100 Ha
AP	100	40.25	38.5	13.6	53.3	73.10	1.11
AM	98.0	2.34	21.1	0.1	33.6	104.70	2.02
BH	70.6	21.72	46.7	3.6	49.2	86.70	1.75
GT	100.0	36.85	27.6	5.6	53.9	191.80	1.28
HR	100.0	49.53	75.6	11.5	60.0	167.10	1.78
HP	100.0	2.76	17.9	0.7	45.9	28.80	6.13
JK	95.0	10.16	42.8	0.5	5.9	49.10	2.74
KT	100.0	36.37	20.3	8.2	67.7	69.00	1.07
KL	100.0	4.05	14.9	12.0	356.7	462.10	3.42
MP	92.0	22.67	24.4	5.2	32.1	23.60	0.75
MH	100.0	25.20	13.7	9.8	73.0	90.60	1.22
OS	70.7	4.83	32.8	1.0	126.0	38.80	1.85
PN	100.0	44.27	93.3	15.7	107.8	196.40	1.95
RJ	83.4	30.69	26.4	2.6	36.3	43.90	0.42
TN	100.0	25.50	46.4	2.7	152.3	201.45	3.40
UP	75.4	39.30	65.6	4.1	69.2	55.21	3.72
WB	75.8	6.96	35.8	1.8	70.0	243.00	6.80
All India	84.0	28.20	35.2	7.0	62.1	108.66	1.81

State	Credit	Health		Marketing		Ag Extension /Research	
	# of Rural Banks Per Lakh Pop.	Beds in Rural Host- pials Per Million	Rural Infant Mortality Rate	# of Maket Per 100 Sq kms	Storage Facility as % of Total Food-grains prod.	Worker Per Mil- lion Rural Pop.	Agricultural Scien- tist Per Million Ha
AP	5.15	72.7	88	2.9	33.0	97.0	152
AM	4.15	140.0	111	2.2	15.8	140.0	180
BH	4.48	30.9	102	2.5	3.0	56.0	139
GT	5.70	120.2	104	1.9	58.4	145.0	112
HR	5.30	34.0	91	6.5	27.9	143.0	459
HP	12.38	108.7	90	0.7	3.3	218.0	1027
JK	8.31	53.6	86	0.8	6.8	298.0	68
KT	6.94	86.0	82	3.5	12.2	173.0	460
KL	2.20	123.3	28	8.9	80.0	116.0	327
MP	5.45	23.1	124	1.4	19.5	258.0	65
MH	4.75	142.3	73	2.7	32.0	130.0	137
OS	5.47	86.5	127	1.0	10.5	259.0	105
PN	7.24	233.5	71	13.2	54.5	293.0	241
RJ	5.36	31.4	110	1.1	21.5	135.0	74
TN	4.93	127.7	93	2.3	20.0	135.0	204
UP	4.54	21.8	140	2.2	13.6	24.0	150
WB	4.19	146.8	75	2.4	14.5	45.0	90
All India	4.23	96.8	105	2.4	21.4	95.4	155

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Female Terrorists: A Study of Agency in Chechnya and Palestine

Anna Laymon

International Studies Major, Class of 2011

“It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.”

Al-Sha’ab, Egypt, 2002



Florence, Italy
Amy Bower, Class of 2011

Introduction

Traditional wisdom dictates that the natural gender roles for women are mother and wife—both nurturing positions that are inherently non-violent. Acts of aggression—whether it be fighting in the backyard or waging war overseas—are best left to men, for whom violence comes naturally. And in the rare exception of violence committed by a woman, the act is seen as a “deviant exception” to the norm, and an example of “a woman taking on masculine characteristics”¹. Indeed, a “female terrorist is incompatible with traditional explanations of all women as the peaceful people whom war protects and who should be protected from war.”² However, in the last decade, the world has seen a surge of women participating in organized violence, and, in particular, engaging in terrorist activities in Chechnya, Palestine, Israel, Iraq, Turkey, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon.

The tendency of the media, the public, governments, and scholars is to associate female terrorists with the image of femininity “gone awry,” establishing female terrorists as the victims of men, and all choice, power, and individual will are placed firmly in male hands. The continued narrative that all female terrorists have been coerced, drugged, or brainwashed “takes away [any] possibility of individual agency.”³ The importance of this narrative, termed the “victim narrative,” is its treatment of the motivations of male and female terrorists. The victim narrative suggests that because men and women are inherently different, their motivations for engaging in terrorism are inherently different—men are motivated by political grievances, women are motivated by men. As such, it is important to look closely at the victim narrative with a gendered lens. I believe that the startling rise in female terrorists is a trend that simply cannot be essentialized into a discourse of gender roles. Instead, an effort must be made to understand women’s radical break from traditional feminine roles and sudden engagement in traditional male roles. Are the women merely the pawns of men, as the victim narrative insists?

Or do women perhaps possess some of their own agency, some of their own grievances, some of their own motivations for turning to terrorism? This paper will examine the agency (or lack thereof) of female terrorists and the factors that motivate women to engage in terrorist activities.

