

MAN IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY AND RELIGION - READINGS, VOLUME I



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READINGS, VOLUME I

SELECTED FOR USE WITH THE TWELFTH EDITION

OF THE SYLLABUS FOR

MAN IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY AND RELIGION

SECOND EDITION 1980

(REVISED 1981)

Edited by

Fred W. Neal

and

The Man Course Staff

Professors G. M. Apperson, History; R. A. Batey, Religion;

M. P. Brown, Religion; H. R. Dinkelacker, Foreign Languages;

D. W. Hatfield, History; J. W. Jobs, Philosophy; W. L. Lacy, Philosophy;

R. R. Llewellyn, Philosophy; F. W. Neal, Religion; R. G. Patterson, Humanities;

D. W. Tucker, Foreign Languages; C. F. Walters, Religion; R. C. Wood, English.

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PREFACE

One reason for the vitality of the "Man" Course has been its openness to change. Each addition to the personnel of the teaching staff, new interpretations of the past arising from current scholarship, new emphases and concerns arising from problems of contemporary man, serve to freshen and revitalize the content of the course-- indeed, making mandatory a completely new edition of our syllabus every three to five years. We have in fact had twelve editions in thirty-seven years.

Equally characteristic of the "Man" Course, however, has been its retention of those features of the course which have continuing validity. Of chief importance among these features has been the alternation between the lecture method and discussion method of teaching, allowing for the rapid communication of information and interpretation by lecture, and the penetration in detail into the thought of significant leaders in the periods we study by discussion. From the beginning we have believed it better to enter into conversation with some of the "great thinkers" of the world via their own words rather than to talk at second-hand about what other persons have thought about them. We have always had an adamant determination to lead our students to the primary sources.

Multiple copies of many different books containing assigned readings have from the beginning been in our library "Man" reserve shelves (e.g. The Gilgamesh Epic). Some of these are also for sale in the Southwestern Bookstore for those students who wish to own their own copy.

In our concern to lead our students to the primary sources we have discovered that discussion was enhanced if students could bring personal copies of the source material to their colloquium sections, and that understanding was increased if wide margins on the page made possible extensive notations by the students. Experimenting first in the Ninth Edition (1967) with a few mimeographed materials added to the Syllabus, we published a separate volume of readings in 1973 which was extended to two volumes of readings in 1975.

In 1981 the "Man" Course, traditionally a twelve-hour Freshman course, was extended to two years, with half of the course covered in the Freshman year and half in the Sophomore year. This volume of readings serves the needs of the first year of the course.

Special thanks is due to Mr. Perry Dement, Student Assistant to the "Man" Staff, who has spent many hours helping to prepare this edition.

Fred W. Neal, and
The Man Course Staff

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THE IDEA OF HISTORY

SELECTED FOR USE WITH THE TWELFTH EDITION

R. G. COLLINGWOOD THE SYLLABUS FOR

History's nature, object, method, and value

What history is, what it is about, how it proceeds, and what it is for, are questions which to some extent different people would answer in different ways. But in spite of differences there is a large measure of agreement between the answers. And this agreement becomes closer if the answers are subjected to scrutiny with a view to discarding those which proceed from unqualified witnesses. History, like theology or natural science, is a special form of thought. If that is so, questions about the nature, object, method, and value of this form of thought must be answered by persons having two qualifications.

First, they must have experience of that form of thought. They must be historians. In a sense we are all historians nowadays. All educated persons have gone through a process of education which has included a certain amount of historical thinking. But this does not qualify them to give an opinion about the nature, object, method, and value of historical thinking. For in the first place, the experience of historical thinking which they have thus acquired is probably very superficial; and the opinions based on it are therefore no better grounded than a man's opinion of the French people based on a single week-end visit to Paris. In the second place, experience of anything whatever gained through the ordinary educational channels, as well as being superficial, is invariably out of date. Experience of historical thinking, so gained, is modelled on text-books, and text-books always describe not what is now being thought by real live historians, but what was thought by real live historians at some time in the past when the raw material was being created out of which the text-book has been put together. And it is not only the results of historical thought which are out of date by the time they get into the text-book. It is also the principles of historical thought: that is, the ideas as to the nature, object, method, and value of historical thinking. In the third place, and connected with this, there is a peculiar illusion incidental to all knowledge acquired in the way of education: the illusion of finality. When a student is *in statu pupillari* with respect to any subject whatever, he has to believe that things are settled because the text-books and his teachers regard them as settled. When he emerges from that state and goes on studying the subject for himself he finds that nothing is settled. The dogmatism which is an invariable mark of immaturity drops away from him. He looks at so-called facts with a new eye. He says to himself: 'My teacher and text-books told me that such and such was true; but is it true? What reasons had they for thinking it true, and were these reasons adequate?' On the other hand, if he emerges from the status of pupil without continuing to pursue the subject he never rids himself of this dogmatic attitude. And this makes him a person peculiarly unfitted

INTRODUCTION

to answer the questions I have mentioned. No one, for example, is likely to answer them worse than an Oxford philosopher who, having read Greats in his youth, was once a student of history and thinks that this youthful experience of historical thinking entitles him to say what history is, what it is about, how it proceeds, and what it is for.

The second qualification for answering these questions is that a man should not only have experience of historical thinking but should also have reflected upon that experience. He must be not only an historian but a philosopher; and in particular his philosophical thought must have included special attention to the problems of historical thought. Now it is possible to be a quite good historian (though not an historian of the highest order) without thus reflecting upon one's own historical thinking. It is even easier to be a quite good teacher of history (though not the very best kind of teacher) without such reflection. At the same time, it is important to remember that experience comes first, and reflection on that experience second. Even the least reflective historian has the first qualification. He possesses the experience on which to reflect; and when he is asked to reflect on it his reflections have a good chance of being to the point. An historian who has never worked much at philosophy will probably answer our four questions in a more intelligent and valuable way than a philosopher who has never worked much at history.

I shall therefore propound answers to my four questions such as I think any present-day historian would accept. Here they will be rough and ready answers, but they will serve for a provisional definition of our subject-matter and they will be defended and elaborated as the argument proceeds.

(a) *The definition of history.* Every historian would agree, I think, that history is a kind of research or inquiry. What kind of inquiry it is I do not yet ask. The point is that generically it belongs to what we call the sciences: that is, the forms of thought whereby we ask questions and try to answer them. Science in general, it is important to realize, does not consist in collecting what we already know and arranging it in this or that kind of pattern. It consists in fastening upon something we do not know, and trying to discover it. Playing patience with things we already know may be a useful means towards this end, but it is not the end itself. It is at best only the means. It is scientifically valuable only in so far as the new arrangement gives us the answer to a question we have already decided to ask. That is why all science begins from the knowledge of our own ignorance: not our ignorance of everything, but our ignorance of some definite thing—the origin of parliament, the cause of cancer, the chemical composition of the sun, the way to make a pump work without muscular exertion on the part of a man or a horse or some other docile animal. Science is finding things out: and in that sense history is a science.

(b) *The object of history.* One science differs from another in that it finds out things of a different kind. What kind of things does history find out? I answer, *res gestae*: actions of human beings that have been done in the past. Although this answer raises all kinds of further questions many of which are controversial, still, however they may be answered, the answers do not discredit the proposition that history is the science of *res gestae*, the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past.

HISTORY'S NATURE, OBJECT, METHOD, AND VALUE

(c) *How does history proceed?* History proceeds by the interpretation of evidence: where evidence is a collective name for things which singly are called documents, and a document is a thing existing here and now, of such a kind that the historian, by thinking about it, can get answers to the questions he asks about past events. Here again there are plenty of difficult questions to ask as to what the characteristics of evidence are and how it is interpreted. But there is no need for us to raise them at this stage. However they are answered, historians will agree that historical procedure, or method, consists essentially of interpreting evidence.

(d) Lastly, *what is history for?* This is perhaps a harder question than the others; a man who answers it will have to reflect rather more widely than a man who answers the three we have answered already. He must reflect not only on historical thinking but on other things as well, because to say that something is 'for' something implies a distinction between A and B, where A is good for something and B is that for which something is good. But I will suggest an answer, and express the opinion that no historian would reject it, although the further questions to which it gives rise are numerous and difficult.

My answer is that history is 'for' human self-knowledge. It is generally thought to be of importance to man that he should know himself: where knowing himself means knowing not his merely personal peculiarities, the things that distinguish him from other men, but his nature as man. Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to be a man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; and thirdly, knowing what it is to be the man *you* are and nobody else is. Knowing yourself means knowing what you can do; and since nobody knows what he can do until he tries, the only clue to what man can do is what man has done. The value of history, then, is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.

What Is History?

The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures
Delivered at the University of
Cambridge January–March 1961

by *Edward Hallett Carr*

Fellow of Trinity College

EDWARD HALLETT CARR was born in London in 1892 and educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. He was attached to the British delegation at the Peace Conference in 1919 and was a member of the department dealing with Russian affairs in the British Foreign Office following the Bolshevik Revolution. He was a member of the British Legation staff in Riga and, from 1930, attached to the staff of the British Delegation to the League of Nations. He resigned from the Foreign Office in 1936 to become Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, a post he held until 1947. From 1941 to 1946 he was an editor of *The Times* of London and, from 1953 to 1955, a Tutor in Politics at Balliol College, Oxford. Since 1955 he has been a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. He is the author of *Dostoevsky* (1931), *Michael Bakunin* (1937), *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (1939), *Nationalism and After* (1945), *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (1947), *The New Society* (1951), and, of course, the monumental work-in-progress, *A History of Soviet Russia*, of which seven volumes have appeared since 1950.

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORIAN AND HIS FACTS

WHAT is history? Lest anyone think the question meaningless or superfluous, I will take as my text two passages relating respectively to the first and second incarnations of *The Cambridge Modern History*. Here is Acton in his report of October 1896 to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press on the work which he had undertaken to edit:

It is a unique opportunity of recording, in the way most useful to the greatest number, the fullness of the knowledge which the nineteenth century is about to bequeath. . . . By the judicious division of labour we should be able to do it, and to bring home to every man the last document, and the ripest conclusions of international research.

Ultimate history we cannot have in this generation; but we can dispose of conventional history, and show the point we have reached on the road from one to the other, now that all information is within reach, and every problem has become capable of solution.¹

And almost exactly sixty years later Professor Sir George Clark, in his general introduction to the second *Cambridge Modern History*, commented on this

¹ *The Cambridge Modern History: Its Origin, Authorship and Production* (Cambridge University Press; 1907), pp. 10–12.

WHAT IS HISTORY, by Edward Hallett Carr.
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belief of Acton and his collaborators that it would one day be possible to produce "ultimate history," and went on:

Historians of a later generation do not look forward to any such prospect. They expect their work to be superseded again and again. They consider that knowledge of the past has come down through one or more human minds, has been "processed" by them, and therefore cannot consist of elemental and impersonal atoms which nothing can alter. . . . The exploration seems to be endless, and some impatient scholars take refuge in scepticism, or at least in the doctrine that, since all historical judgments involve persons and points of view, one is as good as another and there is no "objective" historical truth.²

Where the pundits contradict each other so flagrantly the field is open to enquiry. I hope that I am sufficiently up-to-date to recognize that anything written in the 1890's must be nonsense. But I am not yet advanced enough to be committed to the view that anything written in the 1950's necessarily makes sense. Indeed, it may already have occurred to you that this enquiry is liable to stray into something even broader than the nature of history. The clash between Acton and Sir George Clark is a reflection of the change in our total outlook on society over the interval between these two pronouncements. Acton speaks out of the positive belief, the clear-eyed self-confidence of the later Victorian age; Sir George Clark echoes the be-

² *The New Cambridge Modern History*, I (Cambridge University Press; 1957), pp. xxiv-xxv.

wilderment and distracted scepticism of the beat generation. When we attempt to answer the question, What is history?, our answer, consciously or unconsciously, reflects our own position in time, and forms part of our answer to the broader question, what view we take of the society in which we live. I have no fear that my subject may, on closer inspection, seem trivial. I am afraid only that I may seem presumptuous to have broached a question so vast and so important.

The nineteenth century was a great age for facts. "What I want," said Mr. Gradgrind in *Hard Times*, "is Facts. . . . Facts alone are wanted in life." Nineteenth-century historians on the whole agreed with him. When Ranke in the 1830's, in legitimate protest against moralizing history, remarked that the task of the historian was "simply to show how it really was (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*)" this not very profound aphorism had an astonishing success. Three generations of German, British, and even French historians marched into battle intoning the magic words, "*Wie es eigentlich gewesen*" like an incantation—designed, like most incantations, to save them from the tiresome obligation to think for themselves. The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to this cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them. In Great Britain, this view of history fitted in perfectly

with the empiricist tradition which was the dominant strain in British philosophy from Locke to Bertrand Russell. The empirical theory of knowledge presupposes a complete separation between subject and object. Facts, like sense-impressions, impinge on the observer from outside, and are independent of his consciousness. The process of reception is passive: having received the data, he then acts on them. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, a useful but tendentious work of the empirical school, clearly marks the separateness of the two processes by defining a fact as "a datum of experience as distinct from conclusions." This is what may be called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on, like fish on the fishmonger's slab. The historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him. Acton, whose culinary tastes were austere, wanted them served plain. In his letter of instructions to contributors to the first *Cambridge Modern History* he announced the requirement "that our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, German and Dutch alike; that nobody can tell, without examining the list of authors where the Bishop of Oxford laid down the pen, and whether Fairbairn or Gasquet, Liebermann or Harrison took it up."³ Even Sir George Clark, critical as he was of Acton's

³ Acton: *Lectures on Modern History* (London: Macmillan & Co.; 1906), p. 318.

attitude, himself contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the "surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation" —forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core. First get your facts straight, then plunge at your peril into the shifting sands of interpretation—that is the ultimate wisdom of the empirical, common-sense school of history. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."

Now this clearly will not do. I shall not embark on a philosophical discussion of the nature of our knowledge of the past. Let us assume for present purposes that the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon and the fact that there is a table in the middle of the room are facts of the same or of a comparable order, that both these facts enter our consciousness in the same or in a comparable manner, and that both have the same objective character in relation to the person who knows them. But, even on this bold and not very plausible assumption, our argument at once runs into the difficulty that not all facts about the past are historical facts, or are treated as such by the historian. What is the criterion which distinguishes the facts of history from other facts about the past?

What is a historical fact? This is a crucial question into which we must look a little more closely. According to the common-sense view, there are certain basic

⁴ Quoted in *The Listener* (June 19, 1952), p. 992.

facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But when points of this kind are raised, I am reminded of Housman's remark that "accuracy is a duty, not a virtue."⁵ To praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth. The historian is not required to have the special skills which enable the expert to determine the origin and period of a fragment of pottery or marble, to decipher an obscure inscription, or to make the elaborate astronomical calculations necessary to establish a precise date. These so-called basic facts which are the same for all historians commonly belong to the category of the raw materials of the historian rather than of history itself.

⁵ M. Manilius: *Astronomicon: Liber Primus*, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 87.

The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an *a priori* decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context. It was, I think, one of Pirandello's characters who said that a fact is like a sack—it won't stand up till you've put something in it. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event. It is the historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar's crossing of that petty stream, the Rubicon, is a fact of history, whereas the crossing of the Rubicon by millions of other people before or since interests nobody at all. The fact that you arrived in this building half an hour ago on foot, or on a bicycle, or in a car, is just as much a fact about the past as the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But it will probably be ignored by historians. Professor Talcott Parsons once called science "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality."⁶ It might perhaps have been put

⁶ Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils: *Toward a General Theory of Action*, 3rd. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 167.

more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.

Let us take a look at the process by which a mere fact about the past is transformed into a fact of history. At Stalybridge Wakes in 1850, a vendor of gingerbread, as the result of some petty dispute, was deliberately kicked to death by an angry mob. Is this a fact of history? A year ago I should unhesitatingly have said "no." It was recorded by an eyewitness in some little-known memoirs;⁷ but I had never seen it judged worthy of mention by any historian. A year ago Dr. Kitson Clark cited it in his Ford lectures in Oxford.⁸ Does this make it into a historical fact? Not, I think, yet. Its present status, I suggest, is that it has been proposed for membership of the select club of historical facts. It now awaits a seconder and sponsors. It may be that in the course of the next few years we shall see this fact appearing first in footnotes, then in the text, of articles and books about nineteenth-century England, and that in twenty or thirty years' time it may be a well established historical fact. Alternatively, nobody may take it up, in which case it

will relapse into the limbo of unhistorical facts about the past from which Dr. Kitson Clark has gallantly attempted to rescue it. What will decide which of these two things will happen? It will depend, I think, on whether the thesis or interpretation in support of which Dr. Kitson Clark cited this incident is accepted by other historians as valid and significant. Its status as a historical fact will turn on a question of interpretation. This element of interpretation enters into every fact of history.

May I be allowed a personal reminiscence? When I studied ancient history in this university many years ago, I had as a special subject "Greece in the period of the Persian Wars." I collected fifteen or twenty volumes on my shelves and took it for granted that there, recorded in these volumes, I had all the facts relating to my subject. Let us assume—it was very nearly true—that those volumes contained all the facts about it that were then known, or could be known. It never occurred to me to enquire by what accident or process of attrition that minute selection of facts, out of all the myriad facts that must have once been known to somebody, had survived to become *the* facts of history. I suspect that even today one of the fascinations of ancient and mediaeval history is that it gives us the illusion of having all the facts at our disposal within a manageable compass: the nagging distinction between the facts of history and other facts about the past vanishes because the few known facts are all facts of history. As Bury, who had worked in both periods,

⁷ Lord George Sanger: *Seventy Years a Showman* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons; 1926); pp. 188-9.

⁸ These will shortly be published under the title *The Making of Victorian England*.

said, "the records of ancient and mediaeval history are starred with lacunae."⁹ History has been called an enormous jig-saw with a lot of missing parts. But the main trouble does not consist of the lacunae. Our picture of Greece in the fifth century B.C. is defective not primarily because so many of the bits have been accidentally lost, but because it is, by and large, the picture formed by a tiny group of people in the city of Athens. We know a lot about what fifth-century Greece looked like to an Athenian citizen; but hardly anything about what it looked like to a Spartan, a Corinthian, or a Theban—not to mention a Persian, or a slave or other non-citizen resident in Athens. Our picture has been pre-selected and predetermined for us, not so much by accident as by people who were consciously or unconsciously imbued with a particular view and thought the facts which supported that view worth preserving. In the same way, when I read in a modern history of the Middle Ages that the people of the Middle Ages were deeply concerned with religion, I wonder how we know this, and whether it is true. What we know as the facts of mediaeval history have almost all been selected for us by generations of chroniclers who were professionally occupied in the theory and practice of religion, and who therefore thought it supremely important, and recorded everything relating to it, and not much else. The picture of the Russian peasant as devoutly religious was de-

⁹ John Bagnell Bury: *Selected Essays* (Cambridge University Press; 1930), p. 52.

stroyed by the revolution of 1917. The picture of mediaeval man as devoutly religious, whether true or not, is indestructible, because nearly all the known facts about him were pre-selected for us by people who believed it, and wanted others to believe it, and a mass of other facts, in which we might possibly have found evidence to the contrary, has been lost beyond recall. The dead hand of vanished generations of historians, scribes, and chroniclers has determined beyond the possibility of appeal the pattern of the past. "The history we read," writes Professor Barraclough, himself trained as a mediaevalist, "though based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted judgments."¹

But let us turn to the different, but equally grave, plight of the modern historian. The ancient or mediaeval historian may be grateful for the vast winnowing process which, over the years, has put at his disposal a manageable corpus of historical facts. As Lytton Strachey said in his mischievous way, "ignorance is the first requisite of the historian, ignorance which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits."² When I am tempted, as I sometimes am, to envy the extreme competence of colleagues engaged in writing ancient or mediaeval history, I find consolation in the reflexion that they are so competent mainly because they are so ignorant of their subject. The modern his-

¹ Geoffrey Barraclough: *History in a Changing World* (London: Basil Blackwell & Mott; 1955), p. 14.

² Lytton Strachey: Preface to *Eminent Victorians*.

torian enjoys none of the advantages of this built-in ignorance. He must cultivate this necessary ignorance for himself—the more so the nearer he comes to his own times. He has the dual task of discovering the few significant facts and turning them into facts of history, and of discarding the many insignificant facts as unhistorical. But this is the very converse of the nineteenth-century heresy that history consists of the compilation of a maximum number of irrefutable and objective facts. Anyone who succumbs to this heresy will either have to give up history as a bad job, and take to stamp-collecting or some other form of antiquarianism, or end in a madhouse. It is this heresy, which during the past hundred years has had such devastating effects on the modern historian, producing in Germany, in Great Britain, and in the United States a vast and growing mass of dry-as-dust factual histories, of minutely specialized monographs, of would-be historians knowing more and more about less and less, sunk without trace in an ocean of facts. It was, I suspect, this heresy—rather than the alleged conflict between liberal and Catholic loyalties—which frustrated Acton as a historian. In an early essay he said of his teacher Döllinger: "He would not write with imperfect materials, and to him the materials were always imperfect."³ Acton was surely here pronouncing an

³ Quoted in George P. Gooch: *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1952), p. 385. Later Acton said of Döllinger that "it was given him to form his philosophy of history on the largest induction ever avail-

anticipatory verdict on himself, on that strange phenomenon of a historian whom many would regard as the most distinguished occupant the Regius Chair of Modern History in this university has ever had—but who wrote no history. And Acton wrote his own epitaph in the introductory note to the first volume of the *Cambridge Modern History*, published just after his death, when he lamented that the requirements pressing on the historian "threaten to turn him from a man of letters into the compiler of an encyclopedia."⁴ Something had gone wrong. What had gone wrong was the belief in this untiring and unending accumulation of hard facts as the foundation of history, the belief that facts speak for themselves and that we cannot have too many facts, a belief at that time so unquestioning that few historians then thought it necessary—and some still think it unnecessary today—to ask themselves the question: What is history?

The nineteenth-century fetishism of facts was completed and justified by a fetishism of documents. The documents were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent historian approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed tones. If you find it in the documents, it is so. But what, when we get down to it, do these documents—the decrees, the treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official correspondence, the private letters and diaries

able to man" (*History of Freedom and Other Essays* [London: Macmillan & Co.; 1907], p. 435).

⁴ *The Cambridge Modern History*, I (1902), p. 4.

So he wouldn't write at all?

same conversations, we should still learn from them only what Chicherin thought, and what really happened would still have to be reconstructed in the mind of the historian. Of course, facts and documents are essential to the historian. But do not make a fetish of them. They do not by themselves constitute history; they provide in themselves no ready-made answer to this tiresome question: What is history?

At this point I should like to say a few words on the question of why nineteenth-century historians were generally indifferent to the philosophy of history. The term was invented by Voltaire, and has since been used in different senses; but I shall take it to mean, if I use it at all, our answer to the question: What is history? The nineteenth century was, for the intellectuals of Western Europe, a comfortable period exuding confidence and optimism. The facts were on the whole satisfactory; and the inclination to ask and answer awkward questions about them was correspondingly weak. Ranke piously believed that divine providence would take care of the meaning of history if he took care of the facts; and Burckhardt with a more modern touch of cynicism observed that "we are not initiated into the purposes of the eternal wisdom." Professor Butterfield as late as 1931 noted with apparent satisfaction that "historians have reflected little upon the nature of things and even the nature of their own subject."⁶ But my predecessor in these lectures, Dr. A. L.

⁶ Herbert Butterfield: *The Whig Interpretation of History* (London: George Bell & Sons; 1931), p. 67.

Rowse, more justly critical, wrote of Sir Winston Churchill's *The World Crisis*—his book about the First World War—that, while it matched Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* in personality, vividness, and vitality, it was inferior in one respect: it had "no philosophy of history behind it."⁷ British historians refused to be drawn, not because they believed that history had no meaning, but because they believed that its meaning was implicit and self-evident. The liberal nineteenth-century view of history had a close affinity with the economic doctrine of *laissez-faire*—also the product of a serene and self-confident outlook on the world. Let everyone get on with his particular job, and the hidden hand would take care of the universal harmony. The facts of history were themselves a demonstration of the supreme fact of a beneficent and apparently infinite progress towards higher things. This was the age of innocence, and historians walked in the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked and unashamed before the god of history. Since then, we have known Sin and experienced a Fall; and those historians who today pretend to dispense with a philosophy of history are merely trying, vainly and self-consciously, like members of a nudist colony, to recreate the Garden of Eden in their garden suburb. Today the awkward question can no longer be evaded.

⁷ Alfred L. Rowse: *The End of an Epoch* (London: Macmillan & Co.; 1947), pp. 282-3.

During the past fifty years a good deal of serious work has been done on the question: What is history? It was from Germany, the country which was to do so much to upset the comfortable reign of nineteenth-century liberalism, that the first challenge came in the 1880's and 1890's to the doctrine of the primacy and autonomy of facts in history. The philosophers who made the challenge are now little more than names: Dilthey is the only one of them who has recently received some belated recognition in Great Britain. Before the turn of the century, prosperity and confidence were still too great in this country for any attention to be paid to heretics who attacked the cult of facts. But early in the new century, the torch passed to Italy, where Croce began to propound a philosophy of history which obviously owed much to German masters. All history is "contemporary history," declared Croce,⁸ meaning that history consists essentially in seeing the past through the eyes of the present and in the light of its problems, and that the main work of the historian is not to record, but to evaluate; for, if he does not evaluate, how can he know what is worth recording? In 1910 the American philosopher, Carl Becker, argued in deliberately provocative language that "the

⁸ The context of this celebrated aphorism is as follows: "The practical requirements which underlie every historical judgment give to all history the character of 'contemporary history,' because, however remote in time events thus recounted may seem to be, the history in reality refers to present needs and present situations wherein those events vibrate" (Benedetto Croce: *History as the Story of Liberty* [London: George Allen & Unwin; 1941], p. 19).

facts of history do not exist for any historian till he creates them."⁹ These challenges were for the moment little noticed. It was only after 1920 that Croce began to have a considerable vogue in France and Great Britain. This was not perhaps because Croce was a subtler thinker or a better stylist than his German predecessors, but because, after the First World War, the facts seemed to smile on us less propitiously than in the years before 1914, and we were therefore more accessible to a philosophy which sought to diminish their prestige. Croce was an important influence on the Oxford philosopher and historian Collingwood, the only British thinker in the present century who has made a serious contribution to the philosophy of history. He did not live to write the systematic treatise he had planned; but his published and unpublished papers on the subject were collected after his death in a volume entitled *The Idea of History*, which appeared in 1945.

The views of Collingwood can be summarized as follows. The philosophy of history is concerned neither with "the past by itself" nor with "the historian's thought about it by itself," but with "the two things in their mutual relations." (This dictum reflects the two current meanings of the word "history"—the enquiry conducted by the historian and the series of past events into which he enquires.) "The past which a historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which

⁹ *Atlantic Monthly* (October 1928), p. 528.

in some sense is still living in the present." But a past act is dead, *i.e.* meaningless to the historian, unless he can understand the thought that lay behind it. Hence "all history is the history of thought," and "history is the re-enactment in the historian's mind of the thought whose history he is studying." The reconstitution of the past in the historian's mind is dependent on empirical evidence. But it is not in itself an empirical process, and cannot consist in a mere recital of facts. On the contrary, the process of reconstitution governs the selection and interpretation of the facts: this, indeed, is what makes them historical facts. "History," says Professor Oakeshott, who on this point stands near to Collingwood, "is the historian's experience. It is 'made' by nobody save the historian: to write history is the only way of making it."¹

This searching critique, though it may call for some serious reservations, brings to light certain neglected truths.

In the first place, the facts of history never come to us "pure," since they do not and cannot exist in a pure form: they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. It follows that when we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it. Let me take as an example the great historian in whose honour and in whose name these lectures were founded. Trevelyan, as he tells us in his auto-

¹Michael Oakeshott: *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge University Press; 1933), p. 99.

biography, was "brought up at home on a somewhat exuberantly Whig tradition";² and he would not, I hope, disclaim the title if I described him as the last and not the least of the great English liberal historians of the Whig tradition. It is not for nothing that he traces back his family tree, through the great Whig historian George Otto Trevelyan, to Macaulay, in comparably the greatest of the Whig historians. Dr. Trevelyan's finest and maturest work *England under Queen Anne* was written against that background, and will yield its full meaning and significance to the reader only when read against that background. The author, indeed, leaves the reader with no excuse for failing to do so. For if, following the technique of connoisseurs of detective novels, you read the end first, you will find on the last few pages of the third volume the best summary known to me of what is nowadays called the Whig interpretation of history; and you will see that what Trevelyan is trying to do is to investigate the origin and development of the Whig tradition, and to root it fairly and squarely in the years after the death of its founder, William III. Though this is not, perhaps, the only conceivable interpretation of the events of Queen Anne's reign, it is a valid and, in Trevelyan's hands, a fruitful interpretation. But, in order to appreciate it at its full value, you have to understand what the historian is doing. For if, as Collingwood says, the historian must re-enact in thought what

²G. M. Trevelyan: *An Autobiography* (London: Longmans, Green & Company; 1949), p. 11.

has gone on in the mind of his *dramatis personae*, so the reader in his turn must re-enact what goes on in the mind of the historian. Study the historian before you begin to study the facts. This is, after all, not very abstruse. It is what is already done by the intelligent undergraduate who, when recommended to read a work by that great scholar Jones of St. Jude's, goes round to a friend at St. Jude's to ask what sort of chap Jones is, and what bees he has in his bonnet. When you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none, either you are tone deaf or your historian is a dull dog. The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab. They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use—these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts he wants. History means interpretation. Indeed, if, standing Sir George Clark on his head, I were to call history "a hard core of interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts," my statement would, no doubt, be one-sided and misleading, but no more so, I venture to think, than the original dictum.

The second point is the more familiar one of the historian's need of imaginative understanding for the minds of the people with whom he is dealing, for the thought behind their acts: I say "imaginative under-

standing," not "sympathy," lest sympathy should be supposed to imply agreement. The nineteenth century was weak in mediaeval history, because it was too much repelled by the superstitious beliefs of the Middle Ages and by the barbarities which they inspired, to have any imaginative understanding of mediaeval people. Or take Burckhardt's censorious remark about the Thirty Years' War: "It is scandalous for a creed, no matter whether it is Catholic or Protestant, to place its salvation above the integrity of the nation."⁸ It was extremely difficult for a nineteenth-century liberal historian, brought up to believe that it is right and praiseworthy to kill in defence of one's country, but wicked and wrong-headed to kill in defence of one's religion, to enter into the state of mind of those who fought the Thirty Years' War. This difficulty is particularly acute in the field in which I am now working. Much of what has been written in English-speaking countries in the last ten years about the Soviet Union, and in the Soviet Union about the English-speaking countries, has been vitiated by this inability to achieve even the most elementary measure of imaginative understanding of what goes on in the mind of the other party, so that the words and actions of the other are always made to appear malign, senseless, or hypocritical. History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing.

⁸ Jacob Burckhardt: *Judgments on History and Historians* (London: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Company; 1958), p. 179.

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The third point is that we can view the past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence. The very words which he uses—words like democracy, empire, war, revolution—have current connotations from which he cannot divorce them. Ancient historians have taken to using words like *polis* and *plebs* in the original, just in order to show that they have not fallen into this trap. This does not help them. They, too, live in the present, and cannot cheat themselves into the past by using unfamiliar or obsolete words, any more than they would become better Greek or Roman historians if they delivered their lectures in a *chlamys* or a *toga*. The names by which successive French historians have described the Parisian crowds which played so prominent a role in the French revolution—*les sans-culottes*, *le peuple*, *la canaille*, *les bras-nus*—are all, for those who know the rules of the game, manifestos of a political affiliation and of a particular interpretation. Yet the historian is obliged to choose: the use of language forbids him to be neutral. Nor is it a matter of words alone. Over the past hundred years the changed balance of power in Europe has reversed the attitude of British historians to Frederick the Great. The changed balance of power within the Christian churches between Catholicism and Protestantism has profoundly altered their attitude to such figures as Loyola, Luther, and Cromwell. It requires only a superficial knowledge of the

work of French historians of the last forty years on the French revolution to recognize how deeply it has been affected by the Russian revolution of 1917. The historian belongs not to the past but to the present. Professor Trevor-Roper tells us that the historian "ought to love the past."⁴ This is a dubious injunction. To love the past may easily be an expression of the nostalgic romanticism of old men and old societies, a symptom of loss of faith and interest in the present or future.⁵ Cliché for cliché, I should prefer the one about freeing oneself from "the dead hand of the past." The function of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present.

If, however, these are some of the insights of what I may call the Collingwood view of history, it is time to consider some of the dangers. The emphasis on the role of the historian in the making of history tends, if pressed to its logical conclusion, to rule out any objective history at all: history is what the historian makes. Collingwood seems indeed, at one moment, in

⁴ Introduction to Burckhardt: *Judgments on History and Historians*, p. 17.

⁵ Compare Nietzsche's view of history: "To old age belongs the old man's business of looking back and casting up his accounts, of seeking consolation in the memories of the past, in historical culture" (*Thoughts Out of Season* [London: Macmillan & Co.; 1909], II, pp. 65-6).

an unpublished note quoted by his editor, to have reached this conclusion:

St. Augustine looked at history from the point of view of the early Christian; Tillemont, from that of a seventeenth-century Frenchman; Gibbon, from that of an eighteenth-century Englishman; Mommsen, from that of a nineteenth-century German. There is no point in asking which was the right point of view. Each was the only one possible for the man who adopted it.⁶

This amounts to total scepticism, like Froude's remark that history is "a child's box of letters with which we can spell any word we please."⁷ Collingwood, in his reaction against "scissors-and-paste history," against the view of history as a mere compilation of facts, comes perilously near to treating history as something spun out of the human brain, and leads back to the conclusion referred to by Sir George Clark in the passage which I quoted earlier, that "there is no 'objective' historical truth." In place of the theory that history has no meaning, we are offered here the theory of an infinity of meanings, none any more right than any other—which comes to much the same thing. The second theory is surely as untenable as the first. It does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different shapes from different angles of vision, it has objectively either no shape at all or an infinity of

⁶ Robin G. Collingwood: *The Idea of History* (London: Oxford University Press; 1946), p. xii.

⁷ James Anthony Froude: *Short Studies on Great Subjects* (1894), I, p. 21.

shapes. It does not follow that, because interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no existing interpretation is wholly objective, one interpretation is as good as another, and the facts of history are in principle not amenable to objective interpretation. I shall have to consider at a later stage what exactly is meant by objectivity in history.

But a still greater danger lurks in the Collingwood hypothesis. If the historian necessarily looks at his period of history through the eyes of his own time, and studies the problems of the past as a key to those of the present, will he not fall into a purely pragmatic view of the facts, and maintain that the criterion of a right interpretation is its suitability to some present purpose? On this hypothesis, the facts of history are nothing, interpretation is everything. Nietzsche had already enunciated the principle: "The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it. . . . The question is how far it is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-creating."⁸ The American pragmatists, moved, less explicitly and less wholeheartedly, along the same line. Knowledge is knowledge for some purpose. The validity of the knowledge depends on the validity of the purpose. But, even where no such theory has been professed, the practice has often been no less disquieting. In my own field of study I have seen too many examples of

⁸ Froude: *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ch. i.

extravagant interpretation riding roughshod over facts, not to be impressed with the reality of this danger. It is not surprising that perusal of some of the more extreme products of Soviet and anti-Soviet schools of historiography should sometimes breed a certain nostalgia for that illusory nineteenth-century haven of purely factual history.

How then, in the middle of the twentieth century, are we to define the obligation of the historian to his facts? I trust that I have spent a sufficient number of hours in recent years chasing and perusing documents, and stuffing my historical narrative with properly foot-noted facts, to escape the imputation of treating facts and documents too cavalierly. The duty of the historian to respect his facts is not exhausted by the obligation to see that his facts are accurate. He must seek to bring into the picture all known or knowable facts relevant, in one sense or another, to the theme on which he is engaged and to the interpretation proposed. If he seeks to depict the Victorian Englishman as a moral and rational being, he must not forget what happened at Stalybridge Wakes in 1850. But this, in turn, does not mean that he can eliminate interpretation, which is the life-blood of history. Laymen—that is to say, non-academic friends or friends from other academic disciplines—sometimes ask me how the historian goes to work when he writes history. The commonest assumption appears to be that the historian divides his work into two sharply distinguishable phases or periods. First, he spends a long preliminary period reading


his sources and filling his notebooks with facts: then, when this is over, he puts away his sources, takes out his notebooks, and writes his book from beginning to end. This is to me an unconvincing and unpalatable picture. For myself, as soon as I have got going on a few of what I take to be the capital sources, the itch becomes too strong and I begin to write—not necessarily at the beginning, but somewhere, anywhere. Thereafter, reading and writing go on simultaneously. The writing is added to, subtracted from, re-shaped, cancelled, as I go on reading. The reading is guided and directed and made fruitful by the writing: the more I write, the more I know what I am looking for, the better I understand the significance and relevance of what I find. Some historians probably do all this preliminary writing in their head without using pen, paper, or typewriter, just as some people play chess in their heads without recourse to board and chess-men: this is a talent which I envy, but cannot emulate. But I am convinced that, for any historian worth the name, the two processes of what economists call “input” and “output” go on simultaneously and are, in practice, parts of a single process. If you try to separate them, or to give one priority over the other, you fall into one of two heresies. Either you write scissors-and-paste history without meaning or significance; or you write propaganda or historical fiction, and merely use facts of the past to embroider a kind of writing which has nothing to do with history.

Our examination of the relation of the historian to

the facts of history finds us, therefore, in an apparently precarious situation, navigating delicately between the Scylla of an untenable theory of history as an objective compilation of facts, of the unqualified primacy of fact over interpretation, and the Charybdis of an equally untenable theory of history as the subjective product of the mind of the historian who establishes the facts of history and masters them through the process of interpretation, between a view of history having the centre of gravity in the past and the view having the centre of gravity in the present. But our situation is less precarious than it seems. We shall encounter the same dichotomy of fact and interpretation again in these lectures in other guises—the particular and the general, the empirical and the theoretical, the objective and the subjective. The predicament of the historian is a reflexion of the nature of man. Man, except perhaps in earliest infancy and in extreme old age, is not totally involved in his environment and unconditionally subject to it. On the other hand, he is never totally independent of it and its unconditional master. The relation of man to his environment is the relation of the historian to his theme. The historian is neither the humble slave, nor the tyrannical master, of his facts. The relation between the historian and his facts is one of equality, of give-and-take. As any working historian knows, if he stops to reflect what he is doing as he thinks and writes, the historian is engaged on a continuous process of moulding his facts to his

interpretation and his interpretation to his facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other.

