Slavery meant work; work for the slaves, work for the slave-owners, work for the slave-traders. Naturally, slaves had the hardest work burden; after all, they were forced into their work. But still, slave-owning and slave-trading was not an easy task. Profits were often slim and unpredictable; to maximize these slim profits, both slave-owners and slave-traders had to try different strategies. Such strategies included the manipulation of their human slaves. After all, slaves were capital, and they played an important role in profits. Although past studies have focused on slave treatment, no prominent study solely focuses on the profit motives behind slave treatment. This area of profitability is quite unique because workers are property. Outside of slavery, business owners do not have complete control over their workers and can not manipulate people to increase profits. However, slave-owners were able to do just this. Thus, slavery presents a unique opportunity to see how profit-maximizing individuals treated human property and conversely, to investigate how a slave’s humanness affected profits. Two major occupations dealt directly with this, plantation owners and slave-traders. One area which included both occupations was West Tennessee; it included slave-traders in the Memphis slave market and plantation owners on Ames land base. Ames land base is an 18,400 acre plantation community located in Fayette and Hardeman Counties, Tennessee. On
this plantation land and in slave markets in West Tennessee, owners strove to maximize profits and treated slaves accordingly; however, slaves were human property, and because of this, they were able to affect profits as well.

Although some may already assume that West Tennessee slave-owners made a profit from slavery, reasoning alone does not prove that slave plantations in West Tennessee were profitable. Although it is true that the land was especially fertile compared to other areas in Tennessee and that it was also relatively cheap compared to the nearby Mississippi alluvium, West Tennessee is part of a larger academic debate in which scholars argue if slavery was profitable across the United States (Patterson 61-62). This debate really took off in the 1950’s and did not slow down until the 1980’s. Although it did not reach a firm resolution, Mark Thornton wrote in 1994 that “the only true information from economic theorists is from the profitability thesis that investment in slaves might have earned a ‘normal rate of return’” (112).

In order to estimate the specific rate of return in West Tennessee, the cost-benefit model of Conrad and Meyer is best suited for this analysis. In their model, Conrad and Meyer estimate the economic costs and benefits of owning prime field hands throughout the South. They then divide the estimated benefit by the projected costs. The resulting cost-benefit ratio expresses the economic profitability. Published in 1958, Conrad and Meyer’s model in *The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* has received some criticism. For instance, Douglas Dowd questions the scope of the analysis, arguing that it was too specific for broad interpretations (Aitken 179). However, for an analysis of West Tennessee, such a specific model works well. Despite other detail-oriented criticism, this model remained largely intact throughout the scholarly debate that followed, and no
alternate economic model has taken its place since it was published fifty years ago. Therefore, this seems like the most viable economic model for this analysis.

Since Conrad and Meyer did not use specific data from West Tennessee, such data will be applied to the model to see if West Tennessee slavery was profitable. The data used is from Ames land base located in Fayette and Hardeman County, Tennessee. To analyze this data, the present-value of costs and benefits should be totaled. Basically, the present-value accounts for one’s preference to be paid now rather than in the future; if one is paid now, then the money can accumulate interest. Since owners in the slave business did not immediately make a profit on their slave investments, their profits must be discounted for the waiting period. As far as costs, renewable costs such as land or work tools also must be discounted for present-value. However, most costs are paid initially and are already in the present-value. To start the analysis, the costs and benefits in present-value must be totaled so that they can be compared.

The first and most obvious cost of slave-ownership is the slave price in itself. One of the fundamental aspects of slave prices was their association with cotton. Cotton and slaves were market compliments; when the price of cotton rose, the plantation owners demanded more slaves in order to make more cotton. Therefore, the prices of slaves rose with cotton prices. As Bell Irvin Wiley states, “the demand for cotton and the demand for negroes went hand in hand” (Wiley 93). Wiley illustrates this point with a chart of slave prices and cotton prices for different years.¹ These slave prices are nearly identical to the estimated slave prices of Conrad and Meyer, despite being based on

---

¹ See Table 1.
different sources. In addition, these prices are also consistent with the slave prices from the 1836 Fayette and Hardeman county tax records (*Slave Taxes: 1836 Tax Records*). Furthermore, when these prices are compared with data from twenty slave transactions on Ames plantation, thirteen of the slave transactions were consistent with the prices, four were fairly cheaper and three of the deeds were clearly too cheap (*Slave Deeds*). Two of the fairly cheap transactions can potentially be explained by the number of slaves involved. These transactions include multiple slaves, and crudely put, slaves were likely cheaper in bulk. Of the three transactions that were clearly too cheap, two were granted to John Jones in 1841. Interestingly, Jones was the largest land-owner and slave-owner on the entire Ames land base. Since he was such a predominant figure, perhaps Jones had superior bargaining skills, or perhaps the smaller plantations were in debt to him. Whatever the case, Jones certainly appeared to pay less than the premium for two slave transactions. The third underpaid slave deed was from Ralph Graves to Thomas Graves. Since these two were family, Ralph probably cut Thomas a special deal. Still with these exceptions, the majority of slave prices paid by Ames residents were consistent with the estimates of Conrad, Meyers, and Wiley, as supported by the aforementioned slave deeds. Thus, Conrad and Meyer’s previous estimate of $900 to $1,100 for prime field hands from 1830-60 will remain the same, suggesting that slave prices were fairly constant throughout the South (Aitken 142).

In addition to these prices, the costs of slave-owning include the costs of the land on which the slaves worked. According to land deeds from 1849 to 1851, land on the

---

2 See Table 2.  
3 See Table 3.  
4 See Table 4.
preferable part of the Ames plantation averaged a price of $8.55 per acre.\(^5\) Furthermore, land closer to the Wolf River and less suited to planting averaged $2.75 per acre, about a third of the price of premium land. This relationship held true from 1859 to 1861; both land prices nearly doubled.\(^6\) The premium land was around $18.22 per acre, and the marshier land was about one-third of the price at $6.30 per acre. However, both estimates are substantially lower than the $35 to $40 prices of premium Mississippi land during this time period (Aitken 143). The reason for this price difference would be a great topic for further study of the Ames economy. Also, it is important to remember that these averages merely came from available land deeds; information about the development of the land, the houses included in the deed, and relationship between the buyers and sellers is largely unavailable. Thus, the averages could be skewed or misinterpreted in either direction. However, for the purpose of this study, the estimates from the land deeds will suffice as the best estimates of Ames land prices.