Rationale

Since September 11, 2001, *terrorism* has become a household word. Everyone fears it, and the only commonly known fact is that terrorism targets civilians. Everyone is a potential victim. And that, in summary, is the genius of terrorism. Its greatest impact is the fear it creates, the psychological impact that it manifests in seemingly safe societies. In addition, globalization, immigration, and modernization have transformed terrorism is now a global reality.

To take the mystery and the myth out of terrorism is to remove the fear associated with the unknown. It is therefore imperative that terrorism, and all its components, be defined, studied, and understood. Scholars have seized upon the opportunity to study such a current and omnipresent topic, and, as a result, terrorism studies is one of the fastest growing branches of scholarship in the world. The motivations of terrorists, has been covered in depth by the international community. However, scholars have misused the gendered lens in their understanding of motivational factors, essentializing women to traditional gendered norms. The victim narrative, as discussed above, is thus an incomplete assessment of the motivational factors of female terrorists. Thus, this paper will contribute to the study of terrorism by examining the motivational factors of female terrorists through feminist international relations.

Literature Review

Although the use of terrorist tactics as a tool of sub-national groups and legitimate governments is not new to the international system, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 have inspired and necessitated scholarship dedicated to terrorism and security studies. As such, the current scholarship on terrorism is dense. There is a great deal of scholarship dedicated to the question, “what factors drive a person to engage in terrorist activities?” However, when examining this particular question from the critical eye of feminist IR, the body of work is overwhelmingly incomplete—this question could just as easily be worded, “What factors drive a man to engage in terrorist activities?” Or, “how are women coerced into engaging in terrorist activities?” The majority of terrorism scholars either ignore, marginalize, or stereotype women who participate in terrorist activities. Occasionally, scholars will address the topic of women who engage in violence from a truly unbiased and curious viewpoint, but these are almost always feminist scholars and

are certainly the exception as opposed to the rule.

For the purposes of this paper, I will privilege constructivist feminism as my main mode of analysis. Constructivist feminism is one of the most practiced branches of IR feminism as it allows for both a positivist and postpositivist interpretations (e.g. Prugl, 1999). With a dedication to examining the social layers of international relations and gender, constructivist feminism truly captures the importance of identity, culture, behavior, and structure in the international system.

I will examine gender and its relation to identity, culture, and behavior, using a post-positivist approach to my analysis. More particularly, I will examine the way ideas about gender shape the discourse surrounding female terrorists, and closely examine the ‘social layers of international relations and gender’ to draw my own conclusions. By looking at terrorist studies through a gendered, constructivist feminist lens, one can establish two categories of gendered thought within security and terrorism scholarship.

First, many scholars make no attempt to address women, or make any distinction between male and female terrorists (e.g., Stern, 2010; Cronin, 2009; Sageman, 2008). In this body of work, terrorists are referred to only as “he”—males are the de facto gender, the norm of discussion. For example, Jessica Stern, a preeminent scholar on terrorism, wrote an article titled “Five Myths about Who Becomes a Terrorist” for the Washington Post. In her discussion about *who* becomes a terrorist she states:

“By now, more than eight years after the September 11, 2001, attacks, we should be better at plucking a terrorist out of an airport security line. After all, we have some idea of what *he’ll* be like: young, socially alienated and deeply religious. And *he’ll* come from a country like Afghanistan....Or will *he*?”⁴

Stern goes on to debunk the myths that terrorists are all “socially alienated, deeply religious” and from the Middle East, but she never addresses the myth that all terrorists are men. In fact, she advances and supports that myth, never once mentioning women in an article dedicated entirely to determining “who becomes a terrorist.”

In the second body of terrorism scholarship, scholars acknowledge gender distinctions between male and female terrorists, and use the “victim narrative” to explain women’s violent behavior and the “insurgency theory” to explain men’s violent behavior (e.g., Bloom, 2005; Victor, 2003; Hoffman, 2006). Importantly, the two narratives have a distinct but interrelated history. The victim narrative first emerged in terrorism scholarship in the 1970s, and was used to explain the motivations of all terrorists, including both women and men. This discourse

was used by scholars, legislators, journalists, and policy makers to explain what was perceived as radical, unusual behavior. At this point, all terrorists were seen as “aberrant individuals [and] misfits within society... [who] use violence because they are psychologically or morally flawed, evil individuals.”⁵

The victim narrative remains very prominent in mainstream terrorism scholarship. However, while the victim narrative was once used to describe the motivations of all terrorists, today it is used only to describe the motivations of female terrorists. Today, scholars in this category accept preexisting notions of femininity and apply them to female violence, asserting that female terrorists are “motivated by highly charged emotional and personal reasons.”⁶ According to scholars in this second body of work, “women are more vulnerable,” and are therefore more “susceptible to mobilization against their will.”⁷ These scholars frequently argue that, as a result of their emotional vulnerability, female terrorists are coerced, drugged, raped, or manipulated into engaging in violence by stronger, more sure-minded men. Therefore, female terrorists’ violent behavior is not only unusual, unnatural, and irrational, but insane; only a woman with very serious psychological issues could stray so far outside of the traditional roles for women. According to scholars E. Berrington and P. Honkatukia:

Because women are supposed to nurture and protect, not kill, women who do kill are characterized as inhuman monsters. Their pathological deviance from prescribed feminine norms is identified as the prime cause of their violence. Women’s violence is seen as the result of mental abnormality which increases the risk of women behaving violently.⁸

Women do not choose violence, but are forced into violence by stronger men who take advantage of women’s deep personal traumas or preexisting psychological damage.

