I give permission for public access to my Honors paper and for any copying or digitization to be done at the discretion of the College Archivist and/or the College Librarian.

Signed

Sarah Rachel Smith

Date
Peacekeeping Operations: Humanitarianism or Politics as Usual?

Sarah Rachel Smith

Department of International Studies
Rhodes College
Memphis, Tennessee

2011

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree with Honors in International Studies
This Honors paper by Sarah Rachel Smith has been read and approved for Honors in International Studies.

Dr. Nuray Ibryamova
Project Advisor

Dr. Amy Risley
Second Reader

Dr. Christopher Baldwin
Extra-Departmental Reader

Dr. Stephen Ceccoli
Department Chair
# CONTENTS

Signature page ii  
Table of Contents iv  
List of Tables v  
Abstract vi  
Introduction 1  
Theoretical Section 4  
Literature Review 5  
Theory, Methodology, and Hypotheses 18  
The Role of Identity 30  
Case Study: Former Republic of Macedonia 32  
Case Study: Democratic Republic of the Congo 49  
Conclusion 65  
Appendix 72  
List of Symbols and Abbreviations 87  
Bibliography 88
List of Tables

Table 1: Independent variables and hypotheses
Table 2: Independent variables and actual outcomes
ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping Operations: Humanitarianism or Politics as Usual?

by

Sarah Rachel Smith

After the Cold War, International Organizations (IOs) have become the guardians of international peace and security, in charge of creating and maintaining peace in conflicts that are, for the most part, internal. Current research, however, focuses on why states intervene through the auspices of IOs. Research on why IOs themselves intervene in these conflicts, therefore, is largely lacking. This paper thus analyzes the factors that lead to the decision by IOs to establish peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In order to determine whether or not the decision is based on a consequential rationality or based on an IO’s identity and role in society, the research questions is framed by using the logic of expected consequences versus the logic of appropriateness debate. This paper looks in particular at the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) PKOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC in 1999 and Operation Artémis in 2003, respectively) and the EU intervention, Operation Concordia (2003), in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The findings reveal that security and economic interests play a large role in influencing an IOs decision to intervene by framing the way in which IOs deal with humanitarian crises and human rights situations in a conflict. In the end, IO’s base the decision to intervene on a cost-benefit analysis: if the costs of intervention outweigh the benefits, intervention will not take place. If, however, the costs outweigh the benefits of non-intervention, intervention is more likely to take place.
Peacekeeping Operations: Humanitarianism or Politics as Usual?

Sarah R Smith

“The pursuit of peace and progress cannot end in a few years in either victory or defeat. The pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never be abandoned.” – Dag Hammarskjöld

“Peace is not just a colored ribbon. It’s more than a wristband or a t-shirt. It’s not just a donation or a 5K race. It’s not just a folk song, or a white dove. And peace is certainly more than a celebrity endorsement. Peace is a fulltime job. It’s protecting civilians, overseeing elections, and disarming ex-combatants. The UN has over 100,000 peacekeepers on the ground, in places others can’t or won’t go, doing things others can’t or won’t do. Peace, like war, must be waged.” – George Clooney

INTRODUCTION

The idea that the international community has an obligation to protect the rights of all world citizens, regardless of their country of origin, began with the aftermath of World War II and the realization that the world had allowed one man and one country to annihilate an entire people. The United Nations (UN) was, therefore, established in 1945 “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” with the primary goals of “maintain[ing] international peace and security, …develop[ing] friendly relations among nations, …[and] encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms” (UN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 1). As the Cold War dawned, however, the UN was largely ineffective in this mission, as intervention became the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in an effort to increase their respective zones of influence.

Since the end of the Cold War, international peacekeeping has transformed from a purely military operation to a multidimensional approach focused on several aspects of the peace process, including ending hostilities and monitoring elections. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the UN again became the main international actor in charge of maintaining peace and security. In fact, between the years
1991 and 1994, the UN authorized more missions than it had in the previous 45 years. Most recently, however, regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have increasingly worked with the UN in conflict situations, as well as leading their own missions.

The end of the Cold War also saw a change in the nature of conflicts. No longer was war primarily between states. Instead, civil war and armed conflict became more and more common. This raised the question of how the international community should deal with intrastate conflicts and whether or not it had a right to intervene\(^1\) in a sovereign state. The UN and the international community have, in fact, not adequately dealt with many conflicts throughout the years. For example, the number of deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), about 5.4 million, makes it the deadliest conflict since World War II (Coghlan et al. 2008). The DRC case has, unfortunately, not been the only peacekeeping operation (PKO) that has largely failed to protect global human rights across the globe. Why has the international community allowed these deaths to happen? Why does international intervention take place in some cases, but not in others?

Many scholars argue that, due to changing morals and values throughout history, the international community views a major source of legitimacy for intervention as deriving from a humanitarian purpose. In addition, the average world citizen knows of PKOs (PKOs) mainly through celebrity endorsements. Pictures of conflicts make their way to television screens, followed by pleas from George Clooney or Brad Pitt about

---

\(^1\) For the purposes of this paper, the term “intervention” refers to the presence of third party actors in an armed conflict in the form of PKOs established by international organizations.
how the average citizen can help. While this humanitarian attention raises worldwide awareness about these conflicts, the coverage is also heavily focused on the humanitarian aspect of peacekeeping. In other words, the Western world tends to view itself as the ‘good guy,’ helping those who cannot help themselves. Indeed organizations like the UN and the EU were founded on the basis of protecting human rights. In the EU’s founding document, the Treaty on European Union (92/C191/01), member-states highlight their “principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law” (Ibid.). In addition, the Petersberg Tasks, part of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, define EU military roles as including “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making” (Quille 2006). As a result, society assumes that these organizations intervene in these conflicts in order to combat human rights violations. A closer look, however, reveals that many other factors, including security and economic interests, influence IOs’ decision to intervene in conflicts.

In order to examine PKOs, this paper looks at two case studies: (1) the 2001 conflict in the Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the subsequent intervention by the EU, Operation Concordia, in 2003; and (2) the Second Congo War (1998-2003) in the DRC which led to an UN intervention, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 1999, and an EU intervention, Operation Artémis, in 2003. In order to gain a better understanding of PKOs as a whole, the study discusses the topic using the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness debate and three international relations theories, namely neorealism, neoliberalism, and the English school. Using this theoretical background, the paper then looks at whether or not these
IOs were fulfilling their purpose in international society, as well as the possible security and economic interests that helped influence the establishment of a PKO (PKO) in FYROM and the DRC. This paper seeks to show that security and economic interests, through a cost-benefit analysis, influence the way in which IOs deal with human rights violations in a conflict situation.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Most scholarship regarding peacekeeping operations focuses on why specific countries intervene in a conflict area, what peacekeeping operations do on the ground, and in what aspects these operations succeed or fail to establish and maintain peace (see Abbott and Snidal 1998, Mearsheimer 1994-95, McNeill 1997, Autesserre 2009, Gegout 2009, Cleaver and May 1995). Scholarship is focused on why states choose to join an IO and why states decide to take political and military action through the auspices of these organizations (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Much of the current research also depends on the organization itself. The UN and its role in peacekeeping are very well represented in the existing literature. Peace support operations (PSOs) by the EU and the AU, however, are less well represented in scholarly research, largely due to the fact that both of these organizations are relatively new to this type of intervention (for scholarship on both organizations, see Phillips 2004, Pond 2006, Dobbins 2008, Gegout 2009 regarding the EU and Berman and Sams 2003, Moller 2009, Murithi 2005 regarding the AU).

Research on why IOs themselves decide to intervene in conflicts is thus lacking. This paper, therefore, focuses on an important research question: what factors that lead to the decision by IOs to establish peacekeeping operations? A better understanding of the factors leading to such operations provides a foundation on which to further study PKOs
as a whole, as well as how to improve them in the future. Although there is little research pertaining to the specific research question at hand, various international relations paradigms can be used to gain a better understanding of why IOs choose to establish peacekeeping operations. These include the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness debate, neorealism, neoliberalism, and the English school.

In order to address the research question, this paper looks at various international relations paradigms on the assumption that if the factors of peacekeeping are limited to one theoretical paradigm, the ability to more fully understand peacekeeping is limited. Although each paradigm offers a different approach, they all regard the reasons behind intervention as products of a rational calculation. Using this logic, one would assume that IOs decide how to respond to human rights violation in a conflict by whether or not they are legally, politically, and economically able and willing to intervene. Scholars differ, however, on whether this rational calculus is based on the consequences involved in the action or the identity of an IO as protector of human rights. To further examine the rationality behind PKOs, the following section reviews the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness debate and applies it to IR theory.

**Literature Review**

The logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness debate is laid out in James March and Johan Olsen’s article, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” They examine the origins and the nature of actions taken by institutions, or “relatively stable collection[s] of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations” (948, 1998). Both the logic of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness are based on the idea that
international institutions (in this case, IOs) are rational actors. The debate, however, rests on the differences between those who believe that actions are developed through a rational, consequential approach and those who argue that these actions are based on “senses of identity” (Ibid.). The former looks at the gains and losses that will result from the decision to establish a PKO. In other words, it “sees political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated action” (Ibid.). The establishment of a PKO is, therefore, based on a cost-benefit analysis (Sköns 2005, Brown and Rosecrance 1999, Collier et al. 2003). The logic of consequences provides a good theoretical basis from which to study the security and economic consequences involved in PKOs. It fails, however, to regard the role of identity in the decision to intervene and the implementation that a PKO can have on an IO’s position in the international community.

The logic of appropriateness studies how social norms and values influence the decision to establish a PKO, regardless of the possible outcomes. In other words, “Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (March and Olsen 951, 1998). Arguments within the logic appropriateness include that of Martha Finnemore. She suggests that the reasons behind intervention are shaped by what the international community considers its obligation to the citizens of another state (2003). She further argues that, while intervention used to be based on national interests, the establishment of IOs and formal institutions has lent itself to intervention based on humanitarianism (Ibid.).
Similarly, states intervene in conflict situations because they should participate in order to show a sense of solidarity with IOs and IOs intervene because it is part of their identity to protect civilians within other countries (Daniel 2008). Tharoor and Johnstone (2001) use this argument to list out three reasons for PKOs: (1) the delivery of humanitarian relief; (2) the establishment of ‘safe areas’; and (3) the establishment of refugee camps. The validity of this logic cannot be denied, as organizations such as the UN and the EU were in part established to protect civilians and human rights. This interpretation, however, disregards these same IOs’ political and security interests. Thus, while both logics present compelling arguments as to the reasons behind certain decisions, they are not mutually exclusive.

March and Olsen (1998) discuss the limitations of each logic in explaining institutional (i.e. IO) actions. The main limitation of the logic of expected consequences is its assumption of a certain outcome when, in actuality, the final outcome is unknown. The logic of expected consequences can, therefore, only make decisions based on the prediction of outcomes (generally assumed to be made by those who have the best ability to make such predictions). The second major limitation of the logic of consequences is that it tends to divide the complex systems involved in developing a certain action into autonomous subsystems, much like the black box approach taken by many IR theorists. In addition, both study the individual as the main unit of analysis; IOs as one unit are largely overlooked. Therefore, recognizing that one process cannot take place without the other, scholars tend to study them in regards to the relationship between the two.

March and Olsen describe four main methods for studying the relationship between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. The first assumes
that whichever is the clearest and presents the strongest preferences will have the most influence on the final action. Second, some scholars view actions as first developed through consequential rationalism, but over time, developing into laws and institutions, which influence action. Thirdly, some scholars simply view one or the other as the dominant logic behind all actions and decisions. Finally, some argue that one of the logics constrains the other logic by refining how it is used. It is this argument that is the most effective in terms of peacekeeping. This paper argues that PKOs are established in response to grave human rights violations within a state based on the idea that the international community has an obligation to protect all world citizens. However, this decision is framed by a more consequential debate based on possible security and economic outcomes. Before further discussing specific case studies, it is necessary to look at IR theories as they relate to the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness, including neorealism, neoliberalism, and the English school.

**Neorealism** de-emphasizes the role of non-state actors on the international scene, arguing that they are limited in the amount of power they yield in international relations; in essence, IOs are established in order to serve the interests of member-states by providing a legitimate forum for states to intervene in other countries (Gow and Dandeker 2001). Scholars contend that IOs thus have no real influence on state behavior, including a state’s decision to intervene in another state. In other words, IOs establish PKOs in accordance with “state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 13). In addition, intervention or non-intervention is seen as a direct result of whether or not a state wants to maintain or change the international status quo and the balance of power (Gegout 2009).
Finally, individual member states, according to neorealists, make decisions based on a rational calculus; that is, states, as rational actors, objectively analyze the costs and benefits, i.e. the consequences, of intervention when making a policy decision (Pearson 1974). These interests would involve, according to Catherine Gegout (2009), “(1) safeguarding [member-states’] own security; (2) ensuring that [peacekeeping] enhances their trade relations with third states, or at least does not harm them; (3) promoting [member-state] prestige; and (4) promoting peace at limited risk” (232). It is worth noting, however, that Gegout takes a more traditional realist approach with regards to PKO. Neorealists tend to regard the last two tenets as unessential factors behind the decision to intervene. Morality takes a back seat to the more important security and economic implications. Because it is rarely rational for a state to intervene, neorealists argue, states do not intervene in many conflicts, including Darfur (Grono 2006), and only do so when the benefits outweigh the costs. It thus firmly supports the logic of consequences. However, while neorealism accounts for national interests as a major factor behind PKOs, the paradigm does not account for the fact that IOs have increasingly had more influence in implementing PKOs, particularly in the post-Cold War era.