The historian starts with a provisional selection of facts and a provisional interpretation in the light of which that selection has been made—by others as well as by himself. As he works, both the interpretation and the selection and ordering of facts undergo subtle and perhaps partly unconscious changes through the reciprocal action of one or the other. And this reciprocal action also involves reciprocity between present and past, since the historian is part of the present and the facts belong to the past. The historian and the facts of history are necessary to one another. The historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts without their historian are dead and meaningless. My first answer therefore to the question, What is history?, is that it is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past.



Something that is
history to me may
not be history to
someone else.

WHAT IS MAN?

ROBERT LOWRY CALHOUN
PROFESSOR OF HISTORICAL THEOLOGY
YALE UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

MANY MEN, MANY ANSWERS

There is something slightly abnormal about asking the question, What is man? At any rate, most people never put it to themselves in words, nor consciously try to puzzle out an answer. The normal thing is to go ahead *being* a man or a woman, doing whatever comes to hand, and not giving much thought to what one is, nor why. There is, indeed, a highly sophisticated sense in which just to be a human person at all is to be a living question mark, somewhat as a discord in music is a perpetual demand for harmony. We shall look at this view later. It is worth careful study. But it is not the view of common sense. In fact, ordinary common sense does not bother much about having a consistent "view" of man at all, and most people get on most of the time without wanting one. Everybody, no doubt, thinks of himself off and on, in one fashion or another: as a sound fellow, a good father, a loyal American (or Frenchman, or fascist), a worth-while friend. But this glimpsing oneself now in one rôle, now in another, is a quite different thing from grappling with the general problem: What is *man*—any man? and what, therefore, am I? This question is most likely to come up, if at all, when things are going badly, and customary behavior is, for unknown reasons, failing to bring satisfaction. The present is such a time for an uncommonly large number of people, and at the moment it is almost normal to ask what it means to be a human being, and what practical consequences follow.

But though there is widespread agreement in asking the question, there is fantastic disagreement in answering it. This is partly because so many of those who answer have personal or political axes to grind, and are mainly interested in putting themselves in a good light and their opponents in a bad one. But partly it is because the question can be examined from any one of a great number of quite legitimate viewpoints, and an answer that is appropriate from one may be hardly recognizable from another. A carpenter, a chemist, a philosopher, and a parson may all have ideas about human nature that are sound enough, as far as they go, but so different that they might not be referring to the same thing at all. This diversity is a fruitful source of confusion with respect to human relationships just now, and one chief purpose of this small book is to offer some hints about straightening it out.

We may distinguish, for convenience, four main lines of approach to the understanding of man: the ways of everyday common sense, the sciences, the philosophies, and the religions. The first is the way that underlies all the others.

← what is man?

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It comprises the first-hand, concrete, unsystematic acquaintance with himself and his neighbors that every person gets in the course of his work and play and daily struggle. This direct acquaintance has the full-blooded vitality, color, and fluid movement of life itself. It is often what goes by the name of "experience," as contrasted with abstract thought.

The second way is related to the first somewhat as a book of road maps is related to the automobile travel through a given region. Road maps pick out certain features of touring, and ignore others; they bring to bear information from special inquiries that the ordinary tourist cannot or does not bother to make; and they translate all this into sign language, and organize it into systematic diagrams, drawn consistently to scale, which apply not merely to some particular tour, but to any or all tours through the region charted. In like manner, the sciences seek a view of man more diagrammatic, more accurately informed, more coherent, and more general than the vivid but miscellaneous insights of practical common sense, or "experience." Just as the road maps have to leave out colors and smells of the countryside, and pleasures and discomforts of the tourists, so the scientific diagrams of human nature and behavior leave out most of its color and smell, and all of its individuality.

The philosophies try to retain as much as possible of both. They include a good many details that the sciences quite properly ignore, and they try in various ways to catch in their formulae the essence of individuality, also: that which makes each human being uniquely himself, and not any one else. Yet, paradoxically, the terms in which they try to recapture these concrete aspects of human life are even more generalized than those of the sciences. What turns up in philosophic formulae is not the actual individual, but the universal character of individuality, the definition of what it means to be an individual. The actual living individual, the man himself, necessarily eludes all formulae. His natural habitat is the realm not of definitions but of *action*. Practical, common-sense experience is acquainted with him there, since it is itself part and parcel of his active living. But the more strictly theoretic disciplines, the sciences and philosophies, are by their very nature less embedded in practical activity. Theirs is typically the rôle of observer more than that of participant, and they furnish diagrams or portraits rather than living specimens.

The religions, like common sense, move primarily within the practical realm, and their view of man is very concrete and dynamic. Their central concern is with the motives and obligations that are effective in his behavior, and those that ought to be so. They seek to appeal directly to him as a person—individual, social, and responsible; requiring his active commitment to the service of values, or powers, or both, which are superior to himself. A religious attitude may be highly intellectual or anti-intellectual, loving or despising reason. It cannot be neutral, dispassionate onlooking, and be religion.

Plainly the materials are here for all sorts of conflicts, misunderstandings, and confusions of thought about man. Scientists and theologians at a given time may be at one another's throats, the plain man crying plague o' both their

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houses, and the politician exploiting them all, in their failure to understand one another and move along together. That has been happening for a long time, and is happening now with disastrous results. Analysis of points of view is, naturally, no guaranty against such conflicts, which in large part arise from sources not easily amenable to logic. But analysis can help one caught in the cross-currents to see a little more clearly what they mean, where they are tending, and how he may at least avoid being destroyed in them blindly. Whatever else may be true about man, it is more in keeping with his manhood to see where he is going, whether it be to more abundant life or to destruction, than for lack of thought to be driven like beef to the pasture or the slaughter pens.

CHAPTER I

COMMON SENSE SAYS, "JUST A PERSON"

The proper starting point for any inquiry about the nature of man is everyday experience, and the outlook usually known as common sense. This is the layman's outlook, assumed here to be at once uncomplicated by the technical habits of specialists, and unwarped by excessive emotional or other aberrations. Inasmuch as ordinary people, in most of their routine activities, behave more or less nearly like that useful fiction, "the average man," their routine way of seeing themselves and others may serve as a rough definition of what is meant here by common sense.

For this everyday view, a man is just a human person: a perfectly familiar figure, who can best be known by what he does. If you want to know what man is, says common sense, just watch him in action for awhile, and see how he behaves.

1. Man as a person differs in his behavior from the things around him. Especially his tools, languages, and cultures set him off from the rest.

There need be no trouble about finding ways in which man acts differently from the earth and houses and machines, and the plants and animals, that form a part of his environment. He uses them. They do not use him. Or, if that seems too sweeping, in view of the fact that some plants and animals—mostly microscopic ones, plus a few beasts of prey and scavengers—do use him for food, say rather: man uses them deliberately and consciously, according to plans of his own, and there is no clear evidence that any of them use him in that way. Moreover, he makes things for himself on a quite different level from the nests and webs and tunneled mounds that other animals build. They can make a few stereotyped finished products for immediate use as shelters, and the like; or at most, as is true of highly intelligent apes, they can fit sticks or boxes together into simple tools, for getting food that is within sight or smell but out of reach. In contrast, man makes in endless variety tools which themselves by semi-automatic processes turn out endlessly varied products in quantities unapproachable by hand labor. He makes also tools with which to make other tools, and parts to go with other parts, working toward remote goals according to plan. All this is on a different plane, in terms of foresight and technical mastery, from what even the most intelligent apes have learned to do. It involves literally man's building of an artificial physical environment for himself in the midst of raw nature: commodious, man-made "caves" to

dwell in, highways to travel, controlled heat, light, and air, and so on. No other creature on earth has done the like.

Watch man, further, in active relations with others of his own kind. With them he engages in talk, and all manner of elaborate communication, both near by and across wide gulfs in space and time. His numerous languages, or symbol-systems, through which he transacts extremely complicated business, deals with factors that elude sense perception, and puts himself into all sorts of imagined rôles, are again on a different level from the best that other animals can do. Their signal-cries are outstripped by his intricate word-systems in much the same way that their woven nests and bent sticks are outstripped by his machine tools and power houses. Man behaves, in social communication, as none of his animal neighbors seem able to do.

His skill with tools and with words, finally, has helped him develop for himself the extraordinary physical and spiritual environments we call cultures. In them he lives and moves, and carries on his affairs from birth till death. Unlike factories and highways, the traditions, habit-patterns, and beliefs that enter into one of his cultures are invisible and intangible. Yet they surround him and condition his living even more inescapably than any of his buildings or machinery. Each man is likely, indeed, to be unaware of his own cultural atmosphere, as of the air in his lungs, until it is interfered with. But when he comes into contact with men of another culture, their "folkways" are easy enough for him to discern, and perhaps to resent, with some new awareness of his own heritage arising in contrast. Still more, if his familiar way of life is threatened with destruction by a hostile force, its hold on him and his devotion to it are likely to become very plain.

Man is, then, collectively, a maker of tools, a user of languages, and a dweller in living cultures that hold in one common life generations of the past and the present. With these facts in mind, whether explicitly or implicitly, it is not hard for common sense to think of man as different from his non-human neighbors.

2. *Man as a person is an individual, social, responsible self, in intimate contact with a larger world.*

Perhaps, however, we have been going somewhat beyond the ordinary layman's explicit ideas. He would readily recognize everything thus far mentioned, once it was pointed out to him, but he might not pick it out for himself as of especial importance. Perhaps he would be more likely to formulate his own relatively unsystematic thought about man along more immediately personal lines. He would think of a man first, very likely, as an *individual* person, since that is what he ordinarily feels himself to be.

(a) *As individual, a man is largely a bundle of persistent wants and satisfactions (or frustrations), and of habitual ways of acting, thinking, and feeling; but for all that, he is more or less unpredictable, even to himself. On the other hand, there is a well-recognized difference between the unpredictability of a healthy, rational person and the unpredictability of a drug-fiend or a madman. An essential mark of everyday human behavior is reasonable consistency, or coherence,*

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among the desires, thoughts, and actions of the individual, and relevance to the public situations with which he has to deal.

Each man's individuality (which, of course, is a fluid and not a static thing) shows itself primarily in a certain bundle of *wants* that crave satisfaction. These wants are his own, not somebody else's: *his* hunger and thirst, *his* craving for companionship, a mate, and children, *his* need for security, freedom, and self-respect. In fact, these personal wants, and the frustrations or satisfactions in which they issue, are not merely his property. To an important degree they are himself. In large part, he is what he wants and arrives at, for better or for worse.

Some of these wants or interests are obviously located in his body, and all of them are associated with it in some manner. The same is true of the thwartings or satisfactions to which they lead. An individual human body is by no means the whole person, but it is an ever-present part of him, as common sense does not doubt.

A person shows himself, similarly, in his habits, or accustomed ways of acting, thinking, and feeling. These include his skills of all sorts, the ways he has worked up to get the things he wants. Chiefly in them lies his competence to hold a job, to engage in work and play for either payment or fun, and to acquire new skills by planned learning. The things he knows, also, will mostly come under this same head. They too are a part of his equipment for skilled living; some of them important to success in his job, some to less formal kinds of satisfaction—enjoyment of conversation, travel, reading, music, and so on. What he thinks, how he goes about solving problems that call for thinking, how he feels about all sorts of things, and hence his personal standards of conduct, depend in large measure on what habits he has formed. Everybody knows that, and tends to judge himself and his neighbors accordingly. Such and such a one can be depended on to feel, think, or act thus and so. That is how he is accustomed to behave. That is his character, which is, in important measure, himself.

But common sense sees, too, that this is not the whole story. An individual can act "out of character," and set at nought the most confident expectations, both of others and of himself. As a matter of fact, this element of unpredictability in human behavior is one of the aspects that common sense most readily takes for granted. Specialists may argue about whether a man is "free." Practical common sense never doubts it, unless in some mood of emotional dejection. Normally, men act on the assumption that what they are about to do is not completely fixed by what they have done already; and they assume this about others as well as about themselves. Within fairly wide limits, common sense has no prejudice against uncertainty in human behavior.

There are limits, however, to the leeway that most people would regard as natural. Nobody, whatever his own habits may be, likes really erratic behavior in some one else, especially among grown-ups. One expects more unreliability in children, less of it in adults. Growing up is, indeed, very largely a process of developing the definiteness and stability of character that makes one's behavior in important respects more dependable—and in the large more predictable. This does not mean that one's freedom is simply lost as one matures, though with more and more commitments already made, some loss is bound to be an incidental part of the story.

It does mean that native spontaneity is progressively brought under the control of the maturing person himself, so that instead of being merely spontaneous and incalculable, his conduct becomes increasingly self-directed and controlled.

Without putting it into technical language, common sense recognizes that this is or should be so. Nearly every one would draw a distinction between the normal unpredictability of a healthy, rational adult and the erratic behavior of a drunkard, a drug addict, or a psychopath. The distinction is notoriously hard to draw with any great accuracy. We are all a little abnormal. But we all assume its importance in practice; even to the point of holding that hospital or jail, not home or street-corner, is the place for those whose conduct is too unreliable. And though the ground of the distinction may not be put into words, most laymen would agree readily with the gist of the specialists' account of it. "Normal" conduct, with all its spontaneity or freedom, is marked by two features that are lacking in very "abnormal" conduct. One is reasonable consistency, or unity, or integration within the individual's own make-up and activities, so that he is not too flagrantly in conflict with himself. The other is a reasonable relevance of what he does and thinks and feels to the actual conditions which, along with other people, he has to face.

The drunkard or the insane person lives, while under the spell of his liquor or his dementia, in a private world of fantasy which has too little relevance to the public world of everyday fact. He sees things out of focus, cannot drive a car straight, nor hold a job, nor get on with other people. Moreover, the wants and habits in him that lead to these episodes are in conflict with his more sober tendencies, and his life in consequence is more or less profoundly split up and out of control. His unpredictability is that of a complex mechanism gone wrong and coming apart, whereas the freedom of a healthy person's behavior is that of a darting airplane in the hands of a skilled pilot. The one makes sense, the other does not; and laymen are well aware how important is the difference. It means in the most literal way that no man can live to himself alone, without failing to be a normal person. Man is not merely individual, but an individual-social being.

(b) *A man as social being is a member of many groups, each with its special rôles for him to perform. These, like his individual desires and habits, need to be held together in some stable unity.*

Every grown person is, in a sense, a whole company of persons. He combines in himself many rôles that are flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone. Without them he would not be the person he is. Common sense knows all this well enough. When you ask who a certain man is, the layman will reply by telling you his name and family connections, where he lives, his business, the organizations he belongs to, and where he fits into the life of his community. That is the most usable answer to the question: "Who is he?" or "What is he?" He is the person who fills such and such a place in each of these particular groups.

First his family, and the circle of his close friends: what Hocking (interpreting Hegel) has called "the private order," in which a man can live at least part of the time with his more ceremonious masks off. His place in this circle depends more on sensitive feeling and imagination, friendli-

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ness and laughter, generosity and tolerance, than upon any competitive prowess. Sterner qualities are, of course, indispensable here also: tenacity, fairness, courage, loyalty. But they are not enough. One may be a model of business integrity or political courage, and be an egoist or bully at home. What especially is called for in "the private order" more than elsewhere is a readiness to give one's confidence, and to meet others' confidences more than halfway. Needless to say, the life and friendships of actual people, outside cream-puff literature, are by no means all sweetness and light. The clash of personalities cannot be avoided in such close quarters, and at times may rise to fierce heights. If the conflict becomes civil war, then the home-pattern is broken. If the basic pattern of friendship is maintained, a substantial amount of stress may be all to the good. Human growth cannot go on normally in a stagnant pool, even a pool of sunshine. One can learn more from a liked and trusted antagonist than from the most amiable yes-man, provided that mutual confidence grows greater, not less, and that each deals with the other as a person, not a thing. Of this more in a moment.

Where men work and fight for a living, competition is normally more cold-blooded, and requirements more specialized. At home it is the whole man that counts. On the job it may be little more than his skilled fingers or clever tongue. On the job, much of what makes him human is irrelevant, if not positively detrimental to his getting on. Too quick an imagination, too lively sympathy, too nice a sense of fairness toward competitors, too outspoken generosity in protesting against oppression of weaker associates may prove to be quite out of place in the business world.

On the other hand, the very impersonality of the public order contributes to the making of grown men and women. Private personal relationships are likely to become trivial without the bracing demands of a larger world. Friendly domesticity is no adequate school for adulthood. Even person-to-person competition is no substitute for impersonal struggles with refractory raw materials and work-schedules. One can outwit, cajole, or argue down a human opponent, but not a spirit-level nor a time-clock. Either the job gets done, or it does not. Either the joint fits, the wall is plumb, the engine runs, or it does not. And meeting this sort of test is indispensable to personal maturity. To be a grown person means not only to be a good companion. It means also to be a disciplined worker, trained to cope with impersonal requirements and freed thereby from the pettiness of a sentimental individualism or the familiar idolizing of good fellowship.

A similar impersonality marks all the larger patterns of community life that widen out in intersecting circles around a man and his job. Their settled behavior patterns are social institutions. Each man is a member of various organized groups: trades unions or chambers of commerce; towns, states, and nations, with their political parties and their numerous organs; fraternal orders, schools, churches; and many more. These groups tend to fall into cell-like patterns, with small local groups included within larger groups—state-wide, national, international. These groups form the massive structure of organized society, and as such they display far less pliability and quickness of response than persons do.

The economic order of wealth production and consumption; the political order of law and government; the inclusive culture that embraces both of these, along with a network of custom, tradition, literature and art, science, and religion, in their institutional forms: all these are areas in which men come together under conditions more refractory than any private personal relationship. Cutting across both organized groups and institutions, finally, are patterns of still another sort, based on racial differences of the more obvious kinds—color, physique, facial structure. These differences are being vehemently exploited of late, as alleged signs of profound intellectual, emotional, and moral differences; and as such, they are being made the basis for increasingly dangerous social divisions.

We shall have more to say about all these a bit later. For the moment, the chief point to notice is that, in all these groupings, the human person finds himself enmeshed in segments of a social order that, though less impersonal than the physical order of matter, space, and time that he tackles in doing a job of work, has something of the same massive factual character. This is, of course, not uniform. A neighborhood club is much less impersonal than a factory or a state police force or a national credit system. Moreover, no part of a social order is wholly impersonal. Even the proverbial majesty of the law is elastic in fact; and in times of transition the fate of peoples can be tilted by the moods of one man. None the less, in all the contacts that membership in organized society entails, the accepted ways of doing things and their complex grounds are *there*, and have to be taken into consideration as fully as physical laws. No doubt social patterns can be, and are, changed much more rapidly than physical laws. But social change itself always requires deep mass movements, beyond individual control. The public order, in short, calls throughout for a more objective kind of behavior than that which is normally most suitable at home; and therein lies its social significance for the maturing of its individual members.

One final point. Each of these parts that the individual is called on to play, as member of a family, friend, worker, employer, unionist, citizen, is vitalized by its own set of wants, emotions, and loyalties. Among these the occasions for conflict are many, and the more intelligent and emotionally grown-up one becomes, the more acutely aware of them he must be. Aware, too, of the danger that if he tries to be all things to all men, on all sides of every conflict, he will fritter away his personal life and wind up in futility.

In principle, two major alternatives to such disintegration are open to him. One is to cut to the bone the number and variety of his social commitments, with their competing claims. This deliberate simplification may take a monastic form, religious or secular, and when practised by a resolute man or woman—a Thoreau or a Saint Theresa—to increase the effectiveness of his impacts upon reality by concentrating them, it has been a way of great power. But it is a way better suited to pre-industrial civilizations, and to rare individuals, than to the rank and file in a closely knit world. The preferred form of simplification now, as with most peoples in the past, is one-track partisanship, which externalizes one's conflicts and purges away inner doubts and questions. By shutting one's mind to the claims of all but one's fellow partisans, and plunging into action in support of these last alone, it is possible to attain a high degree of inner unity while the particular party or cause holds together.

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When this goes to pieces, or becomes irrelevant to the larger course of events, personal unity or integrity that depends on it must suffer. Hence the familiar plight of demobilized fighting men, and revolutionists when the revolution is over. The other major alternative is to keep one's mind open to the conflicts involved in everyday living, seeking to understand and evaluate them, and to grow in range and stability of character through cumulative rational decisions, instead of taking refuge in stereotyped action.

Powerful personalities (not necessarily the persons who wield the most external power) are those who, like Eduard Benes and the Czech people, threatened and then overrun by Nazi might, can maintain a high degree of integrity under stresses that would disrupt less sturdy folk.. Simplification of their living as dictated by limits of physical energy and mental grasp is no more avoidable by them than by others. But they do not carry it to the point of monastic seclusion nor single-track partisanship.

Common sense is quite able to recognize and value well-united persons. In their stability, it sees the basis for that moral responsibility that is essential in all mature people. Here we come face to face with the crux of human personality.

(c) *Responsible selfhood combines individual integrity and social participation with an acknowledgment of obligations that transcend both. This is, in the last analysis, what differentiates a human person from every impersonal being, alive or dead.*

When I confront an inanimate thing, I recognize it as something to use, to admire, to fear, or what not; but never as something that in turn recognizes me. When I confront an animal, especially a familiar one such as a household pet, I expect also to be recognized in some fashion; but not to be understood, still less to be dealt with in the light of mutually acknowledged rules, norms, or standards of conduct. When I confront a man, this last is exactly what I do expect, both of him and of myself. He and I are presumed to be morally responsible beings, capable of mutual response in a personal way. Each of us expects the other to respond not simply on impulse, nor under the pressure of immediate craving or compulsion, but with some regard also to the desires of the one who confronts him, and to some common scale of values that is not the exclusive property of either, nor of both. Things are moved by physical impacts. Animals are moved partly by desires. Men seem to be moved also by obligations which impose themselves not through force nor through simple bodily craving but by way of imagination, feeling, and rational insight. Such are the familiar demands that we seek truth, play fair, be considerate, and so on. These depend for their effectiveness on human desires, no doubt; but the hunger on which they depend primarily is a complex hunger and thirst after righteousness, beauty, and truth, security, or self-respect; not meat and drink or other simple goals. And the hunger for social justice or some such intangible good can overrule, in human conduct, the narrower cravings that we share with the animals. We act then as though aware of another side to our environment besides the physical and social orders already noticed: namely, a moral order of standards and mandates, not separated from the former, but supplementing them as another aspect of the reality that surrounds us.

The moral order is neither visible nor tangible, and it exerts no physical force in any direct way. It is more like the standards of excellence in one of the fine arts, than like heat or pressure. Yet curiously enough men act as though it were very real. They experience satisfaction when they feel themselves in accord with it, and discomfort when they consciously fail to measure up; discomfort sometimes to the point of chronic indecision, sleeplessness, nervous strain, even physical or mental break-down. These consequences, at least, are very real, and sophistication seems to afford no effectual escape from them. Whatever its theoretical status (about which trained thinkers are still debating after some thousands of years) the moral order seems to be an aspect of reality with which men have to come to terms in everyday practice. Their efforts to do so—to discover little by little what is required of them, and to live up to it in the maze of actual living—often go by the name of aspiration. Without this one is not a moral self, not a human person, at all. The saddest feature of long-drawn-out disease that wrecks body and mind is the loosening of that moral tautness that makes a living body and mind a person.

Recognizing all this, though seldom putting words to it, common sense takes for granted that persons are responsible selves, and treats them accordingly. At least, it demands that they behave responsibly, and punishes them or tries to cure them when they do not. One further application of this insight, however, may be much less easy for the layman to make. If every human person who deserves the name may rightly be expected to act responsibly, it follows that every such person deserves to be treated always as a person, a fellow man, and never as a thing to be used nor as a non-human opponent to be stamped on. For both parties to every human relationship, moral responsibility transcends in principle all individual desires, group loyalties, and one-track partisanship. Irresponsible partisans and all who neglect or abdicate from their duty of moral judgment are by so much the less really persons. But genuine "reverence for personality" remains hard to achieve in practice. It is hard to abate our own claims in favor of another man's, especially when emotions are running high, or when uncorrected fancies blind us to facts. None the less, one proves himself human most fully not so much when he insists that others act as responsible persons, but when under extreme provocation he steadily behaves as one himself.

(d) *Man in contact with his physical surroundings and his neighbors, and sensitive to the demands of a moral order, is sometimes vividly aware of being intimately a member of a great, complex world.*

Even matter-of-fact, prosaic people are moved, at certain seasons—Christmas, harvest time, return of spring—or at crises of danger or joy, to feel themselves a part of ongoing life far greater than they. In more sensitive, poetic or mystical folk, this sense of participation, or oneness with a larger reality, may come to dominate their whole life-patterns, either as an experience consciously prized and sought for its own sake, or as a ground-swell that ebbs and flows beneath all their varied activities. In either instance, it is a chief source of personal religion: an all but universal aspect, in some form, of human living.

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Here, in the tangled flux of everyday experience, is the concrete starting point for every view of man that can be taken seriously. The judgments of common sense are not enough. We need to know ourselves far better than ordinary experience enables us to do. But judgments about man that go too far astray from those of everyday living we may confidently regard as at best negligible, at worst disastrous.

CHAPTER II

THE SCIENCES SAY, "A COMPLICATED ANIMAL"

For everything that has been said in the preceding chapter, the point of view is that of one who is himself in the midst of everyday living, and judges it as a participant. Thus arrived at, his views are vivid rather than precise or systematic. To get a more accurate, orderly picture of man, it is necessary to stand off a bit, and look at him as an object of study rather than as a personal associate. This, once more, is the task of the sciences and the philosophies.

The sciences divide the panorama of human nature and behavior into parts, and each science takes one or more of these parts for special study. All of them try to be objective and impersonal, keeping private preferences as far as possible out of the picture. Wherever possible they use quantitative procedures—counting and measuring—rather than qualitative impressions as a basis for their judgments. There is less room for uncertainty about a man's body temperature, or the number of red corpuscles per cubic millimeter of his blood, than about his patriotism; less reason to dispute the average density of a city's population than the thriftiness of its people. In the interests of accurate and dependable results, every scientist welcomes a way to extend the use of quantitative methods to new sorts of data.

But the picture of man that might result from counting and measuring alone would have so little resemblance to actual men that other methods have to be used also, especially in the study of mental and social behavior. Here qualitative similarity as distinguished from numerical ratio is given much attention, and efforts are made to find correlations between similar sorts of behavior and similar "causes" or conditions with which they are associated. Yet even here the effort is kept, in theory and to some extent in fact, on impersonal ground. Repeated phenomena rather than unique ones are given most attention. Groups rather than individuals are preferred as bases for judgments. Personal bias in the observer is, among scrupulous students of human affairs, ferreted out, so far as possible, discounted, and offset by the findings of other observers whose bias is thought to be different. In especial, value judgments as opposed to factual judgments are supposed to be shunned in strictly scientific work. Personal differences of ability between observers cannot be avoided, and have to be allowed for; but personal preferences, which lead so easily to wishful thinking, are in theory taboo.

In practice, this ideal is far from being realized. No fields of human discussion are more bitterly controversial than those of the social sciences. And, as Socrates long ago pointed out, "This happens when the matters of difference are the

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just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable," rather than "number" and "magnitudes." But objectivity remains for the present, among scientific men not hobbled by ecclesiastical, economic, or political dictators, at least a guiding ideal. And there is no doubt that some of them approach it more closely than others, in their readiness to give a hearing to other views than their own, and to refrain from assertively announcing conclusions that far outrun their facts.

It goes without saying that no expert summary of present scientific thought about man will be attempted here. What is offered is merely a layman's understanding of the sort of contribution made by each of the major groups of sciences to our self-knowledge; together with some comment on the interrelations among these, and their place in a sound working theory about man. In general, the sciences have dealt with man as *a complicated animal*; and if this approach runs the risk of oversimplification, it gives at least one indispensable part of a clear-headed view.

One part, be it noted. In all human efforts to get knowledge, a gain at one point is paid for by some limitation at another. The sciences gain in precision by sacrificing some measure of concreteness in their view of man, that is, by singling out some aspects of him and ignoring others. The result is that each of the sciences presents an account which is abstract, or diagrammatic. Each gives information which, as far as it goes, is the most accurate we have up to date concerning a selected phase of human life; but no one of them, nor even all of them together, can tell all that we want to know. None of them, for instance, can tell us what justice or beauty is, whether generous feelings toward a foe should be cultivated or suppressed, or whether human life itself is worth trying to conserve. Such questions are left for common sense, philosophy, and religion to deal with in their various ways. Yet the sciences are not all equally abstract. They can be arranged roughly into three groups, physical, biological, and social, which taken in that order give more and more concrete information about man, with less and less precision and certainty, or predictive power.

1. *The physical sciences are the most precise and the most abstract. Their essential concern is with shifting distributions of forces in motion, and they recognize in man's body a complex case of such movements.*

Physics is concerned with the most general characters of all physical systems, and has almost nothing distinctive to say about man. If a mathematical physicist were asked for his definition of a human being, said Eddington some years ago, he would probably reply: "A rather complex differential equation." Not that a man is literally a set of algebraic symbols, but that he is, physically speaking, a complex disturbance in which opposing forces can be represented by plus and minus symbols in an equation. In general terms, this can be said equally well of a wind-tunnel or a radio station or a twenty-mule team. Its value, indeed, lies precisely in the clarity with which it affirms that man can be partly described in the same terms that apply to any and all physical systems. He is no mysterious stranger, but a genuine member of the physical order, and subject to study as such.

This study takes, more narrowly, the form of biophysics,

which concerns itself with *living* physical systems, and with man as one of these. Its discoveries of specific ways in which opposing forces are balanced in the living body, so that equilibria of temperature and pressure, tension and relaxation, intake and outgo of energy, are maintained within fairly narrow limits, throw a flood of light on the intricate, moment-by-moment workings of a human organism.

With two important cautions, we laymen can accept and use boldly the physicist's contribution to our self-knowledge. First, the confidence that man's physical behavior can, in principle, be stated completely in exact mathematical terms, is a more or less probable assumption, not a proved conclusion. Even far simpler physical systems than man are as yet a long way from yielding to complete statement in differential equations; and there is among front-rank physicists a fairly widespread doubt that physical events ever display exactly the neat finality of an equation. When considered in large groups, they certainly approximate to exact patterns, and so lend themselves in a high degree to prediction by means of measuring, and other mathematical operations. More than that is not known. But so much is known also about man.

Secondly, no localized physical system, and certainly no human body, can be understood separately from its surroundings. Every planet's motions are affected by those of neighboring planets; every plant's growth by the heat and light of the sun; every man's bodily equilibria by the varying temperatures and pressures and other force-movements in his environment. If a man is a complex disturbance, he is a disturbance not in a vacuum but in a still more complex physical world full of disturbances with which he is in continuous give-and-take. Each man is a small, intricate, precisely knotted whirlpool in the ocean of moving energies. The stuff in it changes at every instant; the pattern lasts a long time.

Chemistry is more concrete than physics. Its concern is not so much the general characters of all bodies, as the special characters that go with differences in molecular composition. The chemist's—especially the biochemist's—view of man, therefore, comes somewhat closer to being recognizable by the layman. For acids, bases, and salts, proteins, fats, and water, are well-known stuffs, and of these in definite proportions the chemical man is composed. The biochemist's picture gains further definiteness from the fact that many of the compounds that go to make up a living body are ordinarily found nowhere else. Blood quickly hardens when exposed to the air. Solid muscle tissues break down within a few hours when cut off from the living blood stream, unless artificially preserved. Moreover, human blood, hair, and so on, differ specifically from those even of closely related animals. The chemist, therefore, much more easily than the physicist, can define a human body so as to distinguish it from other bodies, even living ones. For him, a man is a complex, fluid system of particular chemical substances, in continuous interaction, among which definite proportions are maintained within more or less narrow limits.

Several points here deserve special notice. First, the chemical elements of living bodies are the same as elements found in earth, air, water, and stars. Second, the compounds that are distinctive of living matter, or protoplasm, consist mainly of a very few familiar elements—carbon, oxygen, hydrogen,

nitrogen—in amazingly varied, complex, and ordinarily unstable combinations. Unlikely combinations, the physicist and the inorganic chemist would say; even more unlikely to stay together, once formed, than to get together in the first place. But stay together they do, in living bodies, as long as certain internal and external conditions are maintained, sometimes for more than a hundred years. Third, these internal conditions include most strikingly a whole series of chemical equilibria, as yet but partially explored, which supplement the physical equilibria of temperature, pressure, and so on, already noticed. These chemical equilibria can be studied most easily in the fluid parts and contents of the body: in blood, breath, urine, spinal fluid, glandular secretions, and so on. Thus, the slightly alkaline balance between acidity and alkalinity in the bloodstream has to be maintained within extremely narrow limits, or coma and death result. Oxygen and carbon dioxide have to balance within somewhat wider limits, or respiration stops. Blood sugar has to go up and down in rough parallelism to muscular work done. Chlorides must be somewhere near the right level, else exhaustion or dropsy will result. And so on. Such processes, moreover, are themselves interrelated, and in various ways affect and are affected by the chemical secretions of the endocrine glands, and the functioning of liver, kidneys, bone marrow, sympathetic nervous system, and various lower nerve centers. The whole picture is that of an intricate chemical laboratory within the body, making and distributing automatically a variety of products, often balanced within limits of incredible precision, over a period ranging from a few hours to more than a century.

These internal conditions of life must be matched by proper external conditions. There must be abundant supplies of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen in breathable, drinkable, and eatable forms; together with smaller amounts of sodium, calcium, phosphorus, iron, chlorine, iodine, and sulphur, likewise accessible. Excepting the ingredients in air, water, and common salt, man feeds on these elements in the form of intricate compounds already built up by plants and animals other than himself. As long as such food supplies are available, along with air and water, a continuous interchange goes on between the man's body and its chemical environment. With every breath drawn, oxygen molecules are transferred from the atmosphere to the red corpuscles of his blood, and carbon dioxide and water from his blood to the atmosphere. With every meal eaten, beefsteak becomes human muscle; milk, egg yolks, and spinach help build human bone; bread and potatoes fuel the bodily engine for warmth and work; while lungs, skin, kidneys, and intestines return unused remainders and combustion products to the environment once more. Chemically no less than physically, a man is a whirlpool through which passes a steady stream of materials derived from, and soon or late returning to, the world that keeps him alive.

2. *The biological sciences take for granted all the processes that concern biophysics and biochemistry, and come directly to the study of living things as such. In their view, man is a complex animal evolved from simpler forms, and essentially like them in physical and mental behavior.*

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The physicist's units are electrons and protons, photons, and quanta of energy. The chemist's are atoms and molecules. The biologist's are living cells and their living components. To his eyes each man is a community of millions of cells living together more or less successfully as one individual.

All that has been said of a man's fluid physical and chemical stability can be repeated in terms of his cellular make-up. From moment to moment, as he engages in bodily exertion, suffers and recovers from injury, or simply grows older, some of his body cells are dying and others, through division of older cells, are being born. They are specialized in form and function for a division of labor as intricate as that of a great city. Yet for all their diversity, they work together, normally, with a degree of unity that no city has ever displayed. Each type is produced, maintained, and when necessary, replaced in due proportion to all the rest, and each performs its work in nice co-ordination with others of all types, at relative distances ranging up to the equivalent of more than a hundred miles between people in what would be a super-metropolis. Co-ordination of cell numbers and functions has to be relatively good, or the whole body-community suffers. When a small group of cells run amok, multiply with abnormal rapidity, and encroach on the territory of neighboring cells, which they destroy, a malignant growth results; and, if unchecked, will destroy the life of the whole body. Persistent overproduction of white blood-cells, if unchecked, means distortion and death in a few months; and persistent underproduction means helplessness against infection. Too great unbalance, likewise, in the functioning of the organs that cells compose—heart, kidneys, liver, endocrines, or nerve centers—can be disastrous. Biological stability is co-ordination—mechanical, chemical, physiological.

While it lasts, the distinctive life-processes go on: adaptive response to stimuli, metabolism, reproduction, and their various tributary functions. All these man shares with other animals, for the excellent biological reason that he is, beyond reasonable doubt, their kinsman. Their blood-kinsman, I was about to say; but the truth is deeper than that. He is, for the biologist, their kinsman in cell-substance, which is far more ancient than blood.

With this fact of cell-kinship are bound up two biological views of man that have capital importance for any understanding of ourselves: the evolutionist's view and the geneticist's view. The former began, as is well known, not from the study of cells, but from the observation of the way living things fit into differing environments. Darwin and those before and after him who assembled the first convincing evidence for the development of different species, one from another, came to see clearly, without the more exact knowledge we now have, that man belongs in the series, along with all the other animals. He is the offspring of some forebear of the great apes. His deft tool-making hands are modified fore-paws; his speech, a development out of growls and cries; his social relations rooted in the predatory struggles and the gregarious living of his simpler kin. The marks of his physical descent through invertebrate, water-dwelling, land-dwelling, and tree-dwelling ancestors are plain in his body—plainest during the stages of his growth as an embryo before birth. His life as an individual begins, on the simplest level, with the union of two single cells, and thereafter mirrors in star-

ting fashion the embryonic lives of worm, fish, bird, and mammal. When he is born a human infant, with the capacities for growth into a person latent in him, it is as the heir to geologic epochs of slow transformation and sudden change of living forms. The nice co-ordination of his complicated organism is not created at one stroke, but developed through millions of years, with many crudities still surviving from the long climb.

How this evolution has come about we know only in fragmentary fashion. Darwin's brilliant theory of "natural selection" (or rather natural elimination of forms less well adapted than others to live in a given environment) is still a chief guiding light to further knowledge. But equally brilliant and far more precise insights have come through the work of modern geneticists. Indeed, without their work, the concept of natural selection would remain too vague to satisfy hard-headed laboratory scientists. Darwin assumed, without further analysis, that the offspring of any living things will both resemble the parents and differ from them; and that this combined persistence of the type and variation of the individuals issued, through environmental sifting, in gradual changes in the types or species themselves. The whole question why, how, and how far individuals can vary from the parent form, and especially the hotly disputed question whether characters acquired during the individual life of the parent can be transmitted to the offspring, was left without convincing answer. Now through the work of Mendel, DeVries, Morgan, and their followers, we are well on the way to clearer knowledge.