Next, the amount of land per field hand is estimated by using the agricultural and slave censuses. First, the number of field hands per slave-owner is approximated by counting the number of males aged nine and over, and the number of females aged thirteen to forty-nine in the 1850 slave census. According to Conrad and Meyer, boys and girls were considered self-sustaining field hands at ages nine and thirteen respectively (Aitken 153). Although this crude form of measurement leaves room for error, once again, the records are not thorough enough to allow for a different form of interpretation. In order to find the average number of acres per field slave, each slave-owners’ acreage from the agricultural census is divided by their estimated number of

\(^5\) See Table 5.  
\(^6\) See Table 6.
field slaves. In the census, improved acreage is developed and usable, and unimproved is undeveloped land for future use. According to this, the average number of improved acres per field slave in the premium land area was 16.9 acres with a standard deviation of 5.9. In this same area, the average number of unimproved acres per field slave was 11.8 acres with a standard deviation of 10.4. Since the standard deviation of unimproved acres was quite large, Ames’ residents greatly varied in their amounts of reserved, unimproved land per slave. In the marshy area, the average number of acres per field slave was 23.4 acres with a standard deviation of 7.3 acres. The average number of unimproved acres per field slave was 43.8, again with a large standard deviation of 38.4 acres. This data shows that farmers living on the less fertile soil held over twice as much land per field slave, most likely because the land was harder to cultivate and required more land to yield the same amount of crops (Aitken 144). In addition, both of these acreage estimates fall within the range suggested by Conrad and Meyer.

Subsequently, the initial cost of the field hand can be calculated. Assuming that one track of land lasts a slave’s lifetime as it does in the Mississippi alluvium, the estimated average cost of premium land per field hand is $245.28, and the cost for the marshier land was $184.75; these estimates were found by multiplying the cost of land by the amount of land needed per slave. Significantly, both estimates fall between Conrad and Meyer’s estimated range of $180 to $600. Besides slave prices and land costs, the cost per field hand must also include Conrad and Meyer’s present-value estimate for a lifetime investment in tools, cabins, and wagons at $33 (Aitken 144). Since Ames has

---

7 See Table 7 and 8.
8 When totaling the lifetime investment, Conrad and Meyer estimate the average life-expectancy of a slave to be about 30 years. If the expectancy was higher or lower this would affect both the economic costs and the benefits.
limited information about the costs of such investments, Conrad and Meyer’s estimate of $33 will have to suffice. Adding all of these estimates together and using the interest rate of 8% to attain the present-value, the total money spent on one prime field hand on Ames land base, including the cost of the slave, premium land, and farming equipment was about $1,278.28.

In addition to this initial investment, the annual cost of medical care, taxes, supervision, food, and clothing must be subtracted from the profit for every year of the slave’s life. These are not present values since they are not investments, but rather out-of-pocket annual expenses. Conrad and Meyer’s estimate for these expenses is about $20.50 per year (Aitken 148). This estimate is considerably lower than Wiley’s estimate of $30 for food and clothing (Wiley 63-64). Conrad and Meyer’s estimate is lower because they assume that some clothing and meat were ready-made on the plantation whereas other delicacies were purchased. The family records of a Memphis plantation support this theory. Of many grocery receipts, the Bond family only bought sugar, vinegar, fine salt, coffee, and other hard-to-grow delicacies (Bond Family). Also, their medical receipts average $1.56 per slave which is consistent with Conrad and Meyer’s estimates of $1.50 to $2. Combining this with the aforementioned costs, the annual out-of-pocket costs were $20.50. Simply put, a slave hand was a $1278.28 investment plus an annual maintenance cost of $20.50. This makes up the estimated cost, now for the estimated benefit.

The benefit is simpler; it consists of the annual money that a farmer actually received from one slave’s work. In order to estimate this, one must first estimate how much crop each field hand produced. A chart by Conrad and Meyer estimates an output
of four bales per hand in 1849 in DeSoto County, MS (Aitken 149). Since this is the closest location to Ames, this will be used in the analysis. Next, the cotton marketing costs are estimated at about $2.75 per bale or $.69 per pound in 1840 (150). For estimating the actual Ames cotton prices, Wiley’s cotton prices are best-suited because the prices are specific to West Tennessee (Wiley 93). Averaging the decade average prices and subtracting the marketing costs leaves the money received from one pound of cotton at 8.55 cents. Using this average price at 4 bales per hand, one can now estimate the returns on prime field hands for 30 years, a slave’s estimated lifespan according to Conrad and Meyer.

The results are in the form of a cost-benefit ratio, which is the benefit divided by the cost; with this, a ratio of one would be a neutral profit. According to the analysis, the cost-benefit ratio is 0.81 at 8% interest, and the investment returns a negative profit. However, this number is so close to one, it is not significant proof that the venture was economically unprofitable. In fact, at a 4% interest rate, the farmers’ cost-benefit ratio is about 1.29. Clearly, this is a large positive return on investment compared to the prior estimate. Thus, the farmer’s personal interest rate, the rate at which he or she preferred money in the present, made a huge difference on how economically profitable the land was to him or her. Next, the ratio can be compared to Conrad and Meyer’s results to see what samples yielded similar ratios. The most similar are Conrad and Meyer’s case two and case three, which consisted of hypothetical land prices and output levels which were meant to “encompass the majority of antebellum cotton plantation operations” (Aitken 152). Therefore, it seems logical that Fayette County’s cost and benefit ratio would fit into this scope.
Overall, this analysis establishes that slaveholders on Ames Plantation could easily make a negative, positive, or neutral economic profit; since their profits were narrow and easily affected, owners treated their slaves with this delicate profitability in mind. However, profitable treatment meant different things to different owners. For example, to increase profitability, owners could be harsh on their slaves and demand more labor, or they could be generous to their slaves in hopes that this would boost their spirit, health, and lessen the chance of runaways. The differences of such approaches were recognized, and many writers provided advice about the most efficient and profitable treatment of slaves. Such articles abound in quarterlies such as the *Southern Agriculturist*, the *Planter’s Review*, and the *Farmer’s Register*. Even in Tennessee, the *Nashville Christian Advocate* included sections on plantation management (Breedan 320). In fact, Holland McTyeire, a Tennessee minister and editor of the *Nashville Christian Advocate* wrote a popular article in *Debow’s Review* about slave management, which gives advice about slave health, punishment, and overall treatment (Breedan 341). Such advice created the image of the ideal plantation, which would maximize profits through fairness, discipline, and hard work.