While the neorealist approach adequately explains the security factors, and to a certain extent economic factors, behind states’ decisions to intervene, it fails to account for the fact that there have been and are currently many PKOs deployed worldwide under IO mandates, typically the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It also largely overlooks factors such as the economic implications of allowing humanitarian crises to continue and the desire by IOs themselves to increase international recognition. These
issues are often just as important—sometimes more important—in the cost-benefit analysis behind PKOs. Furthermore, it seems clear that in a world in which intervention is accompanied by humanitarian aid, human rights do play a certain role in influencing the decision to intervene and cannot, therefore, be completely overlooked. As such, the paradigm fails to account for institutional laws and norms as discussed by the logic of appropriateness.

Most PKOs have occurred under an IO mandate, discrediting the neorealist argument that IOs do not play an important role in international relations. In other words, while security interests of individual member-states influence the decision to intervene, not all states share the same security interests. Instead, the decision by an IO to intervene in a conflict area is the result of the security interests of each member-state coming together to determine the security interests of the international community. In addition, IOs have begun to influence state behavior more and more through the establishment of international norms and rules, including the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Therefore, in order to achieve a more comprehensive answer to why PKOs take place, it becomes necessary to also look at other approaches that allow for the cooperation among states.

Neoliberalism, or Neoliberal Institutionalism, accepts the basic arguments of neorealism, but argues that institutions can help solve the problems associated with self-interested states by creating a forum for cooperation (Mitrany 1948, Haas 1956, Keohane and Nye 1998, Coleman 2007). By accounting for a balance between economic and political interests, IOs are viewed as fundamental in preventing conflict (Keohane 1984). Intervention becomes both an economic and security interest. In other words, economic interests inform security interests, as demonstrated by the aid motivations debate and the
'donor interests’ model. This model argues that donor countries of development assistance determine their recipient countries based on their own national security, economic, and political interests (Olsen et. al. 2003). The *aid-motivations debate* further argues that big donors, i.e. the US, France, the United Kingdom, and the EU, are motivated by these donor interests, while smaller countries give development assistance based on the needs of the recipient countries. Since this debate explains the interconnectedness between economic policies and political and security interests, we would assume that economic interests also affect the amount of military and humanitarian support a country receives.

Elisabeth Sköns (2005), for example, explains how the costs of potential armed conflicts can, in fact, influence states and IOs to establish some form of PSO. She argues that “it is more cost-effective for external actors at the regional and global levels to engage in policies to reduce the risk of conflict than to let conflicts break out” (171, 2005). She also gives an overview of other studies made on the costs of armed conflict: this paper focuses on two such studies. The first is that of Brown and Rosecrance (1990), which studies whether or not conflict prevention makes sense when regarded through a cost-benefit analysis by neighboring states, regional powers, and the international community. They develop a list of the external costs of armed conflict, including military costs, refugee costs, and economic opportunity costs. One caveat, however, is that they do not view PSOs as preventive measures, and, thus, include the cost of PSOs with the costs of armed. With the changing structure of PKOs, however, including these operations with the costs of armed conflict is no longer an accurate practice. In addition,
Brown and Rosecrance look only at the global costs of armed conflict, disregarding internal costs associated with conflict situations.

The second study by Collier et al. (2003), in conjunction with the World Bank (WB), focuses on the costs of armed conflict at the national, regional, and global levels. Their study yields three main results: (1) civil wars can have serious ‘ripple effects’; (2) the risks of civil war vary depending on the country; (3) international preventive action could reduce the amount and the effect of civil wars (Skön 2005). Types of costs associated with civil wars in poor developing countries include increased military expenditure, the destruction of infrastructure, and the loss of private capital, all associated with a decreasing gross domestic product (GDP) (Collier et al. 2003). The study is limited, however, in that it looks only at internal conflicts when, in actuality, civil wars are rarely contained within one country, thus contributing to regional and international instability. These studies do, however, reveal the link between economic policy and political and security policy. Following the logic of consequences, IOs should be more willing to establish a PKO if it can be determined that the cost of establishing a PKO is less than the cost off non-intervention.

Neoliberal institutionalism does not deny the fact that states are the dominant actors in the international system and that states make decisions based on rational calculations. The paradigm argues, however, that these economic and security interests play a role in making a collective decision to intervene in a conflict (Mitrany 1948, Keohane 1984). Neoliberal institutionalists, therefore, do not deny that Germany and the UK might be affected differently by a conflict in the Balkans, leading to Germany having a more pressing interest in intervening. However, neoliberals also argue that IOs share
certain international regimes, shared principles, and norms created by various states’ “calculations of power and interest” which later help create new interests that remain in place even with a shifting balance of power (Krasner 1982). For instance, an IO allows a country to voice its concerns about a conflict without the normal transaction costs of dealing one-on-one with states (Krasner 1982).

International intervention is thus explained as the result of international economic and security regimes which “become a function of a delicate negotiating process, with the world organization the forum…of counterbalancing forces unwilling to seek a showdown, fearful of alienating friends or neutrals, and therefore willing to make concessions” (Haas 240, 1956). In the end, the UK might not be intervening for the same reasons as Germany, but they are both participating in a PKO on the basis of shared norms and principles (Tharoor and Johnstone 2001, Caplan 2003, Abbott and Snidal 1998). Neoliberal institutionalism analyzes how states can use their individual interests to create an international response; it is important to understand why these individual states want to intervene in order to understand why an organization as a whole establishes a PKO. However, by emphasizing the relationship between states and IOs, the paradigm does not adequately discuss the reasons that IOs themselves decide to intervene.

Neoliberal institutionalist research on peacekeeping tends to focus on the question of why states intervene through the auspices of IOs, overlooking the IO as a separate actor (Abbott and Snidal 1998). In other words, neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the legitimacy that IOs lend to peace operations conducted by individual states; it fails, however, to account for why an IO authorizes certain PSOs as legitimate while failing to legitimate others. In addition, like neorealism, it neglects to adequately account for IOs’
response to human rights violations, as well as interests involving international
recognition. Finally, neoliberal institutionalism does not adequately account for the fact
that IOs cannot always reach a consensus among states. What happens if this consensus is
not reached? Lack of cooperation, according to neoliberalism, should lead to non-
intervention in conflict areas such as Darfur. The inconsistent establishment of PKO by
IOs is, therefore, most adequately explained using the English school approach, which
frames the logic of appropriateness through the logic of consequences.

The English school, or “international society theory,” introduces the idea of an
‘international society’, or ‘community of states’, composed of individual states. Security
is, therefore, viewed as a common interest, based on common standards and customs. The
theory draws from various theories and concepts, including realism, neorealism,
rationalism, and constructivism. As Martin Wight writes, “The disposition to think of true
policy as a difficult path between seductive but simplified alternatives is a likely, though
not of course an infallible, sign of the tradition we are concerned with” (Wight 1966, 91).
Because of this middle-ground approach, the English school does a good job of
explaining why organizations intervene in some cases and why not in other cases. Thus,
intervention, while conflicting with the sovereignty of a state, is an “unfortunate
necessity” in order to ensure the balance of power and security of the international
community (Wight 1966). It presents elements of the logic of appropriateness, arguing
that the existence of an international society creates a world order in which each member
has certain enforceable duties and obligations to society (Bull 1977, Wight 1966).

The theory also draws from constructivism by allowing for the emergence of
human rights as part of international norms and international law (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998, Barnett and Finnemore 1999). These norms determine when intervention is considered legitimate and necessary; furthermore, with the development of human rights law, state norms and values have transformed to reflect common and changing interests within a community of states (Finnemore 2004). Thus, the English school contends that “statesmen have external obligations that derive from their state’s membership of international society, which brings with it not only benefits but also rights and duties as defined by customary international law…” (Jackson 1994, 118). Because proponents view the international community as having a duty to protect individuals within states, peacekeeping is justified in cases in which human rights are being violated (Wight 1966, Bell 2003). This does not mean, however that human rights violations always lead to PKOs. Instead, the international community frames human rights violations through a consequential lens in order to make a rational decision.

The English school combines elements of the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness to stress the importance of security and human rights factors working together in the intervention decision-making process. An IO may decide, due to humanitarian issues, to intervene in a conflict – even though the conflict presents no direct threat to international security – because intervention itself does not pose a great security threat. However, if international security is negatively affected by intervention, humanitarian issues are put aside in the interest of collective security (Jackson 1994). Thus, states will intervene in conflicts in which there are human rights violations (solidarist approach), but only if this intervention does not conflict with national interests.
(pluralist approach) (Jackson, Tharoor and Johnstone 2001, Caplan 2003). Using this approach, the role of identity should be framed by the consequences involved in a PKO.

According the English school, rational decisions based on identity and norms are influenced by rational decisions based on security and political interests. It views the reasons behind PKOs as the result of many factors, including humanitarian concerns, security and economic interests, and the desire to increase international recognition. This train of thought in explaining the origins of intervention reveals the English school’s ability to look at several facets of peacekeeping. It provides a comprehensive approach in dealing with the question of intervention. It too, however, has its limitations.

While the English school focuses on two important factors behind intervention, it overlooks other relevant factors. The paradigm fails to account for any economic incentives to join an international community, as well as how economic factors within the international community affect the decision to intervene in a conflict (i.e. the cost of refugees or the disruption of trade relations). However, economic interests can be fairly easily studied in conjunction with the English school: if the economic costs associated with intervention are high, intervention is unlikely to take place, even with the presence of human rights violations.

The English school also provides a foundation from which to look at more specific theories, as introduced by J.L. Holzgrefe (2003), that deal with the ethics of intervention, including utilitarianism and legal positivism. Utilitarianism and legal positivism use a similar approach to that of the English school in explaining why IOs intervene. For Utilitarians, intervention by an international actor is just if the consequences are more favorable than unfavorable for all member states. Act-utilitarians look at a cost-benefit analysis; if the costs outweigh the benefits, these institutions are less likely to intervene. Rule-utilitarians, on the other hand, take a more legal approach; international institutions will intervene in situations permitted or required by an international norm that, if followed by everyone, benefits all concerned. Thus, many rule-utilitarians argue that humanitarian intervention fails because it does not concern the best consequences for all concerned. Legal positivists, on the other hand, regard norms as just if they are lawful. Thus, IOs are more likely to intervene in conflicts if intervention is justified by international law, defined by Hedley Bull as “a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law” (Bull 1997, 127). Force, however, is viewed as a measure of last resort.
This paper takes the argument that security and economic interests influence how the international community deals with human rights violations one step further. While these violations provide legitimacy to PKOs, they do not actually play a decisive role in the decision to intervene. In other words, states and IOs must have other reasons in order to react to these human rights violations. That being said, interventions would not and could not take place without the presence of humanitarian crises and human rights violations. Therefore, the English school provides the most comprehensive approach in the explanation of the factors behind PKOs.

While neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the English school all present relevant considerations regarding peacekeeping, each paradigm presents significant limitations. Neorealism and the English school reach limitations because they do not take into account economic interests. As stated earlier, however, economic factors can be implemented fairly easily into the English school approach. Disregarding economic interests overlooks a major factor behind much of the world’s cooperation among states. In addition, neorealism takes a ‘billiard ball’ approach, failing to account for various state interests within an organization. Neoliberal institutionalism, while accepting the importance of international institutions, reaches limitations in explaining why IOs intervene; in other words, there is still a focus on states and why these individual states choose to intervene through an IO mandate. It also fails to account for the fact that sometimes states do not cooperate in the formation of a PKO. Finally, both neorealism

---

3 It is important to note that none of the paradigms mentioned in this paper adequately take into account domestic factors in influencing the decision by states and IOs to intervene. While certainly not discrediting the importance of these factors, my paper will focus on the international dimension of intervention and, thus, theories focusing on international relations.
and neoliberalism fail to adequately explain the roles of the identity within an international community.

The English school, however, most encompasses the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness debate in its analysis of PKOs. It is able to account for cooperation among states, while at the same time noting that individual states are at times not willing to cooperate (i.e. give up national interests). It thus takes elements of neorealism (security interests and the rationalism) and elements of neoliberal institutionalism (cooperation and international regimes) to form a comprehensive answer to why IOs establish PKOs (see Appendix A). The English school also takes elements from classical realism, and is thus able to account for IOs’ quest for international recognition. The English school, therefore, should provide an inclusive explanation for the decision by an IO to establish a PKO. While considering elements of all three perspectives, this paper will primarily use the English school (via the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness) approach to analyze how various security and economic factors influence the response to human rights violations in conflict situations.

Theory, Hypothesis, and Methodology

Before determining the factors that lead to intervention, it is necessary to define the terms of the research question itself, including IOs and peacekeeping operations. First, IOs refer to organizations composed of three or more states that cooperate on political and/or economic matters (Coleman 2007). In addition, they are centralized around certain institutions and norms that purportedly guide policy decisions (Abbott and Snidal 1998). For the purposes of this paper, the United Nations (UN) and the European
Union (EU) are used because both organizations are centered on the idea of protecting human rights and maintaining peace. This study is also interested in analyzing in what ways the reasoning to establish a PKO is either similar or different for the UN and a regional organization. In addition, neither organization is an explicit security organization; in other words, security is regarded as a last resort.

There are, however, differences between the UN and the EU. The EU focuses more on economic cooperation and integration. Therefore, in a given policy decision made by the EU, there might be some economic element that is lacking within the UN. However, due to the impossibility of comparing two IOs with the same mandates and purposes, comparing the UN and the EU provided a good starting point from which to study PKOs. The UN and the EU have both intervened in my particular case studies and both work towards creating increased peace, prosperity, and security – the UN more so on a global scale. I do not suggest, however, that peace and security can be accomplished through only these international actors.