The physical link between parents and offspring is a pair of cells from the "germ plasm"—the specialized reproductive tissue—of the two parents, and there is no clear evidence that powers acquired or injuries suffered by the parents' muscles, nerves, or other bodily organs affect them in any way. The germ plasm can be injured when it is itself directly exposed to drugs in the blood stream, or to X-rays focused on ovary or testicle. But to an astonishing degree it seems immune to the ups and downs of the parent bodies through which it is transmitted generation after generation. **Germ plasm, not blood, is the basis of physical kinship. Because of its unbroken continuity, offspring resemble parents, and its stability is very great.**

But offspring also differ from parents, sometimes to a startling degree. These divergences, likewise, the geneticist refers directly to what goes on inside the newly united germ cells, not outside them: to the shifting combinations of genes, or unit-character-producing factors, transmitted in definite groups from the two parent stocks. Each gene tends to produce in the offspring a particular unit character—brown eye-color, red hair-color, long bone-structure, color-blindness, thin-bloodedness—which one of the parents or some more distant forebear has had. The genes are not themselves, it would seem, readily subject to change; and in a given family tree, a definite number of unit characters are present, capable of a definite number of combinations, and no more. The study of simpler organisms, moreover, seems to show that certain groups of genes are lined up in the nuclear fibers, chromosomes, of the germ plasm in more or less fixed sequences. When chromosomes from two parents come together, the genes from each side are already arranged in defi-

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nite patterns, not free to mingle at random. Yet from time to time there appear mutations, or sudden major changes inside the germ plasm, and give rise to offspring that differ sharply from the parents in size, color, speed, or what not. These wide variations from type may quickly die out, or they may affect permanently the character of the species through propagation of the new forms.

What characters will appear in the offspring of given ancestry will depend, then, first upon what genes were present in the ancestral germ plasm, and secondly upon what reinforcements and cancellations or suppressions take place among these when opposing chromosomes are combined, and in a special way on rare but sometimes highly important mutations.

In simpler organisms than man, many of these resulting characters can be anticipated with more or less accuracy, and breeders of fine stock have been making practical use of such predictability during thousands of years. As regards man, also, a few obvious unit characters, such as color-blindness, can be predicted with confidence; and it must be supposed in general that man as an animal is subject to genetic conditions like those known for simpler forms. The capacities of each new-born child are then provisionally fixed within the range of the particular combination of genes in the germ plasm from which his life begins. Neither feeding, housing, education, nor other environmental resources, can carry him beyond the limits thus determined, though it may make the vital difference between full development and crippling of such powers as he has. Conversely, neither bodily injury nor dissipation is likely to damage the genes that he in turn can hand on to his children, though it may affect profoundly his personal influence on them. Human stocks, no less than blooded horses or cattle, presumably tend to breed true.

But no one has yet the right to say in detail what this implies for actual human living. Far too little is known concerning what the unit characters are that human germ plasm carries, to warrant any such talk about "purity of blood" or "dominant stocks" as politicians in our time are exploiting; especially when this plays up the mongrel concept of a "pure race," a concept in which biological and cultural factors are recklessly confused. Biological science is slandered, not honored, by such loose talk. Within its own proper field, biology has learned much and promises more concerning human inheritance. In the related field of medical research and practice, ways are already being found to correct certain native deficiencies (e.g., of endocrine make-up) in individuals. Work in both fields must be welcomed and pressed with all urgency, while sober analysis of present knowledge may well lead even now to better human perspective and specific social benefits. But at present the maze of unit characters in human germ plasm is mostly uncharted; and mutations remain wholly unpredictable. The chief significance of the genetic view of man lies not in its present practical exploitability, but in its promise of far more exact self-knowledge in the future. Eugenics will some day be more than a hope.

Meanwhile, if biology tends just now to minimize the importance of environmental factors and of acquired traits for the development of human nature, psychology strongly underscores them as of first-rate importance for the develop-

ment of human behavior. In this field, "environment" means chiefly social or cultural environment, and psychology is at once the most humane of the biological, and the most experimental of the social sciences. In it two major areas of scientific work overlap.

Psychology concerns itself mainly with those modes of human behavior in which not a part of the organism but the organism as a whole is the agent. Its unitary concept is not electron, molecule, nor cell, but *response*: an act of the individual evoked by a stimulus either within the organism or in its environment. These responses include, of course, bodily acts of various degrees of complexity. The question whether they include anything other than bodily acts is a main line of demarcation between behaviorists, who say no, and mentalists, who say yes.

Man as thinking, feeling, purposive animal is still the dominant frame of reference for psychological theory. But whereas traditional psychology for a long time tried mainly to analyze human consciousness into various sorts of detailed contents—sensations, images, concepts, and so on—the effort now is to portray man as actively engaged in sense perception, thinking, planning, and other such activities. Responsive processes are now the psychologist's chief concern. "The stream of consciousness" has displaced "conscious states," even among those who carry on most faithfully the tradition that the proper concern of psychology is with *human consciousness in its everyday forms*. This tradition is so familiar that, without detailed characterization, we may note here simply that it continues to be held perhaps more widely than any other view. It is a kind of backlog for the interplay of newer, more specialized theories; and it has shown itself alive and adaptable, as new problems and new emphases have called for revision of old formulae.

But some of these newer theories, notably behaviorism and psychoanalytic theories, profess to be substitutes for traditional psychology, and to require drastic change from its notion of man as intelligent being. Behaviorists today mostly take one of two lines, both developed mainly through experimentation with rats, apes, and various other animals than man. Their most interesting results concern the process of learning. The first of these lines follows Pavlov's work on salivary response, and seeks to interpret all learned behavior, animal and human, in terms of "conditioned reflexes." In this view, the simplest unit-responses in man or beast are all physical reflexes: automatic, unstudied, involuntary acts such as a closing of the eye-pupil under a bright light, a jerk away from a hot steam-pipe, or a watering of the mouth at the smell of food. In studying this last response in his now famous experiments with dogs, Pavlov obtained much precise information about how these reflexes can be "conditioned," or trained to come in response to other stimuli than the original ones. His followers hold that such trained or conditioned reflexes build up of themselves into chains or habit-systems, in which the performance of each act in the chain tends to touch off the next; and one sequence of such acts gets associated with other sequences, so that each tends to set off the others. In this way, conduct becomes a continuously growing system of acquired physical responses, built up out of unit reflexes. The stimuli—light or sound waves, pricks or pressures, and so on—may originate either outside or inside the animal's body. Internal stimuli are of predominant im-

portance for the interpretation of behavior. Some of them are generalized, persistent drive stimuli, such as hunger or thirst. Many more are the particular successive reverberations in joints and muscles and various internal organs, of unfolding movements already in progress. Each part of each response becomes itself a stimulus that helps sustain and guide the response as a whole. Stimuli plus responses are the whole story, for both mice and men.

The most important special key to distinctively human behavior is the elaborate development of words and other symbolic stimuli, to which all sorts of responses can be "conditioned," and by which they can then be evoked. This accounts for man's ability to "remember" the past and "predict" the future, while all the time he is reacting solely to sights, sounds, and internal stresses and strains that are present. The overwhelming importance of acquired behavior patterns in this view is plain. Behaviorism of this first type is the counterpart to physical atomism, an up-to-date version of associationist psychology. It views man as an aggregate of unit-responses.

A second type is far less atomistic, laying stress chiefly upon the ability of animals to respond with "insight" to stimulus situations as significant wholes. A response, it holds, is not to a number of isolated pricks or color-splashes but to a rose-bush, a definite total form or *Gestalt*. Hence the now familiar name, *Gestalt* psychology. In a sense this begins where the conditioned reflex theory professes to arrive: at the level of intelligent responses that take complex situations in stride, not piecemeal.

So far as both theories refer to physical behavior, the difference between them is most obviously one of degree. *Gestalt* theory insists that psychological responses even of the simpler grades involve reaction to meaningful whole-patterns, not to mere unconnected items; and that responses even to very complex situations are still essentially unitary responses, to patterns more inclusive but not less unitary than simple colors or pains. Conditioned reflex theory insists, on the contrary, that all the more elaborate responses are composite, built up out of reflex units woven together, without losing their atomic character, and not supplemented by any sort of insight or other response different from themselves. The one view, in brief, stresses the unity of responsive behavior at every level of elaboration; the other, its plurality at all levels above the simplest. Both hold firmly to the physical concept of stimulus-response as defining human behavior. But they approach this common ground from opposite ends. Conditioned reflex theory approaches it, legitimately enough, from the side of the physical and the simpler biological sciences, in which wholes have long been thought of as built up out of parts, completely analyzable into them, and behaving only as the resultant sum of the behaving parts. This approach tends to be atomistic and mechanistic, trying steadily to reduce more complex phenomena to simpler ones. *Gestalt* theory approaches the same field of responsive behavior from the side of mature human experience, which includes such undoubted facts as memory and prediction, planning, and perception of relatedness among details. Seeing no way to reduce the last of these to anything simpler, this theory seeks to discover by experiment how far back in animal behavior it can be found, and what part it plays at various stages.

Gestalt theory holds it necessary, that is, to orient psycho-

logical thought away from traditional physics toward more concrete views of behavior. In stressing the primacy of wholes over parts, it reverses the tendency to atomism and mechanism, in favor of a more organic view. A man—nay even a rat, or a chick—is more than an aggregate of parts. These animals, and a man most of all, are organisms capable of integrated behavior which at every level is a whole-response to a whole-situation, not a piecemeal response to single stimuli. Moreover, in so far as human responses in especial take shape through insight into meanings, or significant relationships, which are not directly translatable into light-waves, pressures, or sounds, there is in *Gestalt* theory a persistent suggestion—rejected with some vehemence by more atomistic behaviorists—that responsive behavior includes more than bodily acts.

This possibility is affirmed as a fact by not a few *Gestalt* theorists; and, among the psychologies we have called mentalistic, such affirmation is basic. Mind is not body, but another area of response, with laws of its own. Conspicuous among these mentalistic psychologies are the several forms of psychoanalytic theory: Freudian, Jungian, and the rest. They concern themselves primarily with human motivation. Behaviorists seek to understand in detail how animals and men behave. Freudians and kindred psychologists ask first of all why men behave as they do. Their answer, with many differences in detail but much unanimity in principle, is that psychic drives of which man is largely unconscious determine what he feels, thinks, and does. These dominant cravings, for security, sex satisfaction, or power, are partly fulfilled, partly frustrated, in the life of each individual person. To a greater or less extent they come to conscious expression in his feelings and thoughts, which mirror but do not control them. On the other hand, the springs from which these cravings well up are deep in each individual and in the race; and when they are blocked—as by extreme danger, social conventions, or physical deficiency—the drives tend to go underground, and work all manner of disguised conflicts in the individual's life. Rational argument and voluntary effort then have no effect on them, but rather are themselves twisted into disguises for the hidden drives. Reason becomes rationalization, or wishful thinking. The only way out is through curative measures that penetrate into the unconscious itself, and release the knotted drives that struggle there. A healthy person is one whose basic drives are so harmonized that each of them gets a fair amount of satisfaction; whose conscious and unconscious behavior go together, instead of pulling in irreconcilable directions; and whose whole battery of responses is trained primarily on the actual world of work and social intercourse rather than on a fanciful private world of dream-pictures and wish-projections. Such health is a mental achievement. Physical health may go with it, but cannot take its place.

By focusing attention somewhat dramatically on the importance of basic drives and their satisfaction or frustration, psychoanalytic theory has done much to strengthen the current tendency to think of man in dynamic rather than static terms. Man is what he wants and what he does. By its emphatic insistence that these drives and their consequences are primarily mental, not physical processes, it has

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brought colorful support to the view that men are more than living bodies, and respond to intangible things as well as to physical ones. By its stress on man's need for inner integrity and realistic direction of his efforts, finally, it has done more than describe and explain. It has provided a usable way of attacking the problem of human good and evil. Yet with all its strength, it remains a specialized rather than a comprehensive view of man's behavior, a medical theory very pertinent to, but not derived from, observation of ordinary people.

Quite natural, then, are the current attempts to absorb its findings into some more inclusive view. Certain active behaviorists are bent on showing that Freudian complexes are nothing more than unhappily conditioned reflexes. An evolutionary school holds that they are lapses into archaic forms of behavior, which, in the course of animal evolution, human beings have mostly outgrown. Proponents of traditional psychology give comparatively little attention to "the unconscious" and its doings, but concentrate rather on the conscious desires, habits, and purposes of the plain man, from childhood to maturity. Still another group hold that the special concepts of psychoanalysis are best interpreted in terms of social psychology, as phases of the interaction of many individuals in the exacting life of a human community.

In this last view, the emphasis shifts in a very significant direction, from the relatively simple drives within the individual to the complex cultural setting in which he lives and to which he has to respond. Description of this context is the work of the social studies.

3. *The social disciplines presuppose all the powers of man as living, striving, responsive animal; and seek to interpret the ways in which these work out within the framework of various human groups.*

Some of these disciplines deal with single phases of human intercourse: economics with the production, distribution, and use of instrumental goods and services; political theory with the acquisition, exercise, and regulation of coercive power. For the understanding of these, the economist or political theorist may resort to abstractions somewhat like those employed by the physicist. Thus "classical" economics framed for its purposes the concept of "the economic man," moved solely by self-interest, always seeking to buy cheap and sell dear, without regard to any other considerations than these quantitative ones. "Man" so conceived is no actual creature of flesh and spirit. His labor and comfort are not living human concerns, but commodities to be bought and sold and bargained over, like any others, in a hypothetical market in which every buyer and seller is free, and trade can find its own level without emotional, political, or other hindrance. Equally abstract is "the natural man" of Hobbes's or Rousseau's political theory: the former a complete egoist bent on personal security, pleasure, and power, with no scruples but prudential ones, who must be ruled with a heavy hand; the latter an unspoiled child of generous impulse, for whom the least government is the best. In so far as these abstractions stand for real aspects of human social behavior, they can be used to exhibit the latter in simplified perspectives that can be very illuminating. Man is, in part, a shrewd, hard trader, a ruthless egoist, an impulsive child; and we can understand him better once these aspects have been

singled out for scrutiny. But actual men never behave consistently as free and equal bargainers without fear or favor, as predatory thinking machines, immune to both stupidity and generosity, nor as noble freemen who require no restraint. Pure *laissez-faire* economics and pure authoritarian or libertarian political theory have, therefore, the virtues and defects of all hypothetical schemes. Their primary reference is to a certain complex of ideas and assumptions or postulates, whose relevance to actual life is very incomplete, and which may be very misleading. To supplement these hypothetical or postulational schemes, a more concrete kind of economic and political theory is needed.

But to frame such a theory without abandoning the objectivity of science for the ardor of partisanship is no easy task. When one tries to think concretely in these fields, the temptation is strong to abandon dispassionate theory for more or less undisguised practical exhortation. Two conspicuous present claimants to the title of realistic economic and political theory, Marxism and fascism, show this tendency very plainly. Both are frankly and militantly partisan, with no pretense of disinterestedness. The former is primarily economic, the latter primarily political, in its avowed interest. Each professes to be rooted in a special scientific view: Marxism in a simple "labor theory" of economic values, which it uses to explain economic crises and the supposedly inevitable collapse of capitalism; fascism in an equally simple doctrine of national or racial unity, and the natural superiority of one race to another. But whatever one may think of the scientific status of their root ideas, both communism and fascism have become first and foremost totalitarian programs for the control of human life, rather than theories to help understand it. We shall return to them briefly in the chapters on philosophic and religious views of man.

Meanwhile, from the super-heated atmosphere of these rival economic-political creeds, we turn finally to the descriptive disciplines of anthropology and sociology. These studies, unlike economics and politics, deal with the whole range of social living, and look for broad, basic patterns of behavior that emerge in every department of human life. Social anthropology concentrates, in the main, on societies without a written language and literature; cultural sociology is equally concerned with pre-literate and literate peoples. But there is no sharp line of distinction between them. In principle both are concerned with the whole of social development and behavior, and both turn to account all sorts of procedures for their purpose: linguistic and historical inquiries, archaeological explorations, first-hand observation of living societies all over the globe, physical and psychological measurement, statistical studies, and many more. Their subject-matter is so immense and their systematic efforts to explore it so recent that clear-cut areas of agreement among workers in these fields are not as yet very numerous.

One such area is the recognition that, in all human societies, a basic factor is a network of accepted customs or folkways, which have become established almost, if not quite, without conscious intent, and which may maintain themselves for generations with but little change. These are simply matter-of-fact ways of doing things, mere social habits. Some, often called *morés*, come to have the obligatory character of *right* ways as against *wrong* ways of doing things.

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Violation of these accepted mores brings social disapproval and punishment. In most societies, the demand for obedience to the mores is reinforced by the conviction that superhuman powers also favor those who obey, and will punish those who violate them. Especially in a primitive society, the tendency to conform is all but overwhelming, and though disobedience is of course not unknown, deliberate and effective criticism of the accepted customs is extremely rare. The primitive community has long been thought of by a majority of anthropologists as one close-knit whole, claiming one blood-kinship, feeling and acting together, suggesting in some ways a larger, more long-lived, more unwieldy kind of organism.

So strongly has this analogy impressed some social theorists that they have taken it to be not merely an analogy but a principle of explanation. For them, a society is an organism, and its members are simply members of it, and nothing more. Others hold that societies evolve, after the manner of animal species, through adaptation to their natural environments and through competitive struggle with other societies. This evolutionary view, worked out in sweeping fashion by Herbert Spencer, has come to be very widely held, and has been applied in all manner of detailed ways to the differences and the changes which various cultures display. How easily it can be called on to support claims to superiority for this or that culture or race or nation is obvious. When, as sometimes happens, it is associated with a free transfer of Darwin's theory of natural selection into the region of social history, and "survival of the fittest" among societies is construed to mean a natural superiority of aggressive peoples over peaceable ones, the view may lose all claim to be social description and become social exhortation.

Less speculative anthropologists have preferred to avoid such tempting but treacherous concepts as social organism and societal evolution, save as analogies. Forgoing, for the present, any single explanatory principle, they are busy examining in detail the ways in which, in a given culture, the various facets of social living—industry, education, law, morals, religion—appear to be related. Their immediate concern is not to place all societies in a scale of development, nor to prophesy what is coming next, but first of all to get a clearer understanding of what a society is, and how various kinds of societies work, in their manifold phases.

To estimate the progress they have made in this task is for experts, not laymen. But on certain points their findings are well known. One of these deserves special mention here: the troubled question of race differences, over which so much blood and so many tears have already been shed, with no one knows what terrors still to come. Nobody doubts the obvious fact that there are physical differences that are inborn and inherited in diverse human types. This is no less true of different families within each type, and even of different individuals in the same family; and in principle it need cause neither surprise nor disturbance of any kind. One might regard it simply as a welcome avoidance of monotony, making humanity more interesting than if there were only one type. The trouble comes when these innate physical differences, of which all too little is yet known in detail, are made the base for a shaky pyramid of confused popular dogmas that must then be upheld by force, lest it fall and break apart. These dogmas are: that innate physical differences are closely and inevitably tied up with cultural differences—of language,

government, moral standards, and so on; that one "race"—a human group marked off by common physical inheritance, or "blood," and a common language—is intrinsically "superior" to others; and that a "pure race" of this higher type is superior to all "mixed races" of every type.

Under the lens of a disinterested anthropology, these stirring affirmations lose most of their intellectual pretensions. There is no fixed relation between physique and language. There is no way of defining, much less demonstrating, a general superiority of one "race" over another. In all likelihood there is no such thing as a "pure race" on the earth today, if indeed that phrase has any clear meaning at all. From the cold-blooded scientist's point of view, the basic fact about present-day men is that they are all of one species, whose varying types differ far more in their acquired culture patterns than in their known physical and mental endowments. To explain the former as a simple function of the latter is to substitute muddled dogma for clear analysis. The popular concept of "pure race" is itself a mongrel concept, useful only to demagogues.

The dominant impression that an outsider receives from fragmentary reading of the less speculative students of society is an impression of the amazing versatility and unique sensitiveness, or responsiveness, of man. By comparison with other animal societies, intricate as some of them are, human societies display a variety and a relative flexibility that makes any simple reduction of the latter to the former implausible. Flexibility is perhaps the more important point here. Human societies, with all the stubbornness of their established folkways, have succeeded in criticizing and changing their own behavior for all sorts of reasons, by no means all of them biologically compelling ones. Individuals and minority groups from time to time consciously oppose the dominant social currents, and become growing-points through which new habits and new ideas arise. This is a different thing from mere failure to conform. It is reflective non-conformity, in which critical intelligence plays a significant part.

Such human society, in which individuals emerge and critical insight has a footing, even though a precarious one, needs a larger stage than other animal societies. When human individuals dream better ways of living, and stand out against the accepted ways, at cost to themselves, for the sake of what they have dreamed, a new horizon of response is involved, beyond the animal environment that is spread out in space and time. Somehow, man has come to be a self-critical and aspiring animal, bent on making himself over, and becoming at home in a world that includes both things as they are, and possibilities of things as they are not, but ought to be. Into this latter region, of value and obligation, none of the sciences as yet is ready to follow him.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHIES SAY, "A SAMPLE OF THE UNIVERSE"

Like the sciences, most of the philosophies seek to deal with man as an object of dispassionate, systematic study and discourse. But unlike the sciences, each of which focuses on a restricted portion of reality, the philosophies try to deal with man with the whole world as context. Each of them views man as a sample of the universe.

All modern philosophy tries to profit from the special findings of the sciences concerning both nature and man. Without trying to reproduce these in detail, it seeks to interpret them, by noting their apparent interconnections, the general grounds on which they rest, and the general consequences that they involve if true.

No philosophy is final and complete, but some are less faulty than others. Their soundness can seldom if ever be tested once for all by a crucial experiment. The tests they

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have to meet are those of internal consistency as to logical form, and applicability and fruitfulness as a guide to dealing with observable facts. Our concern here will be chiefly with philosophic views about the nature of what is real—with metaphysics.

1. *Nearest to common sense, in many ways, is body-mind dualism. It sees in man, as in the universe generally, two kinds of reality, one physical, the other mental.*

Body is the space-filling, visible, tangible, weighable part of a man and of the world, the part with which the physical sciences deal. Its observable actions are all movements in space, and it is subject to all the laws of physical nature. Mind has none of these characters. Its actions are such processes as feeling, thinking, imagining, wishing, and the like; processes with which psychology and the social sciences, not the physical sciences, are concerned. It has neither size, shape, nor weight; and each person, although directly acquainted with his own mind, is acquainted with the minds of his neighbors mainly, if not wholly, through observing the behavior of their bodies. Somewhat as electricity cannot be seen, but only the effects of its presence in some body—a tungsten filament, a loud speaker, and so on—so the presence of mind in a body can be detected through the ways in which the body acts.

This implies that minds and bodies are related in some intimate way, and defining their relationship is one of the central problems of a dualistic philosophy. As regards man, one of three views is usually held: interactionism, parallelism, epiphenomenalism. As the labels indicate, these views hold, respectively, that mind and body interact; that they run parallel courses without interaction; and that body alone is active, mind its inactive shadow.

The first view regards mind and body as two real things, each of which can bring about changes in the other. Each has its own fund of energy, and each operates as an active cause. From the body side, light rays strike the retina and set up electro-chemical changes in the nervous system; and these somehow give rise to the mental experience of seeing white paper and a green pen. Conversely, a mental impulse to write stirs the nervous centers into action; muscles contract and the pen is grasped and set moving over the paper. The flow of these currents back and forth between body and mind is continuous and fully reciprocal. Either may start the process on a new line, and each retains a measure of independence throughout all their active association.

This view leaves room for a number of common-sense beliefs about man, though it is not in principle committed to any of them. One is belief in man's freedom to choose between alternative courses of conduct, by rational decision at the moment when action begins. The interactionist view, unlike the other two just mentioned, regards a human mind as capable of initiating a course of action and causing its body, within limits, to follow the course thus adopted. It may hold further that each initiative of the mind is itself a new, free act, conditioned but not completely determined by previous decisions and their consequences. Human action viewed in this manner is free action in the everyday, common-sense meaning of the word. But a very different view is also possible. Interactionists may hold that, although the mind is not bound by the body, each mental act is bound by the nature and previous acts of the mind itself; so that "freedom" can mean self-determination but not spontaneity.

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In either case, interaction leaves room for the common-sense view that the body can be brought increasingly under control by rational insight and decision, or will. In this sense, mind may become the dominant partner, and body a well-trained subordinate, whose powers are more and more fully developed and used in the service of rational will. It is only a step further to hold that bodily powers not ordinarily recognized in everyday life can be discovered and exploited through appropriate mental training in such practices as the disciplines from the Far East called Yoga, or the now widely advertised processes of telepathy and "extrasensory perception," whatever may be their detailed relation to ordinary experience. Even the extreme assertion of independence for the mind, the belief that individual minds can survive the destruction of their bodies, is permitted (though in no sense required) by interactionist theory. At all these points the latter stays close to the plain man's way of thinking about himself. But it makes evident a problem of which he is happily unaware: how non-physical mind can cause physical effects, and *vice versa*.

The second and third views of body-mind dualism are more sophisticated, and seek to outflank this problem. Psychophysical parallelism—i. e., mind-body parallelism—regards physical and mental processes as running along side by side, without interaction. Each sequence is complete in itself. Motions succeed motions, ideas follow ideas, and the two chains of events are perfectly synchronized; but neither affects the other in any way. This is obviously an evasion rather than a solution of the puzzle, either a mere restatement of the problem, or a tacit appeal to continuous miracle.

Epiphenomenalism, the third view, very nearly abandons dualism altogether. It regards the body as primary, and mind or consciousness as a continuing, non-physical echo of bodily events. Mind is thus reduced to something like a shadow, or a melody poured out by an organ. It has even less effect on the actions of the body than music has on bronze organ pipes and motors. This is, in short, a scarcely veiled materialism, a kind of disappearance-point of mind-body dualism.

So far as the findings of the sciences are concerned, none of these views can claim a preferred position, and none can be ruled out as certainly false. Any of them can be so interpreted as to avoid conflict with known facts and the accepted principles of scientific inquiry. Acceptance or rejection must depend, therefore, upon their compatibility or incompatibility with the more general requirements of self-consistency and all-around reasonableness. On these grounds, many philosophers have been dissatisfied with dualism of any sort, and have preferred some kind of monism, which seeks to resolve mind into body, body into mind, or both into some more ultimate sort of reality. We shall glance at these in order.

2. *Materialism holds that body alone is real, and "mind" is either a word without meaning or a name for certain bodily functions.*

The apparent obviousness of physical reality to the eye of common sense has been immensely reinforced by the prestige of the physical sciences and their technological results. In consequence, an initial advantage goes to those theories which hold that all reality is body, space-filling, weighty, and mobile, together with its various sorts of behavior. This behavior, moreover, has been regarded by most thinkers

since Newton as strictly in accord with physical laws, which can be stated in precise mathematical terms.

Materialism has taken, in the main, two significant forms: mechanistic, and "dialectical" or "historical" materialism. The former is a worked-over legacy from the eighteenth century, when the Newtonian world-view and the physical sciences were in full sway, and the biological sciences not yet come to maturity. In this view, all reality consists of hard, elastic atoms swarming through infinite space, coming together here and there to form nebulae, solar systems, and occasionally living things. Their motions are all rigorously determined in accordance with the basic Newtonian laws, and their total mass and energy continues from aeon to aeon unaltered in the slightest degree. Change is rearrangement, strictly determined by past and present arrangements; and there is a steady trend toward universal breakdown of complex systems, and dispersal of the atoms throughout infinity. This last feature is, for the most part, not much emphasized; for it casts a shadow over the mood of emancipation that materialists have sought to cultivate, and it has proved a source of theoretic perplexity as well.

Man is like every other part of nature—a temporary grouping of atoms into a small machine, geared into the big machine of the universe. His conduct is as completely and physically determined as that of a fine clock or a moving planet. "Mind" is merely a certain functioning of his body, and has no power of its own. Each man is what he is irrevocably, and everything he does is fixed in advance, like clock-work.

This view has had for a long time a fairly wide acceptance among admirers of Newtonian physics (though Newton's philosophy was very different from this one). Its evident virtues are simplicity, freedom from some sorts of vagueness and bunk, and whole-hearted acceptance of classical physics with all its consequences. Its most evident shortcoming is a tendency to hasty and excessive simplification in the face of facts which more painstaking study has shown to require much less simple and pictorial interpretation.

The rapid advances of evolutionary biology and of quantum physics, together with the upsurge of revolutionary social energies since 1789, have done much to promote the more fluid Marxist version of materialism. Instead of hard, unchanging atoms, this version regards all reality as consisting of physical *processes* in perpetual struggle and periodic advance. Nature is not a machine, but a kind of vast growing thing—wholly impersonal and unconscious, but dynamic, fluent, and progressive. There is real progress, not merely continual reshuffling and eventual stagnation: hence, "historical" materialism. And this progress, best seen in the pageant of animal evolution and social history, comes about through conflict: hence, "dialectical" materialism.

Man is by all odds the most interesting part of this creative turmoil. He is fundamentally a producing animal, who supplies his own needs (as no other animal does) with tools and productive operations of his own devising. All the rest of his life—social organization, language, morals, thought systems—grows out of his economic activities. To these the whole of his mental life is instrumental, being a useful sort of bodily functioning, which can speed up, by swift seizure of crucial opportunities, the otherwise slower advance of the dialectic in human society, where it operates through ruthless class struggle. There is no morality except class morality,

for the benefit of one's allies in the struggle. The enemy has no rights. But some day there will be no class enemies. In the classless society evolution will move to a new plane.

This is by far the most significant form of materialism now current, and its basic view of nature and man is held in a general way by many thinkers who do not share Marxist economic and political views. It seems safe to predict that it will grow in influence in the immediate future. But sooner or later, the question will become more insistent whether this theory, though in many respects very modern, is not basically a revival of primitive ideology in too uncritical a form. Its view of nature ascribes to physical processes the attributes of mind, and ignores the problems thus posed, including the basic problem how "dialectic"—a logical process—can go on where mind is absent. What is worse, its ethic rejects the painfully won human conviction that there is a moral law valid for all men, and reverts to a tribal morality restated in terms of economic class loyalty.

This doctrine has now provoked a vehement rejoinder in the vitalistic doctrines of Nazism, which spring from the same post-Hegelian era in German culture that gave birth to Marxism. Each "folk" of one blood has its own special "genius" or "folk-spirit," which defines the destiny of the folk, and the true way of life for all its members. For one people it means dominance, for another subservience, by a profound natural necessity and right. This necessity or destiny is at once biological and cultural. To it the whole folk-life—family, education, government, religion—must be subordinated. Economic activities, far from being basic to all the rest, are merely one more tributary factor, subject to the most rigid management by the folk-leaders, without concern for so-called economic laws. By stern selection of biologically "pure" stock, by regimented education, one-party government, controlled religion, and army-like "co-ordination" of labor, business, scholarship, art, journalism, and all other pursuits, individual differences and competing interests must be as far as possible eliminated. The folk or community demands supreme loyalty of every member, and is closed to every one of another race. Man is above all a vessel of irrational gregarious instincts, and the ideal community is a splendid large ant-hill.

This Nazi retort to the Marxist gospel of class loyalty has a deadly precision of aim, and the battle between them is joined on essentially primitive grounds. The question, "Which is right?" becomes meaningless, since the answer must be, "Both and neither." Both are "right" in terms of exclusive factional devotion; and neither is, nor cares to be, "right" in an inclusive human sense. This is reversion to pre-civilized thought. In many important respects, both "dialectical materialism" and "vitalistic romanticism" are admirable fighting creeds; but in trying to override problems rather than solve them, both are more apt to evoke fighting retorts than fuller understanding.

The problems waved aside by materialism have been largely responsible for the appeal of its logical opposite, metaphysical idealism.

3. *Idealism holds that only mind, and the rational patterns and processes inseparable from it, are real. Body is the outward appearance of what really is mind.*

This mind may be regarded as one all-embracing, universal mind, or as a society of many minds, great and small,

high and low.

The former kind of idealism goes far back in the history of Indian and Western thought, and is still, under the name of absolute idealism, the most widespread. In the form in which Hegel worked it out, it was the immediate source of the dialectical materialism just noticed, and the two world-views, in spite of their conflicting labels, have very much in common. Both regard the universe as a dynamic, organic system in which human life is embedded and by which it is determined. Both see in social history the clearest working of the powers that are basic in the universe, and both regard human society as therefore entitled to dominate its members. But idealism flatly rejects the view that these basic powers are, in the large, non-rational, and holds instead that the universe is the one perfect example of rational being. Men are but "broken lights" of its "white radiance." They are finite, transient expressions of the infinite Reason, which includes them and all else besides. Yet in so far as they have reason, they can participate consciously in the life of the Absolute, and perform their fully determined parts with understanding and voluntary (though necessitated) devotion. Their devotion is in part to private and public social groups—"beloved communities" large and small. But beyond these, their ultimate commitment is to the Absolute Mind itself, and the rational and moral laws that are its patterns. In principle, therefore, a man or a group may find it obligatory to oppose the society in which they have their place. But in practice, absolute idealism has tended to justify the existing order as an expression of Absolute Reason, and thus to oppose a practical conservatism to the practical revolutionism of orthodox Marxist thought.

Pluralistic idealism has been much less influential, but it has unmistakable vitality, and may gain headway as quantum physics supplants the older atomism. As the discovery of microscopic life encouraged Leibniz to think of reality as composed of living mind-units, or monads, so the theoretic analysis of Newtonian atoms into minute energy-waves is encouraging Leibniz's successors to push further in the same direction. The resulting view is usually called panpsychism, or, in a variant form, personalism or personal idealism. It views the universe as consisting of myriads of individual minds of varying scope, each having as its body other myriads of simpler minds, on down through cells, molecules, atoms, and electrons to whatever may be the simplest units of all. These are all minds in the sense that their activities are of the kind we have been calling mental—feeling, wanting, thinking; though at the simpler levels, all these are very different from what they are in man—blurred, narrowed, or otherwise altered.

A man is a highly complex individual whose body is a multitude of living cells and lesser units which serve as the vehicle of his mind, and whose mind is the inclusive conscious life that pervades his whole body. The two are bound into an organic whole, and together with other persons and things, have their place in the still greater body of the living universe, pervaded by its greater Mind. Each man is thus most intimately at home in a world every part of which is akin to him. As in the case of interactionist dualism, this form of idealism may or may not hold that human minds and lesser individuals are unequivocally free. The tendency to affirm real indeterminacy is growing, and at that point panpsychism draws away from the materialistic and absolute idealistic determination, and approaches common sense.

But to very many people in the West, the assertion of ideal

ism that all is mind seems unnatural, however logically defensible. There is still another possibility that seems to many more plausible.

4. *Neutral monism holds that body and mind alike are aspects of a reality more fundamental than either.*

This more basic reality is called, by one very influential current philosophy, "pure experience." The word thus used refers not simply to the particular experiences of individuals, but to the continuous flowing stream of concrete events in the midst of which individuals arise and pass away. "Experience" in this sense is neither mental nor physical, but that of which mental and physical are special aspects.

The most vital form of this radical empiricism, so-called, is American pragmatism, whose primary interest is not metaphysics but a way of knowing and living. This way is often called instrumentalism, or operationalism, to emphasize its active, practical character. Thinking is acting, problem-solving. One learns by doing. Experimentation is the only test, and verification the only meaning, of truth. There are no fixed portions of reality. Even the past is continually being remade, and the future is wide open.

Man is an animal whose survival and advance has been chiefly furthered by his capacity for problem-solving. This capacity is thus instrumental to life as a whole, and operates within the perpetually changing contexts of "experience." It is creative intelligence, in the sense that through its operations the course of "experience"—i. e., basic reality—is changed. Man is thus really free, within limits, to shape both his environment and himself. Human society differs from other animal societies primarily by virtue of language, which makes it possible for men to put themselves in one another's places, to assume a variety of rôles in imagination, and thus to become persons. As persons they have the unique opportunity and responsibility to define, and at the same time to actualize, continually improving patterns of human life, in association with the helping processes in their natural environment. No terminus is ever final, no insight more than provisionally true, and life is a continual adventure in a growing world. Here again is a view very near to common sense, and proportionately attractive to many people who distrust more recondite philosophies. Its typical outcome is liberal humanism, though in principle and often in fact it can equally well take a theistic road.

Another type of neutral monism is more strongly marked with the stamp of logic and the physical sciences. It has taken more than one form, of which the oldest is that developed by Spinoza into one of the great classical systems of thought. Reality is all-inclusive Nature, infinite Substance, or God, whose attributes are infinite in number, with mind and body among them: mind as consciousness, body as infinite extension. Both these take shape in the multitude of transient particulars, or modes, which we call things and events, bodies and minds. Among these are men. Substance alone is ultimate. Modes are real only as passing phases that Nature assumes. They are completely determined by it, as the terms of an equation are severally determined by the whole. Wisdom and happiness consist in seeing and accepting this truth. In more or less modified form, this represents the world-view of more than one devout man of science.

Another view, more technical and less emotion-stirring, is a kind of logical realism sometimes called neo-realism. It

holds that reality consists of immensely various units which are neither physical nor mental but neutral entities: colors, sounds, pains, pleasures, events, relations, all having whatever character they are seen to have, and interrelated in all sorts of ways. What we call "minds" and "bodies" are merely temporary combinations of such neutral entities: particular selections, or cross sections, in the midst of a world that is neither body nor mind, nor even—according to Russell and other logical atomists—an ordered world, but only an aggregate of units. Man's place in this sort of scheme is such that his philosophy cannot be expected to throw much light on his problem of living.

But there is another philosophic way of seeing human nature. The views thus far examined are alike in regarding man as a specimen of whatever sort of reality they attribute to the universe. When attention is thus fixed mainly on the universe, man is likely to have his place in the picture as a whole class or kind—mankind—rather than as an endlessly varied multitude of individual persons. Without altering the mode of thought which is characteristic of philosophy, it is not difficult to shift the perspective so as to bring the individual person into the center of attention, and regard the universe temporarily as background.