First of all, on the ideal plantation, masters provided health and medical treatment to their slaves to maximize profits. After all, in order for a laborer to be most efficient he had to be well (Patterson 65). Under this ideal, a master should take every measure to nurse sick slaves in order to prevent extended sick leave, contagion, and even death, which constituted a total loss of investment (Davis 86). Evidently, most slave-owners upheld this ideal and made special efforts to keep their slaves healthy. For example, sick slaves in Mississippi were often permitted to eat at their master’s tables, in hopes that a
better diet would help them recuperate (Sydnor 51). In addition, receipts from the Bond family in Memphis indicate that slaves were often taken to the doctor (Bond Family). Doctor care was not always cheap. In fact, an Alabama planter was estimated to pay $2,667.49 in a doctor’s statement from 1850 to 1856 (Davis 88). Besides doctor care, slave-owners also stocked up on home remedies such as castor oil and Epsom salts to treat slaves whenever the need arose (Davis 88). Caleb Patterson confirms that home remedies were also used in Tennessee, specifically red pepper (67). Thus, slave-owners were willing to invest a lot of time and money in medical treatment in order to save their other investment, people. Although information about the health treatment of slaves on Ames is largely unknown, these details from Mississippi, Alabama, and even Memphis may suggest something about slave treatment on the plantation.

Besides medical care, the ideal, profit-maximizing plantation owner also took preventive health measures. First of all, the location and upkeep of the cabins was important; a Tennessee physician advises that houses should be on fertile ground and any nearby marsh should be closely monitored (Breedan 182). Slave cabins were supposed to be clean as well. In fact, Tennessee overseers examined living quarters regularly to look for anything potentially harmful (Patterson 70). McTyeire also advises owners to clean around slave houses because it kept slaves healthy and made money for the manure account, two ways to increase profits; he also advocates proper clothing and feeding of slaves (Breedan 155, 110, 146). Writers even recommended ways to make slaves sleep at night; after all, restful sleep made slaves healthier and more profitable in the field (Breedan 75). Furthermore, many farmers evidently followed these ideals. In a compilation of slave narratives of Tennessee, no slaves complain of their food, dress,
cleanliness or lack of sleep; instead, one slave recalls, “isee bin w’el tuk keer ob, plenty ter eat en warm clothes ter w’ar” (Federal Writers’ Project 3). Even a strict Tennessee slave-holder, who advocated frequent punishment and limited rights, expressed that all slaves should receive proper clothing and food (Thornton 322). Apparently, many planters closely followed the ideal plantation when it came to such factors of slave health. After all, preventative measures decreased the chances of future illness, and therefore increased future profits.

In order to save money on housing, some masters ignored the health risk of overcrowding. Writers tried to inform masters that this did not maximize profits. Although overcrowding cut back on housing costs, the health risks were major; the Practical Farmer and Mechanic which was published in Somerville, TN near Ames land base reads, “…More diseases and loss of time on plantations are engendered from crowded negro cabins than from almost any other cause. The successful planter should therefore have an especial eye to the comfort of his negroes, in not permitting them to be overcrowded in their sleeping quarters” (qtd. Patterson 65). When looking at overcrowding, three sample counties from South Carolina, Louisiana, and Missouri predict that the average number of slaves per slave house is very consistent at around 4.2 (Burton 168, Fuenhausen, Mills 4). However, given the information from the 1860 Slave Census of Fayette County, the average number of slaves per house was 5.37, over one slave higher than the predicted average⁹. However, Fayette county slaves did not necessarily live in overcrowded conditions; after all, the size of the slave houses is still unknown. Perhaps, slave houses in West Tennessee were bigger than the slave houses in South Carolina, Louisiana, or Missouri.

⁹ See Table 9.
Still, in this analysis, three Fayette slave-owners stand out as having a high amount of slaves per house. First of all, Benjamin Moody has twelve slaves per slave house. Logically, he must have large slave houses because this many people packed into an average-sized slave house would be a catalyst for illness. The other two slave-owners with potential overcrowding had about eight or nine slaves per house. Interestingly, these two owners were also the only owners who had hired slaves according to the 1860 census. This association may suggest that slave-hirers cared less about establishing sanitary conditions, or perhaps, slave-hirers had bigger, communal houses less conducive to family life; this relationship would be worth exploring in future research. Although the presence of overcrowding on the Ames land base is unknown, Ames owners would have maximized profits by avoiding overcrowding, but still keeping a fair number of slaves per house.

In addition to medical treatment, profit-motives affected slave treatment in the field. Naturally, all slave-owners wanted their slaves to work as hard as possible while still maintaining their health, and writers such as McTyeire justified such hard work by claiming that servants must work to stay healthy and that idleness makes vice and low spirits (Breedan 61). On this note, many strict slave-owners treated their slaves harshly in the field to maximize output. Although the severity of field treatment at Ames plantation is unknown, harsh accounts from surrounding areas exist. An ex-slave born in Memphis recalls seeing Mississippi masters hitching slaves to plows and making them work as horses (Federal Writers’ Project 75). Also, a South Carolina planter mentions that his neighbor worked his slaves so hard that he felt it should be illegal (Breedan 63). In addition, the harshness in the fields depended on the supervisors. According to James
Oakes, “…overseers had a strong inducement to overwork their slaves” (165). Although they were responsible for the slave’s short-term health, they were not invested in their long-term health. If overseers were employed on Ames plantation, this could imply a more demanding schedule for slaves. Regardless, overworking was damaging to the planter’s profits. Not only did it contradict ideal plantation management, but it also sacrificed the slaves’ respect for the master, eliminated any illusion of fairness, and damaged their health.