Second, internal conflicts have become the norm after the end of the Cold War. Gleditsch et al. (2002) defines internal conflicts as those occurring “between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states” (619). It is difficult, however, to term a conflict as ‘internal’ because many contemporary conflicts cross borders into neighboring countries and have regional security, political, and economic implications. For the purposes of this paper, internal

---

4 The UN’s main goal is “maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights” (un.org). According the EU website, its main aim is “peace, prosperity and freedom for its 498 million citizens – in a fairer, safer world” (europa.org). The EU is thus much more concerned with regional security and only with global security as it relates to regional security. This becomes an important concept in its peacekeeping operations in the Congo (DRC).
conflicts are, thus, classified as those conflicts in which the main protagonists include government forces and rebel groups (both internal and external). In addition, internal conflicts tend to reduce state control over a sovereign territory (Skön 2005). This does not preclude outside state or rebel forces from participating in the conflict.

Third, while several forms of PSOs exist, including humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, I will focus simply on PKOs. The other forms of PSOs will not be discussed, not because they are less important than peacekeeping, but because the differences between them are often minute, unclear, and disputed among scholars. In addition, many UN and EU missions involve several of the various forms of intervention. The organizations themselves, however, generally refer to all operations as PKOs. I will thus address these missions in the same way as the intervening organization while noting, however, that many cases, particularly in the Congo, are not simply PKOs; they take on characteristics of other forms of intervention, as well. Therefore, this study strongly argues for the necessity of a critique regarding the way in which these organizations frame their intervention operations. The following section discusses the various definitions, debates, and discussions surrounding peacekeeping (for a more detailed discussion about the other forms of intervention, see Appendix B).

Because the mandates of peacekeeping have changed throughout the years, peacekeeping in itself is a complex topic. In general, “peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (United Nations 2008). Traditional, or first generation, peacekeeping – referred to by Dag Hammarskjöld as
“Chapter Six and a Half” missions – involves only military tasks, including observation and supervision. Multi-dimensional, or second generation, peacekeeping is intended to build sustainable peace through humanitarian, economic, political, and social components (United Nations 2008, Berman 2000). These components can include “helping build sustainable institutions of governance, human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants” (“Peace and Security” 2010). Although discussions remain regarding what exactly constitutes a peacekeeping force, scholars generally accept certain functions as being key aspects of any PKO.

First, PKOs are undertaken under the consent of the parties involved in the conflict (United Nations 2008, Eide 1966, Durward 2001, Tharoor and Johnstone 2001). Second, PKOs are launched in order to maintain peace, not to restore peace. In other words, peacekeeping forces are intended to ensure a level of peace already established under a peace agreement (Coleman 2007, Gow and Dandecker 2001). This paper regards these two criteria as given. In addition, while PKOs carry a variety of objectives, for the purposes of this paper, peacekeeping is considered a multi-dimensional approach. Three functions are necessary in order to be considered a PKO: (1) Observation, monitoring, and reporting; (2) Liaison with the parties involved to facilitate a peace agreement and ensure the protection of human rights; and (3) Operational support to local law enforcement, through training, in order to ensure the rule of law.

All of these criteria are found in the following case studies:

---

5 Some reports, however, categorize the last three under peacebuilding (United Nations 2008).
• The 2003 EU Operation Concordia during the Macedonian Conflict (2001-2003) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).


These cases are useful for several reasons. First, the cases are both post Cold War-inspired interventions. In other words, they represent interventions in which the main cause was not based on promoting a certain political ideology within the Cold War context. Second, the case studies represent internal conflicts and/or tensions, but have clear regional implications. The conflict in the DRC, for example, included groups from outside actors, including Rwanda, Angola, and Uganda. The conflict in FYROM, if it had escalated into a full-blown conflict, would likely have included groups from the neighboring countries of Albania and Serbia.

Third, major human rights violations were present. In both cases, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) report three types of violations: (1) Civil human rights violations, such as arbitrary arrests, denial to a free trial, and extrajudicial executions; (2) Violence and abuse violations, including torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; and (3) Civilian massacres, arbitrary killings, and ethnic violence (AFR 02/01/99, AFR 62/04/99, AFR 62/06/99, AFR 62/11/99, EUR 65/017/2002, EUR 65/18/2002, EUR 65/18/2002, EUR 65/001/2003). However, neither organization refers to the ethnic violence in either case as genocide or ‘possible genocide.’ In terms of numbers, the death toll in the DRC far exceeds that of FYROM. In addition, while these
human rights violations were cited in the official documents calling for intervention in the DRC, they were not alluded to as great an extent in regards to FYROM. Thus, even while the cases present many similarities, they also provide important variation to the study.

The two case studies also represent internal conflicts in two separate areas of the globe. This variation provides insight into possible similarities and differences for the reasons behind establishing peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world. The case of FYROM in 2001-2003, for example, involves three main international actors: NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the EU. This paper focuses on why the EU intervened in 2003 through Operation Concordia. The UN, however, did not intervene during the conflict, even though it had previously in 1995 through the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). In the DRC, however, the UN intervened in 1999 through MONUC and the EU in 2003 through Operation Artémis. While the mission in Macedonia is viewed largely as a success, many consider the mission in the DRC a failure due to the fact that the violence continues to this day. To further examine each case study, this paper looks specifically at the UN and the EU in order to gain a fuller understanding of why they established peacekeeping operations.

The general explanation, along the lines of the English school, is that consequential rationality influences how IOs view their role and identity as an international actor (see Appendix C). Furthermore, when security and economic benefits outweigh the costs of intervention, IOs should be more likely to heed their role in the

6 Other international actors included the Organization of African States (OAS), and regional African bodies, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
international community and establish PKOs in order to protect civilians and ensure future prosperity. If, on the other hand, security and economic costs outweigh the benefits of intervention, IOs should be more likely to overlook their identity as an international actor and fail to establish a PKO. In other words, security and economic factors determine the way in which the international community views and deals with humanitarian crises and human rights violations. If these factors combine in a way that becomes a threat to the international society, IOs will deem it necessary to intervene. While human rights violations play an important role in the decision-making process, they are generally used by states and IOs to provide legitimacy to a PKO. In order to assess the specific factors behind my dependent variable, the establishment of PKOs, this paper derives two independent variables: security interests and economic interests.

Based on the theories presented by neorealism and the English school, security interests should influence the decision to establish a PKO. Security interests are operationalized using four criteria. First, to what extent does the desire to change or maintain the status quo influence an IO’s decision to intervene? In relation to PKOs, status quo interests refer to the continuation or establishment of peace. Second, the study analyzes balance of power (BoP) interests; BoP interests refer to the relations between states in the international system. To examine these two independent variables, this study examines official documents of the UN and the EU. In particular, UNSC resolutions and reports by the Secretary-General and the President of the UNSC, as well as actions and reports by the Council of the EU, are examined. These reports were chosen because they represent decisions made by the bodies in each respective IO that deals with establishing PKOs. These resolutions and reports are used to determine whether or not a country is of
low or high strategic interest to each organization, based on the number of times the conflict is mentioned, as well as the language used in describing the conflict.

The status quo and BoP explanations are derived from both neorealism and the English school. First, neorealists argue that low strategic interests should lead to a lower probability of intervention, while high strategic interests should lead to a higher chance of intervention. The English school, however, argues that high strategic interests only lead to intervention if the risks involved with intervention are not as costly as the risks involved with non-intervention. This paper, therefore, argues that high status quo interests, i.e. the desire to maintain or establish peace, lead to a higher chance of PKOs (hypothesis 1.1); high BoP interests should also lead to a greater likelihood of intervention (hypothesis 1.2).

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Theoretical Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Security Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Maintaining or changing status quo (peace)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neorealism, English school, Logic of consequences influences logic of appropriateness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Interest in changing/maintaining the balance of power</td>
<td>Greater likelihood of peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Higher levels of violence in conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Desire to increase international recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Higher economic interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Increasing official development assistance (ODA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neoliberalism, English school,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Decreasing ODA as a percentage of gross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Greater likelihood of peacekeeping</strong></td>
<td><strong>Logic of consequences influences logic of appropriateness.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.3</strong></td>
<td>Increasing gross domestic product (GDP).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.4</strong></td>
<td>The economic consequences involved with non-intervention.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.4.1</strong></td>
<td>Higher cost of refugee population.</td>
<td>Neoliberalism, English school, Logic of consequences influences logic of appropriateness.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.4.2</strong></td>
<td>Decreasing exports in country of conflict.</td>
<td><strong>Greater likelihood of peacekeeping</strong></td>
<td>Neoliberalism, English school, Logic of consequences influences logic of appropriateness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, how does the level of violence taking place in the conflict zone affect the decision to intervene? This study measures the level of violence using another study by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Gleditsch et. al. 2002). Armed conflict is divided into three categories: *Minor Armed Conflict, Intermediate Armed Conflict,* and *War.* *Minor Armed Conflict* is defined as having at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, but fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the entire course of the conflict. *Intermediate Armed Conflict* is considered as any conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, a total of at least 1,000 deaths during the entire course of the conflict, but fewer than 1,000 deaths in a given year. *War* is categorized as having at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

Again, neorealism and the English school provide the best explanations regarding the level of violence, the former arguing that the level of violence should not matter unless it directly affects the intervening country and/or IO. Conversely, the latter contends that the level of violence, even while on a separate continent, could have great bearing on the decision to intervene because the level of violence informs whether or not
the costs outweigh the benefits of intervention, particularly when it comes to the lives of the peacekeepers themselves. Thus, this paper argues that conflicts categorized as intermediate to war should lead to a greater likelihood of a PKO (hypothesis 1.3).

Fourth, this paper analyzes how the quest for increased international recognition leads to PKOs. International recognition is operationalized by the potential political benefits gained from establishing a PKO. In order to further operationalize potential political benefits, the paper looks at three criteria. First, does the PKO positively affect the zone of influence of the IO itself and individual member states? Second, the study analyzes whether or not intervention would help the IO gain clout on the international scene and what kind of message intervention would send to the international community.

International recognition is largely explained through the English school (using the traditional approach). As the English school contends, states should only intervene in a conflict situation if the benefits outweigh the costs. An important aspect of potential benefits includes increased political recognition on the international scene. This paper analyzes international recognition interests and their role in establishing PKOs by reviewing the international political scene at the time of intervention. The study hypothesizes that IOs are more likely to intervene in conflict situations in order to establish, maintain, or increase political clout in the international system (hypothesis 1.4). Thus, overall, high security interests should lead to the establishment of a PKO (hypothesis 1) (See Table 1).

Economic interests should also play a large role in determining whether or not IOs will intervene in a conflict zone, according to the neoliberal paradigm. For the purposes of this paper, economic factors include: (1) trade and development relations and
(2) the potential economic costs of intervention. This paper operationalizes trade and development by analyzing three economic measurements: (1) official development assistance (ODA); (2) ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI); and (3) gross domestic product (GDP). To measure these variables, data is taken from the WB and the OECD. ODA levels are further analyzed through various donor groups: (1) EU institutions and its three most powerful members: Germany, France, and the UK; (2) the P-5 members within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); (3) UN institutions, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTA). The study also looks at the amount of ODA given by individual states in order to determine how national interests played a role in the establishment of a PKO.

This paper makes four hypothesizes regarding economic interests. First, increased ODA levels in a country of conflict lead to PKOs (hypothesis 2.1) because IOs have a greater interest in ensuring economic prosperity. Second, decreasing ODA as a percentage of GNI leads to PKOs (hypothesis 2.2) because this would suggest that the economy of the conflict country is improving. Third, increasing GDP in the country of conflict leads to the increased likelihood in the establishment of a PKO (hypothesis 2.3), again because increasing GDP suggests an improving economy and, thus, a more promising payback from intervention. Fourth, the potential costs of non-intervention are operationalized through the potential refugee costs and the amount of exports in a given case study. Using data from reports by the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), Refugees International, and Internally Displaced Persons, this paper
hypothesizes that higher potential refugee costs (hypothesis 2.4.1) and the decreasing export levels from the country of origin (hypothesis 2.4.2) lead to a greater chance of PKOs (hypothesis 2.4).

Neoliberalism provides a theoretical framework from which to approach economic interests, particularly trade and development. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that IOs would be more likely to intervene in conflicts in order to create a more extensive common market or area for trade. Since economic interests influence political actions, a higher level of previous investment logically leads to a higher chance of intervention. Although the English school does not address economic incentives of PKOs, it could easily be added into the paradigm: IOs are assumed to intervene in a conflict situation if the economic benefits outweigh the economic costs. Overall, high economic interests lead to an increased likelihood of the establishment of PKOs by IOs in conflict areas (hypothesis 2) (see Table 1).

With the end of the Cold War, IOs have developed a much stronger influence in international politics, particularly in establishing PKOs. While there is much previous scholarship on PKOs, this study offers a new perspective in that it discusses a very simple question: why? Although the question is simple, the answer is certainly not. This question is critical in order to better understand peacekeeping as a phenomenon in international relations. While many scholars tend to look simply at the human rights violations within these conflicts, these violations should be examined using a more consequential approach. Without security and economic interests, the costs of peacekeeping would likely be too high for IOs to intervene. The following outlines these interests in FYROM and the DRC. Overall, the study found that both the UN and the EU were influenced by
status quo interests, the desire to increase and/or protect international recognition, higher refugee costs, and the possibility of decreasing exports from the country of conflict. While the UN was more influenced by the level of violence, the EU tended to be more influenced by balance of power interests and increasing GDP in the country of conflict.