5. *When this is done, the result is likely to be a view of human persons as unique, self-conscious selves who, even while they live immersed in the world as integral members of it, also assert themselves against the world in critical judgment and purposive effort, and in turn are resisted or supported by it.*

The essential point here is simple, and not dependent on any one prior conception of reality as a whole. Since man is closer to us than any other part of the universe, we may properly observe and judge him directly, with a good chance that our findings with respect to him may have an important influence on our understanding of the universe in which he emerges. The point can be made most easily with reference to man's activities as knower, as purposive doer, and as morally responsible self.

In knowing, first, we perceive all sorts of physical objects—shoes and ships, and cabbages and kings—that seem to fill spaces around us, and impinge on our various sense organs. At first sight, this kind of knowing may seem to be not essentially different from, say, technicolor movie photography with sound recording, in which a stream of physical events is similarly caught and reproduced by sensitive machinery. Man the knower would then be simply a more subtle machine, of one piece with his physical environment and as entirely determined by it as a camera film and sound track by the light and sound waves that strike its surfaces. But on further inspection, unlikenesses come to light which have not proved easy to dismiss as unessential. For one thing, though a camera film is light-sensitive, or susceptible to change when light strikes it, we have no clear reason to suppose that either the film or the camera is *sentient*, that is, aware of either the light or the changes it makes in the film. A man's retina, like camera film, is sensitive to light, his ear to sound-waves, and so on; and in addition, he himself is sentient or conscious. He *feels* colors, sounds, odors; he feels pleasure and pain along with them; and he feels the ebb and flow of his own consciousness of all these. Such feeling or awareness is a kind of fact different from mere sensitivity, or susceptibility to change. Whether cameras, trees, or mi-

crobes have it we do not know. At any rate, men do; and they cannot, therefore, without gross error, be treated as if they were unconscious automata. Mention of error points to a second difference between men and sensitive machines. Not only do men feel colors and sounds, but they refer these to things outside themselves, at various distances from millimeters to millions of light-years. This conscious reference or judgment again is different from what a mirror or a camera might do. A mirror can reflect a star as a pin-point of light. It cannot, presumably, refer that light to a body called Betelgeuse, a third larger in diameter than the earth's orbit, and nearly six hundred light-years away. This the astronomer does, and what he does on so large a scale we all do on a smaller one, every time we judge that moonlight comes from a body bigger than a dinner plate and beyond our reach, or that red color and winy fragrance come from an apple six inches away. Without this power of reference or judgment we might feel colors, pains, and so on, but we could not *know* things outside ourselves. Neither could we fall into error, by referring a color or sound to a thing from which it does not come, or a thing to a location that it does not occupy. A camera cannot make such mistakes. It simply records whatever light strikes its film, and the outcome is automatically an accurate resultant of the physical conditions of the exposure. But when the man using a camera correctly judges light, speed, distance, and so on, his correct judging is not an automatically correct response. It is an achievement in the face of difficulties, an avoidance or a conquest of possible errors. Man as knower, capable of judging correctly or incorrectly of things outside himself, has thus a sort of detachment from his immediate physical environment that a mirror or a camera does not have.

This detachment shows up in another way when a man remembers the past or predicts the future. A machine reacts only to what is physically present here and now: this present ray of light, wave of heat, push or pull. The after-effects of past impacts are, no doubt, among the present conditions that determine what the machine now does; but there is no reason to suppose that the machine refers these after-effects to an event in the past. An exposed kodak film, for example, bears the marks of light-rays now past, and will react to a fresh exposure differently on that account. But there is no reason to suppose the film or the kodak refers its present condition to a past event. A man does just this. The past is not physically present for him, any more than it is for the kodak. Yet when he looks at the snapshot that is now present to him, he refers it to a time in last summer's vacation when the picture was taken. In similar fashion, by referring toward the future certain words or other images now present, he can anticipate next summer's vacation, next week's pay-day, or his next meal. Man is not so enmeshed in the physical present that he can react only to that. By taking some parts of what is present as symbols or signs of what is absent, he reacts also, in the way of reference or judgment, to what is remote in space or in time.

This is possible partly because of another factor in his knowing: his ability to form and use generalized symbols, such as words and ideas, which can refer not merely to one particular thing or event, but to many. In the skill with which he uses such general ideas, or concepts, and not in the sensitiveness of his sense organs, lies the chief ground of difference between the advanced human thinker and the child

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or the animal as knower. Any small boy can see and feel vividly a falling apple. But to see its fall as an event like the swing of a planet or the movement of the tides required the mind of Newton, trained to free itself from thinking of a single body in particular, and to think instead of any and all bodies that move according to "the law of inverse squares." This "law" was a general idea which Newton had derived from Kepler's likewise generalized account of the relation between the respective distances of the six known planets from the sun and the times required for them to make the circuit of their respective orbits. This account, in turn, rested on a whole system of other general ideas, built up by scores of men from the days of the earliest Greek geometers, and applicable to an indefinitely great number and variety of physical events. Man as knower, in short, uses not merely sense percepts and images of particular things, present or absent, but also generalized concepts whose range of reference is not limited to any segment of time or space, however great. In this sense, also, man is partly detached from his immediate environment, and able to judge it in comparison with something other than actual present facts.

With this semi-detachment of man as knower go also his modes of behavior as purposive doer and as moral self. In knowing his environment, he tries to see it as it is. In purposive practical action, he tries to change it (or himself) to accord better with his desires. Into such activity, thinking, planning, and prediction all enter. But, besides these, another sort of judgment and comparison enters also: disparagement of what now exists in comparison with what one would prefer, or what for some reason would be "better." When man thus affirms preference for a different state of affairs, as yet only conceived or imagined, and sets about bringing it to realization, he asserts in what we often call acts of will his characteristic detachment: his ability to act over against his present environment, and even against the results of his own past acts, now present in him as habits which he desires to change.

In such preferential judgment and purposive action, finally, man comes to recognize demands of a kind that differ from matters of fact, from physical laws of nature, and even from human desires or preferences. These demands are what we have in mind when we say, "I ought," or "We ought not." They make their appeal, as we remarked in the first chapter, not primarily to man's sense organs nor to his simpler cravings, but to his deep-seated need to become a more fully adequate person, in give and take with other persons and with a moral order of the world that lays claims upon every human person and group. These are vague terms, not easy to clarify and pin down to precise meanings. One of the main tasks on which philosophy today is engaged, in fact, is an attempt at such analysis of "good," "ought," and "right." But whatever account may be given of the nature of moral obligation or oughtness, no serious thinker today questions its reality in some sense, and its importance for the understanding of human nature. Man is neither a mere automatic machine nor a capriciously free agent. He is a responsible person, obligated at times to act in opposition both to existing environmental conditions and to his own immediate desires. In thus doing his duty—what is due or owed, what he "ought"—he achieves his own proper being, as human person.

At all these several points, each person is unique. As knower, each sees the world in a perspective that no one else

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can have. He occupies his own location in time and space. He alone experiences just the colors, sounds, and odors, the pleasures and pains, the bodily states and movements that are his. His general ideas, even, come to him in a different order and with different associations from those that they have for his neighbors, so that a considerable effort is required to agree upon assured common ground. And when agreement is reached, each observer still sees it from his own angle, though his power of generalization enables him to conceive and acknowledge the validity of other points of view, and the essential unity of that toward which they all look. As purposive agent, he acts in the light of desires, preferences, and goals which more obviously than any other set of characteristics mark him as an individual. Even his responsibilities differ in detail from those of every other person. His duty is not to copy a general model, nor to imitate another person, but to be fully himself, and as such to respond to other persons and make his special contribution to the common life. When philosophy sees man in these terms, it brings into clear focus the individuality of each man, woman, and child as unique self.

In thus emphasizing man's relative freedom within his environment, it is important to avoid any hint that he is separable from it. Without its perpetual support he could not exist for a moment. When he succeeds in understanding or in changing it, his success comes through discovery of its ways and co-operation with them. And when he makes mistakes in judgment and failures in action, its priority is effectively reaffirmed. With all his power and freedom, man is dependent on a reality far greater than he. Like a child, he has much to learn, and is by no means master of his fate. On the other hand, the nature of that reality is itself defined in part by the fact that it has brought man to birth, sustains him, and to an impressive degree supports his efforts at understanding and purposive action. In it man appears to be not an orphan, but a child at home. He and his world belong together.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIONS SAY, "A SERVANT OF SUPERIOR VALUES AND POWERS"

The special genius of religion makes its view of man concrete, personal, and practical, rather than abstract or theoretic. The sciences and philosophies seek to look at man from the outside, and to pass generalized, objective judgments about him. The religions have their place among the inner springs of his action, and seek to redirect his life as a person, with reference to realities superior to himself.

From its dim beginnings until now, religion has recognized two sorts of reality toward which man's life must be oriented: power and right. In primitive religion the former is by far the more prominent. Man feels himself surrounded by mysterious *forces* with which he must come to terms. Some of them are hostile, and must be shunned, warded off, or pacified. But some are friendly, being akin to him and his fellows, and with these friendly powers he can come into union so intimate that their strength enters his body and nerves him to more vigorous life. At the same time, it is necessary that such communion be sought in accordance with time-honored customs, which define what conduct toward the unseen allies is *right*. This last feature, the demand for right behavior toward the god, is connected from the beginning with right behavior toward the human group; and as religion becomes more advanced, the stress laid upon right conduct and the distinctively moral character of the demand for it steadily grow. The gods of advanced religion are not merely strong but good, not merely mysterious but just and merciful. So far, indeed, has this tendency to emphasize value progressed that, in some modern religions, values have displaced divine powers and have become the only objects of religious devotion, other than humanity itself.

Without spending time on other religions than those which today exercise a major influence in the West, we shall examine in turn types of religion in which higher values, higher powers, and a God at once mighty in power and perfect in goodness, are believed in and worshiped.

These last terms need brief notice. Worship as here understood is an experience in which man finds himself confronted by Reality so great or so good, or both, that he stands in awe of it; yet Reality with which, through some mediation, he feels himself reconciled, or brought into communion, and to which he commits his life without misgiving. From the first stage of such experience to the last, faith is involved: belief in the real presence of the Other, trust in its power and goodness, and self-devotion to its service. The normal issue of such devotion is in active work, guided by the insight that worship brings. Worship and work then together make up religious living.

Through such experience, man comes to find himself in a perspective different from any that can be attained in other

ways. Its determining factor is supreme self-devotion or loyalty to something taken as overwhelmingly superior to oneself.

1. *Humanism as religion calls for devotion to humanity and to values that have abiding worth, but not to any divine being that has power. It views each man as himself of high worth, and capable of perfecting his life through intelligence and kindness.*

Here is one sort of highly advanced religion. In principle it is not new, for early Buddhism and Confucianism held convictions not unlike these, and in the West also humanism in various forms has appeared and re-appeared. In detail, its present form is determined largely by the present state of scientific thought. Thus, with respect to man it holds the now familiar evolutionary view, lighted up by a confident optimism. Man who has come so far in wisdom and decency may be expected to go much further, as the habit of intelligent self-discipline grows upon him, and his methods of attaining and applying knowledge are improved. This conviction was put into a phrase current in humanist circles some years ago: "the sufficiency and perfectibility of man."

For humanism there is no God. Man's belief in gods, like his other physical and mental features, has a history, and one who understands the history of this particular belief will see that all its positive values are grounded in man. Religion is first and last an expression of fellowship and aspiration by a human group. The values which it seeks to realize—oneness with kindred beings, liberation from fear and guilt, devotion to the common welfare, and so on—depend not on a super-human deity, but on human growth in social living. Moreover, they can be realized more fully when the confusing personification of them into a supposed God outside of man is outgrown. Mankind is its own god—the only god there is. Religion is devotion to those ideal goals that have arisen in the midst of human struggle, not come by miraculous revelation from heaven. The way to human betterment is education; the goal a glorified humanity and a beautified earth. Individual intelligence and kindness will assure social progress to this goal.

The virtues of this mode of thought are too obvious to need listing. Such ethical religion is humane, and its vision a noble one. In a world which gives so much ground for disparagement of man and his ideals, it is good to have a continual reaffirmation of faith in both, among men and women of high intelligence and vigorous idealism. It is among such men and women that humanism has always had its rebirths, and without them humanity would be worse off than it is.

But the shortcomings of humanism as a religion are likewise familiar. It tends strongly toward sentimentality about man. The particular sort of optimism that evolutionary doctrine once seemed to warrant, before the World War and the new age of savagery, has been discredited by the brutal logic of events. Instead of assured progress in wisdom and decency, man faces the ever-present possibility of swift relapse not merely to animalism but into such calculated cruelty as no other animal can practise. Men freed from belief in God, it appears, are likely under severe pressure to behave less like supermen than like subhuman devils. For such devilry, humanism is naturally not to be held responsible. Every humanist, like every civilized person in his right

mind, is revolted by it and seeks to help put an end to it. The point is that his way of trying to end it relies on something which there is all too good reason to doubt: man's ability to rise by his own efforts alone.

When man worships ideals without power, he takes on himself the sole responsibility for realizing them. But he has always found that rôle discouragingly difficult, chiefly because of—himself. Each man is an aspiring animal, as we have urged; but an animal he is, compelled to struggle for his existence, and not strong enough, secure enough, nor good enough to establish justice and mercy even in his own personal behavior, to say nothing of the world at large. He needs to have his own stumbling efforts powerfully upheld by forces greater than his own. Ideals are not enough.

This need for reinforcement has found in our time, as often in the past, a ready answer in collectivisms that revive many features of primitive religion.

2. *Cults of nation, race, or class demand supreme loyalty to a particular human group, personified in a leader who is exalted to the godlike status of a folk-hero. Each individual follower finds his significance solely as a devoted member of the group, and may be sacrificed at any time by the leader's decree.*

Today the outstanding cases of such relapse into tribal behavior patterns are fascism, especially in its German form, and Russian communism. There is no intention here of slighting their differences, which have been noticed in an earlier chapter. There is no intention, further, of denying the measure of economic and political skill displayed in the methods of each, though grave doubts of the soundness of these methods are in place. The primary point here is that in the appeal which both fascism and militant communism make to blind group loyalties and "the leader principle," they are reviving and crudely exploiting the archaic herd-emotions in which primitive religion largely consists, and which more advanced religions have sought to purge and redirect.

The strength of these emotions is one of the most portentous facts about man. He craves with a fierce hunger to be upheld and reassured by the companionship of power not his own. This power he may find naively within the circle of his tribe and its more-than-man-sized heroes, totems, or other domestic gods. Or he may learn, through painful experience, that such power must be sought beyond the bounds of tribe, nation, and all that is human, in some Being that pervades and transcends the whole world of which he is aware.

The tendency thus to look for a God of the universe is discernible even in early religion, among the more visionary members of primitive societies. It becomes a dominant tendency only in more advanced cultures, when primitive group solidarity has given place to a complex social diversity, and contact with alien cultures has helped widen the primitive horizon of thought. But what religion thus gains in scope and clarity, it may lose in intensity. A God of the universe may easily seem less near at hand than the living Spirit of one's own tribe. Moreover, as critical thinking about the universe advances, first the practical effectiveness and then the very existence of this more remote God may be questioned. When this happens, man finds himself alone with his ideals, in a universe from which friendly Power has

faded out. Some men, like our modern humanists, will accept that outcome and stand by their ideals. But most men will not—at least not yet. Most men, when subjected to the punishing stress of extreme hardship, will revert to the comforting power-cult of tribal solidarity. Like strong drink, the old emotions well through men's veins once more, and they are warmed against the chill of critical thought and bloodless ideals. The upsurge of such tribal solidarity, flowing now in the channels of nation, race, or class, is sweeping in a tide through our disillusioned world.

Its strength and persuasiveness no one with his eyes open will question. It has temporarily revitalized tired millions who had lost the sense of belonging in a powerful, friendly current of life. It has brought new self-respect and hope, for the moment, to beaten victims of oppression: to the propertyless workers of Russia, to the vanquished, ruined middle class of Germany. For many it has become a devouring flood of loyalty that neither sees nor wants any other god than the proletariat or the German folk.

But in this very strength are forces that make for its own destruction. As other religions have learned by long, costly experience, the fanatic mind closed hard against every one outside its own group is certain to provoke outsiders, even moderate people, to retaliation, which in the modern world can be very formidable. More than that, fanatic minds sooner or later turn against one another inside the deified group itself. Inquisitions and blood purges find their victims not only among outsiders but among fellow-enthusiasts, when inevitable differences assert themselves. Roehm and Zinoviev have gone the way of Robespierre and Danton; Goebbels and Goering, Stalin and Trotsky eye one another angrily; and the end is not yet. Most inexorably of all, fanatic minds collide with a deep-seated order of reality—natural, social, moral—which spells bankruptcy and failure for those too headstrong to acknowledge its demands. The economic realities of food-supply and labor power obey no dictator's wishes, and human nature itself rises up in revolt against irresponsible force too long unrelieved. The day for naked power-worship has gone by, if indeed it ever dawned.

3. *In Judaism and Christianity, human craving is directed toward one supreme God, in whom sovereign power and perfect goodness are united. Man, in their view, is a creature and in some sense a child of God, to whom he owes ultimate devotion and whom he can trust without reserve.*

It was a Hebrew psalmist who posed for us in its religious form the question, "What is man?" The eighth Psalm begins and ends with acknowledgment of the supremacy of God, whose glory is above the heavens and whose name is over all the earth. What then is man, that such a God should care for him, and show him favor above all other earthly creatures?

The answer of Hebrew and Jewish religion is the outcome of a long, hard growth from the crude polytheism of desert nomads to a monotheism as clear and high as men have ever known. The answer is that God has made man "in his own image," alone among earthly creatures in ability to hear and obey God's commands voluntarily. Other creatures obey of necessity. The seasons come and go, the winds rise and die away, the ocean roars but keeps its appointed place, the

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plants and animals thrive each after its kind. Man alone obeys freely, and can disobey if he will. His relation with God is a personal-covenant relationship, which depends upon mutual trust. God never fails to keep his part of the covenant. But man fails again and again, even though the law has been made plain to him through inspired law-givers and prophetic interpreters. Hence, man brings on himself again and again punishment at the hands of a just and mighty God, who is supreme Ruler of the universe.

But God is not merely just. He is also merciful. "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him. For he knoweth our frame; he remembereth that we are dust." The mercy of God is not an easy-going indulgence, and man his child is not a pampered darling. God's mercy is never divorced from his justice. His mercy is extended first to the down-trodden among men. Their oppressors—"the proud," "the mighty"—confront first his inexorable justice, which uses the forces of nature and the armies of foreign nations to bring down the mighty from their seats. Yet even for the poor, more than outward poverty is needed to insure the favor of God. Inward repentance and whole-hearted love are what he requires of poor and rich alike. And if the wicked should forsake his way of oppression, and turn to the Lord with "a broken and a contrite heart," he too will find mercy and pardon.

This need not mean prosperity. All too often, this world being what it is, the wicked flourish here and the righteous suffer. Indeed, one of the choicest minds among the Hebrew prophets, the unknown author of Isaiah 40-66, declared that the chosen Servant of the Lord—perhaps the faithful remnant of Israel in exile?—must suffer for the sins of other men, and in that very suffering performs his task as Servant of God, through whom others are made righteous. In any event, the hope of the faithful is in God, not man, and that hope brings an inward peace that is proof against any earthly misfortune. Such hope, moreover, will some day be justified even on earth. For God reigns, and in his own good time he will crush his people's enemies, and establish a new age of justice on the earth.

The characteristic emphasis in Hebrew and Jewish faith is less on the individual than on the people as a social body. Both sin and righteousness, suffering and prosperity, are thought of as affecting the group, not merely this or that person in it. For better, for worse, human life is corporate life. Men suffer for one another's wrongdoing, and profit by one another's kindness and endurance. Men are destroyed or saved together, not one by one. The Jewish people, moreover, has lived this faith through twenty-six hundred years of fiery trial. No other human family has been subjected in the same degree and for so long to persecution *as a people*, nor displayed such indestructible solidarity in the face of it. Individual Jews may be raised up or destroyed. The Jewish people's faith in God and his righteousness has outlived disaster at the hands of pagans and professed Christians alike.


Such tenacity depends in part on the kind of deep-rooted folk psychology that all collectivism exploits. But in Judaism the perspective is radically different from that of all secularism, ancient or modern. Such collectivism exalts the human group itself, as we have seen, into the supreme place, and uses every means to inflame its members to aggression, physical and mental. Judaism worships a God high above all things human, whose law is love toward God and man. Neither Babylon, Greece, nor Rome could induce the Jews to bow down before man-made gods, and there is no sign as yet that modern paganism will be more successful. It is significant that the Jewish people have learned to find their chief satisfactions not in political domination over other peoples, but in the sort of enterprise—commercial, intellectual, artistic—from which all peoples may profit. The tough moral fiber which marked the Jews in the old Roman Empire has outlasted many empires. It was and is one expression of faith in the God before whom "the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are accounted as the small dust of the balance."

In this strong, moral, deeply rooted faith, Christianity was born. As it grew, all the main currents of life in the Mediterranean world contributed to it—Hellenistic thought, Oriental mystery cults, Roman discipline. But its backbone was Hebrew monotheism and morale, come to a vital new embodiment in Jesus of Nazareth. In him plain men and women were convinced that they had seen the chosen Servant and Son of God, and this belief swiftly grew into the conviction that in him men had in truth seen God face to face.

We are not concerned here with the whole fabric of Christianity, but simply with its understanding of man. As at other points, so here it sets out from the Jewish view. Man is a creature, made "according to the image of God," who has misused his high privilege and plunged wilfully into sin against his Maker. From this point, the Christian understanding of man goes beyond that of Judaism on two paradoxically opposite lines, one more deeply pessimistic than any that another religion in the West has tried, the other breath-taking in its optimism for man. Sometimes these opposing strains have been separated, in the history of Christendom, and world-hatred or complacency has been for a time the result. But in the main stream of Christianity, in which one-sided sects or passing fashions have again and again had to find correction, the two strains go together in a powerful counterpoint of desperation and hope. Man's plight, says the Christian analysis, is far worse than most men dare let themselves realize; yet, says Christian faith, the power and love of the God they have slighted will save men from living death into a new plane of life.

Consider first the Christian analysis of man's plight. It is not a cool, detached onlooker's summary, but the distillation of insights gained at first hand, during nineteen centuries and more, by men and women immersed in the struggle to find and be themselves. Such men and women have found the struggle very often a long succession of defeats. The trouble sometimes is that they have set their hearts on achieving particular goals, and then cannot reach them, because some natural or social hindrance is in the way. Sometimes they reach the goals, and then find that these were not worth the cost. Sometimes they cannot even get their desires focused clearly on any goal, but live in continual inner tur-

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moil and self-defeat. Cleverness does not help much, when the situation is really serious. In fact, it often makes a bad matter worse, by promoting shallow self-confidence and a taste for quack remedies. Good intentions are not enough, nor hard work, nor "will power," nor even intelligence and moral devotion of a high order. Schopenhauer's devastating analysis of the futility of education and all cultural refinement as a safeguard against inner frustration is in principle as true now as when he wrote it. Current history is driving home his theory with the hammer blows of fact. Current psychology is helping us to see why intellectual and moral education does not get to the root of the trouble, and how profoundly man needs to be made over. But all these insights are new variations on a very old theme, which St. Paul set out clearly in the seventh chapter of his letter to the Romans, and which has been central in Christianity ever since.

The trouble with man is centered in his feelings and desires, far down beyond the range of conscious thought and will. A man is as he *loves*. He identifies himself, as we say, with what he loves most. "Where a man's treasure is, there is his heart also." If, then, he loves the wrong things most, or loves the right things in the wrong way, or loves nothing very much, frustration is inevitable. But a man cannot decide for himself what he shall love, and how much. He may see clearly that a particular craving cannot be indulged without grave damage to himself, or to others for whom he cares, and yet be unable to rid himself of the conflict which this divided loyalty forces on him, until it has poisoned his life for him. "Oh, wretched man that I am!" wrote St. Paul, "who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

Man, says the Christian thought which has grown out of such experience, is the victim of his own spoiled nature, which has become self-corrupted into a mass of misdirected cravings. Once risen above the level of animal innocence, man as a morally responsible person has taken his fate into his own hands, and has proved himself unfit for the privilege of freedom. Instead of rising steadily from the animal nature from which he set out, he has mired himself in a "second nature" of individual habits and social customs that hobbles him at every step. And that impediment is not, like a physical obstacle, something outside him, but because he is through and through a social being, it is within him as well as outside. This pervasive "second nature" of acquired depravity corrupts the springs of his personal conduct, until it is impossible to say that any part of him is free from its influence. Though still free to think, plan, and choose as other animals are not, he cannot of himself choose as he ought. For him the law is: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and strength and thy neighbor as thyself." Only on these terms—by emerging from the eddies of self-centered effort into the main stream of a communal reality—can one find that fullness of life which every sane person wants. But the fact is that man cannot, by willing it, fulfil this law. For all that he can do, he is condemned to the living death of perennial failure.

The pessimism of historic Christianity at this point stands in the sharpest contrast to the buoyancy of humanism, and even to that serene Jewish piety whose "delight is in the law of the Lord" and which is confident that man can live by it if he will. Indeed, some Christian thinkers have painted man so black that not only modern liberals but

medieval monks have revolted from their exaggerated gloom. There is no need to exaggerate. Nor is there any need to leave the firm ground of experience and the familiar atmosphere of modern thought to see what the Christian analysis of man's plight has in view. It has its eyes on man the animal as we know him in business, in politics, and in war; in the hypocrisies of home and school and church, and all polite society; in the secret lusts and hates of his most private imaginings, and in the waking nightmares of his madness when these lusts and hates come out frankly, inside hospital cells or in lynchings and pogroms. Who indeed shall deliver man, ourselves and our fellow-animals, from the body of this death?

Not high ideals and moral discourses. Not common sense, nor science, nor philosophy. They can all help, but not enough. And above all, not the cults of race or class that sanctify hatred and lust, seeking to free man from conscience and the claims of *right* by handing him over to the whirlwinds of raw *power*. Man is an animal, predatory, deceitful, cruel. But he is no less incurably a social, responsible, aspiring animal, who can no more rid himself of conscience than of his memory or his powers of speech, without ceasing to be a man. If he could, his life would be far simpler.

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain'd,

I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,

They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,

They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God. . . .

No, horses and cattle do not. And Whitman was not the first man nor the last to wish he could be "so placid and self-contain'd." But in his very wishing and self-judging he was in a different order of existence from the beasts. Cattle do not wish to be, nor judge that they ought to be, otherwise than as they are. Men do, and no way except drugging has been found to stop them. Moreover, drugs wear off. Human nerves can stand just so much marching and shouting and regimented cruelty. Then comes nausea, and the cold, drab light in which men temporarily gone animal have to face once more the fact that they are still men, with the problem of being human still unsolved.

It is in this sense that Christian thinkers today are saying: Man is himself the question, "What is man?" It is not primarily a theoretical question at all, but a fearfully urgent, practical one: *What must I be and do, to be human?*

The answer is not: Go on as you are. That would be merely repeating the question over and over, as though a jangling discord were sounded again and again, without being resolved into a harmony. The answer is not in man by himself, at all, but only in man saved by the power and goodness of God.

Here Christian faith brings its positive hope to bear on the otherwise disheartening fact of human self-contradiction and failure. If man cannot love God and his neighbor as he ought, and if his full realization of himself as human person depends upon such love to widen and deepen his being to its full dimensions, then plainly his only hope is that God in some sense loves *him* powerfully enough to quicken and guide his love in return.

Just this is the affirmation of Christian faith. "God so

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loved the world that he gave his only Son. . . ." "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself." The language is necessarily symbolic, the language of myth. Nobody knows what it can mean literally for God, the Creator and Lord of a universe measured in light-years, to have an "only Son" on the earth, in whom God has himself come in human form to save men from themselves. But though the language has to be that of myth, it gives expression to a faith that has thrived on suffering and has rallied men time after time through dark centuries of struggle. Somehow it is the fact that, with the coming of Jesus, whom his followers called Messiah or Christ, a new regenerative energy was liberated among men that has made headway against seemingly overwhelming obstacles, bettered millions of individual lives, and dredged deep channels through the course of human history. This energy has found its vehicles in all sorts of institutions, of which the organized Church in all its branches is one—historically the most distinctive one. But no institution has been able to contain, nor to repress, this power—call it the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, or any other name—which works upon and within men to make whole-hearted love toward God and their neighbors dominant in their living. It is this dynamic factor, and not merely ideals or values as such, that has made strong, wilful men, often in spite of themselves, find their own fullest self-realization as Paul did, or Bernard, or Luther, in surrender to the demand for such impossible self-devotion. This is not to say that men were not saved before Jesus emerged in human history. It is to say—and history itself bears witness—that never before was the impact of this saving or regenerative power made manifest with such effect as it has had since that turning-point in human life was reached.

Trust in this power as the power of God, centrally revealed in and through Jesus Christ, is Christian faith. And this is the ground of Christian hope, which transcends the most drastic pessimism concerning man. The Christian has unquenchable hope for man because he believes in God, as Creator, Father, and Savior.

Faith and hope are not knowledge of any sort that can be proved by argument. They are practical attitudes or ways of living, active commitments that can be tested only in life. The Christian understanding of man as creature, sinner, and still cherished child of God, can be neither proved true nor proved false as a theorem is proved or disproved. It can only be tried or not tried, by men and women engaged in the life-and-death effort to be fully human persons. It can and ought, needless to say, be subjected to criticism of all sorts, from all sides, without ceasing. Blind faith, irresponsible hope, are offenses against the spirit of truth. But when all is said, there remains in religious affirmation a basic venture, a risk, that cannot be escaped.

With its eyes wide open, and with Jesus Christ in mind, Christian faith makes a staggering affirmation about man: "Beloved, now are we sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. But we know that when he is made manifest, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." Certain of the ideas which these words conveyed to the generation that wrote them are surely wrong, and the language as a whole must be reinterpreted in every new age. But one thing is sure. The Christian understanding of man, with its relentless pessimism and its exultant faith, is no ordinary

utopian dream, for it sees man not merely rehoused and re-educated, but remade. It does not crudely glorify man, but it sees him, even in the depths of his sin, as never for a moment alone but always with God, in whose unseen presence he lives and moves, and has his being. If there be any ground of hope for man the animal, it must be because something like this is true.

CHAPTER V

TOWARD SELF-KNOWLEDGE

One final word and we are through. We have glanced along four main roads by which men seek an answer to the question, "What is man?" Two of them are theoretic roads, by way of the sciences and the philosophies. Two are practical roads, through common sense and through religion. Life begins and ends in practice, not in theory. But theory provides the clearest light by which practice can become aware of its ends, and find its way. Each needs the other.

What is more, each mode of theory and each mode of practice here examined makes its distinctive contribution toward our self-knowledge. None of the four can be left out without impoverishing all the rest. And none need be left out. One form of philosophy may contradict another, one religion may conflict with another; but philosophy as such does not conflict with religion as such, nor religion with philosophy. Again some forms of religion, but not all, are incompatible with the temper and findings of some of the sciences, or with some types of philosophy. One who cares to keep his intellectual house in order will not try to mix those types which are mutually contradictory. But there is room in every man's life and thought about himself for all four major ways of approach to self-knowledge, in some significant combination.

Common-sense experience is the everyday earth on which we must walk, and the everyday air we must breathe. No scientific or philosophic subtlety, no religious devotion, can take its place; and any of these cut off from common sense will speedily lose its significance for actual human living.

The sciences provide the specialized information we need if our self-knowledge is ever to go beyond the stage of rough impressions. There is little danger that their importance will be slighted by any one who has once recognized it clearly, but in our day there is real danger for the sciences from two quarters. One is the studied effort of political dictators to suppress those findings about man that do not fit their racial or class dogmas, and to turn scientists from dispassionate inquiry to partisan propaganda. The other is the impatience of hard-pressed men of affairs, and embattled men of religious faith, over the tantalizing detachment of the genuine sciences and the present inconclusiveness of many of their findings. This is understandable, but gravely mistaken. Against every effort to coerce or to belittle the scientific study of mankind, all who really want to know what man is and what he can be must stand everlastingly on guard.

Yet the insufficiency of scientific knowledge by itself must be affirmed, and wise scientists are the first to affirm it. The sciences deal with classes or types, not with what makes an individual unique. Their view is necessarily objective, or external, whereas each living man has an essential inner side to his life which differs from the outer, observable one.

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Their province is the region of fact, especially measurable fact, whereas human life finds its meaning largely in terms of values that none of the sciences can handle in a distinctively scientific way. We need, and shall always need, their contribution, but we can never live by science alone.

Philosophy cannot take the place of the sciences, and, excepting the more dogmatic totalitarian theories, it no longer tries to do so. Its task, as we have seen, is different: to help man piece together in larger patterns the findings of the sciences, of common sense, and of religious experience; and to evaluate all these in critical and systematic ways. If any one be tempted to suppose he can get on without philosophy, it is worth while for him to remember—as has often been remarked—that what he will get thus is simply bad philosophy, or pseudo-philosophic dogma. The clear-headed person will prefer to do his philosophizing with his eyes open, in order that he may both make the most of its special contribution toward his understanding of himself, and recognize clearly its limits. Philosophy is theory, not practice; and if he is wise, he will not expect it to become his life.

Religion, finally, is a man's life in so far as it is defined by his supreme loyalty or devotion. This is, like common-sense experience and unlike the sciences and philosophies, a way in which one can actually live. It is not difficult, indeed, to define religion so inclusively as to take in all the other three modes of life and thought. Perhaps that is the way it should be defined: the whole life of man, critically and consciously oriented toward his god. However that be, the distinctive mode of life we have been calling religious should not be divorced from common sense, the sciences, or philosophy. In isolation from these it becomes fanaticism or rapt dreaming. In association with them all, it can be a wellspring of power for good.

No man will ever know himself fully, so far as we can judge now. He knows himself best who has explored most fully all these roads. But with every major advance on one of them, the meanings of all the others are set in a new light, and no end is as yet even imaginable. If we are persuaded, with most of those who know something of the evidence, that the present scientific understanding of man is on the right track, we shall accept without misgiving our status as evolving animals. If we share the Christian faith, we shall see ourselves and all men also as groping sons of God. In either case, it remains necessary to add: "and it doth not yet appear what we shall be."

SAMUEL M. THOMPSON

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
MONMOUTH COLLEGE

A Modern Philosophy of Religion

WHAT IS RELIGION?

Religion is one of the more flexible words of our language. Different people use it with different meanings and for different purposes, and the same person often uses it differently on different occasions. Its popular meaning is so loose that few would think of using the word in a serious discussion without trying to specify the meaning intended. So at the beginning of our discussion of religion and the philosophy of religion we shall have to look carefully into the question of what *religion* means.

It may be well first to try to clear up a common misunderstanding. People who seek precision and clarity in their thinking are likely to distrust such words as *religion*. They prefer, so far as possible, to use clearly defined technical terms. The ideal, some of them think, is a separate word for each distinguishable meaning. This, however, has a serious drawback. It ignores the fact that although different meanings may be distinguishable they need not be separate. We may say of a man, for example, that "business is his religion." This use of *religion* is so different from its usual or primary meaning that we recognize the word here to be a metaphor. Yet for the metaphor to be effective there must be some relation between the meaning of the term in this statement and its primary meaning. If we think about what we mean when we say of a man that "business is his religion" we may have some new light on the meaning of *religion*.

The fact is that any word which takes us close to real things and events is almost sure to acquire variations in its meanings. For the things it takes us to are not experienced in isolation; they are experienced in relation to other things, and each different relation may add something new to the sense of the word. A word acquires fixity of meaning only as it becomes a technical or abstract term, only as we learn to think its meaning in isolation from other things. Abstraction is necessary and useful for certain purposes; but abstractions are products of thinking and inquiry, not the material with which thinking begins.

In our attempt to come to some understanding of what we mean by *religion* it may be well to look first at what seems to be common to all its various meanings. In other words, what do we mean by *religion* in its most general sense? If we reflect for a moment we shall see that in its broadest sense *to be religious is to be sci-*

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ous. This does not mean *serious* in any negative way, such as *unhappy*. It means rather that we have a concern about something, we are not fooling, we are not flippant, we are not jesting. It means, further, a concern with something we consider important; we attend to it because of its importance and we give to it the degree of consideration its importance deserves.

It is difficult to imagine a person who is serious about nothing. We should suspect one who took the trouble to proclaim such an attitude to be serious at least about not being serious. Just as ordinary waking attention requires that we concentrate our awareness on some things to the exclusion of others so, in order to live and act, we have to be selective. If we live and act with any awareness of what we are doing we judge that some things are more important than others, and we willingly sacrifice the less important to the more important.

Either a man has a serious purpose or he does not act. His purposes may change, and they may be inconsistent with each other; but when he acts he has some purpose at that time. Without purpose a man does not act; he is only acted upon. He does not act; he only reacts. Professor Ralph Barton Perry's discussion of this as it applies to morals is pertinent also to religion. In his discussion of the puritan as "the moral athlete," Professor Perry examines the contention that the puritan overemphasizes moral discipline, that he "takes his game of morality too seriously," so that "he 'exaggerates' morality, as some colleges are said to exaggerate football." Critics of the puritan "who cannot compete with him, because they have only their odd hours to devote to morality, feel that the pace should be slackened. They are advocates of 'morality for all,' 'intramural' morality, morality of a more sportive and spontaneous sort."⁴

But [says Professor Perry] the force of this plea for the amateur spirit in morality is somewhat weakened by the fact that most of those who utter it believe in being professional *somewhere*. They may be professionals in athletics, and although they think that the puritan's perpetual examination of the state of his soul is in bad taste, they have no hesitation in keeping a similar diary of the state of their muscles. Or they may be men of affairs, and want morality tempered to the tired businessman, who, however, is tired because he is so exceedingly businesslike about his business. These critics also think it morbid to balance one's spiritual account, but feel an irresistible urge to balance their bank accounts. And so with the artist, who is perhaps the most contemptuous critic of the puritan. He objects strongly to moral discipline, but devotes himself with infinite patience to the mastery of his own technique.⁴

It is not a question of whether we shall be serious about something, but a question of what we shall be serious about. In Professor Perry's words, "it is not so much a question of whether one shall be strict, as where one shall be strict. One will be strict, presumably, about the more important and central things: the athlete about high hurdles, the businessman about profits, the artist about music, painting, or poetry. The difference is over the question of what is important and central."⁵

Every religious statement expresses an evaluation, and every sincere commitment to value is a religious expression. The two go together; we cannot assume a religious attitude toward something we consider inferior or worthless. But recognition of value is not enough, for there must be devotion to it. When we find religious sentiment in its maturity, Professor Allport says, we find a "disposition, built up through experience, to respond favorably, and in certain habitual ways, to conceptual objects and principles that the individual regards as of ultimate importance in his own life, and as having to do with what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things."⁶

In its broadest sense to be religious is to take toward something we regard important the attitude which is appropriate to the nature of the thing itself. In this sense are included all the meanings of *religious* from the narrowest literal meaning to all the effective metaphorical uses of the term. To be more specific than this we shall have to narrow the meaning by a more definite specification of the objects of religion's interest.