Within the victim narrative literature there is a wide array of gendered discourse. For example, in his book *Inside Terrorism*, Bruce Hoffman spends only five of 295 pages discussing women in terrorism, and only one half of a paragraph explaining the actions of Wafa Idris, a “twenty-eight year old divorcee” and the first female suicide bomber in Palestine.⁹ Hoffman never once mentions a male terrorists’ marriage status. Describing Wafa Idris as a “divorcee,” insinuated that her actions, unlike the actions of her male counterparts, were emotionally driven.

Other scholars within the victim narrative fully commit to the notion that women are motivated by their emotions and are therefore easy prey for cruel men (e.g. Bloom, 2005; Victor 2003). To these authors, female terrorists are “marginalized, divorced, ridiculed, isolated, and influenced by the death and/or humiliation of a male relative.”¹⁰ For example, Barbara Victor, a journalist for CBS and Elle magazine, asserts in her novel *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian*

Women Suicide Bombers, “women have been courted and cajoled [by men] into committing these self-destructive and murderous acts.”¹¹ Victor’s work provides the very important point that the victim narrative is perpetuated today by both mass media and academic scholarship. Victor’s stories are works of journalism. And yet she is quoted by nearly every newspaper and IR scholar that makes any reference to women in their discussion of terrorism (e.g. Hoffman, 2006; Bloom, 2005). Scholars in the field of terrorism are not thinking for themselves on the topic of gender. Instead of critiquing the basis of these gendered arguments, as feminist IR urges IR scholars to do, they are accepting these notions as fact. The concept of women as the pawns of men, despite its lack of scholarly justification, is the prevailing and accepted notion among IR scholars today.¹² While the victim narrative is still used to explain the actions of female terrorists, a new theory, deemed the “insurgency theory,” is used to explain the motivations of male terrorists.

Indeed, scholars have radically altered their understanding of terrorism as a tactic of war, and, as a result, have developed the insurgency theory to explain the motivations of normal (i.e. male) terrorists. According to the insurgency theory, terrorists are believed to be rational actors, and their behavior is believed to be the result of legitimate political grievances. The insurgency theory asserts that terrorists have “deeper issues or grievances within society,” and that their choice to engage in terrorism can be explained rationally.¹³ Indeed, the US State Department now defines terrorism as “*premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.*”

As evidence of terrorists rational motivation, scholars frequently site the high education and income levels typical of today’s terrorists (e.g. Bjorgo, 2005; Pape, 2006; Sageman, 2008; Hoffman, 2006; Killcullen, 2005; Stern, 2010). In terms of terrorists’ high education levels, scholar Robert Sageman, in a sample of 500 recently captured terrorists, discovered that 62% of those in his study have attended a university. However, on average fewer than 10% of people hailing from the same communities as the 500 sampled terrorists go on to college, showing the sharp contrast between the education levels of terrorists and the members of their communities.¹⁴ In addition, scholars have proven that the majority of terrorists come from the middle class, and therefore poverty is not a root cause of terrorism.¹⁵ These scholars assert that once we understand the terrorists themselves, it will be easier to understand their actions. Thus, in recognizing that terrorists are not uneducated, poor, “demented loners,” we also recognize

that terrorism itself is a legitimate and rational tactic of war.¹⁶ According to scholar Robert Pape:

The bottom line, then, is that [terrorists] are not mainly poor, uneducated, immature religious zealots or social loser. Instead, [terrorists] are normally well-educated workers... Especially given their education, they resemble the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement more than they do wayward adolescents or religious fanatics.¹⁷

While we have begun to think of terrorists as rational, sane individuals, this thinking applies only to male terrorists.

Argument and Theory

Although there is a great deal of research on the motivations of terrorists, the mainstream discourse is blatantly gendered, with the majority of terrorist scholars holding steadfast to the victim narrative to explain the behavior of female terrorists. This gap in terrorist studies discourse represents a fundamental misunderstanding of women who engage in terrorism, and must be understood fully if terrorist movements are to be fully understood. I will therefore discuss the motivations of female terrorists under the discourse to which men are held accountable, the insurgency theory, examining the place of female terrorists within this body of thought.

Independent Variables

The insurgency theory privileges two variables above others in its analysis of the motivations of terrorists, and more specifically male terrorists: political goals and the culture of death and martyrdom. I will therefore use these two variables in my exploration of the motivations of female terrorists, determining if women, like men, engage in terrorism because of deeper political and cultural grievances. Indeed, scholars frequently assert political factors in the motivations of terrorists, asserting that terrorists are driven by a nationalistic desire to reclaim the territory they believe is rightfully their own. While male terrorists are typically seen as politically motivated, “women’s political violence is not seen as driven by ideology and belief in a cause, but instead as a perversion of the private realm.”¹⁸ To bridge this gap in terrorist literature the motivations of female terrorists must be examined from the viewpoint of women’s potential agency, and with the notion that female terrorists can and do share certain motivations with their male counterparts. Thus, political goals and motivations will be privileged as my first independent variable in the discussion of the insurgency theory.