ROLE OF IDENTITY

When considering the factors involved in the decision to establish a PKO, the role that identity plays in this calculation cannot be overlooked. In fact, the identity of an IO is the foundation upon which the organization can, subsequently, build a PKO. For both organizations, this identity is centered on the maintenance of peace and diplomacy between nations, as well as the protection of human rights.

The UN has four main goals: “(1) to keep peace throughout the world; (2) to develop friendly relations among nations; (3) to help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other’s rights and freedoms; and (4) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these goals” (“UN at a Glance” 2011). When any of these goals are threatened, the UN has an obligation, according to its own mandate, to intervene in some way, be it through diplomacy or through PSOs.

In regards to FYROM and the DRC, “peace throughout the world” was in danger. In fact, this would suggest – unlike the use of “international peace and security” as laid out in the UN Charter – that any violence that threatens peace, be it regional or international, is subject to UN intervention. In both case studies, the
relations among nations were an important aspect of the conflict. The conflict in the
DRC, for example, involved rebel groups and government interventions from many of
its neighboring countries, including Rwanda, Angola, and Zambia. In the Macedonian
conflict, the potential escalation of violence into a full-blown armed conflict would
have had serious implications on relations with countries such as Greece and Serbia. In
addition, the UN certainly had a duty to maintain peace in the country, as it had failed
to do so during its earlier missions (UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP).

In both cases, the “rights and freedoms” of civilians were threatened; these
conflicts, especially in the case of the DRC, also had serious implications in terms of
the living conditions of civilians, many of whom did not have access to basic
necessities. The absence within these countries of the core values that the UN has
defined as part of its identity to protect is evidence that the UN had an obligation to
intervene in these countries. The language in UNSC documents dealing with each
conflict suggests that this identity certainly had a role in the decision to establish a
PKO. However, these documents also make it clear that the obligation based on
identity was largely influenced by other factors, discussed below.

The main goals of the EU are more difficult to narrow down, as it is both a
regional political and economic organization, as well as an increasingly international
actor. However, in its founding document, it lays out its fundamental principles:
“liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
rule of law” (Treaty on European Union 1992). Furthermore, it requires that countries
with which it trades comply with these core values (“Human Rights” 2011). It also
expresses its desire to “implement a common foreign and security policy including the
eventual framing of a common defense policy” (Ibid.). These ideals have continued throughout the years, even with subsequent treaties, i.e. the Treat of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Thus, the identity of the EU is centered on the idea of promoting democratic values, i.e. human rights and the rule of law, and economic cooperation within and outside of EU borders, while also increasing its own international clout in world politics.

The two case studies threatened the EU’s core values, while at the same time providing an arena to strengthen the organization. Human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law were clearly absent from both FYROM and the DRC. Allowing such atrocities to continue would mean, not only allowing such acts to take place, but also hindering economic cooperation and growth. However, the case studies also allowed the EU to show the world that it was a world power with clear economic, political, and foreign policy objectives. Establishing PKOs in both situations was, therefore, a continuation of this identity. However, the EU’s identity includes more that protecting human rights and maintaining good relations between states, as in the UN. In fact, other factors such as security and economic interests are in many ways intertwined with this identity, as opposed to being separate entities from which to make a decision whether or not to establish a PKO. Nonetheless, analyzing both the UN and the EU allows the paper to study how security and economic factors interact with identity.

CASE STUDY: FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

With the fall of the Soviet Union, relations between the various ethnic groups within the Balkans began to disintegrate, as Serbia increasingly asserted its dominance
within the federation. With the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and the subsequent reaction by the Serbs, the region was thrown into several ethnic conflicts, together referred to as the Yugoslav Wars.\textsuperscript{7} In 1992, the United Nations established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to protect certain regions in Yugoslavia, including FYROM. In 1995, the Macedonian force was given a new mandate through the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). This mission was established, according to then UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, in order to “‘prevent conflicts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia from spilling or threatening that country…[I]t ha[d] become increasingly evident that the primary threat to the country’s stability may come from internal political tensions’” (Zehariadis 270). UNPREDEP was, therefore, very much a mission not only to monitor peace and security in FYROM, but in the entire Balkan region itself.

In fact, maintaining peace and stability was so important that it largely overshadowed human rights violations in the country, Western diplomats argued that the “Macedonian military had shown restraint in their operations, which were judged to be ‘proportional’ to the threat from the ethnic Albanian insurgents” (Phillips 2004, 97). Both security and economic interests influenced the way in which these IOs dealt with human rights violations associated with these conflicts.

Due to the presence of UNPREDEP forces, FYROM did not experience any serious violence within its borders in the 1990s. However, ethnic tensions between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians flared up in 2001. Although this new conflict posed just as great a threat to regional peace and stability, as shown in the following case

\textsuperscript{7} These include the War in Slovenia (1991), the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995), and the Bosnian War (1992-1995). The Kosovo War, considered separately from the Yugoslav Wars, place from early 1998 to mid 1999.
study, the UN did not establish any PKO in the country. Instead, the UN relied on NATO and EU peacekeeping efforts through Operation Essential Harvest and Operation Concordia, respectively. Such a policy change by the UN requires further reflection, as does the increasing role of NATO and EU military and civilian deployments in the Balkans.

Why did the UN decide not to intervene when many of the same factors involved in 1991, such as ethnic violence, economic disruption, and the possibility of regional conflict, still applied to the Macedonian conflict of 2001? Why did the EU intervene in 2003? In the following case study, official UN and EU documents pertaining to the conflict in FYROM are analyzed in order to determine the factors involved in both non-intervention and the establishment of a PKO. The findings reveal that the absence of UN forces was largely due to the changing conceptions of peacekeeping operations, including an increasing reliance on regional peacekeeping efforts. In addition, regardless of human rights violations in the country, the official EU document establishing Operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003/92/CFSP) does not mention any human rights concerns, thus pointing to the influence of security and economic interests in establishing PKOs.8

Security Interests

Status quo and Balance of Power: For both the UN and the EU, the reasons behind intervention in FYROM were based on a rational calculation that involved status quo and BoP interests, the level of violence, and the maintenance of international

---

8 The document does refer to the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001), signed by the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian representatives; it also mentions such aspects as protecting ethnic minorities and civilians. However, the EU document establishing a PKO does not explicitly state any human rights violations with which the mission is concerned.
recognition. In order to examine the rational calculation involved, the following analyzes official documents concerning the situation in FYROM.

The fact that the UN had previously established a PKO in FYROM reveals that the international community regarded maintaining peace in the country as not only vital to the country itself but to the entire Balkan region. The possibility of escalating violence and the potential for spillover throughout the region created serious peace and security implications for the entire European continent. Yet, the UN, while “strongly condemning extremist violence, including terrorist activities” in FYROM and while calling upon NATO’s Kosovo Force (KOFOR) to work with Macedonian authorities, did not establish a separate PKO in the country in 2001 (S/RES/1345, S/RES/1371). It should also be noted that the UNSC does not explicitly refer to human rights violations;\(^9\) this suggests that the UNSC had low status quo interests with regards to the Macedonian conflict as it pertained to international peace and security. The UN regarded the situation in FYROM as a regional security issue, thus delegating the task of peacekeeping to regional authorities. Therefore, the evidence supports hypothesis 1.1.

The EU regarded the situation as a regional security issue and was interested in maintaining peace and security in order to “help contribute towards a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country, as part of a region of stable countries, where an international security presence is no longer needed” (6916/03). There was viable cause to believe that the conflict might escalate into a regional conflict, hurting the EU both politically and economically. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s, the events in

\(^9\) These documents do mention the importance of establishing a multi-ethnic state, respecting ethnic civil rights, acting within international humanitarian and human rights law, and establishing a rule of law. While these do imply some concern with general human rights issues in the country, they are never outright stated and are framed within political, security, and economic contexts.
FYROM have been framed by regional peace and security implications. In 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Blagoj Hanziski, wrote to the UN Secretary General of the importance of the unstable border regions with Kosovo and Albania as having “dreadful consequences for the peace and stability in the whole of Europe” (S/1998/401). These regional security concerns had not subsided by the time that Operation Concordia was launched in 2003, as is evident by the EU’s clear aim of creating regional stability.

Europe also wanted to avoid the security implications associated with refugees and the migration of people across borders. In 1995, for example, about 700,000 Balkan refugees lived in Europe, with about half of these in Germany (Wren 1995). The EU wanted to avoid this happening again at all costs. Finally, Europe, which has experienced two of the deadliest conflicts in the twentieth century, did not want to risk a World War III. The PKO was thus largely a preventative PKO to ensure that violence did not escalate to the point that it could threaten peace in all of Europe. Maintaining peace in the region was thus a very high strategic interest for the EU. The importance of maintaining the status quo in the region helps explain why the EU took over the NATO mandate on March 31, 2003 (Phillips 2004). Therefore, the EU mission in Macedonia further supports hypothesis 1.1.

While individual member-states within the UN were certainly concerned with BoP interests in the Balkans and Europe, these interests were largely Western interests and, thus, manifested themselves in an EU (and NATO) intervention. The United States, along with the EU, was interested in assuring that Macedonia remained intact as one state under Western influence. A Western-led regional PKO would ensure that Russia, a staunch supporter of Macedonia since its independence in 1991, and its recently elected
president, Vladimir Putin, very much interested in enhancing Russia’s position in the world (Cohen 2001), stayed out of the Balkans. It also ensured the non-participation of Serbia and, thus, the prevention of another war in the Balkans.

Finally, Greece, as a member of the EU, was particularly concerned with not only maintaining peace in the region, but also maintaining a European influence in the Balkans, which act as a geographic link between Greece and the rest of Europe. BoP interests were very much a concern when it came to FYROM, supporting hypothesis 1.2 in terms of the EU. However, these security interests manifested themselves in the establishment of a regional, as opposed to an UN-led, PKO. The findings regarding the UN proved inconsistent with the original hypothesis, 1.2. The decision to establish regional PKO was very much a strategic decision by the US and Europe. Also of importance, however, was the UN’s changing perception of its role in PKOs.

As early as 1998, the UNSC began to support regional approaches to the situation in the Balkans, particularly that of the OSCE and its role in Kosovo. This, coupled with the failed missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I, 1992-1993) and Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993-1996), led the UN to increasingly step back to allow regional organizations to take a larger role in the maintenance of international peace and security. On 7 March 2000, then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, established the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (PUNPO); a report of PUNPO’s findings was distributed to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC on 21 August 2000 (S/2000/809). It called for peace operations that “require the active political, logistical and/or military support of one or more great powers, or of major regional powers. The tougher the operation, the more important such backing becomes” (S/2000/809). Thus, in 2001, we see the increase of EU
and NATO involvement in FYROM. The UNSC especially welcomed efforts taken by the EU in southern Serbia (S/RES/1345) and supported the establishment of a multinational security presence in FYROM (S/RES/1371).

The report also makes many recommendations as to how the UN should improve its own PSOs, centered on the idea that UN PSOs should develop more multidimensional mandates. These evolving mandates led to uncertainty as to what type of mission the UN could establish in FYROM. This uncertainty, coupled with a general lack of interest regarding the situation in FRYOM (there was a total of one press statement made by the President of the UNSC regarding FRYOM in 2001; none were made in 2002 and 2003), made the possibility of a UN PKO in 2001 unlikely. The EU, however, was able to establish a more forceful mission in the country. Thus, the presence of other IOs in the country further eliminated the need for a UN mission in FYROM, particularly as the level of violence was relatively low.

**Level of Violence:** Gleditsch et.al. (2002) defines the Macedonian conflict as a *Minor Armed Conflict*. The conflict involved only two main actors, the Macedonian Army, which claimed 63 deaths, and the National Liberation Army – composed of ethnic Albanians – claiming 64 deaths (AIN Press 2001). In addition, the conflict also created about 100,000 refugees and about 70,000 internally displaced peoples (UNHCR 2001). There were also no major reports of peacekeepers already on the ground being killed, explaining why the UN did not intervene.\(^{10}\) In the case of Macedonia, the UN did not intervene in part because there was not enough violence on the ground to qualify as a

\(^{10}\) The US did, however, fear for its 2,000 American citizens in the country, ordering them to return home. (see Phillips 2004). This was however, largely precautionary and does not seem to be based on violent acts already being committed against American citizens.
‘threat to international peace and security.’ These results support hypothesis 1.3 and suggest that the UN viewed the conflict as largely a minor regional problem.

The EU represented those states that were more affected by the violence in their neighboring countries to the east. The fact that the 3,500-strong Operation Concordia force that took over the NATO mandate (under 2003/92/CFSP) came two years after the conflict began further suggests that the level of violence remained quite low in comparison to other conflicts taking place. By the time Operation Concordia was implemented, its mandate consisted simply of monitoring the situation and providing emergency protection for civilians (2003/92/CFSP, Dobbins 2008, Pond 2006). In conclusion, the EU intervened in Macedonia regardless of the current level of violence, providing inconclusive evidence in support of hypothesis 1.3. Instead, the EU intervened in the country because of the concern of rising violence and the desire to increase its international presence.

*International Recognition:* The lack of UN intervention in FYROM in 2001 is also explained by its recent peacekeeping failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the organization did not want to put its international status on the line by intervening in a relatively stable country (Gegout 2009). In other words, the situation in FYROM did not present enough of an international threat for the UN to send a message to the international community that the organization was still a viable enforcer of peace and security. Because the UN was not interested in increasing its international recognition, only maintaining its current international status, the evidence supports hypothesis 1.4. The EU, however, was influenced by the quest to actively increase its international recognition.
In establishing a mission in FYROM, the EU never mentions the human rights implications of the conflict in Council Actions. The EU is very clear about its intentions for FYROM and the region; a PKO in FYROM would “facilitate closer integration with the EU” (6916/03), thus opening up relations with FYROM and the region that would eventually lead to EU membership. In addition, the previous war in the Balkans had severely strained the Atlantic alliance, making it even more essential that the EU work with the US to maintain peace (Dobbins 2008). In order to maintain good relations with the US and “facilitate closer relations with the EU and NATO” (6916/03), the EU worked with NATO forces in the establishment of Operation Concordia; NATO thus contributed finances and equipment to the operation.