In the more specific sense, to be religious is to have the appropriate attitude toward not just anything of importance but, as Professor Allport suggests, toward something we consider to be of primary importance. A religious person, in the more specific meaning of the term, is one who has an attitude of acceptance and commitment to whatever he takes to be of ultimate value in existence. In so far as this which he takes to be of ultimate value is of ultimate value, and his attitude toward it is appropriate to it, then to that extent his religion is true. In so far as he is mistaken in his idea of what is of final worth his religion is false. It is still a religious attitude, else it could not be a false one. But if it is a religious attitude toward what does not merit such an attitude, then the religion it expresses is a false religion.

Many men, for example, have worshipped the state. They have given to the state a devotion which could be merited only by something of ultimate and final worth. In so far as this is not true of the state we must regard the religion of these men as a false religion.

Although religion concerns man's relation to man, as well as man's relation to God or to whatever it is which he considers as of ultimate importance, yet religion is an intensely personal thing. Its social expression is the expression of the individual's own internal attitudes or else, as religion, it is nothing. The individual's religion is not the internalizing of a social fact; this inverts the true relation between the individual and society in religion; or, in those cases in which this seems to be the case, it is not the individual's own religion he expresses but something he has merely borrowed. The social fabric in which religion expresses itself is woven from the attitudes and evaluations of individual persons.

On this point Professor Allport says that "the place of religion in the personal life is basically different from its place in society. The social scientist argues that the function of religion is to produce social stability. Yet no individual, I venture to assert, is religious for any such reason. Indeed, most people would discard

their religion if they thought it was merely a device to keep them out of the hands of the police and out of their neighbor's hair." "Machiavelli saw in the Church an instrument for maintaining civil peace, while his contemporary, St. Catherine of Genoa, found in it the motive and meaning for a life of exceptional charity and devotion. There is a world of difference between the ruler's view and the participant's view."⁸

The same distinction is clearly drawn by Whitehead. "Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things." He goes on to say, "This doctrine is the direct negation of the theory that religion is primarily a social fact. Social facts are of great importance to religion, because there is no such thing as absolutely independent existence. . . . But all collective emotions leave untouched the awful ultimate fact, which is the human being, consciously alone with itself, for its own sake."⁹ It is in the light of this that we should understand Whitehead's oft-quoted statement: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness."¹⁰

Religion is more than merely an attitude, if we think of an attitude simply as a state of mind. Properly understood, of course, an attitude is never a mere state of mind in complete separation from action. Attitudes are incomplete except as they are expressed in thought and action. This shows the close connection of attitude and value, for an attitude may be described as an evaluation in action. The evaluations we act out are the ones we really mean.

Religion is policy; a person's religion is that person's high policy. To the extent that he lives his religion, and does not merely talk about it, he lives in a definitely recognizable way. He deals with things in ways that fit his conception of their importance. He deals with matters of immediate moment not only as they happen to concern him at the moment but with a recognition of their final importance. If they have no such importance he treats them with the triviality they deserve, no matter how seriously others may regard them. But if they do have a bearing on things of final importance he sees this in them and does not permit himself to ignore it. To be religious is to see in the proximate a reflection of the ultimate.

Religion cannot be dismissed as a mere escape, as has so often been attempted. It is true that a religion directs attention to what it considers the basic and final factors in life and existence, but this need not mean that attention is wholly removed from our immediate concerns. Rather it leads us to view the immediate in the light of the ultimate. The fact is that irreligion is more likely than religion to be an escape, an escape from the ultimate to the immediate.

Even less than as an escape from life can religion be dismissed as mere wishful thinking. There is wishful thinking in the name of religion, to be sure, but there is wishful thinking in every activity in which man has a stake. The concerns of religion, Professor Allport points out, are far removed from those of fantasy. "What is demanded by the great religions is self-abnegation, dis-

cipline, surrender. To find one's life one must lose it. Such a transposition of values is too extensive to be covered by the formula of autism that is applied appropriately only to daydreams and to the rationalizations of daily life that are transparent in their self-centeredness. Only occasionally, I think, do we find individuals in whom religion runs its course on the level of wish-fulfilling fantasy. When this occurs we are dealing with a merely abortive religious sentiment in the individual."¹¹ Professor Allport insists that "it is unsound to trace the origin of the religious quest to the desire for escape from reality. It is true that religion tends to define reality as congenial to the powers and aspirations of the individual, but so too does any working principle that sustains human endeavor. Those who find the religious principle of life illusory would do well not to scrutinize their own working principles too closely."¹²

Religion, in the sense we have given to it, is the way in which a life comes to a focus. It reminds us, as we practice it, where we stand with all our interests and personal concerns. We see these matters in their context, in the widest and most nearly final context available to our awareness. Whatever else it may be, religious experience is at least the illumination which is given to the immediate situation by our discovery of its place in the whole range of being. This of course affects our attitude toward the immediate situation and enables us to deal with it as it truly is rather than merely as it appears at the moment—it enables us to do this, that is, in so far as our religion is true.

For example, a religious person who believes in the intrinsic value of human beings cannot treat a man or a woman or a child as a mere means to an end. However casual his dealings with them may be—the clerk at the cigar counter, the waitress in the restaurant, the boy who delivers his paper—he will show to each of them the respect due a person. He will not try to dominate or to hurt or to demonstrate any fancied superiority. In his attitude and in all his dealings with them he will show his recognition of the dignity of their existence as persons.

For those who profess belief in God there is only one true final object of religious devotion because they believe that only in God can ultimate value be found. For those who profess belief in God, religion is the service of God. Since belief in God involves the belief that the source of all existence far exceeds in value anything we can know or imagine, for those who profess such a belief the highest service to God of which they are capable is to serve the best they can imagine. "A man's religion is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and to the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs."¹³

CAN AN ATHEIST BE RELIGIOUS?

We ended our discussion of the meaning of *religion* with a reference to God. Many would take the connection for granted; indeed they would see no meaning in religion apart from God. Yet

we must recognize that there are those who deny the existence of God, who profess atheism, and yet who actually have attitudes which correspond in other respects to what we have called *religion*.

To ask whether an atheist can be religious may seem like asking whether a person can be religiously non-religious. Paradoxical as it may appear this is precisely the impression some people give. An expression of hostility to religion such as we find in the "anti-God crusade" of Soviet Russia shows all the intensity and devotedness of a religious movement. In fact any serious and sincere attack upon religion is likely itself to be a religious expression. In our general conception of the meaning of religion we found it to consist primarily of a commitment to values. A crusading atheist certainly behaves as if he considered it worth his while to promote atheism. His case, as he presents it, is that it is better to be an atheist than to believe in God. Unless he thought this, and unless his argument tacitly assumed it, the only appropriate attitude for him to take would be one of indifference.

It may be remarked in passing that even if he is wrong, and the existence of God is a fact, the crusading atheist may still be closer to the truth than the merely indifferent. For he who fights against the truth does, at least, make contact with it; and there is always the chance that in his contact he will come to see the truth for what it is. Clive Bell goes so far as to say: "All uncompromising belief is religious. A man who so cares for truth that he will go to prison, or death, rather than acknowledge a God in whose existence he does not believe, is as religious, and as much a martyr in the cause of religion, as Socrates or Jesus. He has set his criterion of values outside the physical universe."¹⁴

Students of primitive societies recognize various forms of nature worship as varieties of religion. In some of these there are no "gods" in the usual sense of the term. To consider another and very different example, the Humanism of Auguste Comte was intended to be a religion as well as a philosophy. For the saints of the church it substituted the great men of literature and philosophy and science, and for God it substituted Humanity, the "Great Being" to which it gave adoration and devotion in its forms of worship.

A more recent version of humanism is expressed in the words of a contemporary biologist, Joseph Needham. "Many . . . see that the essence of religion is the sense of the holy (Julian Huxley, J. M. Murry, Canon J. M. Wilson and others). Religion thus becomes no more and no less than the reaction of the human spirit to the facts of human destiny and the forces by which it is influenced; and natural piety, or a divination of sacredness in heroic goodness, becomes the primary religious activity."¹⁵

One of the most powerful political and cultural forces in the world today is a religion without God. Marxist Communism has its sacred writings and its inspired leaders who can do no wrong; it has rituals corresponding to confirmation, confession, repentance, and absolution. It has its paradise and its hell, its saved and its damned. It demands of its devotees the utmost loyalty and

limitless sacrifice. It appeals not to reason and science for its conception of existence—although it does adopt these words for its own use; it demands instead trust in dogma and subjection to authority. Inconsistently it denies all values except economic values and at the same time assumes, without acknowledging the assumption, that it is good to be a Marxist. And it is explicitly and vociferously atheistic.¹⁶

From these examples it would appear that some exceedingly religious persons are also atheists; and, indeed, that atheism may itself be a form of religion. It is quite possible, however, that many who call themselves *atheists* are not atheists after all; or it may be that *atheism* is yet another ambiguous word which carries different meanings for different people and in different contexts.

We must recognize also that *atheist* is often used more for the purpose of arousing an attitude than for the purpose of clarifying meanings and conveying truth. Where it carries an imputation of evil, where the avowal of atheism is in disrepute, the word is often used as a club to clout an enemy. Many use it, as they use *radical* or *communist* or *red* or *fascist* or *reactionary*, with no concern for its meaning; they are concerned only with the emotional attitudes they can guide, by its use, toward the targets of their animosity.

Atheist may have a merely relative meaning in some of its uses. Those who hold to a certain conception of God may believe that any other supposed idea of God is not an idea of God at all. He who is confident that his idea of God is the only correct and adequate one, and that any idea which differs from his is false, may easily believe that he who uses *God* with a different meaning is not referring to God at all. Relative atheism is the denial of this or that conception of God. It is in this sense that the ancient Romans called the early Christians "atheists," for the Christians did not believe in the existence of the gods recognized and worshipped in the state religion of Rome.

Absolute atheism denies that there is anything real to which the term *God* may appropriately be applied. This of course raises the question of just what usages of *God* are appropriate, and if we wish to see clearly what absolute atheism involves we must keep in mind the widest and most general meaning we can give this word. We need to consider what we must *at least* admit in our conception of God if we are to use the term so that our meaning is in any way consistent with ordinary usage. More than this we shall not attempt at this point.

Any conception of God, whatever else it may include, must regard God as really existing. A non-existing God is a contradiction in terms. A conception of God must consider God to be the primary or ultimate existent; that is to say we cannot apply the word *God* to anything which depends on something else for its existence. Finally, we mean by *God* the source of good and the final reality of value.

If God is at least this, and if by *absolute atheism* we mean the denial of this, then the absolute atheist must hold that there is no final and ultimate reality which depends solely upon itself for its own being and which is also the source of good and the reality of

value. Yet, oddly enough, if the absolute atheist considers it worth while to be an atheist he admits value; and at the same time, as an atheist, he seems to deny to value any place in the final structure of being and so in effect he seems to deny the reality of value. The only way he can avoid this inconsistency is to point out some other basis upon which the genuineness of value can be asserted. Otherwise he is advocating nihilism, and in the act of advocating it assumes that what he is doing is worth doing. He fails to see that if no basis for value remains then there is no point even in saying so. If nothing is good it cannot be good to know that nothing is good. If nothing makes any difference then it can make no difference to know that nothing makes any difference.

The atheist may object that there is no connection whatever between the admission of value and the existence of God. There are few problems in the history of thought more fundamental than this, and there have been widely different views concerning it. Nevertheless it seems that an atheist who asserts that values are real (and to regard anything as worth asserting is to assume this) is dangerously close to inconsistency. The problem which faces him is to tell us how values are real, to point out to us the position they occupy in the final structure of existence; he has to explain how they can have any place at all in the kind of real world he is willing to admit. The theist has his answer to this question, and the atheist must not be permitted to evade it.

1. *Endymion*, in *The Novels and Tales of Benjamin Disraeli* (The Bradenham Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., n. d.), Volume XII, p. 371.

2. "Strictly Personal" by Sydney J. Harris in the *Chicago Daily News*, July 31, 1952.

3. From *Puritanism and Democracy*, Copyright 1945 by Ralph Barton Perry. Published by The Vanguard Press, Inc., pp. 257-258.

4. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

5. Perry, *loc. cit.*

6. *The Individual and His Religion* by Gordon W. Allport (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 56.

7. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

8. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

9. *Religion in the Making* by Alfred North Whitehead (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 16.

10. Whitehead, *loc. cit.*

11. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

12. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

13. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

14. *Art* by Clive Bell (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, Fifth Edition, n. d.; London: Chatto and Windus, Ltd.), pp. 91-92.

15. *Time: The Refreshing River* by Joseph Needham (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948; New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 57.

16. Professor Allport denies that such movements as Humanism, Communism, and Nazism are religions capable of satisfying the mature mind. *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-69. They still may be classed among the religions, however inadequate they may be as such, provided we use the word "religion" in the inclusive sense suggested in our present discussion.

17. "Crusades," by Ernest Barker, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1948), Volume VI, p. 772.

18. *Feuer und Blut* by Ernst Jünger, quoted from *European Witness* by Stephen Spender (Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.), p. 206.

DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

- Matthew Arnold: Religion is "morality tinged with emotion."
- V.F. Calverton: "Magic and religion evolved as (a) means whereby (man) believed he was able to acquire. . .power (over his environment) and make the universe bend to his wishes." The Passing of the Gods. New York, 1934. p. 51.
- John Dewey: "Whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious." A Common Faith. New Haven, 1936. p. 24.
"The religious attitude (is) a sense of the possibilities of existence and. . .devotion to the cause of these possibilities." The Quest for Certainty. New York, 1929. p. 303.
- Ludwig Feuerbach: "Man is the beginning of religion, man is the center of religion, man is the end of religion." Tr. from Das Wesen des Christentums. Leipzig, 1904. Kap. 19.
- Sigmund Freud: "Religion is an attempt to get control over the sensory world in which we are placed, by means of the wish world, which we have developed inside us as a result of biological and psychological necessities." New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1932, Lecture 35.
"At bottom God is nothing more than an exalted father." Totem and Taboo, 1912-13.
- Harold Hoffding: "That which expresses the innermost tendency of all religions is the axiom of the conservation of values." The Philosophy of Religion. London, 1906. P. 515.
- William James: "Religion (means). . .the feelings, acts, and experience of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York, 1902. p. 31.
- Karl Marx: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feelings of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the opium of the people." Introduction to a Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, 1844.
- Immanuel Kant: "Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as divine commands." Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Chicago, 1934. p. 142.
- Salomon Reinach: "I propose to define religion as: A sum of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties." Orpheus, A History of Religions. New York, 1932. p. 3.
- Friedrich Schleiermacher: "To take everything individual as a part of the whole, everything limited as a representation of the infinite, --that is religion." Tr. from Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern. Berlin, 1799. p. 56.

"The common element in all expressions of religion (Frommigkeit) no matter how different, whereby they are distinguished from all other feelings, the permanently identical essence of religion, is that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent or, to say the same thing in other words, we are conscious of being in relation with God." Tr. from Der Chistliche Glaube. Berlin, 1861.

H.N. Weiman: "Religion is man's attempt to realize the highest good, through coming into harmonious relations with some reality greater than himself, which commands his reverence and loyal service."

Alfred North Whitehead: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness. It runs through three stages, if it evolves to its final satisfaction. It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion." Religion in the Making. New York, 1926. pp. 16-17.

THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL

Satire III ¹

"The Perils of Life in Rome"

Although distressed at the departure of my old friend, yet I commend him for determining to fix his abode at unfrequented Cumae,² and to give one citizen to the Sibyl.³ . . . while all his household was being stowed in a single carriage, he (i.e., my friend Umbricius) halted at the old triumphal arches and the wet gate of Capena.⁴ . . . "Since," said he, "there is no place in the city for honest employments, no return for industry, since to-day my means are smaller than they were yesterday, and those same means will to-morrow wear away somewhat from their scanty residue, I propose to go to the spot where Daedalus put off his wearied wings,⁵ while my hair is but recently grizzled, while my old age is but beginning and still erect, while there remains something for Lachesis⁶ to spin, and I bear myself on my own feet with no staff supporting my right hand. I must leave my country . . . ; let those remain who turn black into white, to whom it comes easy to take contracts

¹Juvenal is regarded by many as the world's greatest satiric poet. Little is known about the life of Juvenal. It is believed that he was born in Aquinum, about sixty miles southeast of Rome, around 60 A.D. His first book of satires, including Satire III, was written about 110 A.D. He may have had military experience; he did live for a while in Egypt; and in his later years he lived comfortably on a farm near Tivoli. Scholars date his death in 131 A.D.

Juvenal's third satire is a penetrating and revealing analysis of the conditions of life in Rome in the late first and early second centuries. It is not an appealing picture. It clearly indicates that whatever the reasons for the fall of Rome more than 300 years later, the decline of Rome had already begun by the late first century. Augustine in a letter to Marcellinus (see below) quotes Juvenal to make precisely this point as he defends the Christian religion from the charge that it was the cause of the fall of Rome.

The translation of Satire III reproduced here is taken from D. Iunii Iuvenalis Satirae with a Literal English Prose Translation and Notes, by John Delaware Lewis (London, 1882). Footnotes by the editors.

²Near modern Naples. See map of the voyage of Aeneas.

³Priestess of Apollo who prophesied at Cumae. The Sibylline Books foretold the destiny of Rome.

⁴The gate was under an aqueduct which leaked.

⁵I.e., Cumae.

⁶One of the three Fates; measured the thread of life.

about temples, rivers, harbours, cleansing a sewer, carrying a corpse to the funeral-pile, and to put up a man for sale These men, who were formerly horn-blowers, and constant attendants at the amphitheatres of country places, with their puffed-out cheeks well-known from town to town, now give shows of gladiators, and, when the vulgar turn up their thumbs, kill off any one you like to please the people: returned thence, they farm the public privies, and why not everything, since they are men such as Fortune raises up from obscurity to the highest summits of affairs, whenever she chooses to be sportive? What should I do in Rome? I know not how to lie; if a book is a bad one, I cannot praise it and ask for a copy; I am ignorant of the motions of the stars; I neither will nor can promise the death of a father; I never inspected the entrails of frogs; let others know how to carry to a married woman the presents and the messages of her lover--nobody shall be a thief by my aid, and therefore I am not going out in the suite of any one, as though I were maimed and a useless trunk with right hand destroyed. Who boils with hidden things which must ever be kept unrevealed? . . .

What race is now most in favour with our rich men, and what people I would particularly shun, I will hasten to tell you, nor shall shame prevent me. I cannot bear, Romans, a Greek city; and yet, how small a portion of our dregs is from Greece! Long since, Syrian Orontes has flowed into the Tiber, and has brought with it its language and manners, and with the piper the oblique chords, and the national tambourines, and the girls made to stand for hire at the circus. Hie thither, ye who have a fancy for a foreign harlot in an embroidered turban! That once rustic son of yours, Quirinus,⁷ adopts Greek slippers and wears Greek prizes of victory on his neck anointed with Ceroma. . . .

Produce at Rome a witness as virtuous as was the host of the Idaean deity;⁸ let Numa stand forth, or he who saved the trembling Minerva from the burning temple, forthwith the inquiry will be as to his property, and last of all as to his character. 'How many slaves does he keep? How many acres of land does he possess? How numerous and how large the dishes at his dinners?' In proportion to the amount of money each man keeps in his strong-box, so much belief does he obtain. Though you swear by the altars of the Samothracian⁹ and our own divinities, the poor man is supposed to contemn thunderbolts and gods, with the connivance of the gods themselves. Why add that this same poor man furnishes everybody with material and subjects for jests, if his cloak is dirty and torn, if his toga is a trifle shabby and one of his shoes shows an opening with a slit in the leather, or if more than one seam

⁷Romulus.

⁸Cybele, Phrygian goddess identified with the Asiatic Great Mother.

⁹An island in the north Aegean famous for mystic rites of the Cabiri.

exhibits the coarse and recently applied thread, where the rent has been sewn together? There is nothing which unhappy poverty has in itself harder than this, that it makes men ridiculous. 'Let him be off,' says the usher, 'if he has any shame, and rise from the cushions of the knights, whose property does not satisfy the law, . . . ' --the sons of pimps, in whatever brothel born; here let the son of the sleek crier applaud among the gladiator's dandy youths and the youths of the trainer. Such was the fancy of idle Otho,¹⁰ who made the distinction between us. Who is acceptable here as a son-in-law whose means are inferior, and who is unequal to furnishing a trousseau for the young lady? What poor man is put down for a legacy? When is he called into counsel even by the aediles? The poor among the Romans ought long ago to have emigrated in a body. Not easily do those emerge from obscurity whose noble qualities are cramped by domestic poverty: but at Rome the attempt is still harder for them; a great price must be paid for a wretched lodging, a great price for slaves' keep, a great price for a modest little dinner. A man is ashamed to dine off earthenware, which he would not think discreditable if he were suddenly transported to the Marsians and a Sabine¹¹ repast,

There is a great part of Italy, if we accept the truth, in which no one wears a toga but the dead. Whenever even the majesty of festive days is celebrated in a grassy theatre, and at length the well-known interlude reappears on the stage, when the rustic infant in its mother's lap is frightened at the gaping of the ghastly mask, there you will see an equality in dress, the orchestra-stalls and the people alike; and, as the garb of their high office, white tunics are sufficient for the highest aediles. Here splendour of dress is carried beyond people's means; here something more than is enough is occasionally taken out of another man's strong-box. This vice is common to us all; here all of us live in a state of pretentious poverty. Why detain you further? In Rome, everything costs a price. . . .

Who fears, or ever has feared, the falling of a house at cool Praeneste,¹² or at Volsinii seated among the wooded hills, or at primitive Gabii,¹³ or on the heights of sloping Tibur? We inhabit a city propped up to a great extent by thin buttresses; for in this way the steward prevents the houses from falling; and when he has plastered over the gaping of an old crack, he bids us sleep secure, with ruin overhanging us. The place to live in is where

¹⁰Roman emperor for three months, notorious in youth for his vices, often in companionship with Nero. Otho drew up a law giving special seats in the theater to the knights--men whose designation as knight was determined by their property.

¹¹Refers to some of the ancient peoples of Italy.

¹²Town in the mountains near Rome.

¹³Ancient town near Rome.

there are no fires, no nocturnal alarms. Already Ucalegon¹⁴ is calling for water, already he is removing his chattels, already your third story is smoking: you yourself know nothing about it; for if the alarm begins from the bottom of the stairs, he will be the last to burn whom the tiling alone protects from the rain, where the soft doves lay their eggs. Codrus¹⁵ had a couch too small . . . , six little jugs, the ornament of his sideboard, and a tiny drinking-cup beneath it into the bargain, and a figure of Chiron¹⁶ reclining under the same marble: a chest, old by this time, contained some Greek books, and barbarians of mice were gnawing the divine poems. Codrus had nothing: who indeed denies this? and yet the wretched man lost all that nothing: but the crowning point of his misery is, that though naked and begging for broken scraps, no one will help him with food, no one with shelter or a roof. If the great house of Asturicus¹⁷ has been destroyed, we have the matrons dishevelled, the nobles in mourning, the praetor adjourns his court; then we groan over the accidents of the town, then we detest fire. The fire is still burning, and already some one runs up to make a present of marbles, and share in the expenses of rebuilding. One will contribute nude and white statues, another some masterpiece of Euphranor or Polycletus;¹⁸ some lady will give antique ornaments of Asiatic gods, another man books and bookcases and a bust of Minerva, another a bushel of silver: Persicus¹⁹ replaces what is lost by choicer and more numerous objects, most sumptuous of childless men, and suspected with reason of having himself set fire to his own house. If you are capable of being torn away from the games of the Circus, an excellent house can be procured at Sora, or Fabrateria, or Frusino, for the same price at which you now hire a dark hole for a single year. There you have a little garden, and a shallow well, that does not require to be worked with a rope, irrigates your tender plants with easy draught. Live enamoured of your hoe, and the overseer of your own trim garden, from which you could furnish a banquet for a hundred Pythagoreans. It is something, in whatever place, in whatever retreat, to have made one's self owner of a single lizard.

¹⁴A Trojan mentioned in Vergil's description of the burning of Troy (Aeneid, II, 310-12).

¹⁵Unknown individual.

¹⁶Son of Saturn and Philyra.

¹⁷Another unknown individual, but obviously a member of the upper-class.

¹⁸Famous Greek sculptors, 4th and 5th centuries.

¹⁹Another upper-class man.

the evil counsels and evil impulses of this world. For when the empire was sinking in the vile abyss of utterly depraved manners, and of the effete ancient religion, it was signally important that heavenly authority should come to the rescue, persuading men to the practice of voluntary poverty, continence, benevolence, justice, and concord among themselves, as well as true piety towards God, and all the other bright and sterling virtues of life,--not only with a view to the spending of this present life in the most honourable way, nor only with a view to secure the most perfect bond of concord in the earthly commonwealth, but also in order to the obtaining of eternal salvation, and a place in the divine and celestial republic of a people which shall endure for ever--a republic to the citizenship of which faith, hope, and charity admit us; so that, while absent from it on our pilgrimage here, we may patiently tolerate, if we cannot correct, those who desire, by leaving vices unpunished, to give stability to that republic which the early Romans founded and enlarged by their virtues, when, though they had not the true piety towards the true God which could bring them, by a religion of saving power, to the commonwealth which is eternal, they did nevertheless observe a certain integrity of its own kind, which might suffice for founding, enlarging, and preserving an earthly commonwealth. For in the most opulent and illustrious Empire of Rome, God has shown how great is the influence of even civil virtues without true religion, in order that it might be understood that, when this is added to such virtues, men are made citizens of another commonwealth, of which the king is Truth, the law is Love, and the duration is Eternity.

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JOB

I. Introductory considerations

- A. Date--post-exilic; 400 B.C. or later
- B. Various views about the book
 - 1. Literal history
 - 2. Poetic epic
 - 3. Story literal (chs. 1, 2, 42); remainder poetic

C. Textual problems

- 1. Is Zophar's third speech missing?
- 2. Are Elihu's speeches a later addition to the book?
- 3. Is the author's viewpoint that of Job or that of the friends?

II. Prologue and epilogue (chs. 1, 2, 42:7--end)

- A. The question raised: Is there disinterested love of God?
- B. The answer: Yes. (Job does not curse God)
- C. Goodness is rewarded two-fold. (42:10)
- D. Satan as emissary of God

III. Dramatis personae in chs. 3-42

- A. Job--genuinely righteous (else the whole book loses its point)
- B. The friends: Eliphaz - calm authority, an "elder" appeals to experience
 - Bildad - orthodox "wisdom" theology, dogmatic, appeals to what other men have said
 - Zophar - private religious man, violent if anyone disputes his convictions
- C. Elihu--hesitant yet fervent youth, a member of the younger generation who restates yet defends orthodoxy

IV. Analysis of the poem

- A. The curse (ch. 3)
- B. The debate (in three cycles)
 - 1. The first cycle 4:1--14:22
 - Eliphaz (chs. 4, 5) - Politely suggests, Have not all sinned?
 - Job (6, 7) - Your theology doesn't speak to my real experience
 - Bildad (8) - Appeal to bygone ages. . . the moral law
 - Job (9, 10) - God is too great for man, (climax in 9:19-20)
 - Zophar (11) - The most vindictive of the friends
 - Job (12-14) - Sincere effort to convince friends, though with irony

2. The Second Cycle 15:1--21:34
 - Eliphaz (15) - Job's blasphemy is self-condemning
 - Job (16, 17) - No human comforters; no hope in God (yet)
 - Bildad (18) - Orthodox picture of the lot of the wicked
 - Job (19) - The really wicked are the unsympathizing friends; Job's personal problem solved (19:25-26); the remainder of the book turns to the more general problem of God's righteousness
 - Zophar (20) - The wicked man's portion; sin its own retribution
 - Job (21) - But the wicked do prosper!
3. The Third Cycle 22:1--27:23
 - Eliphaz (22) - Repent. (Thus, Eliphaz ends where he began)
 - Job (23, 24) - But is not God indifferent to wickedness?
 - Bildad (25) - Man is a worm. (Has part of this speech been lost?)
 - Job (26:1-4) - How do you know?
 - Bildad - ? (26:5-14) God is great. (This section seems to continue Bildad's speech; otherwise, 27:1 would be superfluous.)
 - Job (26:1-4) - How do you know?
 - Zophar (27:7-28) - (If these chapters are by Job, it must be irony or else Job is convinced by the friends. What seems more likely is that the Zophar heading has been lost. Note that 29:1 supports this view.)
 - Job (29, 30) - Summary of past happiness and present misery

C. The oath of clearing (31) (Job rising and lifting his hands)

D. Interposition of Elihu

Prologue: His intent to speak (32)

1st Speech, to Job: Judgment is redemptive in purpose (33)

2nd Speech, to the friends: Job is indeed sinful (34)

3rd Speech, to the sky: God, who is provident, is just (35)

4th Speech, as a storm begins to arise: God is great (36, 37)

E. The divine intervention

Voice out of the whirlwind (38--40:2) - Man does not have the knowledge or the basis to argue with God

Job (40:3-5) - Job is quieted

Voice out of the whirlwind (40:6--ch. 41)

Job (42:1-2): The Voice (42:3a): Job (42:3b-4a)

The Voice (42:4b)

Job (42:5-6)

V. The theology of the book of Job

A. Answers suggested to the mystery of suffering

1. Suffering a test of saintship (the prologue)

2. Suffering is judgment upon sin (the friends)

3. Suffering is redemptive rather than punitive (Elihu)

4. Suffering is mysterious, but so is the Good and the Great (the Voice from the whirlwind)

5. In any case, Job's quest for God in the midst of suffering is a more acceptable attitude than the servile adoration of the friends. (Epilogue)

B. Revelation as the "real" problem of the book

1. Job's personal problem, How can I have fellowship with God?

2. The more general problem, Is God righteous?

THUCYDIDES

BOOK I

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another. He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he *Greatness of the war.* saw the rest of the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or other of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large....

20 Such are the results of my enquiries, though the early history of Hellas is of a kind *Vulgar errors.* which forbids implicit reliance on every particular of the evidence. Men do not discriminate, and are too ready to receive ancient traditions about their own as well as about other countries. For example, most Athenians think that Hipparchus was actually tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton; they are not aware that Hippias was the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, and succeeded him, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were only his brothers. At the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton suddenly suspected that Hippias had been forewarned by some of their accomplices. They therefore abstained from attacking him, but, wishing to do something before they were seized, and not to risk their lives in vain, they slew Hipparchus, with whom they fell in near the temple called Leocorium as he was marshalling the Panathenaic procession. There are many other matters, not obscured by time, but contemporary, about which the other Hellenes are equally mistaken. For example, they imagine that the kings of Lacedaemon in their council have not one but two votes each, and that in the army of the Lacedaemonians there is a division called the Pitonate division; whereas they never had anything of the sort. So little trouble do men take in the search after truth; so readily do they accept whatever comes first to hand.

Yet any one who upon the grounds which I have given *Uncertainty of early history. If estimated by facts the Peloponnesian greater than any preceding war.* 21 arrives at some such conclusion as my own about those ancient times, would not be far wrong. He must not be misled by the exaggerated fancies of the poets, or by the tales of chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather than to speak the truth. Their accounts cannot be tested by him; and most of the facts in the lapse of ages have passed into the region of romance. At such a distance of time he must make up his mind to be satisfied with conclusions resting upon the clearest evidence which can be had. And, though men will always judge any war in which they are actually fighting to be the greatest at the time, but, after it is over, revert to their

admiration of some other which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, if estimated by the actual facts, will certainly prove to have been the greatest ever known.

22 As to the speeches which were made either before or

The speeches could not be exactly reported. Great pains taken to ascertain the truth about events.

during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the exact words. I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time I endeavoured, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport of what was actually said. Of the events of the war I have not ventured to speak from any chance information, nor according to any notion of my own; I have described nothing but what I either saw myself, or learned from others of whom I made the most careful and particular enquiry. The task was a laborious one, because eye-witnesses of the same occurrences gave different accounts of them, as they remembered or were interested in the actions of one side or the other. And very likely the strictly historical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten.

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BOOK II

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During the same winter, in accordance with an old 34 national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. *The Athenians celebrate the funeral of their citizens who had died in the war.* The ceremony is as follows: Three days before the celebration they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he pleases. At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies are missing, and cannot be recovered after the battle. The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses, whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment and make lamentation. The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner of interment; and the ceremony was repeated from time to time throughout the war. Over those who were the first buried Pericles

was chosen to speak. At the fitting moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty stage, which had been erected in order that he might be heard as far as possible by the multitude, and spoke as follows:—

(FUNERAL SPEECH.)

35 'Most of those who have spoken here before me

The law which enjoins this oration has been often praised. But I should prefer to praise the brave by deeds only, not to imperil their reputation on the skill of an orator. Still, our ancestors approved the practice, and I must obey.

have commended the lawgiver who added this oration to our other funeral customs; it seemed to them a worthy thing that such an honour should be given at their burial to the dead who have fallen on the field of battle. But I should have preferred that, when men's deeds have been brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and with such an honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing. Then the reputation of many would not have been imperilled on the eloquence or want of eloquence of one, and their virtues believed or not as he spoke well or ill. For it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and even moderation is apt not to give the impression of truthfulness. The friend of the dead who knows the facts is likely to think that the words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when he hears of anything which surpasses his own powers, will be envious and will suspect exaggeration. Mankind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well himself, but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy is aroused and he begins to be incredulous. However, since our ancestors have set the seal of their approval upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of all who hear me.

'I will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and 36

seemly that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valour they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from

I will first commemorate our predecessors, who gave us freedom and empire. And before praising the dead, I will describe how Athens has won her greatness.

them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigour of life, have carried the work of improvement further, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and

strangers may profitably listen to them.

‘Our form of government does not enter into rivalry 37 with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment.

Our government is a democracy, but we honour men of merit, whether rich or poor. Our public life is free from exclusiveness, our private from suspicion; yet we revere alike the injunctions of law and custom.

38 ‘And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; our homes are beautiful and elegant; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own.

We find relaxation in our amusements, and in our homes; and the whole world contributes to our enjoyment.

39 ‘Then, again, our military training is in many respects

In war we singly are a match for the Peloponnesians united; though we have no secrets and undergo no laborious training.

superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face. And here is the proof. The Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with their whole confederacy following; we go alone into a neighbour's country; and although our opponents are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil, we have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength; the care of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend to have been vanquished by us all.

'If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? Since we do not anticipate the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too our city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For we

We are not enervated by culture, or vulgarised by wealth. We are all interested in public affairs, believing that nothing is lost by free discussion. Our goodness to others springs not from interest, but from the generous confidence of freedom.

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are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favours. Now he who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation; but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows that in requiting another's generosity he will not be winning gratitude but only paying a debt. We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank

41 *In fine, Athens is the school of Hellas. She alone in the hour of trial rises above her reputation. Her citizens need no poet to sing their praises: for every land bears witness to their valour.*

and fearless spirit. To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and

fact; and the assertion is verified by the position to which these qualities have raised the state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every

sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died ; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them ; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf.

'I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because 42

I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their fame ! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man's worth ; it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valour with which they have fought for their country ; they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the state more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life ; none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be honourably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness ; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives ; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battle-field their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory .

43 'Such was the end of these men ; they were worthy of Athens, and the living need not desire

Contemplate and love Athens, and you will know how to value them. They were united in their deaths, but their glory is separate and single. Their sepulchre is the remembrance of them in the hearts of men. Follow their example without fear : it is the prosperous, not the unfortunate, who should be reckless.

to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. Any one can discourse to you for ever about the advantages of a brave defence, which you know already. But instead of listening to him I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her ; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow

their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres—I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men: not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope.

‘Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the 44

dead who stand here; I would rather comfort them. You know that your life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have been so ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know how hard it is

The parents of the dead are to be comforted rather than pitied. Some of them may yet have children who will lighten their sorrow and serve the state; while others should remember how large their share of happiness has been, and be consoled by the glory of those who are gone.

to make you feel this, when the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. And sorrow is felt at the want of those blessings, not which a man never knew, but which were a part of his life before they were taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: “Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless.”

45 ‘To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed,

Sons and brothers will find their example hard to imitate, for men

I see that the struggle to emulate them will be an arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, however pre-

are jealous of the living, but envy follows not the dead. Let the widows restrain their natural weakness, and avoid both praise and blame.

minent your virtue may be, hardly will you be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach them. The living have their rivals and detractors, but when a man is out of the way, the

honour and good-will which he receives is unalloyed. And, if I am to speak of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth be widows, let me sum them up in one short admonition: To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for evil among men.

46 'I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the

So have I paid a due tribute of words to the dead. The city will pay them in deeds, as by this funeral, so too by the maintenance of their children.

law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead have been honourably interred, and it remains only that their children should

be maintained at the public charge until they are grown up: this is the solid prize with which, as with a garland, Athens crowns her sons living and dead, after a struggle like theirs. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest citizens are enlisted in the service of the state. And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may depart.'

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BOOK III

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For not long afterwards nearly the whole Hellenic world 82 was in commotion; in every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace, men would have had no excuse for introducing either, and no desire to do so; but, when they were at war, the introduction of a foreign alliance on one side or the other to the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of themselves was easily effected by the dissatisfied party^a. And revolution brought upon the cities of Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have been and always will be while human nature remains the same, but which are more or less aggravated and differ in character with every new combination of circumstances. In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities; but war, which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a hard master and tends to assimilate men's characters to their conditions.