In contrast, less severe slave-owners lived closer to the plantation ideal by looking out for their slave’s well-being as they worked; this was the ideal way to increase profits. Instead of forcing them to work all day, some owners worked under the task system, in which owners assigned slaves certain tasks to complete during the day, and after this was done, the slaves were free to do their own work or play (Patterson 67). James Breedan describes the typical task as “a daily chore that while not backbreaking required a brisk pace to finish” (61). This theoretically worked well because it allowed the farmers to set goals for their production and gave incentives for their slaves to finish work faster; it also likely gave slaves a greater sense of independence, lessening the chance of runaways. Although Patterson asserts that the task system was popular in Tennessee, it is unknown whether or not West Tennessee owners preferred the task system or the gang system (Patterson 67). As part of the gang system, slaves were split into groups and forced to work all-day. Regardless of the work form, many Tennessee slaves seemed to have received at least some time to themselves (Mooney 89). This leisure time could be spent working on personal gardens, with the family, or even at weekly feasts and celebrations. Such time was provided by less strict masters who likely believed that slaves would work
harder and be easier to control when someone properly cared for them. Basically, by allowing personal time for the slaves, owners could boost morale and thereby, boost productivity and profits.

In order to increase profits, owners not only granted leisure time, but some also allowed slaves to hold property. Although there were no laws requiring either of these things, owners allowed this, not necessarily out of humanity, but because it benefited them (Peningroth 51). First of all, it probably made the slaves feel more independent and possibly less likely to run away. Second, under the task system, it encouraged slaves to get the master’s work done quickly so that they could do their own work (Patterson 67). Third, it could possibly allow for extra money and food to circulate around the plantation. Since slaves could raise their own crops, the slave owners did not have to provide them with as much food, lowering food costs, which in turn raised potential profits; since one-fifth of output was spent on food and clothing for slaves, this supplement could greatly affect the profits (Peningroth 55). Also, during harsh seasons, the crop could be undependable, and the extra supplement of the slaves’ gardens could be all that kept them alive (56). Some slaves were also allowed to make money by hiring themselves out during their leisure time (53). Theoretically, slaves could have possibly hired themselves out on Ames plantation since the slave census does show records of planters hiring slaves (Eighth United States Census, 1860). Regardless, such work could keep the slave satisfied, motivated, and cut costs for the owner; Penningroth states that “… allowing slaves the ‘privelges’ of time and property ownership made plantations more profitable and easier to manage” (57). On this same note, plantation management literature such as
the *Nashville Christian Advocate* advises that planters allow their slaves to have property
and to work for money (Breedan 320).

Although owners could benefit from their slaves owning property, the resistance
of the slaves and the suspicion of the slave-holders kept many owners from maximizing
these profits. On the ideal plantation, slaves were assumed to be inherently obedient and
could be trusted with this power (Oakes 154). On real plantations, slaves were often not
trusted because they showed resistance. Some owners probably feared giving their slaves
such power; after all, it made it easier for slaves to revolt, and the presence of trading
slaves probably made it harder to spot runaways. Also, owners may have been worried
that such rights suggested a master-slave equality. Regardless, owners became skeptical
of slave ownership rights, and thus, they blamed slaves for stolen goods and used other
excuses to protest the ability of slaves to own and trade property (Penningroth 68).
Consequently, legislation was passed to try and stop their transactions, including the
formation of the anti-traffick association (68). Such organizations and rules kept many
owners from experiencing higher profits that came from their slaves’ trading.

Furthermore, the ideal owner punished slaves with profit-maximization in mind.
According to the ideal plantation management, masters had to gain control, respect and
authority over their slaves, and this should be established with minimal whipping (Oakes
167). After all, slave punishment cost valuable time, diminished the slaves’ value and
decreased their productivity (Thornton 23). Minister McTyeire explains, “To resort to
punishment as seldom as possible, and to administer it in such manner as will best
accomplish its purposes, individual and generally, is the master’s duty” (Breedan 87).
Some masters followed such advice in order to maximize profits; they exercised authority
by setting rules and enforcing them only when necessary. Such owners did not physically force slaves to work and did not strike them unless they broke a well-known rule. They also tried to cool down before punishment, so as not to rashly punish a slave (Federal Writers’ Project 6). Thus, many ex-slaves from Tennessee recalled punishments in the same fashion, painful but deserved. Sylvia Watkins remembers, “I wuz young ‘en, ob course, she whuped me, but she wasn’t mean ter me. I needed eve’y whupin’ she eber gib me, cause I wuz allus fightin’ (Federal Writers’ Project 76). As far as profitability is concerned, such actions, though damaging to the capital and slaves, may have inspired respect for the masters as being just and fair. Such punishment also provided clear consequences for violating rules and perhaps motivated slaves to be more productive and less unruly. In these ways, such minimal, structured punishment made slavery more profitable for their owners.

However, many owners strayed from this ideal of punishment and implemented different methods to increase profits. Some owners did so because they did not read plantation management guides; out of ignorance, they believed that harsh discipline was the only key to obedience and profits (Oakes 67). Others read such literature but did not agree. One such Tennessee planter wrote an article to the Southern Cultivator arguing that “rigid discipline…is the only way to make [slaves] contented and profitable” (Breedan 322). He went on to state that, “It is like ‘casting pearls before swine’ to try to persuade a negro to work. He must be made to work, and should always be given to understand that if he fails to perform his duty he will be punished for it” (Breedan 328). Of a book of 24 slave narratives, only one complained about the strictness of his master, stating “I though mah white folks wuz wawful mean ter me sumtime” (Federal Writers’
Although plantation advisors advocated minimal punishment, some slave-owners obviously strayed from the ideal.

On this same note, masters could affect profits by instigating a relationship with their slaves. After all, slaves who had respect for their master would likely be more productive and less likely to run away. Thus, on the ideal plantation, masters supervised their slaves’ work and cared for them directly rather than leaving such tasks to the overseer (Patterson 68). One advice writer states, “If a master exhibits no extraordinary interest in the proceedings on his plantation, it is hardly to be expected that any other feelings but apathy and perfect indifference could exist with his negroes” (Breedan 31). However, the magnitude of master-slave interaction on Ames plantation is largely unknown and varies by owner. For example, the Holcombe family remained closer to the ideal plantation model by relating to their slaves. They considered slaves part of the family and even trusted the slaves enough to teach them to read and write (Lewis 5). In contrast, John W. Jones, a large Ames landowner, had so many slaves that he could not recognize them on the street (Pritchard). Clearly, he had a large scale operation in which he could not form a personal relationship with all of his slaves. Since his slaves were not easily recognized, theoretically they could escape more easily and felt no attachment to him; consequently, he likely paid more in slave protection and motivation techniques. Thus, according to ideal plantation literature, a stronger relationship could help him boost profits.