It is clear, however, that the EU was also interested in asserting its influence in Europe outside of NATO. In the same document previously mentioned (6916/03), the Council of Ministers refers to Operation Concordia as an “EU take-over” of the NATO operation, implying that, although the two organizations were working together, the EU had plans to assert its independence and its status as a world power (Olsen et al. 2003). In other words, Operation Concordia was very much a rational step in its larger foreign policy plan – the establishment of a common EU foreign and defense policy, EU independence from NATO and the US, and EU enlargement– more than it was lending a helping hand to FYROM.

Creating a larger EU with a common foreign and defense policy would in turn create a more prevalent world power on the international scene; in other words, the organization would gain political clout if it succeeded in its mission, which was likely

---

11 FYROM is currently a candidate country, under review for EU membership. At the time of this document, the country had already signed a Stabilization and Association agreement, thus already on the road to EU integration.
due to the low levels of violence. Furthermore, the EU, also tarnished by its earlier failure to create peace in the Balkans, wanted to change the worldwide perception of the EU’s lack of external influence, particularly in military matters. The EU wanted to show the world that it was capable of military intervention; Operation Concordia became its first solo mission without an official UN mandate (Phillips 2004, Pond 2006). Thus, Concordia demonstrated that intervention could in fact take place outside of the UN and NATO, in regional affairs, legitimacy did not always have to stem from the UN (Dobbins 2008). Concordia further proved that the EU could conduct an independent PKO (Phillips 2004, Bono 2009). In essence, Operation Concordia was another means of showing that the EU was a viable international actor. These findings further support hypothesis 1.4 and suggest that the EU was concerned with the consequences involved in intervention.

Different aspects of security interests in FYROM affected the UN and the EU’s decision to establish a PKO. High strategic interests by some of the UN’s most powerful members did not lead to intervention by the UN itself, but to regional initiatives. In addition, low levels of violence led to the absence of a PKO by the UN. The UN was more influenced about the actual situation in FYROM and its role as international peacekeeper (i.e. the logic of appropriateness). The EU, however, intervened in spite of low levels of violence, suggesting that it was much more influenced by the presence of status quo and BoP concerns, or the security implications of intervention and non-intervention (i.e. the logic of consequences). Regional security interests thus prevailed, pushing the EU to intervene in 2003. Having thus established the security factors behind

---

12 Although NATO did provide financial support, it did not provide personnel to the operation.
the EU intervention, the following section will analyze the economic factors influencing Operation Concordia.

**Economic Interests**

*Trade and Development:* The logic of consequences can also be seen in the economic factors involved in the rationale behind Operation Concordia and the lack of an UN mission. Member states in both the UN and the EU were interested in trade and development in the Balkans; however, economic interests were of a higher concern for the EU.

Both the UN and the EU make some allusion to the importance of establishing good economic relations with FYROM (S/RES/1345, 6916/03). Going into 2001, the beginning of tensions in FYROM, ODA was in a downward trend, the lowest point being in 2001 with 247,130,000 USD (see Appendix D, Chart 1) (World Bank). The fact that the UN did not intervene in FYROM therefore supports hypothesis 2. Net ODA as a percentage of GNI, however, was neither in a decreasing or increasing trend (Chart 2); furthermore, GDP was also not decreasing or increasing leading into 2001 (Chart 3). This evidence is thus inconclusive with the original hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3, which assumed the lack of intervention would result from a downward-trending variable. While the UN was influenced by the lack of aid in FYROM, there is not enough evidence to make a clear conjecture as to whether or not it was concerned about improved economic conditions.

The EU, however, makes its economic intentions clear: “The operation’s core aim remains to contribute, at the explicit request of the government of the Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, to the security of international monitors in the country, thereby contributing to...enhancing economic development” (6916/03). In order to look further into the economic factors behind the establishment of a PKO, this paper analyzes ODA and GDP before, during, and after Operation Concordia.

While net ODA in 2001 ($247,130,000) was much higher than in 1995 ($78,800,000), there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that increased ODA leads to intervention (Ibid.). As shown in Appendix D, Chart 1, while net ODA received by Macedonia sharply increased between 1998 and 1999 (towards the end of UNPREDEP’s presence in the country), these numbers leveled off between 2000 and 2004; 2003 does not fall within either an increasing or decreasing trend. ODA cannot be said to be increasing going in to Operation Concordia in 2003; thus, the evidence was inconsistent with hypothesis 2.1. What seems more important is the promise of economic development and growth in the country.

Between 2002 and 2003, ODA as a percentage of GNI dropped by 1.53 percent (Chart 2), the beginning of a clear downward trend (Ibid.). The decline of net ODA corresponds directly to increasing GDP beginning in 2002 (Chart 3). Therefore, the evidence supports hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3. As ODA began to account for a smaller proportion of economic development in the country, the EU felt more inclined to take decisive action in FYROM. It is clear that the EU was interested in maintaining political and economic stability in a country in which it had already invested much of its resources and that showed promise for future economic prosperity. The EU explicitly states in its master messages regarding Operation Concordia that the organization “provides two-
thirds of all aid to Macedonia” and that the current operation “complements and supports these measures” (6919/03).

By looking at individual contributions to ODA in FYROM (provided by the OECD), the reasons for a regional, as opposed to international, approach is further explained. In 2003, the year Operation Concordia was launched, the four institutions within the UN that contributed the most to ODA in FYROM – UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNTA – contributed a total of $6.54 million in 2003 (Chart 4). These numbers are relatively low compared to EU figures; EU institutions alone contributed $46.25 million (Chart 5). Contributions made by EU institutions and, arguably the EU’s three most powerful members, Germany, France, and the UK, contributed a total of $77.11.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, three of the five veto members of the UNSC – the US, France, and the UK – contributed a total of $74.01 million (Chart 6).\textsuperscript{14} As these three countries are also members of NATO, it suggests that potential conflict in FYROM and its economic implications were regional concerns instead of a threat to international peace and stability.\textsuperscript{15} The EU simply had more to lose, and more to gain, from intervening in FYROM.

In order to prepare Macedonia for membership, the EU worked with the country to develop such processes as democratization, civil equality, and economic reconstruction (Dobbins 2008). In fact, while Macedonia experienced a negative GDP growth in 1995, GDP rates increased in correlation with the increase in trade and development links.

\textsuperscript{13} Contributions by France and the UK are counted twice, as part of UNSC member contributions and EU member contributions.

\textsuperscript{14} According to OECD figures, China did not contribute to FYROM. OECD does not give figures for Russian contribution to FYROM, and I was unwilling to find such figures elsewhere. Regardless, I believe these figures provide us with evidence to analyze the effect economic factors have on the decision to intervene in a conflict area.

\textsuperscript{15} This corresponds with previously mentioned security concerns. NATO members, including the US, wanted to ensure that Russia did not regain influence in the region.
between itself and its European neighbors. Only in 2001 did GDP growth rates fall to about negative 4.5 (IMF). Thus, the EU considered Macedonia and the rest of the Balkans as a very important investment; the country began receiving financial assistance focused on democracy and a free-market system from the EU starting in 1992 (Pond 2006). This focus on economic and political reform accompanied with financial aid also explains why the ‘less violent’ nature of the conflict did not deter the EU from intervening. Intervention was not so much about ending violence as it was about expanding the organization’s sphere of influence. By expanding the organization further east, the EU would increase its internal market, as well as its political clout. Thus, the EU’s economic interests affected security interests, positively affecting its willingness to intervene in Macedonia.

**Economic Consequences of Non-Intervention:** Had the EU not intervened in FYROM, it is likely that it would have experienced many more costs in the long run than the €6.2 million spent on Operation Concordia by the EU.\(^\text{16}\) Using Bradley Thayer’s (1999) method – measuring the direct economic cost through the cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in a given country – the total economic cost associated with Operation Concordia amounted to about €9,420,768. The total estimated cost of conflict prevention was thus €15.6 million. However, this sum is likely to be much less than the cost of conflict had it erupted in FYROM.

Bradley Thayer (1999) estimates the cost of an intermediate conflict in Macedonia during UNPREDEP (based on the cost of conflict in Bosnia through 1996): about $15 billion. He estimated the cost of a large conflict in FYROM as about $143.94

\(^\text{16}\) In addition, each contributing state was expected to provide any economic cost associated with its own troops in the operation.
billion. If such was the cost of conflict in 1999, these figures are likely to have increased in 2003. It is estimated that the savings to the international community by preventive action, which cost about $125.5 million, ranges from $14.87 billion to $129 billion. Clearly, the economic consequences involved in non-intervention were much higher than the economic costs associated with a PKO. Much of this is due to the external costs of armed conflict, including refugee costs and economic opportunity cost (Skön 2005).

The eruption of a conflict in FYROM would have had serious implications for regional stability and economic development, both clear aims of Operation Concordia. One such threat to stability included the movement of people across the Macedonian border; in a state like FYROM, which shares borders with four countries, the cost of refugees could have been staggering for its neighboring countries and the European continent, especially Germany and the UK. When the violence erupted in 2001 more than 175,000 Macedonians were displaced (about 100,000 of these refugees in other countries); by the end of the year, this number had decreased to about 43,500 (22,500 refugees) (World Refugee Survey 2002). In 2003, the number of internally displaced person was estimated at 3,154 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre). Had this violence expanded into an armed conflict, it is likely that these numbers would increase, particularly since armed conflict would have likely spread to other countries in the region.

During the Bosnian conflict, for example, the German government alone spent about $2.5 billion a year on refugees (Thayer 1999). In 2001/2, it is estimated that the UK spent about $1.5 billion dollars on asylum seekers (World of Information 2003). Not only do these countries have to provide basic welfare programs that follow EU human rights
principles, they are also confronted with a new sector of society in need of jobs – and often willing to work for less than nationals. There are also the legal costs involved in the application process towards seeking asylum; countries must pay for refugees to be returned to their country of origin, about £20,000 per person in the UK (Neville 2009). The potential impact of armed conflict on the refugee situation of FYROM therefore supports hypothesis 2.4.1. Such a movement of people would, inevitably, have led to a decrease in the amount being produced in the country and the amount FRYOM was able to trade with others.

The EU was clearly concerned with creating a stable economic environment in Macedonia and the region as a whole, with the end goal being integration into the EU and increased economic and political cooperation. An armed conflict in Macedonia, however, could have seriously stunted these relations. As shown by the *Report on Foreign Trade of Macedonia 2008*, the export of Macedonian products abroad began to decrease from 2000 (1326.71) to 2001 (1158.54), a 12.68 percent drop, and further from 2001 (1158.54) to 2002 (1118.15), a 3.48 percent drop (Petkov 2008). Although these numbers did increase in 2003, it is likely that had intervention not taken place, exports would have continued to decrease, seriously hampering any goal of EU integration. The evidence thus supports hypothesis 2.4.2.

A decrease in exports would make FRYOM less able to contribute to the internal market by exporting goods to other EU members. Serbia and Germany, for example, are consistently the top recipients of Macedonian exports (Petkov 2008). These numbers experienced a decrease, however, in 2001 and 2002. In addition, armed conflict would take away a viable market for EU members; although FDI dramatically increased after
the end of UNPREDEP in 1999 to 2001, with the reemergence of violence in the country in 2001, this investment took a nosedive (see Chart 6 of Appendix D) (World Bank). Such numbers further support hypothesis 2.4.2, revealing that the international community clearly had an economic stake in what was taking place in FRYOM. Intervention was, therefore, part of protecting this investment. The long-term benefits of intervening in FYROM, and the potential economic consequences of non-intervention, clearly outweighed the costs of the peacekeeping effort.

The overall economic consequences of non-intervention in FYROM supports hypothesis 2.4 that PKOs are partly established in order to avoid the costs involved with non-intervention. Although these consequences cover a wide spectrum of economic measures, a look at refugee costs and decreasing export levels involved with non-intervention highlights the rationale involved in the establishment of Operation Concordia. The PKO was a direct result of the EU’s interest of increasing trade relations with FYROM and its ultimate goal of further EU integration. Overall, the Macedonian case reveals that economic interests do play a role in determining whether or not an IO established a PKO, although more so for the EU than the UN, supporting hypothesis 2.

The lack of UN intervention in 2001 and the EU-led intervention in 2003 reveals several key issues regarding each organization and peacekeeping operations. First, the UN was not overly affected by economic trends in FYROM, suggesting that, again, it is less concerned with the economic consequences of intervention. Financially, the UN was already involved in PKOs throughout the world and did not believe the situation in Macedonia warranted further risking its political position in the world. The EU, however, was very much affected by economic interests, influenced largely by its desire to increase
trade relations and improve FYROM’s economic stability in order to put it on the road to EU integration. The consequences were very much a part of the rationale behind Operation Concordia. The decision to establish Operation Concordia was, therefore, a rational decision based on the consequences involved, as well as the desire to increase the EU’s economic borders and its international recognition.