The conflict of democracy and oligarchy, encouraged as it is by the hope of Athenian or Lacedaemonian help, ruins states and disorganises society.

When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed carried the revolutionary spirit further and further, and determined to outdo the report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges. The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was

Changes in men's moral principles and in their use of language.

held to be loyal courage ; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward ; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness ; to know everything was to do nothing. Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. A conspirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in disguise. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was he who detected one. On the other hand, he who plotted from the first to have nothing to do with plots was a breaker up of parties and a poltroon who was afraid of the enemy. In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. (For party associations are not based upon any established law, nor do they seek the public good ; they are formed in defiance of the laws and from self-interest.) The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. If an enemy when he was in the ascendant offered fair words, the opposite party received them not in a generous spirit, but by a jealous watchfulness of his actions . Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless. But he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage, and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater pleasure in a perfidious than he would have had in an open act of revenge ; he congratulated himself that he had taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his enemy and gained the prize of superior ability. In general the dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness than the simple for goodness ; men take a pride in the one, but are ashamed of the other.

The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked in a contest. For the leaders on either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy, while they made the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in reality their prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most monstrous crimes ; yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the very utmost , neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. Either by the help of an unrighteous sentence, or grasping power with the strong hand, they were eager to satiate the impatience of party-spirit. Neither faction cared for religion ; but any fair pretence which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was greatly lauded. And the citizens who were of neither party fell a prey to both ; either they were disliked because they held aloof, or men were jealous of their surviving.

Causes and effects of the revolutionary spirit. Disregard of all laws, human and divine.

Universal distrust. in Hellas. The simplicity which is so
Force of character, not large an element in a noble nature was
intellect, prevailed. laughed to scorn and disappeared. An
attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed;
for there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible
enough to reconcile enemies. Each man was strong only
in the conviction that nothing was secure; he must look
to his own safety, and could not afford to trust others.
Inferior intellects generally succeeded best. For, aware
of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their
opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of
speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate
them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once.
But the cleverer sort, presuming in their arrogance that
they would be aware in time, and disdaining to act when
they could think, were taken off their guard and easily
destroyed.

BOOK V

In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos 84
with twenty ships, and seized any of the Argives who were still suspected
to be of the Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and
the Athenians deposited them in the subject islands near at hand. The
Athenians next made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty
ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and
three hundred archers besides twenty mounted archers of their own, and about
fifteen hundred hoplites furnished by their allies in the islands. The Melians
are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit to Athens like the
other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part. But when the
Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into
open hostilities. The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias
the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island.
But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate
with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the people, the
Melians desired them to explain their errand to the magistrates and to the
dominant class. They spoke as follows:—

- 85 'Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a multitude should be deceived
Since we are to be by seductive and unanswerable argu-
closeted with you, let us ments which they would hear set forth
converse and not make in a single uninterrupted oration (for
speeches. we are perfectly aware that this is what you mean in bring-
ing us before a select few), you who are sitting here may
as well make assurance yet surer. Let us have no set
speeches at all, but do you reply to each several statement
of which you disapprove, and criticise it at once. Say
first of all how you like this mode of proceeding.'

86 The Melian representatives answered:—'The quiet

We do not object. But discussion between you and us is a mockery, and can only end in our ruin.

interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, seem to belie your words.

We see that, although you may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you, slavery.'

87 *Ath.* 'Nay, but if you are only going to argue from *In any case you must face the facts.* fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of looking your circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is your intention we will proceed.'

88 *Mel.* 'It is an excusable and natural thing that men in *It must be as you, and not as we, please.* our position should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we admit that this conference has met to consider the question of our preservation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you propose.'

89 *Ath.* 'Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because *No use in talking about right; expediency is the word.* we overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in their expeditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.'

Mel. 'Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite *For your own sakes, then, it is expedient that you should not be too strict.* us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a principle which is for the common good; that to every man when in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and that any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind.'

Ath. 'The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is *For ourselves we have no fears. It is you who have to learn the lesson of what is expedient both for us and you.* not an event to which we look forward with dismay; for ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to their vanquished enemies. With the Lacedaemonians, however, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters. But this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavour to show that we

have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed.'

92 *Mel.* 'It may be your interest to be our masters, *For you, yes. But how for us?* but how can it be ours to be your slaves?'

93 *Ath.* 'To you the gain will be that by submission you *You will suffer less and we shall gain more.* will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.'

94 *Mel.* 'But must we be your enemies? Will you not *May we not be neutral?* receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?'

95 *Ath.* 'No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to *Our subjects would not understand that.* us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.'

96 *Mel.* 'But are your subjects really unable to distin- *But we are not a colony of yours.* guish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you?'

97 *Ath.* 'Why, they do not doubt that both of them have *You are talking about justice again. We say that we cannot allow freedom to insignificant islanders.* a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think that states like yours are left free because they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not attack them because we dare not. So that your subjection will give us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too, must not be allowed to escape us.'

Mel. 'But do you not recognise another danger? For, 98 once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice and press upon us your doctrine of expediency, we must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be for yours also, may hope to convince you:—Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all?'

Ath. 'We do not consider our really dangerous ene- 99 mies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all who may be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire—these are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee.'

Mel. 'Surely then, if you and your subjects will brave 100 all this risk, you to preserve your

empire and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be your slaves.'

If you fight for empire and your subjects for freedom, shall we be slaves?

101 *Ath.* 'Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not one of honour but of prudence.'

There is no cowardice in yielding to superior force.

102 *Mel.* 'But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand upright.'

But we hope that fortune may befriend us.

103 *Ath.* 'Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, and when men have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then. While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails. You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them.'

Hope is a great deceiver; and is only detected when men are already ruined.

104 *Mel.* 'We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against your power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favour of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose.'

Heaven will protect the right and the Lacedaemonians will succour us.

Ath. 'As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favour as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men's desires about human things. For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the Gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. And then as to the Lacedaemonians—when you imagine that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire the innocence of your idea,

That the stronger should rule over the weaker is a principle common to Gods and men. Therefore the Gods are as likely to favour us as you. And the Lacedaemonians look only to their interest.

but we do not envy you the folly of it. The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and according to their national standard of morality. But, in respect of their dealings with others, although many things might be said, they can be described in few words—of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what is expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent is such a character with your present blind hope of deliverance!

Mel. 'That is the very reason why we trust them; 106 they will look to their interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas and play into the hands of their enemies.'

107 *Ath.* 'But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lacedaemonians seldom care to face?'

108 *Mel.* 'On the other hand, we think that whatever perils there may be, they will be ready to face them for our sakes, and will consider danger less dangerous where we are concerned. For if they need our aid we are close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen.'

109 *Ath.* 'Yes, but what encourages men who are invited to join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those who summon them to their side, but a decided superiority in real power. To this no men look more keenly than the Lacedaemonians; so little confidence have they in their own resources, that they only attack their neighbours when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an island, when we are masters of the sea.'

110 *Mel.* 'But they may send their allies: the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory.'

Ath. 'Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as it 111 has come to others, and should you ever have actual experience of it, then you will know that never once have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your city would be your first care, but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is

not to be compared with that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying to that false sense of honour which has been the ruin of so many when danger and dishonour were staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open to the consequences have found the word "honour" too much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and irretrievable calamities; through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonour than fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you will not run this risk; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will certainly gain no honour if, having to choose between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a single decision.'

112 The Athenians left the conference: the Melians, after

The Melians refuse to yield. consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in their refusal, and made

answer as follows:—'Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to the good fortune which, by the favour of the Gods, has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and endeavour to save ourselves. We are ready however to be your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of both parties.'

113 Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as

Last words of the Athenians. they quitted the conference, spoke as follows:—'Well, we must say, judging

from the decision at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as already realised in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be your ruin.'

114 The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the

The Athenians blockade Melos. generals, when they found that the Melians would not yield, immediately

commenced hostilities. They surrounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own and of their allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their army; the remainder carried on the blockade. . .

The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the Melians

were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonised the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own.

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK VI

PREFACE

1. I AM aware that some will be at a loss to account for my interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake of entering upon the following disquisition on the Roman constitution. But I think that I have already in many passages made it fully evident that this particular branch of my work was one of the necessities imposed on me by the nature of my original design ; and I pointed this out with special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my history. I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it, was that it would enable them to know and fully realise in what manner, and under what kind of constitution, it came about that nearly the whole world fell under the power of Rome in somewhat less than fifty-three years,—an event certainly without precedent. This being my settled purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making a pause, and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself as to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would not, if you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct at a time of uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant success or conspicuous reverse. For the true test of a perfect man is the power of bearing with spirit and dignity violent changes of fortune. An examination of a constitution should be conducted in the same way : and therefore being unable to find in our day a more rapid or more signal change than that which has happened to Rome, I reserved my disquisition on its constitution for this place. . . .

What is really educational and beneficial to students of history is the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now in every practical undertaking by a state we must regard as the most powerful agent for success or failure the form of its constitution ; for from this as from a fountain-head all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed, but attain their consummation. . . .

3. Of the Greek republics, which have again and again risen to greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult to speak, whether we recount their past history or venture an opinion on their future. For to report what is already known is an easy task, nor is it hard to guess what is to come from our knowledge of what has been. But in regard to the Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their present state, owing to the complexity of their constitution ; nor to speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate acquaintance with their peculiar institutions in the past whether affecting their public or their private life. It will require then no ordinary attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the distinctive features of this constitution.

Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of constitutions, which they designate *kingship, aristocracy, democracy*. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to them, whether they name these as being the *only* ones, or as the *best*. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that we must regard as the *best* constitution that which partakes of all these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we admit that these are the *only* forms: for we have had before now examples of absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy.

Classification of politics.

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11. I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus, I will now endeavour to describe that of Rome at the period of their disastrous defeat at Cannae.

I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under this constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account

of it by the omission of certain details. Knowing accurately every portion of it from personal experience, and from having been bred up in its customs and laws from childhood, they will not be struck so much by the accuracy of the description, as annoyed by its omissions; nor will they believe that the historian has purposely omitted unimportant distinctions, but will attribute his silence upon the origin of existing institutions or other important facts to ignorance. What is told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose; what is omitted they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being to appear to know more than the writers. But a good critic should not judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from what he says: if he detects mis-statement in the latter, he may then feel certain that ignorance accounts for the former; but if what he says is accurate, his omissions ought to be attributed to deliberate judgment and not to ignorance. So much for those whose criticisms are prompted by personal ambition rather than by justice. . . .

Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an historical disquisition, is that it should be germane to the matter in hand; if this is not observed, though its style may be excellent and its matter irreproachable, it will seem out of place, and disgust rather than please. . . .

As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy or democracy or

Triple element in the Roman Constitution.

despotism. And no wonder : for if we confine our observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic ; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic ; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy. What the exact powers of these several parts were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state.

12. The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome and are supreme masters of the administration. All other magistrates, except the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate ; bring matters requiring deliberation before it ; and see to the execution of its decrees. If, again, there are any matters of state which require the authorisation of the people, it is their business to see to them, to summon the popular meetings, to bring the proposals before them, and to carry out the decrees of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in a word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all but absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on the allies such levies as they think good, to appoint the Military Tribunes, to make up the roll for soldiers and select those that are suitable. Besides they have absolute power of inflicting punishment on all who are under their command while on active service : and they have authority to expend as much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied by a quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of these powers would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a clear case of royal government. Nor will it affect the truth of my description, if any of the institutions I have described are changed in our time, or in that of our posterity : and the same remarks apply to what follows.

13. The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and regulates the receipts and disbursements alike. For the Quaestors cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls. The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every *lustrum* for the repair or construction of public buildings ; this money cannot be obtained by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are in the hands of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state among the Italian allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed, help or protection to be afforded,—all this is the province of the Senate. Or again, outside Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty, or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their submission, or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them, are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the Consuls were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete aristocracy : and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they had with Rome was settled by the Senate.

14. After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human society are held together: for where the distinction between them is not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect when good and bad are held in exactly the same honour. The people then are the only court to decide matters of life and death; and even in cases where the penalty is money, if the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious, and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if even only one of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the sentence has not voted,—have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples or Praeneste or at Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement has been duly ratified on oath.

Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute power of passing or repealing laws; and, most important of all, it is the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or treaties, it is the people who ratify them or the reverse.

These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief power in the state was the people's, and that the constitution was a democracy.

15. Such, then, is the distribution of power between the several parts of the state. I must now show how each of these several parts can, when they choose, oppose or support each other.

The mutual relation of the three.

The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition with the powers I have described, is to all appearance absolute in the administration of the business in hand; still he has need of the support both of people and Senate, and, without them, is quite unable to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have supplies sent to his legions from time to time; but without a decree of the Senate they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes, nor pay, so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his plans. And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion or no depends entirely upon the Senate: for it has absolute authority at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to continue the existing one in his command. Again, even to the successes of the generals the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory, and on the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit. For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the eyes of the citizens by what are called "triumphs." But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with proper pomp, or in some cases celebrate at all, unless the

Senate concurs and grants the necessary money. As for the people, the Consuls are pre-eminently obliged to court their favour, however distant from home may be the field of their operations; for it is the people, as I have said before, that ratifies, or refuses to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but most of all because when laying down their office they have to give an account of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is it safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the goodwill of the people.

16. As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and it cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against the republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first ratify its decrees. Similarly even in matters which directly affect the senators,—for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate's traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and offices, or even actually cutting down their property,—even in such cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law. But most important of all is the fact that, if the Tribunes interpose their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the Tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and above all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot neglect the feelings of the people.

17. In like manner the people on its part is far from being independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account both collectively and individually. For contracts, too numerous to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the collection of revenue from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and land—everything, in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman government: and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some purchase the contracts from the censors for themselves; and others go partners with them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these transactions the Senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether, if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many details in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on the other hand, grant great indulgences to the contractors: for in every case the appeal is to it. But the most important point of all is that the judges are taken from its members in the majority of trials, whether public or private, in which the charges are heavy. Consequently, all citizens are much at its mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as to when they may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively opposing its will. And for a similar reason men do not rashly resist the wishes of the Consuls, because one and all may become subject to their absolute authority on a campaign.

18. The result of this power of the several estates for mutual help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emer-

gencies, and a constitution than which it is impossible to find a better. For whenever any danger from without compels them to unite and work together, the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary, that everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager rivalry shown by all classes to devote their whole minds to the need of the hour, and to secure that any determination come to should not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual works, privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business in hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State makes it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it determines to attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms are past, and the people are enjoying their good fortune and the fruits of their victories, and, as usually happens, growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, show a tendency to violence and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances, more than ever, that the constitution is seen to possess within itself the power of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part being checked by its fear of the other. . . .

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THE ROMAN REPUBLIC COMPARED WITH OTHERS

43. Nearly all historians have recorded as constitutions of eminent excellence those of Lacedaemonia, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some have also mentioned those of Athens and Thebes. The former I may allow to pass; but I am convinced that little need be said of the Athenian and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent. Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to speak; and while they still thought themselves prosperous, and likely to remain so, they found themselves involved in circumstances completely the reverse. The Thebans got their reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking advantage of the senseless policy of the Lacedaemonians, and the hatred of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the situation. Since fortune quickly made it evident that it was not the peculiarity of their constitution, but the valour of their leaders, which gave the Thebans their success. For the great power of Thebes notoriously took its rise, attained its zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it then enjoyed.

44. A somewhat similar remark applies to the Athenian constitution also. For though it perhaps had more frequent interludes of excellence, yet its highest perfection was attained during the brilliant career of Themistocles; and having reached that point it quickly declined, owing to its essential instability. For the Athenian demus is always in the position of a ship without a commander. In such a ship, if fear of the enemy,

as also the Athenian.

or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be of one mind and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well ; but if they recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no longer all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the voyage, and the other urging the steersman to bring the ship to anchor ; some letting out the sheets, and others hauling them in, and ordering the sails to be furled,—their discord and quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on ; and the position of affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged on the same voyage : and the result has often been that, after escaping the dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they wreck their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what has often happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after repelling, on various occasions, the greatest and most formidable dangers by the valour of its people and their leaders, there have been times when, in periods of secure tranquillity, it has gratuitously and recklessly encountered disaster. Therefore I need say no more about either it, or the Theban constitution : in both of which a mob manages everything on its own unfettered impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of violence and ferocity.

45. Passing to the Cretan polity there are two points which deserve our consideration. The first is how such writers as Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes and Plato — who are the most learned of the ancients—could assert that it was like that of Sparta ; and secondly how they came to assert that it was at all admirable. I can agree with neither assertion ; and I will explain why I say so. And first as to its dissimilarity with the Spartan constitution. The peculiar merit of the latter is said to be its land laws, by which no one possesses more than another, but all citizens have an equal share in the public land. The next distinctive feature regards the possession of money : for as it is utterly discredited among them, the jealous competition which arises from inequality of wealth is entirely removed from the city. A third peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian polity is that, of the officials by whose hands and with whose advice the whole government is conducted, the kings hold an hereditary office, while the members of the Gerusia are elected for life.

46. Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrangements obtains. The laws allow them to possess as much land as they can get with no limitation whatever. Money is so highly valued among them, that its possession is not only thought to be necessary but in the highest degree creditable. And in fact greed and avarice are so native to the soil in Crete, that they are the only people in the world among whom no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever. Again all their offices are annual and on a democratical footing. I have therefore often felt at a loss to account for these writers speaking of the two constitutions, which are radically different, as though they were closely united and allied. But, besides overlooking these important differences, these writers have gone out of their way to comment at length on the legislation of Lycurgus : “ He was the only legislator,” they say, “ who saw the important points. For there being two things on which the safety of a commonwealth depends,—courage in the face of the enemy and concord at home,—by abolishing covetousness, he with it removed all motive for civil broil and contest : whence it has been brought about that the Lacedaemonians are the best governed and most united people in Greece.” Yet while giving utterance to these sentiments, and

though they see that, in contrast to this, the Cretans by their ingrained avarice are engaged in countless public and private seditions, murders and civil wars, they yet regard these facts as not affecting their contention, but are bold enough to speak of the two constitutions as alike. Ephorus, indeed, putting aside names, employs expressions so precisely the same, when discoursing on the two constitutions, that, unless one noticed the proper names, there would be no means whatever of distinguishing which of the two he was describing.

47. In what the difference between them consists I have already stated. I will now address myself to showing that the Cretan constitution deserves neither praise nor imitation.

To my mind, then, there are two things fundamental to every state, in virtue of which its powers and constitution become desirable or objectionable. These are customs and laws. Tests of a good polity.

Of these the desirable are those which make men's private lives holy and pure, and the public character of the state civilised and just. The objectionable are those whose effect is the reverse. As, then, when we see good customs and good laws prevailing among certain people, we confidently assume that, in consequence of them, the men and their civil constitution will be good also, so when we see private life full of covetousness, and public policy of injustice, plainly we have reason for asserting their laws, particular customs, and general constitution to be bad. Now, with few exceptions, you could find no habits prevailing in private life more steeped in treachery than those in Crete, and no public policy more inequitable. Holding, then, the Cretan constitution to be neither like the Spartan, nor worthy of choice or imitation, I reject it from the comparison which I have instituted.

Nor again would it be fair to introduce the Republic of Plato, which is also spoken of in high terms by some philosophers. For just as we refuse admission to the athletic contests to those actors or athletes who have not acquired a recognised position or trained for them, so we ought not to admit this Platonic constitution to the contest for the prize of merit unless it can first point to some genuine and practical achievement. Up to this time the notion of bringing it into comparison with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage would be like putting up a statue to compare with living and breathing men. Even if such a statue were faultless in point of art, the comparison of the lifeless with the living would naturally leave an impression of imperfection and incongruity upon the minds of the spectators.

48. I shall therefore omit these, and proceed with my description of the Laconian constitution. Now it seems to me that for securing unity among the citizens, for safe-guarding the Laconian

territory, and preserving the liberty of Sparta inviolate, the legislation and provisions of Lycurgus were so excellent, that I am forced to regard his wisdom as something superhuman. For the equality of landed possessions, the simplicity in their food, and the practice of taking it in common, which he established, were well calculated to secure morality in private life and to prevent civil broils in the State; as also their training in the endurance of labours and dangers to make men brave and noble minded: but when both these virtues, courage and high morality, are combined in one soul or in one state, vice will not readily spring from such a soil, nor will such men easily be overcome by their enemies. By constructing his constitution therefore in this spirit, and of these elements, he secured two blessings to the Spartans,—safety for

their territory, and a lasting freedom for themselves long after he was gone. He appears however to have made no one provision whatever, particular or general, for the acquisition of the territory of their neighbours; or for the assertion of their supremacy; or, in a word, for any policy of aggrandisement at all. What he had still to do was to impose such a necessity, or create such a spirit among the citizens, that, as he had succeeded in making their individual lives independent and simple, the public character of the state should also become independent and moral. But the actual fact is, that, though he made them the most disinterested and sober-minded men in the world, as far as their own ways of life and their national institutions were concerned, he left them in regard to the rest of Greece ambitious, eager for supremacy, and encroaching in the highest degree.

49. For in the first place is it not notorious that they were nearly the first Greeks to cast a covetous eye upon the territory of their neighbours, and that accordingly they waged a war of subjugation on the Messenians?

In the next place is it not related in all histories that in their dogged obstinacy they bound themselves with an oath never to desist from the siege of Messene until they had taken it? And lastly it is known to all that in their efforts for supremacy in Greece they submitted to do

the bidding of those whom they had once conquered in

war. For when the Persians invaded Greece, they conquered them, as champions of the liberty of the Greeks; yet when the invaders had retired and fled, they betrayed the cities of Greece into

their hands by the peace of Antalcidas, for the sake of getting money to secure their supremacy over the Greeks. It was then that the defect

in their constitution was rendered apparent. For as long as

their ambition was confined to governing their immediate neighbours, or even the Peloponnesians only, they were content with the

resources and supplies provided by Laconia itself, having all material of war ready to hand, and being able without much expenditure of time to return home or convey provisions with them. But directly they took in hand to despatch naval expeditions, or to go on campaigns by land outside the Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency, nor their use of crops for payment in kind, would be able to supply them with what they lacked if they abided by the legislation of Lycurgus; for such undertakings required money universally current, and goods from foreign countries. Thus they were compelled to wait humbly at Persian doors, impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from all the Greeks: knowing that, if they abided by the laws of Lycurgus, it was impossible to advance any claims upon any outside power at all, much less upon the supremacy in Greece.

50. My object, then, in this digression is to make it manifest by actual facts that, for guarding

their own country with absolute safety, and for preserving their own freedom, the legisla-

tion of Lycurgus was entirely sufficient; and for those who are content with these objects we must concede that there neither exists, nor ever has existed, a constitution and civil order preferable to that of Sparta. But if any one is seeking aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and ruler and despot of numerous subjects, and to have all looking and turning to him, is a finer thing than that,—in this point of view we must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is

Their partial failure.

First and second Messenian wars, B.C. 745-724 (?), 685-668.

Battle of Plataea, B.C. 479.

Peace of Antalcidas, B.C. 387.

The causes of this failure.

Sparta fails where Rome succeeds.

deficient, and that of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power. And this has been proved by actual facts. For when the Lacedaemonians strove to possess themselves of the supremacy in Greece, it was not long before they brought their own freedom itself into danger. Whereas the Romans, after obtaining supreme power over the Italians themselves, soon brought the whole world under their rule,—in which achievement the abundance and availability of their supplies largely contributed to their success.

51. Now the Carthaginian constitution seems to me originally to have been well contrived in these most distinctively important particulars. For they had kings, and the Gerusia had the powers of an aristocracy, and the multitude were supreme in such things as affected them; and on the whole the adjustment of its several parts was very like that of Rome and Sparta. But about the period of its entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was on the decline, that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith, and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith; we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they met with capital disasters, by force of prudent counsels they finally conquered the Carthaginians in the war.

52. If we look however at separate details, for instance at the provisions for carrying on a war, we shall find that whereas for a naval expedition the Carthaginians are the better trained and prepared,—as it is only natural with a people with whom it has been hereditary for many generations to practise this craft, and to follow the seaman's trade above all nations in the world,—yet, in regard to military service on land, the Romans train themselves to a much higher pitch than the Carthaginians. The former bestow their whole attention upon this department: whereas the Carthaginians wholly neglect their infantry, though they do take some slight interest in the cavalry. The reason of this is that they employ foreign mercenaries, the Romans native and citizen levies. It is in this point that the latter polity is preferable to the former. They have their hopes of freedom ever resting on the courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour of their own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that even if the Romans have suffered a defeat at first, they renew the war with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do. For, as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is impossible for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but they persist with obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has happened in regard to their navy is an instance in point. In skill the Romans are much behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for the Romans, owing to the valour of their men. For although

Rome fresher
than Carthage;

and its citizen
levies superior
to Carthaginian
mercenaries.

nautical science contributes largely to success in sea-fights, still it is the courage of the marines that turns the scale most decisively in favour of victory. The fact is that Italians as a nation are by nature superior to Phoenicians and Libyans both in physical strength and courage; but still their habits also do much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm for such exploits. One example will be sufficient of the pains taken by the Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win a reputation in their country for valour.

53. Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the course of his funeral, the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum to the Laudations at funerals. Rostra, as a raised platform there is called, and sometimes is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely, is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son, if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not only such as were engaged in the actual Imagines. transactions but those also who were not;—and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a public one affecting the whole people. After the burial and all the usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a wooden canopy or shrine. This likeness consists of a mask made to represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and colour. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies, they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga with purple Toga praetexta, stripes; if a censor, whole purple; if he had also purpurea, celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga embroidered with gold. pieta. These representatives also ride themselves in chariots, while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, according to the dignity of the rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his lifetime; and on arriving at the Rostra they all take Sellae curules. their seats on ivory chairs in their order.

There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For can we conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were living and breathing? Or what could be a more glorious spectacle?

54. Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, Devotion of the citizens. after having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die; and the renown of those who have done good service to their country becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of

the ceremony is that it inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare, in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest, some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to death, in defiance of every custom and law, because they rated the interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with their nearest and dearest. There are many stories of this kind, related of many men in Roman history; but one will be enough for our present purpose; and I will give the name as an instance to prove the truth of my words.

55. The story goes that Horatius Cocles, while fighting with two enemies at the head of the bridge over the Tiber, which is the entrance to the city on the north, seeing a large body of

Horatius
Cocles.

men advancing to support his enemies, and fearing that they would force their way into the city, turned round, and shouted to those behind him to hasten back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him: and whilst they were breaking the bridge, he remained at his post receiving numerous wounds, and checked the progress of the enemy: his opponents being panic stricken, not so much by his strength as by the audacity with which he held his ground. When the bridge had been broken down, the attack of the enemy was stopped; and Cocles then threw himself into the river with his armour on and deliberately sacrificed his life, because he valued the safety of his country and his own future reputation more highly than his present life, and the years of existence that remained to him. Such is the enthusiasm and emulation for noble deeds that are engendered among the Romans by their customs.

56. Again the Roman customs and principles regarding money transactions are better than those of the Carthaginians. In the view of the latter nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain; with the former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes and to make profit by improper means. For they regard wealth obtained from unlawful transactions to be as much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from the most unquestioned source is of commendation. A proof of the fact is this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but among the Romans the penalty for it is death. With such a radical difference, therefore, between the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples, it is natural that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be different also.

Purity of
election.

Cf. ch. 14.

But the most important difference for the better which the Roman commonwealth appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs. For I conceive that what in other nations is looked upon as a reproach, I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is the very thing which keeps the Roman commonwealth together. To such an extraordinary height is this carried among them, both in private and public business, that nothing could exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable; but in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the common people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers, such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary. But seeing that every multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires, unreasoning anger, and violent passion, the only resource is to keep them in check by mysterious terrors and

Regard to
religion.

scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my mind, the ancients were not acting without purpose or at random, when they brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods, and the belief in the punishments in Hades : much rather do I think that men nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in rejecting them. This is the reason why, apart from anything else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many seals, and twice as many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep faith : whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies, men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again, in other nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands out of the public purse, and is entirely pure in such matters : but among the Romans it is a rare thing to detect a man in the act of committing such a crime. . . .

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

57. That to all things, then, which exist there is ordained decay and change I think requires no further arguments to show : for the inexorable course of nature is sufficient to convince us of it.

But in all polities we observe two sources of decay existing from natural causes, the one external, the other internal and self-produced. The external admits of no certain or fixed definition, but the internal follows a definite order. What kind of polity, then, comes naturally first, and what second, I have already stated in such a way, that those who are capable of taking in the whole drift of my argument can henceforth draw their own conclusions as to the future of the Roman polity. For it is quite clear, in my opinion. When a commonwealth, after warding off many great dangers, has arrived at a high pitch of prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its citizens will become more extravagant ; and that the rivalry for office, and in other spheres of activity, will become fiercer than it ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with being the authors, when they become convinced that they are being cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed up with flattery by others from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves. And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name, which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy ; but, in fact, it will become that worst of all governments, mob-rule.

With this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and present state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also its difference, for better and worse, from other polities, I will now at length bring my essay on it to an end.

LUCRETIUS
ON THE NATURE OF THINGS

BOOK I

MOTHER of the Aeneadae, darling of men and gods, increase-giving Venus, who beneath the gliding signs of heaven fillest with thy presence the ship-carrying sea, the corn-bearing lands, since through thee every kind of living things is conceived, rises up and beholds the light of the sun. Before thee, goddess, flee the winds, the clouds of heaven; before thee and thy advent; for thee earth manifold in works puts forth sweet-smelling flowers; for thee the levels of the sea do laugh and heaven propitiated shines with outspread light. For soon as the vernal aspect of day is disclosed, and the birth-favouring breeze of Favonius unbarred is blowing fresh, first the fowls of the air, O lady, show signs of thee and thy entering in, throughly smitten in heart by thy power. Next the wild herds bound over the glad pastures and swim the rapid rivers: in such wise each made prisoner by thy charms follows thee with desire, whither thou goest to lead it on. Yes, throughout seas and mountains and sweeping rivers and leafy homes of birds and grassy plains, striking fond love into the breasts of all thou constrainest them each after its kind to continue their races with desire. Since thou then art sole mistress of the nature of things and without thee nothing rises up into the divine borders of light, nothing grows to be glad or lovely, fain would I have thee for a helpmate in writing the verses which I essay to pen on the nature of things for our own son of the Memmii, whom thou, goddess, hast willed to have no peer, rich as he ever is in every grace. Wherefore all the more, O lady, lend my lays an everliving charm. Cause meanwhile the savage works of war to be lulled to rest throughout all seas and lands; for thou alone canst bless mankind with calm peace, seeing that Mavors lord of battle controls the savage works of war, Mavors who often flings himself into thy lap quite vanquished by the never-healing wound of love; and then with upturned face and shapely neck thrown back feeds with love his greedy sight gazing, goddess, open-mouthed on thee; and as backward he reclines, his breath stays hanging on thy lips. While then, lady, he is reposing on thy holy body, shed thyself about him and above, and pour from thy lips sweet discourse, asking, glorious dame, gentle peace for the Romans. For neither can we in our country's day of trouble with untroubled mind think only of our work, nor can the illustrious offset of Memmius in times like these be wanting to the general weal. . . . for what remains to tell, apply to true reason unbusied ears and a keen mind withdrawn from cares, lest my gifts set out for you with steadfast zeal you abandon with disdain, before they are understood. For I will essay to discourse to you of the most high system of heaven and the gods and will open up the first beginnings of things, out of which nature gives birth to all things and increase and nourishment, and into which nature likewise dissolves them back after their destruction. These we are accustomed in explaining their reason to call matter and begetting bodies of things and to name seeds of things and also to term first bodies, because from them as first elements all things are.

When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth crushed down under the weight of religion, who showed her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece¹ ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story of gods nor thunderbolts nor heaven with threatening roar could quell: they only chafed the more the eager courage of his soul, filling him with desire to be the first to burst the fast bars of nature's portals. Therefore the living force of his soul gained the day: on he passed far beyond the flaming walls of the world and traversed throughout in mind and spirit the immeasurable

universe; whence he returns a conqueror to tell us what can, what cannot come into being; in short on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deepset boundary mark. Therefore religion is put under foot and trampled upon in turn; us his victory brings level with heaven.

This is what I fear herein, lest haply you should fancy that you are entering on unholy grounds of reason and treading the path of sin; whereas on the contrary often and often that very religion has given birth to sinful and unholy deeds. Thus in Aulis the chosen chieftains of the Danaï, foremost of men, foully polluted with Iphianassa's blood the altar of the Trivian maid.² Soon as the fillet encircling her maiden tresses shed itself in equal lengths adown each cheek, and soon as she saw her father standing sorrowful before the altars and beside him the ministering priests hiding the knife and her countrymen at sight of her shedding tears, speechless in terror she dropped down on her knees and sank to the ground. Nor aught in such a moment could it avail the luckless girl that she had first bestowed the name of father on the king. For lifted up in the hands of the men she was carried shivering to the altars, not after due performance of the customary rites to be escorted by the clear-ringing bridal song, but in the very season of marriage, stainless maid mid the stain of blood, to fall a sad victim by the sacrificing stroke of a father, that thus a happy and prosperous departure might be granted to the fleet. So great the evils to which religion could prompt!

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This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, but by the aspect and the law of nature;³ the warp of whose design we shall begin with this first principle, nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine power. Fear in sooth holds so in check all mortals, because they see many operations go on in earth and heaven, the causes of which they can in no way understand, believing them therefore to be done by power divine. For these reasons when we shall have seen that nothing can be produced from nothing, we shall then more correctly ascertain that which we are seeking, both the elements out of which every thing can be produced and the manner in which all things are done without the hand of the gods.

If things came from nothing, any kind might be born of any thing, nothing would require seed. Men for instance might rise out of the sea, the scaly race out of the earth, and birds might burst out of the sky; horned and other herds, every kind of wild beasts would haunt with changing brood tilth and wilderness alike. Nor would the same fruits keep constant to trees, but would change; any tree might bear any fruit. For if there were not begetting bodies for each, how could things have a fixed unvarying mother? But in fact because things are all produced from fixed seeds, each thing is born and goes forth into the borders of light out of that in which resides its matter and first bodies; and for this reason all things cannot be gotten out of all things, because in particular things resides a distinct power. Again why do we see the rose put forth in spring, corn in the season of heat, vines yielding at the call of autumn, if not because, when the fixed seeds of things have streamed together at the proper time, whatever is born discloses itself, while the due seasons are there and the quickened earth brings its weakly products in safety forth into the borders of light? But if they came from nothing, they would rise up suddenly at uncertain periods and unsuitable times of year, inasmuch as there would be no first-beginnings to be kept from a begetting union by the unpropitious season. No nor would time be required for the growth of things after the meeting of the seed, if they could increase out of nothing. Little babies would at once grow into men and trees in a moment would rise and spring out of the ground. But none of these events it is plain ever comes to pass, since all things grow step by step at a fixed time, as is natural, since they all grow from a fixed seed and in growing preserve their kind; so that you may be sure that all things increase in size and are fed out of their own matter. Furthermore without fixed seasons of rain the earth is unable to put forth its gladdening produce, nor again if kept from food could the nature of living things continue its kind and sustain life; so that you may hold with

greater truth that many bodies are common to many things, as we see letters common to different words, than that any thing could come into being without first-beginnings. Again why could not nature have produced men of such a size and strength as to be able to wade on foot across the sea and rend great mountains with their hands and outlive many generations of living men, if not because an unchanging matter has been assigned for begetting things and what can arise out of this matter is fixed? We must admit therefore that nothing can come from nothing, since things require seed before they can severally be born and be brought out into the buxom fields of air. Lastly since we see that tilled grounds surpass untilled and yield a better produce by the labour of hands, we may infer that there are in the earth first-beginnings of things which by turning up the fruitful clods with the share and labouring the soil of the earth we stimulate to rise. But if there were not such, you would see all things without any labour of ours spontaneously come forth in much greater perfection.

Moreover nature dissolves every thing back into its first bodies and does not annihilate things. For if aught were mortal in all its parts alike, the thing in a moment would be snatched away to destruction from before our eyes; since no force would be needed to produce disruption among its parts and undo their fastenings. Whereas in fact, as all things consist of an imperishable seed, nature suffers the destruction of nothing to be seen, until a force has encountered it sufficient to dash things to pieces by a blow or to pierce through the void places within them and break them up. Again if time, whenever it makes away with things through age, utterly destroys them eating up all their matter, out of what does Venus bring back into the light of life the race of living things each after its kind, or, when they are brought back, out of what does earth manifold in works give them nourishment and increase, furnishing them with food each after its kind? Out of what do its own native fountains and extraneous rivers from far and wide keep full the sea? Out of what does ether feed the stars? For infinite time gone by and lapse of days must have eaten up all things which are of mortal body. Now if in that period of time gone by those things have existed, of which this sum of things is composed and recruited, they are possessed no doubt of an imperishable body, and cannot therefore any of them return to nothing. Again the same force and cause would destroy all things without distinction, unless everlasting matter held them together, matter more or less closely linked in mutual entanglement: a touch in sooth would be sufficient cause of death, inasmuch as any amount of force must of course undo the texture of things in which no parts at all were of an everlasting body. But in fact, because the fastenings of first-beginnings one with the other are unlike and matter is everlasting, things continue with body uninjured, until a force is found to encounter them strong enough to overpower the texture of each. A thing therefore never returns to nothing, but all things after disruption go back into the first bodies of matter. Lastly rains die, when father ether has tumbled them into the lap of mother earth; but then goodly crops spring up and boughs are green with leaves upon the trees, trees themselves grow and are laden with fruit; by them in turn our race and the race of wild beasts are fed, by them we see glad towns teem with children and the leafy forests ring on all sides with the song of new birds; through them cattle wearied with their load of fat lay their bodies down about the glad pastures and the white milky stream pours from the distended udders; through them a new brood with weakly limbs frisks and gambols over the soft grass, rapt in their young hearts with the pure new milk. None of the things therefore which seem to be lost is utterly lost, since nature replenishes one thing out of another and does not suffer any thing to be begotten, before she has been recruited by the death of some other. . .