Besides the example of John Jones, other evidence suggests that Ames owners may not have had a strong attachment to their slaves. Comparing the 1850 and 1860 slave censuses, thirteen owners have data in both. The census data includes slave age,
gender, and race, so theoretically, if a slave was on the plantation in 1850 and remained until 1860, one would find the slave ten years older with the same gender and race in the 1860 census. Comparing the censuses in these ways, an average of 45% of slaves remained on each plantation after ten years. This includes the highest stay percentage of 78% on John Hunt’s plantation, and the lowest stay percentage of 10% on William Baugh’s plantation. According to this data, among these thirteen cases, 244 slaves stayed on the plantation and 273 slaves left. Of these 273 slaves, 51 slaves were above 35 years old in 1850; for the sake of analysis, these slaves may be assumed to have died since the average life span was around 30 years in 1850 (Aitken 141-142). Thus, about 222 slaves were actually sold from the plantation, 124 slaves were brought onto the plantation from elsewhere, and 162 slaves were born on the plantation. Factoring in the death rate, 48% of slaves did not stay on the same plantation for the ten year span.

Although errors in the census data could greatly affect the analysis, the seemingly high turnover rate at Ames plantation implies that the master-slave relationship may not have been that strong; if masters knew and appreciated their slaves on a personal level, it seems that they would be less likely to sell them. Although a weak relationship could imply lower profits, one must also realize that Ames landowners probably made profits from their frequent slave transactions. Also, the 1850 and 1860 census comparison may not provide accurate data. Slaves often did not know their own age, and ages may have been inaccurately recorded in either or both years. Thus, more slaves may have stayed on the plantation than estimated. Regardless, this area is something that should be explored in further research.
Overall, owners treated slaves with profitability in mind; however, slaves could also affect the owner’s profits. James Breedan recognizes this: “Masters complained that their slaves were lazy because they frequently would not work. By deliberate lassitude, by running away, by sabotage, slaves withheld their labor from the master. In effect they were striking, and to some degree every master succumbed to the slaves’ demands” (180). As Breedan mentions, slaves could drastically lower profits just by being deliberately slow and lazy. One planter states that he would much rather have a hostile, “spirited” slave than a lazy one with an “even temper” (Breedan 32). Another planter looks down upon slave women as lazy and claims that flattery and gifts are the only way to cure a woman’s lazy nature (Breedan 32). Such flattery is evident in a Tennessee slave’s narrative in which she says that her mistress is taking her out of the field because “I was so pretty she fraid somebody come steal me” (Federal Writers’ Project 57). In addition, slaves could be difficult in the field by creating arguments between the master and the overseer (Patterson 69). Such conflicts took time to resolve and allocated resources away from production.

Also, slaves could affect profitability by running away. Some slaves would runaway after punishment only to return in a few days (Federal Writers’ Project 37). Still, this situation cost slave-owners search costs and days of field time. Others would permanently runaway in elaborate schemes or by the underground railroad, causing the owner to lose his entire investment. Because Memphis was a traveling port with “a rather large free black population,” many fugitive slaves came here (Mooney 54). Some were caught; others escaped. In the slave states only one out of every 3,165 slaves escaped in 1850 and one out of every 5,000 escaped in 1860 (58). In Tennessee, only 70 slaves
escaped in 1850 and only 29 in 1860 (58). This decrease was likely due to increased security. The Tennessee patrol system, which watched for runaways, became stricter every few years, since it was established in 1806 (Patterson 38-39). The prohibition of reading and writing was also enforced to prevent slaves from faking papers (Federal Writers’ Project 5, 67). Clearly, slave-owners had to use extra resources to ensure that their investment would not run away. Thus, by being resistant and threatening to runaway, slaves increased the costs of slavery and decreased the profits.

Slaves also affected the profitability simply by being human. Since slaves felt emotions, slave-owners had to use incentives and other means to keep these emotions favorable. If not, drastic things could happen. A Tennessee slave woman describes a grizzly scene where a slave woman bust her master’s skull with a shovel because he took her sick baby and demanded her to work in the field (Federal Writers’ Project 58-59). Dylan Peningroth also mentions a North Carolina overseer who was killed by his slaves by taking away their own property (58). To prevent such grizzly situations, slave-owners had to spend resources on keeping their slaves satisfied, mainly by appealing to their human emotions. Tennessee minister, McTyeire states, “you must understand that slaves are real people with real emotions and then treat them this way” (Breedan 48). He even advises slave-owners to let family members go out of the field, if their loved one is on a death bed (221). Because slaves could exercise resistance, owners had to keep them satisfied, often at the loss of profits.

A specific way that owners kept their slaves satisfied was by spending money on incentives. Incentives “loosened the bonds of slavery” because slaves felt that they were working of their own accord (Thornton 33). Although little is known about incentives on
Ames, other research suggests that incentives could range from working for clothing to being bribed with money (Breedan 257). A former Tennessee slave, Rachel Gaines fondly remembers the holidays; “I member how he would tote out fried chicken, pig meat en uthuh good stuff ter us darkies. Dey ’greed ter pay me $35.00 a yeah (en keep) en hit wuz gib me eve’y Christmas mawning” (Federal Writers’ Project 17). Also, holiday celebrations and weekly dances seemed quite common and are mentioned in nearly every account of Tennessee slavery (Davis 58). For instance, one former Tennessee slave talked favorably about a big barbecue and watermelon feast every week. Another fondly recalled President’s Day celebrations (Federal Writers’ Project, 17-18, 58). Even McTyeire states, “When the fourth of July comes, or the crop is laid by, why not have a jubilation?” (Breedan 261). In order to stop slave resistance and appeal to their emotions, owners rewarded them with dances and celebrations. However, such events cost money and valuable work time, resources which could have been put toward production to increase profits. Thus, by requiring such incentives, slaves lessened the profits of their owners. On a side note, the money spent on such festivals are not included in the Conrad and Meyer’s estimate as costs of maintaining a slave; if such activities were required to keep slaves satisfied, the economic profit could be slightly overstated. This also raises a great question for future study.