The culture of death and martyrdom is also integral to the understanding of the insurgency theory. Fear, violence, and death have become normalized in many conflicts, and as a result martyrdom has become glorified and idealized. Thus, in many conflicts terrorist actions are seen

as legitimate forms of protest, instead of abnormal and irrational actions as they are viewed by those removed from the conflict. The actions of male terrorists are often explained, in part, as a result of the desensitization of violence in certain conflicts, and the glorification of the martyr in others. Yet women are never held to the same discourse, as if they are somehow removed from the culture of death that permeates the conflict. Thus, the culture of death and martyrdom will be privileged as my second independent variable in the discussion of the insurgency theory.

Combined, these two variables will offer a succinct overview of the insurgency theory and its implications for the motivations of female terrorists. Indeed, the presence of these variables in most conflicts combined with their presence in the explanations of motivations of male terrorists make these two variables integral to any study of female terrorist’s motivations. There are, of course, many other variables that could and do exist, but for the purposes of this study political goals and the culture of death will be privileged as independent variables.

Statement of Hypotheses

I will examine the two independent variables—political motivations, and culture of death/martyrdom—against the presence of female terrorists in a conflict, discovering if the variables serve as motivators for female terrorists. I will test four distinct hypotheses. First, I will test the presence of political factors in the motivations of female terrorists. And second, I will test the presence of a culture of death/martyrdom in the motivations of female terrorists. I believe the evidence will confirm both hypotheses, and that political motivations and the culture of death/martyrdom will lead to the presence of female terrorists in a conflict.

Research Design and Methods

Case Selection

Female terrorists are present in conflicts that are grounded in very different contexts—female terrorists have been seen in rich countries, poor countries, democratic countries, and lawless countries, and in various countries such as Chechnya, Lebanon, Palestine, Sri Lanka, and the Kurdish region. For the purposes of this paper, I will examine the cases of Palestine and Chechnya.

I have chosen the case studies for two reasons. First, there is more relevant data and information available on the motivations of terrorists in Chechnya and Palestine than any other case where female terrorists are present. Terrorism scholarship tends to focus on what

is current and what is relevant to the United States, and because the conflicts in both Chechnya and Palestine fit this description, more is being written on these cases, and the women involved in them, than the other cases where female terrorists are present. While it might have been most obvious to pick the two cases with the highest percentages of female terrorists for this case study (the PKK and Chechnya) I instead chose Palestine and Chechnya because of the high degree of relevant, available sources.

Second, terrorism scholars insist that “because there are different types of terrorism with highly disparate foundations there are very diverse types of causes and levels of causation... Certain forms of terrorism are a result of certain combinations of factors.”¹⁹ Thus, when comparing different cases of terrorism it is imperative to examine cases with similar ‘combinations of factors’; only in this way can ensure that the variable are comparable and draw larger conclusions about the factors examined. Therefore, in terms of their similarities, I have highlighted three main ‘combinations of factors’ that will be important in my examination of these two cases. First, and most importantly, both case studies have a presence of female terrorists. In Palestine, female terrorists are featured prominently in the conflict, and have constituted 7.5% of successful Palestinian suicide bombings since 2002. Female terrorists represent 10 of 135 completed suicide missions in Palestine, and many more women have been arrested for attempted suicide bombings, attempted/successful murders of Israeli police forces, and other terrorist actions.²⁰ Palestine has the fourth highest presence of female terrorists in terms of recent conflicts in which female terrorists have been present.²¹ In Chechnya, female terrorists are known as the Black Widows. In total, Chechen women have been responsible for 22 of 27 suicide attacks since 2000, constituting 81% of the total number of successful suicide strikes.²² Today, Chechen leaders claim to have “two battalions of up to 500 women prepared to martyr themselves in the cause of independence from Russian rule.”²³ Chechnya has the second highest presence of female terrorists in terms of recent conflicts in which female terrorists have been present.²⁴ Second, both cultures have similar traditional gender roles in which the women are caregivers and men are soldiers. Third, in both cases the terrorists are fighting for insurgency movements within a larger, established, legitimate conflict. The Chechens are fighting the Russians and the Palestinians are fighting the Israelis.²⁵ Indeed, both groups are driven by nationalism in a bid for full autonomy over the land they believe is rightly their own. And finally, both conflicts have religious implications and undertones as the terrorists groups are Muslim while the target is non-Muslim.²⁶

It is also important to note that the case studies, while similar, will offer variation to the

variables. Because they are two completely separate conflicts fought by two completely separate groups of people, the psychological, personal, political, and cultural implications of each conflict are necessarily different. The variables, while examined under the same lens, will present different narratives in terms of each case study. Therefore, the possibility of variation within the variables in addition to the high degree of relevant scholarly sources related to Chechnya and Palestine, the comparable nature of the two conflicts provides sufficient reasoning to use the Black Widows of Chechnya and the Army of Roses of Palestine as my two case studies.