**CASE STUDY: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

The DRC was thrown into crisis after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, when approximately 1.1 to 1.25 million Hutu refugees, including former soldiers and militiamen, were forced out of Rwanda to settle into refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of the DRC (Emizet 2000). The presence of these former soldiers and militiamen transferred the violence to the Congo as Hutu militiamen and soldiers began using refugee camps to attack Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis. External countries, including Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, intervened in the DRC, taking Mobutu Sese Seko, a Hutu supporter, out of power and installing Laurence Kabila. Under Kabila, however, violence in the region continued to escalate, culminating in the Second Congo War, which began in August 1998 and officially ended in July 2003.

Both the UN and the EU intervened in the DRC, the UN through MONUC in 1999 and the EU through Operation Artémis in 2003. Although human rights violations, which center on the issue of refugees and access to humanitarian assistance, seem to have been a more relevant concern in the DRC, security and economic concerns were also very prevalent and shaped the way in which both organizations approached human rights violations. In a 1999 statement, the President of the UNSC said, “large-scale human suffering is a consequence and sometimes a contributing factor to instability and further
conflict, whether due to displacement, violent assault or other atrocities” (S/PRST/1999/6). Despite these growing concerns from the international community, however, an official PKO was not established until 1999.

Official UN and EU documents regarding the DRC again show changing conceptions of their respective roles as international peacekeepers. The UN was trying to take a step back, viewing the conflict as a regional security issue. This hesitancy to intervene led to the UNSC stating in December 1998 that it would entertain coordination with the Organization for African Union (OAU) to implement a peace agreement (S/PRST/1998/36). After the Lusaka Agreement was signed between the various parties to the conflict, the UNSC began a preliminary deployment of 90 UN military personnel – along with civilian, political, humanitarian, and administrative staff – in the DRC, in coordination with a Joint Military Commission (composed mostly of African states).

The EU, on the other hand, was just beginning to establish itself on the international scene. Even though it expressed a willingness to support activities with the ultimate aim of establishing political and economic stability (1999/728/CFSP), it still managed to keep at a distance, viewing the conflict as largely an African problem that required an African solution (98/350/CFSP). This approach was very much in contrast to what the UN Secretariat and Secretary General were advocating, that is increased military intervention with peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates. In his second report on the preliminary deployment to the DRC, the Secretary General states,

The Political Committee expressed concern about ‘the slow pace at which the [UN] was handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the [DRC].’ It noted that similar situations in other regions ‘normally receive more prompt and
appropriate responses from the [UN]’ and called upon the [UN] ‘to address the situation in the [DRC] with the urgency and seriousness it deserved.

(S/1999/1116)

Only on 30 November 1999, did the UNSC establish MONUC as an official military deployment with peacekeeping mandates. At the request of the UN, the EU temporarily took over this mission in 2003. The following case study thus seeks to determine what factors led to a PKO in 1999 and 2003. A closer look at both the UN and the EU will reveal that in 1999 and 2003, respectively, security and economic interests in the DRC, and the consequences of non-intervention, finally outweighed the costs of peacekeeping.

**Security Interests**

*Status quo and Balance of Power:* In the case of the DRC, the international community changed its perception of status quo and BoP interests within the DRC. Originally viewed as a humanitarian situation and a regional problem, the conflict escalated until the UN was forced to act in order to maintain peace in the region and its status as international peacekeeper. In addition, the EU saw an opportunity to expand its foreign policy past its own borders. Thus, while the conflict in the DRC did not pose a great direct security threat to the international powers, in the end, the security implications associated with non-intervention forced the international community to take action. The rationale behind this final action is again evident in official documents concerning the DRC.

The events taking place in the DRC were initially of low strategic interest to the UNSC and the EU. Throughout 1998, the UNSC discusses the matter as a humanitarian situation and focuses on the question of refugees, the removal of all external forces, and
the role of the OAU. When the Secretary General reports that there is evidence of “grave human rights” and “possible genocide” (S/1998/581), the UNSC president simply expresses concern about these human rights violations and the need for further investigation (S/PRST/1998/20). Issues such as refugee camps, while posing a regional security threat, did not affect the security interests of the international community.

The fact that the DRC was in central Africa played a large role in the hesitant call to intervention by the UNSC. In 1998, the UNSC referred to the conflict as a “threat to international peace and security in the region” (S/RES/1291, Reyntjens 1999, Emizet 2000) or as a “threat to regional peace and security” (S/PRST/1998/26). The Western powers largely viewed Africa as inherently violent and constantly in conflict (Autesserre 2009). In addition, afraid that a Western intervention Africa would be seen as a repeat of colonial policies, the international community was generally unwilling to intervene in Africa. Then US Secretary of State Colin Powell later articulated this view when he argued that Africans “needed to do more for themselves” (Schraeder 2006, 176). In other words, many people in the international community believed in an “African solution to an African problem” (Schraeder 2006, 173). It was, therefore, waiting for the OAU to take the lead in the peacekeeping effort. This uncertainty in establishing a PKO was coupled by the recent failures in Somalia and Rwanda. Once the Lusaka Agreement had been signed, however, the UN had no choice but to establish MONUC; that being said, MONUC’s mandate was nothing like that set out in the Lusaka Agreement. Even while

---

17 On 30 November 1999, the UNSC created MONUC in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement, a peace framework proposed by the OAU. The Lusaka Agreement called for a UN force with both peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacities. The UN resolution, however, mandated only PKOs (S/RES/1279); the mandate was, in essence, an enlargement of the small liaison staff—composed of military, civilian, political, humanitarian, and administrative personnel—already stationed in the Congo, as mandated by an earlier resolution (S/RES/1258).
establishing the operation, the UNSC seemed hesitant. In other words, the UN was willing to intervene only if it did not have to take a leading role.

The UNSC’s main concern is the maintenance of peace and security. Thus, it was interested in changing the current status quo, i.e. conflict, in the DRC and was willing to take more forceful action on two conditions: (1) regional security threats becoming international security threats and (2) the willingness of regional actors to take the leading role. Thus, in 1999, the language of UN documents began to change. Human suffering was linked to international security. When establishing the preliminary operation, the UNSC reiterated its primary purpose as the “maintenance of international peace and security” (S/RES/1258), including the influx of refugees and the destabilization of the African continent. The establishment of MONUC, therefore, supports hypothesis 1.1.

In 1995, the EU Summit in Madrid officially sanctioned security problems in Africa as a concern for Europe (Olsen 2010). In 1998, at the outbreak of renewed violence in the DRC, the EU published a *Common Position Concerning Human Rights, Democratic Principles, the Rule of Law and Good Governance in Africa* (98/35/CFSP), including a discussion of human rights violations in the region. The Directorate-General for development within the EU began focusing on conflict prevention in the region, including “strengthening African capacity for conflict management” (Olsen 2010, 90). These developments point to an increased concern for the peace and stability in Africa.

The EU thus began to increase its influence abroad and to spread EU values of democracy and human rights. While the EU was concerned about human rights in Africa, its own security interests influenced this concern. In 1998 it was considering
increased financial support (in democratization, human rights, rule of law, and good governance) for African countries that had experienced general improvements. In 1999, it supported the Lusaka Agreement, as well as the UN and OAU PKOs, expressing its “support for activities which contribute to political stability and the alleviation of economic and social problems which contribute to instability in the Great Lakes region” (1999/728/CFSP). It was, however, only willing to intervene in the DRC if it had a UN mandate, thus pointing, again, to the influence of the colonial past in making the international community hesitant to intervene. The EU, like the UN, was obviously concerned with changing the status quo from one of instability to one of stability, thus further supporting hypothesis 1.1. However, while the EU was concerned about human rights in Africa, this concern was partly due to its own security interests, in particular increasing its presence on the international scene (Gegout 2009).

Historically, the DRC had close relations with the West since its independence in 1960, particularly with the ‘troika’ of Belgium, France, and the United States. However, Laurence Kabila, gaining power in 1997, engaged in little diplomatic relations with any of the Western powers. The United States did not support his regime and did not officially denounce the actions of the rebel groups from Uganda and Rwanda (Gegout 2009). France, a firm supporter of the Francophile Mobutu, supported Kabila, but this endorsement was lukewarm at most (Ibid.). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, supported the governments of Uganda and Rwanda; it had no real security interests in the DRC itself, however (Adebajo 2006, Macqueen). Thus, the Western powers wanted to avoid partiality in the conflict. Additionally, the UN as an organization is not concerned with changing the BoP; it is concerned with maintaining peace when such a change
should occur. The UN did not seek to change or maintain the balance of power, proving inconsistent with hypothesis 1.2. Because of the nature of the EU, however, it was interested in changing the BoP by asserting itself as a valid IO and actor on the international scene.

In terms of BoP, the EU was very much concerned with increasing its status on the international scene. In addition, national interests played a dominant role in the establishment of Operation Artémis. France saw the Congo, the biggest country in the francophone world, as a vital tool to continuing the francophone culture and French dominance on the continent (Gegout 2009, Schraeder 2006, Autesserre 2009, Misseroli 2003). France had also undergone much international critique after its failed intervention in Rwanda and thus wanted to prove itself as a military actor. Furthermore, the country simply wanted to show that France was still an important and relevant player in international relations. The driving force behind the EU mission was, therefore, the willingness of France, and Belgium to a lesser extent, to take a leading role (Homan 2009, Gegout 2009). In fact, France was already planning a mission named Operation Mamba when the “French President Chirac realized this intervention would be the ideal case to prove the capacity of the EU to act autonomously from NATO” (Homan 2009, 2). Hypothesis 1.2, therefore, is supported.

*Level of Violence:* Gleditsch et al. categorize the conflict in the DRC as *War* from 1998 to 2000 (in which MONUC was launched) and *Intermediate Armed Conflict* starting in 2001 (in which the EU established Operation Artémis). The powerful states within the conflict involved eight African armies, including those of Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Chad, Sudan, Uganda, and Rwanda, all of which had high strategic interests in the conflict, especially the latter two. In addition, there were numerous rebel groups from each country participating in the conflict,
the UNSC, and thus the United Nations, did not want to risk lives and money on a regional conflict that was largely viewed as typically ‘African,’ and therefore unlikely to end (Bariagaber 2006). Furthermore, an international peacekeeping operation was considered unlikely to succeed. In fact, Resolution 1341 (S/RES/1341) calls for the endorsement of changes envisioned by the Secretary-General, including the withdrawal of forces in any situation in which there is “undue risk” (S/2001/128). It is this undue risk that is key; the UN was not interested in risking the lives of its own peacekeepers in order to save the lives of civilians in the DRC. This was deemed too high a security risk to justify humanitarian intervention. As the violence continued to escalate, however, the lives of humanitarian workers and peacekeepers became increasingly at risk.

On 24 February 2000, the UNSC allowed MONUC, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to take the necessary means (i.e. military force) to “protect United Nations and co-located JMC [Joint Military Coalition] personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (S/RES/1291). The conflict, in addition to being a possible genocide, became a threat to international peace and security on a global scale only when UN officials themselves were threatened. While the violence in the DRC was high, the level of violence was analyzed in light of the risk it posed to peacekeepers. This was the predominant security interest that factored into UNSC’s decision to intervene in the conflict. The case of MONUC, therefore, supports hypothesis 1.3.

only increasing the level of violence in the region. Refugee camps were also a source of violence, as the Hutu militia used them to attack Rwanda, as well as Congolese Tutsi.
The level of violence, while it had declined to an *Intermediate Armed Conflict*, still affected the EU’s decision to intervene in the DRC in 2003.\(^\text{19}\) In this case, however, there was no mention in the mandating document (S/RES/1484) of violence being targeted towards peacekeepers or humanitarian workers. Before the launch of Operation Artémis, however, there was international outcry of the risk of genocide in the region (2003/203/CFSP, Homan 2007). Therefore, the EU launched Operation Artémis on 5 June 2003 in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1484 in order to protect civilians and “promote the peace process at the national level” (S/RES/1484). It helped restore security in the region and returned thousands of displaced persons back to their homes, enabling the UN to continue its peacekeeping operation. In this way, then, the EU operation was simply a continuation of MONUC, taking over during a time when the UN was being criticized for its failure to end the violence. Continuing violence thus led to the establishment of Operation Artémis. Therefore, Operation Artémis supports hypothesis 1.3. Medium to high levels of violence are more likely to lead to peacekeeping operations by the international community.

*International Recognition:* As the previously mentioned concerns of the Political Committee show, international and public opinion from within the UN itself was in favor of some form of intervention to stop the grave human rights violations from taking place. While the UN had failed to maintain peace in Somalia and Rwanda, failure to intervene in the DRC – especially since part of the blame for the violence in the DRC certainly lay with the UN’s failed mission in Rwanda – would have tarnished its reputation to an even greater extent. Furthermore, the situation in the DRC presented enough of a threat to

\(^{19}\) The Ituri region where Operation Artémis was stationed had suffered some 50,000 deaths between 1999 and 2003 and another 500,000 displaced persons (Homan 2007).
regional peace and security that the UN could risk a peacekeeping operation in the hopes of proving the validity of the organization itself, as well as its PKOs (Emizet 2000, Autesserre 2009, Gegout 2009). Failure to act would have resulted in a failure to promote its agenda, to promote the ideals on which the organization was founded, the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of basic human rights.

Based on interviews with UN diplomats and staff members, Autesserre writes, “War resumption [in the DRC] would be seen as a proof that, even when given a strong mandate and enormous resources, the UN missions were ineffective” (2009, 266). Thus, the UN had a lot to gain if it succeeded in the DRC; it also had a lot to lose. If the mission did succeed, the UN would be sending a clear message that the UN’s role as an arbiter of international peace and security had not ended and was unlikely to end. The UN mission, at the core, was thus clearly influenced by the need to reestablish, maintain, and increase its international reputation as peacekeeper, thus supporting hypothesis 1.4.