Outside of the plantation context, the profitability-slave treatment relationship can also be explored in the slave market. However, to analyze the Memphis slave-market, one must first understand the concept of buying states and selling states. Buying states were in the Deep South, whereas selling states included Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri (Aitken 163). For the most part, selling states likely focused on slave-breeding, and
buying states likely focused on agricultural production. Since Tennessee was between the buying and selling states, this made it a perfect hub for the slave-trade (Mooney 46). However, because of its location, Tennessee also had aspects of both a buying and selling state, and it is hard to decipher which economy dominated. Although the plantation agriculture of Ames is similar to that of a buying state, West Tennessee also shared characteristics with selling regions. For instance, in the Nashville Republic, Robert Cotton, an Ames resident, advertises three tracts of his land including houses and cabins for sell and writes “any or all will be sold low for cash or negroes from the age of twelve to twenty years old…my only object is to exchange land for negroes” (Cotton). This article could possibly suggest slave-breeding on Ames plantation; for what other reason would he buy slaves if he was selling his land?

Furthermore, the age of the slave population on Ames can provide insight into its use as a buying or selling region. In Economics of Slavery in the Antebellum South, Conrad and Meyer find that selling or breeding states “contained a greater proportion of children…and a substantially greater proportion of slaves above the age of fifty than did the buying states” (Aitken 162). According to the 1850 slave census from Ames, 47% of slaves were children under 15. This percentage is much greater than the buying states and even the selling states in Conrad and Meyer’s table (163). However, only 5% of slaves on Ames plantation were elderly. This percentage is below both the buying and the selling states. Therefore, the high child percentage indicates Ames as a possible selling region, but the low elderly percentage also indicates that Ames could be a buying state. Future research can be done to account for these extreme and somewhat contradictory percentages, but for now, the research is inconclusive. Overall, Tennessee
is probably best classified as a transferring state, which bought, raised, and sold slaves (Mooney 51).

Since it was a transferring state, the Memphis slave market was quite diverse and provided many opportunities for slave traders to make profits. First of all, Memphis’s location lent itself to being a very resourceful slave market. Being on the Mississippi River, it was quite accessible for both buying and selling states to trade (Bancroft 250). In this way, the Memphis slave trade even contributed to allocative efficiency, a benefit to society as well as the traders. When something is allocatively efficient, resources are distributed so that the maximum benefit is attained from their use; when slaves from less fertile lands were traded to cotton-rich states such as Louisiana and Mississippi, slaves could then produce more output or benefits. Clearly, such efficiency made the Memphis slave market a busy hub, but still there is no direct linkage between this slave market and Ames Plantation. However, Ames farmers often brought their cotton crops to Memphis, as evident by frequent accounts of such trips by Howell Taylor, a Somerville planter (Taylor). If Ames planters were coming to Memphis to sell cotton, they could have easily purchased slaves there as well. Regardless of this connection, the Memphis slave-trade was a booming and efficient market and showed great potential for profits. Perhaps, this is why Frederic Bancroft refers to Memphis as the city with the largest slave trade in the “central South” (250).

As evident by the three largest companies, slave-traders in Memphis could make hefty profits. By 1857 in Memphis, there were over twelve slave-trading companies in regular business (Bancroft 251). However, there were three main companies: Bolton, Dickins, and Co, Byrd Hill, and Nathanial Bedford Forrest. Although the smaller
companies certainly struggled more with profits, Bolton and Dickins made an annual profit of $96,000 in their best years, and Nathanial Bedford Forrest could have made $50,000 annually for many years (264, 263). However, these profits came with their costs; such slave-traders faced negative stereotypes, and their lives became so obsessed with profits that they had little time for anything else (Deyle 128).

Since such slave-traders obsessed over their profits, they implemented different strategies to increase profits. One way that Tennessee slave-traders appealed to customers was through efficiency. For instance, a slave marketer often dealt in both livestock and slaves (Bancroft 250). This was efficient because a farmer could shop for many of their farming needs without wasting additional resources. In addition, potential buyers could examine any physical part of the slave and could even order slaves to do particular exercises (251). Likewise, one slave in a Nashville market recalls that at market “you had ter tek all ob clothes off en roll down de hill so dey could see dat you didn’t hab no bones broken, er sores on yer” (Federal Writers’ Project 66). Assuming such inspections provided perfect information to the buyers, buyers and slaves could be matched efficiently; that is, the buyer could get exactly the slave he needed. Similarly, most Memphis slave-traders advertised slaves of certain professions such as mechanics, cooks, or even “acclimated cotton negroes” (Bancroft 253). Once again, these advertisements provided slave-owners with information which reduced search costs and increased efficiency.

Still, some slave-traders made their profits from trickery. Such corrupt slave-traders were known as “nigger traders” (Bancroft 376). All slave-traders made profits by buying slaves at a low price and selling them at a high price. The greater this gap, the
better for the slave-trader. However, corrupt slaveholders would buy sick slaves, spend money making them look better, and sell them as if they were in perfect health (Johnson 121). Many diseases were not noticeable upon a buyer’s quick inspection, and this ploy did work. In New Orleans, a young slave woman had a noticeable lump which the seller explained as early signs of pregnancy. Only after he bought the slave, did the buyer realize that she had a tumor on her stomach (148). Likewise, a Tennessee farmer was greatly angered when he discovered that his recently purchased slave “had no toes on his feet” (Mooney 350). It was also common for slave-traders to dress up slaves in certain outfits and make them play a role, such as a young mechanic or an elderly quilter (129). Obviously, such ploys made profits for the traders, but only at the expense of the buyers.