Measurement of Variables

The dependent variable—women engaging in terrorist activities—will be measured simply by the presence of female terrorists in the conflict. What matters for this study is not to understand the levels of female terrorists in a conflict, but simply to understand the motivations of female terrorists in a given conflict. The independent variables—political goals, and culture of death—are not easily quantifiable, and will thus be measured qualitatively using interviews, historical analysis, and current academic studies. The presence of political goals in the motivations of female terrorists, which are defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence...intended to influence an audience,” will be determined through historical analysis and first-hand narratives. The presence of the culture of death/martyrdom in the motivations of female terrorists, which is defined as a societal normalization and glorification of violence, death, and martyrdom, will also be determined through historical analysis and first-hand narratives.

Evidence Section

Political Motives: Palestine

In June of 1967, Israel established Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, refusing to pull their troops out of these ‘disputed areas.’ As Israelis began to encroach further onto Palestinian land, Jewish settlers not only consumed more water and more land, but simultaneously increased their military presence. As a result, there was a violent uprising from the Palestinian people, culminating in the First Intifada in 1987 and the Second Intifada in 2000-2004. Since then, fighting has raged between Israelis and Palestinians, with the result of horrendous living conditions for Palestinians and thousands of lives lost in the struggle. In total, the UICHR estimates that 208,300 Palestinians

currently live in Israeli occupied territories, and that 75% of those Palestinians live below the poverty line. In addition, Freedom House reports that two-thirds of Palestinians lack access to electricity and water, and that access to medical supplies is in extremely limited. In the Freedom House rankings of human rights conditions, the Israeli-occupied territories scored a 6 for both political and civil rights, with 1 being the best and 7 being the worst. Overall, those living in the Israeli-occupied territories are given the lowest possible status of ‘not-free.’

Palestinian women are not exempt from the wars, the turmoil, or the deep hatred towards Israelis. Even though Palestinian women live in a traditional, gendered society where they are not allowed to engage in warfare, they live with the men who do engage in violence. And “because these women have been exposed to politics and political arguments in the home, they are already more politicized,” and more ready to take up arms for their cause.²⁷ According to Palestinian psychiatrist Iyad Sarraj, “the children who threw stones and Molotov cocktails and confronted Israeli soldiers in 1987 and who watched their fathers and other male relatives being beaten and humiliated by Israeli forces are the young men and women who are the martyrs of today.”²⁸

Indeed, Palestinians themselves do not assert that the motivations of female terrorists are grounded in emotional irrationality. On the contrary, Palestinians, both men and women, terrorists and civilians, assert political motivations—the destruction of Israel and the recapturing of Palestinian land—as the primary objective. According to Dr. Emanuel Savin, a Palestinian psychiatrist in Gaza City, “the drive for power is ultimately political... The Israeli occupation and its dire socio-economic consequences are the main motivations for the Palestinians readiness to commit suicide attacks. This affects people of both genders.”²⁹ For example, Wafa Idris, the female suicide bomber who was previously asserted as acting out of despair and humiliation, is actually described by most as independent and politically motivated. Her mother, unlike most Western scholars, attributes her motivations not to her divorce, but to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict:

“[Wafa] was a Muslim, which made her fearless. But the injustice of the Jews made her act.”³⁰

Many other women echoed the same sentiments as Wafa’s mother in some of the only first hand accounts available—their martyrdom videos. Ayat Akras, a journalist who wanted to reach a large audience with the message of the Palestinian cause, stated, “I am going to fight instead of sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone.”³¹ Hanadi Jaradat, a Palestinian attorney, stated: “By the will of God I decided to be the sixth martyr who makes her body full with splinters in order to enter every Zionist heart who occupied our country. We are not the only ones who will taste the death from their occupation. As they sow so will they reap.”³²

Other female terrorists are still alive today, and have given testament to their political drive. Zina, the failed suicide bomber stated in an interview, “For the first time in my life I was free and doing something meaningful for myself and for a political cause. I could study and not have to worry about what people thought.”³³ One unidentified woman stated similar claims of seeking justice through violence:

We have waited long, heard a lot of poetic words, make-believe promises and talk of peaceful solutions, justice and fairness for the Palestinians, but look around you, tell me what you see. We have nothing—nothing. Just empty, meaningless words that have brought us nothing. So it is time we abandon the talk and take our destiny into our own hands. Dramatic maybe, violent maybe, but there is no other way. Our acts are cries of desperation in the hope that someone will eventually heed us.³⁴

These narratives, straight from the mouths of the Palestinian female terrorists, sound completely rational and make no mention of acting out of personal tragedy. Indeed, a closer examination of female terrorists reveals these women as a part of the larger political system, motivated towards terrorism as a result of legitimate political grievances against Israel.

Political Motives: Chechnya

The Chechen and Russian conflict is “one of the deadliest conflicts in recent European history.” Between 180,000 and 250,000 people have died since 1993, and people continue to die each day as low-level fighting drags on. In total, it is estimated that 20% of the Chechen population has been killed, and another 200,000 live as refugees in Eastern Europe. The majority of the refugees are women and children.³⁵

The political reality of the situation is highlighted in the brutal and violent treatment of the Chechens by the Russians:

Beatings, torture, killings, gender-based violence, and disappearances [are all commonplace.] Detained men have reported electric shock torture, often used on their genitals as a way of decreasing fertility. Rape constitutes normal conduct, and many of the cases never come to court due to the occupation and guilt of the Russian forces and the cultural norms of Chechnya... Women are increasingly becoming the subject of arbitrary detentions, torture, rape in custody, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings.³⁶

Doctors Without Borders, an NGO dedicated to global health equity, documented that 85% of the torturers and rapists were soldiers or police officers with the Russian forces, the other 15% Chechen forces. All Chechens—men, women, children, terrorists, and civilians—have experienced the brutality of the war against Russia. And while the violence is intense and disproportionately inflicted upon Chechens by Russians, the Russian government continues to deny any blame for the current conflict.