The EU mission was thus ‘Europeanized’ and renamed Operation Artémis from the originally planned French mission. France, however, remained the leader in the operation, which was largely influenced by France’s desire to increase its own international recognition, as well as the EU’s status in international politics. Much of this sentiment stemmed from tense relations between France and the US, the former believing that the latter had too much influence on the European continent through its membership and leading role in NATO. France saw the EU mission as an opportunity to show the United States that France and the EU were capable of having a powerful military force outside of US and NATO influence. Furthermore, France and Germany viewed the EU peacekeeping force as a means of proving the sustainability and credibility of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Gegout 2009, Homan 2009). Thus, the desire to consolidate the EU’s zone of influence, as well as increase France’s military, political, and cultural influence abroad, greatly influenced the decision to intervene on the African continent, thus supporting hypothesis 1.4.

For both the UN and the EU, then, high status quo interests, high levels of violence and the interest of promoting international recognition of their respective organizations proved influential in establishing a PKO. While both IOs were concerned with the humanitarian situation on the ground (the level of violence), their responsibility to stop this violence and establish peace was influenced by the likely final outcome, including the likelihood of success and, as a result, increasing international recognition (logic of consequences). Both the UN and the EU were concerned with maintaining peace and stability in the region, as well as the level of violence found in the DRC. The most important aspect in terms of violence for the UN, however, was the lives of its own peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. The EU’s mission, on the other hand, was launched in part because of continuing violence and the failure of the UN mission. This decision was, however, greatly influenced by the chance to expand the EU’s foreign and defense policy, as well as the leadership of France in implementing the mission. In the case of the DRC, therefore, the overall hypothesis regarding security interests – high security interests are more likely to lead to peacekeeping – proved true.

**Economic Interests**

*Trade and Development:* The Western powers viewed the DRC as an investment opportunity. National economic interests, including access to markets and enhanced trading in mineral resources, were a driving force for member states such as the UK, the
US, and France to become heavily involved in the country, particularly through
development aid. In 2002-2003, at the end of the official conflict, France donated $704
million in development aid; the United States donated $740 million (Gegout 2009). The
EU also had strong trade and development interests in the region, providing about $232
million in development aid in 2004-2005, more than half of total development aid in the
DRC; it also covered 80 percent of the 2006 election campaign costs (Gegout 2009). The
EU was, therefore, heavily invested in the region and had much to lose if the conflict
escalated into complete chaos. It based its decision to intervene on the security
development nexus, the idea that there is no security without development and no
development without security (Hoebek 2007). Economic development was viewed as a
vital aspect of creating regional peace (Olsen 2003); regional peace would then lead to
increased trade with the Western world. To further test the influence of economic factors
on the establishment of PKO, the following analyzes ODA and GDP levels, as well as the
possible economic consequences involved in non-intervention.

The economic indicators reveal a stark difference between the UN and the EU’s
interests behind establishing a PKO. Between 1996 and 2001, ODA levels in the DRC
were relatively low, with an average of $167,331,666 over a period of six years (see
Appendix E, Chart 1) (World Bank databank). There was no increasing or decreasing
trend in terms of ODA levels received leading into the establishment of MONUC in
1999. The same results were found with net ODA received as a percentage of GNI (Chart
2) (World Bank data bank). Finally, 1999 fell in the middle of a downward trend in the
country’s GDP (Chart 3) (World Bank databank). In fact, in 1999, the DRC had a
negative 4% GDP growth rate. The data suggests that the UN, while certainly concerned
about the importance of “peace in order to reconstruct the economy of the country, enhance development, and foster national reconciliation” (S/PRST/1999/17), was not influenced by the current economic situation in the DRC and how these indicators might affect future economic development. In regards to the UN, the evidence suggests that ODA and GDP cannot always indicate the presence of a PKO, thus inconclusive with hypotheses 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Data concerning the EU, however, shows a different picture.

The DRC experienced a sharp increase in the amount of ODA received after 2001 and leading into 2003, supporting hypothesis 2.1 and suggesting that the EU was more concerned about the economic conditions already on the ground when establishing Operation Artémis (Appendix E, Chart 1). Interestingly, however, net ODA received as a percentage of GNI also sharply increased between 2001 and 2003 (Appendix E, Chart 2). The economy was being pumped by foreign aid, but was not adequately recovering. This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis 2.2. At the same time, GDP after 2000 and through 2003 is trending upwards, supporting hypothesis 2.3 (Appendix E, Chart 3). This would suggest that the EU, was concerned about the whether or not the economy was improving as a whole; it was not as concerned about how much of this improvement was due to foreign aid. Additionally, it was not really interested in the DRC until institutions such as aid to the population, the strengthening of state structures, and economic reconstruction were already in place. In fact, the EU had been contributing to the DRC since before the establishment of MONUC.

Individual ODA contributions also reveal an interesting trend: EU member states and institutions contribute more ODA overall to the DRC than the UNSC P-5 members and UN institutions. In 1999, France, Germany, the UK and EU institutions contributed a
total of 30.28 USD million, compared to 23.16 USD million by the P-5 members\textsuperscript{20} and 27.67 USD million by UN institutions (see Appendix E, Charts 4-6) (OECD.StatsExporter). These numbers increased to 1918.28 USD million for France, Germany, the UK and EU institutions, 2712.11 USD million for P-5 members, and 41.96 USD million for UN institutions in 2003. All three groups contributed fairly substantial amounts to the country before 1999 and increased their contribution to the DRC by 2003. This evidence further suggests that the international community had substantial economic reasons behind the decision to intervene. Another aspect of these economic reasons involved the consequences of non-intervention.

\textit{Economic Costs of Non-intervention:} Today, it is estimated that there are more than 450,000 Congolese refugees in neighboring countries and about 2 million internally displaced persons ("DR Congo" 2011). In January 1999, there were a total of approximately 80,000 refugees in the Great Lakes region; this number had already increased by about 15,000 at the end of the same year ("Special Programme…" 1999). The number of displaced persons peaked in 2003 to approximately 3,044,000 people (IDMC).\textsuperscript{21} In addition, in 2000, there were a total of about 347,200 refugees in the DRC from neighboring countries. The movement of people throughout the region was clearly an important element of the conflict in the DRC and is noted by both the UN and the EU in numerous official documents.

These refugees and displaced persons had a tremendous financial impact on the international community. In 2000, the UNHCR spent a total of 20,453,762 USD on refugees and displaced persons in the DRC alone. Allowing the conflict to continue by

\textsuperscript{20} This number does not include data for the Russian Federation, as it was not provided by OECD and was not found on other databases.
\textsuperscript{21} Data unavailable for 1999.
non-intervention would have increased this amount year by year. In addition, further conflict would only add to the increasing number of Africans immigrating to the West, particularly Europe, which had an interest in preventing migrants and refugees from arriving to its own borders (Olsen 2010). Hypothesis 2.4.1 is, therefore, supported. The cost of refugees, however, was not the only economic loss faced by the international community in the case of the DRC.

The loss of exports is less of a clear indicator in the case of the DRC. It does appear that 1999 was in the middle of a downward trend of exports of goods and services (% of GDP) from the DRC, supporting hypothesis 2.4.2 and helping to explain why the UN intervened at this time (Chart 7, World Bank). However, exports continued to decrease after the establishment of MONUC. Exports began to rise beginning in 2001, which proves inconclusive with hypothesis 2.4.2 in terms of the EU. These results are likely due to the fact that MONUC was not a preventative force, but was established in the middle of a preexisting conflict. Conditions were, therefore, not conducive to improving the economy. In addition, export levels in 2003 were still below that of 1998. It is, therefore, feasible that the EU was simply interested in maintaining the already increased export levels. Since 2005, however, exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP have experienced a severe decline, as low as %10 in 2009. Regardless of export levels, the DRC held an important position in the trade of goods such as diamonds, petroleum, coffee, and copper.

In 1999, $579 million worth of diamonds were exported from the DRC. Coffee and copper followed at $86 million and $47 million, respectively (Europa Publications). In 2000, these numbers had decreased to $444 million in diamonds, $7 million in coffee,
and $47 million in copper. While many goods again increased in 2001, the export market remained inconsistent. These goods, however, were very important to the West, especially Belgium, then its main trading partner. As of 1999, the US imported on average 30% or more of goods and services in the DRC. In 2001, Belgium imported 59.7%, the United States 12.9%, and France 6.9% (Europa Publications). This is evidence that the West viewed the DRC as an important market to buy key goods important to its technology and luxury goods sector. It appears that as the illegal trading market expanded, the West traded less and less, at least directly, with the DRC. While the West continued to import goods from the DRC throughout the conflict, however, its exports were continually diverted to China. It is unclear, however, if this is due to increased illegal trade of many goods, including diamonds and tungsten. Establishing peace would, therefore, ensure a more legal form of trade that would eliminate the need for a middleman in the form of China. Overall then, the evidence supports hypothesis 2.4.

Economic interests were less conclusive in the DRC case. For the UN, the economic indicators relevant to the establishment of a PKO involved the costs of non-intervention, including refugee costs and decreasing exports from the country of conflict. This suggests that the UN was interested in not only its role to protect and aid civilians and countries experiencing unrest, but in the consequences involved if it did not act upon its identity as international peacekeeper. The EU, however, while not influenced by decreasing ODA as a percentage of GNI, was influenced by increasing ODA and GDP levels, as well as the costs of non-intervention.

The EU, thus, made a rationale calculation based on its role in society and the costs involved; its focus on the economic consequences involved seemed more
pronounced than in the case of the UN. Overall, the EU was clearly interested in more than the humanitarian situation on the ground, pursuing both increased economic opportunity and an expanded foreign policy. The UN was, in the case of the DRC, concerned about the humanitarian situation on the ground, but tended to frame this situation by its security implications. In both cases, however, both actors considered the consequences involved in intervention and non-intervention alike.

The DRC further points to several differences between the establishment of PKOs by the UN and the EU. Both organizations are clearly influenced by a rational calculus of the humanitarian situation in the country of conflict and the costs involved in intervention. Both IOs were concerned with the high levels of violence and the implications this violence had on the migration of peoples, regional stability, and economic indicators. The EU, however, was more interested in BoP interests than the UN when establishing PKOs. In particular, the EU (and France) wanted to establish itself as a viable security actor on the international scene. The EU also took into consideration the current situation (economic and security) in the country of conflict, suggesting that the UN is more prone to establish a PKO based on its identity. This conclusion has important implications for the future of the PKOs.

CONCLUSION

Because every conflict is different, the factors behind establishing a PKO will invariably differ according to each conflict situation. PKOs must be developed in order to fit the specific circumstances of each individual conflict. In addition, there is a certain degree of subjectivity in terms of the costs involved in establishing a PKO and the costs involved in non-intervention. In fact, the only way to determine how individuals within
these IOs defined the costs involved and analyzed the independent variables outlined in this paper is through direct interviews. That being said, this paper attempts to outline some of the factors involved in the decision to establish a PKO in order to show that there are general similarities in terms of the interests involved behind the establishment of a PKO. These involve security and economic factors, both of which help frame humanitarian crises and human rights situations in a conflict. The findings of this study firmly support the idea that consequential rationalism influences how IOs conceptualize their identity and role in society (see Table 2). It further reveals that IOs do, in fact, undergo a cost-benefit analysis before intervening in a conflict. If the overall benefits outweigh overall costs, IOs will be more likely to establish PKOs, thus supporting the overall hypothesis of the paper. The study also reveals, however, several diverging outcomes of particular interest for further study.

The first divergence involves different security interests for the UN and the EU, leading to the conclusion that it is not a combination of status quo interests, balance of power interests, and the level of violence that leads to intervention. Instead, certain security interests tended to be more important than others, depending on the organization. The UN was much more concerned about maintaining or changing the status quo, i.e. peace, than it was with the balance of power. This is easily explained by the main goal of the UN: the maintenance of peace and security. The UN, as a world organization, however, would not be interested in changing the balance of power.

The EU, on the other hand, while interested in status quo issues, was very much influenced by its desire to change the balance of power and increase its own clout on the international scene. Additionally, the EU’s status quo interests in FYROM were of more
direct concern than those in the DRC. This can help explain why the EU did not gain a mandate from the UNSC before intervening in FYROM. This would suggest that the EU, as a regional organization, is much more concerned about maintaining peace in its own region. This can also be seen when looking at the effects of the level of violence on intervention. While the UN took into account the varying degrees of violence in FYROM and the DRC, there was no correlation found between the level of violence and EU intervention. More important to the EU was the possibility of increasing violence and the implications this would have on regional stability.

The second divergence involved differing economic interests between the UN and the EU. Both the UN and the EU were influenced by the potential economic consequences of non-intervention, namely the cost of refugees and the decrease in exports. Not surprisingly, however, the EU was influenced by other economic indicators – indicators that seemed to have less of an influence on the UN. As in security interests, the location of the conflict also played a role. In FYROM, the EU was less concerned about the current economic situation on the ground and more concerned with the consequences of intervention, i.e. increased economic prosperity and trade. In the DRC, however, intervention seemed to be more conditional on the economic conditions already in place. In other words, in the DRC, the EU was not interested in intervention unless there was evidence that the economy was already improving and that the EU would be able to take advantage of this improvement.

It is clear that the changing views of peacekeeping affected the operations in both FYROM and the DRC. Although the UN’s decision not to intervene in FYROM in 2001 was certainly influenced by the relatively low level of violence, more research needs to
be conducted in order to ascertain the role of the EU in this decision. Based on this study, it is reasonable to assume that the UN did not intervene in FYROM simply because it did not need to intervene due to the EU’s (and NATO) presence in the region. The UN was delegating more authority to regional organizations. What is more interesting, however, is why the UN delegated this authority to the EU in the case of the DRC, especially when African regional organizations were already aiding the peace process. This can largely be explained by the EU’s desire, particularly that of France, to expand its CFSP and increase its international recognition. Also of interest, however, is whether or not the EU is simply more capable of establishing PKOs than the AU and other African organizations.