Because of the negative stereotype of the “nigger trader,” Memphis slave-traders had to separate themselves from this image in order to make profits (Bancroft 375). They did this largely through advertisements which were meant to bring in customers, while also legitimizing their business. One ad of Bolton and Dickins, Co., directly attempts to legitimize the slave business, stating “..This is the true Road to wealth and if you neglect the present offer of becoming wealthy its your own fault and not ours as the Road is laid out plainly” (qtd. Bancroft 253). Such an ad inspires confidence in the trade as a reliable industry. Other ads served to legitimize the trader himself. For example, Nathanial Forrest advertises his jail for three hundred slaves to be the most comfortable, clean, and safe of “any in the Union” (Forrest and Maples). Clearly, this ad gives Forrest a favorable image as a trader who cares for his slaves. Because he cares for his slaves, this also implies that his stock is clean and in high spirits. On this note, when one of Forrest’s slaves did run away, he advertised it as being “without a cause” (Bancroft 265). Clearly,
he did not want runaway slaves to reflect on his character or his stock of slaves, so he
denied responsibility. Similarly, an 1849 slave advertisement for Byrd Hill reads “don’t
be alarmed because of the cholera. These Negroes are all healthy” (Commercial Appeal
2-15-74). In this way, Hill also hopes to boost his profits by appearing responsible; he
reasonably addresses the problem of cholera and ensures the quality of his slaves. Such a
favorable image not only attracts customers, but it also makes customers feel more
comfortable. If they are more comfortable, they will likely be willing to buy more
expensive slaves because they trust the traders’ stock. Thus, by creating a favorable
image, Memphis slave traders could boost their profits.

This image became a vital part of slave-trading life. No one expresses this more
than Isaac Bolton of the Bolton, Dickins, Co. While he was trading slaves, Bolton once
purchased what he thought was a slave from James McMillian. However, the slave later
was found to be a freedman who sued for his freedom and got it. Isaac Bolton not only
lost his money in the deal, but his reputation, the image that he depended on, was badly
damaged. Isaac Bolton was so upset about this transaction that he shot McMillian
multiple times in the back, brutally killing him. Despite evidence, Bolton was acquitted,
and rumors circulated about bribery and corruption in the jury (Bancroft 255). Although
his business spent thousands of dollars on his defense, Bolton refused to pay back any of
the money, stating that it was a whole business affair (Bancroft 256). This resulted in a
business feud which turned very bloody very quickly, claiming the lives of up to thirteen
people (Bancroft 256). Bolton’s story illustrates how important the trade was to slave
traders. More specifically, it shows that traders obsessed over their image and their
profits, and when something happened to either of these, anger could become uncontrollable.

As shown, slave-traders cared greatly about profits and implemented different strategies to increase them; thus, unsurprisingly, they also treated slaves with profits in mind. To begin, the treatment of slaves in the slave market could actually be better than the treatment that slaves received on a typical plantation. Mammy, a slave traded by Forrest stated, “General Forrest, he bought and sold slaves but he was kind to them. He treated me mighty well, bought me new clothes, fed all of us far better than we had been fed by our old masters” (Commercial Appeal 4-28-33). As stated, slave-traders made their money by selling slaves for more than they paid for them. Thus, it was in their best interest to make sure that the slaves looked their best. Not only did this include nice clothing, but it included treatment for their physical health. For example, to get them ready for market, they would “allow them to wash, rest, and heal; an increased fattened diet of bacon, milk, butter, etc.” (Johnson 119). Also in an attempt to keep slaves healthier, male and female slaves were separated to prevent pregnancy or venereal diseases (62). When slaves did become ill, they were taken care of, often to the fullest extent. In fact, on transportation ships, sick slaves were taken to their owner’s state rooms for care (62).

In contrast, the profit-incentives of slave-traders also negatively affected their treatment of the slaves. First of all, families were torn apart to make more profits. Although Robert Fogel in Time on the Cross argues that families were most frequently left intact, his data sources likely did not account for non-recorded marriages (49). Such marriages included couples that belonged to two different plantations; this happened
frequently in communities such as Ames. In this case, if one of the two owners would sell his half of the couple, this was not called separation because the spouses belonged to different owners (Bancroft 201). Thus, such marriages were likely absent from Fogel’s analysis. Furthermore, when breaking up families, slave-traders likely encountered two major profit-incentives. First, slave-traders surely wanted to please their buyers. If a buyer wanted one male slave, the slave-trader wanted to sell them one male slave. But more importantly, slave-traders could get more money for the individual slaves than the family. In fact, selling slaves together reduced the slave’s market value by half or more (Bancroft 214). However, slave-traders’ profits still depended on their humane image. How could they keep this image, while splitting up families for profit? Traders could simply deny the slave’s family history. This would increase profits in two ways; it maintained a humane appearance and raised the slave’s value, since slaves without a family were considered less likely to run away (Johnson 175). Once again, Fogel’s assertion proves faulty because it fails to account for marriages which slave-traders purposefully denied. Thus, it seems that many slave-traders broke apart families in order to maximize profits.10

Furthermore, slave-traders often allowed customers to inspect and treat the slaves in degrading ways in order to make profits. Not only would they be allowed to examine slaves manually, but they could possibly even order them to strip, exercise, or maybe even dance in a stereotypical fashion (Bancroft 251). In addition, many potential buyers mocked slaves right in front of their faces, as if the slaves could not hear them (Johnson

10 Please note that the analysis becomes broader in the following discussion because the rest of the data on the profitability and treatment of the slave-trade does not center on West Tennessee. Direct accounts of the Tennessee slave markets are much more sparse than in other regions. However, such general analysis can still reconstruct how Memphis slave-traders may have treated their slaves.
139). Although technically a potential buyer had to have a reason and permission to look below a woman’s skirt, sexual harassment was also not uncommon (143, 148). In fact, customers could frequently request a private examination room, which could be used for lustful purposes even before buying the slave (149). Although such treatment was atrocious, some slave-traders allowed such mockery because it pleased their customers and thereby, it raised their profits.

In these ways, slave-traders manipulated slaves to increase profits; however, slaves were not ordinary property. As humans, they could affect the trader’s profits as well. First of all, most slaves did not want to be traded; they did not want to leave their families and feared being sold to a harsher owner (Johnson 23). Because of this fear, slaves often prevented potential trades. For example, many slaves would attempt to run away as soon as they heard even a rumor that their master was selling them (31). A former slave recalls, “mother hid us to prevent the master from selling us” (32). Obviously, this reduced the profitability of the slave trade, because if slaves ran away, the slave-trader lost potential business. Similarly, some slaves protested potential trades by cutting off body parts; this lowered their market price and lessened the slave-trader’s potential profits (33). Other slaves would rather die than be traded; one mother even killed her child to prevent it from being sold away (34). Such extreme cases did happen and when they did, both the slave-owner and the slave-trader lost potential profits.