Female Chechen terrorists, just like their male counterparts, are products of the political reality of hundreds of years of Chechen oppression, and more recently, violent civil wars. Therefore, female Chechen terrorists, just like their male counterparts, are motivated to fight because of centuries of political grievances with Russia. Indeed, “the women involved [in the conflict] describe their motives as political and religious.”³⁷ Among Female Chechen terrorists, there is strong evidence of “self-recruitment and willingness to martyr oneself on behalf of [Chechnya] and independence from Russia.”³⁸ Yet despite the fact that the women themselves describe their motivations as political, “we, the West, treat suicide bombers as delusional figures, brainwashed by Imams. But they are products of political realities. The Chechens have legitimate political grievances that have created the momentum behind the extreme and brutal tactic of suicide bombing.”³⁹

Political Motives: Analysis and Conclusions

In both Chechnya and Palestine, first-hand accounts of the motivations of terrorists always cite political goals of resistance to foreign occupation as the primary reason for action, with the ultimate goal of full autonomy from an oppressor and a return of territory they believe to be rightly their own. In both cases, the enemy is the occupier, and the narrative of the ‘homeland’ is “imbued with memories, meanings, and emotional attachments.”⁴⁰ Indeed, scholars have found an extremely strong sense of nationalism amongst Chechens and Palestinians and assert that this nationalism inspires and encourages tactics that will achieve results. According to scholar Robert Pape, “people who love their nation can come to feel intense loathing toward the nation occupying their homeland and may develop a heroic sense of duty to inflict terrible punishment on the enemy society in order to compel it to leave. Accordingly, people and communities often go to extreme lengths to regain self-determination.”⁴¹ As the narratives of Chechnya and Palestine show, women who carry out terrorist attacks, just like their male counterparts, are motivated by the political realities of occupation. Indeed, female terrorists are not crazed, drugged, or brainwashed, but are “much like ordinary soldiers with a strong sense of duty and a willingness to sacrifice all for the common good of their community.”⁴²

Culture of Death/Martyrdom: Palestine

Palestinian culture is fully saturated with the images and ideals of martyrdom. The walls of ice-cream shops, barbers, bedrooms, and school buildings are plastered with posters and portraits of Palestinian martyrs. The ideology is so pervasive that in 2001, a Palestinian child psychologist determined that “among Palestinian school children little girls were just as likely as

little boys to say they longed to be suicide bombers. They thought that such a death was the highest honor that life could bring them.”⁴³ The culture of death in Palestine normalizes and glorifies martyrdom, legitimizing a form of terrorism that would otherwise be understood as evil, irrational, and extreme.

The modern Palestinian culture of death and martyrdom began during the First Intifada. As the Israelis quickly moved further into Palestinian territories, Palestinians pushed back, shifting from guerilla warfare to more dominant, terrorist tactics. The use of terrorist tactics, and more particularly suicide bombings, quickly gained popular support—in 1994, one third of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza stated popular support for suicide terrorist attacks. By 1999, the number had doubled, and over two thirds of Palestinians openly stated support for subversive, terrorist tactics.⁴⁴ Clearly, women are not exempt from the pervasive culture of death that exists in Palestine. I would assert that women are equally as entrenched in Palestinian society as men and are equally aware of the glorification of terrorists and martyrs.

Indeed, the rewards for martyrdom are great and go beyond the status of national hero—after death, female martyrs are said to become “even more beautiful than the seventy-two virgins [given to male martyrs]... And if they are not married, they are guaranteed a pure husband in Paradise, and of course they are entitled to bring seventy of their relatives to join them there without suffering the anguish of the grave.”⁴⁵ One failed female suicide bomber, while in Israeli custody after attempting to cross into Israeli territory with ten kilograms of explosives around her waste, told reporters that her “dream was to be a martyr.”⁴⁶ Another woman, a friend of suicide bomber Ayat Akras, told journalists, “It’s great... It’s sensational. Anyone would want to be in her place... If I had the means I would have done it yesterday.”⁴⁷ Indeed, the women of Palestine, when asked why they would blow themselves up, cite political goals and a dream of martyrdom as their primary motivations.

Culture of Death and Martyrdom: Chechnya

Chechnya has a very distinct culture of death and martyrdom that manifests itself quite differently than in the Palestinian case. The Chechen culture of death is not visibly displayed on walls as it is in Palestine, but is instead a pervading ideology that transcends gender, age, or circumstance. The hundreds of years of human rights atrocities perpetrated on the Chechens by the Russians have caused the Chechen people to become desensitized to violence. Rape, torture, murder, and death are no longer outside the norm; instead, they are le-

gitimate tools of political protest. In addition, Russians are no longer people, they are the enemy, the ‘other.’ This makes the act of committing violence against Russians somewhat normalized and legitimized—if they are no longer people, if they are seen only as the enemy, then in many ways they deserve death. The culture of death has normalized violence and has therefore established terrorist attacks and suicide missions as a legitimate response to political grievances.