This paper revealed that different IOs intervene in a conflict situation for variations of the same interests. Furthermore, different issue areas may be of particular interest to some IOs, but not to others. While the UN was much more concerned with overall security interests, mainly the maintenance of peace, the EU was more concerned with economic interests (see Appendix F). These differences are largely due to the fact that, although very similar, they differ in fundamental ways. The EU, for example, was first established as an organization based solely on economic cooperation; it makes sense that it still focuses on economic interests based on previous investment in trade and development. The UN, however, was established in order to maintain world peace and security, thus explaining why it is more concerned with security interests, in particular the level of violence. These differences also have far-reaching implications for PKOs in the future, as well as the role of IOs on the international political system.

The EU intervention in the DRC also brings up interesting dynamics regarding cooperation between international and regional organizations in PKOs. Regional
organizations are certainly becoming more influential in the peacekeeping process. However, the results of this study suggest that the UN takes into account to a greater extent its identity and role in society as protector of human rights and international peacekeeper. Further study – analyzing the reasoning behind intervention and the subsequent results – is, therefore, required to determine whether or not international, i.e. the UN, or regional PKOs are and will be more successful. Such a study would also be helpful in determining how PKOs and the institutions surrounding these PKOs should change in order to ensure greater success in terms of maintaining peace and security for the citizens affected by conflict.

Understanding the reasons behind PKOs can provide insight into why PKOs fail or succeed. Although the determination of a successful PKO is beyond the scope of this study, it deserves further investigation, bearing in mind the original mandates and incentives for intervening in the first place. If the main underlying factor behind a PKO lies with the logic of appropriateness, i.e. an IO is compelled to intervene through a rational calculation of its identity as an organization and its obligation to society, it seems more likely that the intervention will be based on protecting civilians. If, on the other hand, an IO establishes a PKO based on a calculated review of the costs and benefits involved in both intervention and non-intervention, i.e. the logic of consequences, PKOs might run the risk of failing. On the other hand, these incentives might, in fact, encourage successful PKOs. It would, thus, be interesting to study whether a PKO implemented based on the interests of the intervener can succeed while not taking into account the interests of the country of conflict. Again, these conclusions require further study through the addition of more case studies of varying types of conflict, different locations, and
involving several IOs. In addition, it is also necessary to take a more in-depth analysis of the IOs themselves (via organizational theory developed for IOs) in order to get a getter sense of the bureaucratic processes involved in the decision to establish a PKO.

The findings of this paper also have implications for the role of IOs in world politics. While these organizations are established in order to promote cooperation, peace, and security, they in large part fail to do so. In other words, as the factors behind peacekeeping show, IOs are still very much a continuation of politics as usual. While an IO like the UN exists in order to intervene in a conflict in which human rights are being violated – simply because human lives are needlessly being lost – the reality is that IOs, and their individual member states, make rational and calculated decisions based on the benefits and costs involved in a PKO. It is not the case that IOs are not concerned with humanitarian issues; the development of the Responsibility to Protect is just one example of how international norms of sovereignty have begun to transform into the idea that states have an obligation to protect all world citizens. However, the practical application of such norms has not yet caught up with the norms themselves. In other words, humanitarian issues are framed by the security and economic interests of the intervening organization. In order to fully understand PKOs and other PSOs, as well as their likelihood to succeed, it is imperative that we understand the ways in which politics influence operations that are largely purported to support humanitarian efforts and protect human rights.

Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1</th>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Actual Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Security</td>
<td>UN interests: status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>quo, higher levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater likelihood of peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Maintaining or changing status quo (peace).</td>
<td>of violence, and the desire to increase international recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Interest in changing/maintaining the balance of power.</td>
<td>EU interests: status quo, BoP, and desire to increase international recognition. No correlation was found regarding level of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Higher levels of violence in conflict.</td>
<td>UN more influenced by logic of appropriateness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Desire to increase international recognition.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis 2**  
**Higher economic interests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Greater likelihood of peacekeeping</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Increasing official development assistance (ODA).</td>
<td>UN interests: no clear connection in regards to hypotheses 2.1-2.3. Concerned with costs of non-intervention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Decreasing ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI).</td>
<td>EU interests: no clear correlation regarding ODA. Concerned with GDP and costs of non-intervention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Increasing gross domestic product (GDP).</td>
<td>UN more concerned with logic of appropriateness.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>The economic consequences involved with non-intervention.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1</td>
<td>Higher cost of refugee population.</td>
<td>UN and EU: influenced by refugee cost and decreasing exports, i.e. trade.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2</td>
<td>Decreasing exports in country of conflict.</td>
<td>Both more concerned with consequences.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix A**

**Neoliberal Institutionalism**
- Economic interests
- Accounts for international cooperation
- International regimes: *Krasner (1982)*
- Limitations: focus on why states act though IOs; states do not always cooperate


---

**Neorealism**
- Role of Individual States: Security interests
- Rational Choice Model
- Limitations: doesn’t look at economic interests and human rights violations; ‘billiard ball approach


---

**English School**
- ‘International society’
- Security interests (balance of power) and humanitarian interests working together
- HR has become part of international norm
- Elements of realism: prestige
- Limitations: lack of economic factors


---

**Cooperation**
- Int’l Regimes

---

**Security**
- Rational Choice

---

**Cooperation**
- Int’l Regimes
Appendix B

Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are generally spoken of to refer to several types of intervention operations, including humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. While the distinctions are often blurred, especially regarding the practical application of PSOs, it is important to keep in mind the differences between the various operations. This is especially important in that IOs tend to refer to PSOs as simply humanitarian, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding missions in order to stay clear of crossing that line that is national sovereignty.

PSO operations began, as early as 1827 (England in Greece) according to Thomas Weiss, as humanitarian intervention. Weiss further defines humanitarian intervention as “employing coercion for human protection purposes (2007, 31). Humanitarian intervention was thus a purely military operation in order to protect a country’s citizens, regardless of whether or not the state being intervened agreed to the intervention. In his 1921 International Intervention and Law, Ellery Stowell defines humanitarian intervention as “the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitant of another state from the treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice” (Weiss 2007, 32-33). Stowell thus outlines the necessity of clear and grave human rights violations taking place in order for the international community to legitimately trespass on a state’s sovereignty. Another defining factor of humanitarian intervention is the protection of citizens, not military forces, of a state (Lechner 2010). Sylvia Lechner also argues that humanitarian intervention is based on
ethics, not realpolitik and the quest for power and prestige (2010). Weiss, however, would disagree, arguing that oftentimes operations referred to as humanitarian are not in actuality humanitarian, but are used as a justification to hide the real reasons for intervention: “the exercise of raw power motivated by strategic, economic, or political interests” (2007, 33). I would tend to agree with Weiss; this is not to say that humanitarian intervention should not be based on purely ethical grounds. The reality, however, is that this is rarely the case. In fact, even IOs themselves have stopped using the term ‘humanitarian intervention;’ instead, they have adopted the use of ‘humanitarian aid,’ “which takes the form of financing, provision of goods and services, or technical assistance, aimed to help prepare for and deal urgently with the crises which seriously affect populations” (EU Humanitarian aid). After the Cold War, military intervention became more known as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

**Peace enforcement** (associated with Chapter VII of the Charter) is viewed by UN as an extension of peacekeeping operations, to be initiated only in the most dire, and clearly defined, circumstances, as a response to “outright aggression” (I have not found a definition of peace enforcement provided by the EU) (A/47/277-S/24111). Furthermore, “peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (United Nations 2008). Peace enforcement deals with conflicts in which peace has not previously been established through peace agreements. Thus, peace enforcement is more similar to the original form of humanitarian
intervention in that it is mainly a military force and does not require the consent of the parties involved (as do peacekeeping operations). As Catherine Coleman writes, peace enforcement operations are “forcible military interventions by one or more states into a third country with the express objective of maintaining or restoring international, regional, or local peace and security by ending a violent conflict within the country” (2007). The international community has thus framed peace enforcement as something linked with security matters, not humanitarian matters. Indeed, peace enforcement operations do not require the presence of human rights violations and are thus not necessarily launched in order to help the civilian population. For this reason, they are seldom launched by either the UN or the EU, who are both in favor of other PSOs, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

According the UN, the main objective of **peacemaking** (in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter) includes “bring[ing] ongoing conflicts to an end, and to prevent new crises from emerging or escalating…management of crisis, including the use of…diplomatic ‘good offices’ to help parties in conflict settle disputes peacefully” (United Nations, Department of Political Affairs). Peacemaking is concerned with establishing a peace agreement among hostile parties within a conflict. Peacemaking thus deals with the same political process (conflicts still in progress) as peace enforcement, only through diplomatic instead of military means. Peacekeeping operations therefore take place before the establishment of PKOs (which ensure that the peace established within these peace agreements is maintained). While peacemaking takes place before peacekeeping, peacebuilding takes place after peacekeeping.
Peacebuilding deals with “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development” (United Nations 2008). These measures include monitoring ceasefires, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, assisting the return of refugees and displaced persons, supporting the implementation of a peace process; providing electoral assistance, supporting justice and security sector reform, and enhancing human rights (Department of Political Affairs). The EU defines peacebuilding as “a follow-up strategy to peacekeeping and peace enforcement and as an attempt to guide a post-conflict area to institutionalized stability and to eventual comprehensively entrenched state-building” (Hannay 2009, European Union and the Reform of the UN). It is thus similar to peacemaking in that it often involves diplomatic engagement, as well as IO observers; in addition, it does not rely on military might to ensure the establishment of peace. Oftentimes, however, the peacebuilding effort relapses into a conflict, requiring the need of peacekeeping forces.
Appendix C

LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES:
Rational analysis involved in intervention (i.e. peacekeeping mission) and non-intervention, including the security and economic costs and benefits. Involved in a cost-benefit analysis.

LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS:
Rationally analyze why IO would intervene in the first place, outside of security and economic costs and benefits. Does the organization’s identity and perceived role in the international community include the protection of human rights and all world citizens?

Yes

NO PEACEKEEPING MISSION

Peacekeeping mission unlikely, unless a key security factor involves increasing international recognition.

No

Key Security Interest: Increasing International Recognition

Key Security Interest: Protecting International Recognition/Identity

Peacekeeping mission likely, unless intervention would somehow hurt identity.

No

Yes

PEACEKEEPING MISSION
Appendix D

Economic Indicators: FYROM

Chart 1


---

Net official development assistance received (current US$)

---

Chart 2


---

Net ODA received (% of GNI)
Chart 3

GDP (current US$)

Chart 4

ODA Contribution to FYROM: UN institutions
Chart 5

ODA Contribution to FYROM: EU institutions

Chart 6

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)
Appendix E

Economic Indicators: DRC

Chart 1

Net official development assistance received (current US$)

Chart 2

Net ODA received (% of GNI)
Chart 3

**GDP (current US$)**

Chart 4

**ODA Contribution to DRC: UN institutions**
Chart 5

ODA Contribution to DRC: EU institutions
ODA Contribution to DRC: P-5 members (China had no contributions; no data found for Russia).

Chart 6

Chart 7

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
## Appendix F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Actual Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Security Interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.1              | Maintaining or changing status quo (peace). | Greater likelihood of peacekeeping | **UN**: correlation  
**FYROM**: corr.  
**DRC**: correlation  
**EU**: correlation |
| 1.2              | Interest in changing/maintaining the balance of power. |                  | **UN**: no correlation  
**FYROM**: no corr.  
**DRC**: no corr.  
**EU**: correlation  
**FYROM**: corr.  
**DRC**: correlation |
| 1.3              | Higher levels of violence in conflict. |                  | **UN**: correlation  
**FYROM**: corr.  
**DRC**: correlation  
**EU**: no correlation  
**FYROM**: no corr.  
**DRC**: correlation |
| 1.4              | Desire to increase international recognition. |                  | **UN**: correlation  
**FYROM**: corr.  
**DRC**: correlation  
**EU**: correlation  
**FYROM**: corr.  
**DRC**: correlation |
| Hypothesis 2     | Higher economic interests       |                  |                                             |
| 2.1              | Increasing official development assistance (ODA). | Greater likelihood of peacekeeping | **UN**: no correlation  
**FYROM**: corr.  
**DRC**: no corr.  
**EU**: no correlation  
**FYROM**: no corr.  
**DRC**: correlation |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>Decreasing ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI).</th>
<th>UN: no correlation FYROM: no corr. DRC: no corr. EU: no correlation FYROM: no corr. DRC: no corr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>The economic consequences involved with non-intervention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1</td>
<td>Higher cost of refugee population.</td>
<td>UN: correlation FYROM: corr. DRC: correlation EU: correlation FYROM: corr. DRC: correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2</td>
<td>Decreasing exports in country of conflict.</td>
<td>UN: correlation FYROM: corr. DRC: correlation EU: correlation FYROM: corr. DRC: correlation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoP</td>
<td>Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNPO</td>
<td>Panel on United Nations Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>Worlds Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Juncos, Ana E. “The EU’s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re) Inventing the EU?” Southeast European Politics. 6.2 (2005): 88-108.


Linklater, Andrew. “Neo-realism in Theory and Practice.”


Neville, Mark. “Immigration/Migration in Europe.” Syracuse Center, Strasbourg, France. 30 Nov. 2009.