Even after being sold to a slave-trader, slaves could still affect their profits. First of all, they still had opportunities to run away (Johnson 65). When this happened, the slave-trader encountered search costs to look for the slave, and if he was unable to locate the slave, he lost all of his investment. The threat of losing a large investment motivated
traders to pay for extra security of slaves by means of shackles, jails, and safe transportation vehicles (49). Thus, the resistance of the slaves lowered possible profits of the traders because the traders had to invest in security. But even this security investment was not enough. Slaves often escaped, sometimes by planning as a large group in their cells (Johnson 72). Such a group escape was a devastating loss of profits for a slave-trader. In addition, since slaves were humans, they could also escape by tricking the trader. For instance, one slave, Isaac Williams, pretended to be completely satisfied and content as a slave. As soon as the trader carelessly left his cell open, Williams fled to freedom (65). Other slaves escaped by murdering their captors, such as the slaves aboard the Creole who killed the captain and assistants in order to be freed (75). Clearly, such displays of resistance diminished slave-trading profits significantly.

Furthermore, slaves could potentially affect profits by the way that they acted at market. First of all, slaves carefully watched potential buyers, evaluating their demeanor and their clothing (Johnson 165). If they sensed a harsh master, they could purposefully appear as an unruly or even lazy slave. As Walter Johnson states, “as the buyers proceeded through ever more intimate examinations of the slaves, the slaves could manipulate ever subtler signs to guide them” (163). Such subtle signs could include slouching, looking down, or speaking of rebellion. Also, potential buyers could ask slaves questions, and slaves could purposefully give the “wrong” answers (Johnson 174). In an extreme circumstance, one slave at market threatened to slit her throat if a certain owner bought her (Berlin, Favreau, and Miller 43). Although certain words and actions may have kept slaves from being sold to unwanted buyers, such unruly behavior also
drove down the overall value of the slave at auction; in this way, slaves affected the
profits of their traders.

Slaves also affected profits simply by being human. Unlike other property, slaves
could exercise resistance and express emotion. As part of this, they were greatly attached
to their families. Therefore, although slaves were worth more individually, separating
families could also have a negative effect on profits. For one thing, slaves with families
were known to be more likely to run away since they had loved ones waiting for them
(Johnson 175). Because of this, they were worth less at market. Also, slaves who were
separated from loved ones likely expressed a lower morale or a higher tendency for
suicide, other characteristics that could possibly decrease their value. In addition, the
slave’s attachment to their families lessened the trader’s profits in other ways. When
family members saw their kin being sold, they likely reacted to this with a great
commotion. In order to reduce this disorder and the chance of revolt, slave-owners spent
time and effort devising ways to trade a slave without causing a commotion. For
instance, one mistress sent her slave into town, so that he would not see his son being
traded (Johnson 39). If slaves were ordinary property, the slave-trader would not have to
take extra time and energy to trick them; they could allocate these resources towards
production instead and possibly receive higher profits.

Because slaves were people, slaves also made owners invest resources into
looking somewhat humane. As Walter Johnson states, “their economy could be sustained
only at the cost of its pretense of humanity” (40). Simply by being human and not
machinery, slaves made slave-holders conscious of the morality behind their actions, and
thus, both slave-owners and slave-traders often felt the need to justify their transactions.
As Johnson states, “Slave-traders pre-emptive explanations, lies, and violence betray their awareness of the feelings of the people they sold” (40). Owners often came up with excuses for selling their slaves, such as a need for money, or specific faults of the slave. Never was the transaction the owner’s fault, but always the slave’s fault or something “uncontrollable” (27-29). On this same note, very few owners actually admitted that they broke up families, despite evidence to the contrary (Bancroft 204). Also, some owners allowed their slaves to find their buyers or to be traded to someone nearby; with this, owners probably did not receive the highest possible price, but they did appear more humane (Johnson 37). Thus, since slaves were humans, owners had to invest time and effort into looking and feeling more humane. Once again, these resources could have been allocated towards work and increased profits.

Overall, both plantation owners and slave traders in West Tennessee strove to maximize profits and treated their slaves with this in mind. Since slaves were property, some people may assume that they were treated as plow animals or farm equipment. However, in both the slave market and the plantation, slave-owners were forced to recognize their slaves as humans. After all, they had to control and appeal to the slaves’ human impulses in order to make profits. Also, both profitable owners and traders gave their slaves effective medical and health treatment. In addition to this contribution, the analysis shows that Ames plantation owners and Memphis slave traders had to work hard for profits; their slaves did not just make money for them. But most importantly, such research brings a sense of economic rationality to an institution largely regarded as irrational. For example, as suggested in the Ante-bellum literature, in order to be an ideal slave owner and maximize profits, the plantation owner needed to be fair and rational
about the treatment of his or her enslaved people. Some slave owners reflected this ideal. Of course, too many owners and slave-traders were unbearably cruel, and this paper is not meant to justify their actions as rational. Still, determining economic motives for the actions of slave-owners and slave-traders is an important part of research. Not only does this help scholars understand the workings of the economy, but it also helps people understand human nature. After all, the ways that humans treated human property can say a lot about humanity.
Works Cited


*Bond Family Collection.* Memphis and Shelby County Room. Memphis Public Library.


Davis, Charles S. *The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama.* Montgomery, Alabama State Department, 1939.


Evans, Jamie. “Ames Ownership Maps: 1820-1900.”


Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1938, ed. Tennessee Slave Narratives: A Folk History of

*Slavery in Tennessee from Interviews with Former Slaves.* Bedford: Applewood


Forrest and Maples. “Slave Dealers”. *City Directory.* Memphis Public Library,

Memphis and Shelby County Room: Date Unknown.

Fuenfhausen, Gary Gene. “A Short history of the institution of slavery in Clay County,


<http://members.aol.com/garyfuenfh/indexslave.html>.


Harvard University, 1999.

Lewis, Elizabeth Wittenmyer. *Queen of the Confederacy: The Innocent Deceits of Lucy


Dynamics and Slaveholding by Free People of Color.” *Southern Quarterly* Winter


Penningroth, Dylan C. *The Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and


“Untitled Article.” Commercial Appeal. April 28, 1933. Memphis Public Library, Memphis and Shelby County Room.