As a result of the emerging ideology of death, female terrorists in Chechnya see force as a legitimate means to an end. Eliza Musayeva, a Chechen human rights worker, describes the situation as follows: “Something has changed in our society, in our psychology. So many terrible things have happened to these women that actions that once seemed unthinkable have somehow become acceptable.”⁴⁸ Years of violence, war, and oppression have created a political environment in which any response is an appropriate response. The action of blowing oneself up has ‘become acceptable’ in Chechnya as a result of the desensitization and dehumanization produced in the political climate. According to Sojberg and Gentry, “women can only take so much humiliation and violence before being driven to act.”⁴⁹

In Chechnya today, violence and criminality are no longer dishonorable actions; instead, violence towards the Russians is seen as heroic and honorable. Terrorists are glorified for the actions, and female terrorists are not exempt from this praise. For example, in an interview with the New York Times regarding suicide bomber Elza Gazuyeva, a Chechen woman told a reporter, “They are understood here. They are adored. She was, is, and will remain a heroine for us.”⁵⁰ Thus, the culture of martyrdom dictates that to choose death is “heroic”—to die for the Chechen cause is “adored.” Female terrorists in Chechnya are the physical embodiment of the cultural acceptance of violent solutions to the Russian problem, establishing themselves as unique heroines in a long and bloody story. The Black Widows are not forced into violence by men—instead, their violent actions are simply a result of the norms of death and violence to which they are accustomed.

Culture of Death/Martyrdom: Analysis and Conclusions

In both Chechnya and Palestine, fear, violence, and death have become normalized, and as a result martyrdom has become glorified, idealized, and legitimized. The glorification of martyrdom represents entire communities embracing the concept of self-sacrifice—a particularly relevant point in both Chechnya and Palestine where traditional Islamic teachings would normally prohibit suicide. However, these communities have come to understand martyrdom as something different than suicide and have thus embraced it as a legitimate tactic in the battle for autonomy.

Scholar Robert Pape describes the connection between martyrdom and communal acceptance:

Martyrdom—death for the sake of one’s community—is a social construct. An individual may wish to become a martyr and may voluntarily sacrifice his or her life to achieve the aim. However, it is the community that designates the qualifications for martyrdom and judges whether the self-sacrifice of specific individuals meets the requirements for this special status. Communities commonly reserve a prominent place for the names of their martyrs. Streets and schools are named in their honor. Monuments list their names. But adding new names is up to the community. An individual can die. Only a community can make a martyr.⁵¹

Therefore, in both conflicts, martyrs become legends because their sacrifice is understood as a necessity of a greater communal struggle. Martyrdom has come to symbolize the greater nature of the conflicts—the struggle for autonomy is literally a struggle worth dying for.

Because of the prevailing nature of the culture of death and martyrdom in Palestine and Chechnya, terrorist movements no longer have to actively recruit members—“most suicide attackers are walk-in volunteers,” eagerly anticipating their chance to impact the conflict.⁵² Indeed, the prevailing notion in terrorist rhetoric that terrorists are forced into action is decidedly untrue—Al-Qaeda turns away roughly the same percentage of applicants as Harvard.⁵³ Instead, suicide missions must be understood for what they are—carefully detailed, meticulously planned events in which the suicide bomber takes pride in his or her actions. As scholar Robert Pape discovered in his study of 462 terrorists,

They were not highly impulsive, not subject to delusions, not readily characterized as depressed, not unable to enjoy life, not detached from friends and society... Rather, they had friends, observed ordinary norms of social and other behavior in their communities, and generally approached their task with a soldier-like sense of mission... For them, suicide attack was not an escape—it was a duty. From smiles to statements of satisfaction in their final moments on earth, the world’s most deadly suicide terrorists took evident pride in what they saw not as crimes but as sacrifices for their communities.⁵⁴

In both Palestine and Chechnya, female terrorists, male terrorists, and regular civilians site the pull towards martyrdom as a motivation for engaging in terrorism. Thus, I conclude that my hypothesis in regards to the culture of death and martyrdom was correct.

Conclusions

When a male terrorist is discussed, either in mainstream media or modern academic discourse, the term ‘terrorist’ is not qualified by a gender; it is understood that the term ‘terrorist’ refers to a male terrorist. However, when a discussion of a female terrorist takes place, she will always be qualified as a ‘female terrorist.’ In the victim narrative, the distinction must be made between a ‘terrorist’ and a ‘female terrorist’ because the discourse that follows

such terms is radically different. The victim narrative examines the behavior of female terrorists through the lens of traditional gender roles—a female terrorist’s actions are understood and defined by her gender. Because women are seen as non-violent, any exception to that norm is explained as unusual and irrational. Indeed, “Very few researchers actually depict violent women as rational actors, even though scholars often characterize violent men as rationally or logically motivated.”⁵⁵ Thus, a woman who behaves violently must do so out of emotions because the traditional woman reacts emotionally, not logically. And if she is not reacting emotionally than she must be insane, because nothing else could possibly explain her motives. Women who engage in terrorism are held to the gendered norms of female behavior, and because they do not behave within those strict boundaries, their violent behavior is explained in any terms that will delegitimize their actions.