BOOK II

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Now mark and I will explain by what motion the begetting bodies of matter do beget different things and after they are begotten again break them up, and by what force they are compelled so to do and what velocity is given to them for travelling through the great void: do you

mind to give heed to my words. For verily matter does not cohere inseparably massed together, since we see that everything wanes and perceive that all things ebb as it were by length of time and that age withdraws them from our sight, though yet the sum is seen to remain unimpaired by reason that the bodies which quit each thing, lessen the things from which they go, gift with increase those to which they have come, compel the former to grow old, the latter to come to their prime, and yet abide not with these. Thus the sum of things is ever renewed and mortals live by a reciprocal dependency. Some nations wax, others wane, and in a brief space the races of living things are changed and like runners hand over the lamp of life.

If you think that first-beginnings of things can lag and by lagging give birth to new motions of things, you wander far astray from the path of true reason: since they travel about through void, the first-beginnings of things must all move on either by their own weight or haply by the stroke of another. For when during motion they have, as often happens, met and clashed, the result is a sudden rebounding in an opposite direction; and no wonder, since they are most hard and of weight proportioned to their solidity and nothing behind gets in their way. And that you may more clearly see that all bodies of matter are in restless movement, remember that there is no lowest point in the sum of the universe, and that first bodies have not where to take their stand, since space is without end and limit and extends immeasurably in all directions round, as I have shown in many words and as has been proved by sure reason. Since this then is a certain truth, sure enough no rest is given to first bodies throughout the unfathomable void, but driven on rather in ceaseless and varied motion they partly, after they have pressed together, rebound leaving great spaces between, while in part they are so dashed away after the stroke as to leave but small spaces between. And all that form a denser aggregation when brought together and rebound leaving trifling spaces between, held fast by their own close-tangled shapes, these form enduring bases of stone and unyielding bodies of iron and the rest of their class, few in number, which travel onward along the great void. All the others spring far off and rebound far leaving great spaces between: these furnish us with thin air and bright sunlight. And many more travel along the great void, which have been thrown off from the unions of things or though admitted have yet in no case been able likewise to assimilate their motions. Of this truth, which I am telling, we have a representation and picture always going on before our eyes and present to us: observe whenever the rays are let in and pour the sunlight through the dark chambers of houses: you will see many minute bodies in many ways through the apparent void mingle in the midst of the light of the rays, and as in never-ending conflict skirmish and give battle combating in troops and never halting, driven about in frequent meetings and partings; so that you may guess from this, what it is for first-beginnings of things to be ever tossing about in the great void. So far as it goes, a small thing may give an illustration of great things and put you on the track of knowledge. And for this reason too it is meet that you should give greater heed to these bodies which are seen to tumble about in the sun's rays, because such tumbings imply that motions also of matter latent and unseen are at the bottom. For you will observe many things were impelled by unseen blows to change their course and driven back to return the way they came now this way now that way in all directions round. All you are to know derive this restlessness from the first-beginnings. For the first-beginnings of things move first of themselves; next those bodies which form a small aggregate and come nearest so to say to the powers of the first-beginnings, are impelled and set in movement by the unseen strokes of those first bodies, and they next in turn stir up bodies which are a little larger. Thus motion mounts up from the first-beginnings and step by step issues forth to our senses, so that those bodies also move, which we can discern in the sunlight, though it is not clearly seen by what blows they so act....

BOOK III
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And now since I have shown what-like the beginnings of all things are and how diverse with varied shapes as they fly spontaneously driven on in everlasting motion, and how all things can be severally produced out of these, next after these questions the nature of the mind and soul should methinks be cleared up by my verses and that dread of Acheron be driven headlong forth, troubling as it does the life of man from its inmost depths and overspreading all things with the blackness of death, allowing no pleasure to be pure and unalloyed. . . .

This same principle teaches that the nature of the mind and soul is bodily; for when it is seen to push the limbs, rouse the body from sleep, and alter the countenance and guide and turn about the whole man, and when we see that none of these effects can take place without touch nor touch without body, must we not admit that the mind and the soul are of a bodily nature? Again you perceive that our mind in our body suffers together with the body and feels in unison with it. When a weapon with a shudder-causing force has been driven in and has laid bare bones and sinews within the body, if it does not take life, yet there ensues a faintness and a lazy sinking to the ground and on the ground the turmoil of mind which arises, and sometimes a kind of undecided inclination to get up. Therefore the nature of the mind must be bodily, since it suffers from bodily weapons and blows.

I will now go on to explain in my verses of what kind of body the mind consists and out of what it is formed. First of all I say that it is extremely fine and formed of exceedingly minute bodies. That this is so you may, if you please to attend, clearly perceive from what follows: nothing that is seen takes place with a velocity equal to that of the mind when it starts some suggestion and actually sets it agoing; the mind therefore is stirred with greater rapidity than any of the things whose nature stands out visible to sight. But that which is so passing nimble, must consist of seeds exceedingly round and exceedingly minute, in order to be stirred and set in motion by a small moving power. Thus water is moved and heaves by ever so small a force, formed as it is of small particles apt to roll. But on the other hand the nature of honey is more sticky, its liquid more sluggish and its movement more dilatory; for the whole mass of matter coheres more closely, because sure enough it is made of bodies not so smooth, fine, and round. A breeze however gentle and light can force, as you may see, a high heap of poppy seed to be blown away from the top downwards; but on the other hand Eurus itself cannot move a heap of stones. Therefore bodies possess a power of moving in proportion to their smallness and smoothness; and on the other hand the greater weight and roughness bodies prove to have, the more stable they are. Since then the nature of the mind has been found to be eminently easy to move, it must consist of bodies exceedingly small, smooth, and round. The knowledge of which fact, my good friend, will on many accounts prove useful and be serviceable to you. The following fact too likewise demonstrates how fine the texture is of which its nature is composed, and how small the room is in which it can be contained, could it only be collected into one mass: soon as the untroubled sleep of death has gotten hold of a man and the nature of the mind and soul has withdrawn, you can perceive then no diminution of the entire body either in appearance or weight: death makes all good save the vital sense and heat. Therefore the whole soul must consist of very small seeds and be inwoven through veins and flesh and sinews; inasmuch as, after it has all withdrawn from the whole body, the exterior contour of the limbs preserves itself entire and not a tittle of the weight is lost. Just in the same way when the flavour of wine is gone or when the delicious aroma of a perfume has been dispersed into the air or when the savour has left some body, yet the thing itself does not therefore look smaller to the eye, nor does aught seem to have been taken from the weight, because sure enough many minute seeds make

up the savours and the odour in the whole body of the several things. Therefore, again and again I say, you are to know that the nature of the mind and the soul has been formed of exceedingly minute seeds, since at its departure it takes away none of the weight. . . .

Again the quickened powers of body and mind by their joint partnership enjoy health and life; for the nature of the mind cannot by itself alone without the body give forth vital motions nor can the body again bereft of the soul continue to exist and make use of its senses: just, you are to know, as the eye itself torn away from its roots cannot see anything when apart from the whole body, thus the soul and mind cannot it is plain do anything by themselves. Sure enough, because mixed up through veins and flesh, sinews and bones, their first-beginnings are confined by all the body and are not free to bound away leaving great spaces between, therefore thus shut in they make those sense-giving motions which they cannot make after death when forced out of the body into the air by reason that they are not then confined in a like manner; for the air will be a body and a living thing, if the soul shall be able to keep itself together and to enclose in it those motions which it used before to perform in the sinews and within the body. Moreover even while it yet moves within the confines of life, often the soul shaken from some cause or other is seen to wish to pass out and be loosed from the whole body, the features are seen to droop as at the last hour and all the limbs to sink flaccid over the bloodless trunk: just as happens, when the phrase is used, the mind is in a bad way, or the soul is quite gone; when all is hurry and every one is anxious to keep from parting the last tie of life; for then the mind and the power of the soul are shaken throughout and both are quite loosened together with the body; so that a cause somewhat more powerful can quite break them up. Why doubt I would ask that the soul when driven forth out of the body, when in the open air, feeble as it is, stript of its covering, not only cannot continue through eternity, but is unable to hold together the smallest fraction of time? Therefore, again and again I say, when the enveloping body has been all broken up and the vital airs have been forced out, you must admit that the senses of the mind and the soul are dissolved, since the cause of destruction is one and inseparable for both body and soul. . . .

Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot, since the nature of the mind is proved to be mortal; and as in time gone by we felt no distress, when the Poeni from all sides came together to do battle, and all things shaken by war's troublous uproar shuddered and quaked beneath high heaven, and mortal men were in doubt which of the two peoples it should be to whose empire all must fall by sea and land alike, thus when we shall be no more, when there shall have been a separation of body and soul, out of both of which we are each formed into a single being, to us, you may be sure, who then shall be no more, nothing whatever can happen to excite sensation, not if earth shall be mingled with sea and sea with heaven. And even supposing the nature of the mind and power of the soul do feel, after they have been severed from our body, yet that is nothing to us who by the binding tie of marriage between body and soul are formed each into one single being. And if time should gather up our matter after our death and put it once more into the position in which it now is, and the light of life be given to us again, this result even would concern us not at all, when the chain of our self-consciousness has once been snapped asunder. So now we give ourselves no concern about any self which we have been before, nor do we feel any distress on the score of that self. For when you look back on the whole past course of immeasurable time and think how manifold are the shapes which the motions of matter take, you may easily credit this too, that these very same seeds of which we now are formed, have often before been placed in the same order in which they now are; and yet we cannot recover this in memory: a break in our existence has been interposed, and all the motions have wandered to and fro far astray from the sensations they produced. For he whom evil is to befall, must in his own person exist at the very time it comes, if the mis-

ery and suffering are haply to have any place at all; but since death precludes this, and forbids him to be, upon whom the ills can be brought, you may be sure that we have nothing to fear after death, and that he who exists not, cannot become miserable, and that it matters not a whit whether he has been born into life at any other time, when immortal death has taken away his mortal life.

Therefore when you see a man bemoaning his hard case, that after death he shall either rot with his body laid in the grave or be devoured by flames or the jaws of wild beasts, you may be sure that his ring betrays a flaw and that there lurks in his heart a secret goad, though he himself declare that he does not believe that any sense will remain to him after death. He does not methinks really grant the conclusion which he professes to grant nor the principle on which he so professes, nor does he take and force himself root and branch out of life, but all unconsciously imagines something of self to survive. For when any one in life suggests to himself that birds and beasts will rend his body after death, he makes moan for himself: he does not separate himself from that self, nor withdraw himself fully from the body so thrown out, and fancies himself that other self and stands by and impregnates it with his own sense. Hence he makes much moan that he has been born mortal, and sees not that after real death there will be no other self to remain in life and lament to self that his own self has met death, and there to stand and grieve that his own self there lying is mangled or burnt. For if it is an evil after death to be pulled about by the devouring jaws of wild beasts, I cannot see why it should not be a cruel pain to be laid on fires and burn in hot flames, or to be placed in honey and stifled, or to stiffen with cold, stretched on the smooth surface of an icy slab of stone, or to be pressed down and crushed by a load of earth above.

'Now no more shall thy house admit thee with glad welcome, nor a most virtuous wife and sweet children run to be the first to snatch kisses and touch thy heart with a silent joy. No more mayst thou be prosperous in thy doings, a safeguard to thine own. One disastrous day has taken from thee luckless man in luckless wise all the many prizes of life.' This do men say; but add not thereto 'and now no longer does any craving for these things beset thee withal.' For if they could rightly perceive this in thought and follow up the thought in words, they would release themselves from great distress and apprehension of mind. 'Thou, even as now thou art, sunk in the sleep of death, shalt continue so to be all time to come, freed from all distressful pains; but we with a sorrow that would not be sated wept for thee, when close by thou didst turn to an ashen hue on thy appalling funeral pile, and no length of days shall pluck from our hearts our ever-during grief.' This question therefore should be asked of this speaker, what there is in it so passing bitter, if it come in the end to sleep and rest, that any one should pine in never-ending sorrow.

This too men often, when they have reclined at table cup in hand and shade their brows with crowns, love to say from the heart, 'short is this enjoyment for poor weak men; presently it will have been and never after may it be called back'. As if after their death it is to be one of their chiefest afflictions that thirst and parching drought is to burn them up hapless wretches, or a craving for any thing else is to beset them. What folly! no one feels the want of himself and life at the time when mind and body are together sunk in sleep; for all we care this sleep might be everlasting, no craving whatever for ourselves then moves us. And yet by no means do those first-beginnings throughout our frame wander at that time far away from their sense-producing motions, at the moment when a man starts up from sleep and collects himself. Death therefore must be thought to concern us much less, if less there can be than what we see to be nothing; for a greater dispersion of the mass of matter follows after death, and no one wakes up, upon whom the chill cessation of life has once come.

Once more, if the nature of things could suddenly utter a voice and in person could rally any of us in such words as these, 'what hast thou,

O mortal, so much at heart, that thou goest such lengths in sickly sorrows? Why bemoan and bewail death? For say thy life past and gone has been welcome to thee and thy blessings have not all, as if they were poured into a perforated vessel, run through and been lost without avail: why not then take thy departure like a guest filled with life, and with resignation, thou fool, enter upon untroubled rest? But if all that thou hast enjoyed, has been squandered and lost, and life is a grievance, why seek to make any addition, to be wasted perversely in its turn and lost utterly without avail? Why not rather make an end of life and travail? For there is nothing more which I can contrive and discover for thee to give pleasure: all things are ever the same. Though thy body is not yet decayed with years nor thy frame worn out and exhausted, yet all things remain the same, ay though in length of life thou shouldst outlast all races of things now living, nay even more if thou shouldst never die, what answer have we to make save this, that nature sets up against us a well-founded claim and puts forth in her pleading a true indictment? If however one of greater age and more advanced in years should complain and lament poor wretch his death more than is right, would she not with greater cause raise her voice and rally him in sharp accents, 'Away from this time forth with thy tears, rascal; a truce to thy complainings: thou decayest after full enjoyment of all the prizes of life. But because thou ever yearnest for what is not present, and despisest what is, life has slipped from thy grasp unfinished and unsatisfying, and or ever thou thoughtest, death has taken his stand at thy pillow, before thou canst take thy departure sated and filled with good things. Now however resign all things unsuited to thy age, and with a good grace up and greatly go: thou must.' With good reason methinks she would bring her charge, with reason rally and reproach; for old things give way and are supplanted by new without fail, and one thing must ever be replenished out of other things; and no one is delivered over to the pit and black Tartarus: matter is needed for after generations to grow; all of which though they follow thee when they have finished their term of life; and thus it is that all these no less than thou have before this come to an end and hereafter will come to an end. Thus one thing will never cease to rise out of another, and life is granted to none in fee-simple, to all in usufruct. Think too how the bygone antiquity of everlasting time before our birth was nothing to us. Nature therefore holds this up to us as a mirror of the time yet to come after our death. Is there aught in this that looks appalling, aught that wears an aspect of gloom? Is it not more untroubled than any sleep?...

Once more what evil lust of life is this which constrains us with such force to be so mightily troubled in doubts and dangers? A sure term of life is fixed for mortals, and death cannot be shunned, but meet it we must. Moreover we are ever engaged, ever involved in the same pursuits, and no new pleasure is struck out by living on; but whilst what we crave is wanting, it seems to transcend all the rest; then, when it has been gotten, we crave something else, and ever does the same thirst of life possess us, as we gape for it open-mouthed. Quite doubtful it is what fortune the future will carry with it or what chance will bring us or what end is at hand. Nor by prolonging life do we take one tittle from the time past in death nor can we fret anything away, whereby we may haply be a less long time in the condition of the dead. Therefore you may complete as many generations as you please during your life; none the less however will that everlasting death await you; and for no less long a time will he be no more in being, who beginning with to-day has ended his life, than the man who has died many months and years ago.

EPICETUS

ENCHEIRIDION

I

Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion, movement towards a thing, desire, aversion; and in a word, whatever are our own acts: not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices, and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. Remember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men: but if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is another's as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily, no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm.

If then you desire such great things, remember that you must not lay hold of them with a small effort; but you must leave alone some things entirely, and postpone others for the present. But if you wish for these things also, and power and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things because you aim also at those former things: certainly you will fail in those things through which alone happiness and freedom are secured. Straightway then, practice saying to every harsh appearance, You are an appearance, and in no manner what you appear to be. Then examine it by the rules which you possess, and by this first and chiefly, whether it relates to the things which are in our power or to things which are not in our power: and if it relates to anything which is not in our power, be ready to say, that it does not concern you.

III

In every thing which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the description; what is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has been broken, you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed.

IV

When you are going to take in hand any act, remind yourself what kind of an act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what happens in the bath: some splashing the water, others pushing against one another, others abusing one another, and some stealing: and thus with more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformable to nature. And so you will do in every act: for thus if any hindrance to bathing shall happen, let this thought be ready: it was not this only that I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a way conformable to nature; but I shall not maintain it so, if I am vexed at what happens.

V

Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things: for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, it would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinion about death, that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded or disturbed or grieved, let us never blame others, but

ourselves, that is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame others for his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself.

VIII

Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.

X

On the occasion of every accident that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use. If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to resist is temperance. If labour be presented to you, you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will find it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the proper habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them.

XIV

If you would have your children and your wife and your friends to live for ever, you are silly; for you would have the things which are not in your power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others to be yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults, you are a fool; for you would have badness not to be badness, but something else. But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are able to do that. Practice then this which you are able to do. He is the master of every man who has the power over the things, which another person wishes or does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither wish for anything nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not observe this rule, he must be a slave.

XV

Remember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that something is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your hand and take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with respect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect to magisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some time a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take none of the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then you will be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, but also a partner with them in power. For by acting thus Diogenes and Heracleitus and those like them were deservedly divine, and were so called.

XIX

You can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is not in your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honoured before others or possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any reason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by the appearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy nor jealousy will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish to be a general or senator or consul, but a free man: and there is only one way to this, to despise the things which are not in our power.

XX

Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When then a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion which has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried away by the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will more easily master yourself.

XXVI

We may learn the will of nature from the things in which we do not differ from one another: for instance, when your neighbor's slave has broken his cup, or any thing else, we are ready to say forthwith, that it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that when your cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when your neighbor's cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater things also. Is another man's child or wife dead? There is no one who would not say, this is an event incident to man. But when a man's own child or wife is dead, forthwith he calls out, "Wo to me, how wretched I am." But we ought to remember how we feel when we hear that it has happened to others.

XXVII

As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

XXXI

As to piety toward the Gods you must know that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and that they administer All well and justly; and you must fix yourself in this principle, to obey them, and yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will never either blame the Gods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be done in any other way than by withdrawing from the things which are not in our power, and by placing the good and the evil only in those things which are in our power. For if you think that any of the things which are not in our power is good or bad, it is absolutely necessary that, when you do not obtain what you wish, and when you fall into those things which you do not wish, you will find fault and hate those who are the cause of them; for every animal is formed by nature to this, to fly from and to turn from the things which appear harmful and the things which are the cause of the harm, but to follow and admire the things which are useful and the causes of the useful. It is impossible then for a person who thinks that he is harmed to be delighted with that which he thinks to be the cause of the harm, as it is also impossible to be pleased with the harm itself. For this reason also a father is reviled by his son, when he gives no part to his son of the things which are considered to be good: and it was this which made Polynices and Eteocles enemies, the opinion that royal power was a good. It is for this reason that the cultivator of the earth reviles the Gods, for this reason the sailor does, and the merchant, and for this reason those who lose their wives and their children. For where the useful is, there also piety is. Consequently he who takes care to desire as he ought and to avoid as he ought, at the same time also cares after piety. But to make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor carelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do.

In every thing we should hold these maxims ready to hand:

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go:
To follow I am ready. If I choose not,
I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.

But whoso nobly yields unto necessity,
We hold him wise, and skill'd in things divine.

And the third also : O Crito, if so it pleases the Gods, so let it be; Anytus and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me.

(Translated by George Long, 1877.)

THE MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

BOOK II

BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not only of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in the same intelligence and the same portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away.

3. All that is from the gods is full of Providence. That which is from fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and involution with the things which are ordered by Providence. From thence all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee, let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to the gods.

5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more from him who observes these things.

8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says, like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through desire are more blameable than those which are committed through anger. For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed with pleasure is more blameable than that which is com-

mitted with pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something by desire.

14. Though thou shouldst be going to live three thousand years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere moment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of like forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the only thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it not.

15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.

16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and polity.

17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgement. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

This in Carnuntum.

BOOK IV

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3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred; and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at last.—But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to thee out of the universe.—Recall to thy recollection this alternative; either there is providence or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things; or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of political community, and be quiet at last.—But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon thee.—Consider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and pleasure, and be quiet at last.—But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment thee.—See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of the present, and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want of judgement in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space within which it is circumscribed, and be quiet at last. For the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.

This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these things, which thou seest, change immediately and will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.

4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.

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DIOGENES LAERTIUS ON EPICURUS

TRANSLATED BY
MILTON P. BROWN

Although Epicurus himself was a prolific writer, very little of his own work survives, and most of that is in fragments reported to us by writers of a later time. Such is Diogenes Laertius, writing about 225 BC. In his long work on The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers Diogenes devoted the tenth and final book to the life and thought of Epicurus. In that book he quoted what is now regarded as one of our most valuable primary sources on Epicurus' teachings, the "Letter to Menoeceus." What follows below is a translation of an excerpt (roughly one-half) of that letter from Epicurus to his disciple.

EPICURUS TO MENOECEUS, GREETINGS. . . .

[The letter starts with some exhortations to Menoeceus to "study philosophy" for the sake of his soul's health, by which he means happiness. Right belief in God is encouraged, though piety as commonly understood and practiced by hoi polloi is to be shunned. Wise men do not yearn after immortality nor fear death, which is simply the cessation of all consciousness or feeling.]

One ought also to consider that among the various desires we have some are natural, but others are idle or vain. And of the natural desires, some are necessary, and some are only natural (but not necessary).* And of those necessary desires, some are so for the sake of happiness, and others are necessary for freedom from bodily trouble, and still others for survival itself. Now steady contemplation of these things will relate every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the tranquility of the soul, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For this is why we do all we do--that we may not feel pain nor live in dread; and when once this becomes our lot, every tempest of the soul is relieved, seeing that the living creature has no reason to move as if in need of something or to seek anything else by which the good of soul and body should be fulfilled.

Now we have need of pleasure precisely at that time when we experience pain because of pleasure's absence; but when we are not in pain, we no longer need pleasure. So that is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life. This is what we recognize as a primary and congenial good, for we make pleasure our point of departure in every choice and avoidance, and to this we turn, as we judge every good thing by the criterion of its effect (whether pleasurable or painful.) And since this is our primary and inborn good, we do not on this account choose just any pleasure, but there are times when we pass over many pleasures, when the

unpleasant effect that would follow from these would seem to us more (than the pleasure to be gained). Indeed, many pains we count better than pleasures, when by enduring the pains for a long time we experience the greater pleasure. Therefore, while all pleasure--because it is naturally congenial--is good, not every pleasure is to be desired; accordingly, all pain is an evil, but not every pain nature has produced is always to be avoided.

However, by calculating both what is profitable and what is inexpedient one will see how properly to judge all these things. So we may, depending on the occasion, treat the good as an evil or, conversely, the evil as a good.

Also we regard independence or self-sufficiency a great good, not that invariably we get by on little, but that in the event we have not much, we may be content with little, sincerely persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who need it least, and that everything natural is easy to get, but what is vain or meaningless is hard to gain. For plain food offers pleasure equal to a costly diet when once the pain of want is taken away; even bread and water furnish the pinnacle of pleasure when offered to the hungry. So to get in the habit of living simply and inexpensively is fully adequate for (good) health; moreover it makes a man resolute in meeting life's necessities, it conditions us for those times when we come upon luxuries, and it prepares us to be unafraid of fortune.

Therefore, when we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the dissolute and those that depend on (sensual) enjoyment, as some suppose out of ignorance and confusion or maligning prejudice, but rather (the ideal is) to feel no pain of body nor be troubled in soul or mind. For it is not drinking-bouts and revels strung together, not enjoyment of boys and women, nor of fish and other (such delicacies)--whatever the expensive table bears--that produce the sweet life, but it is sober reasoning, examining the causes of every choice and avoidance, and driving out those beliefs through which the greatest tumult seizes our souls. Of all these the foremost and greatest good is prudence; thus prudence is more to be prized even than philosophy. From it stem all the other virtues, since it teaches that it is impossible to live pleasantly without living thoughtfully and nobly and justly, and (likewise) impossible to live thoughtfully, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. For the virtues have grown together in the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.

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*Editorial and explanatory phrases, not a part of the Greek text, are put in parentheses.

SELECTIONS FROM THE LAWS AND THE REPUBLIC

BY

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO

Translated by
Richard C. Wood

On Law, Justice, and Reason

Laws VI. . . . To arrive at Justice, the most learned men have agreed to start with the Law, the right decision for them if, as they define it, Law is the highest reason inherent in nature, which commands what ought to be done and prohibits the opposite. This reason, when confirmed and crystallized in the human mind, is Law. And so they hold that Law is intelligence, which commands right action and forbids wrongdoing. They think Law derives its name in Greek from the idea of granting to each man what is rightly his; I believe it is linked in our language with the idea of choosing. If they have associated Law with fairness to all, we have considered it as a selection, although both assumptions are proper to Law. If this is correct defining, and I think it is, then Justice grows out of Law, for Law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and injustice are determined.

Laws VII. . . . That animal we call man, perceptive, quick-witted, complex, keen, gifted with memory, full of reason and purpose, has been endowed by the supreme God, his creator, with a distinguished status. For he alone out of all the varieties of living things participates in reason and thought, while all the rest are bereft. Indeed, what is more divine--I will not say in man only but in all heaven and earth--than reason? And reason, when it has become mature and complete, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore there is nothing better than reason, which is the prime common possession of man and God. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must hold that men have Law in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must share Justice; those who share these are to be considered members of the same civil society. If indeed they submit to the same authorities and powers, this is an even greater truth. They do serve the celestial order of things, the divine mind, the transcendent God. Therefore we must assume that the whole universe is a common-wealth of gods and men.

Laws X. . . . Nothing more important is reflected upon in scholarly discussions than the complete realization that we are born for Justice, not as a matter of opinion but as a fact of nature. This will become clear at once if you perceive the interrelationships and unity of mankind. For nothing is so like anything else, so much the same, as all of us are to each other. If bad habits and foolish beliefs did not distort the weak-minded and bend them the way they are inclined to go, no man would be as much like himself as like everybody else. However man is to be defined, one definition applies to all. This is proof enough that there is no difference in kind, for if there were, one definition would not apply to all men; indeed reason, which raises us above the beasts and makes us able to speculate, to prove and disprove, to argue and solve problems, and to come to conclusions, is certainly common to all, and though differing in what may be learned, the ability to learn is the same. For the same things are perceived by the senses, and those things which affect the senses affect them the same way in all men; and those primitive beginnings of intelligence of which I have spoken, which were imprinted on our minds, are imprinted on all minds alike; and speech, the interpreter of the mind, though varying in the choice of words, agrees in the sentiments expressed. There is no human being whatsoever who, if he acquires a guide, cannot attain virtue.

The One Law

Republic XXII. . . . True Law is right reason in agreement with nature; it suffuses everything, unchanging, everlasting; it commands to duty and prohibits wrongdoing. It does not vainly command or prohibit good men, although it does not change the wicked. It is wrong to try to alter this Law or to repeal it, nor can it be abolished altogether. We cannot be released from its obligations by Senate or people, and we need not search beyond ourselves for an interpreter or expounder of it. Nor will there be a different law at Rome from that at Athens or a different law now from that in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable Law will hold for all people and all times, and there will be the one master and ruler of all, God, who is the author of this Law, its promulgator and its high judge. Whoever is disobedient flees from himself, and whoever denies his human nature will suffer by this fact the worst penalties, even if he escapes obvious punishment. . . .

VERGIL

ECLOGUE IV

Sicilian Muses, let the shepherd's rhyme
A loftier theme pursue. Not all delight
In cosses green and humble hedge-row flowers.
Yet may this music please our consul's ear!

Now come the world's last days, the age foretold
By Cumae's prophetess in sacred song.
The vast world-process brings a new-born time.
Once more the Virgin comes and Saturn's reign,
Behold a heaven-born offspring earthward hies!
Holy Lucina, lend thy light and aid
The while this child is born before whose power
The iron race of mortals shall give way,
And o'er this earth a golden people reign,
For blest Apollo is at last their king.
While you are consul, Pollio, forth shall shine
This glory of our age; guided by thee
These potent times begin, which if there be
Some stain still with us of our common guilt,
Shall blot it out and from its age-long fear
Set the world free. The child to whom I sing
Will have a life divine, and as of old
See kings and heroes with great gods confer,
Himself their counsel sharing, while he rules
A world his virtuous father led to peace.

For tributes at thy birth, O blessed babe,
The untilled earth with wandering ivies wild
Shall mingle spikenard, and from bounteous breast
Pour forth her lilies and Egyptian balm;
The flock shall come unguided to the fold
Flowing with milk; nor shall the feeding sheep
At the huge lion tremble; fragrant flowers
Shall from thy cradle spring; the deadly snake
Shall perish, every baneful herb shall fail,
And orient spices by the wayside bloom.

As soon as you have learned to read about
Our glorious heroes and the mighty deeds
Your father wrought, soon as your soul shall see
What beauty virtue wears,--in those blest days
The unploughed field shall yellowing harvests show,
The bramble-bushes yield the purple grape,
And hard-limbed oaks distil sweet honey dew.
Some traces may remain of wicked guile,
Which bade men vex with ships the sacred sea,
Or circle towns with stone, or scar earth's breast

With furrows. Another Argo then
Shall carry chosen heroes, at her helm
Another Tiphys sitting; other wars
Shall blaze abroad and once again will come
The great Achilles to the Trojan town.
Yet when in after-time the strengthening years
Have made you man, from kingdoms of the sea
The trader's sail shall cease, nor to and fro
With foreign cargoes ply from shore to shore.
Each land shall all things bear; the patient ground
Shall feel no mattock, nor the vine a knife.
The brawny ploughmen from the laboring yoke
Shall let their bulls go free. No woven wool
Shall flaunt its stolen hues; the ram himself
Shall in the meadows wear the Tyrian stain,
Or change to saffron; and vermilion gay
Shall mantle artlessly the feeding lambs.

"Thus let the ages ever onward roll!"
So sang the Fates, turning their spindles round,
Obedient to the fixed decree of doom.

Receive this glory, for your day is risen,
O child of gods, offspring of mighty Jove!
Look, how the round world with its burden reels,
Its far-spread shores and seas and boundless sky!
Look, with what joy it hails the time to be!
Oh, may such length of days be granted me,
And skill, as shall suffice your deeds to tell!
Not then would Thracian Orpheus' heavenly strains
Nor Linus' voice outdo me; though to one
His mother gave the song, to one his sire--
The Muse to Orpheus, Phoebus to his son.
Yea, Pan himself, though all Arcadia heard,
Would own Pan vanquished in Arcadia's ear.

Infant, begin! Give back your mother's smile
Who ten long moons her weary sickness bore!
Begin, O child! If parents give no smile,
What god would sup with you, or goddess wed?

Translation by T. C. Williams,
slightly revised

THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE

THE EIGHTH BOOK

Augustine's thirty-second year. He consults Simplicianus: from him hears the history of the conversion of Victorinus, and longs to devote himself entirely to God, but is mastered by his old habits; is still further roused by the history of St. Antony, and the conversion of two courtiers; during a severe struggle hears a voice from heaven, opens Scripture, and is converted, with his friend Alypius. His mother's vision fulfilled.

O MY God, let me, with thanksgiving, remember, and confess unto Thee Thy mercies on me. *Let my bones be bedewed with Thy love, and let them say unto Thee, Who is like unto Thee, O Lord? Thou hast broken my bonds in sunder, I will offer unto Thee the sacrifice of thanksgiving.* And how Thou hast broken them, I will declare; and all who worship Thee, when they hear this, shall say, "Blessed be the Lord in heaven and in earth, great and wonderful is His name." Thy words had stuck fast in my heart, and *I was hedged round about on all sides by Thee.* Of Thy eternal life I was now certain, though I saw it in a figure and as *through a glass.* Yet I had ceased to doubt that there was an incorruptible substance, whence was all other substance; nor did I now desire to be more certain of Thee, but more steadfast in Thee. But for my temporal life, all was wavering, and *my heart had to be purged from the old leaven.* *The Way,* the Saviour Himself, well pleased me, but as yet I shrunk from going through its straitness.

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For, I saw the church full; and one went this way, and another that way. But I was displeased that I led a secular life; yea now that my desires no longer inflamed me, as of old, with hopes of honour and profit, a very grievous burden it was to undergo so heavy a bondage. For, in comparison of Thy sweetness, *and the beauty of Thy house which I loved,* those things delighted me no longer. But still I was enthralled with the love of woman; nor did the Apostle forbid me to marry, although he advised me to something better, chiefly wishing *that all men were as himself was.*

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My will the enemy held, and thence had made a chain for me, and bound me. For of a froward will, was a lust made; and a lust served, became custom; and custom not resisted, became necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together (whence I called it a chain) a hard bondage held me enthralled. But that new will which had begun to be in me, freely to serve Thee, and to wish to enjoy Thee, O God, the only assured pleasantness, was not yet able to overcome my former wilfulness, strengthened by age. Thus did my two wills, one new, and the other old, one carnal, the other spiritual, struggle within me; and by their discord, undid my soul.

Thus I understood, by my own experience, what I had read, how *the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.* Myself verily either way; yet more myself, in that which I approved in myself, than in that which in myself I disapproved. For in this last, it was now for the more part not myself, because in much I

rather endured against my will, than acted willingly. And yet it was through me, that custom had obtained this power of warring against me, because I had come willingly, whither I willed not. And who has any right to speak against it, if just punishment follow the sinner? Nor had I now any longer my former plea, that I therefore as yet hesitated to be above the world and serve Thee, for that the truth was not altogether ascertained to me; for now it too was. But I, still under service to the earth, refused to fight under Thy banner, and feared as much to be freed of all encumbrances, as we should fear to be encumbered with it. Thus with the baggage of this present world was I held down pleasantly, as in sleep; and the thoughts wherein I meditated on Thee were like the efforts of such as would awake, who yet overcome with a heavy drowsiness, are again drenched therein. And as no one would sleep for ever, and in all men's sober judgment waking is better, yet a man for the most part, feeling a heavy lethargy in all his limbs, defers to shake off sleep, and, though half displeased, yet even, after it is time to rise, with pleasure yields to it, so was I assured that much better were it for me to give myself up to Thy charity, than to give myself over to mine own cupidity; but though the former course satisfied me and gained the mastery, the latter pleased me and held me mastered. Nor had I any thing to answer Thee calling to me, *Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light.* And when Thou didst on all sides show me that what Thou saidst was true, I, convicted by the truth, had nothing at all to answer, but only those dull and drowsy words, "Anon, anon," "presently," "leave me but a little." But "presently, presently," had no present, and my "little while" went on for a long while; in vain *I delighted in Thy law according to the inner man, when another law in my members rebelled against the law of my mind, and led me captive under the law of sin which was in my members.* For the law of sin is the violence of custom, whereby the mind is drawn and holden, even against its will; but deservedly, for that it willingly fell into it. *Who then should deliver me thus wretched from the body of this death, but Thy grace only, through Jesus Christ our Lord?...*

Then in this great contention of my inward dwelling, which I had strongly raised against my soul, in *the chamber* of my heart, troubled in mind and countenance, I turned upon Alypius. "What ails us?" I exclaim: "what is it? what heardest thou? The unlearned start up and *take heaven by force*, and we with our learning, and without heart, lo, where we wallow in flesh and blood! Are we ashamed to follow, because others are gone before, and not ashamed not even to follow?" Some such words I uttered, and my fever of mind tore me away from him, while he, gazing on me in astonishment, kept silence. For it was not my wonted tone; and my forehead, cheeks, eyes, colour, tone of voice, spake my mind more than the words I uttered. A little garden there was to our lodging, which we had the use of, as of the whole house; for the master of the house, our host, was not living there. Thither had the tumult of my breast hurried me, where no man might hinder the hot contention wherein I had engaged with myself, until it should end as Thou knewest, I knew not. Only I was healthfully distracted and dying, to live; knowing what evil thing I was, and not knowing what good thing I was shortly to become. I retired then into the garden, and Alypius, on my steps. For his presence did not lessen my privacy; or how could he forsake me so disturbed? We sate down as far removed as might be from the house. I was troubled in spirit, most vehemently indig-

into myself. What said I not against myself? with what scourges of condemnation lashed I not my soul, that it might follow me, striving to go after Thee! Yet it drew back; refused, but excused not itself. All arguments were spent and confuted; there remained a mute shrinking; and she feared, as she would death, to be restrained from the flux of that custom, whereby she was wasting to death.

Lastly, in the very fever of my irresoluteness, I made with my body many such motions as men sometimes would, but cannot, if either they have not the limbs, or these be bound with bands, weakened with infirmity, or any other way hindered. Thus, if I tore my hair, beat my forehead, if locking my fingers I clasped my knees; I willed, I did it. But I might have willed, and not done it; if the power of motion in my limbs had not obeyed. So many things then I did, when "to will" was not in itself "to be able"; and I did not what both I longed incomparably more to do, and which soon after, when I should will, I should be able to do; because soon after, when I should will, I should will thoroughly. For in these things the ability was one with the will, and to will was to do; and yet was it not done: and more easily did my body obey the weakest willing of my soul, in moving its limbs at its nod, than the soul obeyed itself to accomplish in the will alone this its momentous will.

Whence is this monstrousness? and to what end? Let Thy mercy gleam that I may ask, if so be the secret penalties of men, and those darkest pangs of the sons of Adam, may perhaps answer me. Whence is this monstrousness? and to what end? The mind commands the body, and it obeys instantly; the mind commands itself, and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved; and such readiness is there, that command is scarce distinct from obedience. Yet the mind is mind, the hand is body. The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will and yet it doth not. Whence this monstrousness? and to what end? It commands itself, I say, to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely: therefore doth it not command entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth; and, so far forth is the thing commanded, not done, as it willeth not. For the will commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself. But it doth not command entirely, therefore what it commandeth, is not. For were the will entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will, partly to nill, but a disease of the mind, that it doth not wholly rise, by truth up-borne, borne down by custom. And therefore are there two wills, for that one of them is not entire: and what the one lacketh, the other hath. . .

Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing myself much more severely than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain, till that were wholly broken, whereby I now was but just, but still was, held. And Thou, O Lord, pressedst upon me in my inward parts by a severe mercy, redoubling the lashes of fear and shame, lest I should again give way, and not bursting that same slight remaining tie, it should recover strength, and bind me the faster. For I said within myself, "Be it done now, be it done now," and as I spake, I all but enacted it: I all but did it, and did it not; yet sunk not back to my former state, but kept my stand hard by, and took breath. And I essayed again, and wanted somewhat less of it, and somewhat less, and all but touched, and laid hold of it; and yet came not at it, nor touched nor laid hold of it; hesitating to die to death and to live to life: and the worse whereto I was injured, prevailed more with me than the better whereto I was unused: and the very moment

wherein I was to become other than I was, the nearer it approached me, the greater horror did it strike into me; yet did it not strike me back, nor turned me away, but held me in suspense.

The very toys of toys, and vanities of vanities, my ancient mistresses, still held me; they plucked my fleshly garment, and whispered softly, "Dost thou cast us off? and from that moment shall we no more be with thee for ever? and from that moment shall not this or that be lawful for thee for ever?" And what was it which they suggested in that I said, "this or that," what did they suggest, O my God? Let Thy mercy turn it away from the soul of Thy servant. What defilements did they suggest! what shame! And now I much less than half heard them, and not openly showing themselves and contradicting me, but muttering as it were behind my back, and privily plucking me, as I was departing, but to look back on them. Yet they did retard me, so that I hesitated to burst and shake myself free from them, and to spring over whither I was called; a violent habit saying to me, "Thinkest thou, thou canst live without them?"

But now it spake very faintly. For on that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there appeared unto me the chaste dignity of Continency, serene, yet not relaxedly, gay, honestly alluring me to come and doubt not; and stretching forth to receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples: there were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave widows and aged virgins; and Continnence herself in all, not barren, but a *fruitful mother of children* of joys, by Thee her Husband, O Lord. And she smiled on me with a persuasive mockery, as would she say, "Canst not thou what these youths, what these maidens can? or can they either in themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God? The Lord their God gave me unto them. Why standest thou in thyself, and so standest not? cast thyself upon Him, fear not He will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldest fall; cast thyself fearlessly upon Him, He will receive, and will heal thee." And I blushed exceedingly, for that I yet heard the muttering of those toys, and hung in suspense. And she again seemed to say, "Stop thine ears against *those* thy unclean *members on the earth*, that they may be *mortified*. *They tell thee of delights, but not as doth the law of the Lord thy God.*" This controversy in my heart was self against self only. But Alypius sitting close by my side, in silence waited the issue of my unwonted emotion.

But when a deep consideration had from the secret bottom of my soul drawn together and heaped up all my misery in the sight of my heart; there arose a mighty storm, bringing a mighty shower of tears. Which that I might pour forth wholly, in its natural expressions, I rose from Alypius: solitude was suggested to me as fitter for the business of weeping; so I retired so far that even his presence could not be a burden to me. Thus was it then with me, and he perceived something of it; for something I suppose I had spoken, wherein the tones of my voice appeared choked with weeping, and so had risen up. He then remained where we were sitting, most extremely astonished. I cast myself down I know not how, under a certain fig-tree, giving full vent to my tears; and the floods of mine eyes gushed out an *acceptable sacrifice to Thee*. And, not indeed in these words, yet to this purpose, spake I much unto Thee: *and Thou, O Lord, how long? how long, Lord, wilt Thou be angry, for ever? Remember not our former iniquities,*⁶³ for I felt that I was held by them. I sent up these sorrowful words: How long, how long, "to-morrow, and to-morrow?" Why not now? why not is there this hour an end to my uncleanness?

So was I speaking and weeping in the most bitter contrition of my heart, when, lo! I heard from a neighbouring house a voice, as of boy or girl, I know not, chanting, and oft repeating, "Take up and read; Take up and read." Instantly, my countenance altered, I began to think most intently whether children were wont in any kind of play to sing such words: nor could I remember ever to have heard the like. So checking the torrent of my tears, I arose; interpreting it to be no other than a command from God to open the book, and read the first chapter I should find. For I had heard of Antony, that coming in during the reading of the Gospel, he received the admonition, as if what was being read was spoken to him: *Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come and follow me:* and by such oracle he was forthwith converted unto Thee. Eagerly then I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting; for there had I laid the volume of the Apostle when I arose thence. I seized, opened, and in silence read that section on which my eyes first fell: *Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence.* No further would I read; nor needed I: for instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the darkness of doubt vanished away.

Then putting my finger between, or some other mark, I shut the volume, and with a calmed countenance made it known to Alypius. And what was wrought in him, which I knew not, he thus showed me. He asked to see what I had read: I showed him; and he looked even further than I had read, and I knew not what followed. This followed, *him that is weak in the faith, receive;* which he applied to himself, and disclosed to me. And by this admonition was he strengthened; and by a good resolution and purpose, and most corresponding to his character, wherein he did always very far differ from me, for the better, without any turbulent delay he joined me. Thence we go in to my mother; we tell her; she rejoiceth: we relate in order how it took place; she leaps for joy, and triumpheth, and blessed Thee, *Who art able to do above that which we ask or think;* for she perceived that Thou hadst given her more for me, than she was wont to beg by her pitiful and most sorrowful groanings. For thou convertedst me unto Thyself, so that I sought neither wife, nor any hope of this world, standing in that rule of faith, where Thou hadst showed me unto her in a vision, so many years before. And Thou didst *convert her mourning into joy* much more plentiful than she had desired, and in a much more precious and purer way than she erst required, by having grandchildren of my body.

THE CITY OF GOD.

BOOK FOURTEENTH.

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Of the nature of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly.

Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves : the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God ; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men ; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory ; the other says to its God, "Thou art my glory, and the lifter up of mine head." In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling ; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers ; the other says to its God, "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength." And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man, have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God "glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened ; professing themselves to be wise,"—that is, glorying in their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride,—"they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." For they were either leaders or followers of the people in adoring images, "and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever." But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, "that God may be all in all."

BOOK NINETEENTH.

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What produces peace, and what discord, between the heavenly and earthly cities.

But the families which do not live by faith seek their peace in the earthly advantages of this life ; while the families which live by faith look for those eternal blessings which are promised, and use as pilgrims such advantages of time and of earth as do not fascinate and divert them from God, but rather aid them to endure with greater ease, and to keep down the number of those burdens of the corruptible body which weigh upon the soul. Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both kinds of men and families

alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely different aim in using them. The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it. But, as the earthly city has had some philosophers whose doctrine is condemned by the divine teaching, and who, being deceived either by their own conjectures or by demons, supposed that many gods must be invited to take an interest in human affairs, and assigned to each a separate function and a separate department,—to one the body, to another the soul; and in the body itself, to one the head, to another the neck, and each of the other members to one of the gods; and in like manner, in the soul, to one god the natural capacity was assigned, to another education, to another anger, to another lust; and so the various affairs of life were assigned,—cattle to one, corn to another, wine to another, oil to another, the woods to another, money to another, navigation to another, wars and victories to another, marriages to another, births and fecundity to another, and other things to other gods: and as the celestial city, on the other hand, knew that one God only was to be worshipped, and that to Him alone was due that service which the Greeks call *λατρεία*, and which can be given only to a god, it has come to pass that the two cities could not have common laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been compelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious to those who think differently, and to stand the brunt of their anger and hatred and persecutions, except in so far as the minds of their enemies have been alarmed by the multitude of the Christians and quelled by the manifest protection of God accorded to them. This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognising that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessities of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can be truly

called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want, and in all its members subjected to the will. In its pilgrim state the heavenly city possesses this peace by faith; and by this faith it lives righteously when it refers to the attainment of that peace every good action towards God and man; for the life of the city is a social life.

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BOOK TWENTIETH.

What the reign of the saints with Christ for a thousand years is, and how it differs from the eternal kingdom.

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But while the devil is bound, the saints reign with Christ during the same thousand years, understood in the same way, that is, of the time of His first coming. For, leaving out of account that kingdom concerning which He shall say in the end, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, take possession of the kingdom prepared for you," the Church could not now be called His kingdom or the kingdom of heaven unless His saints were even now reigning with Him, though in another and far different way; for to His saints He says, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world." Certainly it is in this present time that the scribe well instructed in the kingdom of God, and of whom we have already spoken, brings forth from his treasure things new and old. And from the Church those reapers shall gather out the tares which He suffered to grow with the wheat till the harvest, as He explains in the words, "The harvest is the end of the world; and the reapers are the angels. As therefore the tares are gathered together and burned with fire, so shall it be in the end of the world. The Son of man shall send His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all offences." Can He mean out of that kingdom in which are no offences? Then it must be out of His present kingdom, the Church, that they are gathered. So He says, "He that breaketh one of the least of these commandments, and teacheth men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven: but he that doeth and teacheth thus shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." He speaks of both as being in the kingdom of heaven, both the man who does not perform the commandments which He teaches,—for "to break" means not to keep, not to perform,—and the man who does and teaches as He did; but the one He calls least, the other great. And He immediately adds, "For I say unto you, that except your righteousness exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees,"—that is, the righteousness of those who break what they teach; for of the scribes and Pharisees He elsewhere says, "For they say and do not;"—unless, therefore, your righteousness exceed theirs, that is, so that you do not break but rather do what you teach, "ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven." We must understand in one sense the kingdom of heaven in which exist together both he who breaks what he teaches and he who does it, the one being least, the other great, and in another sense the kingdom of heaven into which only he who does what he teaches shall enter. Con-

sequently, where both classes exist, it is the Church as it now is, but where only the one shall exist, it is the Church as it is destined to be when no wicked person shall be in her. Therefore the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign hereafter; and yet, though the tares grow in the Church along with the wheat, they do not reign with Him. For they reign with Him who do what the apostle says, "If ye be risen with Christ, mind the things which are above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God. Seek those things which are above, not the things which are on the earth." Of such persons he also says that their conversation is in heaven. In fine, they reign with Him who are so in His kingdom that they themselves are His kingdom. But in what sense are those the kingdom of Christ who, to say no more, though they are in it until all offences are gathered out of it at the end of the world, yet seek their own things in it, and not the things that are Christ's?

It is then of this kingdom militant, in which conflict with the enemy is still maintained, and war carried on with warring lusts, or government laid upon them as they yield, until we come to that most peaceful kingdom in which we shall reign without an enemy, and it is of this first resurrection in the present life, that the Apocalypse speaks in the words just quoted. For, after saying that the devil is bound a thousand years and is afterwards loosed for a short season, it goes on to give a sketch of what the Church does or of what is done in the Church in those days, in the words, "And I saw seats and them that sat upon them, and judgment was given." It is not to be supposed that this refers to the last judgment, but to the seats of the rulers and to the rulers themselves by whom the Church is now governed. And no better interpretation of judgment being given can be produced than that which we have in the words, "What ye bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and what ye loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." Whence the apostle says, "What have I to do with judging them that are without? do not ye judge them that are within?" "And the souls," says John, "of those who were slain for the testimony of Jesus and for the word of God,"—understanding what he afterwards says, "reigned with Christ a thousand years,"—that is, the souls of the martyrs not yet restored to their bodies. For the souls of the pious dead are not separated from the Church, which even now is the kingdom of Christ; otherwise there would be no remembrance made of them at the altar of God in the partaking of the body of Christ, nor would it do any good in danger to run to His baptism, that we might not pass from this life without it; nor to reconciliation, if by penitence or a bad conscience any one may be severed from His body. For why are these things practised, if not because the faithful, even though dead, are His members? Therefore, while these thousand years run on, their souls reign with Him, though not as yet in conjunction with their bodies. And therefore in another part of this same book we read, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord from henceforth: and now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; for their works do follow them."

The Church, then, begins its reign with Christ now in the living and in the dead. For, as the apostle says, "Christ died that He might be Lord both of the living and of the dead." But he mentioned the souls of the martyrs only, because they who have contended even to death for the truth, themselves principally reign after death; but, taking the part for the whole, we understand the words of all others who belong to the Church, which is the kingdom of Christ.

As to the words following, "And if any have not worshipped the beast nor his image, nor have received his inscription on their forehead, or on their hand," we must take them of both the living and the dead. And what this beast is, though it requires a more careful investigation, yet it is not inconsistent with the true faith to understand it of the ungodly city itself, and the community of unbelievers set in opposition to the faithful people and the city of God. "His image" seems to me to mean his simulation, to wit, in those men who profess to believe, but live as unbelievers. For they pretend to be what they are not, and are called Christians, not from a true likeness, but from a deceitful image. For to this beast belong not only the avowed enemies of the name of Christ and His most glorious city, but also the tares which are to be gathered out of His kingdom, the Church, in the end of the world. And who are they who do not worship the beast and his image, if not those who do what the apostle says, "Be not yoked with unbelievers?" For such do not worship, *i.e.* do not consent, are not subjected; neither do they receive the inscription, the brand of crime, on their forehead by their profession, on their hand by their practice. They, then, who are free from these pollutions, whether they still live in this mortal flesh, or are dead, reign with Christ even now, through this whole interval which is indicated by the thousand years, in a fashion suited to this time.

"The rest of them," he says, "did not live." For now is the hour when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live; and the rest of them shall not live. The words added, "until the thousand years are finished," mean that they did not live in the time in which they ought to have lived by passing from death to life. And therefore, when the day of the bodily resurrection arrives, they shall come out of their graves, not to life, but to judgment, namely, to damnation, which is called the second death. For whosoever has not lived until the thousand years be finished, *i.e.* during this whole time in which the first resurrection is going on,—whosoever has not heard the voice of the Son of God, and passed from death to life,—that man shall certainly in the second resurrection, the resurrection of the flesh, pass with his flesh into the second death. For he goes on to say, "This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection," or who experiences it. Now he experiences it who not only revives from the death of sin, but continues in this renewed life. "In these the second death hath no power." Therefore it has power in the rest, of whom he said above, "The rest of them did not live until the thousand years were finished;" for in this whole intervening

time, called a thousand years, however lustily they lived in the body, they were not quickened to life out of that death in which their wickedness held them, so that by this revived life they should become partakers of the first resurrection, and so the second death should have no power over them.

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EINHARD

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES

HAVING made up my mind to write an account of the life and conversation, and to a large extent of the actions of my lord and patron King Charles, of great and deservedly glorious memory, I have compressed my task within the narrowest possible limits. My aim has been on the one hand to insert everything of which I have been able to find an account; and on the other to avoid offending the fastidious by telling each new incident at wearisome length. Above all, I have tried to avoid offending in this new book those who look down upon even the monuments of antiquity written by learned and eloquent men.

There are, I do not doubt, many men of learning and leisure who feel that the life of the present day must not be utterly neglected, and that the doings of our own time should not be devoted to silence and forgetfulness as wholly unworthy of record; who, therefore, have such love of fame that they would rather chronicle the great deeds of others in writings, however poor, than, by abstaining from writing, allow their name and reputation to perish from the memory of mankind. But, even so, I have felt that I ought not to hold my hand from the composition of this book, for I knew that no one could write of these events more truthfully than I could, since I was myself an actor in them, and, being present, knew them from the testimony of my own eyes; while I could not certainly know whether anyone else would write them or no. I thought it better, therefore, to join with others in committing this story to writing for the benefit of posterity rather than to allow the shades of oblivion to blot out the life of this King, the noblest and greatest of his age, and his famous deeds, which the men of later times will scarcely be able to imitate.

Another reason, and not, I think, a foolish one, occurred to me, which even by itself would have been strong enough to persuade me to write—the care, I mean, that was taken with my upbringing, and the unbroken friendship which I enjoyed with the King himself and his children from the time when first I began to live at his Court. For in this way he has so bound me to himself, and has made me his debtor both in life and death, that I should most justly be considered and condemned as ungrateful if I were to forget all the benefits that he conferred upon me and were to pass over in silence the great and glorious deeds of a man who was so kind to me; if I were to allow his life to remain as unchronicled and unpraised, as if he had never lived, when that life deserves not merely the efforts of my poor talents, which are insignificant, small and almost non-existent, but all the eloquence of a Cicero.

So here you have a book containing the life of that great and glorious man. There is nothing for you to wonder at or admire except his deeds; unless, indeed, it be that I, a barbarian, and little versed in the Roman tongue, have imagined that I could write Latin inoffensively and usefully, and have become so swollen with impudence as to despise Cicero's words when, speaking about Latin writers in the first book of the *Tusculans*, he says: "If a man commits his thoughts to paper when he can neither arrange them well nor write them agreeably, nor furnish pleasure of any kind to the reader, he is recklessly misusing both his leisure and his paper." The great orator's opinion would, perhaps, have deterred me from writing if I had not fortified myself with the reflection that I ought to risk the condemnation of men, and bring my poor talents into peril by writing, rather than spare my reputation and neglect this great man's memory.

The Preface ends: the Book begins

THE race of the Merovings from which the Franks were accustomed to choose their kings is reckoned as lasting to King Hilderich, who, by the order of Stephen, the Roman Pontiff, was deposed, tonsured, and sent into a monastery. But this race, though it may be regarded as finishing with him, had long since lost all power, and no longer possessed anything of importance except the empty royal title. For the wealth and power of the kingdom was in the hands of the Præfects of the Court, who were called Mayors of the Palace, and exercised entire sovereignty. The King, contented with the mere royal title, with long hair and flowing beard, used to sit upon the throne and act the part of a ruler, listening to ambassadors, whencesoever they came, and giving them at their departure, as though of his own power, answers which he had been instructed or commanded to give. But this was the only function that he performed, for besides the empty royal title and the

precarious life income which the Præfect of the Court allowed him at his pleasure he had nothing of his own except one estate with a very small revenue, on which he had his house, and from which he drew the few servants who performed such services as were necessary and made him a show of deference. Wherever he had to go he travelled in a waggon, drawn in rustic style by a pair of oxen, and driven by a cowherd. In this fashion he used to go to the palace and to the general meetings of the people, which were held yearly for the affairs of the kingdom; in this fashion he returned home. But the Præfect of the Court looked after the administration of the kingdom and all that had to be done or arranged at home or abroad.

2. When Hilderich was deposed Pippin, the father of King Charles, was performing the duties of Mayor of the Palace as if by hereditary right. For his father Charles, who put down the tyrants who were claiming dominion for themselves through all Frankland, and so crushed the Saracens, when they were attempting to conquer Gaul, in two great battles (the one in Aquitania, near the city of Poitiers, the other near Narbonne, on the river Birra), that he forced them to return into Spain—his father Charles had nobly administered the same office, and had inherited it from his father Pippin. For the people did not usually give this honour except to such as were distinguished for the renown of their family and the extent of their wealth.

This office, then, was handed down from his father and his grandfather to Pippin, the father of King Charles, and to his brother Carloman. He exercised it for some years conjointly with his brother Carloman on terms of the greatest harmony, still in nominal subordination to the above-mentioned King Hilderich. But then his brother Carloman, for some unknown cause, but probably fired with love of the contemplative life, abandoned the toilsome administration of a temporal kingdom and retired to Rome in search of peace. There he changed his dress, and, becoming a monk in the monastery upon Mount Soracte, built near the church of the blessed Silvester, enjoyed for some years the quiet that he desired, with many brethren, who joined themselves to him for the same purpose. But as many of the nobles of Frankland came on pilgrimage to Rome to perform their vows, and, unwilling to pass by one who had once been their lord, interrupted the peace that he most desired by frequent visits, he was compelled to change his abode. For, seeing that the number of his visitors interfered with his purpose, he left Mount Soracte and retired to the monastery of Saint Benedict, situated in the camp of Mount Cassino, in the province of Samnium. There he occupied what remained to him of this temporal life in religious exercises.

3. But Pippin, after he was made King instead of Mayor of the Palace by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, exercised sole rule over the Franks for fifteen years, or rather more. Then, after finishing the Aquitanian war, which he had undertaken against Waifar, Duke of Aquitania, and had carried on for

nine consecutive years, he died at Paris of the dropsy, and left behind him two sons, Charles and Carloman, to whom by divine will the succession of the kingdom came. For the Franks called a solemn public assembly, and elected both of them to be kings, on the understanding that they should equally divide the whole kingdom, but that Charles should receive for his special administration that part which his father Pippin had held, while Carloman received the territories ruled by their uncle Carloman. The conditions were accepted, and each received the share of the kingdom that was allotted to him. Harmony was maintained between the two brothers, though not without difficulty; for many partisans of Carloman tried to break their alliance, and some even hoped to engage them in war. But the course of events proved that the danger to Charles was imaginary rather than real. For, upon the death of Carloman, his wife with her sons and some of the leading nobles fled to Italy, and, for no obvious reason, passed over her husband's brother, and placed herself and her children under the protection of Desiderius, King of the Lombards. Carloman, after ruling the kingdom for two years conjointly with Charles, died of disease, and Charles, upon the death of Carloman, was made sole king with the consent of all the Franks.

4. It would be foolish of me to say anything about his birth and infancy, or even about his boyhood, for I can find nothing about these matters in writing, nor does anyone survive who claims to have personal knowledge of them. I have decided, therefore, to pass on to describe and illustrate his acts and his habits and the other divisions of his life without lingering over the unknown. I shall describe first his exploits both at home and abroad, then his habits and interests, and lastly the administration of the kingdom and the end of his reign, omitting nothing that demands or deserves to be recorded.

5. Of all the wars that he waged that in Aquitania, begun, but not finished, by his father, was the first that he undertook, because it seemed easy of accomplishment. His brother was still alive, and was called upon for assistance, and, though he failed to provide the help that he promised, Charles prosecuted the enterprise that he had undertaken with the utmost energy, and would not desist or slacken in his task before, by perseverance and continuous effort, he had completely reached the end after which he strove. For he forced Hunold, who after the death of Waifar had attempted to occupy Aquitania and renew the almost finished war, to abandon Aquitania and retire into Gascony. Even there he did not allow him to remain, but crossed the Garonne, and sent ambassadors to Lupus, Duke of the Gascons, ordering him to surrender the fugitive, and threatening him with war unless he did so at once. Lupus, more wisely, not only surrendered Hunold but also submitted himself and the province over which he presided to the power of Charles.

6. When the Aquitanian trouble was settled and the war finished, when, too, his partner in the kingdom had withdrawn from the world's affairs, he undertook a war against the Lombards, being

moved thereto by the entreaties and the prayers of Hadrian, Bishop of the City of Rome. Now, this war, too, had been undertaken by his father at the supplication of Pope Stephen, under circumstances of great difficulty, inasmuch as certain of the chiefs of the Franks, whose advice he was accustomed to ask, so strongly resisted his wishes that they openly declared that they would leave their King to return home. But now Charles undertook the war against King Haistulf, and most swiftly brought it to an end. For, though his reasons for undertaking the war were similar to, and, indeed, the same as those of his father, he plainly fought it out with a very different energy, and brought it to a different end. For Pippin, after a siege of a few days at Pavia, forced King Haistulf to give hostages, and restore to the Romans the towns and fortresses that he had taken from them, and to give a solemn promise that he would not attempt to regain what he had surrendered. But King Charles, when once he had begun the war, did not stop until he had received the surrender of King Desiderius, whom he had worn down after a long siege; until he had forced his son Adalgis, in whom the hopes of his people seemed to be centred, to fly not only from his kingdom but from Italy; until he had restored to the Romans all that had been taken from them; until he had crushed Hruodgausus, Præfect of the Duchy of Friuli, who was attempting a revolution; until, in fine, he had brought all Italy under his rule, and placed his son Pippin as king over the conquered country. I should describe here the difficulties of the passage of the Alps and the vast toil with which the Franks found their way through the pathless mountain ridges, the rocks that soared to heaven, and the sharply-pointed cliffs, if it were not that my purpose in the present work is rather to describe Charles's manner of life than to chronicle the events of the wars that he waged. The sum of this war was the conquest of Italy, the transportation and perpetual exile of King Desiderius, the expulsion of his son Adalgis from Italy, power taken from the kings of the Lombards and restored to Hadrian, the Ruler of the Roman Church.

7. When this war was ended the Saxon war, which seemed dropped for a time, was taken up again. Never was there a war more prolonged nor more cruel than this, nor one that required greater efforts on the part of the Frankish peoples. For the Saxons, like most of the races that inhabit Germany, are by nature fierce, devoted to the worship of demons and hostile to our religion, and they think it no dishonour to confound and transgress the laws of God and man. There were reasons, too, which might at any time cause a disturbance of the peace. For our boundaries and theirs touch almost everywhere on the open plain, except where in a few places large forests or ranges of mountains are interposed to separate the territories of the two nations by a definite frontier; so that on both sides murder,

robbery, and arson were of constant occurrence. The Franks were so irritated by these things that they thought it was time no longer to be satisfied with retaliation but to declare open war against them.

So war was declared, and was fought for thirty years continuously with the greatest fierceness on both sides, but with heavier loss to the Saxons than the Franks. The end might have been reached sooner had it not been for the perfidy of the Saxons. It is hard to say how often they admitted themselves beaten and surrendered as suppliants to King Charles; how often they promised to obey his orders, gave without delay the required hostages, and received the ambassadors that were sent to them. Sometimes they were so cowed and broken that they promised to abandon the worship of devils and willingly to submit themselves to the Christian religion. But though sometimes ready to bow to his commands they were always eager to break their promise, so that it is impossible to say which course seemed to come more natural to them, for from the beginning of the war there was scarcely a year in which they did not both promise and fail to perform.

But the high courage of the King and the constancy of his mind, which remained unshaken by prosperity and adversity, could not be conquered by their changes nor forced by weariness to desist from his undertakings. He never allowed those who offended in this way to go unpunished, but either led an army himself, or sent one under the command of his counts, to chastise their perfidy and inflict a suitable penalty. So that at last, when all who had resisted had been defeated and brought under his power, he took ten thousand of the inhabitants of both banks of the Elbe, with their wives and children, and planted them in many groups in various parts of Germany and Gaul. And at last the war, protracted through so many years, was finished on conditions proposed by the King and accepted by them; they were to abandon the worship of devils, to turn from their national ceremonies, to receive the sacraments of the Christian faith and religion, and then, joined to the Franks, to make one people with them.

8. In this war, despite its prolongation through so many years, he did not himself meet the enemy in battle more than twice—once near the mountain called Osning, in the district of Detmold, and again at the river Hasa—and both these battles were fought in one month, with an interval of only a few days. In these two battles the enemy were so beaten and cowed that they never again ventured to challenge the King nor to resist his attack unless they were protected by some advantage of ground.

In this war many men of noble birth and high office fell on the side both of the Franks and Saxons. But at last it came to an end in the thirty-third year, though in the meanwhile so many and such serious wars broke out against the Franks in all parts of the

world, and were carried on with such skill by the King, that an observer may reasonably doubt whether his endurance of toil or his good fortune deserves the greater admiration. For the war in Italy began two years before the Saxon war, and though it was prosecuted without intermission no enterprise in any part of the world was dropped, nor was there anywhere a truce in any struggle, however difficult. For this King, the wisest and most high-minded of all who in that age ruled over the nations of the world, never refused to undertake or prosecute any enterprise because of the labour involved, nor withdrew from it through fear of its danger. He understood the true character of each task that he undertook or carried through, and thus was neither broken by adversity nor misled by the false flatteries of good fortune.

9. Whilst the war with the Saxons was being prosecuted constantly and almost continuously he placed garrisons at suitable places on the frontier, and attacked Spain with the largest military expedition that he could collect. He crossed the Pyrenees, received the surrender of all the towns and fortresses that he attacked, and returned with his army safe and sound, except for a reverse which he experienced through the treason of the Gascons on his return through the passes of the Pyrenees. For while his army was marching in a long line, suiting their formation to the character of the ground and the defiles, the Gascons placed an ambuscade on the top of the mountain—where the density and extent of the woods in the neighbourhood rendered it highly suitable for such a purpose—and then rushing down into the valley beneath threw into disorder the last part of the baggage train and also the rearguard which acted as a protection to those in advance. In the battle which followed the Gascons slew their opponents to the last man. Then they seized upon the baggage, and under cover of the night, which was already falling, they scattered with the utmost rapidity in different directions. The Gascons were assisted in this feat by the lightness of their armour and the character of the ground where the affair took place. In this battle Eggihard, the surveyor of the royal table; Anselm, the Count of the Palace; and Roland, Præfect of the Breton frontier, were killed along with very many others. Nor could this assault be punished at once, for when the deed had been done the enemy so completely disappeared that they left behind them not so much as a rumour of their whereabouts.

22. His body was large and strong; his stature tall but not ungainly, for the measure of his height was seven times the length of his own feet. The top of his head was round; his eyes were very large and piercing. His nose was rather larger than is usual; he had beautiful white hair; and his expression was brisk and cheerful; so that, whether sitting or standing, his appearance was dignified and impressive. Although his neck was rather thick and short and he was somewhat corpulent this was not noticed owing

to the good proportions of the rest of his body. His step was firm and the whole carriage of his body manly; his voice was clear, but hardly so strong as you would have expected. He had good health, but for four years before his death was frequently attacked by fevers, and at last was lame of one foot. Even then he followed his own opinion rather than the advice of his doctors, whom he almost hated, because they advised him to give up the roast meat to which he was accustomed, and eat boiled instead. He constantly took exercise both by riding and hunting. This was a national habit; for there is hardly any race on the earth that can be placed on equality with the Franks in this respect. He took delight in the vapour of naturally hot waters, and constantly practised swimming, in which he was so proficient that no one could be fairly regarded as his superior. Partly for this reason he built his palace at Aix, and lived there continuously during the last years of his life up to the time of his death. He used to invite not only his sons to the bath but also his nobles and friends, and at times even a great number of his followers and bodyguards.

23. He wore the national—that is to say, the Frankish dress. His shirts and drawers were of linen, then came a tunic with a silken fringe, and hose. His legs were cross-gartered and his feet enclosed in shoes. In winter-time he defended his shoulders and chest with a jerkin made of the skins of otters and ermine. He was clad in a blue cloak, and always wore a sword, with the hilt and belt of either gold or silver. Occasionally, too, he used a jewelled sword, but this was only on the great festivals or when he received ambassadors from foreign nations. He disliked foreign garments, however beautiful, and would never consent to wear them, except once at Rome on the request of Pope Hadrian, and once again upon the entreaty of his successor, Pope Leo, when he wore a long tunic and cloak, and put on shoes made after the Roman fashion. On festal days he walked in procession in a garment of gold cloth, with jewelled boots and a golden girdle to his cloak, and distinguished further by a diadem of gold and precious stones. But on other days his dress differed little from that of the common people.

24. He was temperate in eating and drinking, but especially so in drinking; for he had a fierce hatred of drunkenness in any man, and especially in himself or in his friends. He could not abstain so easily from food, and used often to complain that fasting was injurious to his health. He rarely gave large banquets, and only on the high festivals, but then he invited a large number of guests. His daily meal was served in four courses only, exclusive of the roast, which the hunters used to bring in on spits, and which he ate with more pleasure than any other food. During the meal there was either singing or a reader for him to listen to. Histories and the great deeds of men of old were read to him. He took delight also in the books of Saint Augustine, and especially in those which are entitled the City of God. He was so temperate in the use of wine and drink of any kind that he rarely drank oftener than thrice during dinner.

In summer, after his midday meal, he took some fruit and a single draught, and then, taking off his clothes and boots, just as he was accustomed to do at night, he would rest for two or three hours. At night he slept so lightly that he would wake, and even rise, four or five times during the night.

When he was putting on his boots and clothes he not only admitted his friends, but if the Count of the Palace told him there was any dispute which could not be settled without his decision he would have the litigants at once brought in, and hear the case, and pronounce on it just as if he were sitting on the tribunal. He would, moreover, at the same time transact any business that had to be done that day or give any orders to his servants.

25. In speech he was fluent and ready, and could express with the greatest clearness whatever he wished. He was not merely content with his native tongue but took the trouble to learn foreign languages. He learnt Latin so well that he could speak it as well as his native tongue; but he could understand Greek better than he could speak it. His fluency of speech was so great that he even seemed sometimes a little garrulous.

He paid the greatest attention to the liberal arts, and showed the greatest respect and bestowed high honours upon those who taught them. For his lessons in grammar he listened to the instruction of Deacon Peter of Pisa, an old man; but for all other subjects Albinus, called Alcuin, also a deacon, was his teacher—a man from Britain, of the Saxon race, and the most learned man of his time. Charles spent much time and labour in learning rhetoric and dialectic, and especially astronomy, from Alcuin. He learnt, too, the art of reckoning, and with close application scrutinised most carefully the course of the stars. He tried also to learn to write, and for this purpose used to carry with him and keep under the pillow of his couch tablets and writing-sheets that he might in his spare moments accustom himself to the formation of letters. But he made little advance in this strange task, which was begun too late in life.

26. He paid the most devout and pious regard to the Christian religion, in which he had been brought up from infancy. And, therefore, he built the great and most beautiful church at Aix, and decorated it with gold and silver and candelabras and with wicket-gates and doors of solid brass. And, since he could not procure marble columns elsewhere for the building of it, he had them brought from Rome and Ravenna. As long as his health permitted it he used diligently to attend the church both in the morning and evening, and during the night, and at the time of the Sacrifice. He took the greatest care to have all the services of the church performed with the utmost dignity, and constantly warned the keepers of the building not to allow anything improper or dirty either to be brought into or to remain in the building. He provided so great a quantity of gold and silver vessels, and so large a supply of priestly vestments, that at the religious services not even the door-keepers, who form the lowest ecclesiastical order, had

to officiate in their ordinary dress. He carefully reformed the manner of reading and singing; for he was thoroughly instructed in both, though he never read publicly himself, nor sang except in a low voice, and with the rest of the congregation.

27. He was most devout in relieving the poor and in those free gifts which the Greeks call alms. For he gave it his attention not only in his own country and in his own kingdom, but he also used to send money across the sea to Syria, to Egypt, to Africa—to Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Carthage—in compassion for the poverty of any Christians whose miserable condition in those countries came to his ears. It was for this reason chiefly that he cultivated the friendship of kings beyond the sea, hoping thereby to win for the Christians living beneath their sway some succour and relief.

Beyond all other sacred and venerable places he loved the church of the holy Apostle Peter at Rome, and he poured into its treasury great wealth in silver and gold and precious stones. He sent innumerable gifts to the Pope; and during the whole course of his reign he strove with all his might (and, indeed, no object was nearer to his heart than this) to restore to the city of Rome her ancient authority, and not merely to defend the church of Saint Peter but to decorate and enrich it out of his resources above all other churches. But although he valued Rome so much, still, during all the forty-seven years that he reigned, he only went there four times to pay his vows and offer up his prayers.

28. But such were not the only objects of his last visit; for the Romans had grievously outraged Pope Leo, had torn out his eyes and cut off his tongue, and thus forced him to throw himself upon the protection of the King. He, therefore, came to Rome to restore the condition of the church, which was terribly disturbed, and spent the whole of the winter there. It was then that he received the title of Emperor and Augustus, which he so disliked at first that he affirmed that he would not have entered the church on that day—though it was the chief festival of the church—if he could have foreseen the design of the Pope. But when he had taken the title he bore very quietly the hostility that it caused and the indignation of the Roman emperors. He conquered their ill-feeling by his magnanimity, in which, doubtless, he far excelled them, and sent frequent embassies to them, and called them his brothers.

29. When he had taken the imperial title he noticed many defects in the legal systems of his people; for the Franks have two legal systems, differing in many points very widely from one another, and he, therefore, determined to add what was lacking, to reconcile the differences, and to amend anything that was wrong or wrongly expressed. He completed nothing of all his designs beyond adding a few capitularies, and those unfinished. But he gave orders that the laws and rules of all nations comprised within his dominions which were not already written out should be collected and committed to writing.

He also wrote out the barbarous and ancient songs,

in which the acts of the kings and their wars were sung, and committed them to memory. He also began a grammar of his native language.

He gave the months names in his own tongue, for before his time they were called by the Franks partly by Latin and partly by barbarous names. He also gave names to the twelve winds, whereas before not more than four, and perhaps not so many, had names of their own. Of the months, he called January Winter-month, February Mud-month, March Spring-month, April Easter-month, May Joy-month, June Plough-month, July Hay-month, August Harvest-month, September Wind-month, October Vintage-month, November Autumn-month, December Holy-month. The following are the names which he gave to the winds:—The Subsolanus (east) he called East Wind; the Eurus (east by south) East-South Wind; the Euroauster (south by east) South-East Wind; the Auster (south) South Wind; the Austro-Afric (south by west) South-West Wind; the Afric (west by south) West-South Wind; the Zephyr (west) West Wind; the Corus (west by north) West-North Wind; the Circius (north by west) North-West Wind; the Septentrion (north) North Wind; the Aquilon (north by east) North-East Wind; the Vulturnus (east by north) East-North Wind.

30. At the very end of his life, when already he was feeling the pressure of old age and sickness, he summoned his own son Lewis, King of Aquitania, the only surviving son of Hildigard, and then solemnly called together the Frankish nobles of his whole kingdom; and then, with the consent of all, made Lewis partner in the whole kingdom and heir to the imperial title. After that, putting the diadem on his head, he ordered them to salute him "Imperator" and Augustus. This decision of his was received by all present with the greatest favour, for it seemed to them a divine inspiration for the welfare of the realm. It added to his dignity at home and increased the terror of his name abroad.

He then sent his son back to Aquitania, and himself, though broken with old age, proceeded to hunt, as his custom was, not far from the palace of Aix, and after spending the rest of the autumn in this pursuit he came back to Aix about the beginning of November. Whilst he was spending the winter there he was attacked by a sharp fever, and took to his bed. Then, following his usual habit, he determined to abstain from food, thinking that by such self-discipline he would be able either to cure or alleviate the disease. But the fever was complicated by a pain in the side which the Greeks call pleurisy; and, as Charles still persisted in fasting, and only very rarely drank something to sustain his strength, seven days after he had taken to his bed he received holy communion, and died, in the seventy-second year of his life and in the forty-seventh year of his reign, on the fifth day before the Kalends of February, at the third hour of the day.