Is it true, “in fact, that [there] are very different motives for the men who died a martyr’s death than for the women?” Or that every female terrorist has “personal problems that made their lives untenable within their own culture or society?”⁵⁶ In my opinion, the answer is a clearly *no*. In this study I examined political and cultural motivators of female terrorists, trying to understand the relevance of the insurgency theory in mainstream terrorism scholarship. As hypothesized, the study proved that the insurgency theory should be applied to both men and women. In terms of the political and cultural motivators associated with the insurgency theory, this paper proved that these variables are not only relevant to the motivations of female terrorists, they represent the most prominent explanations in first-hand accounts of the conflict. Indeed, this study has proven that in fact, there are *not* very different motives for men who died a martyr’s death than for women who died a martyr’s death.

This paper also raised the critical issue of the need for further empirical studies on the motivations of terrorists, particularly female terrorists. Many of the studies I found were general studies of terrorists over a long period of time, which are effective for making sweeping generalizations but less effective when attempting to do specific case studies. In addition, I could not find any reliable data on terrorists and their motivations past 2007. While this is certainly an indicator of the difficulties of staying current on a topic that is constantly evolving, methods must be developed so that we evolve as they evolve. The access to solid empirical information is critical—without it, a true understanding of the motivations of terrorists will be difficult to assess. As scholar Robert Paper asserts, further studies are essential to “evaluate the still dominant perception that terrorists are essentially society’s losers.”⁵⁷

Most importantly, this paper proved that female terrorists, just like their male counterparts, are human. Female terrorists are motivated by the lives they lead; people cannot be separated from their political and cultural surroundings. Any an attempt to do so is merely an attempt to delegitimize the many tragic realities of marginalized groups. Indeed, emotional responses to devastatingly political situations are natural, and terrorists, both male and female, are responding to the political and cultural realities of greater conflicts. As Sojberg and Gentry describe,

Women, like men, are capable of violence. Women, like men, commit violence for a variety of reasons, some rational and some irrational. Women, like men, sometimes see violence as the best means to their political ends. Women, like men, sometimes commit senseless and heinous acts out of deprivation or some other socio-economic motivation.⁵⁸

Indeed, if this study taught me anything it is simply that people are people.

NOTES

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10. Sojberg and Gentry, *Mothers*, 137.
11. Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers*. (Pennsylvania: Rodale, 2003).
12. It is important to note that I use a great deal of Barbara Victor’s data in my evidence section. She is one of the only people who has successfully gathered interviews and first hand accounts of female terrorists. However, unlike many current IR scholars, I use only Victor’s data, and not her rhetoric or her conclusions.
13. Kilcullen, *Countering*, 605.
14. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008), 58.
15. Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*, 48.
16. Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 200.

17. Pape, Dying to Win, 216.

18. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 32.

19. Tore Bjorgo, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge, 2005), 2.

20. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 111.

21. Pape, Dying to Win, 209.

22. A Speckhard and K. Akhmedova, 63.

23. I. Bruce, "Attacks Blamed on Black Widows," *Herald*, July 7, 2003, 8.

24. Pape, Dying to Win, 209

25. It is also important to distinguish between the terms 'terrorist' and 'insurgent,' as the two terms are frequently conflated. For the purposes of this paper, 'insurgency' will be defined as "a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict, and terrorism." (Kilcullen 603). Terrorism, then, must be understood as one of many strategic components of insurgency movements. Thus, insurgency movements can exist without the use of terrorism; however, "terrorism is the tactical repertoire of virtually every insurgency...and insurgent objectives (that is, a desire to change the status quo through subversion and violence) lie behind almost all terrorism" (Kilcullen 603). Therefore, this paper will refer to its subjects as female terrorists in order to specify the specific nature of their position within a larger, insurgent movement.

26. Pape, Dying to Win, 86.

27. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 116.

28. Victor, Army of Roses, 40.

29. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 117.

30. Victor, Army of Roses, 40.

31. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 121.

32. T. Toles Parkin, "Explosive Baggage: Female Palestinian Suicide Bombers and the Rhetoric of Emotion," *Women and Language* (2004): 86.

33. Victor, Army of Roses, 133

34. H. Jaber, "Inside the World of the Palestinian Suicide Bomber," *Sunday Times*, March 24, 2003, 2

35. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 90.

36. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 91.

37. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 88.

38. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 104.

39. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 108.

40. Pape, Dying to Win, 85.

41. Pape, Dying to Win, 85.

42. Pape, Dying to Win, 219.

43. Victor, Army of Roses, XI.

44. Pape, Dying to Win, 82,

45. Victor, Army of Roses, 112.

46. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 122.

47. E. Rubin, "Gen C," *New Republic*, April 14, 2002, 15.

48. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 99.

49. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 101.

50. Steven Lee Myers, "From Dismal Chechnya, Women Turn to Bombs," *The New York Times*, September 10, 2004.

51. Pape, Dying to Win, 82.

52. Pape, Dying to Win, 81.

53. Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*.

54. Pape, Dying to Win, 220.

55. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 13.

56. Victor, Army of Roses, 7.

57. Pape, Dying to Win, 200.

58. Sojberg and Gentry, Mothers, 4.

